Multi-Domain Ops and Intel PDF

Chapter 2 Multidomain Operations and Intelligence SECTION I – OVERVIEW 2-1. To provide effective and flexible intelligence support, intelligence professionals must understand multidomain operations. FM 3-0 provides many doctrinal concepts that are important to intelligence...

Chapter 2 Multidomain Operations and Intelligence SECTION I – OVERVIEW 2-1. To provide effective and flexible intelligence support, intelligence professionals must understand multidomain operations. FM 3-0 provides many doctrinal concepts that are important to intelligence professionals. (See figure 2-1.) This chapter presents the following FM 3-0 doctrinal concepts and how intelligence relates to each concept: ⚫ Army operations within a joint strategic context; challenges for Army forces; the strategic environment, including threats and peer threats; and the Army strategic contexts (section II). ⚫ Understanding a broad OE and focusing the elements of the OE to support an Army unit’s specific mission (section II). ⚫ The fundamentals of operations—Army operations, multidomain operations, large-scale combat operations, combined arms and combat power, multidomain operations as the Army’s operational concept, and operational approach and operational framework (section III). Figure 2-1. FM 3-0 logic chart Note. Throughout this chapter are blue boxes following operational concepts discussed in FM 3-0. These blue boxes address different aspects of intelligence related to these operational concepts. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-1 Chapter 2 Intelligence (Multidomain and Multidimension) All Army operations are multidomain operations. Similarly, Army intelligence activities, at and across echelons, consider the domains and dimensions: The information collection effort, including collection by the intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities. Intelligence PED, analysis, and production in developing threat objectives and intent, characteristics, capabilities, targets, and COAs, as well as in analyzing civil considerations and other significant aspects of the OE. All intelligence analysis tasks, such as pre-mission analysis of the OE, IPOE, situation development, and intelligence support to targeting, as well as collection management and intelligence architecture tasks. Readers should not misinterpret any isolated portions of FM 2-0 and assume the intelligence activity or task does not account for all domains and the human, information, and physical dimensions. SECTION II – STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 2-2. The Army intelligence warfighting function is designed to provide effective and flexible intelligence support to all Army forces. However, providing this intelligence support is challenging; the corresponding Army strategic context, relevant factors of the OE, echelon, unit type, and specific mission all significantly affect intelligence support. Therefore, there are several aspects to consider when providing effective and flexible intelligence support; while not all encompassing, three important general aspects are— ⚫ Employing and adapting all available intelligence capabilities in the context of the current situation and a unit’s mission/operation. ⚫ Knowing and adapting intelligence and operational fundamentals (largely captured in Army doctrine) in the context of the current situation and a unit’s mission/operation. ⚫ Building and maintaining tactically and technically proficient intelligence professionals who are effective in both the profession of arms and the intelligence profession. ARMY STRATEGIC CHALLENGES 2-3. The joint force deters most adversaries from achieving strategic objectives through direct military confrontation with the United States. Therefore, adversaries pursue their objectives indirectly through malign activities and armed conflict, targeting others in ways calculated to avoid war with the United States. These activities include subversive political and legal strategies, establishing physical presence on the ground to buttress resource claims, coercive economic practices, supporting proxy forces, and spreading disinformation. However, several adversaries have both the ability and the will to conduct armed conflict with the United States under certain conditions. This requires Army forces to be prepared for limited contingencies and large-scale combat operations. 2-4. Global and regional adversaries apply all instruments of national power to challenge U.S. interests and the joint force. Militarily, they have extended the battlefield by employing network-enabled sensors and long- range fires to deny access during conflict and challenge friendly forces’ freedom of action during competition. These standoff approaches seek to— ⚫ Counter U.S. space, air, and naval advantages to make the introduction of land forces difficult and exploit the overall joint force’s mutual dependencies. ⚫ Increase the cost to the joint force and its partners in the event of armed conflict. ⚫ Hold the joint force at risk both in the United States and at its overseas bases and contest Army forces’ deployment from home station to forward tactical assembly areas overseas. Note. Instruments of national power are all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military (JP 1, Volume 1). 2-2 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-5. Adversary actions increase the level of risk to the U.S. joint force in order to raise the threshold at which the United States might respond to a provocation with military force. By reducing the joint force’s conventional deterrence, adversaries believe they have greater freedom of action to conduct malign activities both within and outside the U.S. homeland. Adversaries exploit this freedom of action through offensive cyberspace operations, disinformation, legal operations, influence operations, unconventional forces, and the aggressive positioning of ground, air, and naval forces to support territorial claims. Adversaries employ different types of forces and capabilities to attack private and government organizations, threaten critical economic infrastructure, and disrupt political processes, often with a degree of plausible deniability that reduces the likelihood of a friendly military response. 2-6. During crisis and armed conflict, enemies typically initiate their aggression under conditions optimal for their success, requiring U.S. forces to respond at a disadvantage. U.S. combat operations typically involve force projection over long distances, providing advantages for enemy forces operating closer to their bases of support. Enemies typically have a degree of popular support cultivated through decades of propaganda and isolation from the free flow of information. This increases the enemy’s will to fight and can make local populations hostile to U.S. forces and objectives. 2-7. Army forces overcome challenges posed by threats and the environment with credible formations able to employ lethal capabilities. Credible combat forces are those able to overcome the advantages adversaries generate within a specific regional context. Lethality is the capability and capacity to destroy (FM 3-0). Employing and threatening the employment of lethal force are at the core of how Army forces achieve objectives and enable the rest of the instruments of national power to achieve objectives. 2-8. Lethality is enabled by formations maneuvering into positions of relative advantage where they can employ weapons systems and mass effects to destroy enemy forces or place them at risk of destruction. The speed, range, and accuracy of weapons systems employed by a formation enhance weapons systems’ lethality. The demands of large-scale combat rapidly deplete available stockpiles and require forces to retain large reserves of ammunition, weapons, and other warfighting capabilities. Leaders multiply the effects of lethal force by employing combinations of capabilities through multiple domains to create, accrue, and exploit relative advantages— imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces and overwhelming their ability to respond effectively. 2-9. Intelligence is inherently multidomain, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational. The intelligence warfighting function supports lethality directly by providing effective and flexible intelligence support to large-scale combat operations—the Army’s modernization focus. However, intelligence support is critical to all Army strategic contexts. The intelligence warfighting function strives to provide commanders and staffs with the timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence required to visualize the OE, assess the situation, set the theater, direct military actions, and establish positions of relative advantage across the domains and dimensions of the OE as a part of the joint force. 