European Union Normative Power and Security Challenge PDF

European Security ISSN: 0966-2839 (Print) 1746-1545 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/feus20 European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge Ian Manners To cite this article: Ian Manners (2006) European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge, E...

European Security ISSN: 0966-2839 (Print) 1746-1545 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/feus20 European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge Ian Manners To cite this article: Ian Manners (2006) European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge, European Security, 15:4, 405-421, DOI: 10.1080/09662830701305880 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830701305880 Published online: 19 May 2007. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 3520 View related articles Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=feus20 European Security Vol. 15, No. 4, 405421, December 2006 European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge IAN MANNERS Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark ABSTRACT In this discussion of security and democracy in the European Union two interrelated arguments are put forward about the use of normative power to address the security challenge. The article starts by discussing the European (security) Union within the context of over 15 years of European human security debates, and then reflects on the current conduct of the total war on terror as led by the USA. The author argues for the need to be normative in the EU’s security policies and concludes by considering the normative security dilemmas that the EU and its member states face over security and democracy, war and peace. He reiterates the argument that the EU should and must apply its own normative principles to the security challenge if we are ever to move beyond total war and towards sustainable peace. Introduction [I]t is now clear that European Union is the best example in the history of the world of conflict resolution and it is the duty of everyone, particularly those who live in areas of conflict to study how it was done and to apply its principles to their own conflict resolution.1 In this discussion of security and democracy in the European Union I would like to bring together two inter-related arguments regarding the ‘normative power’ and the ‘security challenge’ of the EU. I wish to do so in order to answer the question I see as being at the centre of my contribution *what should the EU do about the ‘security challenge’? My answer is simple, and draws on the words of Nobel peace laureate John Hume. The EU should apply its own normative principles to the security challenge, if we are to stop democracy from defeating itself. Michael Ignatieff has argued that ‘terrorism cannot defeat democracy in a straight fight, but democracy can defeat itself’.2 In line with the introductory framework provided by Kantner and Liberatore the intention is to Correspondence Address : Ian Manners, Senior Researcher and Head of Unit, European Union Internal Dynamics Unit, Danish Institute for International Studies Strandgade 56, 1401, Copenhagen, Denmark. Email: [email protected] ISSN 0966-2839 Print/1746-1545 Online/06/04000405 17 # 2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09662830701305880 406 I. Manners examine how the normative principles which provide the legitimacy for the EU and its external security policies are being challenged in the age of al-Qaeda. This challenge threatens to undermine both democracy and legitimacy in the EU, and any possibilities for progressing away from total war and towards sustainable peace. The security challenge to the EU presented by acts of terrorism against civilians in places such as New York, Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, Sharm el-Sheikh, Amman and Mumbai is doubly challenging because these terrorist acts raise fundamental questions as to the merits of the EU’s normative approach to world politics. In the face of such undifferentiating, non-negotiable ‘new terrorism’ and the need for effective counter-terrorist strategy, what place is there for the niceties of normative principles such as democracy, human rights or good governance? Surely the EU must be pragmatic about putting aside its normative ideals in the pursuit of terrorists and the prevention of terrorism, if only to ensure the security of its citizens? And, finally, whilst the principles Hume advocates are clearly successful in resolving conflict within Europe, the new terrorism of al-Qaeda inspiration is obviously a radically different manifestation of violence. In just four steps this article will discuss: the question of the security challenge; the current conduct of the total war on terror; my answer, of applying the EU’s own normative principles; and the dilemmas regarding an effective and pragmatic counter-terrorist strategy. I shall begin by discussing the European (security ) Union within the context of 15 years of European human security debates. Then I will reflect on the current conduct of the total war on terror as led by the USA. In contrast to that, I will argue the need to be normative in the EU’s security policies. Drawing these three strands of thinking together, the article will conclude by considering the normative security dilemmas that the EU and its member states face over security and democracy, war and peace, by reiterating my argument that the EU should and must apply its own normative principles to the security challenge if we are ever to move beyond total war. European (security ) Union The enlargement of the European Union will have far-reaching con- sequences. We all hope that a larger union will also be a stronger union that will make an even more decisive contribution to global progress and stability. That contribution will be badly needed because in this century, so many of the threats to our peace and security are global *from international terrorism... to... climate change... [T]he EU is a beacon of hope for peace and reconciliation, not only for Europe, but for the whole world.3  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 407 For over half a century the European Communities, now European Union, has been unsystematically engaged in the coordination and integration of an increasingly wide range of common policies. Such activity in one sector has often led to similar activities in another *leading from the economic to the environmental, and from the social to the political. Although by no means uncontroversial, the processes and policies of the EU have generally not been seen as life threatening, either to citizens, or to the peoples of the wider world. Thus, from