ATP 2-01.3, C2 Chapter 4 PDF - Describe Environmental Effects on Operations

Chapter 4 Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations WHAT IS IT? 4-1. Step 2 of the IPOE process determines how significant characteristics of the OE can affect friendly and threat operations. The staff begins evaluation by analyzing existing and projected conditions in the AO and...

Chapter 4 Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations WHAT IS IT? 4-1. Step 2 of the IPOE process determines how significant characteristics of the OE can affect friendly and threat operations. The staff begins evaluation by analyzing existing and projected conditions in the AO and AOI, and then determining effects on both friendly and threat operations. The example shows how significant characteristics of the OE (specifically the terrain) impact friendly operations. Example A brigade S-2 informs the commander that the terrain the brigade must attack through will canalize friendly forces into platoon-sized mobility corridors that will prevent the friendly forces from supporting each other. The brigade S-2 also informs the commander that the terrain favors enemy use of obstacles, small antitank ambushes, and indirect fire throughout its security zone. SO WHAT? 4-2. The “so what” of step 2 is to identify how relevant characteristics of the AOI affect friendly and threat operations: ⚫ Outcome of success: Success results in the commander being able to quickly choose and exploit terrain, weather, and civil considerations to best support the mission during decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. ⚫ Consequences of failure: ◼ The commander may not have the information needed to exploit the opportunities the OE provides at a given time and place. ◼ The threat commander may have the information needed to exploit the opportunities the OE provides in a way the friendly commander did not anticipate. For example, the threat commander may use subterranean terrain to maneuver against friendly forces. If the friendly commander is unaware of the advantage that this terrain provides to the threat, all threat COAs will not be considered during this step. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-1 Chapter 4 HOW TO DO IT: THE PROCESS 4-3. Describing environmental effects on operations consists of the substeps and outputs shown in figure 4-1. Figure 4-1. Substeps and outputs of step 2 of the IPOE process DESCRIBE HOW THE THREAT CAN AFFECT FRIENDLY OPERATIONS 4-4. Threats are part of the OE; therefore, commanders need to understand all threats that can potentially affect operations within the AO and AOI. They may face one unified threat force or several disparate threat forces that must be engaged to accomplish the mission. Although detailed analysis of threat forces occurs during steps 3 and 4 of the IPOE process, the type of threat force and its general capabilities must be defined during step 2. This places the threat force in context with other variables in order to understand its relative importance as a characteristic of the OE. For example— ⚫ When facing a regular threat in combat operations, regardless of where the engagement occurs, that threat is likely the most important characteristic in that OE. ⚫ When facing an irregular threat conducting operations as part of an insurgency in a failing nation- state, the state of governance and other civil considerations may be more significant than the threat posed by the irregular threat. 4-2 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations ⚫ When facing a hybrid threat in combat operations, the hybrid threat will likely be equipped with capabilities that can be used to exploit perceived friendly vulnerabilities. The mixture of regular and irregular threat capabilities expands threat COA possibilities and can create significant impacts outside friendly force decision cycles. 4-5. The threat overlay and the threat description table focus the analysis of the threat and assist in communicating that analysis to the commander. (See chapter 5 for descriptions of regular, irregular, and hybrid threats.) THREAT OVERLAY 4-6. The threat overlay depicts the current physical location of all potential threats in the AO and the AOI. The overlay includes the identity, size, location, strength, and AO for each known threat location. The date- time group of the threat activity should be annotated on the threat overlay or maintained in intelligence reference files. Maintaining a threat overlay provides a reference to past threat activity and assists in determining patterns of threat movement and dispositions. During step 4 of the IPOE process, this reference assists in determining threat COAs. Figure 4-2 illustrates an example of a threat overlay. Figure 4-2. Threat overlay example 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-3 Chapter 4 THREAT DESCRIPTION TABLE 4-7. The threat description table supports the threat overlay by classifying the types of threats identified on the overlay and describing the broad capabilities of each threat. Table 4-1 exemplifies a threat description table. Table 4-1. +Threat description table example Identity Location Description +Additional information Companies are known to Companies conduct littoral reconnaissance 2x special purpose operate down to platoon Northern coast to provide information on potential regional forces companies and section echelons from threat coastal invasion or border incursions. sanctuary locations. Platoons oversee smuggling of methamphetamines and their precursor Platoon(+) drug East and west Platoons operate in 10-15 chemicals out of the country. trafficking personnel international boundary personnel teams. Platoons are known to work with gangs for distribution of narcotics in urban areas. Key forces prevent regional threats from Normally maintain platoon 2x platoons riverine Eastern and western using riverine network to move south toward integrity while patrolling infantry marsh areas key terrain. rivers and littoral areas. Gang personnel Gang personnel support the distribution of (assessed to be narcotics within urban areas. Normally operate in cells of Northeast urban center approximately 100 Gang personnel provide information on 7-10 personnel. personnel) regional threats operating near the coast. Companies overwatch main north-south highways and establish hasty checkpoints. Companies operate down to 2x special purpose Vicinity main north- Companies use population centers to section and team echelons forces companies south highways collect information on regional threats. from hasty defensive Companies also conduct positions and hide sites. counterreconnaissance of low-lying marsh areas. SA-13 systems are Air defense artillery assets conduct area Coastal and inland positioned to protect air Battery (-) air defense denial in air avenues of approach vicinity regions usually avenues of approach artillery leading to the Government Complex and masked by terrain vicinity, the coast, and Military Complex. inland key terrain. Top tier BN. Trained mostly in defensive operations as BN is manned at 90% regional threats have postured for attacks strength. in the last five years. Currently conducting Retention of Government Complex and 72d Mechanized training exercises for the Government Complex support of regional military partners are Battalion (BN) next 15 days key strategies to maintain control of BN leadership has country. changed within the last 30 Nested with coastal special purpose days. forces to provide early warning of regional threat presence. Trained mostly in defensive operations as BN is manned at 75% regional threats have postured for attacks strength. 65th Mechanized BN Military Complex over the last five years. Will initiate training Focuses on using obstacle belts and exercises in the next 30 flanking maneuvers. days. Both BNs are manned at 60% strength. Masked by terrain Both BNs completed 97th Mechanized BN Trained in urban operations. equidistant from training exercises within and 10th Infantry BN Well-versed in deception and information Government Complex the last 90 days. (reserve forces) warfare. and Military Complex Last training exercise focused on occupation of urban areas. 