Fundamentals Of Planning PDF

Chapter 1 Fundamentals of Planning This chapter describes the nature of operations in which commanders, supported by their staffs, develop plans and orders for the conduct of operations. Next, it defines and describes planning. A discussion of the f...

Chapter 1 Fundamentals of Planning This chapter describes the nature of operations in which commanders, supported by their staffs, develop plans and orders for the conduct of operations. Next, it defines and describes planning. A discussion of the functions of planning follows. The chapter then describes integrated planning, including a summary of the Army’s planning methodologies. The chapter concludes with a description of plans and orders, guides to effective planning, and common planning pitfalls to avoid. THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS 1-1. To understand the fundamentals of planning, Soldiers first must appreciate the general nature of operations. Military operations are human endeavors—a contest of wills characterized by violence and continuous adaptation among all participants. During operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas of various actors, and changing perceptions of civilians in an operational area. As friendly forces try to impose their will on enemy forces, enemy forces resist and seek to impose their will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs among civilian groups whose own desires influence and are influenced by military operations. Appreciating these relationships among opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations. 1-2. Military operations are also inherently dynamic and uncertain. The complexity of friendly and enemy organizations, unique combinations of terrain and weather, and the dynamic interactions among all participants create uncertainty. Chance and friction further increase the potential for chaos and uncertainty during operations. Chance pertains to unexpected events or changes beyond the control of friendly forces, while friction describes the obstacles that make the execution of even simple tasks difficult. Both are always present for all sides during combat. 1-3. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale combat operations add to the dynamic and uncertain nature of war, making precise cause-and-effect determinations difficult or delayed. For example, the commander and staff may be uncertain about the exact location and strength of an enemy force. Even if the staff feels confident about the enemy’s location and strength, the commander still questions what to infer from those facts—the enemy’s intentions, for example. Even if the commander makes a reasonable inference, the many options available to the enemy make predicting the enemy’s exact behavior difficult. Given the nature of operations, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the middle of it. Leaders who understand the dynamic and uncertain nature of operations are better prepared to develop effective and ethically reasoned plans than those who do not. PLANNING 1-4. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning helps leaders understand situations; identify and develop solutions to problems; direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions; prioritize efforts; and anticipate events. In its simplest form, planning helps leaders determine how to move from the current state to a more desirable future state and identify opportunities and threats that may arise along the way. 1-5. Planning may be highly structured, involving the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others who develop a fully synchronized plan or order. Planning may also be less structured, involving leaders who quickly determine a scheme of maneuver for a hasty attack. Sometimes a planned activity is quite specific with clear goals. At other times, planning must first determine the activity and the goals. 0D\ FM 5-0 1-1 Chapter 1 Planning is conducted along various planning horizons—points in time that focus an organization’s planning efforts—depending on the echelon and circumstances. Some headquarters may plan out to years and months, others plan out to days and hours. 1-6. An output of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. The five-paragraph format (situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and signal) is the standard for issuing Army plans and orders. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of a situation and their vision for how an operation should unfold. Plans and orders synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. They inform others outside the organization on how to cooperate and provide support. The plan serves as a foundation for which the force can adjust from based on changing circumstances. PLANNING AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 1-7. Planning is a continuous activity of the operations process—the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand an operational environment (OE); visualize and describe the operation’s end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations as shown in figure 1-1. Figure 1-1. The operations process 1-8. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. During preparation and execution, the commander and staff continuously refine the order to account for changes in the situation. Subordinates and others provide assessments about what works, what does not work, and how the force can do things better. In some circumstances, commanders may determine that the current order (including associated branches and sequels) no longer applies. In these instances, instead of modifying the current order, commanders reframe the problem and develop a new plan. (See ADP 5-0 for doctrine on the operations process.) 1-2 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning PLANNING AND MISSION COMMAND 1-9. Effective planning incorporates the principles of mission command—the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command is based on the Army’s view that war is a human endeavor and inherently dynamic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change rapidly during execution if they are to succeed. The principles of mission command are— z Competence. z Shared understanding. z Mutual trust. z Mission orders. z Commander’s intent. z Disciplined initiative. z Risk acceptance. 1-10. Mission command requires an environment of trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires building effective teams and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders, commanders focus leaders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks. (See ADP 6-0 for doctrine on command and control and the principles of mission command.) THE SCIENCE AND ART OF PLANNING 1-11. Planning is both a science and an art. Many aspects of military operations, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects, are quantifiable. They are part of the science of planning. The combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of activities belong to the art of planning. Soldiers often gain knowledge of the science of planning through institutional training, education, and self-study. They gain understanding of the art of planning primarily through operational training and experience. Effective planners are grounded in both the science and the art of planning. 1-12. The science of planning encompasses aspects of operations that can be measured and analyzed. These aspects include the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations. The science of planning includes a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors, an understanding of how long it takes to initiate certain actions, the techniques and procedures used to accomplish planning tasks, and the terms and graphics that compose the language of military operations. While not easy, the science of planning is important to understand and master. 1-13. There are several resources available to planners concerning the scientific aspects of military operations, including planning factors by warfighting functions, friendly unit tables of organization, detailed sustainment planning factors, and threat models. In addition to specific echelon and unit doctrinal publications, key Department of the Army approved resources that contain planning tools, factors, and data include— z ATP 5-0.2-1 which contains detailed planning considerations and factors by echelon and by warfighting function. z The U.S. Army Directorate of Force Management, force management system website at https://fmsweb.fms.army.mil that provides tables of organization and equipment for all Army units, including the command relationships of subordinate organizations. z The Combined Arms Support Command planning branch website at https://cascom.army.mil/g_staff/g3/SUOS/site-sustainment/pages/hot-topics.htm which provides several sustainment related planning tools and calculators, including— ƒ Operational logistics planner. ƒ Quick logistics estimation tool. 0D\ FM 5-0 1-3 Chapter 1 ƒ Platform calculator. ƒ Food and water tool. ƒ Class III bulk estimation tool. ƒ Convoy planning tool. z ATP 4-02.55 provides discussion on the use of joint medical planning tool and Army health support system planning. z Army technique publications on Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian forces. 