the Schuman declaration of 1950 to the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU had generally been perceived as benign, peaceful, and predominantly non-threatening in character. This achievement must be seen as remarkable in many respects: ‘a beacon of hope for peace and reconciliation’, as Kofi Annan put it in 2003. In particular, the extent to which many of the EU’s activities in common areas, such as industrial policy, competition policy, trade policy, social provisions, educational coordination and environmental standards, are broadly accepted throughout Europe is important. In previous eras, and currently on other continents, these sorts of issues were considered inflammatory and of distinct ‘national interest’, with the idea of pooling sovereignty in these areas being positively dangerous. From this perspective, the EU has had a ‘desecuritising’ (i.e. pacifying) effect on the politics and policies of highly interdependent European member states during a difficult era of global economic, social, environmental and political transformation. The extent to which this desecuritisation now forms part of European political culture can be seen in the contribution of Isernia and Everts, with their argument that European publics are generally less supportive of the use of military force and far more sensitive to the conditions under which such force is used. This desecuritising effect on the western, and since 1989, eastern parts of the Eurasian sub-continent has not gone unnoticed by European security scholars.4 More importantly, and partially because of the elite technocratic nature of European integration, the word ‘security’ has not needed to be inserted in the European Union. Hence in my article the word (security) is bracketed, because I do not want, or should not need, to insert it. It has been and should be implicit.5 This bracketing of security is important in understanding the success of the EU in the ongoing processes of desecuritising very controversial areas of international policy cooperation, such as climate change, asylum and immigra- tion, external relations and enlargement.6 It is also important to add that my bracketing of security does not imply that the EU is not and should not be a ‘security’ actor, simply that the peace and security the EU represents is far broader than conventional discussions found in this journal. To clarify, when I refer to the EU’s role as a security actor, I mean a provider of ‘human security’ in the shape of ‘a concern with human life and dignity’ with an equal emphasis on ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.7 Within and outside Europe, the EU has sought to promote and provide freedom from fear and want through policies emphasising human protection and life. These 408 I. Manners policies have generally taken the form of non-military economic, social and humanitarian help and assistance, as found in areas such as regional and structural policies within Europe, and development and external relations outside Europe.8 Later developing, but no less important, has been the promotion of human rights in the EU, wider Europe, and the rest of the world, despite the irony of inconsistencies between the inside and outside of the Union.9 Yet it is precisely these achievements which have been placed at risk over the past five years by the post-11 September 2001 processes of militarising the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and policing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the ideas of a common defence policy and a common asylum and immigration policy were conceived at Maastricht in 1991, although thought ‘purely’ symbolic at the time.10 Following the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the current ESDP emerged somewhere between St. Malo, December 1998 and the European Security Strategy, December 2003, with its first outing in Macedonia in March of 2003. In parallel, following the changes in migration patterns during the 1990s, the AFSJ is emerging somewhere between Tampere, October 1999 and the ongoing Hague programme, November 2004. What should be of central interest to this collection of essays is the way in which the agenda of global terrorists has diverted both the processes of militarisation and policing from freedom, justice, democracy and peace. Hence, since December 2003 the development of ESDP has been diverted from preventing Bosnian, Rwandan, or Kosovo-type crises to promoting ‘robust intervention’ around the world.11 In parallel, since September 2001 the agenda of AFSJ has been diverted by the ‘anti-terrorist roadmap’, which infringes upon both freedom and justice in the name of security. My focus in this article will be on the processes of militarisation, rather than policing, which I shall leave for the other contributors to discuss. It is worth noting that, as Bigo discusses in his contribution, such a separation between internal and external security is becoming increasingly difficult to make, as internal and external threats become part of the same web of security-making in EU democracy. Again to clarify, when I refer to the processes of militarisation, I do not mean that engaging in military operations is a bad policy in itself, or that the EU is turning into some sort of militarist polity. What I mean by militarisation is prioritising military aims and means over existing normative concerns, in the pursuit of European homeland security and a defence industrial base, by a ‘military industrial simplex’.12 Lundin and Revelas illustrate this prioritisation in their piece with a discussion of the military Headline Goal of 2003, trailed badly by the civilian Headline Goal of 2008. Clearly any normatively-informed EU external action has to be capable of joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, or conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks under a UN mandate as part of a wider peace-building solution. But, as I will discuss in the next section, current EU  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 409 militarisation processes seem primarily directed towards attacking the symp- toms, rather than addressing the causes, of conflict and insecurity. The consequences of such militarisation in the context of the total war on terror is important, even Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, has conceded that the war is being lost because ‘the West’ has relied too heavily on military force.13 Alongside the rapidly militarising policy developments of the past five years has been an explosion of interest and scholarship by writers and journals on the subject of ESDP. Volumes of work within atypical EU journals, such as Survival , European Security, International Affairs, or