ATP 2-01.3 Chapter 3: Define Operational Environment PDF

PART TWO Fundamental Task Techniques Chapter 3 Step 1—Define the Operational Environment WHAT IS IT? 3-1. During step 1 of the IPOE process, the intelligence staff identifies for further analysis the significant...

PART TWO Fundamental Task Techniques Chapter 3 Step 1—Define the Operational Environment WHAT IS IT? 3-1. During step 1 of the IPOE process, the intelligence staff identifies for further analysis the significant characteristics of or activities within the OE that may influence friendly and threat COAs and command decisions, as well as the physical space the mission will occupy. +Within an OE, Army forces may face large- scale ground combat operations, which simultaneously encompass multiple domains, military engagements, and populations. Examples 1 and 2 portray planning scenarios. Example 1 During planning for a foreign humanitarian assistance mission, a brigade S-2 identifies five ethnic groups with armed militias that have attacked each other, as well as host-nation security forces, in the past 12 months. In the last month, a rocket-propelled grenade shot down a host-nation military helicopter. The militias have not attacked any of the nongovernmental aid organizations in the area. The brigade S-2 identifies each of these groups as a threat. There is no information about these groups in the command’s intelligence data files nor in the higher headquarters’ data files to assist the brigade S-2 in developing valid potential COAs these groups may adopt when U.S. forces enter their AOs. The intelligence staff searches various organizations’ data files within the intelligence community and discovers that, while little is known about the threat characteristics of these militias, some information is available. Each militia is a company-sized element with various types of small arms and crew-served weapons, mortars, demolitions, and antiarmor rockets. It is unknown whether these militias have any ADA. The brigade S-2 initiates a request for collection on the current locations, dispositions, strengths, and capabilities of these militias. Since the information will not be available during IPOE, the brigade S-2 determines possible threat COAs based on what the brigade S-2 knows and assumes about the threat, ensuring the commander and the rest of the staff understand what is known and assumed. As intelligence related to the request for collection arrives, the brigade S-2 updates threat COAs and informs the commander and the rest of the staff. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 3-1 Chapter 3 Example 2 During planning for an attack, a brigade S-2 identifies the enemy has an attack helicopter squadron that could threaten the friendly mission. When developing the threat situation template, the brigade S-2 includes the reported location of the attack helicopter battalion, air attack corridors that could be used to support the enemy defense, and forward arming and refueling points. The brigade S-2 also generates requests for collection to locate and track these assets to support the command’s targeting operations. SO WHAT? 3-2. The “so what” of step 1 is to clearly define for commanders the relevant characteristics of their AOIs: ⚫ Outcome of success: Success results in time and effort saved by focusing only on those characteristics that influence friendly COAs and command decisions. ⚫ Consequences of failure: ◼ Failure to focus on only the significant characteristics leads to wasted time and effort collecting and evaluating intelligence on OE characteristics that do not influence the operation. ◼ Staff failure to identify all significant characteristics in all domains relevant to the OE may lead to the command’s surprise and unpreparedness when some overlooked feature of the OE affects the operation for which the commander did not plan. HOW TO DO IT: THE PROCESS 3-3. Defining the OE consists of the substeps and outputs shown in figure 3-1. Figure 3-1. Substeps and outputs of step 1 of the IPOE process 3-2 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 1—Define the Operational Environment IDENTIFY THE LIMITS OF THE COMMANDER’S AREA OF OPERATIONS 3-4. Area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for the land and maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). The AO comprises an external boundary that delineates adjacent units AOs and includes subordinate unit AOs. Subordinate unit AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous. 3-5. Within an AO, commanders conduct decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to articulate an operation in terms of purpose. Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish the shifting and prioritization of resources. The AO may be impacted due to political boundaries and/or other civil considerations. Once assigned, an AO can be subdivided by that command, as necessary, to support mission requirements. Figure 3-2 illustrates contiguous AOs. (See FM 3-0 for more information on AOs and decisive, shaping, and operational operations.) Figure 3-2. Area of operations examples IDENTIFY THE LIMITS OF THE COMMANDER’S AREA OF INTEREST 3-6. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). The AOI also includes areas occupied by threat forces who could jeopardize mission accomplishment. An area of influence is an area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). The area of influence includes terrain inside and outside the AO and is determined by both the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 3-3 Chapter 3 3-7. The AOI is— ⚫ Established by the commander with input from the G-2/S-2 or G-3/S-3. The operational and mission variables must be considered. ⚫ An area normally larger than or outside the area of influence that directly impacts the AO; therefore, possibly requiring more intelligence assets to monitor. It may include staging areas. ⚫ An area that may be irregular in shape or noncontiguous and can overlap the areas of adjacent and subordinate unit AOs. ⚫ An area that assists in determining NAIs during step 4 of the IPOE process. 