4-4 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations DESCRIBE HOW TERRAIN CAN AFFECT FRIENDLY AND THREAT OPERATIONS 4-8. Terrain analysis refers to the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the natural and man-made features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations. It also involves the study and interpretation of natural and man-made features within an area, their effects on military operations, and the effects of weather and climate on these features. Terrain analysis is a continual process since changes in the OE may alter the analysis of terrain effects on operations. 4-9. A command may operate in two types of terrain—natural and complex—which are analyzed based on the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) (see figure 4-3): ⚫ Natural terrain analysis focuses on airspace and surface and subsurface areas. ⚫ Complex terrain analysis also focuses on airspace, surface and subsurface areas, but it must also consider internal, external, and supersurface areas. Figure 4-3. The focus of natural and complex terrain analysis ANALYZE THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN 4-10. Geospatial intelligence cells generally conduct detailed terrain analysis. These cells are assigned to theater army, corps, and division headquarters and to brigade combat teams based on priorities established by the S-2. These cells have digital mapping tools and access to national-level support from agencies such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The geospatial intelligence cell, along with the G-2/S-2, collaborates with an Air Force staff weather officer to leverage the appropriate weather capabilities in order to incorporate the effects of current and future weather conditions into terrain analysis. Terrain analysis results in the evaluation of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) on operations. 4-11. Staff collaboration during terrain analysis can assist in identifying and addressing factors such as— ⚫ Cross-country mobility. ⚫ Canalizing terrain. ⚫ Line of sight (LOS) impacts on weapon use. ⚫ Terrain impacts on CBRN weapon use. ⚫ Communications dead space. ⚫ Lines of communications (LOCs) (transportation, communications, and power). ⚫ Vegetation types and distribution. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-5 Chapter 4 ⚫ Natural and man-made surface and subsurface areas and materials. ⚫ Natural and man-made obstacles. ⚫ Significant infrastructure. ⚫ Flood zones. ⚫ Aircraft and amphibious sites. Note. The discussion in this section provides broad aspects of the terrain analysis essential to intelligence analysts conducting terrain analysis to support threat analysis. (For more information on the military aspects of terrain, see ATP 3-34.80.) Observation and Fields of Fire 4-12. +Observation is the condition of weather and terrain that permits a force to see the friendly, enemy, and neutral personnel and systems, and key aspects of the environment (FM 1-02.1). Commanders evaluate their observation capabilities for electronic and optical LOS surveillance systems, as well as for unaided visual observation. The highest terrain normally provides the best observation. (For LOS distances in nautical miles [height of eye] versus statute miles [horizon range], see appendix B.) 4-13. +Analyzing the terrain to support observation and fields of fire is challenging. To find the best tactical positions, Soldiers analyze the terrain to find the best LOS. Line of sight is the unobstructed path from a Soldier’s weapon, weapon sight, electronic sending and receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment from one point to another. In other words, a LOS is a straight line from one point to another. 4-14. +Two tools that assist with this analysis are intervisibility line and dead space. An intervisibility line depicts the maximum range at which a Soldier or system can maintain visibility. Based on the terrain, there can be more than one intervisibility line. Dead space reflects those areas a Soldier or system cannot maintain visibility. Mapping the intervisibility lines and dead space together provides an accurate depiction of observation from a given position—if the observer changes positions, the intervisibility line shifts. Figure 4-4 depicts intervisibility lines and dead space from the perspective of the observation outpost at position A. The observer at position A can see point B but cannot see points C and D because the points are in the dead space. Figure 4-4. +Intervisibility line example 4-6 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations 4-15. +Observation can also be limited by adverse weather, smoke, the time of day, and the amount of illumination at night. In urban areas, observation is limited primarily by man-made structures as well as the activity and debris associated with human activity. Analyzing observation and fields of fire in urban areas is more complicated than it is for natural terrain; analysts must also consider surface, subsurface, supersurface, external, and internal areas (see figure 4-3 on page 4-5). Note. Threat forces will seek to exploit observation advantages from areas that friendly forces may not consider. For example, threat forces may use a building protected under the rules of engagement (religious buildings, cultural monuments, places of worship, hospitals, medical clinics) to conduct observations on friendly forces. Threat forces may use subterranean terrain portals to identify friendly forces’ movement routes. (See ATP 3-21.51.) 4-16. +Field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively from a given position (FM 3-90). A unit’s field of fire is directly related to its ability to observe. Evaluation of observation and fields of fire identifies— ⚫ Potential engagement areas. ⚫ Defensible terrain, which offers good observation and fields of fire. ⚫ Specific equipment or equipment positions. ⚫ Areas where forces are most vulnerable to observation and fires. ⚫ Visual dead space. 4-17. +Analysis of fields of fire includes an evaluation of all direct and indirect fire weapon systems in a command’s inventory. An ideal field of fire for direct fire weapon systems is an open area where the threat can be seen and has no protection out to the maximum effective range of that weapon. 4-18. +Both observation and fields of fire are based on LOSs. There are two types of LOSs normally evaluated during terrain analysis: ⚫ Horizontal LOS is an unobstructed path from a Soldier’s weapon, weapon sight, laser designator, and electronic sending and receiving antennas. ⚫ Oblique (or vertical) LOS assists in planning ADA system locations, selecting landing zones and drop zones, and selecting forward arming and refueling points. 4-19. Identifying areas vulnerable to threat aerial information collection systems assists in selecting friendly battle positions. Establishing LOSs and identifying intervisibility lines are critical to analyzing observation and fields of fire because they have a bearing on LOS direct fire weapons, antennas, reconnaissance, and some electro-optical systems. Essentially, identifying intervisibility lines can assist in identifying potential threat locations as well as those locations where friendly forces can evade detection from threat forces. 4-20. An effective technique for analyzing observation and fields of fire is the production of a map displaying observation and fields of fire. Computer-generated terrain applications can assist in producing observation and fields of fire graphics that depict expected ranges and locations of nonpresent, decreased, or increased observation and fields of fire. An ideal field of fire for direct fire weapons is an open field in which the threat can be seen and has no protection from fires. Analysts identify features of terrain that allow good observation for indirect fire weapons and determine if the terrain has any effect on fire support missions. Figure 4-5 on page 4-8 shows LOS analysis used to depict observation and fields of fire from a point on, or above, the ground. This depiction accounts for natural and man-made obstacles to observation. Rings can be added to accommodate for weapons ranges. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-7 Chapter 4 Figure 4-5. Observation and fields of fire (complex terrain) example Avenues of Approach 4-21. Avenue of approach is a path used by an attacking force leading to its objective or to key terrain. Avenues of approach exist in all domains (ADP 3-90). Identifying AAs is important because all COAs that involve maneuver depend on available AAs. +During offensive operations, the evaluation of AAs leads to a recommendation of the best AAs to a command’s objective and to the identification of AAs available to the threat for counterattack, withdrawal, or the movement of reinforcements or reserves. +During defensive operations, it is important to identify AAs that support threat offensive capabilities and AAs that support the movement and commitment of friendly reserves. 4-22. AAs consist of a series of mobility corridors through which a maneuvering force must pass to reach its objective. (See figure 4-6.) AAs must provide ease of movement and enough width for dispersion of a force large enough to affect the outcome of the operation significantly. AAs are developed by identifying, categorizing, and grouping mobility corridors and evaluating AAs. 4-23. Evaluating AAs is a combined effort by the entire staff to identify those AAs that best support threat or friendly capabilities. The AAs should be prioritized based on how well each supports the ability to meet the desired end state timely and efficiently. AAs are evaluated for suitability in terms of access to key terrain and adjacent AAs, degree of canalization and ease of movement, sustainability (LOC support), and access to the objective. Once evaluated for suitability, AAs are prioritized based on how well each supports maneuver. 4-24. Mobility corridor refers to areas that are relatively free of obstacles where a force will be canalized due to terrain restrictions allowing military forces to capitalize on the principles of mass and speed. They use unrestricted terrain that provides enough space for a freedom of action by breaching or bypassing obstacles. The geospatial team provides terrain visualization products for mobility corridors. Identifying mobility corridors requires knowledge of friendly and threat forces and their preferred tactics. (For more information on terrain visualization products, see ATP 3-34.80.) 4-25. Mobility corridor requirements are directly proportional to the type and mobility of the force being evaluated. Military forces, such as mechanized infantry or armored units, have more freedom of movement and maneuver in open areas. Dismounted forces are less impacted in wooded areas, where mechanized units would be delayed. Geospatial teams can produce cross-country mobility-terrain visualization products corresponding with the type of element being employed in a specific area. Reconnaissance should be conducted to validate computer-generated products. 4-8 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations 4-26. Mobility corridors are categorized based on the size or type of force they can accommodate, as well as by their likely use. For example, a mechanized force requires logistical sustainment; a mobility corridor through unrestricted terrain supported by a road network is generally more desirable. A dismounted force might be able to use more restrictive corridors associated with the arctic tundra, swamps or marshes, jungles, or mountains that may or may not have a road network. Due to the rate of march and the lack of fire power, dismounted forces require a more covered and concealed route for survivability to reach their objective. 4-27. Mobility corridors are classed based on the distance between the terrain features that form the corridor. Mobility corridor ranges are not absolute but reflect the relative and approximate distance between terrain features. Table 4-2 identifies these classifications and the typical widths of mobility corridors for a mechanized force. Figure 4-6. Avenues of approach with mobility corridors (natural terrain) example Table 4-2. Maximum distances between and typical widths of mobility corridors Maximum distances between mobility corridors Cross-country mobility corridor Approximate distance between terrain Avenue of approach classification features Division Brigade 10 kilometers Brigade Battalion 6 kilometers Battalion Company 2 kilometers Typical widths of mobility corridors Unit Width Division 6 kilometers Brigade 3 kilometers Battalion 1.5 kilometers Company 500 meters 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 4-9 Chapter 4 Key Terrain 4-28. Key terrain is an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant (ADP 3-90). In natural terrain environments dominated by restrictive terrain features, high ground can be key terrain because it dominates an area with good observation and fields of fire. (See figure 4-7.) In an open or arid environment, a dry riverbed, channel, or valley can be key terrain because it offers good cover and concealment. Figure 4-7. Key terrain (natural terrain) example 4-29. In urban areas, infrastructure (such as bridges, medical facilities, choke points, intersections, industrial complexes, and economic, social, and government institutions) can be considered key terrain. For example, control of a bridge may equate to control over an AA. However, the command needs to consider the operational and strategic impact on the civil dimension when deciding to control a bridge. Example Key Terrain Considerations for Urban Areas Economic or social institution: The main bazaar in a town is key terrain; whoever controls the bazaar controls the town. The economic health of the bazaar is crucial to the economic health of the area. If the threat can maneuver through and control the bazaar (key terrain), it can shut down the town and the economy. Government institution: As key terrain, the local police may exert a great deal of influence on the local population (elections, law enforcement, tribal politics). The tactical use of this key terrain is often directed at increasing the capability to apply combat power while simultaneously forcing threats into areas to reduce their ability to apply combat power. 4-30. Key terrain is evaluated by assessing the impact of its control by either force. A technique that aids this assessment is using the evaluation of the other four military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, AAs, obstacles, and cover and concealment) to assist in determining key terrain. 4-10 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations 4-31. In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward of friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. Adjacent terrain features may be key terrain if their control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the accomplishment of the mission. 4-32. In the defense, key terrain is usually within and/or behind the defensive area, such as— ⚫ Terrain that gives good observation over AAs to and through the defensive position. ⚫ Terrain that permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire. ⚫ Areas along a LOC that affect the use of reserves or sustainment operations. 4-33. +In stability operations, key terrain may include portions of the population, such as— ⚫ Political, tribal, or religious groups or leaders. ⚫ A local population. ⚫ Governmental organizations. 