International Peace- keeping , are now dedicated to the study of the EU as a military security actor.14 Informed scholarship on the militarisation of the European (security) Union (E(s)U) is clearly to be welcomed, although concerns for democratic legitimacy and the potential impact on the EU’s normative power have been largely conspicuous in their absence.15 I would suggest that works which analyse reflexively the implications of discussing EU military security without considering the consequences of inserting or writing security into the E(s)U must be considered part of the securitisation problématique, rather than a normative solution. In this article I express the fear that the rapid and unreflexive insertion of military security policy is having a dramatic effect on the generally benign normative international identity of the E(s)U.16 This effect will undoubtedly be felt in at least three ways*on the role, legitimacy, and perception of the E(s)U, both internally and externally. As discussed, the role of the E(s)U has undoubtedly moved beyond that of ‘civilian power’ with potentially negative consequences for the ‘ethicacy’ and efficacy of its non-military external policies.17 The legitimacy of the E(s)U when it engages in military intervention and peacekeeping is likely to be increasingly questioned by both Union citizens and those who are the subject of intervention, if they are not accomplished in a normative way. Finally, the perception of the E(s)U as a benign and pacific force in the lives of Europeans and non-Europeans is guaranteed to change as militarisation and its consequences unfold *the extremely negative perceptions of NATO actions in Kosovo and the USA in Iraq give us some suggestion of what is to come. Total War on Terror This is total war. We are fighting a variety of enemies. There are lots of them out there. All this talk about first we are going to do Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq... this is entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the world go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we don’t try to piece together clever diplomacy, but just wage a total war... our children will sing great songs about us years from now.18 410 I. Manners In order to make sense of the current militarising processes in the E(s)U, we need to go back over the way in which the security challenge posed by terrorist activities has led to a total war on terror. The events of 11 September 2001 produced a wave of overwhelming sympathy and genuine support in Europe for the people of the USA. This was reinforced during 2001 and 2002 by the USA’s use of the UN and multilateralism in the pursuit of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. From this perspective, the attacks on the Twin Towers could be seen as crimes against humanity, ‘a blow against cosmopolitanism’, for which the appropriate response was an UN-sanctioned ‘just war’ in Afghanistan. However, towards the end of 2002 it soon became clear that the plan of the White House incumbent was to use the ‘opportunity’ provided by 11 September in order to wage total war on terror, including the ‘axis of evil’*Iraq, Iran and North Korea.19 As Bigo’s article suggests, a ‘total war on terror’ is a never- ending war fought at the global level. By February 2003, the US and the EU had parted ways on the conduct of total war and the need to address the causes, not just the symptoms of terrorism. The presidents of both the Social Science Research Council (Craig Calhoun) and the International Studies Association (Steve Smith) in the USA made it clear that the White House preferences for militarism over civil society, communitarianism over cosmopolitanism, total war on terror over crimes against humanity, and targeting the axis of evil over causes of terrorism were part of the problem rather than a solution.20 Despite the fall-out in the EU over Iraq, between February and December 2003 the launch of Javier Solana’s European Security Strategy (ESS) provided a series of signposts for the future development of EU responses to the security challenge. In particular, the ESS identified the need to address the ‘complex causes’ of terrorism including ‘the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises’.21 Clearly such an approach should be central to any normative EU response to the security challenge, with its emphasis on addressing the human security concerns in Europe and the world. However, the USA’s total war on terror has had some significant consequences for the EU’s response to the security challenge, as I will now illustrate with reference to external actions and development policy.22 Firstly, the impact of total war on terror on the EU’s foreign policy relations has been significant. The demands of foreign policy realism rather than EU normative power have become most apparent in the area of external actions, which fall in the EU’s ‘weakest link’, and least normative policy, CFSP. Normative aspects of EU relations with the ‘axis of ego’ are those that have been most compromised by the total war on terror.23 By the ‘axis of ego’, I mean the permanent members of the UN Security Council (here the USA, Russia and China), who consider themselves exceptional or super-powers and above international norms and law. In the case of EU relations with the USA this has led to a muting of serious international debate about the merits of pursuing a largely military campaign against a primarily non-military enemy.24 Equally worrying is the passive acceptance of distinctly un-normative counter-terrorist  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 411 activities in the name of the total war on terror.25 Clearly the ambiguous sanctioning of torture and extraordinary rendition by EU member states in the service of the total war on terror is the first casualty of normative power Europe since 2001.26 In June 2006 the Council of Europe and European Parliament both issued critical reports on these illegal practices, which, together with the US Supreme Court decision on illegal military commissions at Guantánamo Bay, contributed to White House admissions to extraordinary rendition and changes to US military interrogation techniques.27 Other consequences to EU external actions include the opening of normative ‘black holes’ in relations with collaborators of the USA in the total war on terror, in particular Russia and China. As a number of scholars have pointed out, ‘the war on terror retrospectively legitimated Russian actions in Chechnya’ where ‘the EU has sacrificed a coherent and systemic advancement of its normative agenda in favour of strengthening its relations with the Russian Federation’.28 In contrast, other scholars have argued that after the