1-14. Mastery of the science of planning is necessary for military professionals to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. These constraints include the effects of terrain, weather, and time on friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human activity—the solutions to problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of the art of planning. 1-15. The art of planning requires creative application of doctrine, units, and resources. It incorporates operational art (discussed in Chapter 2) and the art of tactics (discussed in FM 3-90-1) to develop plans that comply with the commander’s intent and planning guidance. The art of planning requires understanding the dynamic relationships among friendly forces, the threat, and other aspects of an OE during operations. It includes making decisions based on skilled judgment acquired from experience, training, study, imagination, and critical and creative thinking. Commanders, supported by their staffs, apply judgment based on their knowledge and experience to select the right time and place to act, assign tasks, prioritize actions, and allocate resources. THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANNING 1-16. Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future are inherent in all planning. Planners cannot predict with precision how enemies will react or how other actors will respond during operations. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occurs during planning has great value. Even if units do not execute the plan exactly as envisioned—and few ever do—planning results in an improved understanding of the situation that facilitates future decision making. Planning and plans help leaders— z Build situational understanding. z Identify and develop solutions to problems. z Understand, describe, and accept risk. z Direct, coordinate, and synchronize action. z Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts. z Anticipate events. BUILD SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 1-17. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Planning, including an analysis of the operational and mission variables, helps commanders and staffs develop their initial understanding of an OE and the situation as it relates to the unit’s mission. 1-18. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An OE encompasses the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains; the information environment; the electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. Included within these areas are the enemy, friendly, and neutral systems and actors who are relevant to a specific operation. 1-19. Planners analyze and describe an OE in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). The operational variables not only help leaders understand the land domain, but they help leaders understand 1-4 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning how relevant actors and capabilities in the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and the relevant information aspects that impact operations on land and vice versa. (See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the operational variables.) 1-20. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and integrated into the other variables, informational considerations, remembered with the mnemonic METT-TC (I). The informational considerations are generally the human, information and physical aspects of an OE that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information. Note. METT-TC (I) represents the mission variables leaders use to analyze and understand a situation in relationship to the unit’s mission. The first six variables are not new. However, the increased use of information (both military and civilian) to generate cognitive effects requires leaders to continuously assess the informational aspects and impacts on operations. Because of this, informational considerations, represented with (I) has been added to the familiar METT-TC mnemonic. Informational considerations is expressed as a parenthetical variable in that it is not an independent variable, but an important component of each variable of METT-TC that leaders pay particular attention to when developing understanding of a situation. IDENTIFY AND DEVELOP SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS 1-21. Planning helps leaders better understand and identify problems and develop solutions to solve or manage those problems. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual becomes aware of a significant difference between what actually is and what is desired. In the context of operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired end state. (See paragraph 1-43 for further discussion on identification of problems and problem solving.) Identification of the actual problem to solve is critical to successful planning. Misidentification of the problem often leads to an ineffective plan and operational approach and time critical to subordinates for development of their plans. 1-22. Throughout operations, Army leaders face various problems, often requiring unique and creative solutions. Not all problems require the same level of planning. Leaders often identify simple problems immediately and quickly decide on a solution—sometimes on the spot. However, planning is critical when a problem is actually a set of interrelated issues, and the solution to each issue affects the others. For unfamiliar situations, planning offers ways to solve the complete set of problems as a whole. In general, the more complex a situation is, the more important and involved the planning effort becomes. 1-23. Just as planning is only part of the operations process, planning is only part of problem solving. In addition to planning, problem solving includes implementing the planned solution (execution), learning from the implementation of the solution (assessment), and modifying or developing a new solution as required. The object of problem solving is not just to solve near-term problems but to do so in a way that forms the basis for long-term success. DIRECT, COORDINATE, AND SYNCHRONIZE ACTIONS 1-24. Plans and orders are the principal means commanders use to direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions. They also inform those outside the unit how to cooperate and provide support. Effective plans and orders direct subordinates by stating what is required (the task) and why (the purpose). They leave much of the how (the method) up to subordinates. 1-25. Plans and orders contain control measures to coordinate and synchronize action. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). Control measures aid in coordinating forces without imposing needless restrictions on their freedom of action. Commanders use control 0D\ FM 5-0 1-5 Chapter 1 measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control operations. Control measures assign responsibilities, coordinate actions between forces, establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action, and impose only necessary restrictions. Control measures are essential to coordinating subordinates’ actions and are located throughout the plan. (See FM 1-02.2 for control measure symbols.) 1-26. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). Plans and orders synchronize the warfighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at a chosen place and time. Synchronization is a means of control, not an end. Commanders balance necessary synchronization against desired agility and initiative. Overemphasizing the direction, coordination, and synchronization functions of planning may result in detailed and rigid plans that stifle initiative. Mission command encourages the use of mission orders to avoid creating overly restrictive instructions to subordinates. Mission orders direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions while allowing subordinates the maximum freedom of action to accomplish missions within the commander’s intent as discussed in paragraphs 1-59 to 1-62. TASK-ORGANIZE THE FORCE AND PRIORITIZE EFFORTS 1-27. When developing their concept of operations, commanders, and typically their staff, visualize the decisive operation that directly accomplishes the mission. They then visualize how shaping and sustaining operations support the decisive operation. The decisive operation prioritizes effort, and it is the focal point around which the plan is developed. When developing associated tasks to subordinate units, commanders ensure subordinates have the capabilities and resources to accomplish their assigned tasks. They do this by task-organizing the force and establishing priorities of support. 1-28. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). It includes providing forces and assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. When task organizing the force, commanders visualize capabilities of units two echelons down, based on their visualization of tasks to subordinates one echelon down. Some assets are retained under the commander’s immediate control to retain flexibility to exploit opportunities or counter threats. 