4-34. Decisive terrain is key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment (ADP 3-90). Key terrain is not necessarily decisive terrain. Decisive terrain has an extraordinary impact on the mission. The successful accomplishment of the mission depends on seizing, retaining, or denying the use of the terrain to a threat force. Commanders designate decisive terrain to communicate to the staff and subordinate commanders about the importance of the terrain to the concept of operations. Obstacles 4-35. An obstacle is any barrier designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement and maneuver, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment (JP 3-15). Table 4-3 depicts tactical effects associated with obstacles. Table 4-3. Tactical obstacle effects Obstacle Description effect Disrupt The arrows indicate the direction of threat advance. The length of the arrows indicates where the threat is slowed or allowed to pass. Turn The heel of the arrow is the anchor point. The direction of the arrow indicates the desired direction of the turn. Fix The arrow indicates the direction of threat advance. The irregular part of the arrow indicates where threat advance is slowed by obstacles. Block The vertical line indicates the limit of threat advance and where the obstacle ties into severely restricted terrain. The horizontal line shows the depth of the obstacle effort. Direction of threat attack 4-36. The geospatial team can visually depict cross-country mobility based on obstacles, vehicle capabilities, and preferred movement formations. This product is used to identify AAs and to plan the size and/or echelon that supports movements, socioeconomic restrictive areas, as well as religious and cultural sites. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-11 Chapter 4 4-37. Obstacles affect certain types of mobility differently: ⚫ Mounted mobility. Obstacles such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dense forested areas, road craters, rubble in the street, or densely populated urban areas may have a greater effect on mounted mobility than on dismounted mobility. ⚫ Dismounted mobility. Antipersonnel minefields, concertina wire, or steep slopes may be more effective against dismounted mobility. 4-38. Obstacles to air mobility include terrain features that— ⚫ Exceed the aircraft’s service ceiling. ⚫ Affect nap-of-the-earth flight. ⚫ Impact aircraft lift capabilities. ⚫ Force the aircraft to employ a particular flight profile. (Examples include tall buildings, cellular telephone towers, power lines, rapidly rising terrain features, mountains, smoke, geologic features, high mountains, and other obscurants. High mountainous regions can impact fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft lift capabilities.) 4-39. Obstacles may decrease the effectiveness of information-related capabilities to influence threat operations and activities, as well as friendly and neutral populations. For example, mountains may block terrestrial-based signals used to broadcast surrender appeals to a threat-held territory, or messages to populations explaining the intent of U.S. operations. Use of other message delivery platforms may be necessary to compensate for local terrain effects. Obstacles may also decrease a commander’s ability to communicate and influence the AO, whether that be with organic or attached communications capabilities or an attached psychological operations force. Cover and Concealment 4-40. Cover is protection from the effects of fires (FM 3-96). Cover is the physical protection from bullets, fragments of exploding rounds, flame, nuclear effects, and biological and chemical agents. Cover and concealment can be provided by (but are not limited to) ditches, caves, riverbanks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, and embankments. Cover does not necessarily provide concealment. An example of cover without concealment is a bunker in plain sight that is intended for personnel survivability. (See appendix B for examples of cover; see ATP 3-37.34 for more information on hardening infrastructure and creating survivability positions.) 4-41. Concealment is protection from observation or surveillance (FM 3-96). It degrades the threat’s ability to observe forces, equipment, or positions. Concealment can be provided by trees, underbrush, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, weather conditions (such as snow, fog, or rain), as well as man-made camouflage. Concealment does not necessarily provide cover. 4-42. LOS analysis determines the observation, fields of fire, and cover and concealment the terrain will provide to both friendly and threat forces. Together, the LOS example and figure 4-8 illustrate the concept of cover and concealment in natural terrain and LOS analysis. LOS Example The masked areas lie behind terrain that is level with or higher than the defensive position. One cannot see into the masked areas or fire direct weapons into them. One does not have observation or fields of fire behind the masking terrain. The masked areas provide the attacker cover from the defender’s direct fire and concealment from the defender’s observations. If the threat performs proper analysis, then the threat will select one or more of the approach routes. 4-12 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations Figure 4-8. Cover and concealment (natural terrain) and line of sight analysis examples EVALUATE TERRAIN EFFECTS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS 4-43. The staff determines terrain effects on friendly and threat operations. The MCOO and the terrain effects matrix are the primary analytic tools used to determine these effects. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay 4-44. The combined obstacle overlay provides a basis for identifying ground AAs and mobility corridors. Unlike the cross-country mobility, the combined obstacle overlay integrates all impediments to mobility, such as built-up areas, slope, soils, vegetation, and hydrology into one overlay. This overlay also allows the staff to visualize impediments to mobility for both friendly and threat forces. The overlay depicts areas that impede mobility (severely restricted and restricted areas) and areas where friendly and threat forces can move unimpeded (unrestricted areas). 4-45. The modified combined obstacle overlay is a joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment product used to portray the militarily significant aspects of the operational environment, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives (JP 2-0). The MCOO is tailored to the mission and is a collaborative effort involving input from the entire staff. The staff uses its warfighting function expertise to determine how the terrain will impact that function. For example, the S-6 provides input on how the terrain may affect LOS communications for friendly and threat forces. The nuclear, biological, chemical officer provides information on how terrain may affect the use of persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents. 4-46. Specific aspects of the MCOO include but are not limited to AAs, key terrain, mobility corridors, natural and man-made obstacles, and terrain mobility classifications. (See figure 4-9 and table 4-4 on page 4-14 for an example of and color control measures for MCOO overlays, respectively.) The MCOO depicts the terrain according to the mobility classification. These classifications are severely restricted, restricted, and unrestricted: ⚫ Severely restricted terrain severely hinders or slows movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility, such as committing engineer assets to improving mobility or deviating from doctrinal tactics (moving in columns instead of line formations or at speeds much lower than those preferred). For example, severely restricted terrain for armored and mechanized forces is typically characterized by steep slopes and large or dense obstacle compositions with few bypasses. A common technique to depict this type of terrain on overlays and sketches is marking the areas with green crosshatched diagonal lines. (See appendix B for information on severely restricted terrain for mechanize or armored forces.) ⚫ Restricted terrain hinders movement to some degree. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units may have difficulty maintaining preferred speeds, moving in combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another. Restricted terrain slows movement by requiring zigzagging or frequent detours. Restricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces typically 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-13 Chapter 4 consists of moderate-to-steep slopes or moderate-to-dense obstacle compositions, such as restrictive slopes or curves. Swamps or rugged terrain are examples of restricted terrain for dismounted infantry forces. Logistical or sustainment area movement may be supported by poorly developed road systems. A common and useful technique to depict restricted terrain on overlays and sketches is marking the areas with green diagonal lines. (See appendix B for information on restricted terrain for mechanize or armored forces.) ⚫ Unrestricted terrain is free from any restriction to movement. Nothing is required to enhance mobility. Unrestricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces is typically flat to moderately sloping terrain with few obstacles such as limiting slopes or curves. This terrain allows wide maneuver by the forces under consideration and unlimited travel supported by well-developed road networks. No symbology is needed to show unrestricted terrain on overlays and sketches. Figure 4-9. Modified combined obstacle overlay example +Table 4-4. Typical color control measures for modified combined obstacle Description overlays Color Friendly = blue neutral = black threat = red Avenue of approach Built-up area (urban terrain) Black Hydrology Blue Key terrain Purple Mobility corridor Black Natural and man-made obstacles Black (See ADP 1-02 for exceptions.) Restricted terrain Green Severely restricted terrain Green 4-14 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations 4-47. Terrain mobility classifications are not absolute but reflect the relative effect of terrain on the different types and sizes of movement formations. They are based on the force’s ability to maneuver in combat formations or transition from one type of formation to another. The staff should consider the following: ⚫ Obstacles are only effective if covered by observation and fields of fire. However, even undefended obstacles may canalize an attacker into concentrations, which are easier to detect and target or defend. Obstacles are green on map overlays. ⚫ When evaluating the terrain’s effects on more than one type of organization (for example, mounted or dismounted), obstacle overlays reflect an impact on mobility of a particular force. ⚫ The cumulative effects of individual obstacles should be considered in the final evaluation. For example, individually, a gentle slope or a moderately dense forest may prove to be an unrestrictive obstacle to vehicular traffic; together, the slope and dense forest may prove to be restrictive. ⚫ The staff should account for the weather’s effects on factors that affect mobility. ⚫ The classification of terrain into various obstacle types reflects only its relative impact on force mobility. 4-48. For urban areas, graphics typically depict population status overlays (dense population centers, political boundaries), logistics sustainability overlays, LOCs, route overlays (street names, patterns, widths), bridges (underpass and overpass information), potential sniper and ambush locations (will likely be a separate overlay), and key navigational landmarks. (See figure 4-10.) In developing urban area and complex terrain overlays, the following should be depicted: ⚫ Natural terrain: The underlying terrain on which man-made terrain is superimposed, such as rivers, streams, hills, valleys, forests, desert, bogs, swamps. ⚫ Man-made terrain: Streets, bridges, buildings, railways, canals, sewer systems, subway systems, military bunkers, traffic control points; building density, construct, dimensions; functional zone disposition; street construct, materials, disposition, dimensions. ⚫ Key facilities, targets, and/or terrain: Banks, hospitals, police stations, industrial plants and factories, media and information facilities, bridges, airports, seaports, electric power grids, oil facilities, military facilities, key residences and places of employment, waterways; tall structures (skyscrapers); choke points; street patterns, intersections; industrial complexes; other facilities; density of construction or population. ⚫ Obstacles: Rubble and vehicles on the road; fixed barriers; masking of fires, burning of buildings, and other fire hazards; rivers and lakes; power lines and cell phone towers; population; trenches and minefields; certain religious or cultural sites; wire obstacles (concertina wire, barb wire). Figure 4-10. Modified combined obstacle overlay example for an urban area 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 4-15 Chapter 4 Note. In urban areas, the staff should depict storm and drainage systems and public transportation routes, which may function as mobility corridors for future friendly and threat actions. (See chapter 7 for more on urban areas.) 4-49. In developing urban area graphics, the staff should also consider— ⚫ The street level necessary to support the smallest friendly or threat unit size, and the local street names whenever possible (official and unofficial). ⚫ The width of routes in urban areas. The width may not facilitate military vehicle movement. ⚫ The use of certain vehicle-mounted weapon systems. Buildings and other structures may degrade the use of certain vehicle-mounted weapon systems due to the lack of weapon traverse space or ability to aim above certain angles. ⚫ Surface structure composition (cobblestone, concrete, dirt) along with elevation and slope. ⚫ Construction status (building or destroying) if development is underway. ⚫ Time pattern plots, as necessary, to show local population use in terms of movement. ⚫ Parking areas with weight restrictions, electrification of public transport, local airports, heliports, runways, inland-ports, and any known pipelines (with their status: active, inactive, dimensions). Terrain Effects Matrix 4-50. Using the MCOO as a guide, a terrain effects matrix describes OAKOC factor effects on friendly and threat operations. (See table 4-5.) Table 4-5. Terrain effects matrix example OAKOC factors (military Terrain effects aspects of terrain) Sparse vegetation on generally flat desert terrain with observation of 3 to 5 kilometers. There are 10 kilometers between intervisibility lines. Limited air support observation due to sparse terrain and the Earth’s curvature. Observation and fields of Fields of fire for direct fire are 300 to 500 meters for small arms. fire Intermediate breaks in observation and fields of fire due to runoffs and cuts. Likely engagement area at Julian pass. Likely engagement area 1000 meters north of the major city. Primary and secondary road systems for high AAs. Generally flat terrain with brigade-sized mobility corridors between small villages. Avenues of approach (AAs) Railroad in the north running east to west. AA2 is the recommended AA as it enables the placement of organic weapon systems in range before observation from the threat in the defense. Airfield used as resupply and troop movements. Key terrain Dam controls water flow on the river and is the primary objective of the threat. Restrictive runoffs and cuts run throughout the area of operations with an average depth of 5 to 10 feet and an average width of 20 feet that runs 6 to 10 kilometers long. Obstacles Aboveground oil and transport pipeline (which is severely restrictive terrain) that runs through the central width of the area of operations. Cover by direct fire systems is provided by intervisibility lines. Cover and concealment Concealment is limited by the open terrain and sparse vegetation. 