outbreak of the second Chechen war in September 1999, the EU did adopt sanctions and suspend some of the provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia, as well as limiting TACIS support to emphasise funding for human rights, the rule of law, support for civil society and nuclear safety.29 It is also the case that member states, such as Germany, France, Denmark, Finland and Sweden were keen to engage with Russia during the 1990s in order to facilitate Baltic enlargement (including the difficult issue of Kalingrad), encourage Russia to break diplomatic ties with Milosevic’s Serbia and ensure Russian support for the Kyoto protocol.30 However, beginning in June 2000, and accelerating after September 2001, it is clear that normative EU relations with Russia (as well as Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan) were increasingly subservient to the USA’s foreign policy, including the total war on terror.31 Similar to Chechnya, the EU’s normative ‘black hole’ of Chinese human rights policy (as well as its policies on Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan) has become far bigger since 2001. Following Chinese repression of pro-democracy student demonstrations in the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989, the EU introduced a series of sanctions, which were gradually replaced by a policy of ‘positive engagement’ from 1995 onwards.32 The events of the Beijing Spring of 1989 appeared to wake the EU from exoneration of Chinese human rights abuses, with a particular focus of the European Parliament activism on Taiwan, Tibet and all human rights.33 As a number of scholars have observed, from 2001 onwards the USA’s total war on terror suggested the rise of a ‘new strategic triangle’ with the EU and China as potential beneficiaries.34 But it is equally clear that willing Chinese participation in the total war on terror has had a negative effect on the EU’s specific dialogue on human rights as part of its ‘positive engagement’ policy. In particular, Chinese repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang has been framed in terms of the total war on terror since September 412 I. Manners 2001; although EU attempts to lift the June 1989 arms embargo on China in November 2004 appear equally problematic.35 Secondly, the total war on terror also appears to be shaping the EU’s development policy in potentially worrying ways, as identified by several scholars and the EuropeAid Annual Reports. The first trend can be seen in the ESS, where strategic objectives and security concerns appear to prefigure development concerns, arguing that the EU should be ‘more active in pursuing our strategic objectives... [including] development activities’ where ‘security is the first condition for development’.36 As Ngaire Woods, Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner have pointed out, the logic and strategy of pursuing strategic security concerns precludes one of the basic assumptions of freedom from want*that development is the first condition for human security.37 Interestingly, the EuropeAid Annual Report 2005 breaks with this CFSP logic by placing human security at the centre of development aid; as Benito Ferrero-Waldner argues, ‘promoting human security is central to our approach. We must respond to the full range of threats afflicting the most vulnerable in societies across the world *hunger, deadly diseases, environmental degradation and physical insecurity’.38 The second development policy trend is less clear, but it appears that despite assurances regarding additional appropriations for reconstruction in Afghani- stan and Iraq, the relatively low increase in aid to southern Africa between 2003 and 2004 ‘suggests there may have been reallocations’.39 Faust and Messner have argued that the three ‘mega-projects’ of EU development aid, the Rio sustainable development agenda, the Millennium Development Goals, and now the ESS agenda, are in conflict with the ESS ‘state failure’ agenda requiring the concentration of scarce development funds on 2030 states, away from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).40 Finally, despite the ailing condi- tion of the Constitution for Europe, the aim of bringing coherence to EU external actions by placing them all under the control of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs would also seem likely to bring development policy into the service of the total war on terror.41 Clearly the CFSP/ESS logic of prioritising strategic security over develop- ment aid fundamentally challenges the E(s)U’s human security approach to the security challenge. As Faust and Messner make clear, by following the logic of the total war on terror, the ESS has at least two, if not three, major ‘blind spots’ *it overlooks the complex interplay of socio-economic development, government instability, organised crime, and terrorism; it focuses on a Eurocentric threat perception of transnational terrorism; and it fails to listen to the concerns of partner developing countries regarding the MDGs, the Doha Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Process.42 It is precisely these normative ‘blind spots’ that Kofi Annan addressed directly in his March 2005 report In Larger Freedom , when he crystallised the interplay of human security, freedom from want and freedom from fear: ‘we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development,  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 413 and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed’.43 In dealing with the security challenge it must be obvious that, if the EU prioritises its immediate strategic security concerns over those of the developing world, not only is this not normative, but it is illogical when the ‘root socio-economic causes of the new security risks are located’ in that developing world.44 It is to the means of escaping the logic of total war on terror through emphasising the need to be normative in the EU’s security policies that I will now turn. On Being Normative The protection of human rights is a vital part of any effective strategy against the New Terrorism. It is first and foremost a moral imperative: Commitment to upholding individual human rights is inextricably linked to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. These are values that are at the very foundation of our liberties and to suspend or abandon them in the name of security would be to give the terrorists a victory they could never achieve by themselves.45 I have used the phrase ‘normative power Europe’ (NPE) to attempt to capture the movement away from Cold War (and neo-colonial) approaches to the EU.46 Based upon my research into the symbolic and normative discourses and practices within the