Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations PDF

Chapter 8 Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations SECTION I – OVERVIEW 8-1. Fighting for intelligence during large-scale combat operations (armed conflict) is very different than fighting for intelligence during competition and crisis. B...

Chapter 8 Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations SECTION I – OVERVIEW 8-1. Fighting for intelligence during large-scale combat operations (armed conflict) is very different than fighting for intelligence during competition and crisis. Before large-scale combat operations and deployment, friendly forces have been under continuous enemy observation and influence. Enemy influence has occurred through the information dimension (including through social media, telecommunications, human interaction, and other forms of communications and contact) with the intent to shape the perceptions, behaviors, and decision making of the United States and allied and partner nations. However, with the onset of large-scale combat operations and deployment, the amount, intensity, and lethality of enemy actions increase drastically. 8-2. During large-scale combat operations, operational success requires a successful intelligence effort. Intelligence success during large-scale combat operations requires aggressive preparations during competition and crisis. Intelligence architecture planning and revising, joint TSA, regional expertise, intelligence databases, threat signatures, threat characteristics and models, and intelligence and language training must all be developed or conducted before large-scale combat operations; the intelligence warfighting must not begin a large-scale combat operation as a cold start. 8-3. Building on chapters 1 through 7, this chapter focuses on the tactical aspects of large-scale combat operations. All echelons are important to operations; theater army and corps echelons, as joint land component commands, play pivotal roles in successful large-scale combat operations. However, this chapter discusses corps (not as a joint land component command), division, and BCT echelons. SECTION II – CHALLENGES 8-4. There are many challenges to effective intelligence support during large-scale combat operations. Staff integration, operational planning, and information collection plans are not foolproof and can become ineffective. Army forces compete with a determined and adaptive enemy; therefore, perfect planning and information collection seldom occur. Intelligence is not perfect, information collection is not easy, and a single collection capability (or even all collection at a single echelon) is not persistent and accurate enough to provide all the answers. Conducting information collection requires focused intelligence requirements, thorough and creative planning, aggressive execution, and adjustments based on the operational situation to inform the commander’s situational understanding and support decision making and targeting. 8-5. The commander and staff must understand the doctrinal fundamentals of fighting for intelligence and maintain proficiency in integrating the intelligence warfighting function into operations. Conducting realistic staff and intelligence training and building effective relationships are vital to successful intelligence support during the rigors and stresses of combat operations. This section discusses some of the many challenges of a contested deployment and the conduct of operations and intelligence support after RSOI. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-1 Chapter 8 CONTESTED DEPLOYMENT 8-6. Threat information warfare operations can have a global reach and hamper friendly military deployments. With sufficient scale or precision, they have the potential to completely halt effective unit deployment operations. Targeted disinformation and threats delivered via social media to the Family members of every Soldier in a unit can be potentially devastating without prior planning, preparation, and trust building. 8-7. Commanders and their staffs must understand the potential effects of adversarial disinformation operations on units and leaders. Targeted adversary or enemy activities in the information dimension can rapidly degrade Soldiers’ performance, impacting their readiness. These activities can also degrade civilian performance and affect the critical infrastructure they manage. Leaders combat this through— ⚫ Public communications, both before and during deployment operations. ⚫ Coordination with relevant public affairs personnel. ⚫ Soldier and Family preparation, which can include incorporating response strategies for disinformation dissemination into exercises and other training. 8-8. As friendly forces transition from competition and crisis to armed conflict, threat actors increase the intensity and lethality of their tactics. This can include infrastructure sabotage by pre-positioned agents, a broad scope of cyberspace or information attacks (such as targeting an oil pipeline supplying a large region rather than only a specific port), or long-range precision strikes using a variety of munitions. Concurrently, threat actors posture for, and may eventually escalate through, nonlethal and lethal actions of increasing intensity to improve standoff and prevent power projections from the U.S. homeland and other basing and staging areas. Threat actors may also strike transport vessels along sea lines of communications while these vessels are enroute to a seaport of debarkation. 8-9. Peer threats may choose to support proxy forces or influence unwitting groups, including irregular forces, saboteurs, sympathetic civil organizations, and criminals. These groups may be used to prevent timely deployment operations by denying access to roads or facilities with crowds, protests, or looting. Using these forces may also allow for direct action against U.S. targets while masking the responsible nation or group. Threat actors may design these activities to affect the economy and global trade in addition to the political- military balance in the United States or overseas. Additionally, other state and nonstate actors may exploit the situation with attacks to pursue their own objectives. These attacks may be conducted within the United States or allied nations, in the theater where Army forces are preparing to deploy, or in other, unrelated regions. 8-10. Leaders anticipate adversary activities in all domains while preparing for or conducting deployment operations. Disruptions may not be preventable. They can, however, be mitigated through intelligence support, training, preparation, and coordination with unified action partners. Effective mitigation in planning, preparation, and execution ensures the Army provides the required forces to CCDRs and other JFCs. 8-11. FM 3-0 discusses how deployments comprise various movements and activities—fort to port, port to port, and RSOI—all of which involve unique intelligence considerations. (See appendix C and FM 3-0.) Most subsequent discussions in this chapter address actions after friendly force RSOI. Following RSOI, there may be challenges for the intelligence warfighting function based on the loss of or delay in receiving intelligence personnel or the loss, delay, or damage to intelligence systems. 8-2 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations Fluid Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Operations As part of peer threat A2 and AD, long-range strike capabilities mean that sanctuary to conduct unimpeded RSOI operations in rear areas can no longer be assumed; it is likely that strikes by peer threats will degrade or destroy port and other transportation infrastructure vital to U.S force projection. This can cause Army forces to arrive in a disaggregated manner and disrupt RSOI operations. While integrating U.S. forces in theater can be challenging, Army planners must consider host-nation requirements for logistics infrastructure. The host nation’s response to an attack on its infrastructure, including its military mobilization, can affect freedom of movement for U.S. forces. These challenges may require JFCs to alter their operational plans or remain defensively postured until sufficient combat power is built to enable offensive operations. The theater army has primary responsibility for conducting RSOI operations for the entire joint land force. Once the E-MIB is set in theater, the theater army may task the E-MIB commander and staff to assist in conducting RSOI as subsequent MI units deploy. However, executing RSOI is primarily a unit responsibility. The deploying unit must conduct detailed planning and proper coordination before deploying. Planning must include mitigation actions in the event systems are damaged or destroyed and MI Soldiers are injured or killed during deployment. Army equipment may arrive haphazardly across numerous ports. Commanders must establish secure communications, allowing staff coordination for unit personnel to meet their equipment and facilitate ship offloading. Units provide port support teams with the right personnel and capabilities, such as licensed vehicle operators and communications, to expedite port operations. This assists in ensuring ports of debarkation are not congested with disabled equipment or frustrated cargo. If some unit equipment is lost in transit due to the destruction of transport vessels, some tactical unit personnel may be held temporarily at theater facilities to facilitate re-equipping efforts, or they may be retasked by the combatant command or theater army commander. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE 8-12. As friendly forces flow into the theater, they will be faced with the intensity, lethality, and brutality of large-scale combat operations, which create complex, chaotic, fearful, violent, fatiguing, and uncertain conditions. Battlefields will include noncombatants crowded in and around dense urban areas. To further complicate operations, enemies will employ conventional and unconventional tactics, terrorism, criminal activities, systems warfare, and information warfare. Activities in the information dimension will often be inseparable from ground operations. 8-13. Conflicts encompassing large-scale combat operations are more intense and destructive than limited contingencies. During large-scale combat operations, peer threats will mass effects across multiple domains and dimensions at speeds that will significantly impact ongoing operations. Peer threats will employ many highly lethal and sophisticated capabilities, such as information warfare, cyberspace attacks, counterspace measures, long-range massed fires, IADSs, EW, deception, reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance, to deny and degrade friendly force maneuver, communications, information collection, and targeting capabilities, particularly when they are static. 