4-16 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations Techniques for Evaluating Terrain Effects 4-51. Analysts must relate the evaluation of terrain effects on the COAs available to friendly and threat forces. This evaluation should include a detailed discussion of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC). To evaluate terrain effects on COAs, analysts use four basic techniques: ⚫ Concentric ring. The concentric ring technique establishes concentric rings around U.S. forces, starting from a unit’s base of operations and working outward. Each ring is balanced and based on the threat’s environment and the commander’s need to develop knowledge of the tactical situation. Once a certain information collection ring is in place, it is not abandoned; however, the focus of the evaluation is expanding and establishing a second ring. (See figure 4-11.) ⚫ Belt. The belt technique divides the AO into belts (areas) running the width of the AO. The shape of the belt is based on analysis of the mission variables (METT-TC). It is most effective when terrain is divided into well-defined cross-compartments during phased operations (such as river crossings, air assaults, or airborne operations), or when the threat is deployed in clearly defined belts. Belts can be adjacent to or overlap each other. (See figure 4-12 on page 4-18.) ⚫ Avenue in depth. This technique focuses on one AA. It is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalized terrain inhibits mutual support. (See figure 4-13 on page 4-18.) ⚫ Box. The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an engagement area, a river-crossing site, or a landing zone. It is most useful when time is constrained, and operations are conducted in a noncontiguous AO. (See figure 4-14 on page 4-19.) Figure 4-11. Concentric ring technique example 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 4-17 Chapter 4 Figure 4-12. Belt technique example Figure 4-13. Avenue-in-depth technique example 4-18 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations Figure 4-14. Box technique example 4-52. When properly applied, these four basic techniques assist in identifying areas for use as potential— ⚫ Engagement areas and ambush sites. Using cover and concealment evaluation results, identify areas where the force is vulnerable to threat fires: ◼ If the command is attacking, these are areas where friendly forces are vulnerable to threat fires. ◼ If the command is defending, these are potential engagement areas. ⚫ Battle positions. Identify covered and concealed positions that offer observation and fields of fire into potential engagement areas: ◼ If the command is attacking, battle positions provide a start point for determining possible threat COAs. ◼ If the command is defending, these positions are potential defensive positions. These battle positions might also be used by friendly attacking forces to block threat counterattacks. ⚫ Immediate or intermediate objectives. Identify any areas or terrain features that dominate the AAs or assigned objective areas. These objectives usually correspond to areas already identified as key terrain. 4-53. The terrain rarely favors one type of operation throughout the width and breadth of the AO. Within a given area, certain subsectors affect various operations to varying degrees. Based on the location and nature of potential engagement areas, battle positions, and objectives, analysts must determine which areas of the AO favor each COA. The analysis of the AO, intelligence estimate, and MCOO are useful tools for disseminating the results of terrain analysis. DESCRIBE HOW WEATHER CAN AFFECT FRIENDLY AND THREAT OPERATIONS 4-54. Weather analysis is the collection, processing, evaluation, and interpretation of relevant military aspects of weather. It is the evaluation of forecasted weather effects on operations. Analysts should evaluate the effects of each military aspect of weather. However, just as with terrain analysis, they should focus on the aspects that have the most bearing on operations and decision making. The evaluation of each aspect 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 4-19 Chapter 4 should begin with the local climatology, and the analysts should refine the evaluation with the most current forecasts available. There are two substeps in weather analysis: ⚫ Analyze the military aspects (characteristics) of weather. ⚫ Evaluate the weather’s effects on military operations. ANALYZE THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF WEATHER 4-55. The military aspects of weather are visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure (as required). Visibility 4-56. Visibility refers to the greatest distance that prominent objects can be seen and identified by the unaided, normal eye. A major factor in evaluating visibility is the amount of available light based on weather conditions and illumination as determined by the following factors: ⚫ Begin morning nautical twilight is the start of that period where, in good conditions and in the absence of other illumination, the sun is 12 degrees below the eastern horizon and enough light is available to identify the general outlines of ground objects and conduct limited military operations (JP 3-09.3). Light intensification devices are still effective and may enhance capabilities. ⚫ Begin morning civil twilight refers to the period of time at which the sun is halfway between beginning morning and nautical twilight and sunrise, when there is enough light to see objects clearly with the unaided eye. Currently, light intensification devices are no longer effective, and the Sun is 6 degrees below the eastern horizon. ⚫ Sunrise is the apparent rising of the Sun above the horizon. Rising times depend on latitude. ⚫ Sunset is the apparent descent of the Sun below the horizon. Setting times depend on latitude. ⚫ End evening civil twilight refers to the point in time when the sun has dropped 6 degrees beneath the western horizon, and is the instant at which there is no longer sufficient light to see objects with the unaided eye. Light intensification devices are recommended from this time until begin morning civil twilight. ⚫ End of evening nautical twilight refers to the point in time when the sun has dropped 12 degrees below the western horizon, and is the instant of last available daylight for the visual control of limited military operations. There is no further sunlight available at end of evening nautical twilight. ⚫ Moonrise is the time at which the moon first rises above the horizon. Rising times depend on latitude. Moonset is the time at which the moon sets below the horizon. Setting times depend on latitude. (See ATP 3-18.10 for information on how the moon phases affect illumination and when moonrise and moonlight will occur.) 4-57. Other weather conditions can affect visibility as well. Temperature can affect the use of thermal sights. Cloud cover can negate illumination provided by the moon. Additionally, precipitation and other obscurants can have varying effects as well. Low visibility is beneficial to offensive and retrograde operations because it conceals the concentration of maneuver forces, thus enhancing the possibility of surprise. Low visibility hinders the defense because cohesion and control become difficult to maintain, reconnaissance operations are impeded, and target acquisition is degraded. Wind 4-58. Wind of sufficient speed from any direction can reduce the combat effectiveness of a force due to blowing dust, smoke, sand, or precipitation. Strong winds and wind turbulence limit airborne, air assault, and aviation operations. High winds near the ground can lower visibility due to blowing dust; they can also affect movement or stability of some vehicles. Blowing sand, dust, rain, or snow can reduce the effectiveness or stability of radars, antennas, communications, and other electronic devices. High winds can also affect persistent friendly and threat detection systems such an aerostat or unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). Evaluation of weather to support operations requires information on the wind at the surface as well as at varying altitudes and elevations. 