China's Challenge to US Hegemony (PDF) 2008

“If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino- American conflict is virtually certain....” China’s Challenge to US Hegemony Christopher Layne T he Soviet Union’s collapse trans...

“If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino- American conflict is virtually certain....” China’s Challenge to US Hegemony Christopher Layne T he Soviet Union’s collapse transformed the However, while it is certainly true that China’s bipolar cold war international system into a rise will cause geopolitical turmoil, a Sino-American “unipolar” system dominated by the United war is not inevitable. Whether such a conflict occurs States. During the 1990s, the us foreign policy com- will hinge more on Washington’s strategic choices munity engaged in lively debate about whether than on Beijing’s. America’s post–cold war hegemony could be sus- tained over the long haul or was merely a “unipolar Rise of a great power moment.” More than 15 From the mid-1980s through the late 1990s SECURITY years after the cold war’s China’s economy grew at a rate of approximately Global Trends, 2008 end, it is obvious that 10 percent a year. From the late 1990s until 2005 American hegemony has its economy grew at 8 percent to 9 percent annu- been more than momentary. Indeed, the prevailing ally. In 2006 China’s annual growth rate was above view among policy makers and foreign policy schol- 11 percent, as it is projected to be for 2007. China’s ars today is that America’s economic, military, and phenomenal economic growth is driving its emer- technological advantages are so great that it will be a gence as a great power—and this is a familiar pat- long time before us dominance can be challenged. tern in international politics. The economic power There is mounting evidence, however, that this of states grows at different rates, which means that view is mistaken, and that, in fact, the era of Amer- some states are always gaining power and some are ican hegemony is drawing to a close right before losing power relative to others. As Paul Kennedy our eyes. The rise of China is the biggest reason demonstrated in his 1987 book The Rise and Fall for this. Notwithstanding Washington’s current of the Great Powers, time and again these relative preoccupation with the Middle East, in the com- economic shifts have “heralded the rise of new ing decades China’s great power emergence will be great powers which one day would have a decisive the paramount issue of grand strategy facing the impact on the military/territorial order.” United States. The leadership in Beijing understands the link Whether China will undergo a “peaceful between economic strength and geopolitical weight. rise”—as Beijing claims—is doubtful. Historically, It realizes that, if China can continue to sustain the emergence of new poles of power in the inter- near–double digit growth rates in the early decades national system has been geopolitically desta- of this century, it will surpass the United States as the bilizing. For example, the rise of Germany, the world’s largest economy (measured by gross domes- United States, and Japan at the end of the nine- tic product). Because of this astonishing economic teenth century contributed to the international growth, China is, as journalist James Kynge has put political frictions that culminated in two world it (with a nod to Napoleon), truly shaking the world wars. There is no reason to believe that China’s both economically and geopolitically. Studies by the rise will be an exception. us Central Intelligence Agency and others have pro- jected that China will be a first-rate military power Christopher Layne is a professor at Texas A&M University’s and will rival America in global power by 2020. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. He is author of The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell University Press, Engage or contain? 2006), and (with Bradley A. Thayer) American Empire: A In fact, China’s rise has been on the radar Debate (Routledge, 2007). screens of us foreign policy experts since the early 13 14 CURRENT HISTORY January 2008 1990s. Broadly speaking, the debate about how the Beijing’s actual foreign policy furnishes a con- United States should respond to China’s emergence crete reason to be skeptical of the argument that as a great power has focused on two policy alterna- interdependence leads to peace. China’s behavior tives: engagement and containment. in the 1996 crisis with Taiwan (during which it Engagement assumes that, as China’s contacts conducted missile tests in waters surrounding the with the outside world multiply, its exposure to island in the run-up to Taiwan’s presidential elec- Western (that is, mostly American) political and tion) suggested it was not constrained by fears that cultural values will result in evolutionary political its muscular foreign policy would adversely affect change within China. The proponents of engage- its overseas trade. ment believe that the forces of domestic political Of course, during the past decade, China has liberalization and economic globalization will tem- been mindful of its stake in international trade per Beijing’s foreign policy ambitions and lead to a and investment. But this does not vindicate the peaceful Sino-American relationship. us strategy of engagement. China’s current policy On the economic side, the logic of engagement is reflects the fact that, for now, Beijing recognizes its that, as China becomes increasingly tied to the inter- strategic interest in preserving peace in East Asia. national economy, its interdependence with others Stability in the region, and in Sino-American rela- will constrain it from taking political actions that tions, allows China to become richer and to catch could disrupt its vital access both