3-8. An AOI is the geographical area from which information is required to facilitate planning and the successful conduct of the command’s operation. The area changes as the situation changes and as commanders determine new information requirements. It includes any threat forces or characteristics that significantly influence accomplishing the command’s mission. In combat operations, the AOI extends into threat territory to the objectives of current or planned friendly operations if those objectives are located outside the assigned AO. In stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks, the AOI is typically much larger than that defined for combat operations. 3-9. In establishing the limits of an AOI, time is one of the primary considerations. Time limits should be based not only on the threat’s mobility but also on the amount of time needed to accomplish the friendly mission. For example, if the command estimates that it will take two days to accomplish the friendly mission, the AOI must encompass all threat forces and activities that could influence accomplishing the command’s mission within the two days. Additional considerations when establishing AOI limits include but are not limited to— ⚫ Dividing the AOI into several components (for example, ground AOI, air AOI, subterranean AOI, and cyberspace AOI). Such a division accommodates the types of information relevant to each AOI as well as each AOI’s different geographical limits. At some point, it may be necessary to integrate the various AOIs into a whole in order to present a holistic picture to the commander. One method of illustrating and articulating the AOI is the use of overlays to depict the relevant aspects of the AOI. For example, a threat force outside the AO may have capabilities that reside in or are employed in each of the domains. An overlay depicting this threat’s capabilities (one relevant aspect of the AOI) can be layered with other relevant aspects to show a holistic view. ⚫ Threats to mission accomplishment that may also cross into neutral terrain countries. For example, if political decisions in a neutral terrain country may influence the accomplishment of a unit’s mission, include that country within the limits of the AOI. Likewise, if a segment of the population in a neutral terrain country provides a support base to forces that oppose the command’s mission, include that country within the AOI. ⚫ Technological advances. Due to technological advances in communications, such as social media and global media organizations, commanders are likely to witness increased visibility of friendly operations. This may lead to an increase in neutral and threat actions caused by friendly operations. Considering this, it is important to analyze how civil considerations and the dissemination of information may affect operations (see paragraphs 3-19 through 3-22). Analyzing the AO Based on the AOI Effects By analyzing the AO, as well as identifying and establishing an AOI, the commander and staff can determine how the relevant aspects of the AOI may impact the conduct of operations in the AO. This assists the commander in determining the required capabilities for mission accomplishment, identifying additional required capabilities, and requesting required capabilities in time to successfully impact operations. These required capabilities include the staff’s ability to execute warfighting functions. Commanders consider the extent of subordinates’ areas of influence when defining subordinates’ AOs. In identifying an AO, the staff should avoid making it substantially larger than the unit’s area of influence. Ideally, the area of influence encompasses the entire AO. The area of influence is useful to the commander to focus information collection operations, shape the battlefield, and facilitate future operations. 3-4 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 1—Define the Operational Environment IDENTIFY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND AREA OF INTEREST FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 3-10. In order to focus IPOE and what is important to the commander, the staff identifies and defines the characteristics of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations of the OE to determine the significance of each in relation to the mission—essentially building an environmental model as the framework for conducting and then presenting analysis to the commander. This prevents unnecessary analysis and allows the staff to dedicate and maximize resources in critical areas. The initial analysis that occurs in this substep determines the amount of time and resources the intelligence staff commits to the detailed analysis that occurs in step 2 of the IPOE process. 