1-29. Task organizing includes establishing command or support relationships among subordinate commanders. Army command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Army support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to task-organizing for any operation. (See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of joint, multinational, and Army command and support relationships.) 1-30. Task-organizing results in a task organization—a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (ADP 5-0). The unit’s task organization is stipulated in the base plan or order or addressed in Annex A (Task Organization) to the base plan or order. The operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) also stipulates changes in the task organization by phase. During execution, commanders modify the task organization as required based on the situation through fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). (See Appendix E for task organization formats in Army plans and orders.) 1-31. In addition to task-organizing, commanders establish priorities of support during planning and shift priorities during execution as the situation requires. A priority of support is a priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its relative importance to accomplish the mission (ADP 5-0). Priorities of movement, fires, sustainment, and protection all illustrate priorities of support that commanders use to weight the decisive operation or the main effort if the operation is phased. 1-32. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The main effort is weighted with the preponderance of combat power—the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Designating a main effort temporarily gives that unit the preponderance of support. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation. The force executing the decisive operation is always the main effort. 1-6 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning ANTICIPATE EVENTS 1-33. A fundamental tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation and coordination and the fact that the farther into the future the commander plans, the greater the associated uncertainty and potentially less relevant the plan will likely remain. Given the fundamentally uncertain nature of operations, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a flexible plan that enables the force to adapt to changing circumstances. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance, to include thinking through consequences of certain actions and the potential second- and third-order effects that may result. Planning involves thinking about ways to respond to potential opportunities and threats. 1-34. Planning keeps the force oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations. Planning is essential for seizing and retaining the initiative by allowing commanders and staffs to consider potential decisions and actions in advance. Planning reduces the time between decisions and actions during execution, especially at higher echelons. While some actions are implemented immediately, others require forethought and preparation. For example, changing the direction of attack may be a relatively simple and immediate matter for a battalion; however, changing the scheme of maneuver for a division, including all its support, is complicated and time consuming. Changing the priority of fires at division level may take considerable time if artillery units must reposition. If leaders wait until an event occurs to begin planning and preparing for a response, units may not be able to react quickly enough—ceding the initiative to the enemy. 1-35. During execution planners continue to develop or refine options for potential enemy action and friendly opportunities. By anticipating potential events beforehand, planning promotes flexibility and rapid decision making during execution. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the enemy can act or before situations deteriorate. Several tools are available to the commander and planners to assist in adapting to changing circumstances. These tools include— z Decision points. z Branches. z Sequels. 1-36. A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). A decision point is associated to actions by the enemy, the friendly force, or the population, and it is tied to a commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR). Example friendly actions associated to a decision point range from a single task to a subordinate unit or to the force as a whole in executing a branch or sequel. Decision points and associated CCIRs, conditions, and friendly actions are recorded graphically and in narrative form in a combined decision support template (DST) and decision support matrix (DSM). Both the DST and DSM are key tools used to assist the commander in decision making during execution. (See Appendix F for a sample DST and DSM.) 1-37. Plans and orders often require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operations through branches and sequels. A branch is the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 5-0). Branches anticipate situations that require changes to the basic plan. Such situations could result from enemy action, friendly action, or weather. Commanders build flexibility into their plans and orders by developing branches to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. 1-38. A sequel is the subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase (JP 5-0). Sequels are based on outcomes of current operations, including success, stalemate, or defeat. A counteroffensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Commanders consider and develop sequels during planning and revisit them throughout an operation. 0D\ FM 5-0 1-7 Chapter 1 INTEGRATED PLANNING 1-39. Planning activities occupy a continuum ranging from conceptual to detailed, as shown in figure 1-2. Understanding an OE and its problems, determining the operation’s end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in broad terms all illustrate conceptual planning. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to operational art, and it is the focus of a commander with staff support. (See Chapter 2 for more information on operational art.) 1-40. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with aspects of science, such as movement tables, fuel consumption, target lists, weapon effects, and time-distance factors. Detailed planning falls under the purview of the staff, who focus on specifics of execution. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, synchronizing, and directing the force. Figure 1-2. Integrated planning 1-41. The commander personally leads the conceptual component of planning. While commanders are engaged in parts of detailed planning, they leave most specifics to the staff. Conceptual planning provides the basis for subsequent planning. The commander’s intent and operational approach provide the framework for the entire plan. This framework leads to a concept of operations and associated schemes of support, such as schemes of maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection, engineer operations, information, and sustainment. In turn, the schemes of support lead to the specifics of execution, including tasks to subordinate units and attachments (including annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits) to the base OPLAN or OPORD. However, this dynamic does not operate in only one direction. Conceptual planning must respond to detailed constraints. For example, the realities of a deployment schedule (a detailed concern) influence the operational approach (a conceptual concern). 1-42. Planning requires the integration of both conceptual thinking and detailed analysis. Army leaders employ several methodologies for planning, determining the appropriate mix based on the scope and understanding of the problem, time available, and availability of a staff. Army planning methodologies include— 1-8 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning z Army problem solving. z Army design methodology (ADM). z The military decision-making process (MDMP). z Rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP). z Troop leading procedures (TLP). ARMY PROBLEM SOLVING 1-43. The ability to recognize and effectively solve problems is an essential skill for Army leaders. Army problem solving forms the base logic of other planning methodologies. Where other methodologies are designed for planning operations, Army problem solving is a methodology available for leaders to use to identify and solve a variety of problems both in garrison and in operations. Army problem solving is an analytical approach to defining a problem, developing possible solutions to solve the problem, arriving at the best solution, developing a plan, and implementing that plan to solve the problem. The steps to Army problem solving are— z Step 1 - Gather information. z Step 2 - Identify the problem. z Step 3 - Develop criteria. z Step 4 - Generate possible solutions. z Step 5 - Analyze possible solutions. z Step 6 - Compare possible solutions. z Step 7 - Make and implement the decision. (See Chapter 3 for more information on conducting Army problem solving.) ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 1-44. When problems are difficult to identify, the operation’s end state is unclear, or a course of action (COA) is not self-evident, commanders employ ADM. This is often the case when developing long-range plans for extended operations. ADM is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. ADM is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual planning, but it must be integrated with the detailed planning typically associated with the MDMP to produce executable plans and orders. ADM may be conducted before, concurrent or after the MDMP. There is no one way or prescribed set of steps to employ the ADM. There are, however, several activities associated with ADM including— z Framing an OE. z Framing problems. z Developing an operational approach. z Reframing (as required). 1-45. While planners complete some activities before others, the understanding and learning within one activity may require revisiting the learning from another activity. Based on their understanding and learning gained during ADM, commanders issue planning guidance—including an operational approach—to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP. (See Chapter 4 for information on employing ADM.) THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 1-46. The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology used to understand the problem or problems, understand the situation and mission, develop COAs, decide on a COA, and produce an OPLAN or order. It is an orderly, analytical process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters in the development of a plan or order. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgement, logic, and professional knowledge to develop situational understanding and produce a plan or order that accomplishes the mission. 0D\ FM 5-0 1-9 Chapter 1 Note. Depending on the situation, including the time available for planning, commanders may initiate the MDMP without the benefits of conducting ADM beforehand. 1-47. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step has inputs, a series of substeps, and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation facilitating the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however, before producing the plan or order, they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion as they learn more about the situation. The seven steps are— z Step 1 - Receipt of mission. z Step 2 - Mission analysis. z Step 3 - COA development. z Step 4 - COA analysis. z Step 5 - COA comparison. z Step 6 - COA approval. z Step 7 - Orders production, dissemination, and transition. (See Chapter 5 for more information on conducting the MDMP.) 1-48. Commanders and staffs often begin the MDMP in the absence of an approved higher echelon headquarters’ OPLAN or OPORD. In some instances, they initiate planning based on a warning order (WARNORD), a planning order, or an alert order from higher headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or order is developed. In other instances, the commander recognizes an opportunity or problem to solve and initiates planning in the absence of higher direction. 1-49. Commanders and staff use several integrating processes to synchronize forces and the warfighting functions within the MDMP. An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end. Key integrating processes that occur within the MDMP include— z Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. z Information collection. z Targeting. z Risk management. z Knowledge management. (See Appendix G for a detailed discussion of conducting the integrating processes within the steps of the MDMP.) RAPID DECISION-MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS 1-50. The RDSP is a decision-making and planning technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution when available planning time is limited. While the MDMP seeks an optimal solution, the RDSP seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent. Using the RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and multiple COAs. Leaders combine their experiences and intuition to quickly understand the situation and develop a COA. The RDSP is based on an existing order and includes five steps: z Step 1 - Compare the current situation to the order. z Step 2 - Determine that a decision, and what type, is required. z Step 3 - Develop a course of action. z Step 4 - Refine and validate the course of action. z Step 5 - Issue and implement the order. (See Chapter 6 for information on conducting the RDSP.) 1-10 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES 1-51. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader with assistance from key leaders such as executive officers, first sergeants, forward observers, supply sergeants, and other specialists in the unit. 1-52. TLP enable small-unit leaders to maximize available planning time while developing plans and preparing their units for an operation. TLP consists of eight steps. The sequence of the steps of TLP is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. The eight steps are— z Step 1 - Receive the mission. z Step 2 - Issue a warning order. z Step 3 - Make a tentative plan. z Step 4 - Initiate movement. z Step 5 - Conduct reconnaissance. z Step 6 - Complete the plan. z Step 7 - Issue the order. z Step 8 - Supervise and refine. (See Chapter 7 for information on conducting TLP.) PLANS AND ORDERS 1-53. A key output of planning is a plan or order. Plans and orders come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of planning horizon. Strategic plans establish national and multinational military objectives, and they include ways, and may include the means, to achieve those objectives. Operational-level plans and orders cover a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Tactical plans and orders cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy within the framework of a higher operational-level plan or order. (See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of planning and the levels of warfare. See Appendix D for types of Army plans and orders and their associated formats.) MISSION ORDERS 1-54. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). Mission orders direct subordinates on what to do and why to do it without prescribing exactly how to do it. Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and commander’s intent. They summarize the situation, describe the operation’s objectives and end state, and provide a clear concept of operations to accomplish the mission. When assigning tasks to subordinate units, mission orders include all components of a mission statement: who, what, when, where, and why. However, a mission statement emphasizes the purpose (why) of the tasks to guide (along with the commander’s intent) subordinates’ initiative. Note. A mission order is not a separate type of plan or order; rather, it is a technique for writing plans and orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of action in accomplishing missions. 1-55. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level of detail is situationally dependent. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than others require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require precise synchronization. Its ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order contains only the specific information 0D\ FM 5-0 1-11 Chapter 1 required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the decisive place and time while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders rely on subordinate initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Detailed instructions for aspects of an operation or to synchronize specific warfighting functions are addressed in attachments to the base plan or order. KEY COMPONENTS OF A PLAN OR ORDER 1-56. The mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations are key components of a plan or order that serve as the framework for an operation. Commanders ensure their mission and commander’s intent nest with those of their higher echelon headquarters. While the commander’s intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the way or sequence of actions by which the force will achieve the end state. Mission Statement 1-57. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore (JP 3-0). Commanders analyze a mission based on their higher commander’s intent, concept of operations, specified tasks, and implied tasks. Results of that analysis yield the essential task—a specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. The essential task, or in some cases tasks, becomes the “what” of the mission statement—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for taking it. The five elements of a mission statement answer these questions: z Who will execute the operation (unit or organization)? z What is the unit’s essential task (normally a tactical mission task or tactical enabling task)? z Where will the operation occur (area of operations [AO], objective, engagement areas, or grid coordinates)? z When will the operation begin (by time or event)? z Why will the force conduct the operation (for what purpose)? 1-58. The “who,” “where,” and “when” of a mission statement are straightforward. The “what” and “why” are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The “what” is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs. (See ADP 3-90 for a list of tactical tasks.) The “why” puts the task into context by describing the reason (purpose) for performing the task. Commander’s Intent 1-59. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). The higher echelon commander’s intent provides the basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each commander’s intent nests within the commander’s intent two levels up. During planning, the initial commander’s intent drives COA development. During execution, the commander’s intent establishes the limits within which a subordinate may exercise initiative. 1-60. The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. Commanders convey their intent in a format they determine most suitable to the situation. It may include the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation, the commander’s intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it describes the broader purpose of the unit’s operation in relationship to the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations. 1-61. Key tasks are those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state (ADP 6-0). Key tasks are not specified tasks for any subordinate unit; however, they may be sources of implied tasks. During execution—when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no longer fits the situation—subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired end state. Examples of key tasks include terrain the force must control or an effect the 1-12 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning force must have on the enemy. Commanders often include the purpose of each associated key task to facilitate subordinate decision making and initiative. 1-62. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Commanders may describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners. Concept of Operations 1-63. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0). The concept of operations describes how the commander visualizes the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission within an AO. Planners use components of the operational framework and integrate elements of operational art as appropriate to describe the concept of operations by— z Area—establishing the close, deep, rear, support, and consolidation areas within an AO. z Purpose—designating and sequencing the decisive operation, shaping operations, and sustaining operations. z Priority—designating the main and supporting efforts. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed description of the operational framework and its components. See Chapter 2 for further discussion on elements of operational art.) 1-64. In developing the concept of operations, commanders and staffs ensure their concept nests with that of their higher echelon headquarters. Nested concepts is a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons’ concept of operations. An effective concept of operations describes how the forces will support a mission of the higher headquarters and how the actions of subordinate units fit together to accomplish a mission. PLANNING CELLS AND TEAMS 1-65. Coordinating, special, and personal staff sections are the building blocks for organizing a headquarters into command posts (CPs) for the conduct of operations. Within CPs, staff sections are cross- functionally organized into CP cells—groupings of personnel and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection). Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizons. The three planning horizons are long-, mid-, and short- range and are associated with the plans cell, future operations cell, and current operations integrating cell, as shown in figure 1-3 on page 1-14. 0D\ FM 5-0 1-13 Chapter 1 Figure 1-3. Integrating cells Note. Not all echelons and types of units are resourced for all three integrating cells. Battalions, for example, combine planning and operations into one integrating cell in the main CP. The brigade combat team has a small and dedicated plans cell, but it is not resourced for a future operations cell. Divisions, corps, field armies, and theater armies are resourced for all three integrating cells. (See FM 6-0 for a more detailed discussion of the duties and responsibilities of the staff and CP organization, overall planning requirements, and operations.) PLANS CELL 1-66. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations in the long-range planning horizon (See paragraphs 1-101 through 1-103 for further discussion on planning horizons.) It develops the initial OPORD and prepares for operations beyond the scope of the current order, including developing branch plans and sequels. The plans cell also oversees military deception planning. At division echelon and above, the plans cell consists of a core group of planners led by the assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5). At brigade and lower echelons the plans cell is led by the battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3). Staff sections support the plans cell with representatives as required. Battalions are not resourced a dedicated plans cell. 1-14 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning FUTURE OPERATIONS CELL 1-67. The future operations cell is responsible for planning operations in the mid-range planning horizon. This cell focuses on adjustments to current operations and branch planning. The cell consists of a core group of planners led by a deputy assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3), chief of future operations. Staff sections support the future operations cell with representatives as required. Divisions and higher echelon headquarters are resourced a future operations cell in order to ensure that the plans cell remains focused on long-range planning activities in support of the commander’s shaping and condition setting aims, and either the next phase of the operation or a subsequent operation, while brigades and battalions are not. 1-68. The future operations cell serves as a bridge between the plans and current operations integrating cells. The future operations cell monitors current operations and determines implications for operations within the mid-range planning horizon. In coordination with the current operations integrating cell, the future operations cell assesses ongoing operations and whether they require modification to achieve the current phase’s objectives. The commander directs adjustments to operations, or the cell may also recommend options to the commander. 1-69. Once the commander decides to adjust operations, the cell develops the FRAGORDs necessary to implement the change. The future operations cell also participates in the targeting working group, since the same planning horizons normally concern them both, including shaping operations in the deep area. CURRENT OPERATIONS INTEGRATING CELL 1-70. The current operations integrating cell is the focal point for controlling the execution of operations and short-range planning. This involves assessing the current situation and the status of conditions required to achieve objectives, execute critical events, and the completion of directed tasks and missions while regulating forces and warfighting functions in accordance with the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. A deputy G-3, chief of operations, or an assistant S-3 leads this cell. Elements or watch officers from each staff section and liaison officers from subordinate and adjacent units form this cell. All staff sections are represented in the current operations integrating cell, either permanently or on call. Staff members in the current operations cell normally employ the RDSP when conducting short-range planning. PLANNING TEAMS 1-71. A planning team is a task-organized planning element established to solve problems, and it typically develops long and mid-range plans for future operations. A planning team consists of a lead planner (normally from the G-5, G-3, or S-3 staff sections), a representative for each warfighting function, additional subject matter experts and liaison officers as required, and administrative support. Integrating functional expertise ensures planners consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information, resulting in a planning effort that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough. Planning teams are not enduring. They dissolve on completion of their assigned planning tasks. 1-72. Most planning occurs in the plans or future operations cells. Planners in these cells form the core of a planning team. For major planning requirements, such as the development of a new operation order, core planners from the plans cells, representatives from across the staff, liaison officers, and subject matter experts external to the headquarters form a planning team. For lesser planning requirements, smaller teams are established with membership decided based on the mission or specific planning requirements. Unit standard operating procedures should identify standard planning teams based on common planning requirements to rapidly facilitate alerting and forming planning teams. 1-73. Planning teams must prepare for and recognize indicators to transition a plan between the cells. Since not all headquarters are resourced the same, the timing for transitioning of plans is not always the same, and units should develop procedures to aid in this handoff. Plans transition is a preparation activity that occurs within the headquarters. It ensures members of a cell understand the current plan, assumptions, and relevant planning guidance provided during plan development. (See ADP 5-0 for further discussion on plans to operations transition.) 