Cognitive Linguistics - An Introduction (Evans & Green, 2006) PDF

Cognitive Linguistics An Introduction Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green Cognitive Linguistics This book is dedicated to the memory of Larry Trask, 1944–2004, linguist, scholar, teacher, colleague, mentor and friend. COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AN INTRODUCTION Vyvyan Evans and Me...

Cognitive Linguistics An Introduction Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green Cognitive Linguistics This book is dedicated to the memory of Larry Trask, 1944–2004, linguist, scholar, teacher, colleague, mentor and friend. COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AN INTRODUCTION Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS © Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, 2006 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in Sabon and Gill Sans by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester, and printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 7486 1831 7 (hardback) ISBN 0 7486 1832 5 (paperback) The right of Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  Contents Preface xix Acknowledgements xxiii Abbreviations, symbols and transcription xxv Part I Overview of the Cognitive Linguistics Enterprise Introduction 3 1 What does it mean to know a language? 5 1.1 What is language for? 6 1.1.1 The symbolic function of language 6 1.1.2 The interactive function of language 9 1.2 The systematic structure of language 11 1.2.1 Evidence for a system 12 1.2.2 The systematic structure of thought 14 1.3 What do linguists do? 15 1.3.1 What? 15 1.3.2 Why? 16 1.3.3 How? 16 1.3.4 Speaker intuitions 16 1.3.5 Converging evidence 17 1.4 What it means to know a language 18 1.5 Summary 20 Further reading 22 Exercises 23 v COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 2 The nature of cognitive linguistics: assumptions and commitments 27 2.1 Two key commitments 27 2.1.1 The ‘Generalisation Commitment’ 28 2.1.2 The ‘Cognitive Commitment’ 40 2.2 The embodied mind 44 2.2.1 Embodied experience 45 2.2.2 Embodied cognition 46 2.2.3 Experiential realism 47 2.3 Cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar 48 2.4 Summary 50 Further reading 50 Exercises 52 3 Universals and variation in language, thought and experience 54 3.1 Universals in thought and language 55 3.1.1 Typological universals 57 3.1.2 Universals in formal linguistics 60 3.1.3 Universals in cognitive linguistics 63 3.2 Cross-linguistic patterns in semantic systems 68 3.2.1 Patterns in the conceptualisation of space 68 3.2.2 Patterns in the conceptualisation of time 75 3.3 Cross-linguistic variation in semantic systems 87 3.3.1 Variation in the conceptualisation of space 87 3.3.2 Variation in the conceptualisation of time 92 3.4 Linguistic relativity and cognitive linguistics 95 3.4.1 Whorf and the Linguistic Relativity Principle 96 3.4.2 Language as a shaper of thought 98 3.4.3 The cognitive linguistics position 101 3.5 Summary 101 Further reading 102 Exercises 105 4 Language in use: knowledge of language, language change and language acquisition 108 4.1 Language in use 109 4.1.1 A usage event 109 4.1.2 The relationship between usage and linguistic structure 111 4.1.3 Comprehension and production 112 4.1.4 Context 112 vi  CONTENTS 4.1.5 Frequency 114 4.2 Cognitive Grammar 114 4.2.1 Abstraction, schematisation and language use 115 4.2.2 Schemas and their instantiations 115 4.2.3 Partial sanction 116 4.2.4 The non-reductive nature of schemas 117 4.2.5 Frequency in schema formation 118 4.3 A usage-based approach to language change 120 4.3.1 Historical linguistics and language change 121 4.3.2 The Utterance Selection Theory of language change 123 4.3.3 The Generalised Theory of Selection and the Theory of Utterance Selection 125 4.3.4 Causal mechanisms for language change 127 4.4 The usage-based approach to language acquisition 133 4.4.1 Empirical findings in language acquisition 134 4.4.2 The cognitive view: socio-cognitive mechanisms in language acquisition 136 4.4.3 Comparing the generative view of language acquisition 140 4.5 Summary 146 Further reading 147 Exercises 148 Part II Cognitive Semantics Introduction 153 5 What is cognitive semantics? 156 5.1 Guiding principles 157 5.1.1 Conceptual structure is embodied 157 5.1.2 Semantic structure is conceptual structure 158 5.1.3 Meaning representation is encyclopaedic 160 5.1.4 Meaning construction is conceptualisation 162 5.2 Phenomena investigated within cognitive semantics 163 5.2.1 The bodily basis of meaning 163 5.2.2 Conceptual structure 165 5.2.3 Encyclopaedic semantics 166 5.2.4 Mappings 167 5.2.5 Categorisation 168 5.2.6 Word meaning and polysemy 169 5.3 Methodology 170 5.4 Some comparisons with formal approaches to semantics 171 vii COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 5.5 Summary 172 Further reading 173 Exercises 174 6 Embodiment and conceptual structure 176 6.1 Image schemas 177 6.1.1 What is an image schema? 178 6.1.2 Properties of image schemas 179 6.1.3 Image schemas and linguistic meaning 189 6.1.4 A provisional list of image schemas 190 6.1.5 Image schemas and abstract thought 190 6.2 Conceptual structure 191 6.2.1 Semantic structure 192 6.2.2 Schematic systems 194 6.3 Summary 201 Further reading 201 Exercises 202 7 The encyclopaedic view of meaning 206 7.1 Dictionaries versus encylopaedias 207 7.1.1 The dictionary view 207 7.1.2 Problems with the dictionary view 210 7.1.3 Word meaning versus sentence meaning 213 7.1.4 The encyclopaedic view 215 7.2 Frame semantics 222 7.2.1 What is a semantic frame? 222 7.2.2 Frames in cognitive psychology 222 7.2.3 The   frame 225 7.2.4 Speech event frames 228 7.2.5 Consequences of adopting a frame-based model 229 7.3 The theory of domains 230 7.3.1 What is a domain? 230 7.3.2 Basic, image-schematic and abstract domains 232 7.3.3 Other characteristics of domains 235 7.3.4 Profile/base organisation 236 7.3.5 Active zones 238 7.4 The perceptual basis of knowledge representation 240 7.5 Summary 243 Further reading 244 Exercises 245 viii  CONTENTS 8 Categorisation and idealised cognitive models 248 8.1 Categorisation and cognitive semantics 249 8.1.1 The classical theory 251 8.1.2 The definitional problem 252 8.1.3 The problem of conceptual fuzziness 253 8.1.4 The problem of prototypicality 254 8.1.5 Further problems 254 8.2 Prototype theory 255 8.2.1 Principles of categorisation 255 8.2.2 The categorisation system 256 8.2.3 The vertical dimension 256 8.2.4 The horizontal dimension 264 8.2.5 Problems with prototype theory 268 8.3 The theory of idealised cognitive models 269 8.3.1 Sources of typicality effects 270 8.3.2 Radial categories as a further source of typicality effects 275 8.3.3 Addressing the problems with prototype theory 278 8.4 The structure of ICMs 279 8.5 Summary 281 Further reading 282 Exercises 283 9 Metaphor and metonymy 286 9.1 Literal versus figurative language 287 9.1.1 Literal and figurative language as complex concepts 287 9.1.2 Can the distinction be maintained? 289 9.2 What is metaphor? 293 9.3 Conceptual Metaphor Theory 296 9.3.1 The unidirectionality of metaphor 296 9.3.2 Motivation for target and source 297 9.3.3 Metaphorical entailments 298 9.3.4 Metaphor systems 299 9.3.5 Metaphors and image schemas 300 9.3.6 Invariance 301 9.3.7 The conceptual nature of metaphor 303 9.3.8 Hiding and highlighting 303 9.4 Primary Metaphor Theory 304 9.4.1 Primary and compound metaphors 304 9.4.2 Experiential correlation 305 9.4.3 Motivating primary metaphors 306 9.4.4 Distinguishing primary and compound metaphors 307 ix COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 9.5 What is metonymy? 310 9.6 Conceptual metonymy 314 9.6.1 Metonymy as an access mechanism 315 9.6.2 Metonymy-producing relationships 316 9.6.3 Vehicles for metonymy 317 9.7 Metaphor-metonymy interaction 318 9.8 Summary 321 Further reading 322 Exercises 325 10 Word meaning and radial categories 328 10.1 Polysemy as a conceptual phenomenon 329 10.2 Words as radial categories 331 10.3 The full-specification approach 333 10.3.1 Image schema transformations 337 10.3.2 Metaphorical extensions 339 10.4 Problems with the full-specification approach 339 10.5 The Principled Polysemy approach 342 10.5.1 Distinguishing between senses 342 10.5.2 Establishing the prototypical sense 344 10.5.3 Illustration of a radial category based on Principled Polysemy 347 10.5.4 Beyond prepositions 348 10.6 The importance of context for polysemy 352 10.6.1 Usage context: subsenses 353 10.6.2 Sentential context: facets 354 10.6.3 Knowledge context: ways of seeing 355 10.7 Summary 355 Further reading 356 Exercises 359 11 Meaning construction and mental spaces 363 11.1 Sentence meaning in formal semantics 364 11.2 Meaning construction in cognitive semantics 365 11.3 Towards a cognitive theory of meaning construction 368 11.4 The architecture of mental space construction 371 11.4.1 Space builders 371 11.4.2 Elements 371 11.4.3 Properties and relations 372 11.4.4 Mental space lattices 374 11.4.5 Counterparts and connectors 375 11.4.6 The Access Principle 376 x  CONTENTS 11.4.7 Roles and values 381 11.5 An illustration of mental space construction 382 11.6 The dynamic nature of meaning construction 386 11.6.1 Tense and aspect in English 387 11.6.2 The tense-aspect system in Mental Spaces Theory 389 11.6.3 Epistemic distance 394 11.7 Summary 396 Further reading 397 Exercises 397 12 Conceptual blending 400 12.1 The origins of Blending Theory 401 12.2 Towards a theory of conceptual integration 403 12.3 The nature of blending 407 12.3.1 The elements of conceptual blending 408 12.3.2 Further linguistic examples 410 12.3.3 Non-linguistic examples 415 12.4 Vital relations and compressions 418 12.4.1 Vital relations 419 12.4.2 A taxonomy of vital relations and their compressions 420 12.4.3 Disintegration and decompression 425 12.5 A taxonomy of integration networks 426 12.5.1 Simplex networks 426 12.5.2 Mirror networks 426 12.5.3 Single-scope networks 427 12.5.4 Double-scope networks 429 12.6 Multiple blending 431 12.7 Constraining Blending Theory 433 12.8 Comparing Blending Theory with Conceptual Metaphor Theory 435 12.8.1 Contrasts 435 12.8.2 When is a metaphor not a blend? 