EC/EU during the 1990s, I developed the NPE approach as a response to the relative absence of normative theorising and to promote normative approaches to the EU. This volume on security and democracy in the EU forces me to reflect on being normative about security challenges by asking what a normative EU should do about the security challenge? As the previous two sections have illustrated, the answer to the question is shaped by what we consider the security challenge to be*are we at war with al-Qaeda? Or perhaps the ‘axis of evil’? Are we to fight on the battlefields of Afghanistan, the Philippines and Iraq? I would argue that, if we are to deal with new terrorism in any normatively sustainable way, then we should address the entire sequence of mobilisation, complex causes, radicalisation processes and active symptoms of terrorism, in a ‘genuinely multi-pronged’ approach.47 As I briefly suggested in the previous section, I believe the total war on terror has led to many in the EU forgetting the sequence of these security challenges, at the cost of everyone except the men of violence. As Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan, has tried to make clear over the past year, the total war on terror is on a course to failure in Afghanistan and beyond, because it has failed to seek the roots of terror: ‘the situation has deteriorated because we have not addressed the sources of terrorism’.48 My emphasis in the rest of this article will be on the earlier phases of the mobilisation sequence; addressing the complex causes of terrorism in a 414 I. Manners normative way. This is not to say that I think the other phases, including the radicalisation processes and active symptoms in the form of terrorist groups are unimportant, but that addressing the security challenge in a normative way begins with resolving the complex causes. If clearer normative principles are used and understood as the foundation of a multi-pronged approach, then the likelihood of disseminating their merits in countering the later stages of the mobilisation sequence will be considerably higher. It is worth noting that both objective 6 of the March 2004 declaration Strategic Objectives to Combat Terrorism: ‘to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism’, and area 1 of the November 2004 paper on the ‘ESDP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism’: ‘prevention’, appear to address the complex causes discussed here.49 However, the prevention, radicalisation and recruitment objectives of both these action plans seem to be primarily dealing with the later stages of the mobilisation sequence, although strategic objective 6.3 does refer to using external assistance to support good governance and the rule of law for counter-terrorist activities.50 To provide a normative method of addressing the security challenge to the EU, I am going to rely on the pre-existing Commission ‘Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict’ developed during the period of 1996 2001, prior to 11 September 2001.51 Although the check-list for root causes is developed for conflict, not terrorism, I believe it provides the EU with a reaffirmation of the normative principles with which to resolve the complex causes of insecurity and unsustainable peace. Pre-dating the ESS by three years, the early warning indicators check-list shares the same complex causes of violence and terrorism *the despair, alienation, grievances and pressures created by economic, social, cultural and political change and injustice:52 (1) Legitimacy of the state focuses on the democracy, equality, and good governance in political systems, including questions about pluralism, inclusivity, resentment, and corruption; (2) Rule of law looks at the role of independent, civil judicial systems in a society, including questions about equality, human rights, civilian security, and organised crime; (3) Respect for fundamental rights asks whether freedom and human rights are respected in society, including questions about civil and political freedoms, religious and cultural rights, and human rights; (4) Civil society and media questions the vibrancy of civil society, in particular the free and efficient activities of civil groups, and the independence and professionalism of the media; (5) Relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms inter- rogates democratic processes, rule of law and good governance in order  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 415 to ensure good relations between identity groups, to facilitate arbitration between communities, and to manage migrant/refugee flows; (6) Sound economic management examines the extent of sustainable devel- opment in a society by questioning the robustness, stability and sustainability of a state’s economic and environmental policies; (7) Social and regional inequalities concentrate on the achievement of social solidarity in a state through questioning social welfare policies, social inequalities, and regional disparities; (8) Geopolitical situation asks whether a state has achieved sustainable peace dependent on questions regarding regional geopolitics, external threats, and destabilising state policies. What this eight-point check-list provides is both indicators and signposts to how the EU should apply its own normative principles to the security challenge. As I have previously argued, the EU already promotes, in common with other ‘good international citizens’, nine normative principles which had and should take us on a different path away from total war and towards sustainable peace. As I will briefly revisit here, promoting the normative principles of good governance, sustainable development, social solidarity, equality, rule of law, human rights, freedom, and democracy will help address the complex causes of violence and terrorism and lead us on a path towards sustainable peace.53 Since the end of the Cold War, the EU’s commitment to the promotion of these nine normative principles has moved from internal and enlargement policies to external, development and foreign policies (and sometimes in the other direction, from external to internal). While the new policy and treaty innovations that symbolise this commitment were developed in the period 1991 2000, the means by which such norms were spread remain more diffuse. EU development policy became the primary means outside of Europe to promote the normative principles of good governance, sustainable develop- ment, social solidarity, rule of law, human rights, freedom and democracy.54 A number of scholars have written on the merits of promoting normative principles through development policy, commenting on the use of condition- ality, the problems of coherent democracy policies, and the