2-10. Table 2-1 lists several intelligence considerations associated with Army strategic challenges. Table 2-1. Intelligence considerations for Army strategic challenges Army strategic challenge Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive) Gaining the proper authorities. Write to release and intelligence sharing. Gaining and maintaining support of allies and Multinational interoperability and using systems such as CENTRIXS and the US BICES. partners. Security force assistance and engagements. Language support. Discrediting disinformation and misinformation. Access to the intelligence enterprise and architecture. Access to experts on the different regional governments and civil components of the Maintaining the continuous information operational environment. collection needed to determine the Information collection, analysis, and Intelligence reach. composition, disposition, strength, and Intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination. activities of enemy forces. Warning intelligence. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment. Collection management. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-3 Chapter 2 Table 2-1. Intelligence considerations for Army strategic challenges (continued) Army strategic challenge Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive) Commander involvement and staff teamwork. Integrating and synchronizing intelligence at all Access to the intelligence enterprise and architecture through intelligence reach. echelons, distributed across large operational Intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination. areas with diverse requirements. Developing and maintaining the common intelligence picture. Synchronizing intelligence activities across deep, close, and rear areas. Military intelligence training and integrating military intelligence forces into formations. Military intelligence force tailoring. Preparing forward-stationed forces to fight and win Pre-mission analysis of the operational environment. while outnumbered and isolated. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment. Intelligence application of the imperatives of operations. Leveraging the intelligence enterprise during force projection through intelligence reach. Protecting forward-positioned forces and those Intelligence support to protection. moving into a theater. Counterintelligence primary mission areas. Continuous information collection. Access to the intelligence enterprise and special collection capabilities. Warning intelligence. Minimizing vulnerability to weapons of mass Intelligence preparation of the operational environment. destruction. Support (including terrain and weather analysis) to unit dispersion across operational environments. Maintaining command and control and the Access to the intelligence enterprise and architecture. sustainment of units distributed across vast Synchronizing intelligence activities across deep, close, and rear areas. distances in noncontiguous areas and outside supporting ranges and distances. Support to sustainment. Intelligence activities to consolidate gains. Coordination with military police and other friendly forces. Maintaining a desirable tempo while defeating fixed Continuous information collection. and bypassed enemy forces. Support to targeting. Synchronizing intelligence activities across deep, close, and rear areas. Defeating threat information and irregular warfare Intelligence support to information advantage. attacks against the United States and strategic Discrediting disinformation and misinformation. lines of communications. Integration into joint special operations forces’ intelligence efforts. CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System US BICES United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 2-11. The central challenge to U.S. security is the reemergence of long-term, great power competition with China and Russia as individual actors and as actors collaborating to achieve common goals. China uses its rapidly modernizing military, information warfare, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to its advantage. Additionally, The Belt and Road Initiative, a massive China-led infrastructure project, aims to globally create influence. Concurrently, Russia continues to expand influence in its near abroad and adversely affect security through strategic messaging, economic manipulation (energy and trade), and conflicts in Eastern Ukraine and Georgia. Russia’s capabilities challenge the security environment in Europe. 2-12. In addition to China and Russia, several other states threaten U.S. security. North Korea seeks to guarantee survival of its regime and increase its leverage. It pursues a combination of CBRN, conventional, and unconventional weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Similarly, Iran seeks dominance over its neighbors by asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony. Iran uses state-sponsored terrorist activities, a network of proxies, and its missile capabilities to achieve its objectives. 2-13. While states are the principal actors on the global stage, nonstate actors also threaten the strategic environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, threat cyberspace actors, and other malicious nonstate actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Terrorism remains a persistent tactic driven by ideology and enabled by political and economic structures. 2-4 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-14. U.S. intelligence carefully watches the Nation’s adversaries. Army intelligence is crucial to DOD efforts to prepare for large-scale combat operations. Additionally, Army intelligence heavily leverages the intelligence enterprise for unique and comprehensive intelligence on the Nation’s adversaries. As part of various theater efforts, Army intelligence is heavily involved in setting the theaters to prepare for potential conflicts. In effect, Army intelligence doctrine uses the term set the theater to describe certain doctrinal intelligence concepts. (See chapter 8 for more about intelligence during large-scale combat operations.) 2-15. INSCOM is globally engaged and closely involved in intelligence operations within multiple combatant commands. Some of these INSCOM intelligence units are also involved in several joint force efforts to provide warning intelligence to track adversary actions and changing conditions across the domains and dimensions of the OE in each theater. Simultaneously, intelligence staffs and MI units from corps to maneuver battalions prepare for future operations. (See chapter 7 for more about INSCOM.) THREATS 2-16. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats faced by Army forces are, by nature, hybrid. They include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, criminal elements, nation-states, or national alliances. Generally, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or adversary: ⚫ An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An enemy is also a combatant under the law of war. ⚫ An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Adversaries pursue interests that compete with those of the United States and are often called competitors. Hazards 2-17. While usually not as important as threats, hazards can be a significant part of the OE and can play an important role in the conduct of operations. A hazard refers to a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. The threat’s use of chemical weapons would be a significant hazard within a unit’s AO. The intelligence warfighting function is equipped to provide important intelligence on hazards, as needed, during operations. Access to and collaboration across the intelligence enterprise are especially helpful in conducting intelligence analysis on hazards. Peer Threats 2-18. Peer threats are adversaries or enemies with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across all domains and dimensions of the OE worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power to that of U.S. forces in geographic proximity to a conflict area. Peer threats may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them relative advantages in the human and information dimensions. 2-19. Peer threats employ strategies that capitalize on their advantages to achieve objectives. When these objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. They exploit friendly sensitivities to world opinions and attempt to exploit the Nation’s domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their willingness to endure greater hardships, casualties, and negative public opinion. They also believe their ability to pursue long-term goals is greater than that of the United States. 2-20. Peer threats employ capabilities from and across multiple domains against Army forces, and they seek to exploit vulnerabilities in all strategic contexts. During conflict, peer threats seek to inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short amount of time. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before friendly forces can decisively respond. Peer threats employ many sophisticated and lethal and nonlethal capabilities that create challenges for information collection and 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-5 Chapter 2 the production of intelligence. These challenges include IADSs; long-range fires; counterreconnaissance; cyberspace and EW operations; space and counterspace operations; and camouflage, concealment, and deception. (See appendix C for more on peer threats.) THREAT METHODS 2-21. Peer threats use various methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever possible; every intelligence professional should understand these threat methods and how they can apply to future conflicts. The following broad peer threat methods are often used in combination during conventional or irregular conflicts and below the threshold of conflict; FM 3-0 provides more details: ⚫ Information warfare. In the context of the threat, information warfare refers to a threat’s orchestrated use of information activities (such as EW, cyberspace operations, and psychological operations) to achieve objectives. Operating under a different set of ethics and laws than the United States’, and under the cloak of anonymity, peer threats conduct information warfare aggressively and continuously to influence populations and decision makers. Peer threats can also use information warfare to create destructive effects during competition below armed conflict and crisis. During armed conflict, peer threats use information warfare in conjunction with other methods to achieve strategic and operational objectives. ⚫ Systems warfare. Systems warfare refers to the identification and isolation or destruction of critical subsystems or components to degrade or destroy an opponent’s overall system. Peer threats view the battlefield, their own instruments of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and components. They use systems warfare to attack critical components of a friendly system while protecting their own system. ⚫ Preclusion. Peer threats use a variety of actions, activities, and capabilities to preclude a friendly force’s ability to shape an OE and mass and sustain combat power. A2 and AD are two strategic and operational approaches to preclusion. ▪ Antiaccess is action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). The employment of A2 capabilities against Army forces begins in CONUS and extends throughout the strategic support area into a theater. Peer threats’ A2 means include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and space, cyberspace, and information warfare capabilities. ▪ Area denial is action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational area (JP 3-0). Usually, adversaries do not design AD to keep friendly forces out but rather to limit their freedom of action and ability to accomplish their mission in using long-range fires, IADSs, EW, CBRN weapons, man- made obstacles, and conventional ground maneuver forces. ⚫ Isolation. Isolation refers to the containment of a force so that it cannot accomplish its mission. Peer threats will attempt to isolate U.S. forces in many ways: ▪ During competition below armed conflict, peer threats may attempt to isolate friendly forces using disinformation campaigns and the threat of aggression. ▪ During crisis, peer threats seek to isolate U.S. forward-positioned forces and prevent their support from the United States or elsewhere in theater. ▪ During armed conflict, enemy forces identify isolated friendly forces using a variety of capabilities and rapidly attempt to destroy them through long-range, massed, and precision fires. ⚫ Sanctuary. Sanctuary refers to the positioning of threat forces beyond the reach of friendly forces. It is a form of protection derived by some combination of political, legal, and physical boundaries that restricts freedom of action by a friendly force commander. Peer threats will use any means necessary, including sanctuary, to protect key capabilities from destruction, particularly by air and missile capabilities. Peer threats will also protect their key interests, whether these interests reside in their homeland or in another country. To create a sanctuary that protects key interests, adversaries employ combinations of both physical and nonphysical means to protect key interests. 2-6 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence EMERGING THREAT CAPABILITIES 2-22. The intelligence enterprise is continuously conducting intelligence collection and analysis on adversary actions, possible intent, and capability developments. Additionally, intelligence analysts watch for trends and the employment of new capabilities and techniques during ongoing conflicts. While the principles and fundamentals of warfare remain relatively unchanged, emerging capabilities—which many of the Nation’s adversaries have procured or can procure—may have a disproportionate impact on future conflicts with U.S. and allied forces. Therefore, intelligence collection and analysis are critical in developing countermeasures and contingency plans. Certain Army intelligence units and organizations, primarily INSCOM, the Army Space and Missile Command, and the Army Futures Command, contribute to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other DOD and intelligence enterprise organizations in performing these tasks. 2-23. Current and future capability developments—in terms of artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, robotics, and fully and semiautonomous weapons system capabilities, among other developments—require continued intelligence collection and analysis. In recent exercises and conflicts, fully and semiautonomous weapons system capabilities and drone swarm technologies have been effectively employed by the Nation’s adversaries. The use of semiautonomous weapons systems and drone swarms have occurred during Israel Defense Forces versus Hamas engagements, the 2d Norgorno-Karabakh conflict (2020), the renewed Russian invasion of the Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and subsequent operations. This trend will most likely continue; therefore, the U.S. military must leverage intelligence collection and develop resources to ensure the Nation’s adversaries do not capture the strategic advantage. ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS 2-24. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. (See JP 3-0.) Each relationship is defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims. Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different parts of the world. 2-25. Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces conduct operations: competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict. Figure 2-2 illustrates the Army strategic contexts and the range of military operations. Figure 2-2. Army strategic contexts and operational categories Note. This publication often uses competition to mean competition below armed conflict. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-7 Chapter 2 2-26. The Army strategic contexts and the range of military operations, which along with consolidating gains, significantly affect intelligence supporting activities. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Army commanders must exploit successful operations by continuously consolidating gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Chapter 4 details intelligence support to each strategic context and the consolidating gains for each context. UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2-27. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an OE includes portions of the five domains (land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace) understood through three dimensions (human, information, and physical). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by their physical characteristics. Cyberspace, a man-made network of networks, transits and connects the other domains as represented by the dots shown in figure 2-3. Figure 2-3. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment Note. Joint doctrine describes the components of an OE as the physical areas of the land, maritime, air, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the EMS; and other factors. (See JP 2-0 and JP 5-0 for doctrine on describing and analyzing an OE from a joint perspective.) 2-28. The OE model assists in accounting for the totality of factors, specific circumstances, and conditions that impact the conduct of operations. This understanding enables commanders and staffs to better identify problems, anticipate potential outcomes, and understand the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions, including the effects these actions have on achieving the military end state. A description of an OE includes all factors that the commander and staff must capture and understand in order to inform the conduct of operations. 