437 12.8.3 What Blending Theory adds to Conceptual Metaphor Theory 437 12.9 Summary 439 Further reading 440 Exercises 441 13 Cognitive semantics in context 445 13.1 Truth-conditional semantics 446 13.1.1 Meaning, truth and reality 446 xi COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 13.1.2 Object language versus metalanguage 446 13.1.3 The inconsistency of natural language 447 13.1.4 Sentences and propositions 448 13.1.5 Truth-conditional semantics and the generative enterprise 449 13.1.6 Compositionality of meaning 450 13.1.7 Translating natural language into a metalanguage 451 13.1.8 Semantic interpretation and matching 452 13.1.9 Comparison with cognitive semantics 455 13.2 Relevance Theory 459 13.2.1 Ostensive communication 459 13.2.2 Mutual cognitive environment 459 13.2.3 Relevance 460 13.2.4 Explicature and implicature 461 13.2.5 Metaphor 463 13.2.6 Comparison with cognitive semantics 463 13.3 Summary 465 Further reading 466 Exercises 466 Part III Cognitive Approaches to Grammar Introduction 471 14 What is a cognitive approach to grammar? 475 14.1 Guiding assumptions 476 14.1.1 The symbolic thesis 476 14.1.2 The usage-based thesis 478 14.1.3 The architecture of the model 479 14.2 Distinct cognitive approaches to grammar 480 14.2.1 The ‘Conceptual Structuring System Model’ 480 14.2.2 Cognitive Grammar 480 14.2.3 Constructional approaches to grammar 481 14.2.4 Cognitive approaches to grammaticalisation 482 14.3 Grammatical terminology 483 14.3.1 Grammar 484 14.3.2 Units of grammar 484 14.3.3 Word classes 486 14.3.4 Syntax 492 14.3.5 Grammatical functions 494 14.3.6 Agreement and case 498 14.4 Characteristics of the cognitive approach to grammar 500 xii  CONTENTS 14.4.1 Grammatical knowledge: a structured inventory of symbolic units 501 14.4.2 Features of the closed-class subsystem 502 14.4.3 Schemas and instances 504 14.4.4 Sanctioning and grammaticality 505 14.5 Summary 506 Further reading 507 Exercises 509 15 The conceptual basis of grammar 512 15.1 The grammatical subsystem: encoding semantic structure 513 15.2 Talmy’s ‘Conceptual Structuring System Model’ 514 15.2.1 The configuration of  and  515 15.2.2 Conceptual alternativity 516 15.2.3 Schematic systems 517 15.2.4 The ‘Configurational Structure System’ 518 15.2.5 The ‘Attentional System’ 526 15.2.6 The ‘Perspectival System’ 528 15.2.7 The ‘Force-Dynamics System’ 531 15.3 Langacker’s theory of Cognitive Grammar 533 15.3.1 The conceptual basis of word classes 533 15.3.2 Attention 535 15.3.3 Force-dynamics 544 15.4 Categorisation and polysemy in grammar: the network conception 545 15.5 Summary 548 Further reading 549 Exercises 550 16 Cognitive Grammar: word classes 553 16.1 Word classes: linguistic categorisation 554 16.2 Nominal predications: nouns 556 16.2.1 Bounding 557 16.2.2 Homogeneity versus heterogeneity 559 16.2.3 Expansibility and contractibility versus replicability 559 16.2.4 Abstractions 560 16.3 Nominal versus relational predications 561 16.4 Temporal versus atemporal relations 563 16.4.1 Temporal relations: verbs 564 16.4.2 Atemporal relations 565 16.4.3 Class schemas 570 16.5 Nominal grounding predications 572 xiii COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 16.5.1 Determiners and quantifiers 572 16.5.2 Grounding 575 16.6 Summary 577 Further reading 577 Exercises 578 17 Cognitive Grammar: constructions 581 17.1 Phrase structure 582 17.1.1 Valence 583 17.1.2 Correspondence 584 17.1.3 Profile determinacy 585 17.1.4 Conceptual autonomy versus conceptual dependence 585 17.1.5 Constituency 588 17.1.6 The prototypical grammatical construction 588 17.2 Word structure 589 17.2.1 Phonological autonomy and dependence 590 17.2.2 Semantic autonomy and dependence 590 17.2.3 Prototypical stems and affixes 591 17.2.4 Composite structure 591 17.2.5 Constructional schemas 592 17.2.6 Grammatical morphemes and agreement 593 17.3 Clauses 594 17.3.1 Valence at the clause level 595 17.3.2 Grammatical functions and transitivity 601 17.3.3 Case 606 17.3.4 Marked coding: the passive construction 609 17.4 Summary 610 Further reading 611 Exercises 612 18 Cognitive Grammar: tense, aspect, mood and voice 615 18.1 English verbs: form and function 616 18.2 The clausal head 617 18.2.1 The passive construction: [be2 [3 [V]]] 620 18.2.2 The progressive construction: [be1 [-ing [V]]] 621 18.2.3 The perfect construction: [have [4 [V]]] 621 18.3 The grounding predication: mood and tense 624 18.3.1 Mood 625 18.3.2 Tense 626 18.3.3 The epistemic model 627 18.4 Situation aspect 631 xiv  CONTENTS 18.4.1 Situation types 631 18.4.2 Perfective and imperfective  632 18.4.3 Aspect and the count/mass distinction 634 18.5 Summary 637 Further reading 638 Exercises 638 19 Motivating a construction grammar 641 19.1 Constructions versus ‘words and rules’ 642 19.2 Exploring idiomatic expressions 643 19.2.1 Typology of idiomatic expressions 643 19.2.2 Case study I: the let alone construction 648 19.2.3 Case study II: the what’s X doing Y construction 651 19.3 Construction Grammar 653 19.3.1 The Construction Grammar model 653 19.3.2 Construction Grammar: a ‘broadly generative’ model 659 19.3.3 Comparing Construction Grammar with Cognitive Grammar 660 19.4 The ‘Generalisation Commitment’ 661 19.5 Summary 662 Further reading 662 Exercises 663 20 The architecture of construction grammars 666 20.1 Goldberg’s construction grammar 667 20.1.1 Assumptions 667 20.1.2 Advantages of a constructional approach to verb argument structure 669 20.1.3 The relationship between verbs and constructions 671 20.1.4 Relationships between constructions 680 20.1.5 Case studies 684 20.2 Radical Construction Grammar 692 20.2.1 Taxonomy of constructions 693 20.2.2 Emphasis on diversity 693 20.2.3 Five key features of RCG 693 20.3 Embodied Construction Grammar 697 20.3.1 Emphasis on language processing 697 20.3.2 Analysis and simulation 698 20.4 Comparing constructional approaches to grammar 699 20.5 Summary 701 xv COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION Further reading 702 Exercises 703 21 Grammaticalisation 707 21.1 The nature of grammaticalisation 708 21.1.1 Form change 710 21.1.2 Meaning change 712 21.2 Metaphorical extension approaches 714 21.2.1 Case study: -- 718 21.2.2 Case study: -- 719 21.3 Invited Inferencing Theory 721 21.3.1 Case study: the evolution of must 725 21.4 The subjectification approach 728 21.4.1 Case study: be going to 730 21.4.2 Case study: the evolution of auxiliaries from verbs of motion or posture 730 21.5 Comparison of the three approaches: be going to 732 21.6 Summary 733 Further reading 734 Exercises 736 22 Cognitive approaches to grammar in context 741 22.1 Theories of grammar: assumptions, objectives, methodology 741 22.1.1 Cognitive approaches to grammar 743 22.1.2 Generative approaches to grammar 743 22.1.3 Cognitive versus generative models 752 22.1.4 Functional-typological approaches to grammar 758 22.2 Core issues in grammar: comparing cognitive and generative accounts 761 22.2.1 Word classes 761 22.2.2 Constituency: heads and dependents 763 22.2.3 The status of tree diagrams 763 22.2.4 Grammatical functions and case 765 22.2.5 The verb string: tense, aspect and mood 767 22.2.6 The passive construction 769 22.3 Summary 771 Further reading 771 Exercises 773 xvi  CONTENTS Part IV Conclusion 23 Assessing the cognitive linguistics enterprise 777 23.1 Achievements 777 23.2 Remaining challenges 779 23.3 Summary 782 Appendix: Tables and Figures 783 References 792 Index 812 xvii  Preface The nature of this book This book represents a general introduction to the area of theoretical linguis- tics known as cognitive linguistics. It consists of three main parts. Part I pro- vides an overview of some of the main aims, assumptions and commitments of the cognitive linguistics enterprise, and provides an indicative sketch of some of the descriptive analyses and theoretical positions that are representative of cognitive linguistics. The next two parts focus on the two best-developed research frameworks in cognitive linguistics: cognitive semantics (Part II), and cognitive approaches to grammar (Part III). Although some cognitive linguists (notably Langacker) have extended their theories to account for phonology as well as meaning and grammar, we will be mainly concerned with meaning and grammar in this book, and will have little to say about phonology. In part, this reflects the fact that phonology has received relatively little attention within cognitive linguistics (although this situation is changing), and in part this reflects our own interests. Who is this book for? Our aim has been to provide a reasonably comprehensive general introduction to cognitive linguistics that is accessible enough for undergraduate students at the university level, while also serving as a work of reference both for linguists and for scholars from neighbouring disciplines. While striving for accessibility, we have also retained considerable detail (including relevant citations in the running text), so that readers (including research students and professional lin- guists unfamiliar with cognitive linguistics, as well as interested readers from xix COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION neighbouring disciplines), are provided with a route into the primary