to foreign markets up to the United States in relative power. For a and capital and to high-technology imports from state in China’s position vis-à-vis the United States, the United States, Japan, this is the optimal realpo- and Western Europe. litik strategy: buying time This was the claim made for its economy to grow The era of American hegemony is in the 1990s by the Clin- so that the nation can ton administration and its drawing to a close right before our eyes. openly balance against supporters during a debate the United States militar- about whether the United ily and establish its own States should extend permanent normal trade rela- regional hegemony in East Asia. Beijing is pursu- tions to China and support Beijing’s accession to the ing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen World Trade Organization. itself to confront the United States tomorrow. Proponents of engagement have also argued The belief that a democratic—or more liberal— that the United States can help foster political lib- China would be pacific and collaborative in its eralization in China by integrating the country external policies is similarly dubious. This view into the international economy and embedding it rests on the so-called “democratic peace theory” in the complex web of international institutional which is near and dear to many us foreign policy arrangements. A China so engaged, it is said, will experts. In fact, the democratic peace theory is have strong interests in cooperation and will not another one of those bits of foreign policy conven- be inclined to pursue security competition with tional wisdom that is based on flimsy evidence. America or with its Asian neighbors. The historical record demonstrates that when vital Engagement is a problematic strategy, however, national interests have been at risk, democratic because it rests on a shaky foundation. The con- states have routinely practiced big-stick diplomacy ventional wisdom notwithstanding, there is little against other democracies (including threats to use support in the historical record for the idea that force). In other words, when the stakes are high economic interdependence leads to peace. After all, enough, great powers act like great powers even in Europe never was more interdependent (not only their relations with other democracies. Thus, even economically but also, among the ruling elites, intel- if China does undergo political liberalization in the lectually and culturally) than before World War I. It future, there is no reason to believe that its foreign was famously predicted, on the eve of World War I, policy behavior would be fundamentally affected. that the economic ties among Europe’s great powers A us containment strategy for China differs from had ushered in an era in which war among them engagement in that it relies mostly on the traditional was unthinkable. Yet, as we know, the prospect of “hard power” tools of military might and alliance forgoing the economic gains of trade did not stop diplomacy to thwart China’s great power emergence. Europe’s great powers from fighting a prolonged and Containment calls for the United States to emulate devastating war. its anti-Soviet cold war strategy by assembling a  China’s Challenge to US Hegemony 15 powerful coalition of states sharing a common inter- The Clinton administration similarly was com- est in curbing rising Chinese power—particularly mitted to the perpetuation of us preponderance. by tightening the us security relationship with Japan And the administration of George W. Bush has while simultaneously investing that alliance with an embraced the hegemonic strategy of its two imme- overtly anti-Chinese mission. Containment would diate predecessors. The 2002 National Security require the United States to pledge explicitly to Strategy of the United States promises that America defend Taiwan while bolstering Taiwanese military will act to prevent any other state from building up capabilities. Some containment advocates also argue military capabilities in the hope of “surpassing, or that the United States should engage in covert oper- even equaling, the power of the United States.” ations to destabilize China, especially by fomenting Ideologically, us grand strategy amounts to “real- unrest among China’s ethnic minorities. politik-plus,” to borrow Brandeis University profes- To contain China, the United States would main- sor Robert Art’s phrase. As such, national interests tain both its nuclear and conventional military are defined in terms of both hard power and the superiority over China, and would develop a cred- promotion of American ideals. As the National Secu- ible first strike option based on a combination of rity Strategy puts it, us grand strategy is “based on robust offensive nuclear capabilities and effective a distinctly American internationalism that reflects ballistic missile defenses. Advocates of contain- the union of our values and our national interests.” ment hope that the various measures encompassed Some observers have described this formula as by this strategy could halt China’s rise and pre- “liberal realism,” “national security liberalism,” serve American dominance in East Asia. However, or (as neoconservative pundit Charles Krautham- as argued for example by Missouri State Univer- mer puts it) “democratic realism.” This sort of sity’s Bradley A. Thayer, if these steps failed to stop liberalism is more muscular and offensive than China’s great power emergence, the United States idealistic. The spread of democracy and economic would have to consider “harsher measures.” In openness are imbedded in American grand strate- other words, the United States should be prepared gic thought because policy makers believe that us to engage in a preventive war against China. Con- power, influence, and security