3-11. When identifying significant characteristics of the OE, the staff may be faced with analyzing aspects that transcend the AO—for example, analyzing a threat located outside the AO (and potentially outside the geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility) who will likely use cyberspace capabilities to affect friendly operations in the AO across multiple domains. Accounting for these actors and their capabilities and determining their relationships and interdependencies with systems and other actors in the OE significantly increase the effectiveness of analysis in subsequent IPOE steps and provide commanders with multiple options during the MDMP. 3-12. Additionally, the intelligence staff and other staff sections must consider threat forces and other aspects of the environment that may affect accomplishing the friendly mission. These include but are not limited to— ⚫ The area’s geography, terrain, and weather. ⚫ Population demographics (ethnic groups, religious groups, age distribution, income groups). ⚫ Political or socioeconomic factors, including the role of clans, tribes, religious organizations, criminal organizations, corruption, rule of law, gender, age, cultural groups, and ethnicity. ⚫ Infrastructures such as transportation or telecommunications. ⚫ Rules of engagement or legal restrictions such as international treaties, status of forces agreements, international sanctions, or United Nations charters. ⚫ Threat force capabilities, including, military, other foreign security forces, as well as paramilitary forces, criminal and terrorist organizations (transnational and local), and antigovernment groups. 3-13. The intelligence staff should— ⚫ Inspect each characteristic briefly to identify those of significance to the command and its mission. ⚫ Further evaluate the effects of each characteristic in later steps of the IPOE process. ⚫ Analyze each characteristic that may impact decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. ⚫ Evaluate each threat’s specific capabilities and determine probable COAs during later steps of the IPOE process. ENEMY 3-14. Analysis of the enemy includes not only the known enemy but also other threats to mission success, such as multiple threats posing with a wide array of political, economic, religious, and personal motivations. Additionally, threats may wear uniforms and be easily identifiable, blend into the population, and use either traditional threat capabilities (such as rifles or mortars) or nontraditional capabilities (such as computer networks and social media). To understand threat capabilities and vulnerabilities, commanders and staffs require detailed, timely, and accurate intelligence produced because of IPOE. TERRAIN AND WEATHER 3-15. It is important to identify the types of environments in which a unit will conduct operations. Terrain and weather are natural conditions of the environment that profoundly influence operations and the type of information collected. Terrain and weather favor neither the friendly nor the threat force unless one is more familiar with or better prepared to operate in the physical environment. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 3-5 Chapter 3 Terrain 3-16. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers, caves, valleys, and mountains) and man-made features (such as cities, subway tunnels, bunkers, airfields, and bridges). Terrain directly affects how commanders select objectives and locate, move, and control forces. Terrain also influences protective measures and the effectiveness of weapons and other systems. 3-17. The effective use of terrain reduces the effects of threat fires, increases the effects of friendly fires, and facilitates surprise. Terrain appreciation—the ability to predict its impact on operations—is an important skill for every leader. For tactical operations, commanders and staffs analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment [OAKOC]), as performed during step 2 of the IPOE process. Weather 3-18. Climate refers to the average weather conditions of a location, area, or region for a specific time of the year as recorded for a period of years. Operational climatology is used to assess effects on weapon systems, collection systems, ground forces, tactics and procedures, threat TTP, and other capabilities based on specific weather sensitivity thresholds when operational planning occurs more than 10 days before the execution. Climatological data is important at both the operational and tactical levels. Actual weather forecasts and/or predictions, using weather models and other tools, are used to assess weather effects on weapon systems, collection systems, ground forces, TTP, and other capabilities when operations occur within 10 days of operational planning. (See chapter 4 for more information on weather effects.) CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 3-19. +Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADP 6-0). Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of these characteristics: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). (See chapter 4.) 3-20. Civil considerations assist commanders in refining their understanding of the operational and mission variables within the AO and effects on the mission. Understanding the relationship between military operations and populations is critical in conducting operations and essential in developing effective plans. Operations often involve stabilizing the situation, securing the peace, building partner capacity, and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat operations directly affect the populace, infrastructure, and the force’s ability to transition to host-nation authority. The degree to which the populace is expected to support or resist U.S. and friendly forces also affects the offensive and defensive operational design. 