literature. In selecting the material presented, and in the presentation itself, we have attempted to provide as balanced a perspective as possible. However, cognitive linguistics represents a collection of approaches rather than a unified theoret- ical framework, and different authors often take quite distinct positions on similar phenomena, sometimes relying on distinct terminology. It follows that what we present here under the name of ‘cognitive linguistics’ should be understood as a presentation of the cognitive approach ‘as we see it’. Using the book We have designed the book so that, in general terms, each chapter builds on preceding chapters. In particular, our decision to present the material on cog- nitive semantics (Part II) before the material on cognitive approaches to grammar (Part III) reflects the fact that cognitive grammarians assume much of what has been established by cognitive semanticists in developing their approaches. However, because different readers and course tutors will need to use the book in ways tailored to their specific objectives, we have attempted to make Part II and Part III of the book relatively independent so that they can be used for separate courses. The book has sufficient coverage to provide the basis for a number of different courses. We outline below suggestions for ‘routes’ through the book for three different types of course, assuming 12 teaching weeks at the rate of one chapter per week. Of course, these suggestions can be adjusted depending on teaching time available, level of course and so on. The suggestions made here reflect undergraduate courses taught at the University of Sussex, where this textbook was piloted prior to publication. Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green Linguistics and English Language Department University of Sussex March 2005 xx  PREFACE Introduction to cognitive Cognitive semantics Cognitive approaches to linguistics grammar Week 1 Ch. 1. What does it mean Ch. 1. What does it mean Ch. 1. What does it mean to know a language? to know a language? to know a language? Week 2 Ch. 2. The nature of Ch. 2. The nature of Ch. 2. The nature of cognitive linguistics: cognitive linguistics: cognitive linguistics: assumptions and assumptions and assumptions and commitments commitments commitments Week 3 Ch. 3. Universals and Ch. 5. What is cognitive Ch. 14. What is a variation in language, semantics? cognitive approach to thought and experience grammar? Week 4 Ch. 4. Language in use: Ch. 3. Universals and Ch. 4. Language in use: knowledge of language, variation in language, knowledge of language, language change and thought and experience language change and language acquisition language acquisition Week 5 Ch 5. What is cognitive Ch. 6. Embodiment and Ch. 15. The conceptual semantics? conceptual structure basis of grammar Week 6 Ch. 6. Embodiment and Ch. 7. The encyclopaedic Ch. 16. Cognitive conceptual structure view of meaning grammar: word classes Week 7 Ch. 7. The encyclopaedic Ch. 8. Categorisation and Ch. 17. Cognitive view of meaning idealised cognitive models grammar: constructions Week 8 Ch. 9. Metaphor and Ch. 9. Metaphor and Ch. 18. Cognitive metonymy metonymy grammar: tense, aspect, mood and voice Week 9 Ch. 14. What is a cognitive Ch. 10. Word meaning and Ch. 19. Motivating a approach to grammar? radial categories construction grammar Week 10 Ch. 19. Motivating a Ch. 11. Meaning Ch. 20. The architecture construction grammar construction and mental of construction grammars spaces Week 11 Ch. 20. The architecture Ch. 12. Conceptual Ch. 21. of construction grammars blending Grammaticalisation Week 12 Ch. 23. Assessing the Ch. 13. Cognitive Ch. 22. Cognitive cognitive linguistics semantics in context approaches to grammar in enterprise context xxi  Acknowledgements In writing this book we have been supported by a large number of people to whom we would like to express our thanks. Firstly, we would like to thank a number of colleagues whose comments and suggestions have helped us to develop and improve the book: Mark Turner and Brigitte Nerlich, our review- ers for Edinburgh University Press, for their advice and encouragement, and Lynne Murphy, Max Wheeler and Jörg Zinken, who read and provided detailed comments on a number of chapters. Of course, these people do not necessarily share our interpretation of the material discussed in this book and any remaining shortcomings are our responsibility. Secondly, we owe a debt of thanks to our students. Earlier drafts of this text- book were used to teach undergraduate courses at the University of Sussex in ‘Cognitive Semantics’ during the 2003/4 academic year, and ‘Cognitive Grammar’, ‘Grammar and Mind’ and ‘Cognitive Semantics’ during the 2004/5 academic year. These students engaged fully with the text and provided all sorts of practical suggestions that greatly improved both the presentation and the accessibility of the book. We thank them for their patience and friendly criticism. In particular, we would like to acknowledge the following students from the 2003/4 cohort: Alison Barnes, Nicola Buxton, David Cafferty, Hayley Clark, Steven Cuthbert, Laura Daw, Mary Downham, Mark Hall, Esther Hamon, Shinichiro Harigai, Minna Kirjavainen, Andrew Reid, Kristal Robinson, Claire Simmonds, Rebecca Stubbs, Caroline Veale, Daniel Whaley, Hannah Williams and Susannah Williams; and the following from the 2004/5 cohort: Jonathan Archer, Beatrice Ashmore, Thomas Baker, Mathew Baker, James Brown, Joseph Clark, Tegan French, Simon Harber, Sarah Hayward, Simon Knight, Thomas Kuhn, Alice Lee, Alistair Lockie, Melinda Lowing, Tanja Obradovic, Lucy Meyer, Peter Nichols, Sean Palmer, Melanie Pinet, xxiii COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION Elizabeth Price, Andrew Spratley, Hannah Thomas, Jodi Wenham, Stephanie Wood and Rebecca Wright. Thirdly, we are grateful to members of the Sussex Cognitive Linguistics Research Group for their constructive comments in response to excerpts from an early draft of the book. In particular we would like to acknowledge Jason Harrison, Basia Golebiowska, Anu Koskela, Shane Lindsay, John Sung and Sarah Witherby. We are also extremely grateful to our colleague Lynne Murphy for her support of the Cognitive Linguistics Research Group, and for her own research, which has informed our thinking on a number of the issues addressed in this book. For financial support in funding the indexing costs we gratefully acknowledge the support of the Department of Linguistics and English Language at Sussex, and the head of department, Richard Coates. Vyvyan Evans gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the University of Sussex, Research Development Fund no. 03R2, which in part supported his participation in this project, and gratefully acknowledges the support of the Dean of the School of Humanities, Stephen Burman, in securing this grant. Melanie Green also gratefully acknowledges her colleagues in the Department of Linguistics and English Language for a period of sabbatical leave that enabled her to complete her part of the project. We also acknowledge our editor at Edinburgh University Press, Sarah Edwards, for her patience and advice, and we remain indebted to Angela Evans for designing the cover image for the book. Finally, this book is in many ways a product of the unique academic envi- ronment at the University of Sussex, most notably the depth and quality of teaching and research in the cognitive sciences, and an atmosphere in which researchers of different theoretical persuasions can share their ideas. It was while the Linguistics and English Language Department was in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences (COGS) that the late Professor Larry Trask first proposed and developed undergraduate courses in cognitive lin- guistics at Sussex, which our students could take alongside courses in formal linguistics and the other cognitive sciences in order to develop a broader and more critical understanding of theoretical models in linguistics. This book emerged from our attempts to teach these courses at a time when appropriate teaching materials were few and far between. Our motivation for writing this book can therefore be directly attributed to the interest in cognitive linguistics, and linguistics in general, that Larry’s teaching instilled in others here at Sussex. This book is dedicated to Larry’s memory. xxiv  Abbreviations, symbols and transcription A adjective ABS absolutive ACC accusative ANT anterior AP adjective phrase AUX auxiliary BEN benefactive DEF definite ERG ergative F feminine HPSG Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar ICM idealised cognitive model IMPF imperfective INF infinitive LF logical form M masculine MOD modal N noun NEG negative NOM nominative NP noun phrase OBJ object P preposition PASS passive PERF perfective PF phonological form xxv COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION PL plural PP preposition phrase P.PART past participle PRED predicate PRES present PROG progressive PRT particle S singular SFOC focused subject SUBJ subject TR trajector LM landmark TAM tense, aspect, mood V verb VP verb phrase 1 1st person 2 2nd person 3 3rd person * ungrammatical ? marginal # unacceptable /x/ phoneme [x] allophone v̄ long vowel v̀ low tone vowel v̂ falling tone vowel italics linguistic form   concept bold bold is used for the first mention of key terms introduced in each chapter and for those terms in the summary at the end of each chapter xxvi Part I: Overview of the cognitive linguistics enterprise  Introduction Cognitive linguistics is a modern school of linguistic thought that originally emerged in the early 1970s out of dissatisfaction with