are enhanced in a tainment, therefore, is a strategy that at best would world comprised of “free market democracies.” result in an intense Sino-American security compe- America’s post–cold war strategy is based firmly tition. At worst, it could lead to war. on these twin pillars of military superiority and lib- eral internationalist ideology. And because domes- The actual strategy tic ideology is the fundamental driver of us grand Engagement and containment are “ideal type” strategy, America’s geopolitical aims transcend grand strategies toward China. In the real world, those traditionally associated with power poli- Washington’s actual approach fashions elements tics. Not only does the emergence of a powerful of both engagement and containment into a hard- challenger in general threaten America’s ability to edged grand strategy that requires China to accept control its environment, but China in particular is us geopolitical and ideological hegemony—or else. seen as a threat because its politico-economic sys- In this respect, American policy toward China is the tem challenges America’s need for a world compat- specific manifestation of overall us grand strategy, ible with—and safe for—its own liberal ideology. which rests on both strategic and idealistic pillars. China’s rise threatens to close East Asia to us eco- Strategically, the goal of post–cold war us strat- nomic and ideological penetration. egy has been to prevent the emergence of new great powers (or, as the Pentagon calls them, “peer Liberalize—or else competitors”). This strategy was first articulated Because of ideology, engagement has a role in us in March 1992 in the initial draft of the Penta- strategy, but it is engagement with (bared) teeth. gon’s Defense Planning Guidance document for The United States is willing to give China the fiscal years 1994–1999. It stated that the goal of opportunity to integrate itself into the us-led inter- us grand strategy henceforth would be to main- national order—on Washington’s terms. Thus, as tain America’s preponderance by preventing new a Pentagon document has put it, the United States great powers from emerging. The United States, wants China to become a “responsible member of it declared, “must maintain the mechanisms for the international community.” Responsibility, how- deterring potential competitors from even aspiring ever, is defined as Beijing’s willingness to accept to a larger regional or global role.” Washington’s vision of a stable international order. 16 CURRENT HISTORY January 2008 As President Bush declared in a November 2005 istration’s 2005 report on The Military Power of the speech in Kyoto, responsibility also requires China People’s Republic of China, which stated that “Chi- to achieve political liberalization and develop as a na’s military modernization remains ambitious,” free market economy firmly anchored to the inter- and warned that in coming years “China’s leaders national economy. may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more Indeed, us policy makers believe that, over the quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance long term, peaceful relations are possible with Bei- security interests, or resolve disputes.” jing only if China undergoes domestic political and Similarly, at an October 2007 conference on economic liberalization. As a result, the United Sino-American relations Admiral Timothy Keat- States aims to promote China’s internal transforma- ing, the commander in chief of the us Pacific Com- tion. As the Bush administration’s National Secu- mand, made three points with respect to America’s rity Strategy declares: “America will encourage the China strategy. First, the United States will seek advancement of democracy and economic open- to maintain its present military dominance over ness” in China, “because these are the best foun- China. Second, America will, through arms sales, dations for domestic stability and international ensure there is a cross-Strait military balance order.” As then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert between Taiwan and China. Third, the United Zoellick said in 2005, “Closed politics cannot be a States will not allow China to change the status permanent feature of Chinese society.” quo in Taiwan by force. In short, the United States us officials believe that nations such as China is determined both to make sure that China does that do not adopt American-style political and eco- not emerge as a peer competitor and to impose nomic systems, and that do not play by the rules of itself as an obstacle to China’s overriding national the American-led international order, are ipso facto goal of reunification with Taiwan. threats to us interests—threats to which America must be prepared to respond aggressively. Strangling the baby Here is where America’s willingness to employ China’s rise affects the United States because the hard fist of military power against China of what international relations scholars call the comes into play. The Bush administration has “power transition” effect: Throughout the history said it “welcomes a confident, peaceful, and pros- of the modern international state system, ascending perous China that appreciates that its growth powers have always challenged the position of the and development depend on constructive con- dominant (hegemonic) power in the international nections with the rest of the world.” At the same system—and these challenges have usually culmi- time, however, Washington has made crystal clear nated in war. Notwithstanding Beijing’s talk about a that it will not countenance a China that emerges “peaceful rise,” an ascending China inevitably will as a great power rival and challenges American challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. primacy. The 2002 National Security Strategy