0D\ FM 5-0 1-15 Chapter 1 GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE PLANNING 1-74. Planning is an inherent and fundamental part of command and control, and commanders are the single most important factor in effective planning. Effective planning requires dedication, study, and practice. Planners must be technically and tactically competent within their areas of expertise and understand basic planning concepts. The following guides aid in effective planning: z Commanders focus planning. z Apply critical thinking. z Apply creative thinking. z Encourage collaboration and dialogue. z Optimize available planning time. z Focus on the right planning horizon. z Develop and maintain accurate running estimates. z Develop simple, flexible plans and orders. COMMANDERS FOCUS PLANNING 1-75. The responsibility for planning is inherent in command. Commanders are planners—they are the central figures to effective planning. Commanders often have the most planning experience, and they are ultimately responsible for the development and execution of the plan. As such, the plan must reflect how commanders intend to conduct operations. Commanders ensure the approaches to planning meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, level of detail, and desired outcomes. Commanders ensure that all plans and orders comply with domestic and international laws and the Army ethic. They confirm that the plan or order is relevant and suitable for subordinates. 1-76. Generally, the more involved commanders are in planning, the faster staffs can plan. Through personal involvement, commanders learn from the staff and others about a situation and ensure the plan reflects their commander’s intent. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations as shown in figure 1-4. During planning, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing. While depicted sequentially, the activities of understanding and visualizing are iterative. 1-16 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning Figure 1-4. Commander’s role in the operations process Understand 1-77. To understand something is to grasp its nature and significance. Understanding includes establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation. Understanding an OE and its associated problems is fundamental to establishing a situation’s context and visualizing operations. Planning, the integrating processes, and running estimates all help commanders develop situational understanding. During planning and throughout the operations process, commanders collaborate with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners to build a shared understanding of their OEs and associated problems. Commanders also have a unique understanding of the capabilities of subordinate units that is relayed to the staff at various times throughout planning. Visualize 1-78. As commanders build understanding of their OEs and identify problems, commanders start to visualize solutions to solve identified problems. Collectively, this is known as commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0). 1-79. In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). Figure 1-5 on page 1-18 depicts activities associated with developing the commander’s visualization. 0D\ FM 5-0 1-17 Chapter 1 Figure 1-5. Commander’s visualization Describe 1-80. Commanders describe their visualization to their staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate shared understanding and purpose throughout the force. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin COA development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in FRAGORDs that adjust the original OPORD. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it, as circumstances require. Commanders describe their visualization in terms of— z Commander’s intent (discussed in paragraphs 1-59 through 1-62). z Planning guidance, including an operational approach. z CCIRs. z Essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs). Commander’s Planning Guidance 1-81. Commanders provide planning guidance to the staff based upon their visualization. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization, including a description of the operational approach. Effective planning guidance reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding. The commander’s planning guidance broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher echelon commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders maximum latitude; it enables proficient staffs to develop flexible and effective options. Commanders modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions during different stages of planning and throughout the operations process. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 1-82. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). A CCIR is directly tied to a decision that facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the operation. A CCIR may support one or more decisions. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. Refinement of CCIRs is continuous throughout an operation. During preparation and execution, staffs recommend changes to CCIRs based on their assessments of the operation. 1-83. Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders limit the number of CCIRs to focus the efforts of limited collection assets. The fewer the CCIRs, the easier it is for staffs to remember, recognize, and act on each one. CCIRs constantly change. Commanders add and delete them throughout an operation based on the information needed for specific decisions. Commanders determine their own CCIRs and select some 1-18 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning from staff nominations. Once approved, a CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). 1-84. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01). PIRs identify the information about the enemy and other aspects of an OE that the commander considers most important. Intelligence about civil considerations may be as critical as intelligence about the enemy. In coordination with the staff, the intelligence officer manages PIRs for the commander as part of the intelligence staff responsibilities. 1-85. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages friendly force information requirements for the commander. Essential Elements of Friendly Information 1-86. Commanders also describe information they want protected as EEFIs. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0). Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish elements of information to protect rather than elements to collect. Their identification is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information. (See Chapter 5 for further discussion on information requirements.) APPLY CRITICAL THINKING 1-87. Thinking includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Much thinking, however, is faulty and biased. When information is lacking, individuals tend to rely on prior beliefs and assumptions about how and why events came to be and would normally transpire. In essence, these mindsets are a distillation of all that planners think they know about a subject. As planners evaluate information they need to be aware that mindset and cognitive biases influence their thinking. They practice critical thinking to guard against faulty reasoning. 1-88. Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective thought about what to believe or what to do in response to observations, experiences, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. By thinking critically, individuals formulate judgments about whether the information they encounter is true or false, or if it falls somewhere along a scale of plausibility between true or false. Critical thinking involves questioning information, assumptions, conclusions, and points of view to evaluate evidence, develop understanding, and clarify goals. Critical thinking helps commanders and staffs identify causes of problems, arrive at justifiable conclusions, and make good judgments. Critical thinking helps leaders counter their biases and avoid logic errors. Cognitive Bias 1-89. A cognitive bias is an unconscious belief that conditions govern or compel human behavior. Just as planners must know their own mindset and its influence on conscious thought, they must also know other cognitive biases that influence their thinking. Some of the more common cognitive biases include— z Confirmation bias. z Status quo bias. z Sunk cost bias. z Sample size bias. z Anchoring bias. (See ATP 5-0.1 for additional discussion of common cognitive biases and logic errors.) 