Army Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Overview PDF

Chapter 1 Operational Environment Overview This chapter describes the aspects of the operational environment in which the Army conducts cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. It describes cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare forces’ core compe...

Chapter 1 Operational Environment Overview This chapter describes the aspects of the operational environment in which the Army conducts cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. It describes cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare forces’ core competencies and lays out the fundamental principles of cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare. This chapter discusses interrelationships and interdependencies between cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, and the warfighting functions. OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-1. Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare (EW) play an essential role in the Army’s conduct of unified land operations as part of a joint force and in coordination with unified action partners. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Electromagnetic warfare is a military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). 1-2. Cyberspace is one of the five domains of warfare and uses a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for operations, for example, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and satellite transport. Therefore, cyberspace operations and EW require frequency assignment, management, and coordination performed by spectrum management operations. Spectrum management operations consist of four key functions—spectrum management, frequency assignment, host-nation coordination, and policy adherence. Spectrum management operations include preventing and mitigating frequency conflicts and electromagnetic interference (EMI) between friendly forces and host nations during Army operations (refer to ATP 6-02.70). CYBERSPACE AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 1-3. Cyberspace and the EMS are critical for success in today’s operational environment (OE). U.S. and adversary forces alike rely heavily on cyberspace and EMS-dependent technologies for command and control, information collection, situational understanding, and targeting. Achieving relative superiority in cyberspace and the EMS gives commanders an advantage over adversaries and enemies. By conducting cyberspace operations and EW, commanders can limit adversaries’ available courses of action, diminish their ability to gain momentum, degrade their command and control, and degrade their ability to operate effectively in the other domains. 1-4. Commanders must leverage cyberspace and EW capabilities using a combined arms approach to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Effective use of cyberspace operations and EW require commanders and staffs to conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA). Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare in support of unified land operations (ADP 3-0). By integrating and synchronizing cyberspace operations and EW, friendly forces gain an information advantage across multiple domains and lines of operations. Figure 1-1 on page 1-2 illustrates how cyberspace operations and EW contribute to Army operations. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-1 Chapter 1 Figure 1-1. Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare logic chart 1-2 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview SECTION I – CORE COMPETENCIES AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 1-5. The Army’s reliance on networked systems and weapons necessitates highly trained forces to protect warfighting systems and networks dependent upon access to cyberspace and the EMS. Cyberspace and the EMS are heavily congested due to the high volume of friendly, neutral, and adversary use, and contested due to adversary actions. 1-6. Adversaries continue to develop sophisticated weapons and networked systems that project power through or depend on cyberspace and the EMS. The Army employs cyberspace and EW capabilities as part of a joint and combined arms approach to defeat threat activities in cyberspace and the EMS, protect friendly forces, and enable friendly freedom of action across the conflict continuum. Army cyberspace and EW forces apply the following core competencies and underlying fundamental principles to ensure friendly forces gain and maintain positions of relative advantage. CORE COMPETENCIES 1-7. Cyberspace forces and EW professionals are organized, trained, and equipped to provide the following core competencies that deliver essential and enduring capabilities to the Army—  Enable situational understanding.  Protect friendly personnel and capabilities.  Deliver effects. CREATE UNDERSTANDING 1-8. Cyberspace forces execute cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in and through the information environment to identify and understand adversary networks, systems, and processes. This information enables commanders to understand adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities, thereby enhancing the commanders’ ability to prioritize and deliver effects. 1-9. EW professionals surveil the EMS to collect combat information used to characterize adversary use of the EMS and understand the integration of adversary emitter systems arrays at echelon. This information enables understanding friendly vulnerabilities and threat capabilities while allowing commanders to prioritize and deliver effects. PROTECT FRIENDLY PERSONNEL AND CAPABILITIES 1-10. Cyberspace forces defend networks, warfighting platforms, capabilities, and data from ongoing or imminent malicious cyberspace activity. By protecting critical networks and systems, cyberspace forces help maintain the Army’s ability to conduct operations and project power across all domains. 