4-20 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations Precipitation 4-59. Precipitation is any moisture falling from a cloud in frozen or liquid form. Rain, snow, hail, drizzle, sleet, and freezing rain are common types. Precipitation affects soil trafficability, visibility, and the functioning of many electro-optical systems needed for information collection. Heavy precipitation can affect sustainment, communications, personnel, military operations, information collection, and many civilian activities. Cloud Cover 4-60. Cloud cover affects ground operations by limiting illumination and could affect the thermal signature of targets. Heavy cloud cover can degrade many intelligence sensors, target acquisition systems, and general aviation operations. Conversely, low cloud cover may increase the available level of light when there is ground-based light, such as what is available in urban areas. Excessive low cloud cover may restrict visibility and limit safe aviation operations. 4-61. +Ceiling is the lowest cloud layer, or obscuring phenomena above the Earth’s surface, covering at least half the sky. +It is reported as broken or overcast; it is not classified as few or scattered. A ceiling listed as unlimited means that the sky is clear or is free of any substantial cloud cover. Low cloud ceilings also reflect sound waves back to the ground, increasing noise level, making engine noises of mechanized formations and generators, as well as explosions, gunfire, and artillery more audibly detectable. Temperature 4-62. Temperature extremes can reduce the effectiveness of troops and equipment capabilities. They may affect the timing of combat operations. For example, extremely high temperatures in a desert environment may require dismounted troops to operate at night. High temperatures can affect the lift capability of medium- rotary-lift assets in high altitudes and elevations. For example, during the summer months of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the UH 60 could not carry its full complement of passengers. High temperatures can also increase fuel consumption in vehicles, cause overheating, and affect the muzzle velocity of direct and indirect fire weapons (155-millimeter howitzers, sniper rifles, tanks). 4-63. Thermal crossover is the natural phenomenon that normally occurs twice daily when temperature conditions are such that there is a loss of contrast between two adjacent objects on infrared imagery (JP 3-09.3). In other words, thermal crossover is the condition in which the temperature of a ground-based vehicle is close to, if not the same as, the surrounding land. Because of this condition, thermal optics are unable to detect threat vehicles until a temperature disparity exists between the land and the vehicles. Humidity 4-64. Humidity is the state of the atmosphere with respect to water vapor content. High humidity affects the human body’s ability to cool itself. Hence, troops in tropical areas may become less effective because of higher humidity levels. Humidity is usually expressed as either relative humidity or absolute humidity. High relative humidity (near or at 100 percent) or coincidence between the temperature and absolute humidity (dew point) create fog. When the air is saturated with moisture, clouds begin to form at ground level, creating additional visibility factors from humidity. Fog typically forms in the mornings when the temperature and dew point are closest to each other. Atmospheric Pressure 4-65. Atmospheric pressure has a significant impact on aviation operations. Based on the elevation of the operational area, atmospheric pressure affects the lift capacity of aircraft, especially rotary-wing aircraft in mountainous terrain. When combined with extreme temperatures, atmospheric pressure increases the amount of runway an aircraft requires for takeoff. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 4-21 Chapter 4 EVALUATE THE WEATHER EFFECTS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS 4-66. Weather has both direct and indirect effects on military operations. The following are examples of direct and indirect effects on military operations: ⚫ Temperature inversions might cause some battle positions to be more at risk to the effects of chemical agents because of atmospheric ducting, a process that occurs when strong high pressure influences an area and prevents particulates from dispersing into the upper atmosphere. ⚫ Local visibility restrictions, such as fog, affect observation for both friendly and threat forces. Severe restrictions to visibility often restrict aviation operations. ⚫ Hot, dry weather might force friendly and threat forces to consider water sources as key terrain. ⚫ Dense, humid air limits the range of loudspeaker broadcasts, affecting sonic deception, surrender appeals to threat forces, and the ability to provide instruction to friendly or neutral audiences. ⚫ Sandstorms with high silica content may decrease the strength and clarity of radio and television signals. 4-67. Weather and climate effects can impact seasonal outlooks, which affect seasonal decision making— for example, giving crop selection and rotation advice in a particular area that boosts plant growth. Knowing that a particular area may be susceptible to locust swarms may enable pesticide application to prevent such a swarm. If a drought is expected, civil affairs personnel may advise planting another crop that raises the benefit to the farmer. 4-68. The G-2/S-2 coordinates with the Air Force staff weather officer to provide weather effects to support operations. +The following work aids are some examples the Air Force staff weather officer may provide to assist in analyzing and describing weather effects on operations: ⚫ +Weather forecast charts are guides for determining the weather information needed for planning and operations. (See figure 4-15.) ⚫ +Light and illumination data tables are guides for determining the light and illumination data needed for planning and operations. (See figure 4-16.) ⚫ +Weather effects matrices are guides for determining the weather effects on personnel, weapons, and equipment needed for planning and operations. (Figure 4-17 on page 4-24 illustrates an example matrix of weather effects critical values.) +Note. The weather effects critical values listed in figure 4-17 may not reflect accurate operational minimums used by deployed units. As such, the information in the graphic must be confirmed or revalidated by weapon system subject matter experts during planning and the conduct of any military operation. 4-22 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations Figure 4-15. +Weather forecast chart example Figure 4-16. +Light and illumination data table example 06 January 2021 ATP 2-01.3, C1 4-23 Chapter 4 FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE OPERATION (No Degradation) (Significant Degradation) Maneuver (Tracked) Visibility > 1 mile < 1/2 mile Rainfall < 0.1 inch/hour > 0.5 inch/hour Snow Depth < 12 inches > 20 inches Maneuver with Night Vision Goggles (Tracked) Visibility > 1/8 mile < 1/16 mile Rainfall < 0.1 inch/hour > 0.5 inch/hour Snow Depth < 12 inches > 20 inches Dismounted Infantry Visibility > 1/5 mile < 1/16 mile Rainfall < 0.1 inch/hour > 0.5 inch/hour Snow Depth < 3 inches > 6 inches Temperature < 32° Celsius > 32° Celsius Wind Chill Temperature > 0° Celsius < −30° Celsius Weapon Positioning Visibility > 2 miles < 1/4 mile Temperature > 18° Celsius < 18° Celsius Fires Support (155MM) Visibility > 3 miles < 1 mile Ceiling > 800 feet < 500 feet Surface Wind < 35 knots > 50 knots Snow Depth < 4.0 inches > 6.0 inches Close Air Support (A-10) Visibility > 5 miles < 3 miles Ceiling > 3000 feet < 500 feet Air Defense Artillery(Vulcan, Chaparral, Stinger) Visibility > 3 miles < 2 miles Ceiling > 5000 feet < 3000 feet Rainfall < 0.5 inch/hour > 1.0 inch/hour Battlefield Obscuration Precipitation None Moderate–Heavy Airborne Operations (C-130/C-17) Visibility > 3 miles < 1/2 mile Ceiling > 1500 feet < 300 feet Surface Wind < 10 knots > 13 knots Precipitation None Freezing/Thunderstorm Aviation (Rotary) Visibility > 2 miles < 1/4 mile Ceiling > 500 feet < 