2-29. Knowledge of the OE is the precursor to effective action. Obtaining knowledge about an OE requires aggressive and continuous intelligence operations, surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations to acquire information. Information collected from multiple sources and analyzed becomes intelligence that answers commanders’ intelligence requirements. Using all available relevant information to determine how the OE affects operations is essential to understanding which COAs are the most feasible, suitable, and acceptable. Throughout the course of operations, commanders and staffs rely on an integrated information collection effort to develop an accurate picture of their OE. (See chapter 6 for more on collection.) 2-8 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-30. An OE is the totality of factors that affect what occurs in an assigned area. These factors include actors, events, or actions that occur outside the assigned area. How the many entities behave and interact with each other is difficult to discern. No two OEs are the same, and all of them continually change. Changes result, in part, from opposing forces and actors interacting, learning, and adapting. 2-31. The complex and dynamic nature of an OE makes determining the relationship between cause and effect challenging, and they contribute to the uncertain nature of war and human competition. This requires commanders, supported by their staffs, to develop and maintain the best possible understanding of their OE. Several tools and processes assist commanders and staffs in understanding their OE. They include— ⚫ Domains. ⚫ Dimensions. ⚫ Operational and mission variables. ⚫ Running estimates (described in ADP 5-0). ⚫ ADM (described in ATP 5-0.1). ⚫ The MDMP (described in ADP 5-0). ⚫ Pre-mission analysis of the OE (described in chapter 5). ⚫ IPOE (described in chapter 5). ⚫ Sustainment preparation of the OE (described in FM 4-0). DOMAINS 2-32. Within the context of an OE, a domain is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills (FM 3-0). Understanding the strengths and dependencies of joint capabilities in each domain is fundamental to a multidomain, combined arms approach to operations. Although each military Service and branch trains and educates its leaders to be experts about operations in a primary domain, each Service has some capability in each of the domains, and each Service develops a shared understanding of how to integrate capabilities from different domains. (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on the domains.) 2-33. Although most domains align with the skills developed in a particular Service, no Service focuses entirely on or exerts total control of that single domain during operations. Joint commanders assign responsibilities and task-organize based on mission requirements. However, the domains present very different conditions of warfare and require the specialized warfighting skills developed by the different Services and subcomponents within each of the Services. The joint force and all Services must collaborate and synchronize to thoroughly understand each domain. When the threat takes actions to significantly counter collection in a particular domain and friendly forces have an incomplete understanding within that domain it challenges operations. In these situations, the intelligence warfighting function must identify all information gaps and depend on collection in the other domains to maintain as complete an understanding of the OE as possible. Army leaders do not need to understand all the technical components of the other domains, but they do need to understand the complementary and reinforcing ways in which they can request and employ joint capabilities and methods to support operations on land. The following occurs across all domains: ⚫ The Army provides forces and capabilities from all domains to the joint force. ⚫ Army forces employ joint capabilities from all domains to complement and reinforce their own capabilities. ⚫ Understanding domain interdependencies assists leaders in better mitigating friendly vulnerabilities while creating and exploiting relative advantages. ⚫ In an environment where the enemy can contest every domain, successful operations require continuous joint integration down to the lowest tactical echelons. ⚫ The intelligence warfighting function must assist commanders and staffs in understanding the threat and other significant aspects of the OE and conducting/leveraging information collection across all domains. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-9 Chapter 2 2-34. Table 2-2 lists several operational aspects and intelligence, threat, and other OE considerations associated with the land domain. Table 2-2. Land domain operational aspects and intelligence and other considerations Land domain The land domain is the area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). Variations in climate and terrain and the diversity of populations have a far greater impact on operations in the land domain than in any other domain. The land domain’s most distinguishing characteristic is the human dimension. Terrain also significantly impacts the nature of land combat. Land-based domain capabilities can use or alter terrain and operate in most weather conditions and among populations. Threat and other operational Operational aspects Army intelligence considerations environment considerations Army intelligence must— ▪ Understand and visualize the interdependencies of the land Threat capability examples: domain on the other domains and Morale, doctrine, and effectiveness. characterize the threat’s capabilities Leaders and their biographic Possibility of high lethality, operating and vulnerabilities in each domain information. in complex terrain, and a CBRNE- relative to operations. C2. degraded environment. ▪ Leverage the intelligence Long-range fires. Significantly impacted by long-range architecture, including intelligence Medium- and short-range fires. precision fires. from the intelligence community to CBRNE. Battles and engagements depend on get a different perspective and Information warfare, including EW and Army forces closing with enemy forces greater insight. cyberspace. and prevailing in close combat. ▪ Collaborate, participate in Integrated air defense systems and Land capabilities extend operational exercises, and build intelligence other A2 and AD capabilities. reach and provide options for enabling relationships with the other Tank and armored. joint operations. Services, CCMDs, and unified Infantry and small arms. Joint interdependence: action partners. Engineering. ▪ Operational mobility. Support other Services, CCMDs, and Military police. ▪ Joint fires. unified action partners— Logistics and maintenance. ▪ Other key enabling capabilities. ▪ In understanding the land domain. Other operational environment Army support to other Services, ▪ As tasked, by providing significant examples: capabilities across all-source CCMDs, and unified action partners: Government officials with biographies. intelligence, the intelligence ▪ Ground-based indirect fires. NGOs, PVOs. disciplines, and the complementary ▪ Air and missile defense. capabilities. Political with biographies. ▪ EW. Provide Army forces— Economic, commercial, and industrial ▪ Cyberspace operations. ▪ An extensive all-source intelligence studies. ▪ Communications. foundation at and across echelons. Communications infrastructure. ▪ Intelligence. ▪ Significant capabilities across the Energy infrastructure. ▪ Rotary-wing aircraft. intelligence disciplines and City infrastructures. ▪ Logistics. complementary capabilities. Terrain. ▪ Engineering. ▪ Effective and flexible intelligence Weather trends, forecasts, and ▪ Security operations. support. effects. The human and information Weather effects on terrain. dimensions make the land domain the History. most complicated domain and the most Culture and customs. challenging for the intelligence warfighting function. A2 antiaccess EW electromagnetic warfare AD area denial JP joint publication C2 command and control NGO nongovernmental organization CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives PVO private voluntary organization CCMD combatant command 2-10 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-35. Table 2-3 lists several operational aspects and intelligence, threat, and other OE considerations associated with the maritime domain. Table 2-3. Maritime domain operational aspects and intelligence and other considerations Maritime domain The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). The maritime domain overlaps with the land domain in the seaward segment of the littoral. Maritime capability may be viewed as global, regional, territorial, coastal, and self-defense forces. Most maritime nations also maintain air forces capable of conducting operations over the maritime domain. This air capability, combined with land-based long-range fires, greatly