1-11. EW forces, in coordination with the G-6 or S-6 and in support of the commander’s directive, implement and enhance measures to protect friendly personnel, facilities, warfighting platforms, capabilities, and equipment from adverse effects in the EMS. EW forces recommend measures to mask or control friendly emissions from enemy detection and deny adversaries the ability to locate and target friendly formations. EW forces detect and mitigate enemy attacks in or through the EMS to maintain the Army’s ability to conduct operations and project power across all domains. DELIVER EFFECTS 1-12. Cyberspace forces deliver cyberspace effects against adversary networks, systems, and weapons. These effects enhance the Army’s ability to conduct operations, reduce adversary combat power, and project power across all domains. 1-13. EW professionals deliver effects in the EMS against adversary networks, systems, and weapons. These actions reduce adversary combat power, protect friendly forces, and enhance friendly forces and weapons’ lethality. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-3 Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 1-14. Fundamental principles are basic rules or assumptions of central importance that guide how cyberspace and EW professionals’ approach and conduct cyberspace operations and EW. These fundamental principles are—  Operational focus.  Adaptability and versatility.  Global reach. OPERATIONAL FOCUS 1-15. Cyberspace and EW forces execute missions in support of a commander’s overarching operational design. When properly integrated and synchronized as part of a combined arms approach, cyberspace and EW capabilities can produce layered dilemmas for the adversary in multiple domains and enhance relative combat power. To accomplish this, cyberspace and EW staff must collaborate across all warfighting functions. ADAPTABILITY AND VERSATILITY 1-16. Cyberspace and EW forces conduct operations using capabilities that are adaptable to a variety of mission requirements. Cyberspace and EW capabilities vary in both the size of the force employed and the magnitude or scope of effects created. Depending on mission requirements, cyberspace and EW capabilities may be used as primary or supporting efforts for decisive, shaping or sustaining operations. GLOBAL REACH 1-17. The nature of the cyberspace domain increases the operational reach of cyberspace and EW forces. Combat mission force(s) and EW professionals deliver strategic, operational, or tactical effects worldwide from remote, co-located, or forward operating positions. SECTION II – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-18. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Conditions in cyberspace and the EMS often change rapidly and can positively or negatively impact a commander’s ability to achieve mission objectives. Friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy actions in cyberspace and the EMS can create near- instantaneous effects on the battlefield or in garrison. Given the global nature of cyberspace and the EMS, these actions can impact a commander’s OE even though the actions may originate or terminate beyond that OE. Cyberspace and EW effects also cross through and impact multiple domains simultaneously. For these reasons, commanders must gain and maintain an in-depth understanding of the OE that extends beyond the land domain to the multi-domain extended battlefield to seize, exploit, and retain operational initiative. 1-19. Operational initiative is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation (ADP 3-0). By gaining and maintaining positions of relative advantage, including information advantage in and through cyberspace and the EMS, commanders can seize and retain the operational initiative. To gain and maintain information advantage, commanders must account for the temporal nature of information and the temporary nature of many cyberspace and EW effects. On average, the relative operational advantage that a commander can gain from a piece of information or from a cyberspace or EW effect degrades over time. This means that a commander who takes action first, on average, will obtain a greater information advantage from a similar piece of information or effect than a commander who acts later. In this way, the commander who can sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster than an opponent will generally obtain the greatest information advantage. 1-20. Commanders can use cyberspace and EW capabilities to gain enhanced situational awareness and understanding of the enemy through reconnaissance and sensing activities. These reconnaissance and sensing activities can augment and enhance the understanding a commander gains from information collection and intelligence processes. Commanders can also use cyberspace and EW capabilities to decide and act faster than an adversary or enemy. By protecting friendly information systems and signals from disruption or exploitation 1-4 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview by an adversary or enemy, a commander can ensure command and control and maintain tactical and operational surprise. Conversely, a commander might use cyberspace and EW capabilities to slow or degrade an enemy’s decision-making processes by disrupting enemy sensors, communications, or data processing. To make effective use of cyberspace and EW capabilities to achieve an information advantage, a commander must plan early to integrate cyberspace operations and EW actions fully into the overall scheme of maneuver. CYBERSPACE DOMAIN 1-21. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12). Cyberspace operations require the use of links and nodes located in other physical domains to perform logical functions that create effects in cyberspace that then permeate throughout the physical domains using both wired networks and the EMS. 1-22. The use of cyberspace is essential to operations. The Army conducts cyberspace operations and supporting activities as part of both Army and joint operations. Because cyberspace is a global communications and data-sharing medium, it is inherently joint, inter-organizational, multinational, and often a shared resource, with signal and intelligence maintaining significant equities. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media websites, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. 1-23. To aid the planning and execution of cyberspace operations, cyberspace is sometimes visualized in three layers. These layers are interdependent, but each layer has unique attributes that affect operations. Cyberspace operations generally traverse all three layers of cyberspace but may target effects at one or more specific layers. Planners must consider the challenges and opportunities presented by each layer of cyberspace as well as the interactions amongst the layers. Figure 1-2 on page 1-6 depicts the relationship between the three cyberspace layers. The three cyberspace layers are—  The physical network layer.  The logical network layer.  The cyber-persona layer. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-5 Chapter 1 Figure 1-2. Relationship between the cyberspace network layers PHYSICAL NETWORK LAYER 1-24. The physical network layer consists of the information technology devices and infrastructure in the physical domains that provide storage, transport, and processing of information within cyberspace, to include data repositories and the connections that transfer data between network components (JP 3-12). Physical network components include the hardware and infrastructure such as computing devices, storage devices, network devices, and wired and wireless links. Components of the physical network layer require physical 1-6 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview security measures to protect them from damage or unauthorized access, which, if left vulnerable, could allow a threat to gain access to both systems and critical data. 1-25. Every physical component of cyberspace is owned by a public or private entity. The physical layer often crosses geo-political boundaries and is one of the reasons that cyberspace operations require multiple levels of joint and unified action partner coordination. Cyberspace planners use knowledge of the physical location of friendly, neutral, and adversary information technology systems and infrastructures to understand appropriate legal frameworks for cyberspace operations and to estimate impacts of those operations. Joint doctrine refers to portions of cyberspace, based on who owns or controls that space, as either blue, gray, or red cyberspace (refer to JP 3-12). This publication refers to these areas as friendly, neutral, or enemy cyberspace respectively. LOGICAL NETWORK LAYER 1-26. The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network, based on the logic programming (code) that drives network components (i.e., the relationships are not necessarily tied to a specific physical link or node, but to their ability to be addressed logically and exchange or process data) (JP 3-12). Nodes in the physical layer may logically relate to one another to form entities in cyberspace not tied to a specific node, path, or individual. Web sites hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where content can be accessed through a single uniform resource locator or web address provide an example. This may also include the logical programming to look for the best communications route, instead of the shortest physical route, to provide the information requested. CYBER-PERSONA LAYER 1-27. The cyber-persona layer is a view of cyberspace created by abstracting data from the logical network layer using the rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop descriptions of digital representations of an actor or entity identity in cyberspace, known as a cyber-persona (JP 3-12). Cyber-personas are not confined to a single physical or logical location and may link to multiple physical and logical network layers. When planning and executing cyberspace operations, staffs should understand that one actor or entity (user) may have multiple cyber-personas, using multiple identifiers in cyberspace. These various identifiers can include different work and personal emails and different identities on different Web forums, chatrooms, and social network sites. 1-28. For example, an individual’s account on a social media website, consisting of the username and digital information associated with that username, may be just one of that individual’s cyber-personas. Conversely, multiple different users may share a single cyber-persona or set of cyber-personas. Planners must understand that enemy use of cyber-personas can make attributing responsibility for cyberspace actions difficult. ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 1-29. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) - is a maneuver space essential for facilitating control within the operational environment (OE) and impacts all portions of the OE and military operations. Based on specific physical characteristics, the EMS is organized by frequency bands, including radio waves, microwaves, infrared radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, and gamma rays. Figure 1-3 on page 1-8 illustrates the range of standard frequencies in the EMS and some of the common devices operating in those frequencies. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-7 Chapter 1 Figure 1-3. The electromagnetic spectrum TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS 1-30. The rapid proliferation of cyberspace and EMS capabilities has further congested an already challenging OE. In addition to competing with threat actors in cyberspace and the EMS, U.S. forces also encounter challenges resulting from neutral actors. Such neutral systems as commercial aircraft and airports, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, and commercial cellular infrastructures contribute to continuing congestion in cyberspace and the EMS. Figure 1-4 on page 1-9, depicts cyberspace and the EMS in a congested OE. 1-31. Several key trends and characteristics impact a commander’s ability to use cyberspace and the EMS. Such trends and characteristics include—  Congested environments.  Contested environments.  Threats.  Hazards.  Terrain. CONGESTED ENVIRONMENTS 1-32. Both cyberspace and the EMS are increasingly congested environments that friendly, neutral, and threat actors use to transmit and process large amounts of information. Since 2000, the Army’s use of networked information systems in almost every aspect of operations has increased tenfold. Neutral and threat actors have similarly expanded their use of cyberspace and the EMS for a wide range of military and non-military purposes. 1-8 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview Figure 1-4. Congestion in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS 1-33. As cyberspace and the EMS continue to become more congested, the capabilities of state and non-state actors to contest U.S. advantages in both areas have also expanded. State and non-state threats use a wide range of advanced technologies that may represent relatively inexpensive ways for a small or materially disadvantaged adversary to pose a significant threat to the United States. The application of low-cost cyberspace capabilities can provide an advantage against a technology-dependent nation or organization and an asymmetric advantage to those who could not otherwise effectively oppose U.S. military forces. Figure 1-5 on page 1-10, depicts an operational view of cyberspace and the EMS in a contested OE. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-9 Chapter 1 Figure 1-5. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum in a contested environment THREATS 1-34. For every operation, threats are a fundamental part of an OE. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threat is an umbrella term that includes any actor with the potential to harm the United States or its interests. Threats include—  Enemies.  Adversaries.  Peer threats.  Hybrid threats.  Insider threats. 1-35. An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An enemy is also called a combatant and treated as such under the laws of war. Enemies will employ various advanced technologies to attack Army forces in cyberspace and EMS to disrupt or destroy the ability to conduct operations or collect information that will give friendly forces a strategic, operational, or tactical advantage. 1-36. An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Though an adversary is not treated as a combatant, the goal is still to prevent and deter conflict by keeping their activities within a desired state of cooperation and competition. 1-37. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy able to effectively oppose U.S. forces world-wide while enjoying a position of relative advantage in a specific region (ADP 3-0), including cyberspace and the EMS. Peer threats often have cyberspace and EW capabilities that are comparable to U.S. capabilities. Peer threats 1-10 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview may employ these capabilities across the competition continuum to collect intelligence, delay the deployment of U.S. forces, degrade U.S. capabilities, and disrupt U.S. operations. Peer threats have electromagnetic attack (EA) capabilities such as telecommunications and EMS jamming equivalent to or better than U.S. forces. Peer threats can conduct advanced cyberspace attacks, including denial-of-service, various forms of phishing, eavesdropping, and malware. 1-38. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADP 3-0). Commanders and staffs must understand that the diversity of a hybrid threat complicates operations since hostility is coming from multiple actors operating from various geographical territories. A hybrid threat complicates the United States' efforts to identify, characterize, attribute, and respond to threats in cyberspace and the EMS. 1-39. Organized crime or other non-state, illegitimate organizations often make sophisticated malware available for purchase or free, allowing even unsophisticated threat actors to acquire advanced capabilities at little to no cost. Because of the low barriers to entry and the potentially high payoff, the United States can expect an increasing number of adversaries to use cyberspace capabilities to attempt to negate U.S. advantages in military capability. 1-40. An insider threat is a person with placement and access who intentionally causes loss or degradation of resources or capabilities or compromises the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission through espionage, providing support to international terrorism, or the unauthorized release or disclosure of information about the plans and intentions of United States military forces (AR 381-12). Insider threats may include spies within or working with U.S. forces, as well as personnel who may be unaware of their actions either through deception or third party manipulation. Insider threats present unique challenges because they are trusted individuals with authorized access to Army capabilities and sensitive operational information. Insider threats may include spies within or working with U.S. forces. Note. Law enforcement and counterintelligence capabilities also operate in cyberspace during their efforts to neutralize criminal activities. Countering insider threats falls primarily within the purview of these organizations and outside the authorized activities of the cyberspace forces. However, information discovered in the course of authorized cyberspace operations may aid these other organizations. HAZARDS 1-41. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Disruption to cyberspace’s physical infrastructure often occurs due to operator errors, industrial accidents, and natural disasters. These unpredictable events may have just as significant impact on operations as the actions of enemies. Recovery from accidents and hazardous incidents may require significant coordination external to the DOD or the temporary reliance on backup systems with which operators may be less familiar. 1-42. Electromagnetic energy can also impact the operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms. Various hazards from electromagnetic energy include electromagnetic environmental effects, electromagnetic compatibility issues, EMI, electromagnetic pulse, and electromagnetic radiation hazards. 1-43. Electromagnetic radiation hazards include hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel; hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance; hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuels; and natural phenomena effects such as space weather, lightning, and precipitation static. CONFLICT AND COMPETITION 1-44. Army forces face continuous competition and conflict in cyberspace and the EMS from threats intending to diminish friendly capabilities. Commanders must seek and exploit opportunities for success in cyberspace and the EMS wherever and whenever authorized. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-11 Chapter 1 COMPETITION CONTINUUM 1-45. Cyberspace operations, EW, and spectrum management operations take place across the competition continuum. The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict Superiority in cyberspace and the EMS enables U.S. forces to conduct operations to achieve the goals and accomplish the objectives assigned to them by the President and Secretary of Defense. Though U.S. forces may conduct cyberspace operations and EW during competition below the level of armed conflict, they are critical enablers to combat power when conducting large-scale combat operations during armed conflict. Competition below armed conflict consists of situations in which joint forces take actions outside of armed conflict against a strategic actor in pursuit of policy objectives. 1-46. Spectrum management operations fulfill a crucial within the CEMA construct. Spectrum management operations take place across the entire competition continuum and ensure proper coordination of EMS activities spanning the entirety of military operations. MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD 1-47. The enemy seeks to employ capabilities to create effects in multiple domains to counter U.S. interests and impede friendly operations. Threat actors will conduct activities in the information environment, space, and cyberspace to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt the deployment of friendly forces. Land-based threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of action across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They will disrupt the EMS, sow confusion, and challenge the legitimacy of U.S. actions. Understanding how threats can present multiple dilemmas to Army forces in all domains helps Army commanders identify (or create), seize, and exploit their opportunities. Implementing operations security (OPSEC) is critical to protecting essential friendly information technology infrastructures, command and control, and targeting systems. Operations security is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3). POSITIONS OF RELATIVE ADVANTAGE IN CYBERSPACE AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 1-48. The Army conducts cyberspace operations and EW to attain positions of relative advantage in cyberspace and the EMS, to establish information superiority. A position of relative advantage is a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage (ADP 3-0). SECTION III – CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS 1-49. This section describes how cyberspace operations and EW support the warfighting functions. It specifies the types of cyberspace operations and EW missions and actions that contribute to the various tasks related to each warfighting function. COMMAND AND CONTROL 1-50. Commanders rely heavily on cyberspace and the EMS for command and control. At corps and below, the network in the command-and-control system is the Department of Defense information network-Army (DODIN-A). The Department of Defense information network-Army is an Army-operated enclave of the DODIN that encompasses all Army information capabilities that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide (ATP 6-02.71). Signal forces establish, manage, secure, and defend the DODIN-A by conducting Department of Defense information network operations and maintaining cybersecurity compliance to prevent intrusions into the DODIN-A. For more information on DODIN operations, refer to FM 6-02 and ATP 6-02.71. The networks and systems that comprise the DODIN-A enable commanders to control units, have a shared understanding of the OE, and interact with subordinate units in near real-time. 1-12 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview 1-51. EW supports command and control through electromagnetic protection (EP) to eliminate or mitigate the negative impact of friendly, neutral, enemy, or naturally occurring EMI on command-and-control systems. The frequency assignment and deconfliction tasks of spectrum management operations support EP (See ATP 6-02.70). Such EP tasks include—emission control, mitigating electromagnetic environmental effects, electromagnetic compatibility, electromagnetic masking, preemptive countermeasures, and electromagnetic warfare reprogramming. These tasks require integration with spectrum management operation for frequency management and deconfliction. Chapter 2 of this publication and ATP 3-12.3 details information on EP. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 1-52. Cyberspace operations and EW enhance friendly forces commanders’ movement and maneuver by disrupting adversary command and control, reducing adversary and increasing friendly situational awareness, and negatively affect the adversary’s ability to make sound decisions. Due to the range and reach of cyberspace capabilities, cyberspace forces are often able to support friendly maneuver in close areas while simultaneously supporting deep area operations. For information on close and deep area operations, refer to FM 3-0. For techniques on deep operations, refer to ATP 3-94.2. 1-53. DODIN operations support movement and maneuver by establishing secure tactical networks that allow communications with friendly forces conducting operations laterally in close and deep areas, in addition to communications with higher headquarters in the rear area. Units use the DODIN-A as the primary means of communication during movement and maneuver. Satellite communications, combat net radios, and wired networks are elements of the DODIN-A used to synchronize operations, collaborate, understand the environment, and coordinate fires. The network enables near real-time updates to the common operational picture. The upper and lower tiers of the DODIN-A connect headquarters to subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters and unified action partners. 1-54. Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) in coordination with other forms of fires also support movement and maneuver by opening avenues necessary to disperse and displace enemy forces. Synchronizing OCO with other fires sets conditions that enable maneuver to gain or exploit positions of relative advantage. OCO will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 1-55. EW assets support movement and maneuver by conducting operations to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capabilities in the EMS. Defensive EA protects friendly forces from enemy attacks during movement and maneuver by denying the enemy the use of the EMS. Using friendly EA to counter radio- controlled devices, such as improvised explosive devices, drones, robots, or radio-guided munitions is an example of defensive EA. During defensive EA, EW assets conduct operations to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capabilities in the EMS. EW assets conduct defensive EA by employing EA capabilities such as counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare and devices used for aircraft survivability. Offensive EA supports movement and maneuver by projecting power within the time and tempo of the scheme of maneuver. Electromagnetic jamming, electromagnetic intrusion, and electromagnetic probing are examples of offensive EA. Electromagnetic support (ES) supports movement and maneuver by providing combat information for a situational understanding of the OE. 1-56. A variety of EP tasks also support movement and maneuver. Spectrum managers and EW personnel deconflict friendly frequencies to prevent or mitigate frequency interference from friendly forces. Frequency deconfliction includes preventive and mitigating measures to ensure friendly radio devices used during movement and maneuver tasks do not cause frequency interference to the radios used by other friendly forces. Electromagnetic masking supports movement and maneuver by concealing electromagnetic signatures radiated by friendly forces’ spectrum dependent systems during operations. Conducting emission control during movement and maneuver reduces electromagnetic signatures of friendly forces’ spectrum dependent communications and navigational systems during movement and maneuver. EW forces also employ sensors before a movement as preemptive countermeasures. Electromagnetic security supports movement and maneuver by denying an enemy the ability to decipher information derived from electromagnetic energy that they intercept. These tasks are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 of this publication and in ATP 3-12.3. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-13 Chapter 1 INTELLIGENCE 1-57. Cyberspace operations, EW, and intelligence mutually identify the cyberspace and EMS aspects of the OE to provide recommendations for friendly courses of action during the military decision-making process. Cyberspace and EW forces support information collection that may be used by intelligence professionals. Conversely, intelligence operations provide products that enhance understanding of the OE, enable targeting, and support defense in cyberspace and the EMS. It is critical that information acquired through cyberspace operations and EW is standardized and reported to the intelligence community. 1-58. Intelligence supports cyberspace operations through the intelligence process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and information collection. Intelligence at all echelons supports cyberspace operations and EW planning, and helps measure performance and effectiveness through battle damage assessment. Cyberspace planners leverage intelligence analysis, reporting, and production capabilities to understand the OE, develop plans and targets, and support operations throughout the operations process. In the context of cyberspace and the EMS, the OE includes network topology overlays that graphically depict how information flows and resides within the operational area and how the network transports data in and out of the area of interest. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1-59. During IPB, the staff considers how the adversary or enemy utilizes cyberspace and the EMS to achieve their objectives. Intelligence and CEMA staff also consider state and non-state actors with capability, access, and intent to affect friendly operations as they define and analyze the area of interest. 