formal approaches to lan- guage. Cognitive linguistics is also firmly rooted in the emergence of modern cognitive science in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in work relating to human categorisation, and in earlier traditions such as Gestalt psychology. Early research was dominated in the 1970s and 1980s by a relatively small number of scholars. By the early 1990s, there was a growing proliferation of research in this area, and of researchers who identified themselves as ‘cognitive linguists’. In 1989/90, the International Cognitive Linguistics Society was established, together with the journal Cognitive Linguistics. In the words of the eminent cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker ( 2002: xv), this ‘marked the birth of cognitive linguistics as a broadly grounded, self conscious intellectual movement’. Cognitive linguistics is described as a ‘movement’ or an ‘enterprise’ because it is not a specific theory. Instead, it is an approach that has adopted a common set of guiding principles, assumptions and perspectives which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) the- ories. For this reason, Part I of this book is concerned with providing a ‘char- acter sketch’ of the most fundamental assumptions and commitments that characterise the enterprise as we see it. In order to accomplish this, we map out the cognitive linguistics enterprise from a number of perspectives, beginning with the most general perspective and gradually focusing in on more specific issues and areas. The aim of Part I is to provide a number of distinct but complementary angles from which the nature and character of cognitive linguistics can be understood. We also draw comparisons with Generative Grammar along the way, in order to set the 3 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION cognitive approach within a broader context and to identify how it departs from this other well known model of language. In Chapter 1, we begin by looking at language in general and at linguistics, the scientific study of language. By answering the question ‘What does it mean to know a language?’ from the perspective of cognitive linguistics, we provide an introductory insight into the enterprise. The second chapter is more spe- cific and explicitly examines the two commitments that guide research in cognitive linguistics: the ‘Generalisation Commitment’ and the ‘Cognitive Commitment’. We also consider the notion of embodied cognition, and the philosophical doctrine of experiential realism, both of which are central to the enterprise. We also introduce the two main approaches to the study of language and the mind adopted by cognitive linguists: cognitive semantics and cognitive (approaches to) grammar, which serve as the focus for Part II and Part III of the book, respectively. Chapter 3 addresses the issue of linguistic universals and cross-linguistic variation. By examining how cognitive linguists approach such issues, we begin to get a feel for how cognitive linguistics works in practice. We explore the idea of linguistic universals from typological, formal and cognitive perspectives, and look in detail at patterns of similarity and variation in human language, illustrating with an investigation of how language and language-users encode and conceptualise the domains of SPACE and TIME. Finally, we address the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: the idea that language can influence non-linguistic thought, and examine the status of this idea from the perspective of cognitive linguistics. In Chapter 4 we focus on the usage-based approach adopted by cognitive lin- guistic theories. In particular, we examine how representative usage-based the- ories attempt to explain knowledge of language, language change and child language acquisition. Finally, we explore how the emphasis on situated lan- guage use and context gives rise to new theories of human language that, for the first time, provide a significant challenge to formal theories of language. 4  1 What does it mean to know a language? Cognitive linguists, like other linguists, study language for its own sake; they attempt to describe and account for its systematicity, its structure, the functions it serves and how these functions are realised by the language system. However, an important reason behind why cognitive linguists study language stems from the assumption that language reflects patterns of thought. Therefore, to study language from this perspective is to study patterns of conceptualisation. Language offers a window into cognitive function, pro- viding insights into the nature, structure and organisation of thoughts and ideas. The most important way in which cognitive linguistics differs from other approaches to the study of language, then, is that language is assumed to reflect certain fundamental properties and design features of the human mind. As we will see throughout this book, this assumption has far-reaching implications for the scope, methodology and models developed within the cognitive linguistic enterprise. Not least, an important criterion for judging a model of language is whether the model is psychologically plausible. Cognitive linguistics is a relatively new school of linguistics, and one of the most innovative and exciting approaches to the study of language and thought that has emerged within the modern field of interdisciplinary study known as cognitive science. In this chapter we will begin to get a feel for the issues and concerns of practising cognitive linguists. We will do so by attempting to answer the following question: what does it mean to know a language? The way we approach the question and the answer we come up with will reveal a lot about the approach, perspective and assumptions of cognitive linguists. Moreover, the view of language that we will finish with is quite different from the view suggested by other linguistic frameworks. As we will see throughout this book, particularly in the comparative chapters at the ends of Part II and Part III, the 5 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION answer to the title of this chapter will provide a significant challenge to some of these approaches. The cognitive approach also offers exciting glimpses into hitherto hidden aspects of the human mind, human experience and, conse- quently, what it is to be human. 1.1 What is language for? We take language for granted, yet we rely upon it throughout our lives in order to perform a range of functions. Imagine how you would accomplish all the things you might do, even in a single day, without language: buying an item in a shop, providing or requesting information, passing the time of day, express- ing an opinion, declaring undying love, agreeing or disagreeing, signalling dis- pleasure or happiness, arguing, insulting someone, and so on. Imagine how other forms of behaviour would be accomplished in the absence of language: rituals like marriage, business meetings, using the Internet, the telephone, and so forth. While we could conceivably accomplish some of these things without language (a marriage ceremony, perhaps?), it is less clear how, in the absence of telepathy, making a telephone call or sending an e-mail could be achieved. In almost all the situations in which we find ourselves, language allows quick and effective expression, and provides a well developed means of encoding and transmitting complex and subtle ideas. In fact, these notions of encoding and transmitting turn out to be important, as they relate to two key functions asso- ciated with language, the symbolic function and the interactive function. 1.1.1 The symbolic function of language One crucial function of language is to express thoughts and ideas. That is, lan- guage encodes and externalises our thoughts. The way language does this is by using symbols. Symbols are ‘bits of language’. These might be meaningful subparts of words (for example, dis- as in distaste), whole words (for example, cat, run, tomorrow), or ‘strings’ of words (for example, He couldn’t write a pop jingle let alone a whole musical). These symbols consist of forms, which may be spoken, written or signed, and meanings with which the forms are conven- tionally paired. In fact, a symbol is better referred to as a symbolic assembly, as it consists of two parts that are conventionally associated (Langacker 1987). In other words, this symbolic assembly is a form-meaning pairing. A form can be a sound, as in [k
t]. (Here, the speech sounds are represented by symbols from the International Phonetic Alphabet.) A form might be the orthographic representation that we see on the written page: cat, or a signed gesture in a sign language. A meaning is the conventional ideational or seman- tic content associated with the symbol. A symbolic assembly of form and meaning is represented in Figure 1.1. 6  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? [Kæt] Figure 1.1 A symbolic assembly of form and meaning Linguistic Percept(ion) Concept(ion) meaning The world Form ‘out there’ Figure 1.2 Levels of representation It is important to make it clear that the image of the cat in Figure 1.1 is intended to represent not a particular referent in the world, but the idea of a cat. That is, the image represents the meaning conventionally paired with the form pronounced in English as [k