impacts operations in the maritime domain. Threat and other operational Operational aspects Army intelligence considerations environment considerations Move strategic fires capabilities, conceal strategic capabilities below Army intelligence must— the ocean surface, transport ▪ Leverage the intelligence personnel and equipment over vast architecture, including intelligence Threat capability examples: distances, and sustain maritime from the intelligence community on Nuclear weapons. operations. the maritime domain. Cruise missiles. Navy functions provide a unique ▪ Collaborate, participate in Naval C2. advantage for the joint force: exercises, and build intelligence Naval aviation. deterrence, operational access, sea relationships with Navy forces, Ship-to-shore fires. control, power projection, and CCMDs, and unified action Naval infantry/Marines. maritime security. partners. Naval reconnaissance. Maritime force joint interdependence: ▪ Build an understanding of and Underwater detonation and sabotage ▪ Protect maritime capabilities and integrate with unique Navy capabilities. ports. capabilities such as shipboard Naval air defense systems. ▪ Secure geographic choke points. signals intelligence and EW and Naval EW and cyberspace ▪ Mitigate long timelines for maritime naval aviation. capabilities. movement. Support other Services, CCMDs, and Military port and maritime basing ▪ Compensate for limited number of unified action partners: agreements. platforms. ▪ Conduct detailed assessments on Other operational environment ▪ Mitigate lost ships and platforms. key maritime choke points, as examples: Army forces rely on maritime forces— appropriate. Commercial sea traffic. ▪ For deployment and sustainment. ▪ Support joint target development on Port infrastructure and conditions. ▪ Fires and AMD to complement and certain threat maritime capabilities, NGOs, PVOs. reinforce land-based systems. as appropriate. Underwater earthquakes and Army forces assist maritime forces— ▪ Support Navy identification of tsunamis. ▪ Sea control. threats to maritime capabilities, as Current and forecasted oceanographic ▪ In controlling littorals by projecting appropriate. effects on friendly and threat maritime power. ▪ Support port protection activities. capabilities. ▪ Local and regional maritime Provide Army forces— Littoral studies. superiority through long-range fires, ▪ Intelligence on littorals. Fishing and other sea-based attack aviation, AMD, and ▪ Intelligence support to Army industries. cyberspace capabilities. watercraft operations. Arctic strategic and political For intratheater operations, Army ▪ Effective and flexible intelligence on considerations. watercraft provide a significant the maritime domain when required capability to move maneuver for the mission. formations and sustain operations. AMD air and missile defense JP joint publication C2 command and control NGO nongovernmental organization CCMD combatant command PVO private voluntary organization EW electromagnetic warfare 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-11 Chapter 2 2-36. Table 2-4 lists several operational aspects and intelligence, threat, and other OE considerations associated with the air domain. Table 2-4. Air domain operational aspects and intelligence and other considerations Air domain The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The speed, range, and payloads of aircraft, rockets, missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles in the air domain directly and significantly affect operations on land and sea. Likewise, advances in AMD, EW, directed energy, and cyberspace capabilities increasingly contest freedom of maneuver in the air. Threat and other operational Operational aspects Army intelligence considerations environment considerations Army intelligence must— ▪ Leverage the intelligence Control of the air and land are often architecture, including intelligence interdependent requirements for from the intelligence community on successful campaigns and operations. the air domain. Allows the attack of strategically ▪ Collaborate, participate in exercises, and build intelligence Threat capability examples: valuable targets at long ranges. However, requires land forces to relationships with USAF, Naval, and Nuclear weapons. Marine Corps aviation units; Theater ballistic missiles. secure airfields and other Cruise missiles. infrastructure. CCMDs; unified action partners. ▪ Understand Army, joint, and other Air C2 (ground-based). Control of the air can vary over time Service aerial ISR and EW Airfields and supporting facilities and and geography from no control to capabilities. logistics. parity, local superiority, and air ▪ Build an understanding of and Aircraft specifications and capabilities. supremacy. integrate with unique USAF Aerial C2 systems. While the Army, other Services, and coalitions/host nations have certain air capabilities such as Rivet Joint and Radar systems, capabilities, capabilities, Army forces depend on Compass Call. limitations, and vulnerabilities. USAF completely or in some instances Support other Services, CCMDs, and Air ISR. for— unified action partners: Close air support tactics, including air ▪ ISR. ▪ Conduct detailed assessments on controller capabilities. ▪ Strategic attack. likely threat operations against key Air interdiction tactics. airfields to support contingency Runway cratering munitions. ▪ Close air support and interdiction. planning, as appropriate. Rotary-wing attack, air assault, and air ▪ Personnel recovery (in some instances). ▪ Support air domain target movement capabilities. development on certain threat UAS and drone tactics and ▪ Sustainment and mobility. capabilities, as appropriate. Air domain limitations can include capabilities. ▪ Support USAF identification of Air and ground EW capabilities. weather, enemy collection threats to key USAF capabilities, as Military airfield use agreements. countermeasures, and proximity of appropriate. Other operational environment airfields. ▪ Support airfield protection activities. examples: Army aviation provides— ▪ Support SEAD and joint SEAD. Weather trends and forecasts. ▪ ISR. Provide Army forces— Commercial air traffic. ▪ Fires. ▪ Current and forecasted weather Commercial airfields and ▪ Communications. effects through the staff weather ▪ Movement. infrastructure. officer, staff weather team, or other Overflight rights. Commanders establish control means. measures to enable Army aviation to Emerging aircraft technology. ▪ Effective and flexible support to operate unimpeded. Army aviation operations. Army rotary-wing aviation uses terrain ▪ Effective and flexible intelligence on to protect it from enemy detection. the air domain across all echelons for every mission. Conduct signals intelligence surveys. AMD air and missile defense JP joint publication C2 command and control SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses CCMD combatant command UAS unmanned aircraft system EW electromagnetic warfare USAF United States Air Force ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 2-12 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-37. Table 2-5 lists several operational aspects and intelligence, threat, and other OE considerations associated with the space domain. Table 2-5. Space domain operational aspects and intelligence and other considerations Space domain The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible (FM 3-0). Like land, maritime, and air domains, space is a physical domain where military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. The U.S. Space Command is responsible for planning and executing operations, activities, and missions in the space domain. Activities in the space domain enable freedom of action in all other domains, and operations in the other domains can create effects in and through space. (See FM 3-14.) Threat and other operational Operational aspects Army intelligence considerations environment considerations Commanders and staffs must understand how to employ or coordinate for Army or joint space and counterspace control assets to deny, degrade, disrupt, or deceive adversary space-based and counterspace-based capabilities to achieve relative Army intelligence must— advantages during operations. ▪ Leverage the intelligence Proliferation of advanced space architecture, including intelligence technology provides access to space- from the intelligence community on enabled technologies to most of the the space domain. Nation’s threats. ▪ Collaborate, participate in Threat capability examples: Some adversaries have their own exercises, and build intelligence Space intelligence collection. space capabilities, while commercial relationships with the Army Space Space C2 and communications. capabilities allow universal access to and Missile Command, CCMDs, space capabilities with military Ground stations, space control, and and unified action partners. infrastructure. applications. ▪ Build