ATP 2-01.3. Additional Considerations for Operational Environments PDF - Military Doctrine

Chapter 8 Additional Considerations for Operational Environments THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 8-1. During step 1 of the IPOE process, the OE is defined. An OE encompasses the domains, the information environment, the EMS, and other factors. IPOE applies across the range of Army operations....

Chapter 8 Additional Considerations for Operational Environments THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 8-1. During step 1 of the IPOE process, the OE is defined. An OE encompasses the domains, the information environment, the EMS, and other factors. IPOE applies across the range of Army operations. Therefore, when defining the OE, all domains in which Army and threat operations occur must be considered. AIR DOMAIN 8-2. The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The air domain is the operating medium for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft; air defense systems; UASs; cruise missiles; and some ballistic and antiballistic missile systems. Air AAs are different from maritime and ground AAs. Analysis of the air domain is critical in identifying air AAs, which are also associated with terrain restrictions of the land domain. 8-3. As with IPOE conducted for land-based operations, IPOE performed for air-based operations focuses on determining air domain characteristics that influence friendly and threat operations. Analysts should consider that IPOE for the different domains is conducted using the same process; it is the characteristics of differing domains that are determined and incorporated into the overall IPOE product. (For more on IPOE considerations for the air domain, see FM 3-01.) 8-4. To determine the relevant aspects of the air domain, it may be useful to— ⚫ View it as a medium for using capabilities. For example, how does or will the air domain affect the use of civilian and military aircraft, civilian and military UASs and drones, weather monitoring systems, air corridors, fly over rights, and broadcasting rights? ⚫ Think about relationships. For example, what is the air domain’s relationship to weather, the EMS and communications, and effects on performance (considering altitude, barometric pressure, and humidity)? 8-5. The air domain has potential relevant effects on maneuver units, signal units, psychological operations units, and artillery units just as it has on Army rotary-wing aircraft units. LAND DOMAIN 8-6. The land domain is the area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). These areas also include subsurface and supersurface areas. Army operations are conducted primarily in the land domain. Analyzing the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) of the land domain’s natural and man-made features assists in determining the domain’s effects on friendly and threat operations. In turn, this analysis assists in determining how terrain supports friendly and threat COAs. 8-7. Analysis of the OE’s land domain covers natural and man-made features as well as populations, transportation systems (roads, bridges, railways, airports, seaports, inland waterways, tunnels), surface materials (including the density of buildings, building construction framework and material, building height, cultural or historic significance), ground water, cities, towns, villages, multistory buildings, skyscrapers, natural obstacles such as large bodies of water and mountains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the configuration of surface drainage and other subsurface structures, such as subways, basements, bunkers. Understanding the relevant aspects of the land domain is essential in all steps of the IPOE process. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 8-1 Chapter 8 MARITIME DOMAIN 8-8. The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). The maritime domain’s vastness and proximity to the land masses make this domain critical for force projection and the application of weapons and sensors that support Army operations. 8-9. The maritime domain is a vast maneuver space that allows for tactical maneuver in the air, on the surface, and beneath the surface of the water. Although the Navy is the primary Service responsible for security in the maritime domain, Army forces use this domain for all aspects of operations, including but not limited to joint forcible entry, multinational exercises, information collection, sustainment, aviation sea basing, protection, humanitarian assistance, and noncombatant evacuation. 8-10. The maritime domain facilitates most of the world’s trade and is essential in maintaining a global economy. The interdependence of global economics and maritime security requires continuous monitoring of the maritime domain and the regions bordering its waters. Therefore, Army operations in this domain may likely continue to increase. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE MARITIME DOMAIN 8-11. Because most Army operations occur in the land domain, intelligence staffs must maintain situational awareness of possible contingencies for which the maritime domain may become relevant to mission success. The following includes considerations when researching significant aspects of the maritime domain: ⚫ Sea LOCs and sea ports of debarkation, including— ◼ Chokepoints (straights, shipping lanes, and canals). ◼ Naval bases. ◼ Coastal defenses (antiaccess and area denial, coastal mines, and coastal long-range fires). ⚫ Threat vessels, including but not limited to— ◼ Civilian: Pirate, narcotics, and human-trafficking vessels. ◼ Military: Destroyers, cruisers, carriers, frigates, and submarines. ⚫ Natural harbors and anchorages. ⚫ Infrastructure, including ports, shipping yards, and dry-docks. ⚫ Friendly forces, including host-nation forces and other Services that may be able to provide OE information. ⚫ Threat forces in the OE. ⚫ Surface and subsurface effects. ⚫ Weather effects. ⚫ Tidal and current impacts. ⚫ Transportation networks. 