t]. The meaning associated with a linguis- tic symbol is linked to a particular mental representation termed a concept. Concepts, in turn, derive from percepts. For instance, consider a piece of fruit like a pear. Different parts of the brain perceive its shape, colour, texture, taste, smell and so on. This diverse range of perceptual information deriving from the world ‘out there’ is integrated into a single mental image (a representa- tion available to consciousness), which gives rise to the concept of PEAR. When we use language and utter the form pear, this symbol corresponds to a conven- tional meaning, and therefore ‘connects’ to a concept rather than directly to a physical object in the external world (see Figure 1.2). Our cognitive abilities integrate raw perceptual information into a coherent and well defined mental image. The meanings encoded by linguistic symbols then, refer to our projected reality (Jackendoff 1983): a mental representa- tion of reality, as construed by the human mind, mediated by our unique perceptual and conceptual systems. We stated above that the symbolic function of language serves to encode and externalise our thoughts. We are now in a position to qualify this view. While our conceptualisations are seemingly unlimited in scope, language represents a limited and indeed limiting system for the expression of thought; we’ve all 7 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION experienced the frustration of being unable to ‘put an idea into words’. There is, after all, a finite number of words, with a delimited set of conventional mean- ings. From this perspective then, language merely provides prompts for the construction of a conceptualisation which is far richer and more elaborate than the minimal meanings provided by language (Fauconnier 1997; Turner 1991). Accordingly, what language encodes is not thought in its complex entirety, but instead rudimentary instructions to the conceptual system to access or create rich and elaborate ideas. To illustrate this point, consider the following illustra- tion adapted from Tyler and Evans (2003): (1) The cat jumped over the wall. This sentence describes a jump undertaken by a cat. Before reading on, select the diagram in Figure 1.3 that best captures, in your view, the trajectory of the jump. We anticipate that you selected the fourth diagram, Figure 1.3(d). After all, the conventional interpretation of the sentence is that the cat begins the jump on one side of the wall, moves through an arc-like trajectory, and lands on the other side of the wall. Figure 1.3(d) best captures this interpretation. On first inspection, this exercise seems straightforward. However, even a simple sen- tence like (1) raises a number of puzzling issues. After all, how do we know that the trajectory of the cat’s jump is of the kind represented in Figure 1.3(d)? What information is there in the sentence that provides this interpretation and excludes the trajectories represented in Figures 1.3(a–c)? Even though the sentence in (1) would typically be judged as unambiguous, it contains a number of words that have a range of interpretations. The behav- iour described by jump has the potential to involve a variety of trajectory shapes. For instance, jumping from the ground to the table involves the tra- jectory represented in Figure 1.3(a). Jumping on a trampoline relates to the trajectory represented in 1.3(b). Bungee jumping involves the trajectory rep- resented in 1.3(c), in which the bungee jumper stops just prior to contact with the surface. Finally, jumping over a puddle, hurdle, wall and so on involves an arc-like trajectory as in 1.3(d). (a) (b) (c) (d) Figure 1.3 Possible trajectories for The cat jumped over the wall 8  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? If the lexical item jump does not in itself specify an arc-like trajectory, but is vague with respect to the shape of the trajectory, then perhaps the preposition over is responsible. However, over can also have a range of possible interpreta- tions. For instance, it might mean ‘across’, when we walk over a bridge (a hori- zontal trajectory). It might mean ‘above’, when an entity like a hummingbird is over a flower (higher than but in close proximity to). Equally, over could mean ‘above’ when a plane flies over a city (much higher and lacking close proximity). These are just a few of the possibilities. The point to emerge from this brief dis- cussion is that over can be used when different kinds or amounts of space are involved, and with a number of different trajectories or paths of motion. Consider a further complication. Figure 1.3(d) crucially represents the cat’s motion ending at a point on the opposite side of the wall relative to the start- ing position of the jump. Yet no linguistic element in the sentence explicitly provides us with this information. Example (1) therefore illustrates the following point: even in a mundane sen- tence, the words themselves, while providing meanings, are only partially responsible for the conceptualisation that these meanings give rise to. Thought relies on a rich array of encyclopaedic knowledge (Langacker 1987). For example, when constructing an interpretation based on the sentence in (1), this involves at the very least the following knowledge: (1) that the kind of jumping cats perform involves traversing obstacles rather than bungee jumping; (2) that if a cat begins a jump at a point on one side of an obstacle, and passes through a point above that obstacle, then gravity will ensure that the cat comes to rest on the other side of the obstacle; (3) that walls are impenetrable barriers to forward motion; (4) that cats know this, and therefore attempt to circumnavigate the obstacle by going over it. We use all this information (and much more), in con- structing the rich conceptualisation associated with the sentence in (1). The words themselves are merely prompts for the construction process. So far, then, we have established that one of the functions of language is to represent or symbolise concepts. Linguistic symbols, or more precisely sym- bolic assemblies, enable this by serving as prompts for the construction of much richer conceptualisations. Now let’s turn to the second function of language. 1.1.2 The interactive function of language In our everyday social encounters, language serves an interactive function. It is not sufficient that language merely pairs forms and meanings. These form- meaning pairings must be recognised by, and be accessible to, others in our community. After all, we use language in order to ‘get our ideas across’, in other words to communicate. This involves a process of transmission by the speaker, and decoding and interpretation by the hearer, processes that involve the construction of rich conceptualisations (see Figure 1.4). 9 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION [kæt] Speaker Hearer Figure 1.4 The interactive function The messages we choose to communicate can perform various interactive and social functions. For example, we can use language to change the way the world is, or to make things happen: (2) a. I now pronounce you man and wife. b. Shut the door on your way out! The utterance in (2a), spoken by a suitably qualified person (such as a member of the clergy licensed to perform marriages), in an appropriate setting (like a church), in the presence of two unmarried adults who consent to be joined in matrimony, has the effect of irrevocably altering the social, legal and even spir- itual relationship between the two people. That is, language itself can serve as a speech act that forever alters an aspect of our reality. Similarly, in the example in (2b), the utterance represents a command, which is also a type of speech act. Language provides a means of communication, allowing us to share our wishes and desires. Moreover, the way in which these wishes and desires are expressed signals who we are, and what kind of rela- tionship we have with our addressee. We would be unlikely to issue a command like (2b) to the Queen of England, for example. Another way in which language fulfils the interactive function relates to the notion of expressivity. Language is ‘loaded’, allowing us to express our thoughts and feelings about the world; consider the different mental images evoked by the following expressions, which might be used by different speak- ers to refer to the same individual: (3) a. the eminent linguist b. the blonde bombshell 10  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? While the example in (3a) focuses on the profession of the individual and her relative standing in that profession, the example in (3b) focuses on her phys- ical appearance. Moreover, although both these sentences relate to a female lin- guist, the person’s gender cannot be inferred from the sentence in (3a) while it can from the second sentence due to normative patterns of linguistic behaviour and social stereoptypes. That is, we typically use the expression blonde bomb- shell to describe the physical attributes of women rather than men. Language also plays a role in how we affect other people in the world, and how we make others feel by our choice of words. That is, language can provide information about affect (emotional response): (4) a. Shut up! b. I’m terribly sorry to interrupt you, but... These examples also illustrate the way in which we present our public selves through language. The language we choose to use conveys information about our attitudes concerning others, ourselves and the situations in which we find ourselves. Language can be used to create scenes or frames of experience, indexing and even constructing a particular context (Fillmore 1982). In other words, lan- guage use can invoke frames that summon rich knowledge structures, which serve to call up and fill in background knowledge. (5) a. How do you do? b. Once upon a time... The example in (5a) creates a greeting frame, signalling an acknowledgement of another person and a recognition that this is the first time they have met. It also signals a degree of formality, which expressions like hey, what’s up? or hi would not. Analogously, the utterance in (5b) signals the beginning of a fairy- tale. In other words, just by hearing or reading the expression in (5b) an entire frame is invoked, which guides how we should respond to what follows, what our expectations should be and so forth. In summary, we’ve seen that not only does language encode particular mean- ings, but also that, by virtue of these meanings and the forms employed to sym- bolise these meanings which constitute part of shared knowledge in a particular speech community, language can serve an interactive function, facilitating and enriching communication in a number of ways. 1.2 The systematic structure of language Having seen some examples of what language is used for, let’s now consider how language is structured. Language is a system for the expression of meaning and 11 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION for carrying out its symbolic and interactive functions. So, what evidence is there for the systematicity of language? 