Planning and Operational Art PDF

Chapter 2 Planning and Operational Art This chapter begins with a description of planning and the levels of warfare. A discussion of operational art follows. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the elements of operational and the tools availab...

Chapter 2 Planning and Operational Art This chapter begins with a description of planning and the levels of warfare. A discussion of operational art follows. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the elements of operational and the tools available to commanders and staffs in the application of operational art. PLANNING AND THE LEVELS OF WARFARE Operational art spans a continuum—from strategic direction to concrete tactical actions. Bridging the continuum requires creative vision coupled with broad experience and knowledge. As such, it is important that Army commanders and staffs appreciate how planning (and associated planning products) nest among the levels of warfare. Without this context, tactical operations become disconnected from operational end states and strategic objectives. The levels of warfare is a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of warfare focus organizations on one of three broad roles—creating strategy and providing strategic direction (strategic); planning and conducting campaigns and major operations (operational); or planning and executing battles, engagements, and actions (tactical). The levels of warfare are conceptual, and they do not have finite limits or boundaries. They do, however, correlate to specific levels of responsibility and planning with decisions at one level affecting other levels. They help commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic objectives, military operations at scale, and tactical actions. Planning horizons, methods, and products can differ greatly among the levels of warfare. STRATEGIC LEVEL The strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives (JP 3-0). The focus at this level is on the development of strategy—a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives (JP 3-0). United States federal law and policy provides the legal framework for strategic direction among the branches of government and their departments. Strategic direction provides context, tasks, and purpose for the employment of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic). The specifics of strategic direction address long-term, emergent, and anticipatory issues or concerns that may quickly evolve due to rapidly changing circumstances. Regardless, strategic direction is neither fixed nor transient. Rather, strategic direction is always evolving and adapting. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests. The President’s decisions drive the Secretary of Defense’s strategic guidance, which the CJCS operationalizes. These leaders generally communicate strategic direction to the Armed Forces through key documents known as strategic guidance. Strategic guidance comes in the form of national strategies (such as the National Security Strategy), presidential directives, and strategic plans (such as the Unified Command Plan). Figure 2-1, on page 2-2, shows several key strategic guidance documents that provide direction to the Armed Forces to promote unified action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or 0D\ FM 5-0 2-1 Chapter 2 integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). (See JP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of strategic guidance and joint planning.) Figure 2-1. Strategic direction National Strategies There are numerous national-level strategies that address areas ranging from immigration to public health. Overarching strategies that address national security and defense include— z The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). z The National Defense Strategy (NDS). z The National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS). National Security Strategy Approved by the President, the NSS is prepared by the Executive Branch for Congress, and it outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to 2-2 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art address them using all instruments of national power to accomplish national goals. Title 50, U.S. Code directs the President to submit an annual report on the national security strategy of the United States on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year or not later than 150 days after the new President takes office. This document frames the strategic context by defining national interest and goals, the capabilities necessary to implement the strategy, and the short-term and long-term use of the military as an instrument of national power to protect and promote interests and achieve goals and objectives. The President, in conjunction with the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council, provides additional amplifying guidance in Presidential policy directives, executive orders, and strategic guidance statements. National Defense Strategy Approved by the Secretary of Defense, the NDS outlines the national approach to the defense of the nation and its interest. Generally prepared every four years, the NDS translates and refines the NSS into broad military guidance for military strategy, planning, force posturing, force structure, and force modernization. The NDS establishes a set of overarching defense objectives that guide Department of Defense (DOD) security activities and provides the foundation for the NMS development. The NDS objectives serve as links between military activities and those of other U.S. Government departments and DOD agencies in pursuit of national goals. National Military Strategy The CJCS, in coordination with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, prepares the NMS. The NMS expands upon the NSS and NDS by defining national military objectives (ends), how to achieve these objectives (ways), and addresses the military capabilities (means) required to execute the strategy. The NMS provides the strategic framework to prioritize planning, resource allocation, and distribution of risk. It provides the CJCS amplifying guidance for planning, force employment, posture, and future force development of the Armed Forces. The NMS is the CJCS’s central strategy and planning document. Title 10, U.S. Code directs the CJCS to determine for each even numbered year whether to prepare a new NMS or update an existing strategy. The NMS serves as the starting point for all other joint strategic planning system actions. Note. The joint strategic planning system is the primary system by which the CJCS, in coordination with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, conducts deliberate planning and provides