consequences of incoherent human rights policies.55 It is undoubtedly the case that the promotion of normative principles through development policy had difficulties of coordination, complementarity, coherence, and consistency due to the continued centrality of bilateral member state development aid, the fragmented nature of Commission external actions, and the uncertainties of the relative merits of positive versus negative conditionality and top-down versus bottom-up approaches.56 Despite these reservations, the commitments of EU member states to the MDGs and the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on the financing of development, together with the reorganisation and objectives of the Constitution for Europe, raised the prospects for EU development policy becoming more effective in promoting the 416 I. Manners normative principles it had set itself ten years earlier.57 However, as I have discussed, development policy itself now appears to be at risk of being diverted away from the MDGs towards the service of the total war on terror, at the expense of addressing the complex causes of terrorism. Conclusion: Normative Security Dilemmas For 50 years the EC/EU has constructed an adherence to a succession of normative principles as part of creative efforts to safeguard world peace. The security challenges presented by terrorism and counter-terrorism to the EU and its principles raise a number of normative security dilemmas, as considered in this article. Throughout the article I have argued that the challenges of terrorism, militarisation, and the total war on terror all provoke one response*a strengthening of commitment, coherence and consistency in promoting normative principles in a democratic EU. The article began with a discussion of the historical understanding of the E(s)U as a human security actor that contributed to the desecuritisation of potential international conflicts and, following Hume and Annan, acted as an example and beacon to the rest of the world. I argued that over the past five years the development of the ESDP, and the scholarship associated with it, has been diverted away from peacekeeping and conflict management towards the militarising priorities of robust intervention by a European military industrial simplex. Such militarising process and scholarship might not be quite so problematic, if done in a reflexive way for normative ends, but increasingly it appears that the total war on terror has rendered such ends expendable. The article proceeded to assess the impact which the USA’s total war on terror was having on the EU’s external actions, including relations with the ‘axis of ego’ and development policy. What becomes clear is that the total war on terror has rendered invisible certain normative principles in EU external actions, including ‘black holes’ in relations with Russia and China, ‘black sites’ of torture and abuse involving Europe and the world, as well as ‘blind spots’ in the ESS approach to development policy. I made the point that allowing the total war on terror to predetermine the EU’s security challenge will, in the words of Kofi Annan, ensure that in the causes of development, security and human rights, ‘none will succeed’. I then responded to these challenges of terrorism, militarisation and total war by suggesting how we might be normative about addressing the complex causes of terrorist mobilisation. By drawing upon the Commission’s check-list for the prevention of conflict it was suggested how EU normative principles could form the basis for a more encompassing and complex human security approach to addressing the nexus of development, security and human rights. Clearly the same norms should inform the means of countering the radicalisa- tion processes and organised violence of terrorists themselves, both inside and outside Europe. Normative principles such as democracy, human rights, social  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 417 justice and good governance are not just the niceties of a Kantian paradise; they are the means and the ends of sustainable peace. More than five ‘fraught and futile’ years after 11 September 2001, the EU and its friends around the world must fundamentally rethink how to understand the terrorist threat and address the security challenge.58 Addressing the complex causes of violence and terrorism provides the means of progressing both security and democracy by applying EU normative principles. This can be done without giving terrorists the victory of our own democratic demise, which the total war on terror facilitates. Acknowledgements I am very grateful for helpful comments from Raffaella Del Sarto, Cathleen Kantner, Catarina Kinnvall, Friedrich Kratochwil, Angela Liberatore, and the referees; as well as Alyson Bailes, Walter Carlsnaes, Magnus Ekengren, Gustav Lindström, and Pernille Rieker on an earlier version of E(s)U. Notes 1 John Hume, ‘Nobel Peace Prize Lecture’, Oslo, 10 December 1998, available at http:// nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1998/hume-lecture.html, last accessed 6 February 2007. 2 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Terrorism’s Other Peril is How it Transforms Us’, The Globe and Mail , 17 June 2004, p. A23. 3 Kofi Annan, ‘European Union, a Beacon of Hope’, Presidents and Prime Ministers 12/2 (March/ April 2003), p. 19. 4 Ole Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), pp. 69 118. 5 Ian Manners, European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to Ontological Security, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 5-2002, available at http://www.diis.dk/ graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI_publications/publications/5-2002.doc, last accessed 7 February 2007. 6 Ian Manners, An Anatomy of Cooperation: Achieving Common Security Policy in the New Europe (Bristol: Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 1996). 7 Preamble to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948); United Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security (New York: UNDP, 1995); Steve Smith, ‘Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’, International Studies Quarterly 48/3 (2004), pp. 499 515. 8 See Sven Grimm, Human Security: Placing Development at the Heart of the EU’s External Relations (Dublin: Dóchas, 2004). 9 See Andrew Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 10 See Ian Manners, Substance and Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chapters 3 and 6. 11 See Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’, in Helen Sjursen (ed.), Special Edition of Journal of European Public Policy 13/2 (April 2006), pp. 200  216. 