1.2.1 Evidence for a system Language consists of symbolic assemblies that are combined in various ways to perform the functions we described in section 1.1. A symbolic assembly is a conventional linguistic unit, which means that it is a piece of language that speakers recognise and ‘agree’ about in terms of what it means and how it is used. As we will see later in the book, particularly in Part III, one of the prominent concerns in cognitive approaches to grammar is how to model the inventory of linguistic units that make up a language. For example, speakers of Modern English ‘agree’ that the form cat is used to refer to a certain kind of meaning which we illustrated in Figure 1.2. A conventional unit can be a meaningful sub- part of a word, which linguists call a morpheme (anti-dis-establish...), a whole word, a string of words that ‘belong’ together (a phrase) or a whole sentence. Now let’s consider another example: (6) He kicked the bucket This utterance consists of a sentence that has an idiomatic meaning in English. That is, its meaning is not predictable from the integrated meanings of the individual words. A non-native speaker of English who has not learnt the ‘special’ idiomatic meaning will only be able to interpret example (6) literally. Native speakers of English, on the other hand, while also being able to inter- pret the sentence literally, often cannot avoid the idiomatic meaning ‘he died’. Of course, whether a literal versus an idiomatic interpretation is accessed depends on the situation or context in which the utterance occurs. Focusing for now on the idiomatic interpretation, we can view this utterance as a unit that has a particular meaning associated with it. Therefore, it counts as a symbolic assembly. Another term for symbolic assembly that is employed by some cognitive linguists is construction (e.g. Goldberg 1995). We will look in detail at the notion of symbolic assemblies and constructions in Part III of the book. When we change certain aspects of the sentence in (6), the meaning is affected. For example, if we change the object (the thing being kicked), as in (7), we lose the idiomatic meaning and are left with a literal utterance: (7) He kicked the mop. For many cognitive linguists, what makes example (7) ‘literal’ is that this sen- tence ‘as a whole’ does not represent a construction. Instead, the meaning of (7) 12  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? is interpreted by unifying the smaller units, the words. In contrast, example (6) is interpreted as a whole single unit: a construction. One way of expressing this idea in more intuitive terms is to use the metaphor of ‘storage’: suppose we store our knowledge of words, phrases and complex constructions in a mental ‘box’. The behaviour of larger constructions, like kick the bucket, suggests that these are stored as ‘chunks’ or single units, just like words. The meanings of sen- tences like (7) on the other hand are ‘built’ by unifying the individual words that make them up. Now consider another example. If we change the structure of example (6) in the following way, we also lose the idiomatic meaning: (8) The bucket was kicked by him. This example shows that, in addition to meaning, constructions (form- meaning pairings) have particular formal grammatical patterns associated with them. In other words, the properties of the construction relate not only to the individual words that make it up, as in (6), but also to the grammatical form, or word order. The passive construction in (8), in which the bucket is placed in subject position, fails to provide the idiomatic meaning associated with the sen- tence in (6). We can conclude from this that the linear arrangement of the words in the sentence constitutes part of an individual’s knowledge of idiomatic constructions like (6). This point is also illustrated by an ungrammatical sentence, a sentence that does not correspond to any of the formal patterns associated with the con- structions of English, as in (9), and consequently does not have a conventional meaning associated with it. Ungrammaticality is indicated by an asterisk: (9) *Bucket kicked he the As we noted above, the sentence in (6) qualifies as a construction because it con- sists of particular words arranged in a particular order, and these words are con- ventionally associated with a particular (idiomatic) meaning. However, we have suggested that constructions can also give rise to ‘literal’ meanings. To illus- trate this, we will examine another sentence that has both idiomatic and literal meanings. For instance, consider the following linguistic joke: (10) A: Waiter, what is this fly doing in my soup? B: I think that’s the breaststroke, sir! This joke turns on the ambiguity between the regular interrogative construc- tion, in which a speaker is enquiring after the intention or purpose of some- thing or someone (What’s that seagull doing on the roof ? What’s that woman 13 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION doing over there?), and the ‘What’s X doing Y construction’, studied in detail by cognitive linguists Paul Kay and Charles Fillmore (1999), in which the speaker is indicating that a particular situation is incongruous or unacceptable (What are you doing wearing those bunny ears? What are those clothes doing on the floor?). Notice that each of these interpretations requires a different kind of response. For the regular interrogative construction, the response should consist minimally of a piece of information corresponding to the question word (building a nest; waiting for a bus). For the ‘what’s X doing Y’ construction, on the other hand, the expected response is typically an explanation, excuse or apology (I’m going to a fancy-dress party; I’ve been busy). Crucially, for example (10), these two very different meanings are conven- tionally associated with exactly the same words arranged in the same sequence. The humorous effect of the waiter’s reply rests on the fact that he has chosen to respond to the ‘wrong’ interpretation. While the diner is employing the ‘what’s X doing Y’ construction, the waiter prefers to respond to the interrog- ative construction. The examples in this section illustrate the fact that there is a systematic rela- tionship between words, their meanings and how they are arranged in conven- tional patterns. In other words, language has a systematic structure. 1.2.2 The systematic structure of thought Does the systematic structure found in language reflect a systematic structure within our conceptual system? Cognitive linguists certainly think so. Cognitive linguists explore the hypothesis that certain kinds of linguistic expressions provide evidence that the structure of our conceptual systems is reflected in the patterns of language. Moreover, as we will see throughout this book, the way the mind is structured can be seen as a reflection, in part, of the way the world (including our sociocultural experience) is structured and organised. Consider the examples in (11). (11) a. Christmas is fast approaching. b. The number of shares we own has gone up. c. Those two have a very close friendship. These examples relate to the abstract conceptual domains of TIME (11a), QUANTITY (11b) and AFFECTION (11c). A conceptual domain is a body of knowl- edge within our conceptual system that contains and organises related ideas and experiences. For example, the conceptual domain of TIME might relate a range of temporal concepts including Christmas, which is a temporal event. Notice that in each sentence in (11) the more abstract concepts Christmas, number (of shares) and friendship are understood in terms of conceptual domains relating to concrete 14  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? physical experience. For instance, Christmas is conceptualised in terms of the domain of physical MOTION, which is evident in the use of the word approaching in (11a). Clearly Christmas (and other temporal concepts) cannot literally be said to undergo motion. Similarly, the notion of number of shares is conceptualised in terms of VERTICAL ELEVATION, which is clear from the use of the phrase gone up in (11b). Finally, friendship is conceptualised in terms of PHYSICAL PROXIMITY in (11c), which is shown by the use of the word close. One of the major findings to have emerged from studies into the human con- ceptual system is that abstract concepts are systematically structured in terms of conceptual domains deriving from our experience of the behaviour of phys- ical objects, involving properties like motion, vertical elevation and physical proximity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). It seems that the language we use to talk about temporal ideas such as Christmas provides powerful evidence that our conceptual system ‘organises’ abstract concepts in terms of more concrete kinds of experiences, which helps to make the abstract concepts more readily accessible. 