8-14. Large-scale combat operations typically entail— ⚫ High-resource consumption, high casualty rates, and an incredible level of stress on all aspects of sustainment. Flexibility and adaptability at all echelons are critical. ⚫ The deliberate and imaginative use of capabilities within and across all domains synchronized to create effects across all dimensions to gain and exploit positions of relative advantage. ⚫ The ability to effectively provide the joint force with important capabilities and employ joint capabilities when they are allocated. ⚫ Focusing operational and mission variables through the sequence of planning and execution necessary to apply combat power on threat defeat mechanisms. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-3 Chapter 8 ⚫ The execution of campaigns and effective tactical transitions between offensive, defensive, and stability operations. ⚫ Tactical actions that in some cases can have strategic impacts to an international audience. ⚫ Eventual negotiations, peace talks, and other political considerations. 8-15. Successful large-scale combat operations defeat enemy-armed forces while establishing control over land and populations to achieve strategic and operational objectives. They may capitalize on superior military capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker enemy and consolidate gains as part of a rapid campaign. Large- scale combat operations against more capable enemy forces are likely to be of longer duration, lasting months or longer. When operating against a peer threat, commanders aggressively and simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army operations must orchestrate many simultaneous actions in the most demanding OEs. Figure 8-1 illustrates the scope, complexity, and lethal nature of large-scale combat operations. Figure 8-1. Large-scale combat operations (offensive action) (example) INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGE 8-16. The fluid and chaotic nature of large-scale combat operations will cause the greatest degree of fog, friction, and stress on the intelligence warfighting function. Units must be prepared to fight for intelligence against enemy formations, a range of sophisticated threat capabilities, and many unknown conditions within the OE. The challenges to information collection include IADSs, long-range fires, counterreconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, and camouflage, concealment, and deception. The enemy’s ability to create a denied, disrupted, intermittent, and limited (DDIL) communications environment can have major impacts on intelligence support. 8-17. Despite these challenges, commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute friendly operations. This is essential when determining how best to mitigate sophisticated threat A2 and AD systems, IADSs, deception, information warfare, EW operations, UAS swarms, robotics, and long-range fires capabilities. Additionally, there are many unique requirements to account for civil considerations and support sustainment operations and friendly activities within the various rear areas. 8-4 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations 8-18. IPOE and information requirements differ significantly during large-scale combat operations and often require detailed analysis. IPOE and information requirements, in supporting warning intelligence (which indicates changes in the likelihood of threat actions against friendly forces or developments likely to cause harm to friendly forces), are especially important in protecting the force. IPOE and information requirements also differ significantly based on the defensive or offensive operation, the specific situation, and unique requirements for concurrent supporting operations such as deep and rear operations. During both friendly defensive and offensive operations, there are consolidating gains requirements to detect enemy bypassed or stay-behind forces, special purpose forces, irregular forces, terrorists, and efforts to create an insurgency or conduct information warfare. Example IPOE and information requirements are listed throughout section III for the operational framework and various types of operations. 8-19. Although large-scale combat operations considerations span the intelligence process, three areas of particular importance to intelligence include— ⚫ The intelligence architecture. ⚫ PED. ⚫ Information collection. INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 8-20. During competition, the intelligence architecture is developed well before any deployments based on future planning and assumptions regarding the employment of intelligence capabilities. During crisis and into a large-scale combat operation, intelligence leaders must carefully plan for revisions to the existing intelligence architecture and expand it as tactical units arrive in or move within a theater. 8-21. During competition or crisis, no matter how well-planned, the friction of deployment and then large- scale combat operations can adversely affect the use and tactical extension of the intelligence architecture. For example— ⚫ The TPFDL may have execution flaws when situations arise that demand changes. This, in turn, delays transport and arrival in theater of key intelligence architecture components. ⚫ Damage to equipment essential to the intelligence architecture during transit from garrison to the port of debarkation may delay the integration and employment of that equipment into the intelligence architecture. ⚫ Friction at the port of debarkation, along forward movement routes, and at intermediate staging bases in theater, especially during contested deployments, can multiply RSOI challenges, which may impact the arrival and integration of intelligence architecture components. 8-22. Friendly actions and conditions can also challenge establishing the intelligence architecture. For example— ⚫ U.S. forces may have to operate on a theater-specific network such as CENTRIXS or US BICES. ⚫ Receipt in theater of unanticipated Army, joint, and multinational reinforcing units adds requirements that stress the capabilities of the intelligence architecture. ⚫ Receipt in theater of new or unanticipated information collection or foundational capabilities stresses the ability to integrate these capabilities into the intelligence architecture when time available is limited and interoperability is less than optimal. ⚫ Greater congestion (more intelligence nodes than in peacetime) and greater volumes of transported data and information strain the intelligence architecture. PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION 8-23. Deployment and then large-scale combat operations can also cause the highest level of stress on the conduct of intelligence PED activities. Leaders and Soldiers must anticipate, plan, and train for intelligence PED in conditions closely resembling the strenuous conditions of large-scale combat operations. Although these high stress levels cannot be replicated in training environments, CP exercises, or field training exercises, leaders and Soldiers must exercise flexibility, adaptability, and creativity in performing intelligence PED tasks during large-scale combat operations. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-5 Chapter 8 Note. Intelligence PED capabilities and activities depend on intelligence architectures; therefore, they incur the same challenges and risks that intelligence architectures must face and overcome in large-scale combat operations. INFORMATION COLLECTION GAPS 8-24. After RSOI, as tactical units start information collection, there may be significant challenges based on enemy capabilities and risks to Soldiers. The inability to collect at certain locations and ranges without a high degree of risk to organic, attached, assigned, and supporting collection capabilities is considered a collection gap. Section IV discusses mitigating collection gaps. 8-25. Information collection gaps often occur due to the following: ⚫ Threat capabilities, including countermeasures limiting or preventing friendly collection. ⚫ Insufficient networks, systems, or personnel/linguists. ⚫ Lack of technical capabilities. ⚫ Inadequate collection ranges. ⚫ Movement in preparation for operations. ⚫ A high tempo and constant maneuver. ⚫ Unfavorable terrain. ⚫ Unacceptable risk for the employment of specific assets. ⚫ National technical means, when available, focus on national priorities. Even when aligned against joint force command priorities, these means may not meet tactical-level requirements. ⚫ Collection may not be authorized due to international borders, existing agreements, or areas that are not part of a joint operations area. ⚫ Most of the other Service ISR systems do not focus on ground requirements unless they are allocated to Army forces. ⚫ Most theater-level intelligence collection assets and sensors are employed to answer theater intelligence requirements. ⚫ Collection factors can significantly impact intelligence operations from theater army to BCT levels. The intelligence cell and MI unit must consider these factors during planning. Collection factors include— ▪ The impact of enemy IADS on aerial collection. ▪ Limits on the range of ground collection. ▪ Geography. ▪ Technical aspects of collection capabilities. ▪ Threat signatures. ▪ The specific operational and tactical situation. SECTION III – DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (FRIENDLY) 8-26. Corps and division commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. Successful corps and division operations may depend on intelligence and successful joint interdiction operations, including those operations to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before the battle is fully joined. 8-27. Corps and divisions execute defensive, offensive, and stability operations, of which offensive and defensive operations comprise most of the activities. Commanders must focus and use intelligence to explicitly understand the lethality of large-scale combat operations to preserve their combat power and manage risk. Commanders must also use ground maneuver and other land-based capabilities to enable maneuver in the other domains. 