300 feet Surface Wind < 20 knots > 30 knots Precipitation None Freezing Rain/Hail Medical Evacuation (Plus Above Criteria) Ceilings (Day) >= 700 feet < 500 feet Ceilings (Night) >= 1000 feet < 700 feet Visibility (Day) >= 2 miles < 1 mile Visibility (Night) >= 3 miles < 2 miles >= 25% and < 25% and Illumination/Moon Angle > 30° Above Horizon < 30° Above Horizon Gray Eagle Ceilings (Launch/Recovery) >= 3000 feet < 3000 feet Visibility >= 3 miles < 1 mile Headwind (Surface) 26 knots Crosswind (Surface) 18 knots Tailwind (Surface) 08 knots Gust Spread 08 knots Thunderstorms None Within 5 nautical miles/Route of Flight Flight Level Hazards NG Turbulence/Icing Moderate Turbulence/Moderate Icing Precipitation None Moderate Figure 4-17. +Weather effects critical values example 4-24 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE OPERATION (No Degradation) (Significant Degradation) Shadow Unmanned Aircraft System Clouds Few Broken–Overcast Visibility >= 3 miles < 3 miles Sustained < 20 knots Sustained >= 20 knots Headwind (Surface) Gusts < 25 knots Gusts >= 25 knots Sustained = 21 knots Crosswind (Surface) Gusts = 26 knots Flight Level Hazards NEG Turbulence/Icing Moderate Turbulence/Any Icing Precipitation None Any Type Thunderstorms None Within 25 nautical miles Density Altitude >= 9000 feet Humidity < 90% >= 90% Manned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (RC-12/MC-12) Visibility >= 3 miles < 2 miles Ceilings >= 2000 feet < 200 feet Thunderstorms None On Station/Route of Flight Winds < 35 knots >= 35 knots Cross Winds < 20 knots >= 20 knots Hazards NEG Turbulence/Icing Severe Icing/Turbulence Visual Sensors Visibility >= 2 miles < 1/2 mile Cloud Coverage Below Flight Level Few Broken–Overcast Precipitation Light Heavy Humidity < 90% > 90% Infrared Sensors Visibility >= 2 miles < 2 miles Precipitation Light Heavy Temperature >= 20 < 125° Fahrenheit < −25 >= 125° Fahrenheit Humidity < 90% >= 90% Engineer Operations Visibility >= 1/8 mile < 1/8 mile Winds (Line Charge Cannot Fire) < 20 knots >= 30 knots Temperature −25 – 125° Fahrenheit < −25 > 125° Fahrenheit Precipitation Light Heavy Ground Conditions Snow < 3 inches Snow >= 6 inches Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (Chemical Defense) Enemy Usage of Chemical Agents Winds >= 15 knots < 5 knots Wind Direction Away from Friendly Toward Friendly Precipitation Moderate–Heavy None Stability Unstable Stable NEG not encountered Figure 4-17. +Weather effects critical values example (continued) DESCRIBE HOW CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS CAN AFFECT FRIENDLY AND THREAT OPERATIONS 4-69. An understanding of civil considerations—the ability to analyze their impact on operations—enhances several aspects of operations, including the selection of objectives; location, movement, and control of forces; use of weapons; and protection measures. The intelligence staff should leverage the rest of the staff, as well as outside agencies, who have expertise in civil considerations, to aid the intelligence analysis in this area. Generating intelligence knowledge is an opportunity to leverage nonorganic units, agencies, academia, other organizations, or other Services that are not deploying with the unit but have relevant regional knowledge. This is especially true when accounting for cyberspace considerations, which may not be an organic expertise at the G-2/S-2 levels. 4-70. Civil considerations assist commanders in understanding the social, political, and cultural variables within the AO and their effects on the mission. Tactical Army staffs use ASCOPE characteristics to analyze civil considerations that are essential in supporting the development of effective plans for operations. 06 January 2021 ATP 2-01.3, C1 4-25 Chapter 4 Table 4-6 presents one method by cross-walking civil considerations (including examples for each ASCOPE characteristic) with the operational variables (PMESII). Table 4-6. Crosswalk of civil considerations (ASCOPE) with operational variables (PMESII) Areas Structures Capabilities Organizations People Events Public administration: ▪ Civil authority, practices, and rights ▪ Political system, stability, traditions United Nations ▪ Standards and representatives Elections effectiveness Banks Political leaders Council Executive and Business Courts (court Governors meetings Legislative: organizations Enclaves house, mobile Councils Speeches ▪ Administration Cooperatives Municipalities courts) Elders (significant) ▪ Policies Economic POLITICAL Provinces Government Community Security and ▪ Powers nongovernment Districts centers leaders military ▪ Organization organizations Political districts Provincial/District Paramilitary training Judicial/Legal: Guilds Voting centers members sessions ▪ Administration Labor unions Party affiliation areas Meeting halls ▪ Capacity Judges Significant Major illicit Shadow government Polling sites ▪ Policies Prosecutors trials industries influence areas Police stations ▪ Civil and criminal Law Political Large Motivation Prisons codes enforcement landholders ▪ Powers officers Treaties Volunteer groups ▪ Organization Corrections Will ▪ Law enforcement officers Dispute resolution, grievances Local leadership Degrees of legitimacy Corrections Doctrine Organization Host-nation Training forces present Areas of influence Materiel Insurgent groups Areas of interest Combat Leadership present and Areas of operations Historical Bases Personnel manpower networks MILITARY Safe havens or Key leaders Noncombat Headquarters Facilities Multinational sanctuaries forces present Multinational, Kinetic (police) History Multinational/local insurgent, events Known leader Nature of civil-military Paramilitary nation bases military Unit reliefs houses/businesses relationships organizations Historic data on Fraternal Loss of Resource constraints operations by the organizations leadership opposition Local security forces Quick-reaction forces Civic Insurgent strength organizations Enemy recruiting Fiscal: access to Bankers Drought, Banks banks, currency, Police harvest, yield, monetary policy Business Employers/ domestic Commercial Banking organizations Can tolerate drought Employees animals, Fishery Fuel: distribution, Cooperatives Black market Labor livestock Forestry refining, source Economic Energy occupations (cattle, Industrial Industrial plants nongovernment ECONOMIC Imports/Exports Consumption sheep), Livestock dealers Manufacturing organizations market cycles External support/aid patterns Markets Mining Guilds Food: distributing, Unemployment Labor Mining Warehousing Labor unions rate (if exists) migration marketing, production, Movement of goods/ Markets Major illicit Job lines events processing, rationing, services Silos, granaries, industries Market days security, storing, Landholders Smuggling routes warehouses transporting Large Payday Merchants Trade routes Farms/Ranches landholders Inflation Money lenders Business Black market areas Auto repair shops Volunteer groups openings Market prices Black marketers Police Loss of Raw materials Gang members departments business Tariffs Smuggling chain 4-26 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations Table 4-6. Crosswalk of civil considerations (ASCOPE) with operational variables (PMESII) (continued) Areas Structures Capabilities Organizations People Events Community leaders, councils, and members Celebrations Education Civil Ethnicity/Racial: disturbance biases, Clubs National dominant group, Refugee camps holidays Jails percentages, Enclaves: ethnic, Religious Historical Clan role in conflict religious, social, buildings/houses Medical: Traditional, holidays and Community Key figures: tribal, families or modern observance Libraries councils and criminals, clans Social networks, days Religious buildings organizations entertainment, Neighborhoods including those on Food lines Schools/ School councils religious leaders, SOCIAL Boundaries of websites chiefs/elders Weddings Universities Familial influence Academic Birthdays Stadiums Patriotic/Service Languages/