1.3 What do linguists do? As we have begun to see, cognitive linguists form hypotheses about the nature of language, and about the conceptual system that it is thought to reflect. These hypotheses are based on observing patterns in the way language is structured and organised. It follows that a theory of language and mind based on linguis- tic observation must first describe the linguistic facts in a systematic and rig- orous manner, and in such a way that the description provides a plausible basis for a speaker’s tacit knowledge of language. This foundation for theorising is termed descriptive adequacy (Chomsky 1965; Langacker 1987, 1999a). This concern is one that cognitive linguists share with linguists working in other traditions. Below, we provide an outline of what it is that linguists do and how they go about it. 1.3.1 What? Linguists try to uncover the systems behind language, to describe these systems and to model them. Linguistic models consist of theories about lan- guage. Linguists can approach the study of language from various perspectives. Linguists may choose to concentrate on exploring the systems within and between sound, meaning and grammar, or to focus on more applied areas, such as the evolution of language, the acquisition of language by children, language disorders, the questions of how and why language changes over time, or the relationship between language, culture and society. For cognitive linguists, the emphasis is upon relating the systematicity exhibited by language directly to 15 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION the way the mind is patterned and structured, and in particular to conceptual structure and organisation. It follows that there is a close relationship between cognitive linguistics and aspects of cognitive psychology. In addition to this, applied linguistics also informs and is informed by the cognitive linguistics research agenda in various ways (see Chapters 3 and 4 for further discussion of this point). 1.3.2 Why? Linguists are motivated to explore the issues we outlined above by the drive to understand human cognition, or how the human mind works. Language is a uniquely human capacity. Linguistics is therefore one of the cognitive sci- ences, alongside philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelli- gence. Each of these disciplines seeks to explain different (and frequently overlapping) aspects of human cognition. In particular, as we have begun to see, cognitive linguists view language as a system that directly reflects conceptual organisation. 1.3.3 How? As linguists, we rely upon what language tells us about itself. In other words, it is ordinary language, spoken every day by ordinary people, that makes up the ‘raw data’ that linguists use to build their theories. Linguists describe lan- guage, and on the basis of its properties, formulate hypotheses about how lan- guage is represented in the mind. These hypotheses can be tested in a number of ways. 1.3.4 Speaker intuitions Native speakers of any given human language will have strong intuitions about what combinations of sounds or words are possible in their language, and which interpretations can be paired with which combinations. For example, native speakers of English will agree that example (6), repeated here, is a well- formed sentence, and that it may have two possible meanings: (6) He kicked the bucket. They will also agree that (7) and (8), repeated here, are both well-formed sen- tences, but that each has only one possible meaning: (7) He kicked the mop. (8) The bucket was kicked by him. 16  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, speakers will agree that all of the follow- ing examples are impossible in English: (12) a. *bucket kicked he the b. *kicked bucket the he c. *bucket the kicked he d. *kicked he bucket the Facts like these show that language, and speakers’ intuitions about language, can be seen as a ‘window’ to the underlying system. On the basis of the pat- terns that emerge from the description of language, linguists can begin to build theoretical ‘models’ of language. A model of language is a set of statements that is designed to capture everything we know about this hidden cognitive system in a way that is principled, based on empirical evidence and psychologically plausible. 1.3.5 Converging evidence How do cognitive linguists evaluate the adequacy of their models? One way is to consider converging evidence (Langacker 1999a). This means that a model must not only explain linguistic knowledge, but must also be consistent with what cognitive scientists know about other areas of cognition, reflecting the view that linguistic structure and organisation are a relatively imprecise but nevertheless indicative reflection of cognitive structure and organisation. By way of illustration, consider the scene in Figure 1.5. How might we use language to describe a scene like this? Most English speak- ers will agree that (13a) is an appropriate description but that (13b) is ‘odd’: (13) a. The cat is on the chair. b. ?The chair is under the cat. Figure 1.5 The cat is on the chair 17 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION Why should (13b) be ‘odd’? It’s a perfectly grammatical English sentence. From what psychology has revealed about how the human mind works, we know that we have a tendency to focus our attention on certain aspects of a visual scene. The aspect we focus on is something about which we can make certain predictions. For example, in Figure 1.5 we focus on the cat rather than the chair, because our knowledge of the world tells us that the cat is more likely than the chair to move, to make a noise or to perform some other act. We call this prominent entity the figure and the remainder of the scene the ground, which is another way of saying ‘background’ (see Chapter 3). Notice that this fact about human psychology provides us with an explanation for why language ‘packages’ information in certain ways. In (13a) the cat has a prominent posi- tion in the sentence; any theory of language will tell you that sentence initial position is a ‘special’ position in many of the world’s languages. This accords with the prominence of the corresponding entity in the visual scene. This explanation, based on the figure-ground distinction, also provides us with an explanation for why (13b) is ‘odd’. This is an example of how converging evi- dence works to strengthen or confirm theories of language. Can you think of a situation in which (13b) would not be odd? 1.4 What it means to know a language Let’s look more closely now at some of the claims made by cognitive linguists about how language is represented in the mind. We have established that the linguist’s task is to uncover the systematicity behind and within language. What kinds of systems might there be within language? We’ll begin to answer this question by introducing one fundamental distinction based on the founda- tional work of pioneering cognitive linguist Leonard Talmy. Talmy suggests that the cognitive representation provided by language can be divided into lexical and grammatical subsystems. Consider the following example: (14) The hunter tracked the tigers. Notice that certain parts of the sentence in (14) – either whole words (free mor- phemes), or meaningful subparts of words (bound morphemes) – have been marked in boldtype. What happens when we alter those parts of the sentence? (15) a. Which hunter tracked the tigers? b. The hunter tracks the tigers. c. Those hunters track a tiger. All the sentences in (15) are still about some kind of tracking event involving one or more hunter(s) and one or more tiger(s). What happens when we change 18  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? the ‘little’ words like a, the and those and the bound morphemes like -ed or -s is that we then interpret the event in different ways, relating to information about number (how many hunters or tigers are/were there?), tense (did this event happen before now or is it happening now?), old/new information (does the hearer know which hunters or tigers we’re talking about?) and whether the sen- tence should be interpreted as a statement or a question. These linguistic elements and morphemes are known as closed-class elem- ents and relate to the grammatical subsystem. The term closed-class refers to the fact that it is typically more difficult for a language to add new members to this set of elements. This contrasts with the non-boldtype ‘lexical’ words which are referred to as open-class. These relate to the lexical subsystem. The term open-class refers to the fact that languages typically find it much easier to add new elements to this subsystem and do so on a regular basis. In terms of the meaning contributed by each of these two subsystems, while ‘lexical’ words provide ‘rich’ meaning and thus have a content func- tion, ‘grammatical’ elements perform a structuring function in the sen- tence. They contribute to the interpretation in important but rather more subtle ways, providing a kind of ‘scaffolding’ which supports and structures the rich content provided by open-class elements. In other words, the elem- ents associated with the grammatical subsystem are constructions that contribute schematic meaning rather than rich contentful meaning. This becomes clearer when we alter the other parts of the sentence. Compare (14) with (16): (16) a. The movie star kissed the directors. b. The sunbeam illuminated the