1-60. Intelligence analysts, with support from other staff elements, evaluate enemy and adversary use of cyberspace and the EMS. This includes evaluating aspects such as—  Adversary or enemy use of cyberspace and the EMS.  Reliance on networked capabilities.  Sophistication of cyberspace attack capabilities.  Adversary cyberspace defense capabilities.  Adversary EW capabilities.  Network vulnerabilities (both adversary and friendly).  Ability to synchronize cyberspace operations with other operations.  Adversary use of social media for social engineering. 1-61. When assessing the enemy or adversary courses of action, the intelligence staff considers how the enemy or adversary will include cyberspace and the EMS in its operations. The commander and staff should consider threat courses of action in cyberspace and the EMS when planning friendly operations. (See ATP 2- 01.3 for more information about IPB). 1-62. Weather (terrestrial and space) also affects operations in cyberspace and the EMS. In assessing weather effects, the staff considers key terrain in cyberspace and the EMS in relation to other aspects of the area of interest and the area of operations. ELECTROMAGNETIC SUPPORT AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 1-63. ES and signals intelligence (SIGINT) are similar in function, but SIGINT requires separate authorities. EW personnel conduct ES to acquire information in support of a commander’s maneuver plan. No requirement or restriction exists for EW personnel to have SIGINT authorities to conduct these activities. 1-64. EW and SIGINT personnel both identify emitters in the EMS and may cue each other for targeting, but have distinct mission responsibilities. EW personnel characterize and identify emitters by analyzing external signals for immediate threat recognition and warning, force protection, and targeting. ES provides combat information that has a limited time value to support operations. ES information may be passed to intelligence units or staff for further SIGINT analysis depending on situation and authorities. SIGINT personnel analyze internal signal parameters to produce and disseminate intelligence, which requires SIGINT authorities. 1-14 FM 3-12 24 August 2021  Operational Environment Overview FIRES 1-65. OCO and EA tasks are part of the fires warfighting function. Cyberspace forces employ cyberspace attacks to deny, degrade, disrupt, and destroy or otherwise affect enemies’ cyberspace or information-dependent capabilities. EW personnel employ EA to degrade, and neutralize the enemies’ ability to use the EMS. Cyberspace and EW effects transcends beyond cyberspace and the EMS and may result in second-and-third- order effects that could impact the other physical domains. 1-66. Army cyberspace and EW effects applied against enemy capabilities and weapon systems deny their ability to communicate, track, or target. EW also supports fires by enabling lethal fires through the employment of ES to search for, identify, and locate or localize sources of radiated electromagnetic energy used by the enemy for targeting. Defensive EA can support fires through the deployment of decoys or noise to mask friendly fires networks. SUSTAINMENT 1-67. Cyberspace operations support sustainment through DODIN operations and defensive cyberspace operations (DCO). Sustainment organizations, functions, systems, and sustainment locations that are highly dependent on DODIN operations include—  The global supply chain.  Army logistics networks and information systems.  Mobilization and power projection platforms.  Aerial ports of debarkation.  Seaports of debarkation. 1-68. DODIN operations establish the necessary communications to conduct sustainment functions. Cyberspace forces defend sustainment systems when adversaries breach cybersecurity measures of networks and systems from threat cyberspace attacks. EW supports sustainment through EP and ES, ensuring freedom of action for DODIN operations in and through the EMS for continued sustainment support. Management, coordination, and deconfliction of frequencies in the EMS are functions of spectrum management operations. Refer to Chapter 2 for more information on defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM). PROTECTION 1-69. DCO-IDM and EP tasks, in addition to the cyberspace security tasks of DODIN operations, are part of the protection warfighting function. DODIN operations, DCO-IDM, EP, and defensive EA support protection by securing and defending the DODIN-A. Cyberspace forces conduct DCO-IDM to detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate ongoing or imminent threats to the DODIN-A. DODIN operations and DCO-IDM also enable other protection tasks by providing secured communications for—  Area security.  Police operations.  Personnel recovery.  Air and missile defense.  Detention operations. 1-70. EP involves actions to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the EMS. EP includes measures to protect friendly personnel and equipment in a contested and congested electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). The EMOE is a composite of the actual and potential electromagnetic energy radiation, conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and the decisions of the commander. The CEMA spectrum manager work closely with the S-6 or G-6 spectrum manager to deconflict frequencies used by friendly forces. Friendly forces can employ proactive measures such as emission control to reduce their electromagnetic signature, thus increasing OPSEC. Defensive EA protects friendly forces by denying enemy use of the EMS, disrupting their ability to target, guide, or fire weapons. Refer to Chapters 2 and 4 of this publication for more information on emission control. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 1-15