0D\ FM 5-0 1-19 Chapter 1 Logical Fallacy 1-90. A logical fallacy is an error in logic. When analyzing information, the goal of analysis is to ascribe and validate meaning. When individuals make an argument, they offer reasons why others should accept their view or judgment. These reasons are premises (sometimes evidence) and the assertion that they support is called the conclusion. A sound argument meets the following conditions: the premises are acceptable and consistent, the premises are relevant to the conclusion and provide sufficient support for the conclusion, and missing components have been considered and are judged consistent with the conclusion. If the premises are dubious or if they do not warrant the conclusion, then the argument is fallacious. APPLY CREATIVE THINKING 1-91. There are no planning checklists or set solutions that adequately apply to every military problem. The operational and mission variables always combine to form a different set of circumstances. Creative thinking helps planners examine problems for a fresh perspective in order to develop innovative solutions. Creative thinking helps generate new and useful ideas, and it reevaluates or combines old ideas to solve new problems. Creative thinking involves breaking old habits of thought, questioning the status quo, visualizing a better future, and devising unique responses to problems. There are numerous creative thinking tools available to commanders and staffs, such as brainstorming, mind mapping, and the four ways of seeing as described in ATP 5-0.1. ENCOURAGE COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE 1-92. Collaboration and dialogue facilitates critical and creative thinking and helps to develop shared understanding within the headquarters and externally with other commands and unified action partners. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialogue is a way to collaborate that involves the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners collaborate and dialogue by sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to understand situations and make decisions. 1-93. Through collaboration and dialogue, leaders create a learning environment by allowing participants to think critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without fear of retribution. Effective dialogue requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, competition of ideas. Participants must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight; this includes sharing ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders listen to novel ideas and counterarguments concerning any problem. 1-94. Dialogue is the catalyst that drives planning teams to develop new ways of thinking about problems and identify innovative solutions. Effective dialogue ensures team members may question one another about ideas, discuss alternatives, and refine the team’s thinking. When done well, dialogue helps— z Reveal assumptions that underlie an argument or concept and reveal individual biases. z Reveal what members are not thinking about the situation. z Display diversity of ideas and expose a range of viewpoints. z Avoid group think and explore concepts from different perspectives. z Reveal areas where the team lacks diversity or experience and where external subject matter experts are valuable. z Develop shared mental models—individual beliefs about cause-effect relationships and assumptions and biases about how the world works—concerning problems and solutions. z Build trust in the team and the planning effort. 1-95. Effective collaboration and dialogue are not possible unless the commander ensures it. Commanders establish a culture of collaboration and dialogue in the organization. They recognize that they do not know everything, they can be wrong, and they have something to learn from even the most junior Soldier or unified action partner. Throughout the operations process, commanders demonstrate humility to learn and understand from others to make better decisions. Commanders establish a command climate where 1-20 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning collaboration and dialogue routinely occur throughout the organization through personal example, coaching, and mentorship. OPTIMIZE AVAILABLE PLANNING TIME 1-96. Time is a critical variable in all operations. Therefore, time management is important in planning. Whether done deliberately or rapidly, all planning requires the skillful use of available time to optimize planning and preparation throughout the unit. Taking more time to plan often results in greater synchronization; however, any delay in execution risks yielding the initiative to the enemy. 1-97. When allocating planning time to staffs, commanders must ensure subordinates have enough time to plan and prepare their own actions prior to execution. Commanders follow the “one-third, two-thirds rule” as a guide to allocate time available. They use one-third of the time available before execution for their planning, and they allocate the remaining two-thirds of the time available before execution to their subordinates for planning and preparation. 1-98. Both collaborative planning and parallel planning help optimize available planning time. Collaborative planning is two or more echelons planning together in real time, sharing information, perceptions, and ideas to develop their respective plans simultaneously (ADP 5-0). This type of planning speeds planning efforts as organizations share their understanding of the situation, participate in COA development and decision making together, and develop their respective plans or orders as opposed to waiting for a higher echelon to complete the plan prior to beginning planning. 1-99. Parallel planning is two or more echelons planning for the same operations nearly simultaneously facilitated by the use of warning orders by the higher headquarters (ADP 5-0). In this type of planning, several echelons developing their plans in parallel shorten planning time across the force. The higher headquarters shares information concerning future operations with subordinate units through WARNORDs and other means. Frequent communication between commanders and staffs and sharing of information (such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB] products) help subordinate headquarters plan. 1-100. Commanders are careful not to burden subordinates with planning requirements too far into the future. Generally, the higher the headquarters, the more time and resources staff have available to plan and explore options. Higher headquarters involve subordinates with developing those options that have the highest likelihood of being adopted. FOCUS ON THE RIGHT PLANNING HORIZON 1-101. The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time. Tension exists when commanders determine how far ahead to plan effectively, but without adequate preparation and coordination planning becomes irrelevant. Planning too far into the future may overwhelm the capabilities of planning staffs, especially subordinate staffs. Not planning far enough ahead may result in losing the initiative and being unprepared. Understanding this tension is key to ensuring that the command focuses on the right planning horizon. 1-102. A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events (ADP 5-0). Planning horizons may be measured in weeks, months, or years or in hours and days, depending on the echelon and situation. Organizations often plan simultaneously in several different horizons, especially at division and higher echelons. To guide their planning efforts, commanders use three planning horizons—short-range, mid-range, and long-range. 1-103. The range of planning directly correlates with the certainty commanders have of attaining the end state. Short-range planning is conducted under conditions of relative certainty when commanders believe they can reasonably forecast events, assign resources, and commit to a particular plan. Short-range planning normally results in an OPORD or FRAGORD for execution. In conditions of moderate certainty, mid-range planning focuses on developing several options to the base plan, normally resulting in a branch plan or sequel. Beyond the mid-range planning horizon, the situation normally involves significant uncertainty. Long-range planning focuses on situations with high uncertainty and ambiguous problems, and it involves planning to plan for specific contingencies, campaigns, strategies, and the development of initial plans and orders for major operations. Commanders use the long-range planning horizon to develop broad concepts 0D\ FM 5-0 1-21 Chapter 1 (for example, an OPLAN in concept form) addressing a number of different circumstances over a longer time period. If significant uncertainty exists, the commander may direct the staff to develop branch plans to reduce the risks associated with an uncertain future. DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN ACCURATE RUNNING ESTIMATES 1-104. Developing and maintaining accurate running estimates is critical to effective planning. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Running estimates assist commanders and staffs with understanding situations, assessing progress, and making decisions throughout an operation. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on current and accurate running estimates. 1-105. Because a commander may need an estimate at any time, staffs must develop, update, and continuously revise running estimates while in garrison and during operations. At a minimum, staffs maintain a running estimate on friendly capabilities while in garrison or when not actively engaged in operations. Commanders and staff sections immediately begin updating their running estimates upon receipt of a mission. They continue to build and maintain their running estimates throughout the operations process in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. 