The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a reassurance enjoins Beijing from challenging the United States strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay militarily and warns that, “In pursuing advanced others’ fears of growing Chinese power and to fore- military capabilities that can threaten its neigh- stall the United States from acting preventively dur- bors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following ing the dangerous transition period when China is an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its catching up to the United States. own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China Does this mean that the United States and China will find that social and political freedom is the are on a collision course that will lead to a war in only source of that greatness.” the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What hap- As Washington sees it, China has no justifiable pens in Sino-American relations largely depends grounds for regarding the us military presence on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt in East Asia as threatening to its interests. Then– toward China. If the United States tries to maintain Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made this point its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American in 2005 when he stated that any moves by China conflict is virtually certain, because us grand strat- to enhance its military capabilities necessarily are egy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory vio- signals of aggressive Chinese intent. According to lence as an instrument for maintaining American Rumsfeld, China’s military modernization cannot primacy. For a declining hegemon, “strangling the possibly be defensive because “no nation threatens baby in the crib” by attacking a rising challenger China.” Rumsfeld’s view was echoed in the admin- preventively—that is, while the hegemon still  China’s Challenge to US Hegemony 17 holds the upper hand militarily—has always been independence as a casus belli. If us policy fails to a tempting strategic option. prevent a showdown between China and Taiwan, the odds are that America will be drawn into the An alternative plan conflict because of its current East Asia strategy. Washington, however, faces perhaps a last chance There would be strong domestic political pressure to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in favor of us intervention. Beyond the arguments in ensuring that Chinese power is contained in East that Chinese military action against Taiwan would Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash constitute aggression and undermine us interests in with Beijing. This strategy is “offshore balancing,” a a stable world order, powerful incentives for inter- concept that is finding increasing favor with a group vention would also arise from ideological antipathy of influential American scholars in the field of secu- toward China, concerns for maintaining us “cred- rity studies. According to this strategy, the United ibility,” and support for a democratic Taiwan in a States should deploy military power abroad only in conflict with authoritarian China. the face of direct threats to vital American interests. Notwithstanding these arguments, which are The strategy recognizes that Washington need not underpinned by a national security discourse that (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the favors American hegemony, the issues at stake in globe, that it is better off setting priorities based on a possible showdown between China and Taiwan clear national interests and relying on local actors simply would not justify the risks and costs of us to uphold regional balances of power. The idea of intervention. Regardless of the rationale invoked, offshore balancing is to husband national power for the contention that the United States should go maximum effectiveness to war to prevent Bei- while minimizing per- jing from using force ceptions that this power By adopting an offshore balancing strategy, to achieve reunifica- represents a threat. tion with Taiwan (or in As an offshore bal- the United States could better preserve its response to a unilateral ancer in East Asia, the relative power and strategic influence. declaration of inde- United States would pendence by Taipei) embrace a new set of pol- amounts to nothing icies regarding Sino-American economic relations, more than a veiled argument for fighting a “pre- political liberalization in China, the defense of Tai- ventive” war against a rising China. wan, and America’s strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing strategy would require Sharing the burden the United States to approach economic relations The final element of a us offshore balancing with China based on a policy of strategic trade strategy would be the devolution from the United rather than free trade. A strategic trade policy States to the major powers in Asia of the respon- would seek to curtail the flow of high technol- sibility for containing China. An offshore balanc- ogy and direct investment from the United States ing strategy would rely on the balance-of-power to China. It also would require a shift in current dynamics of a twenty-first century multipolar us trade policy to drastically reduce the bilateral global order to prevent China from dominating trade deficit, which is a de facto American sub- East Asia. The other major powers in Asia—Japan, sidy of the very economic growth that is fueling Russia, and India—have a much more immediate China’s great power emergence. interest in stopping a rising China in their midst Second, the United States would abandon its than does the United States. efforts to effectuate political liberalization in China. In a multipolar system, the question is not This policy