3-21. Commanders and staffs use personal knowledge and running estimates to assess social, economic, and political factors. Commanders consider how these factors may relate to potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. Their goal is to develop an understanding to the level of cultural awareness. At this level, commanders can estimate the effects of friendly actions and direct subordinates with confidence. Cultural awareness improves how Soldiers interact with the populace and deters false or unrealistic expectations by both sides. Soldiers have more knowledge of the society’s common practices, perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values, giving better insight into the intent of individuals and groups. This allows staffs to better understand how friendly actions may affect the OE and assist in planning for possible branches and sequels. 3-22. To improve commanders’ sociocultural understanding, intelligence staffs can use sociocultural databases and repositories, when available, to aid the intelligence analysis conducted as part of assessing civil considerations. (See paragraphs 4-96 through 4-103.) Additionally, commanders and staffs should continually seek to improve cultural understanding to improve their roles in IPOE. SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS BRIEFING EXAMPLE 3-23. During step 1, the intelligence staff briefs the commander on the AO’s significant characteristics. This brief should be concise and provide all significant characteristics pertaining to step 1 only; it should not include specifics, such as the MCOO and threat template statements, which pertain to steps 2 and 3, 3-6 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 1—Define the Operational Environment respectively. The example provides a briefing used by intelligence analysts to inform the commander of the AO’s significant characteristics. Example Briefing: Identifying Significant Characteristics Terrain: Wooded areas are primarily composed of pine trees. Most creeks require an armored vehicle-launched bridge to cross if there is no ford or road crossing. Major roadways can support four lanes of traffic. Marshes within the AO are restrictive most of the year; during heavy rains, they can become severely restrictive. The soil composition is loose dirt, and the water table is six to seven feet below ground except where the marshes are located. The highest point is located on the ridgeline in the northeastern sector of the AO. Weather: The weather during this time of year consists of light rain with mild thunderstorms. The average rainfall is three to four inches. Precipitation affects potential river crossing sites. Strong gusts usually occur in early mornings and midafternoons, which can affect some aerial assets. Temperatures range from 65 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Fog occurs during the early morning hours and can last up to two hours after sunrise. Civil considerations: Two major groups occupy the AO—the Regional Military Force and the National Liberation Group. A small group of the Russian-speaking population supports the National Liberation Group by providing sustainment and cache locations. The Russian-speaking population is sporadic through the AO and supported indirectly by the Regional Military Force. Apartments are usually several stories high and made of reinforced concrete; single-family homes are stone or brick with tile roofs. The population receives information primarily through television and social media sites. The major highway that runs through the AO is a hardball and all weather, but most of roads are dirt. The airfield is all weather and can support C-130 traffic. One potable water treatment plant operates in the AO and supports the whole region. The AO has two major cities where 40 percent of the population resides. Enemy: Based on recent reporting and historical information, the staff expects to encounter a brigade- to division-sized element in the AO. The enemy likely has simple battle positions that are covered for dismounts and uncovered for vehicle fighting positions. Rudimentary tunnels link battle positions adjacent to mountainous terrain. Most simple battle positions have a tank ditch directly in front of them and a mine field about 50 to 100 meters in front of the tank ditch. C2 nodes consist of multiple hardened underground facilities. General support assets reside about 2 to 5 kilometers from the most forward battle positions. The staff expects to encounter ADA, artillery, T-90 tanks, and small arms weapons capabilities. 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 3-7 Chapter 3 EVALUATE CURRENT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE HOLDINGS TO DETERMINE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDED TO COMPLETE IPOE 3-24. Not all information needed to complete IPOE will be in the command’s or higher headquarters’ data files and databases. Information gaps should be identified early and prioritized based on the commander’s initial guidance and intent for intelligence and information collection. The staff should ensure the commander is aware of any information gaps that cannot be answered within the time allotted for IPOE, develop reasonable assumptions to use in place of these answers, and explain to the commander how it arrived at these assumptions. INITIATE PROCESSES TO ACQUIRE THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO COMPLETE IPOE 3-25. After determining that the information necessary to complete IPOE is not contained within local and searchable external data files and databases, staff sections submit requests for information or requests for collection to obtain the information necessary to complete IPOE. As information is received, IPOE products are updated and intelligence gaps eliminated. New intelligence gaps and information requirements may be developed as IPOE continues. (See FM 3-55 for more doctrine on information collection. See ATP 2-01 for more doctrine on collection management.) 3-8 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024