1-106. Each staff section maintains a running estimate within its specified area of expertise (for example, intelligence, fires, logistics, or personnel). Upon receipt of a new mission or in anticipation of one, staff members immediately begin to update their running estimates. When building and maintaining a running estimate, staff sections monitor current operations and continuously consider the following items in the context of operations: z Facts. z Assumptions. z Friendly status, including location, activity, and combat power of subordinate units from two echelons down. z Enemy status, including composition, disposition, and strength. z Civil considerations. z Conclusions and recommendations with associated risk. (See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of running estimates.) 1-107. Running estimates cover essential facts and assumptions, including a summary of the current situation. A fact is something known to exist or have happened—a statement known to be true. Facts concerning the operational and mission variables serve as the basis for developing situational understanding during planning. When listing facts, planners ensure they are directly relevant to a COA or help commanders make a decision. Any captured, recorded, and, most importantly, briefed fact must add value to the planning conversation. 1-108. An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, presumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions must be valid (logical and realistic) and necessary for planning to continue. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge that are critical for the planning process to continue. Assumptions may be validated by submitting requests for information to the higher echelon headquarters and receiving information that confirms those assumptions. Information collection assets are also directed to confirm or deny assumptions. Staffs continually review assumptions to ensure validity and to challenge them if they appear unrealistic. 1-109. Commanders and staffs use care with assumptions to ensure they are not based on preconceptions; bias; false historical analogies; or simple, wishful thinking. Additionally, effective planners recognize any unstated assumptions. Accepting a broad assumption without understanding its sublevel components often leads to other faulty assumptions. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include— z Assumptions must be necessary, logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true. z Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be invalid. 1-22 FM 5-0 0D\  Fundamentals of Planning z The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches to execute if one or more key assumptions prove false. z An unstated assumption may often prove more dangerous than a stated assumption proven wrong. 1-110. Running estimates always include recommendations and associated risks for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders use these recommendations to select valid (meaning feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete) COAs for further analysis. During preparation and execution, commanders use recommendations from running estimates to inform their decision making. DEVELOP SIMPLE, FLEXIBLE PLANS AND ORDERS 1-111. Commanders stress the importance of developing simple, flexible plans and orders. Developing and using a planning standard operating procedure assists in more effectively and efficiently developing complete plans and orders. Simplicity is a principle of war; it is key to effective planning. Staffs prepare clear, concise plans and orders to ensure thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Planners promote simplicity by minimizing details where possible and by limiting the actions or tasks to what the situation requires. Subordinates can then develop specifics within the commander’s intent. For example, instead of assigning a route, planners can designate an axis of advance. Developing shorter plans helps maintain simplicity. Shorter plans are easier to disseminate, read, and remember. 1-112. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events. This allows them to operate inside of the enemy’s decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating situations. Incorporating options to reduce risk, such as designating a large mobile reserve, adds flexibility to a plan. Identifying decision points and designing branches and sequels ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—helps create flexible plans. PLANNING PITFALLS 1-113. Commanders and staffs recognize the value of planning and avoid common planning pitfalls. These pitfalls generally stem from a common cause: the failure to appreciate the unpredictability and uncertainty of military operations. Pointing these out is not a criticism of planning, but of planning improperly. Common planning pitfalls include— z Lacking commander involvement. z Failing of the commander to make timely decisions. z Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future. z Trying to plan in too much detail. z Using the plan as a script for execution. z Institutionalizing rigid planning methods. z Lacking a sufficient level of planning detail. 1-114. The first pitfall is the lack of commander involvement in the development of the plan. As discussed in paragraphs 1-74 through 1-85, the responsibility for planning is inherent in command. Commanders are the central figures in effective planning. Since the plan describes their visualization of the end state and how the force will achieve that end state, commanders must devote significant time and effort in the development of plans and orders. 1-115. The second pitfall is a lack of timely decisions by the commander necessary to continue effective planning. Pending or missing decisions can hinder the planning process and reduce developing a flexible and timely plan. In a rapidly changing and fluid environment, a lack of timely decisions can result in a loss of agility, initiative, or opportunities. The lack of timely decisions and timely plan development also inhibits subordinate planning and may unintentionally increase risk to the mission and force. 1-116. The third pitfall, attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future, may result from believing a plan can control the future. Planners tend to plan based on assumptions that the future will be a linear continuation of the present. These plans often underestimate the scope of changes in directions that 0D\ FM 5-0 1-23 Chapter 1 may occur and the results of second- and third-order effects. Even the most effective plans cannot anticipate all the unexpected events. Often, events overcome plans much sooner than anticipated. Effective plans include sufficient branches and sequels to account for the nonlinear nature of events. 1-117. The fourth pitfall consists of trying to plan in too much detail. Sound plans include necessary details; however, planning in unnecessary detail consumes limited time and resources that subordinates need. This pitfall often stems from the desire to leave as little as possible to chance. In general, the less certain the situation, the fewer details a plan should include. However, planners often respond to uncertainty by planning in more detail to try to account for every possibility. Often this over planning results in an extremely detailed plan that does not survive the friction of the situation and constricts effective action. A good plan only includes details needed to coordinate or synchronize actions of two or more subordinate units and accomplish the mission, achieve the objective, or produce the desired effect. 1-118. The fifth pitfall, using the plan as a script for execution, tries to prescribe the course of events with precision. When planners fail to recognize the limits of foresight and control, the plan can become a coercive and overly regulatory mechanism. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates mistakenly focus on meeting the requirements of the plan rather than deciding and acting effectively. 1-119. The sixth pitfall is the danger of institutionalizing rigid planning methods that leads to inflexible or overly structured thinking. This pitfall tends to make planning rigidly focused on the process and produces plans that overly emphasize detailed procedures. Effective planning provides a disciplined framework for approaching and solving complex problems. Taking that discipline to the extreme often results in subordinates not getting plans on time or getting overly detailed plans instead of using mission-type orders. 1-120. The seventh pitfall is the danger of insufficient planning detail. While planning with too much detail may consume too much time, and result in plans which are overly constraining to subordinates, plans with too little detail result in unsynchronized and uncoordinated actions of subordinate units. Some operations, for example a gap crossing, air assault, or obstacle breach, require detailed planning to synchronize the coordinated actions of subordinate units to ensure success. Determining the right balance of detail and permissiveness requires a trained and experienced staff with commander involvement. 1-24 FM 5-0 0D\