is a form of gratuitous eye-poking. whether balancing will occur, but which state or Because the United States lacks sufficient leverage to states will do the heavy lifting. Because the United transform China domestically, the primary effect of States is geographically distant from China—and trying to force liberalization on China is to inflame protected both by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean Sino-American relations. and by its own formidable military (including An offshore balancing strategy also would require nuclear) capabilities—the United States has the a new us stance on Taiwan, a powder-keg issue option of staying out of East Asian security rivalries because China is committed to national reunifica- (at least initially) and forcing Beijing’s neighbors to tion and would regard a Taiwanese declaration of assume the risks and costs of stopping China from 18 CURRENT HISTORY January 2008 attaining regional hegemony. Because its air and doubtful because America’s predominance in the naval power is based on long-range strike capabili- region is ebbing in any event. One indication of ties, the United States can keep its forces in an over- this is that us economic supremacy in East Asia is the-horizon posture with respect to East Asia and waning as China rises. China is emerging as the limit itself to a backstopping role in the unlikely motor of the region’s economic growth. event that the regional balance of power falters. While the United States has been preoccupied It is hardly surprising—indeed, it parallels in with Iraq, Iran, and the so-called war on terrorism, many ways America’s own emergence as a great China has used its burgeoning economic power to power—that China, the largest and potentially extend its political influence throughout East and most powerful state in Asia, is seeking a more Southeast Asia. Indeed, most of the smaller states in assertive political, military, and economic role in Southeast Asia are gradually slipping into Beijing’s the region, and even challenging America’s pres- political orbit because their own prosperity is ever ent dominance in East Asia. However, this poses more closely tied to their relations with China. no direct threat to us security. Japan, India, and America’s strategy of trying to uphold the geo- Russia, on the other hand, are worried about the political status quo in East Asia clashes with the implications of China’s rapid ascendance for their ambitions of a rising China, which has its own ideas security. They should bear the responsibility of bal- about how East Asia’s political and security order ancing against Chinese power. should be organized. If the United States puts itself An incipient drift toward multipolarity—which in the forefront of those trying to contain China, the is the prerequisite for the United States to adopt an potential for future tension—or worse—in Sino- offshore balancing strat- American relations can egy—is already apparent only increase. By pull- in East Asia. Driven by Great powers that seek hegemony are ing back from its hege- fears of us abandonment monic role in East Asia in a future East Asian cri- always opposed—and defeated—by the and adopting an offshore sis, Japan has embarked counterbalancing efforts of other states. balancing strategy, the on a buildup of its mili- United States could bet- tary capabilities and ter preserve its relative has even hinted that it is thinking about acquir- power and strategic influence. It could stand on the ing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the past several sidelines while that region’s great powers enervate years have seen a significant escalation in tensions themselves by engaging in security competitions. between China and Japan, fueled both by nation- alism and by disputes over control of the South The temptation of power China and East China seas (which may contain If American strategy were determined by the tra- large energy deposits). ditional metrics that have governed the grand strat- From the standpoint of offshore balancing, egies of great powers—the distribution of power Japan’s military buildup in response to its fear of in the international system, geographic proximity China is a good thing if it leads to Japan’s reemer- of rivals, and military capabilities—China would gence as an independent geopolitical actor. How- not be considered much of a threat to the United ever, Japan’s military resurgence is not so good (for States. The wellspring of us grand strategy lies the United States) if it takes place under the aegis elsewhere, however: in Wilsonian ideology. This is of the us-Japan security alliance, and if the United why the United States remains wedded to a strat- States remains in the front lines of the forces con- egy of upholding its predominance in East Asia, as taining China. Under those conditions, the United well as in Europe and the Middle East. States could find itself ensnared in an Asian con- One of the few ironclad lessons of history is flict; its alliance with Japan risks dragging it into a that great powers that seek hegemony are always war with China in which American strategic inter- opposed—and defeated—by the counterbalanc- ests would not be engaged. The idea of an offshore ing efforts of other states. Yet the prevailing belief balancing strategy is to get the United States out among the American foreign policy community is of China’s crosshairs, not to allow it to remain a that the United States is exempt from the fate of target because of its present security commitments hegemons. This belief, really a form of American to allies in the region. exceptionalism, is wrong. If Washington gives in The wisdom of risking war with China to main- to the temptation of hegemonic power, dangerous tain us hegemony in East Asia is all the more times lie ahead.