military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. (See CJCSI 3100.01E for information on the joint strategic planning system.) Key Strategic Plans and Directives In addition to national security, defense, and military strategies, several documents provide strategic direction to the Armed Forces. Key documents include— z Unified Command Plan (UCP). z Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). z Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). z Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). Unified Command Plan Prepared by DOD and approved by the President, the UCP provides guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structures; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility (AOR) for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national security needs. Title 10, U.S. Code tasks the CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP “not less often than every two years” and 0D\ FM 5-0 2-3 Chapter 2 submit recommended changes to the President through the Secretary of Defense. The UCP provides broad guidance from which combatant commanders derive objectives, missions, and tasks. Contingency Planning Guidance Prepared by DOD and approved by the President, the CPG conveys guidance (including prioritization) to the CJCS and combatant commanders for contingency planning. The CPG fulfills the statutory duty of the Secretary of Defense to furnish written policy guidance annually to the CJCS for contingency planning. Contingency plans are branches of global, functional, regional, and combatant command campaign plans. The CPG focuses the guidance given in the NSS and NDS and is the principal source document for the JSCP. (See paragraphs 2-24 through 2-26 for more information on contingency planning.) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan The JSCP fulfills the CJCS’s statutory responsibilities to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for strategic direction to the Armed Forces and implementing strategic guidance in the NSS, NDS, NMS, and the CPG. The JSCP is a five-year global strategic plan (reviewed every two years) that operationalizes the NMS. The JSCP is the CJCS’s primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of joint force campaign plans and associated contingency plans. The three types of campaign plans addressed in the JSCP are— z Global campaign plans. A global campaign plan is the primary means by which the CJCS or designated combatant commanders arrange for unity of effort through which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatant command AORs and functional responsibilities. Global campaign plans address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains. Each global campaign plan has an assigned coordinating authority which is a combatant commander with the primary responsibility for a global campaign plan. Contingency plans to a global campaign plan are called integrated contingency plans. z Functional campaign plans. Functional campaign plans address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordination across multiple combatant commands. The CJCS directs functional campaign planning through the JSCP or a planning order to combatant commands. z Combatant command campaign plans (CCPs). CCPs are the primary planning documents that combatant commanders (both geographic and functional) use when campaigning to specifically fulfill their UCP-assigned AOR or functional responsibilities. CCPs incorporate applicable objectives established in global, regional, and functional campaign plans. Global campaign plans and functional campaign plans are generally problem-focused plans that focus the efforts of multiple organizations on specific problem sets that span organizational and geographic boundaries. Global campaign plans focus on competing with a single priority challenge, while functional campaign plans focus on addressing multiple related challenges, not necessarily one priority challenge. Global campaign plans are generally organization-focused and serve to guide day-to-day campaigning (incorporating requirements from global campaign plans and functional campaign plans) and operational execution to achieve U.S. strategic objectives short of war. Although no longer directed in the JSCP, another type of campaign plan is a regional campaign plan. Regional planning guidance addresses regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple combatant commands. Generally, issues that require regional campaign plans are not as significant a threat to U.S. interests as global campaign plans, but they require attention to ensure they do not evolve into a more significant crisis. If necessary, the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, could direct a regional campaign plan with a designated coordinating authority. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance The GFMIG, approved by the Secretary of Defense, integrates complementary policy and guidance on and specifies procedures for the directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment of global forces into a single authoritative global force management document in support of the 2-4 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art strategic guidance. Published during even numbered years, the GFMIG provides Secretary of Defense guidance and assigns responsibilities for performing all aspects of global force management, including the allocation of forces in the global force management allocation process. It provides procedures to assign and allocate forces to support resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically employed. (Further discussion of the global force management allocation process can be found in FM 5-0.) Note. The Department of the Army and the United States Army Forces Command play a key role in global force management by providing ready, trained, and equipped Army forces to combatant commanders as directed. They routinely coordinate with the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Army components (theater Armies and Army Service component commands), and others, in the sourcing of Army forces for ongoing operations and Army force requirements identified in joint campaign and contingency plans. (For further discussion on global force management see JP 5-0.) Theater Strategies Based on strategic guidance, geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and staffs—with input from subordinate commands (including theater armies) and supporting commands and agencies—update their strategic estimates and develop theater strategies. A theater strategy is a broad statement of a GCC’s long-term vision that bridges national strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and theater objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance. The theater strategy serves as the basis for development of the CCP. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development also provide direction to combatant commanders through various strategies (including joint, regional, integrated country, and country development cooperation). Establishing and maintaining unity of effort with the Department of State and chiefs of mission requires combatant commanders and planners to say abreast of these products in the development of their theater strategies and plans. This includes applicable country specific security cooperation plans. OPERATIONAL LEVEL The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas (JP 3-0). Planning at this level employs operational art—the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. The operational level of warfare is generally the purview of combatant commands and their components (both Service and functional); sub-unified commands and their components; and subordinate joint task forces and their components. Within a joint headquarters, planners employ operational art and use operational design and the joint planning process to develop campaign plans, operation plans (OPLANS), and operation orders (OPORDs) for the conduct of joint operations. (See JP 5-0 for details on operational design and the joint planning process.) The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning at this level are collectively termed the joint planning and execution community. Not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the joint planning and execution community consists of the stakeholders shown in figure 2-2 on page 2-6. The supported combatant commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the CPG, the JSCP, or other planning directives. The supported commander can initiate planning at any time based on command authority or in response to direction or orders from the President, Secretary of Defense, or CJCS. The designated supporting commanders provide planning assistance, forces, or other resources to a supported commander, as directed. 0D\ FM 5-0 2-5 Chapter 2 Figure 2-2. Joint integrated planning Combatant Command Campaign Plan The centerpiece for operational-level planning within a geographic combatant command is the CCP. Formally known as the theater campaign plan, the CCP operationalizes the GCC’s strategy by organizing and aligning operations and activities with planned and available resources to achieve strategic and operational objectives in an AOR. The CCP establishes objectives, conditions, and tasks under which the combatant command and its component (Service and functional) plan operations, activities, and investments to achieve theater objectives in support of national policy and objectives. The CCP organizes the day-to-day operations of the joint force and provides a framework within which the GCC conducts security cooperation activities and military engagement with regional partners. Note. The theater army commander and staff assist the GCC and staff in development of the CCP. They provide advice on Army capabilities and resources, force and resource posturing, and the conduct of operations from a land perspective. In addition, the theater army develops a theater support plan to the CCP. This plan includes methods to achieve security cooperation, training and exercise programs, and ongoing Army activities within the theater, including intelligence, air and missile defense, sustainment, and communications. (See FM 3-94 for a detailed discussion of the roles, responsibilities and organization of theater armies.) Contingency Plans A key aspect of combatant command planning is the development of contingency plans. A contingency plan is a branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for 2-6 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions (JP 5-0). Contingency plans are branches to global, regional, functional, and combatant campaign plans that address potential threats that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that warrant military operations. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that campaign activities could fail to prevent aggression, fail to preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or fail to adequately respond to a natural disaster. The UCP, CPG, and JSCP assign combatant commanders responsibilities for developing specific contingency plans. Combatant commanders also develop contingency plans to their CCPs based on theater estimates. Contingency plans address an anticipated crisis, and they must be modified during execution to respond to conditions at the time of execution. If an approved contingency plan exists that closely resembles the emerging scenario, that plan can be refined or adapted as necessary and executed. Contingency plans are often phased, and they have specified end states. Contingency plans seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the United States. Contingency plans have an identified military objective and termination criteria. They address military operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to large-scale combat operations. Planning for a contingency encompasses the activities associated with the development of plans for the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in response to potential crises identified in joint strategic planning documents. The level of planning detail of contingency plans varies based on guidance and changes in the security environment. Planning details range from level 1 to level 4 as discussed in paragraphs 2-27 through 2-30. Although laid out sequentially, during a crisis they may be conducted concurrently or compressed depending on the situation and conditions. (See JP 5-0 for more information on contingency planning and associated levels of planning detail.) Level 1—Commander’s Estimate The commander’s estimate is the commander’s initial assessment in which options are provided in a concise statement that defines who, what, when, where, why, and how the course of action will be implemented (JP 5-0). The commander’s estimate, at planning level 1, involves the least amount of detail and focuses on producing multiple courses of action (COAs) to address a contingency. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum with a required force list. The commander’s estimate provides the Secretary of Defense with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. Level 2—Base Plan A base plan, at planning level 2, describes the concept of operations, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes. A base plan may contain alternatives, including flexible deterrent operations, to provide flexibility in addressing a contingency as it develops or to aid in developing the situation. Level 3—Concept Plan A concept plan, at planning level 3, is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete and detailed level 4 OPLAN or an OPORD. It includes a plan summary, a base plan, and selected annexes. If the development of a time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) is directed for the concept plan, the planning level is described as a 3T, and it requires consideration of intelligence community-assessed, contested-environment impacts on deployment and distribution operations. In this case a troop list and TPFDD would also require the addition of a joint Annex E (Personnel) and Annex W (Operational Contract Support) be prepared in addition to all others as part of the level 3 concept plan. Level 4—OPLAN An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources to execute the plan. It contains a full description of the concept of operations, all applicable annexes, a time-phased force and deployment list (known as a TPFDL), a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD, and an analysis of the impact of a potentially contested 0D\ FM 5-0 2-7 Chapter 2 environment on the joint deployment and distribution enterprise. A TPFDD phases unit requirements into the theater of operations to support the concept of operations and provide closure estimates. Note. The theater army commander and staff assist the GCC in developing contingency plans, including developing subordinate contingency plans as required. Theater army planners routinely review and update contingency plans to ensure they remain feasible. This includes a review of Army force structure and TPFDD. Army corps and divisions aligned to a specific contingency plan (normally those addressing large-scale combat operations) develop subordinate plans as directed. Army corps and divisions train on and rehearse these plans in Joint Chief of Staff exercises, Army Mission Command Training Program exercises, and other training events. Subordinate Joint Operation Plans and Orders Operational-level planning also includes the development of subordinate campaign plans, OPLANs, and OPORDs for specific joint operations within an AOR. This may include refining an already developed contingency plan or developing a new plan based on the situation. In this context, a campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). Subordinate joint campaign plans are often phased and have specified end states that seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the United States. Planning joint campaigns and operations includes organizing the joint force, organizing the joint force headquarters, and organizing the operational area. Depending on the situation, the GCC may choose to command and control operations within the existing combatant command structure (through combatant command headquarters and assigned Service and functional component command headquarters). This was the command and control structure the United States Central Command employed during the 1991 Gulf War. Figure 2-3 shows the linkage of the levels of warfare during OPERATION DESERT STORM and how Army forces are employed at both the operational and tactical levels. 2-8 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art Figure 2-3. Levels of warfare Note. Figure 2-3 illustrates the linkage of the levels of warfare during OPERATION DESERT STORM. Based on strategic guidance, United States Central Command developed OPERATION DESERT STORM as the coalition campaign plan to liberate Kuwait. Third Army served as an operational-level land force headquarters to United States Central Command. Consisting of two corps (seven U. S. divisions and two armored cavalry regiments, one British division, and one French Division), Third Army was the main strike force for United States Central Command for the encirclement and destruction of Iraqi Republican Guard divisions. Third Army plans and orders guided the scheme of maneuver of its two corps and subordinate divisions in numerous battles and engagements, resulting in the defeat of the Iraqi Army in a 100-hour ground offensive. In other instances, the GCC may establish a subordinate joint task force for the conduct of military operations within an operational area (typically a joint operations area). For limited contingencies and crisis response operations, Army corps and division headquarters often serve as the base of a joint task force headquarters or as the joint force land component to a joint task force. While augmented with joint personnel, it is important that Army staff members in these headquarters are familiar with adaptive 0D\ FM 5-0 2-9 Chapter 2 planning and the joint planning process. (See JP 3-33 for doctrine on joint task force headquarters. See JP 3-31 for doctrine on joint land component headquarters.) Corps or divisions headquarters serving as the joint force land component headquarters may also be designated the ARFOR headquarters. In addition to planning major ground operations, these headquarters must also plan and coordinate with the theater army headquarters for administrative and logistic support to Army forces and for Army support to other services in the operational area. (See FM 3-94 for a detailed discussion of the role of corps and division headquarters, including roles and responsibilities of the ARFOR.) TACTICAL LEVEL The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). A battle is a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement (ADP 3-90). Battles affect the course of a campaign or major operation, as they determine the outcome of a division or corps echelon achieving one or more significant objectives. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade echelons and below. Tactical planning focuses on tactics—the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90). Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations. In turn, tactical commanders and staffs develop plans and orders to achieve assigned objectives through the ordered arrangement, movement, and maneuver of forces in relation to each other and to the enemy force. Tactical leaders employ both operational art and the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within their higher commander’s intent. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of tactics.) Operational- and tactical-level planning complement each other, but they have different aims. Operational-level planning involves broader dimensions of time, space, and purpose than tactical-level planning involves. Operational-level planners need to define an operational area, estimate required forces, and evaluate requirements. In contrast, tactical-level planning proceeds from an existing operational approach. Normally, areas of operation (AOs) are prescribed, objectives and available forces are identified, and a general sequence of activities is specified for tactical-level commanders. Tactical-level planning revolves around how best to achieve objectives and accomplish tasks assigned by higher echelon headquarters. Planning horizons for tactical-level planning are relatively shorter than planning horizons for operational-level planning. Tactical-level planning works within the framework of an operational-level plan, and it is addressed in Service doctrine or, in the case of multinational operations, allied or the lead-nation’s doctrine. For units with a staff, Army tactical planners employ Army design methodology (ADM) (described in Chapter 4) and the military decision-making process (MDMP) (described in Chapter 5). For units without a staff, Army leaders use troop leading procedures (TLP) (described in Chapter 6) to plan and prepare for operations. OPERATIONAL ART Military operations require integrating ends, ways, means, and risks across the levels of warfare. Joint and Army commanders and staff do this through operational art. In the context of planning, operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations, and it serves two main functions— z To ensure that military actions are aligned with and directly support strategy. z To ensure that tactical actions occur under the most advantageous conditions possible. As stated in paragraph 2-1, operational art spans a continuum—from strategic direction to concrete tactical actions. As such, operational art is not limited to a specific echelon (combatant command, theater army, or corps) or role (joint task force headquarters, joint force land component headquarters, or tactical 2-10 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art Army headquarters). Rather, multiple echelons performing joint and Service roles within the scope of operational art all contribute to the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic and operational objectives. For Army forces, operational art seeks to ensure that commanders employ forces, material, and time effectively to achieve objectives. It requires a broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of means to ends, and understanding of inherent risk. Always within the context of a higher echelon joint plan or order, operational art helps Army commanders and staffs understand, visualize, and describe operations, as shown in figure 2-4. Figure 2-4. Operational art Operational art helps commanders to determine when, where, and for what purpose to employ forces and to determine the sequence of those forces in major operations and battles. It requires commanders and staffs to answer these questions: z What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)? z How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)? z What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)? z What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)? z What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of actions (risk)? Both ADM (described in Chapter 4) and the MDMP (described in Chapter 5) are tools used by Army commanders and their staffs in the application of operational art. ADM supports operational art as a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. ADM is associated with conceptual planning that helps commanders and staffs frame an operational environment (OE), frame ill-defined problems, and develop an operational approach to resolve identified problems. The understanding and products of ADM inform more detailed planning conducted during the MDMP. A key output of ADM is an operational approach. It is a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. The operational approach provides the framework for operations, serves as the basis for detailed planning, and facilitates unity of purpose across the force. Operational art never occurs in a vacuum. An echelon’s operational approach—and the context that informs it—is always based on the operational approach of its higher headquarters, and that informs subordinates’ development of their operational approaches. 0D\ FM 5-0 2-11 Chapter 2 ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART The elements of operational design and the elements of operational art listed in figure 2-5 assist commanders and staffs in employing operational art. Other tools include the principle of joint operations, principles of unified land operations, and tenants of unified land operations. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on unified land operations.) During planning, these tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe operations and develop their commander’s intent, operational approach, and planning guidance. Figure 2-5. Elements of operational art Joint force commanders (JFCs) and staffs use the elements of operational design when developing plans for campaigns and operations. As some elements of operational design only apply to JFCs (for example, termination), the Army modifies the elements of operational design into elements of operational art as shown in figure 2-5. Echelons above brigade headquarters frequently participate in joint planning and receive joint OPLANs and OPORDs. As such, they must be knowledgeable with both the elements of operational design and the elements of operational art. JP 5-0 discusses each element of operational design in detail. Paragraphs 2-47 through 2-76 describe the Army’s elements of operational art used in the development of Army plans and orders. END STATE AND CONDITIONS A military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. Determining the military end state of a campaign or joint operation links the operational and strategic levels of warfare, and it is the purview of the JFC, not functional commanders or those of Service echelons. Army commanders must clearly understand the military end state when developing the end states for their supporting operations. An operation’s end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). A condition is a reflection of the existing state of an OE. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after change to an OE. Since every operation should focus on a clearly defined and attainable end state, accurately describing conditions that represent success is essential. Commanders explicitly describe end state conditions which guide the development of their operational approach. Commanders summarize the operation’s end state in their commander’s intent. A clearly defined 2-12 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization of the force, and guides subordinate initiative during execution. CENTER OF GRAVITY A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). Centers of gravity may change over time, they may be different at the operational and strategic level, and they could be different from location to location. A way to think about the center of gravity is that it is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective. Thus a center of gravity is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity may also change. There may be different centers of gravity at different echelons of warfare. At the strategic level, a center of gravity may be an alliance, political or military leaders, or national will. At the operational level, a center of gravity often is associated with a threat’s military capabilities such as a powerful element of the armed forces. The loss of a center of gravity forces a change in the ends, ways, or means, and it often results in defeat. As an element of operational art, a center of gravity analysis helps commanders and staffs understand friendly and enemy strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. This understanding helps to determine ways to undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from enemies attempting to do the same. Understanding the critical factors of a center of gravity helps commanders and staffs identify decisive points and determine an operational approach. (See Chapter 4 for more information on center of gravity analysis in ADM.) DECISIVE POINTS A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Key terrain decisive points can include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Key events and elements of an enemy force may also be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of an enemy operational reserve and reopening a major oil refinery. Identifying decisive points helps commanders to select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving the end state. Decisive points are often derived from the center of gravity analysis. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are often critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. Thus, they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. A decisive point’s importance may cause the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points, eventually leading to an attack on the center of gravity itself. Generally, more decisive points exist in a given operational area than available forces and capabilities can attack, seize, retain, control, or protect. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the enemy’s center of gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. Operational art includes selecting decisive points that best lead to establishing end state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Decisive points identified for action become objectives. An objective can be physical (for example, an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual (the established rule of law). In the physical sense, an objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. In the conceptual sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate units. The most important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation. Combined with end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operations and lines of effort. 0D\ FM 5-0 2-13 Chapter 2 LINES OF OPERATIONS AND LINES OF EFFORT Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives in time, space, and purpose to achieve end state conditions as shown in figure 2-6. A line of operation links a base of operations to a physical objective. A line of effort links tasks with goal-oriented objectives. Commanders describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both in their operational approach. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives (ADP 3-0). Lines of operations connect a series of intermediate objectives that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence. Lines of operations can be categorized as interior and exterior. The choice of using interior or exterior lines supports a concept based on the length of movement and the supporting lines of sustainment and their associated lines of communications. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point (ADP 3-0). Commanders choose interior lines based on the fact that lines of movement and sustainment within an enclosed area are shorter than those lines outside the enclosed area. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operations. Figure 2-6. Sample line of operations and line of effort Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy (ADP 3-0).This requires the attacking force to be stronger or more mobile than the enemy force. Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Exterior lines facilitate seizing opportunities to encircle and destroy the weaker or less mobile enemy. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state (ADP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. TEMPO Commanders and staff consider tempo both when planning and executing operations. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders maintain the initiative during operations. 2-14 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art Commanders seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy in order to disrupt the enemy’s decision making, create multiple dilemmas, and overwhelm the enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. There is more to tempo than speed. While speed can be important, commanders balance speed with endurance and reach. Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess the force’s capacity to operate at a high tempo based on its performance and available resources. An effective operational approach varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining speed and momentum. Several factors affect tempo, including sustainment and decisions on when and where to consolidate gains. Having adequate forces to simultaneously consolidate gains while maintaining the offense enables greater tempo. This is a key consideration for theater level planning when determining force allocation and tailoring. Planning can also accelerate tempo by anticipating decisions and actions in advance. This emphasis on increased tempo, while a guiding principle, is not an unbending rule. Commanders weigh the advantages of acting more quickly against the advantages of preparing more thoroughly. PHASING AND TRANSITIONS Planning determines the sequence of actions—including the phases and transitions—that best accomplishes the mission and achieves the desired end state. Ideally, commanders plan to accomplish a mission with simultaneous and synchronized actions throughout the AO. However, operational reach, resource constraints, and the size of the friendly force limits what units can do at one time. In these cases, commanders phase operations. Phasing provides a way to view and conduct operations in manageable parts. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADP 3-0). Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase. Commanders phase operations as required by the specific circumstances of the problem they are trying to solve. A change in phase usually involves a change of task organization and a new task to subordinate units. Phasing may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. Well-designed phases— z Focus effort. z Concentrate combat power in time and space. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among the offense, defense, and stability operations also involves transitions. Transitions require planning and preparation so the force can maintain the initiative and tempo of operations. Transitions normally occur whenever there is an abrupt change to an OE, threat, or friendly forces. Transitions can be planned or unplanned, but any transition creates a period of vulnerability for the side in transition such as during a wet gap crossing or forward passage of lines. Unplanned transitions present the force with the most danger. Whenever possible, leaders must anticipate transitions through effective planning and preparation, and mitigate or exploit their effects accordingly. However, since some transitions are not anticipated, leaders build flexibility into their plans. Maintaining an adequate reserve is one way of doing so successfully. When commanders anticipate a transition such as when developing branches and sequels, they, their staffs, and subordinate leaders carefully consider these items to ensure success: z Forecasting in advance the conditions necessary, when, where, and how to transition. z Arranging tasks to facilitate transitions. z Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions. z Rehearsing certain transitions such as from defense to counterattack or from offense to consolidating gains. z Developing branch plans or sequels as necessary. Forces are vulnerable during transitions, so commanders establish clear conditions for their execution. Planning identifies potential transitions and accounts for them throughout execution. Effective commanders consider the time required to plan for and execute transitions. Assessments help commanders 0D\ FM 5-0 2-15 Chapter 2 measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions to execute them. Each echelon has the responsibility to anticipate and facilitate transitions for subordinate echelons. OPERATIONAL REACH While designing operations, it is critical to consider operational reach—the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of basing and lines of operations. Reach may be constrained by the geography, threats, and civil and diplomatic considerations. Reach may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, leveraging host-nation support and contracted support, and maximizing the efficiency of the distribution system. CULMINATION The culminating point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. On the offense, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack, and it must assume the defensive or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive operations, the culminating point occurs when the force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Examples of conditions that may result in culmination include a unit being too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end state. Commanders ensure forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the operation and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later phases. Integration and synchronization of sustainment with the concept of operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control tempo. At both tactical and operational levels, planners forecast the expenditure of resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve objectives before reaching their culminating points. BASING Basing is an indispensable part of operational art that enables lines of operations and operational reach. Determining the location and sequence of establishing bases and base camps is essential for projecting power and sustaining the force. Basing may be joint or single Service, and bases will routinely support U.S. forces, multinational forces, and interagency partners. Commanders designate a specific area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility to a single commander for protection, terrain management, and day to day operations. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). Basing is always a critical consideration when arranging operations at any echelon, because bases directly support or determine— z The force’s proximity to an operational area. z Its reach and endurance. z The depth it can achieve. z How quickly it can generate, apply, converge, and reconstitute combat power. Bases exist both in the United States and in foreign nations, and they may be permanent or temporary. Types of bases include installations, base camps, intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and lodgments. Units located within a base or base camp are under the tactical control of the base or base camp commander for base security and defense. In large support areas or joint security areas, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and to exercise command and control. When a base camp expands to include clusters of sustainment, headquarters, and other supporting units, commanders may designate a support area. These specific areas of operations facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control operations. (See JP 3-34 and ATP 3-37.10 for more information on basing.) 2-16 FM 5-0 0D\  Planning and Operational Art RISK Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Success during operations depends on a willingness to identify, mitigate, and accept risk to create opportunities and counter threats. When considering how much risk to accept, commanders consider risk to the mission and risk to the force. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and anticipated cost. Inadequate planning and preparation puts forces at risk, as does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to successful operations. Effective commanders balance imagination against uncertainty to strike in a manner, location, and time unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise. Part of developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of success or are there unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risk decisions range from ways to address resource shortfalls to when to transition the force or parts of the force to the consolidation of gains. Identified risks are communicated to higher echelon headquarters, and risk mitigation guidance is provided in the commander’s planning guidance. 0D\ FM 5-0 2-17