8-6 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations 8-28. BCTs and subordinate echelons concentrate on performing defensive and offensive operations and necessary enabling operations, such as reconnaissance, security, or passage of lines. During large-scale combat operations, they only perform those minimum-essential stability operations tasks (paragraph 8-49) necessary to comply with the laws of land warfare and applicable international standards. These requirements create an even greater challenge for the intelligence warfighting function because operations to consolidate gains require a dynamic intelligence effort to maintain positive momentum and achieve additional gains. FUNDAMENTALS OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 8-29. The effective application of tactics creates multiple dilemmas for the enemy, allowing the friendly commander to prevail in combat operations. Successful tactics also require synchronizing all elements of combat power. The intelligence warfighting function fuses information collected from the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations. These complementary and reinforcing effects contribute to effective defensive and offensive operations. For the intelligence warfighting function to be successful during large-scale combat operations, intelligence professionals must understand the doctrinal fundamentals of defensive and offensive operations as well as the forms of contact; deep, close, and rear operations; and enabling operations. FORMS OF CONTACT 8-30. Commanders consider all forms of contact possible with enemy forces and visualize their AOI as the situation develops, including effects of enemy influence and disinformation and misinformation. During IPOE, the G-2/S-2, in coordination with other staff members, determined how capabilities can be leveraged against friendly forces using the nine forms of contact. During the MDMP, the commander and staff determine how to leverage the nine forms of contact within the OE. 8-31. Tactics assist the G-2/S-2, in conjunction with the commander and staff, in determining the best form of contact to engage enemy forces. Contact is an interaction between two or more forces. The nine forms of contact describe the method of interaction that positively identifies the location or activity of a force: ⚫ Direct: Interactions from line-of-sight weapons systems (small arms, heavy machine guns, and antitank missiles) in any domain. ⚫ Indirect: Interactions from non-line-of-sight weapons systems (cannon artillery, mortars, rockets). ⚫ Nonhostile: Neutral interactions (civilians on the battlefield) that may degrade military operations. ⚫ Obstacle: Interactions from friendly, enemy, and natural obstacles (minefields and rivers). ⚫ CBRN: Interactions from friendly, enemy, and civilian CBRN effects (chemical, nuclear, and biological attacks; industrial accidents; and toxic/hazardous industrial materials). ⚫ Aerial: Interactions from air-based combat platform effects (attack helicopters, armed UASs, and close air support). ⚫ Visual: Interactions from acquisition via the human eye, optical, or electro-optical systems (ground reconnaissance telescopic, thermal, and infrared sights on weapons and sensor platforms such as UASs and satellites). ⚫ Electromagnetic: Interactions via systems used to acquire, degrade, or destroy using select portions of the EMS (radar systems, jamming, cyberspace, space-based systems, and electromagnetic pulse). ⚫ Influence: Interactions through the information dimension (social media, telecommunications, human interaction, other forms of communications and contact) intended to shape the perceptions, behaviors, and decision making of people relative to a policy or military objective. DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS 8-32. Within assigned areas, commanders organize their operations in terms of time, space, and purpose by synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations. An echelon’s focus in time, space, and purpose—not necessarily the echelon’s physical location—determines whether the echelon conducts deep, close, or rear operations. The deep. close, and rear operations model assists commanders and staffs in synchronizing capabilities that reside outside of their unit’s assigned area (for example, from air, space, cyberspace), with 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-7 Chapter 8 operations inside their assigned areas. Intelligence support to deep, close, and rear operations involves close coordination with the operations staff to determine how the intelligence warfighting function can best support operations at any given time. Although deep, close, and rear operations are distinctly different, aspects of each may overlap; likewise, at times intelligence operations in each may comprise similar activities. 8-33. Typically, corps and divisions assign CPs to enable control of deep, close, and rear areas. At echelons brigade and below, differentiating between deep, close, and rear areas may have less utility during large-scale combat operations because of the high tempo, narrow focus, and short planning horizons. However, at every echelon, commanders must understand the relationship among these operations and their combined impact on mission accomplishment. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-94 for doctrine on deep, close, and rear operations.) 8-34. Intelligence synchronization across deep, close, and rear operations is required to ensure the unity of support and unity of effort. This mitigates the dynamic nature of the OE. Operations in each area will cause effects, impacting threat, neutral and friendly forces. These impacts must be continuously monitored to ensure commanders and staffs have the most updated and accurate assessments from which to make decisions. For example, information regarding bypassed enemy forces in the close area must be received by units in the rear and deep areas to assist in deep and rear area assessments. 8-35. Commanders, G-2/S-2s, and the staff must ensure analytical sections in deep, close, and rear areas are manned, able to assess threat activities in each area, and have access to an architecture to share information across these areas. During large-scale combat operations, analytical elements in the three areas must collaborate to ensure threat monitoring is maintained as the unit maneuvers through their AORs and communicate that information to subordinate elements. 8-36. The fusion of information and intelligence from the deep, close, and rear areas provides commanders and staffs with a holistic picture, from which to build assessments of current operations and subsequently provide the relevant information to determine future operations. G-2/S-2s must maintain communications with higher, subordinate, and adjacent echelons to ensure all relevant information regarding the OE is assessed, considered, and incorporated into operations. Figure 8-2 illustrates the variety of activities across the operational framework and how they interrelate. Figure 8-2. Notional operational framework during offensive operations 8-8 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations Deep Operations 8-37. At the operational level, deep operations influence the timing, location, and enemy forces involved in future battles; at the tactical level, deep operations set conditions for success during close operations and subsequent engagements. The principal effects of deep operations focus on an enemy force’s freedom of action and the coherence and tempo of their operations. (See ATP 3-94.2 for doctrine on deep operations.) 8-38. Deep operations contribute to setting the conditions to transition to the next phase of an operation (for example, from a defensive to an offensive operation). Deep operations are not simply attacking an enemy force in depth; instead, they are the sum of all activities that influence when, where, and in what condition enemy forces will be committed. Deep operations are normally planned and controlled at theater army, corps, and division levels. The following activities are typically conducted as part of deep operations either singly or in combination: ⚫ Deception. ⚫ Information collection and target acquisition. ⚫ Interdiction (by ground or air fires, ground or aerial maneuver, cyberspace forces, special operations forces, or any combination of these). ⚫ Long-range fires against enemy IADSs, sustainment nodes, fires capabilities, and echeloned follow-on maneuver formations. ⚫ EW. ⚫ Information advantage activities. ⚫ Offensive cyberspace operations. ⚫ Space operations. ⚫ Military information support operations. 8-39. Not all activities focused forward of the line of contact are deep operations. For example, counterfire primarily supports close operations although the targets attacked may be located at great distances from the forward line of troops. 8-40. Deep operations focus on the enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities most dangerous to the next close operation. These operations involve efforts to prevent uncommitted or out-of-contact enemy maneuver forces from being committed coherently or preventing enemy enabling capabilities, such as fires and air defense, from creating effects in the close area. Attacks must employ enough combat power to achieve the desired result. This is critical when—as is frequently the case—maintaining momentum in close operations depends on the successful prosecution of deep operations. 8-41. Intelligence support to deep operations is an inherent part of intelligence support to targeting. IPOE and information requirements related to deep operations include— ⚫ Gaining and maintaining threat activities and intentions, which focus on— ▪ Locating the enemy reserve. ▪ Locating enemy forces capable of impacting the close fight. ▪ Locating long-range fires capabilities and other A2 and AD capabilities. ▪ Locating C2 nodes. ▪ Locating logistics nodes. ▪ Disrupting enemy recruiting activities. ▪ Enemy intentions during friendly transitions. ⚫ Key and decisive terrain associated with the deep operation. ⚫ Enemy indicators that allow the commander to identify time windows to conduct deep operations. ⚫ HPTs and target system components vulnerable to attack as well as the most effective method of attack. ⚫ BDA to determine if the correct target was attacked, the results of that attack, if reattack is required, and the impact of the attack on enemy COAs. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-9 Chapter 8 ⚫ Information gaps in deep operations intelligence and developing collection strategies to fill those gaps. ⚫ Support to protection activities. ⚫ Support to security activities. ⚫ Activities to consolidate gains. ⚫ Integrating intelligence, civil information, military information support operations, cyberspace, and electromagnetic activities. ⚫ The convergence of capabilities from multiple domains to isolate, penetrate, and disintegrate an enemy’s integrated fires commands and IADSs. Close Operations 8-42. Until enemy forces are defeated or destroyed in close operations, they retain the ability to fight and hold ground. Close operations include the deep, close, and rear operations of their subordinate maneuver formations. For example, divisions and separate brigades conduct corps close operations. BCTs are the primary forces conducting division close operations. (See FM 3-0.) Due to the relationships of these operations, intelligence activities must be synchronized across the operational areas. G-S/S-2s at all echelons must ensure the intelligence effort is synchronized and unified, lessening the possibility for gaps in information collection coverage. 8-43. Close operations occur in the close area—the portion of the commander’s area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). The close area contains the current battles and engagements of its major maneuver units. For example— ⚫ A field army’s close area is where its committed corps and divisions conduct operations. ⚫ A corps’ close area includes the deep, close, and rear areas of its committed divisions and separate maneuver brigades. ⚫ A division’s close area is primarily where BCTs operate. 8-44. Speed and mobility are essential to close operations to exploit windows of opportunity by rapidly concentrating overwhelming combat power at the right time and location. Close operations comprise the following activities: ⚫ Maneuver of subordinate formations (including counterattacks). ⚫ Close combat (including offensive and defensive operations). ⚫ Indirect fire support (including counterfire, close air support, EA, and offensive space and cyberspace operations against enemy forces in direct physical contact with friendly forces). ⚫ Information collection. ⚫ Sustainment support of committed units. 8-45. Intelligence activities in close operations (corps and division) focus on— ⚫ Continuous monitoring of threat activities in corps and division deep areas. ⚫ Gaining and maintaining information concerning threat activities and intentions: ▪ Locating and targeting HPTs. ▪ Locating and targeting bypassed forces. ▪ Locating enemy reserve forces. ▪ Identifying and exploiting windows of opportunity across all domains and dimensions. ▪ Locating threat capabilities that may impact sustainment operations. ⚫ Considering flexibility when planning information collection. ⚫ Achieving relative advantages across relevant domains and dimensions. ⚫ Synchronizing the use of intelligence handover lines. ⚫ Activities to consolidate gains. ⚫ Support to security operations. ⚫ Protecting critical infrastructure and key lines of communications for future operations. ⚫ Ensuring continuous updates to the CIP. 8-10 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations 8-46. Intelligence activities in close operations (BCT) focus on— ⚫ Gaining and maintaining information concerning threat activities and intentions: ▪ Locating and targeting HPTs. ▪ Providing support to branches and sequels. ▪ Locating and targeting bypassed forces. ▪ Locating reserve forces. ▪ Locating present/planned obstacles, including the use of obscuration and chemical weapons. ▪ Threat’s use of denial and deception. ▪ Threat’s use of EW. ▪ Threat’s use of misinformation and disinformation in population centers. ▪ Threat’s use of UASs, including drone swarms. ⚫ Activities to consolidate gains. ⚫ Support to security activities. ⚫ Support to protection activities. Rear Operations 8-47. The rear area is that area in a unit’s AO extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear boundary of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. Operations in this area facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and maintain the desired tempo. Rear operations support close and deep operations. At the operational level, rear operations sustain current operations and prepare for the next phase of the campaign or major operation. At the tactical level, they enable the tempo of combat, assuring friendly forces have the agility to exploit any opportunity. 8-48. Rear operations typically include efforts that consolidate gains to make conditions created by deep and close operations more permanent. Corps and division rear CPs are generally responsible for rear operations. Rear operations typically include five broad activities: ⚫ Positioning and moving reserves. ⚫ Positioning and repositioning aviation, fire support, and air and missile defense units. ⚫ Conducting support area operations. ⚫ Securing sustainment and C2 nodes. ⚫ Controlling tactical-unit movement between corps and divisions or rear boundary and units conducting close operations. 8-49. There are several considerations for conducting rear operations: ⚫ C2. ⚫ Information collection activities to detect enemy forces. ⚫ Establishing and maintaining routes. ⚫ Terrain management. ⚫ Movement control. ⚫ Protecting critical friendly capabilities. ⚫ Information activities. ⚫ Infrastructure repair and improvement. ⚫ Defeating bypassed forces and continuing to consolidate gains. ⚫ Minimum-essential stability operations tasks: ▪ Establish civil security, which requires Army units to protect the population from violence and restore public order. ▪ Provide immediate needs, which requires Army units to ensure the population has food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment. ⚫ Coordinating with host-nation and multinational governmental organizations. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-11 Chapter 8 ⚫ Adjusting to shifts in the unit and subordinate rear boundaries. ⚫ Integrating new units into corps and divisions. 8-50. Intelligence support to rear operations focuses on ensuring operational and tactical gains achieved during operations are not lost and the tempo of operations in close and deep areas is maintained. IPOE and information requirements related to sustainment operations include but are not limited to— ⚫ Gaining and maintaining information concerning threat activities and intentions such as— ▪ Threat capabilities that may impact sustainment operations. ▪ Bypassed forces that may impact rear operations. ▪ Threat capabilities that may impact freedom of maneuver for friendly forces through the AO. ▪ Threat long-range fires capabilities. ⚫ Support to security activities. ⚫ Support to protection activities. ⚫ Activities to consolidate gains. ⚫ Support to developing and implementing stability mechanisms. ⚫ Key and decisive terrain associated with rear operations. ⚫ Support to echelons conducting consolidating gains activities. ⚫ Support to protection and security operations. ⚫ Support to information advantage activities. ⚫ Information gaps in rear operations intelligence and developing collection strategies to fill the gaps. SETTING CONDITIONS: ENABLING OPERATIONS 8-51. There are many important aspects of offensive and defensive operations, including enabling operations. An enabling operation is an operation that sets the friendly conditions required for mission accomplishment (FM 3-90). The nine types of enabling operations are— ⚫ Reconnaissance. ⚫ Countermobility. ⚫ Security operations. ⚫ Mobility. ⚫ Troop movement ⚫ Tactical deception. ⚫ Relief in place. ⚫ Linkup. ⚫ Passage of lines. 8-52. Reconnaissance and security operations are the enabling operations most important to the intelligence warfighting function. In combat, seizing the initiative involves conducting reconnaissance, maintaining security, conducting defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively, and setting the conditions to prevail. Reconnaissance 8-53. Commanders normally assign reconnaissance objectives, which can be a specific geographic location, a specific enemy activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked. Reconnaissance objectives can focus on any operational or mission variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. Therefore, every reconnaissance is different and there is no general list of information requirements. The following are the five types of reconnaissance operations: ⚫ Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (FM 3-90). Commanders assign a zone reconnaissance when they need additional information on a zone before committing other forces. ⚫ Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (FM 3-90). This area may consist of a single location, such as a town, a ridgeline, a forest, an airhead, a bridge, an installation, or any other critical operational feature such as obstacles. 8-12 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations ⚫ Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (FM 3-90). The route may be a road, highway, trail, mobility corridor, AA, or axis of advance. The reconnaissance effort provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy, adversary, and civilian activity along the route. ⚫ Reconnaissance in force is a form of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information (FM 3-90). Battalion-sized task forces or larger organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force. Commanders assign this operation when an enemy force is operating within an area, and they cannot obtain adequate information about the enemy force by other means. ⚫ Special reconnaissance is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance provides an additional capability for commanders and supplements other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. 8-54. Table 8-1 shows the echelon/type of unit that can conduct the types of reconnaissance operations. Table 8-1. Types of reconnaissance operations and dedicated reconnaissance units Type of Scout Troop or Cavalry Air cavalry BCT Division SOF reconnaissance platoon company squadron Zone X X X X X Area X X X X X Route X X X Reconnaissance in X X X force (if reinforced) Special X BCT brigade combat team SOF special operations forces 8-55. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. During any type of reconnaissance, the commander may require information about a specific aspect of the AO. To obtain this information the commander may direct a specific focus task that typically requires using an organization uniquely trained and equipped for the mission. The following include focus tasks: ⚫ Electromagnetic reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic reconnaissance supports information collection at brigade and higher echelons using assigned EW personnel and capabilities. Information obtained through electromagnetic reconnaissance assists the commander with situational understanding and can support SIGINT activities. Electromagnetic reconnaissance may result in EP modifications or lead to an EA against enemy capabilities. Regarding the EMS, commanders use electromagnetic reconnaissance assets to identify enemy attempts to regain the initiative, readjust targeting priorities and fire support plans, and keep adversaries on the defensive. (See FM 3-12.) ⚫ Engineer reconnaissance includes missions to obtain information about the infrastructure, terrain, or threat. This may include data on obstacles, gap crossing sites, airfields, bridges, tunnels, roads, and trails. Engineer units do not have designated reconnaissance teams. Engineer reconnaissance is directed and task-organized based on mission requirements using assets that would otherwise support other engineer missions. (See ATP 3-34.81.) ⚫ CBRN reconnaissance includes missions to obtain information on suspected or confirmed CBRN threats and hazards in an assigned area. CBRN reconnaissance identifies indicators of enemy CBRN production or employment, and indicators related to civilian or industrial facilities that could be weaponized or produce hazards when damaged or destroyed. (See ATP 3-11.37.) ⚫ Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events (JP 3-57). Civil reconnaissance verifies or refutes civil information, supports OE assessments, and detects and monitors changes in the civil component. It is conducted over time through routine engagements and patterned civil observations using active and passive sensors, virtual sensors, and other means. (See FM 3-57.) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-13 Chapter 8 Security Operations 8-56. The main difference between conducting security operations and reconnaissance is that security operations orient on the force or facility being protected while reconnaissance orients on the enemy and terrain. Security operations aim to protect a force from surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. Commanders conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of their forces, which may be moving or stationary. Their goal is to determine the enemy’s COA and assist the main body in defeating enemy forces. For security operations, economy of force is often considered during planning. The following are the four types of security operations: ⚫ Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, installation routes and actions within a specific area (FM 3-90). The security force may be protecting the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure within a unit’s assigned area. ⚫ Cover is a type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). A force tasked to cover may do so offensively or defensively. ⚫ Guard is a type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). Units performing a guard cannot operate independently. They rely on fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. A force tasked to guard may do so offensively and defensively. ⚫ Screen is a type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force (ADP 3-90). Screens provide less protection than guards or covers. Screen missions are defensive in nature and accomplished by establishing a series of observation posts and patrols to ensure observation of the assigned area. The screen force gains and maintains enemy contact consistent with the OPORD and destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance units by conducting counterreconnaissance. 8-57. Main body commanders designate the size of the security force and its mission. This designation determines the limit of the security forces’ responsibilities to perform screen, guard, cover, and area security operations. Table 8-2 shows the typical sizes of security forces at various echelons in relation to their missions. The limited capabilities of most maneuver platoons prohibit them from having a mission separate from their parent company; scout platoons are the exception to this rule. Table 8-2. Typical security force echelon for a given mission and echelon Security mission Echelon Guard Screen Cover Advance Flank or rear Echelons above corps (joint force land CAB, armored BCT, Reinforced corps or CAB, armored BCT, or Reinforced corps or components or numbered Stryker BCT division Stryker BCT division Army) Division, armored BCT, CAB, combined arms Division, armored BCT, Stryker BCT, combined Reinforced division or Corps battalion, battalion task Stryker BCT arms battalion, battalion armored BCT force task force Reinforced cavalry Cavalry squadron, Reinforced cavalry squadron, combined Division combined arms battalion, Reinforced BCT squadron or BCT arms battalion, or or battalion task force battalion task force Reinforced combined BCT Company team Battalion task force arms battalion, or battalion task force Battalion task force Scout platoon BCT brigade combat team CAB combat aviation brigade 8-14 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS (FRIENDLY) 8-58. Enemy commanders conducting offensive operations identify probable enemy objectives and possible enemy avenues of approach (AAs) to achieve them. The G-2/S-2 must understand enemy capabilities in all domains; this is critical to devising the most effective friendly defensive schemes. Identifying enemy limitations assists in determining opportunities to exploit friendly advantages. Enemy forces employ reconnaissance, EW, information warfare, and other capabilities during offensive operations. Figure 8-3 depicts a notional enemy offensive operation. Figure 8-3. Notional enemy offensive operation 8-59. During friendly defensive operations, enemy forces employ precision fires, other long-range fires, and nonlethal capabilities (such as cyberspace and EW) to attack friendly C2 and key supporting and sustaining capabilities. Friendly forces aim to prepare defensive positions and set conditions while the enemy attempts to set the timing of, location of, and conditions for battle. The three basic friendly defensive operations are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. Successful defenses apply the following characteristics (see ADP 3-90): ⚫ Disruption—deceiving or destroying enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up combat formations, separating echelons, and impeding an enemy force’s ability to synchronize its combined arms. ⚫ Flexibility—developing plans that anticipate a range of enemy actions and allocate resources accordingly. ⚫ Maneuver—achieving and exploiting a position of physical advantage over an enemy force. ⚫ Mass and concentration—creating overwhelming combat power at specific locations to support the main effort. ⚫ Depth—engaging multiple enemy echelons, enemy long-range fires, sustainment, and C2. ⚫ Preparation—preparing the defense before attacking enemy forces arrive. ⚫ Security—conducting security, protection, information activities, OPSEC, and cyberspace and EW tasks. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-15 Chapter 8 AREA DEFENSE 8-60. Area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). Area defense can occur at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. The area defense focuses on retaining terrain where the bulk of a defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The operation focuses fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack. Commanders can use their reserve to reinforce fires, add depth, block, or restore a position by counterattack; seize the initiative; and destroy enemy forces. Units at all echelons can conduct an area defense. (See FM 3-90 for the advantages and disadvantages of using a defense in depth and a forward defense during the conduct of an area defense.) MOBILE DEFENSE 8-61. Mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). Mobile defense is more often associated with the operational level of warfare. The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying an enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by a striking force—a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk of available combat power (ADP 3-90). A fixing force—a force designated to supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from moving from a specific area for a specific time (ADP 3-90)—supplements the striking force by holding attacking enemy forces in position to help channel attacking enemy forces into ambush areas and to retain areas from which to launch the striking force. 8-62. A mobile defense requires an AO with considerable depth. Commanders shape their battlefields, causing an enemy force to overextend its lines of communications, expose its flanks, and dissipate its combat power. Commanders move friendly forces around and behind an enemy force to cut off and destroy them. A division or higher echelon normally executes a mobile defense. BCTs and maneuver battalions participate in a mobile defense as part of a striking force or fixing force. RETROGRADE 8-63. Retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). A retrograde can take place at the tactical or operational levels of warfare. An enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The higher echelon commander of a force executing a retrograde must approve the retrograde before its initiation. A retrograde is a transitional operation. It is not conducted in isolation. It is always part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. 8-64. The following are the three forms of the retrograde: ⚫ Delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged (ADP 3-90). In delays, units yield ground to gain time while retaining flexibility and freedom of action to inflict the maximum damage on an enemy. ⚫ Withdraw is to disengage from an enemy force and move in a direction away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). Withdrawing units, whether all or part of a committed force, voluntarily disengage from an enemy to preserve the force or release it for a new mission. ⚫ Retirement is when a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). 8-65. In each form of retrograde, a force not in contact with an enemy moves to another location, normally by a tactical road march. In all retrograde operations, firm control of friendly maneuver elements is a prerequisite for success. 