an understanding of and Specific capabilities provide— Disruption of friendly space integrate with space and capabilities. ▪ Information collection. counterspace capabilities. Other operational environment ▪ Early warning. Support other Services, CCMDs, and examples: ▪ Target acquisition. unified action partners in conducting Dual commercial- and military-space ▪ EW. detailed assessments on threat activities. ▪ Communications. space-ground stations, Space weather trends and forecasts. ▪ Positioning, navigation, and timing. communications, and infrastructure, Commercial space activities. ▪ Environmental monitoring. as appropriate. Commercial space infrastructure. Space and counterspace operations Provide Army forces, in conjunction with the space operations officer and Emerging space technology. depend on cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum; space staff weather officer, considerations capabilities provide critical portions of for space weather and space weather cyberspace bandwidth. effects on intelligence activities, Commanders and staffs cannot information collection, and support to assume unconstrained use of space- operations security. based capabilities, including communications. Army forces must be prepared to operate under the conditions of a denied, degraded, and disrupted space domain. C2 command and control EW electromagnetic warfare CCMD combatant command FM field manual 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-13 Chapter 2 2-38. Table 2-6 lists several operational aspects and intelligence, threat, and other OE considerations associated with the cyberspace domain. Table 2-6. Cyberspace domain operational aspects and intelligence and other considerations Cyberspace domain The cyberspace domain is the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (FM 3-0). Cyberspace is not constrained by geography; it is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting nodes that reach across every domain. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructure are all part of cyberspace. The cyberspace domain is congested, contested, and critical to successful operations. (See FM 3-12.) Operational aspects Army intelligence considerations Threat and other OE considerations Army intelligence must— ▪ Leverage the intelligence architecture, including intelligence from the intelligence and cyberspace communities about the cyberspace domain. ▪ Collaborate, participate in exercises, and build intelligence relationships with U.S. Cyber Space domain depends on the land, Command, other Services, CCMDs, and UAPs. maritime, air, and space domains. ▪ Understand USCYBERCOM, Army, joint, CO use links and nodes located in these and other Service cyberspace and EW domains and perform functions to gain capabilities. access and create effects, first in ▪ Build an understanding of and integrate with Threat capability examples: cyberspace and then in other domains. unique Army cyberspace capabilities and Information warfare intent and objectives Space operations depend on organizations such as ARCYBER, in the cyberspace domain. (This can cyberspace; space capabilities provide ARCYBER G-2, and the Cyber Military have global effects.) critical portions of cyberspace bandwidth. Intelligence Group. Offensive CO against friendly forces. Inherently joint, interorganizational, ▪ Build an electromagnetic order of battle in Defensive cyberspace capabilities. multinational, and often a shared conjunction with the cyberspace community. Cyberspace infrastructure with resource with signal and intelligence Support other Services, CCMDs, and UAPs: specifications and nodes. units and organizations. ▪ Support all measures to counter threat EW capabilities, to include meaconing, Army forces conduct CO and supporting information warfare, misinformation, and jamming, and decoys. activities as part of both Army and joint disinformation in the cyberspace domain, as Disruption of friendly space capabilities. operations. authorized. Other OE examples: Commanders and staffs use cyberspace ▪ Support cyberspace domain target Cyberspace (nonground) and EW capabilities to gain situational development on certain threat capabilities, communications, including cellular awareness and understanding of the as appropriate. coverage. enemy. ▪ Support the joint identification of threats to Cyberspace providers and ground Cyberspace and EW capabilities enable key friendly cyberspace capabilities, as infrastructure, including power decision making, protect friendly appropriate. generation and networks. information, and inform and influence Provide Army forces— Computer, information technology, and audiences. associated commercial advancements. To achieve an information advantage, ▪ Coordinated electromagnetic spectrum actions, in terms of signals intelligence. Other associated emerging technologies the commander and staff must integrate such as nano computers and quantum EW activities and CO: ▪ Support to EW activities. computing. ▪ Ensures command and control and ▪ Support to CO and cybersecurity. maintains operations security. Team with ARCYBER to exploit cyberspace capabilities as part of intelligence support and ▪ Slows or degrades enemy decision information collection. making and targeting. Team with Army EW units to exploit EW capabilities as a part of intelligence support and information collection. Conduct signals intelligence surveys. Note. Challenges in terms of authorities, coordination, and deconfliction between Title 10 and Title 50 statute operations can occur. (See paragraphs B-71 through B-74.) ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command FM field manual CCMD combatant command OE operational environment CO cyberspace operations UAP unified action partner G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command EW electromagnetic warfare 2-14 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence DIMENSIONS 2-39. Understanding the human, information, and physical dimensions of each domain assists commanders and staffs in assessing and anticipating the impacts of their operations. Operations reflect the reality that war is an act of force (in the physical dimension) to compel (in the information dimension) the decision making and behavior of enemy forces (in the human dimension). Actions in one dimension influence factors in the other dimensions. Intelligence analysts can categorize information and intelligence related to the human, information, and physical dimensions across all domains by the following elements for each threat entity: intent, capability, access, resources, and expertise. Understanding this interrelationship enables decision making about how to create and exploit advantages in one dimension and achieve objectives in the others without causing undesirable consequences. (See figure 2-4.) (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on the dimensions.) Figure 2-4. Interrelationships between the human, information, and physical dimensions 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-15 Chapter 2 2-40. Table 2-7 list several operational and intelligence considerations associated with the human dimension. Table 2-7. Operational and intelligence considerations for the human dimension The human dimension encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and groups, how they understand information and events, make decisions, generate will, and act within an operational environment (FM 3-0). Operational considerations (not all-inclusive) Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive) Discussion: Impossibility of isolating the human dimension from the information and physical dimensions. The will to fight emerges from the complex interrelationship of culture, emotion, and behavior. Activities and effects within the human dimension. They are challenging, but not impossible, to understand, collect against, make predictions Military objectives are achieved by influencing that interrelationship. about, and support operational planning. Human thinking, will, intent, and Influencing that interrelationship occurs by affecting attitudes, behavior are complex. beliefs, motivations, and perceptions. Intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities conducting The commander and staff identify relevant actors and predict their information collection in and against the human dimension. For behaviors. example, PAI research, OSINT, HUMINT, and identity activities can By understanding the operational environment, including relevant make important contributions to understanding important aspects of actors, the commander and staff attempt to influence relevant the human dimension; however, Army forces ultimately use an all- actors’ behaviors, decision making, and will through physical and source approach. informational means. IWFTs, including warning intelligence, intelligence preparation of Human advantage: the operational environment, situation development, and A human advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in intelligence support to targeting. They assist in accounting for terms of training, morale, perception, and will. aspects within the human dimension. A human advantage enables friendly morale and will, degrades Center of gravity analysis, functional analysis using critical factors, the enemy morale and will, and influences popular support. outside-in thinking analytic technique, and thorough analysis of relevant actors. They are critical in assisting intelligence analysts in understanding Examples include— the human dimension. ▪ Soldier competence. Operational variables, civil considerations (within the mission ▪ The force’s health and physical fitness. variables), and a crosswalk of both operational and mission variables. They assist intelligence analysts in considering the ▪ A cultural affinity and good relations with the local population. human dimension. FM field manual OSINT open-source intelligence HUMINT human intelligence PAI publicly available information IWFT intelligence warfighting function task 2-41. Table 2-8 lists several operational and intelligence considerations associated with physical dimension. Table 2-8. Operational and intelligence considerations for the physical dimension The physical dimension is the material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and manufactured, within an operational environment (FM 3-0). Operational considerations (not all-inclusive) Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive) Discussion: War is conducted with physical mechanisms. Impossibility of isolating the physical dimension from the human Each domain is inherently physical. and information dimensions. The physical dimension includes space orbits, terrain, weather, Existence of most of the threat and other operational environment military formations, electromagnetic radiation, and weapons systems considerations in table 2-2 on page 2-10 within the physical and their ranges. dimension. Physical activities create effects in the human and information Activities and effects within the physical dimension. They are dimensions. easier, although not easy, to understand, collect against, and predict compared to threat and other relevant actor aspects of the The electromagnetic spectrum is one of the physical mechanisms human and information dimensions. that occurs across all domains. Proficiency of intelligence disciplines and complementary Physical advantage: capabilities in conducting information collection in the physical A physical advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in dimension. terms of the number and combinations of capabilities, quality of IWFTs, including warning intelligence, IPOE, situation capabilities, or geographic positioning. development, and intelligence support to targeting. They must Finding multiple physical advantages is typically the goal of most consider the physical dimension. tactical operations: occupation of key terrain, physical isolation of the A relatively complete list of threat and other operational enemy, and destruction of enemy units. environment aspects. This list within the physical dimension is A physical advantage results in superior combat power. quite extensive. A physical advantage creates human and information advantages. FM field manual IWFT intelligence warfighting function task IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment 2-16 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-42. Table 2-9 list several operational and intelligence considerations associated with the information dimension. Table 2-9. Operational and intelligence considerations for the information dimension The information dimension is the content and data that individuals, groups, and information systems communicate and exchange, as well as the analytics and technical processes used to exchange information within an operational environment (FM 3-0). Operational considerations (not all-inclusive) Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive) Discussion: Connects humans to the physical world. Information transits through Impossibility of isolating the information dimension from the human all domains. and physical dimensions. Information—true, false, or in between—is used by friendly, enemy, Activities and effects within the information dimension. They are adversary, and neutral actors to influence perceptions, decision challenging, but not impossible, to understand, collect against, make making, and behaviors. predictions about, create intelligence products, conduct intelligence The effective employment of information depends on the audience, assessments, and support operational planning. message, and method of delivery. Intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities conducting Social media can enable the swift mobilization of people and information collection in and against the information dimension. For resources around ideas and causes. example, PAI research, OSINT, and identity activities can make Disinformation can significantly and negatively affect emotions, important contributions to the intelligence effort; however, Army perceptions, decision making, and behaviors. forces ultimately use an all-source approach. Information enables decision making and combat power. IWFTs, including warning intelligence, IPOE, situation The information dimension is key to seizing, retaining, and exploiting development, and intelligence support to targeting. They must the initiative and consolidating gains. account for aspects within the information dimension. Information advantage: Support to protecting information and disrupting threat An information advantage is the operational benefit derived when— communications. This is not that difficult. Support to deception. This is more difficult, while support to ▪ Friendly forces understand and exploit informational influencing behaviors and countering misinformation and considerations to achieve information objectives. disinformation are very difficult. ▪ Denying the threat’s ability to achieve information objectives. Functional analysis with critical factors, the operational variables, Army forces employ human and physical aspects to gain information civil considerations (within the mission variables), and a crosswalk advantages. of the operational and mission variables. They assist intelligence Most types of information advantage result from intrinsic human and analysts in considering the information dimension. physical aspects of Army operations. Content, data, and processes that individuals, groups, and An information advantage can occur in terms of— information systems use to communicate; the technical processes ▪ Collecting more and better information. and analytics used to exchange information; and how relevant actors and populations communicate. Intelligence analysts should ▪ Using relevant information more effectively. highlight these. ▪ Effective communications and protecting information. Importance of analyzing relevant actors, information processes, ▪ Disrupting the threat’s communications. communications means and nodes, and computer hardware and ▪ Conducting deception. software—among other aspects. ▪ Influencing relevant actors’ behavior. FM field manual OSINT open-source intelligence IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment PAI publicly available information IWFT intelligence warfighting function task OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES 2-43. The operational and mission variables are tools that assist commanders and staffs in refining their understanding of the domains and dimensions of an OE. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an OE in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). The operational variables assist leaders in understanding the land domain and its interrelationships with information, relevant actors, and capabilities in the other domains. 2-44. Commanders analyze information categorized by the operational variables in the context of the missions they are assigned. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations—each of which has informational considerations—those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information (FM 3-0). The mission variables are represented as METT-TC (I). (See FM 5-0 for doctrine on the operational and mission variables.) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-17 Chapter 2 Note. METT-TC (I) represents the mission variables that leaders use to analyze and understand a situation in relationship to the unit’s mission. The first six variables are not new. However, the pervasiveness of information and its applicability in different military contexts requires leaders to continuously assess various aspects of information during operations. Because of this, I has been added to the METT-TC mnemonic. Informational considerations, expressed as a parenthetical variable, is an important component of each variable of METT-TC that leaders must understand in developing an understanding of a situation and the relevant portions of the OE. (See FM 3-0.) INTELLIGENCE AND UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2-45. Understanding the domains and dimensions of an OE requires aggressive information collection and thorough intelligence analysis across echelons—from the joint level, where there are sophisticated capabilities, to the lowest tactical echelon. However, analyzing and understanding the domains and dimensions of an OE are not an end in and of themselves; information from the domains and dimensions must also feed the operational and mission variables. This ultimately results in the commander and staff reaching adequate situational understanding and visualizing, describing, and directing operations. Figure 2-5 concisely illustrates how to understand an OE and continuously focus and refine information from the domains and dimensions to support operations. Figure 2-5. Understanding an operational environment 2-18 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence 2-46. Understanding an OE is complex. The intelligence staff and intelligence analysis contribute to analyzing and describing the relevant aspects of the domains and dimensions through the operational and mission variables specific to a unit’s mission. Through participation with the entire staff, the intelligence staff leads and/or performs an important role in— ⚫ Understanding the domains and dimensions in time and space and identifying OE changes, including their causes and impacts. ⚫ Identifying how human behaviors and beliefs and information impact the physical dimension of operations. ⚫ Identifying one or more centers of gravity, depending on the echelon and situation. ⚫ Functional analysis. ⚫ Developing adversary and enemy threat models and identifying strengths and vulnerabilities across all domains. ⚫ Identifying possible friendly and enemy windows of opportunity across the domains and dimensions to create effects and possibly reach an advantage. Note. The intelligence staff must view the OE from friendly and enemy perspectives and any significant neutral and other actors. ⚫ Determining how, when, and where to leverage friendly capabilities across the domains to find and exploit friendly windows of opportunity. ⚫ Assisting the commander to visualize operations and impacts on the OE. ⚫ Framing and planning COAs and decisions during the MDMP. 2-47. The intelligence staff, primarily through continuous intelligence analysis and IPOE, assists the commander and staff in focusing on and understanding the relevant aspects of an OE and determining in which domains those relevant aspects reside. This allows the commander and staff to discount irrelevant aspects of the OE. Identifying significant aspects of the OE (a substep to step 1 of IPOE) and describing environmental effects on operations (step 2 of IPOE) are crucial in ensuring the operational and mission variables are properly considered during the MDMP. The following also support the commander and staff’s understanding of an OE: ⚫ Understanding domain capabilities and how they are employed and understanding the various aspects of the dimensions are critical in synchronizing intelligence activities, to include modifying the intelligence architecture. ⚫ In turn, intelligence synchronization supports effective collection management and intelligence collection, which result in more focused and relevant information within the operational and mission variables. ⚫ Leveraging specialized and detailed intelligence from the intelligence enterprise is crucial to the effort. ⚫ Collaborating with each staff section and across the intelligence enterprise provides additional depth to understanding each domain and its interdependencies. ⚫ Accessing joint target system analysis (TSA) and joint target development products can be useful when trying to understand domain capabilities and interdependencies. ⚫ Army forces, especially when preparing for armed conflict during competition, must conduct Army analysis of threat systems through a federated target production effort. ⚫ The following IWFTs also support understanding an OE (see appendix B): ▪ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE. ▪ Provide warnings. ▪ Provide intelligence support to targeting (including target value analysis). ▪ Perform situation development. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 2-19 Chapter 2 2-48. Figure 2-6 illustrates several ways that intelligence supports understanding an OE. Figure 2-6. How intelligence supports understanding an operational environment SECTION III – FUNDAMENTALS OF OPERATIONS 2-49. Understanding operational doctrine starts with understanding the higher-level doctrinal concepts in FM 3-0. Intelligence professionals must understand these fundamental concepts as well as how the intelligence warfighting function nests within them. In this manner, intelligence professionals can use the correct terminology and proper concepts in their dealings with the supported commander and staff and fellow intelligence professionals. This ensures the credibility of the professionals and the intelligence warfighting function. 2-50. The primary purpose of intelligence is to effectively support operations. Intelligence professionals must understand intelligence fundamentals and basic Army operational doctrine to provide effective and flexible intelligence support. This also assists intelligence professionals in understanding how commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize intelligence into operations as well as ensuring they are an effective part of the combined arms team. 2-20 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Multidomain Operations and Intelligence ARMY OPERATIONS 2-51. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape OEs, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles by providing forces for joint campaigns that enable the integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict and the defeat of enemies during conflict or war. 2-52. Army forces achieve objectives through the conduct of operations. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations vary in many ways. They occur in all types of physical environments, including urban, subterranean, desert, jungle, mountain, maritime, and arctic. Operations vary in scale of forces involved and duration. Operations change various conditions in the human, information, and physical dimensions of an OE and how these dimensions interrelate. 2-53. The complex environment in which operations occur demands leaders who understand both the science and art of operations. Understanding the science of operations—such as combat power ratios, weapons ranges, and movement tables—assists leaders in improving synchronization and reducing risk. However, there is no way to eliminate uncertainty, and leaders must exercise operational art to make decisions and assume risk. Intangible factors, such as the impact of leadership on morale, using shock effect to defeat enemy forces, and supportive populations, are fundamentally human factors that can overcome physical disadvantages and often decide the outcomes of an operation. 2-54. Army forces must be prepared for the most demanding and dangerous types of operations. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence through their demonstrated capability, capacity, and will to wage war on land in any environment against any opponent. Credible combat forces with lethal capabilities make the other instruments of national power more potent, and they assist in deterring the enemy’s escalation of violence during other types of operations. (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on Army operations.) 2-55. Effective and flexible intelligence support assists the Army with the challenges and complexity associated with a broad variety of and significant differences between the types of Army operations and the OE factors that affect those operations. Army commanders, staffs, and the intelligence warfighting function must leverage the intelligence enterprise and fight for intelligence to grapple with these issues. While intelligence is complex and threats, especially peer threats, can counter at least some of the intelligence capabilities and collection assets, Army commanders and staffs can overcome these issues. Every Army echelon can mitigate these challenges through the commander owning the intelligence effort, effective staff integration, and creative and adaptive information collection to overcome existing information collection gaps. Together, these aspects of fighting for intelligence ensure success, whether the operation is a large- scale combat operation, foreign humanitarian operation, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, or a noncombatant evacuation. MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS 2-56. Multidomain operations is the combined arms