rooftops. c. The textbook delighted the students. What all the sentences in (16) have in common with (14) is the ‘grammatical’ elements. In other words, the grammatical structure of all the sentences in (16) is identical to that of (15). We know that both participants in the event can easily be identified by the hearer. We know that the event took place before now. We know that there’s only one movie star/sunbeam/textbook, but more than one director/rooftop/student. Notice that the sentences differ in rather a dra- matic way, though. They no longer describe the same kind of event at all. This is because the ‘lexical’ elements prompt for certain kinds of concepts that are richer and less schematic in nature than those prompted for by ‘grammatical’ elements. The lexical subsystem relates to things, people, places, events, prop- erties of things and so on. The grammatical subsystem on the other hand relates to concepts having to do with number, time reference, whether a piece of information is old or new, whether the speaker is providing information or requesting information, and so on. 19 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION Table 1.1 Properties of the lexical and grammatical subsystems Lexical subsystem Grammatical subsystem Open-class words/morphemes Closed-class words/morphemes Content function Structuring function Larger set; constantly changing Smaller set; more resistant to change Prompts for ‘rich’ concepts, e.g. people, Prompts for schematic concepts, e.g. number, things, places, properties, etc. time reference, old vs. new, statement vs. question, etc. A further important distinction between these two subsystems concerns the way that language changes over time. The elements that comprise the lexical (open-class) subsystem make up a large and constantly changing set in any given human language; over a period of time, words that are no longer ‘needed’ disappear and new ones appear. The ‘grammatical’ (closed-class) elements that make up the grammatical subsystem, on the other hand, constitute a smaller set, relatively speaking, and are much more stable. Consequently, they tend to be more resistant to change. However, even ‘grammatical’ elements do change over time. This is a subject we’ll come back to in more detail later in the book when we discuss the process known as grammaticalisation (see Chapter 21). Table 1.1 provides a summary of these important differences between the lexical and grammatical subsystems. Together, these two subsystems allow lan- guage to present a cognitive representation, encoding and externalising thoughts and ideas. Having provided a sketch of what it means to know a language from the per- spective of cognitive linguistics, we will now begin to examine the cognitive linguistics enterprise in more detail. In particular, we must consider the assumptions and commitments that underlie the cognitive linguistics enter- prise, and begin to examine this approach to language in terms of its perspec- tive, assumptions, the cognitive and linguistic phenomena it considers, its methodologies and its approach to theory construction. We turn to these issues in the next chapter. 1.5 Summary We began this chapter by stating that cognitive linguists, like other linguists, attempt to describe and account for linguistic systematicity, structure and function. However, for cognitive linguists, language reflects patterns of thought; therefore, to study language is to study patterns of conceptualisa- tion. In order to explore these ideas in more detail we looked first at the func- tions of language. Language provides a means of encoding and transmitting 20  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? ideas: it has a symbolic function and an interactive function. Language encodes and externalises our thoughts by using symbols. Linguistic symbols consist of form-meaning pairings termed symbolic assemblies. The meaning associated with a linguistic symbol relates to a mental representation termed a concept. Concepts derive from percepts; the range of perceptual information deriving from the world is integrated into a mental image. The meanings encoded by linguistic symbols refer to our projected reality: a mental representation of reality as construed by the human mind. While our conceptualisations are unlimited in scope, language merely provides prompts for the construction of conceptualisations. Language also serves an interactive function; we use it to communicate. Language allows us to perform speech acts, or to exhibit expressivity and affect. Language can also be used to create scenes or contexts; hence, language has the ability to invoke experiential frames. Secondly, we examined the evidence for a linguistic system, introducing the notion of a conventional linguistic unit, which may be a morpheme, a word, a string of words or a sentence. We introduced the notion of idiomatic meaning which is available in certain contexts and which can be associated with constructions. This contrasts with literal meaning, which may be derived by unifying smaller constructions like individual words. Word order constitutes part of an individual’s knowledge of particular construc- tions, a point illustrated by ungrammatical sentences. We also related linguistic structure to the systematic structure of thought. Conceptual domains reflected in language contain and organise related ideas and experiences. Next, we outlined the task of the cognitive linguist: to form hypotheses about the nature of language and about the conceptual system that it reflects. These hypotheses must achieve descriptive adequacy by describing linguis- tic facts in a systematic and rigorous manner. Linguists try to uncover, describe and model linguistic systems, motivated by the drive to understand human cognition. Linguistics is therefore one of the cognitive sciences. Cognitive linguists carry out this task by examining linguistic data and by relying on native speaker intuitions and converging evidence. As an example of con- verging evidence, we explored the linguistic reflex of the distinction made in psychology between figure and ground. Finally, we looked at what it means to know a language, and introduced an important distinction between kinds of linguistic knowledge: the cognitive representation provided by language can be divided into lexical and gram- matical subsystems. The lexical subsystem contains open-class elements which perform a content function. The grammatical subsystem contains closed-class elements, which perform a structuring function providing schematic meaning. 21 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION Further reading A selection of introductory texts that deal broadly with all aspects of linguistics for those relatively new to the subject Dirven and Verspoor (2004). This introductory textbook of general linguistics takes a cognitive approach and includes chapters on language and thought, and words, meanings and concepts. Fromkin, Rodman and Hyams (2002). A very popular introduc- tory textbook of linguistics. Trask (1999). An accessible introduction to linguistics for the layper- son; an entertaining read. A selection of introductory texts on cognitive science in general Bechtel and Graham (eds) (1999) Cummins and Cummins (eds) (1999) Green (ed.) (1996) Each of these volumes is an introductory-level collection of papers on various aspects of cognitive science. The Green volume places a particular emphasis on linguistics. A list of texts that provide an overview of the issues of concern to cognitive linguists Allwood and Gärdenfors (eds) (1999). A collection of papers on various aspects of cognitive semantics; the paper by Gärdenfors pro- vides a particularly useful overview. Geeraerts (1995). This article compares cognitive linguistic approaches with cognitive science and generative grammar and pro- vides a very broad survey of work on cognitive linguistics; not as acces- sible as Radden’s chapter. Geeraerts and Cuyckens (2005). An important reference work fea- turing articles on a wide range of areas in cognitive linguistics by leading scholars in the field. Goldberg (ed.) (1996). A collection of conference papers. Provides a representative sample of the range of concerns and issues addressed by cognitive linguists. Janssen and Redeker (1999). A collection of papers by some of the leading proponents in the field; a good background to cognitive linguis- tics in general. 22  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO KNOW A LANGUAGE? Lakoff (1987). Seminal text for cognitive linguistics; lively and accessible. Radden (1992). Provides a clear and accessible overview of iconicity in language, categorisation, metaphor, cultural models and grammar as a conceptual organising system. Rudzka-Ostyn (1988). An early collection. Includes seminal papers by, among others, two highly influential scholars, Langacker and Talmy. A list of texts that relate to the issues dealt with in this chapter Evans (2004a). Explores the relationship between language and con- ceptual organisation by focusing on how we think and talk about time and temporal experience. Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988). Seminal article on the relation between idiomaticity and constructions. Lakoff and Johnson (1980). An early but hugely influential study which first proposed that language reflects systematic ‘mappings’ (con- ceptual metaphors) between abstract and concrete conceptual domains. Langacker (1999a). A survey article which deals with the notions of the symbolic (in Langacker’s terms ‘semiotic’) and interactive func- tions associated with language, the notion of converging evidence, and how cognitive linguistics differs from formal and functional approaches to