8-16 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 8-66. Before a battle, commanders at all echelons require intelligence and combat information. IPOE and information requirements may include— ⚫ The composition, equipment, intent, strengths, vulnerabilities, and scheme of maneuver of the attacking enemy force. ⚫ The location, direction, and speed of enemy reconnaissance elements. ⚫ The location and activities of enemy units and reserves. ⚫ Enemy C2 and communications facilities. ⚫ The location of enemy fire support and air defense systems with associated C2 networks. 8-67. The G-2 uses the operations process’ prepare activity to complete information collection integration and synchronization. Corps and divisions rely on joint and national systems to detect and track targets beyond their limited organic capabilities. The corps headquarters employs available collection assets to refine its knowledge of the terrain, weather, and civil considerations within the area of influence. Collection assets identify friendly vulnerabilities and key defensible terrain. The division headquarters conducts periodic information collection of any unassigned areas to prevent the enemy from exploiting those areas to achieve surprise. 8-68. Commanders continuously refine the enemy portion of the COP throughout their AOIs as part of deep operations. They focus their information collection efforts on key geographical areas and enemy capabilities of particular concern using NAIs. Figure 8-4 depicts a situation template of enemy forces in an offensive operation; the friendly forces in figure 8-4 provide context. 8-69. Surveillance of the AOIs and effective reconnaissance are necessary to acquire targets and to verify and evaluate potential enemy COAs and capabilities. Information collection efforts focus on validating when, where, and with what strength the enemy will attack. This allows commanders to identify opportune times to conduct spoiling attacks and reposition forces. 8-70. Intelligence supports friendly force efforts to protect the force, disburse and reassemble the force as necessary, and answer requirements on when, where, and in what strength the enemy will attack. This intelligence supports decisions on setting the defense, employing various capabilities, repositioning forces, conducting counterattacks, and when possible, transitioning to offensive operations. Figure 8-4. Situation template depicting enemy forces in the offense (example) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-17 Chapter 8 8-71. Table 8-3 depicts IPOE and information requirements generally associated with friendly defensive operations. Table 8-3. IPOE and information requirements associated with defensive operations (friendly) Determine the likely purpose (for example, terrain- or force-oriented) and type of enemy offense. Determine the likely enemy end state, objectives, decision points, culmination point, strengths, vulnerabilities, and scheme of maneuver. Identify military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) and weather effects that support enemy offensive operations: Favorable ground corridors and air avenues of approach (including for the use of drone swarms and drone delivered munitions). Areas with significant concealment and/or cover. Terrain, including subterranean, that allows forces to bypass obstacles and friendly positions. (See ATP 3-21.51.) Infiltration routes. Landing zones (manned and unmanned aircraft systems). Favorable weather effects (such as visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover/ceilings, temperature, thermal crossover, humidity, and atmospheric pressure) for friendly systems relative to enemy systems. Favorable weather for the use of obscuration or chemical weapons. Identify military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) and weather effects that support friendly defensive operations: Terrain that allows friendly forces to tie obstacles to existing terrain features to supports friendly defensive positions. Favorable air and ground avenues of approach for a counterattack. Terrain that canalizes enemy attacking forces. Favorable weather effects (such as visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover/ceilings, temperature, thermal crossover, humidity, and atmospheric pressure) for enemy systems relative to friendly systems. Identify the location of enemy assembly areas, ammunition and logistics nodes, forward aviation locations, and likely movement routes into the friendly area of operations. Template and track the composition, disposition, likely routes, and time phase lines of reconnaissance and surveillance, security, advanced engineering, infiltrating, and air assault units (most include intelligence handover lines). Template and track the composition, disposition, likely routes, and time phase lines of advance guard, main body, antitank, reserve, and second echelon units. Template and track specific locations where the enemy will conduct key maneuver tasks, such as occupying support by fire positions and dismounting infantry, or where friendly units may be isolated in defensive positions due to enemy use of artillery scatterable mines. Determine the likely use and template the location of enemy command and control nodes, long-range fires, artillery and rocket units, air defense systems, attack helicopter units, close air support, engineer units, CBRN units, electromagnetic warfare assets, and special operations forces. Determine the likely use of enemy information warfare, cyberattacks, and denial and deception operations; likely impacts to friendly, threat, and neutral forces; and impacts of misinformation and disinformation on local, regional, and international audiences. Determine the impact of significant civil considerations on friendly and enemy operations such as hindering movement on lines of communications, medical and health considerations, criminal activity, and the housing and feeding of a displaced population. ATP Army techniques publication CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment 8-72. Table 8-4 depicts IPOE and information requirements generally associated with each of the three types of friendly defensive operations. Table 8-4. IPOE and information requirements associated with each defensive operation type Area defense The intelligence staff leads the rest of the staff in identifying when, where, with what strength, and how the enemy will attack across domains and potentially engaging one or more dimensions. This allows the commander to identify opportune times to conduct spoiling attacks and reposition forces. The entire staff also identifies threats to support and rear areas, such as enemy special purpose forces and irregular activities, which may interfere with control of the defense. Besides the IPOE and information requirements identified in table 8-3, conducting area defense operations includes considering the following requirements: Identify the location of natural lines of resistance, well-defined avenues of approach, intervisibility lines, cover and concealment, and other terrain features that support area defense. (See ATP 2-01.3.) Determine whether the terrain better supports a forward defense or a defense in depth. Consider cyberspace, space, information advantage activities, and EW capabilities that enable friendly defensive operations while also defending against those same threat capabilities. Mobile defense Besides IPOE and information requirements, conducting mobile defense operations includes considering the following requirements: Likely locations where the threat can employ fire support coordination measures to turn or block friendly forces executing the mobile defense. Likely locations where the enemy can expose its flanks and dissipate its combat power. Likely times when and locations where the friendly commander can launch a spoiling attack. Where and when friendly force combat power is greater than enemy force combat power. Likely locations where the commander can employ striking and fixing forces based on the enemy’s scheme of maneuver. 8-18 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations Table 8-4. IPOE and information requirements associated with each defensive operation type (continued) Retrograde The intelligence staff leads the rest of the staff in analyzing the terrain, including ground and air avenues of approach, to determine the best routes for both the friendly force retrograde and the likely enemy exploitation or pursuit operation. Besides IPOE and information requirements, conducting a retrograde operation includes considering the following requirements: Identify possible routes friendly forces can use to conduct retrograde operations. Identify possible hasty defensive positions in zone that facilitate attrition of the enemy. Identify possible pursuit routes enemy forces may use. Identify blocking points enemy forces may use to prevent the retrograde. Determine how enemy forces can exploit friendly retrograde operations (consider local, regional, and international audiences). ATP Army techniques publication IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (FRIENDLY) 8-73. The enemy employs two types of defenses: ⚫ A maneuver defense trades terrain for the opportunity to destroy portions of an opponent’s formation and render the opponent’s combat system ineffective. ⚫ In an area defense, the enemy denies key areas to friendly forces. 8-74. In most situations against a peer or superior opponent, enemy forces are willing to surrender terrain to preserve their major combat forces since the loss of those forces threatens the survival of the enemy’s state or regime. Figure 8-5 depicts a notional enemy maneuver defense. Figure 8-5. Notional enemy maneuver defense 8-75. During friendly offensive operations, enemy forces in the defense attempt to disrupt friendly activities by employing precision fires, other long-range fires, and nonlethal capabilities (like cyberspace and EW). Therefore, friendly forces strive to conduct the necessary movements, prepare logistical support, and set other conditions while the enemy attempts to prevent friendly forces from effectively synchronizing adequate combat power. The four basic friendly offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Successful offenses apply the following characteristics (see ADP 3-90): ⚫ Audacity—the ability to assume risk to create opportunity with bold action. ⚫ Concentration—orchestrating forces or effects to create and exploit opportunity. (Concentrating effects is referred to as mass.) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-19 Chapter 8 ⚫ Surprise—taking action that catches enemy forces off guard. ⚫ Tempo—maintaining a pace of operations that is faster than the enemy’s but not so fast that it cannot be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve all assigned objectives. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT 8-76. Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation (FM 3-90). Commanders conduct a movement to contact when an enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. The goal of a movement to contact is to make initial contact with a small element while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the associated risk. A movement to contact employs purposeful and aggressive reconnaissance and security operations to gain contact with the enemy main body and develop the situation. The movement to contact force defeats enemy forces within its capability and creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. If the movement to contact force meets a superior force that it is unable to defeat, the movement to contact force conducts the security or defensive operations necessary to develop the situation further. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. Once an enemy force makes contact, the friendly commander has five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw. Subordinate forms of a movement to contact include search and attack, and cordon and search operations. ATTACK 8-77. An attack a type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or secures terrain (FM 3-90). Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by fires. A commander may describe an attack as hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. A commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires (including EW, offensive cyberspace operations, and information advantage activities), based on an analysis of the mission variables. An attack differs from a movement to contact because in an attack, commanders know at least part of an enemy’s dispositions. This knowledge enables commanders to better synchronize and more effectively employ combat power. Subordinate forms of the attack have special purposes. They include the tasks of ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack. The commander’s intent and the mission variables determine which of these forms of attack to employ. Commanders conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation. EXPLOITATION 8-78. An exploitation is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-90). An exploitation seeks to disintegrate enemy forces, so they have no alternative but to surrender or retreat. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher headquarters normally plan exploitations as a branch or sequel. PURSUIT 8-79. A pursuit is a type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (FM 3-90). A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, if enemy resistance breaks down and the enemy begins fleeing the battlefield, any offensive operation can transition into a pursuit. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control. Bold action and calculated initiative are required in the conduct of a pursuit. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (FRIENDLY) 8-80. The information collection effort assists commanders in deciding when and where to concentrate combat power. Collection assets answer the corps or division commander’s intelligence requirements, which flow from IPOE and the war-gaming process. Important IPOE and information requirements may include— ⚫ Enemy centers of gravity or decisive points. ⚫ Location, orientation, and strength of enemy defenses. ⚫ Location of enemy reserves, fire support, and other attack assets to support defensive positions. 8-20 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations ⚫ Enemy air AAs and likely enemy engagement areas. ⚫ Key terrain, AAs, and obstacles. 8-81. The G-2 identifies threats to corps and division support and rear areas, such as enemy special purpose forces, enemy bypassed conventional forces, and irregular activities that may interfere with corps or division support and rear activities. 8-82. The G-2 integrates and synchronizes unified action partner capabilities into the collection effort. The G-2 recommends specific reconnaissance tasks for corps- or division-controlled reconnaissance forces, realizing the commander may task these forces to conduct offensive operations or other tactical enabling tasks. A focused approach to allocating collection assets maximizes the capability of the limited number of assets available to corps or divisions. 8-83. The G-3 synchronizes information collection operations with combat operations to ensure all corps and division information collection provides timely information to support operations. The G-3 tasks collection assets to support the targeting process. Collection assets locate targets identified in the AGM and call for fires. The fires cell may engage targets to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects. 8-84. MI units and systems conduct intelligence operations to locate enemy units and systems. SIGINT and EW systems usually operate with the covering force and flank guard. The covering force commander directs EW against enemy C2 and fire support networks. The commander may use electromagnetic deception to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main body. Space-based and cyberspace systems and activities also support the security force in locating and determining the presence of enemy disruption forces, contact forces, and shielding forces. 8-85. Intelligence identifies when and where the enemy will concentrate combat power, find gaps and vulnerabilities in enemy defenses, and predict how the enemy will conduct counterattacks and other tactics across the domains and dimensions. This intelligence supports decisions on conducting information collection, executing long-range fires, penetrating enemy security areas, overcoming obstacles, avoiding enemy strengths, defeating enemy counterattacks, and when possible, transitioning to exploitation or pursuit. Figure 8-6 depicts a threat template of enemy forces in the defense. Figure 8-6. Threat template of enemy forces in the defense (example) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-21 Chapter 8 8-86. Table 8-5 depicts IPOE and information requirements generally associated with friendly offensive operations. Table 8-5. IPOE and information requirements associated with offensive operations (friendly) Determine the likely purpose and type of enemy defense: area defense, mobile defense, or retrograde. Determine the likely enemy’s likely end state, objectives, decision points, culmination point, strengths, vulnerabilities, and scheme of maneuver. Synchronize efforts to gain and maintain relative advantages and maintain tempo. Identify military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) and weather effects that support enemy defensive operations: Terrain that allows reconnaissance and security outposts to be arranged in depth along choke points and terrain features that canalize friendly forces to attrite our forces and diminish our combat power in depth. Terrain, including subterranean, that allows the enemy to tie obstacles to existing terrain features to support enemy defensive positions. (See ATP 3-21.51.) Favorable air and ground avenues of approach for an enemy counterattack (including for the use of drone swarms and drone delivered munitions). Terrain that canalizes friendly attacking forces. Favorable weather effects (such as visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover/ceilings, temperature, thermal crossover, humidity, and atmospheric pressure) for enemy systems relative to friendly systems. Identify terrain military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) and weather effects that support friendly offensive operations: Favorable ground and air mobility corridors. Areas with significant concealment and/or cover. Terrain that allows forces to bypass obstacles and enemy positions. Infiltration routes. Landing zones (manned and unmanned aircraft systems). Favorable weather effects (such as visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover/ceilings, temperature, thermal crossover, humidity, and atmospheric pressure) for friendly systems relative to enemy systems, and favorable weather for using obscuration or chemical weapons. Identify the location and orientation of enemy counterreconnaissance and security units, obstacles, engagement areas, main battle areas, reserve units, and likely counterattack routes (most incorporate intelligence handover lines). Within each enemy defensive area, identify specific primary, secondary, tertiary locations of enemy infantry, armor, antitank, mortar, and other units and systems, and the potential use of camouflage. Determine the likely use and identify the location of enemy command and control nodes, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, long-range fires, artillery and rocket units, air defense systems, rotary aviation units, close air support, engineer units, ammunition and logistics nodes, CBRN units, electromagnetic warfare assets, and special operations forces. Determine the likely use of enemy information warfare, cyberattacks, and denial and deception operations; likely impacts to friendly, threat, and neutral forces; and impacts of misinformation and disinformation on local, regional, and international audiences. Determine the impact of significant civil considerations on friendly and enemy operations such as hindering movement on lines of communications, medical and health considerations, criminal activity, and the housing and feeding of a displaced population. ATP Army techniques publication CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment 8-87. Table 8-6 depicts IPOE and information requirements generally associated with each of the four types of friendly offensive operations. Table 8-6. IPOE and information requirements associated with each offensive operation type Movement to contact A thorough IPOE and war-gaming effort indicates areas where contact with the enemy is likely as well as friendly and enemy vulnerabilities by phase of the operation. Besides the IPOE and information requirements identified in table 8-5, movement to contact includes considering the following requirements: Intent and likely locations for enemy reconnaissance and security Likely enemy use of a feint or deception. forces. Indications that the enemy is still conducting movement. This could Likely observation post locations. turn the operation into a meeting engagement or cause friendly Likely enemy defensive locations with close obstacles and forces to employ a hasty defense. engagement areas. Likely electromagnetic warfare, cyberspace, and space targets as Likely enemy activities in friendly rear areas. well as the type and disposition of sensors in each domain. Attack Besides IPOE and information requirements, attack includes considering the following requirements: Known and likely enemy defensive locations with likely purpose and use of close obstacles and engagement areas. Known and likely enemy command and control and communications nodes and systems. Known and likely electromagnetic warfare, cyberspace, and space targets. Exploitation Besides IPOE and information requirements, exploitation includes considering the following requirements: Likely locations where friendly forces can interdict enemy reinforcements or second echelon forces through fires and subsequent operations. Enemy reserve or second echelon and logistic units. Enemy long-range artillery, missile systems, and associated fires units. 