12 See Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered’; and Gustav Lindström, Protecting the European Homeland. The CBR Dimension , Chaillot Paper 69 (Paris: EU ISS, 2004). 418 I. Manners 13 Tony Blair, ‘Speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council’, 1 August 2006, available at http:// www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page9948.asp, last accessed 6 February 2007. 14 See, for example, the issues dedicated to the militarisation of the E(s)U in Survival 42/2 (Summer 2000); European Security 11/2 (Summer 2002); International Affairs 78/4 (October 2002); and International Peacekeeping 11/3 (Autumn 2004). 15 Exceptions include Wolfgang Wagner, ‘What Legitimacy for the European Security and Defence Policy?’, in Helen Sjursen (ed.), Special Edition of Journal of European Public Policy 13/2 (April 2006); Giovanna Bono, ‘The EU’s Military Doctrine: An Assessment’, International Peace- keeping 11/3 (2004), pp. 439 456; and Frank Decker, ‘Governance Beyond the Nation-state: Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 9/2 (2002), pp. 256 272. 16 See Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU’s Network of Relationships’, Journal of European Integration 21/2 (1998), pp. 231 249; and ‘The ‘‘Difference Engine’’: Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 10/3 (2003), pp. 380 404. 17 Richard Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/ NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs 77/3 (2001), pp. 587 603. 18 Richard Pearle, Chair of the USA’s Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, in John Pilger, ‘America’s Bid for Global Dominance’, New Statesman , 12 December 2002. 19 Frank Gaffney, former assistant to Richard Pearle and President of the Center for Security Policy, Washington, USA, used the term ‘opportunity’ on live BBC television, 11 September 2001. It appears that the ‘axis of evil’ has now broadened itself into a ‘circle of antagonists’, including Venezuela and Syria *see Daniel Dombey, ‘Axis of Evil Broadens into Circle of Antagonists’, Financial Times, 28 July 2006, p. 5. 20 Craig Calhoun, ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’, in Daniele Archibugi (ed.), Debating Cosmopolitics (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 86 116; Smith, ‘Singing Our World into Existence’. 21 European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World *European Security Strategy (Brussels, Council, 2003). 22 I have explored the militarisation of EU institutions, missions, networks, and human security agenda in Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered’. See also Frank Slijper, The Emerging EU Military Industrial Complex: Arms Industry Lobbying in Brussels, TNI Briefing Series 1 (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2005). 23 Although the total war on terror has led to a significant rise in human rights abuses across a much wider range of countries, in particular Pakistan, BJP-ruled India, Malaysia and Thailand. See Barry Wain, ‘Unfriendly Fire’, Far Eastern Economic Review 165/36 (12 September 2002), pp. 15 22; Rosemary Foot, ‘Collateral Damage: Human Rights Consequences of Counterterrorist Action in the Asia-Pacific’, International Affairs 81/2 (2005), pp. 411 425. 24 Although Javier Solana, EU High Representative, has recently been more clear about an EU approach to such global challenges in saying that ‘[w]e do system change, not regime change. We do it slowly and on a basis of partnership’. Javier Solana, ‘Europe’s Answers to the Global Challenges’, speech to the University of Copenhagen, 8 September 2006, available at http:// www.ku.dk/satsning/europa/pdf/solanas_tale.pdf, last accessed 5 February 2007. 25 This includes the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ at extra-judicial detention centres such as Bagram Air Base, Guantanamo Bay, Diego Garcia, Abu Ghraib, Basra, and other ‘black sites’ around the world, including Eastern Europe. See Dana Priest, ‘CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons’, Washington Post , 2 November 2005. 26 Jane Meyer, ‘Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s ‘‘Extraordinary Rendition’’ Programme’, The New Yorker, 14 February 2005.  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 419 27 Dick Marty (rapporteur), Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 7 June 2006; Giovanni Claudio Fava (rapporteur), Interim Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, European Parliament, 15 June 2006; Claude B. Stansbury (counsel), ‘Amicus Curiae Brief of 304 United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians in Support of Petitioner, Salim Ahmed Hamdan’, No. 05-184 (Washington, 2005); Supreme Court of the United States, ‘Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence’, No. 05-184, decided 29 June 2006. 28 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Stephen Welch, ‘Russia and the United States after 9/11’, Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005), p. 284; Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, ‘The EU, Human Rights, and the Russo-Chechen Conflict’, Political Science Quarterly 120/3 (2005), p. 455; see also Stefania Panebianco, ‘Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in European Union Relations with Russia and China’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 130 146. 29 Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Margot Light, ‘Enlargement and the New Outsiders’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40/1 (2002), p. 139; Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, ‘Russia’s Relations with the European Union: A Constructivist Cut’, International Politics 39 (December 2002), p. 413; Raimo Lintonen, ‘Understanding EU Crisis Decision-making: The Case of Chechnya and the Finnish Presidency’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 12/1 (March 2004), pp. 29 38. 30 Helmut Hubel, ‘The EU’s Three-level Game in Dealing with Neighbours’, European Foreign Affairs Review 9/3 (2004), pp. 353 357. 31 Lintonen, ‘Understanding EU Crisis Decision-making’, p. 35; Daniel Dombey, ‘Brussels to Unveil Uzbek Sanctions Five Months after Andijan Killing’, Financial Times, 30 September 2005; Philip Stephens, ‘The West Pays a Heavy Price for Foreign Policy Realism’, Financial Times, 14 October 2005; Philip Stephens, ‘Azerbaijan: The Crucible of Power’, Financial Times, 29 October 2005. 32 Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s Mediterranean and Asian Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); see also Catarina Kinnvall, Cultural Diffusion and Political Learning: The Democratization of China (Lund: Lund University Press, 1995). 