8-22 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations Table 8-6. IPOE and information requirements associated with each offensive operation type (continued) Pursuit Any rapid decision making to support a pursuit uses IPOE planning and products from the original offensive operation and the appropriate branch or sequel planning. Besides IPOE and information requirements, pursuit includes considering the following requirements: Identify ground and air avenues of approach to determine the best routes for retreating enemy forces. Identify locations that second echelon enemy forces may reinforce retreating enemy forces. IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment SECTION IV – INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT: DEVELOPING THE SITUATION Note. This section focuses on tactical intelligence support during a large-scale combat operation from completion of RSOI through a series of tactical engagements. The discussion assumes familiarity with the doctrinal content in chapters 1 through 7 and sections I through III of this chapter. 8-88. From RSOI to the first engagement (often in the form of close combat), the commander and staff may largely focus on countering threat capabilities, preserving combat power, and protecting friendly units as friendly forces set conditions for the first engagement—preferably from a position of relative advantage. Friendly forces are under continuous threat observation and contact, and the threat has several means to disrupt and desynchronize friendly operations. Theater army and corps collection assets are likely in contact with enemy forces. These echelons provide intelligence support to tactical echelons throughout deployment and the completion of RSOI. However, tactical echelons should not assume they will receive perfect intelligence support; it is important for them to quickly gain and maintain contact, in terms of information collection, with the enemy. Gaining contact is each echelon’s first step in developing the situation to strive for situational understanding and attempt to find a position of relative advantage. 8-89. Key aspects of developing the situation within the intelligence warfighting function include the following: ⚫ Effective staff integration. ⚫ Effective intelligence requires the extension of the intelligence architecture to tactical units as they move and prepare for their first engagement. ⚫ A thorough understanding of threat TTP, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations is crucial. ⚫ An understanding of time and space and their relationship to the employment of friendly and threat capabilities. ⚫ A thoroughly developed and flexible information collection plan. ⚫ A successful information collection plan begins with identifying the right requirements. ⚫ Together, commanders, staffs, and subordinate units strive and constantly adjust to develop and execute a layered, phased, continuous, and aggressive information collection plan. 8-90. During this period, tactical echelons may potentially face a high tempo, many unit movements, and the need to conduct planning within a relatively short time. They may resort to using the RDSP and overlay orders or a series of FRAGORDs with a plan for multiple branches and sequels, depending on the tempo. The commander indicates when, in what format, and the focus of the different staff products; it is vital for tactical echelons to remain focused on meeting the commander’s needs. 8-91. When facing these pressures, it is crucial to apply operational and intelligence doctrinal fundamentals to execute the operations process. Although there are means of abbreviating the different intelligence processes and tasks, intelligence personnel must ensure they conduct each step of these processes and tasks—even if abbreviated. Staff collaboration and integration, accounting for the mission variables, and thoughtful war- gaming are more important than producing every operational and intelligence product to the highest standard. 8-92. The entire intelligence process applies in providing tactical intelligence support during a large-scale combat operation; however, the rest of this section focuses on three important aspects of tactical intelligence: thoroughly integrated planning, intelligence synchronization and effective information collection, and producing focused and tailored intelligence. (See figure 8-7 on page 8-24.) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 8-23 Chapter 8 Figure 8-7. Key aspects of tactical intelligence THOROUGHLY INTEGRATED PLANNING 8-93. As much as possible, planning before deployment and at higher echelons reduces the pressure imposed on tactical units about to move to their first engagement. For the intelligence warfighting function, IPOE and participation in the MDMP are important, but there is more to intelligence planning than IPOE. Staff teamwork and collaboration are critical to intelligence planning, especially during this difficult phase of operations. Thoroughly integrated planning focuses on— ⚫ The tactical portion of the intelligence architecture. ⚫ IPOE and information requirements. ⚫ Target development. TACTICAL PORTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 8-94. Conditions from RSOI through close combat degrade a Soldiers’ and units’ abilities to revise the existing intelligence architecture and extend the tactical portion of the architecture. The lethal, fluid, and chaotic nature of combat causes the greatest stress on the intelligence architecture. This level of stress cannot be replicated in training environments, CP exercises, or field training exercises; therefore, leaders and Soldiers must exercise flexibility, adaptability, and creativity to establish and revise the intelligence architecture during operations. These traits must be reflected in tactical intelligence architectures. 8-24 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations 8-95. Frequent CP movements with short halts challenge units’ abilities to reestablish the intelligence architecture. Integrating new personnel—for example, when personnel arrive as replacements for lost or undeployable personnel—can challenge. These personnel may require unit-oriented training or specified network certifications not previously received, and they must quickly familiarize themselves with local SOPs. 8-96. Adverse weather and terrain conditions in the AO can negatively affect Soldiers’ and units’ abilities to establish and revise an intelligence architecture. Weather, such as extreme temperatures (hot and cold), extreme winds, and dust can adversely affect equipment performance and impede Soldiers’ abilities to perform intelligence architecture related tasks in exposed conditions. Restrictive terrain can also adversely affect the intelligence architecture. For example, line-of-sight communications blocked by intervening terrain or limited space available for locating a CP may force units to locate intelligence systems in inconvenient locations. 8-97. Enemy and threat actions against U.S. and multinational partner communications can threaten and adversely affect intelligence architecture operations. Spare parts and replacement systems may not be available to maintain components or replace damaged or destroyed physical components of the intelligence architecture. Enemy cyberspace attacks and EAs can also degrade the intelligence architecture. 8-98. These conditions and situations that can occur during operations are not all-inclusive. When planning the intelligence architecture during ongoing operations, the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff must consider these factors as well as— ⚫ Developing, managing, and revising the intelligence architecture as mission requirements change. ⚫ The survivability and resiliency of systems and networks. ⚫ The redundancy of systems and networks. ⚫ Contingencies and PACE planning in the event of the physical destruction of systems and networks. ⚫ DDIL communications environments. 8-99. Planning as well as practiced unit drills can anticipate the integration of new units once in theater. Contested communications environments require active, aggressive communications security measures and activities. Flexible, adaptive, and creative thinking and actions can mitigate many of the challenges and risks to intelligence architectures. For example— ⚫ Creatively using systems to reroute data and information can overcome transport obstacles and challenges in a DDIL communications environment. ⚫ Prioritizing and tailoring data and information to the right point at the right time can ease transport congestion. ⚫ Ensuring noncommissioned officers are trained as trainers and have effective, practiced training plans can assist in integrating new Soldiers, especially once the unit is deployed in theater. Note. The G-2/S-2 must articulate how the intelligence architecture supports the commander’s objectives and desired end state. Successful tactical operations depend on the commander’s understanding of the intelligence warfighting function (including the intelligence architecture) and integration of intelligence into operations. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 8-100. For the commander and staff, IPOE is critical to understanding the OE and setting the conditions for successful operations. Pre-mission analysis of the OE facilitates effective IPOE. During the MDMP, the intelligence staff leads IPOE and conducts continuous intelligence analysis to understand the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat capabilities. For example, threat databases and signatures developed during pre-mission analysis of the OE assist in assessing threat capabilities and vulnerabilities during IPOE. This information facilitates operational planning during the MDMP a