33 Philip Baker, ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, The China Quarterly 169 (2002), pp. 47 53; Kay Möller, ‘Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union’, The China Quarterly 169 (2002), p. 27; Yuchun Lan, ‘The European Parliament and the China-Taiwan Issue: An Empirical Approach’, European Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2004), pp. 115 140. 34 David Shambaugh, ‘The New Strategic Triangle: US and European Reactions to China’s Rise’, The Washington Quarterly 28/3 (Summer 2005), pp. 7 25; Rosita Dellios and Heather Field, ‘China and the European Union: Potential Beneficiaries of Bush’s Global Coalition’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 56/1 (2002), pp. 83 98. 35 Amnesty International, ‘People’s Republic of China Uighurs Fleeing Persecution as China Wages its ‘‘War on Terror’’’, AI Index: ASA 17/021/2004, 7 July 2004; Raül Romeva Rueda, ‘Report on the Council’s Fifth Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (2004/2103(INI))’, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, 19 October 2004; see also Panebianco, ‘Promoting Human Rights and Democracy’. 36 EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World , pp. 17 and 19. 37 Ngaire Woods, ‘The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid’, International Affairs 81/2 (2005), p. 406; Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner, ‘Europe’s New Security Strategy: Challenges for Development Policy’, European Journal of Development Research 17/3 (September 2005), p. 426. 420 I. Manners 38 European Commission, Annual Report 2005 on the European Community’s Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2004 (Brussels: EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 2005), p. 3. 39 Woods, ‘Shifting Politics’, p. 407; EuropeAid Annual Reports suggest that a large increase in external aid financed by the Commission budget in 2003 has not been matched in 2004. 40 Faust and Messner, ‘Europe’s New Security Strategy’, p. 430. 41 Woods, ‘Shifting Politics’, pp. 406 407; Faust and Messner, ‘Europe’s New Security Strategy’, pp. 426 427. 42 Faust and Messner, ‘Europe’s New Security Strategy’, pp. 427 428. 43 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All , Report of the Secretary General (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 6; see also Jeffrey Sachs, ‘US Leadership may be set for Consensus with World’s Poor’, Financial Times, 13 September 2005. 44 Faust and Messner, ‘Europe’s New Security Strategy’, p. 428. 45 Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson, ‘Introduction to Special Issue on Terrorism and Human Rights’, Terrorism and Political Violence 17/3 (2005), p. 7. 46 Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 38-2000, available at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/ COPRI_publications/publications/38-2000.doc; Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40/2 (2002), pp. 235 258. 47 Ranstorp and Wilkinson, ‘Introduction to Special Issue on Terrorism and Human Rights’, p. 7; see also Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Terror: An Agenda for the 21st Century’, Political Psychology 21/2 (2000), pp. 405 420; Paul Erlich and Jiangou Liu, ‘Some Roots of Terrorism’, Population and Environment 24/2 (November 2002), pp. 183 192; James Wolfensohn, ‘Making the World a Better and Safer Place: The Time for Action is Now’, Politics 22/2 (2002), pp. 118  123; Catarina Kinnvall, ‘Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security’, Political Psychology 25/5 (2004), pp. 741 767. 48 Hamid Karzai in David Pilling and Rachel Morarjee, ‘Seek Roots of Terror, Afghan Leader Urges’, Financial Times, 6 July 2006, p. 6; also Rachel Morarjee, ‘Poppy Wars and Unpopularity: Why Afghanistan Looks on Course to Fail’, Financial Times, 5 September 2006, p. 13. 49 European Council, ‘Annex I: EU Strategic Objectives to Combat Terrorism (revised plan of action)’, of the Declaration on Combating Terrorism , Brussels, 24 March 2004; Council, ‘Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism’, 14797/04, Brussels, 18 November 2004; EU Presidency and Counter-terrorism Coordinator, ‘Addendum 1: Revised EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism’, Note to the European Council , Brussels, 16 and 17 June 2005. 50 Objective 6.3 *‘Make more efficient use of external assistance programmes to address factors which can contribute to the support for terrorism, including in particular support for good governance and the rule of law’. 51 European Commission, ‘Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict’, DG External Relations, Brussels, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm, last accessed 5 February 2007; see also Martin Landgraf, ‘Developing Analytical Tools for Preventive Strategies: A Practitioner’s View on Conflict Impact Assessments’, in Michael Lund and Guenola Rasamoelina (eds.), The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments, SWP-Conflict Prevention Network Yearbook 1999/2000 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsge- sellschaft, 2000); and Javier Niño Pérez, ‘Conflict Indicators Developed by the Commission: The Check List for Root Causes of Conflict/Early Warning Indicators’, in Vincent Kronenberger and Jan Wouters (eds.), The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2004). 52 European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World , p. 7; Niño Pérez, ‘Conflict Indicators’, pp. 12 14.  EU ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge 421 53 For a fuller discussion see Ian Manners, ‘The Constituent Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European Union’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 19 41. 54 Treaty on European Union, article 130u identifies ‘sustainable economic and social development’ and the ‘campaign against poverty’ as policy aims; Council, ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development’, 28 November 1991; Commission, ‘On the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements Between the Community and Third Countries’, COM (95)216, Brussels, 23 May 1995. 55 Elana Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy ; Williams, Human Rights Policies. 56 See Federico Bonaglia, Andrea Goldstein and Fabio Petito, ‘Values in European Union Development Cooperation Policy’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 164 184. 57 The Union’s objectives (article I 3) of the Constitution are to ‘contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children’s rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’. 58 Edward Alden, ‘Five Fraught and Futile Years *Why America Must Align Aims and Reality’, Financial Times, 11 September 2006, p. 9; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Under- standing the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray, 2006).