8-12. During generate intelligence knowledge, intelligence staffs should reach out to outside organizations and agencies as well as other Services to increase their knowledge base on the maritime domain. Many missions using this domain, especially missions in the littorals, are conducted with joint forces. TRADE 8-13. Approximately 80 percent of global trade is conducted using the maritime domain. The importance of this domain on the global economy is significant mostly due to the low cost of shipping via water (ship) instead of air. Items such as finished products, raw materials, as well as components to finish products are shipped via the maritime domain. When considering global trade agreements and the impacts they have on billions of people, it is understandable why threat groups see maritime routes as potential avenues to leverage power and control. 8-14. Not all maritime trade is legal. Items, such as narcotics, weapons, money, people, and black-market and counterfeit goods, are trafficked using the maritime domain. In many OEs, illicit trade conducted using the maritime domain can be linked to threat groups that intelligence staffs evaluate. 8-2 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Additional Considerations for Operational Environments THREAT FORCES 8-15. Threat forces in the maritime domain range from conventional naval forces conducting missions in open seas to criminal groups, including pirates, operating in the littorals. Based on the mission, intelligence staffs determine which threat groups have the capability to impact operations. Often, the OE determines what type of threat forces are present. Intelligence staffs must view the OE holistically to determine why threats are present. For example, oftentimes, isolated and poorly patrolled littoral waters along the coasts of Colombia, Central America, and Mexico offer drug trafficking organizations an adequate environment to smuggle narcotics in semisubmersible watercrafts. Another example is the isolated coast of Somalia, which offers pirates a good environment for using small, relatively fast watercraft to target international shipping lanes. Their presence could be rooted in many objectives such as the control of waterways for financial gain or the enforcement of legitimate or illegitimate coastal borders. The full range of maritime domain threat forces varies by location and threat objectives. SPACE DOMAIN 8-16. The space domain is the area surrounding Earth at altitudes of greater than or equal to 100 kilometers above the mean seal level (JP 3-14). The space domain is essential to information collection, missile tracking, launch detection, environmental monitoring, communications, navigation, global positioning, and timing. It is also essential to multiple systems and subsystems necessary for the conduct of military operations across the warfighting functions. Analysis of threat capabilities that can affect the space domain as well as the effects a degraded space domain can have on friendly operations must be considered as threat exploitation of friendly technology may be used. (See FM 3-14 and JP 3-14.) 8-17. Space is considered as the region around the Earth with little atmosphere, where satellites are placed in orbit. Increased access to information capabilities that leverage the cyberspace and space domains to disseminate information, demonstrates the importance of analyzing the space domain to identify its relevant aspects. 8-18. The U.S. military, including all Army warfighting functions as well as civil and commercial sectors, rely on the space domain to employ capabilities for daily operations. Use of the space domain facilitates military communications, navigation, environmental monitoring, information collection, and warning intelligence. Space-based resources provide freedom of action, global reach, responsiveness, and insights into an OE that might otherwise be a denied area. These resources are not constrained by the geographic borders of otherwise geographically denied regions. 8-19. Whether for commercial or military use, all countries have access to the space domain and its satellite capabilities. State and nonstate actors use these capabilities to shape the OE to achieve parity or overmatch. Army forces have freedom of action in the space domain. This has made threat forces aware that they must contest the U.S. presence in the space domain to achieve relative advantages in other domains, such as cyberspace where information campaigns can be used to level effects at a time and place of the threat’s choosing. (See ATP 3-14.3 for more on space domain capabilities.) 8-20. Military, civil, and commercial sectors of the United States and its allies increasingly rely on space capabilities to create targets of opportunity. Threats often view these opportunities as exploitable vulnerabilities. The increasing reliance of the United States on space capabilities has created a valuable target for threats to exploit and attack. U.S. space-related centers of gravity are potential targets, especially ground space assets, including the supporting infrastructure of systems. To the threat, this vulnerability translates into an HVT. Conversely, a potential threat who relies even minimally on space systems will have space centers of gravity as potential, lucrative HPTs for friendly forces to engage. 8-21. The staff and commander need to consider space capabilities and vulnerabilities during IPOE, ultimately leading to COAs that will synchronize space aspects into the operation. The use of space systems significantly affects operations involving communications, navigation, weather support, and surveillance. This protects force capabilities and intelligence information collected across the battlefield. Across the range of military operations—from predeployment to mission completion—space effects on operations are ongoing assets that the commander must plan for, can influence, and will rely on for the MDMP. The G-2 and space staff officer must ensure an effective space IPOE effort is performed and incorporated into the overall IPOE staff effort. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 8-3 Chapter 8 8-22. Intelligence staff coordination with the space support element (at corps, divisions, fires brigades, special forces groups, and other organizations with emerging requirements) is critical to understanding what space domain systems may influence an AO. To determine how those space domain systems will impact an operation from a friendly and threat perspective, the intelligence staff applies the IPOE process. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE SPACE DOMAIN 8-23. Relevant aspects of the space domain within the IPOE process are the— ⚫ Space environment. ⚫ Space weather. ⚫ Space weather phenomena. Space Environment 8-24. Space environment is the environment corresponding to the space domain, where electromagnetic radiation, charged particles, and electric and magnetic fields are the dominant physical influences, and that encompasses the Earth’s ionosphere and magnetosphere, interplanetary space, and the solar atmosphere (JP 3-59). In addition to the emission of electromagnetic radiation, the space environment also consists of a continuous outflow of energetic charged particles from the Sun called solar wind. Solar wind is ionized gas composed of ions, electrons, and charged particles that continuously erupt from the solar corona at more than 400 kilometers per second. Several types of solar activity can cause energetic particle streams to enhance normal or background levels of solar wind. These enhancements and discontinuities in solar wind speed or density can cause solar storms, which impact the EMS. 8-25. The disturbance of ions, atoms, and electrons as they move through space accounts for either the degradation or improvement of radio wave propagation in the space domain. Environmental impacts, such as cosmic rays, solar storms, temperature fluctuations, and radiation commonly affect wave propagation. The layers of the Earth’s atmosphere, through which radio waves travel, also affect propagation. (For more information on radio wave propagation, see ATP 2-22.6.) 8-26. To understand how the space domain may be impacted during operations, intelligence officers must engage Army space support teams and Air Force staff weather officers to understand and articulate the impact of three of the various layers of the Earth’s atmosphere—ionosphere, stratosphere, and troposphere—that may affect the EMS and space-based capabilities (see figure 8-1). (See ATP 2-22.6 for a detailed explanation of those layers of the Earth’s atmosphere.) Figure 8-1. Layers of the Earth’s atmosphere 8-4 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Additional Considerations for Operational Environments Space Weather 8-27. Space weather is the conditions and phenomena in space and specifically in the near-Earth environment that may affect space assets or space operations (JP 3-59). Space weather is the variation in the space environment driven primarily by changes in the solar emissions of the Sun. As the understanding of space weather has increased, military considerations for space weather conditions and the implications on operations have increased as well. Intelligence officers must understand the possible or probable effects of space weather in a given timeframe to identify when mitigation strategies are needed. This becomes more evident when understanding the interdependence of domains and how space-based capabilities support operations across multiple domains. Although space support elements may not reside at all echelons, it is important to consider relevant information they must provide during IPOE. 8-28. Space weather information should be integrated into the planning process to enable commanders to anticipate space weather impacts to friendly and threat systems and to exploit this information to optimize current and future operations. In coordination with the G-2/S-2 and the Air Force staff weather officer, the Army space support team provides space situational awareness to the commander and staff through the daily space brief. Changes in the status of space assets that yield operational implications according to the commander’s critical information requirements are reported immediately. 8-29. +The G-2/S-2, in coordination with the Army space support team and the Air Force staff weather officer, provides tailored weather effects from the surface to space on both space assets and Army operations, and integrates this information into the IPOE process, C2, MDMP, and risk management to enable situational understanding and decision making. The G-2/S-2 provides situational awareness on the weather effects from the surface to space, include but not limited to— ⚫ Determining how weather effects could impact the supported unit, threat systems, operations, plans, and anticipated COAs. ⚫ Identifying space-based alternatives and coordinating their usage with the appropriate staff. ⚫ Monitoring the health and status of the Global Positioning System constellation, and potential effects of space weather. ⚫ Providing updates on scintillation for ultrahigh frequency and high frequency propagation. Space Weather Effects 8-30. Space weather phenomena are disturbances that can significantly degrade or effectively eliminate— for relatively short timeframes (several minutes to a few hours)—military space-based capabilities. Sources of space weather effects include but are not limited to the following space weather phenomena: ⚫ X-rays, electronic ultraviolet radiation, and radio bursts from the Sun arrive at the Earth in approximately eight minutes, normally last one to two hours, and may result in the following effects: satellite communications interference, radar interference, high frequency radio blackout, geolocation errors, and satellite orbit decay. ⚫ Energetic particle events arrive at the Earth from the Sun in 15 minutes to a period of hours, last days, and may result in the following effects: high altitude radiation hazards, spacecraft damage, satellite disorientation, launch payload failure, false sensor readings, and degraded high frequency communications (high latitudes). ⚫ Scintillation occurs daily, lasts four to six hours following sunset and may result in the following: degraded satellite communications and Global Positioning System errors (position, navigation, and timing). ⚫ Geomagnetic storms on the Sun arrive at the Earth in one to three days, last days, and may result in the following: spacecraft charging and drag, geolocation errors, space track errors, launch trajectory errors, radar interference, radio propagation anomalies, and power grid failures. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 8-5 Chapter 8 DETERMINING RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE SPACE DOMAIN 8-31. During step 1 of the IPOE process, intelligence staffs determine if there are relevant aspects of the space domain—ranging from environmental impacts on space platforms needed to provide information collection capabilities, to threat capabilities directed against friendly space systems—that must be considered for the mission. To determine relevant aspects that can affect capabilities provided through the space domain, intelligence staffs must understand the following space domain-related terms: ⚫ Orbital mechanics describes the orbit a satellite moves in space. ⚫ Propagation is the spread of radio signals through the EMS to and from the Earth to orbiting satellites. ⚫ Orbital density and debris pertain to the number of satellites and amount of space debris in the same orbital path. ⚫ Solar and geomagnetic activity pertains to atmospheric activity that has the ability to impact radio wave propagation. ⚫ EMS dependency describes radio wave frequency and amplitude as it moves within through space and the characteristics that determine radio wave propagation. 8-32. See ATP 2-22.6 for detailed information on these space domain-related terms. CYBERSPACE DOMAIN 8-33. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12). The cyberspace domain is an essential part of the information environment. It can be used by nation-states and a variety of actors unable or unwilling to commit to military confrontation. Since multiple entities (military, government, economic sectors) worldwide depend on the cyberspace domain for information exchange, this domain must be considered during IPOE. Note. The IPOE process remains unchanged in its framework when analyzing any of the domains of the OE. However, there are unique aspects that should be considered when analyzing the cyberspace domain. (For considerations unique to the cyberspace domain, see appendix D.) THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 8-34. The information environment is the aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information (JP 3-04). Although defined separately, the information environment and OE are interdependent and integral to each other. A unit’s information operations officer or designated representative supports IPOE with a specific focus on the information environment. (See FM 3-13 and ATP 3-13.1 for a detailed discussion on information operations considerations for IPOE.) 8-35. The information environment consists of three interrelated dimensions—physical, informational, and cognitive. Cyberspace, a significant component of the information environment, overlaps the physical and informational dimensions. The IPOE process must determine a threat’s capabilities to operate in each of these dimensions of the command’s battlefield: ⚫ Physical dimension comprises C2 systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. It includes but is not limited to people, computers, smart phones, and newspapers. ⚫ Informational dimension encompasses where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It includes but is not limited to C2 systems, knowledge management TTP, and physical and operational security policies. A key aspect of this dimension is determining where, how, and when friendly, neutral, and threat information and information systems will be vulnerable to exploitation and attack. 8-6 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Additional Considerations for Operational Environments ⚫ Cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. It includes but is not limited to cultural norms, perspectives, beliefs, and ideologies. 8-36. Table 8-1 provides IPOE considerations for the information environment. It assists in organizing where and how information and information capabilities reside, are employed, and disseminated. Table 8-1. IPOE considerations for the information environment Informational aspects relevant to friendly forces Those that enable friendly capabilities, including each warfighting function. Where, how, and when information can be employed to support operations. Note. This is not just outward application of capabilities; it includes knowledge management, information assurance, information security, operations security, as well as how the command leverages information to enable the staff and maneuver units to achieve the mission. Where, how, and when friendly information and information systems will be vulnerable to exploitation and attack by others. Identifying components of information infrastructure or nodes of information systems that must be destroyed, disabled, or left in place. Informational aspects relevant to neutral forces Where, how, and when information can be employed to support operations. Those that enable neutral capabilities, including each warfighting function or system. Note. Analysts should avoid putting U.S. architectures (warfighting functions) on other force’s constructs as this may create a gap in analysis. Where, how, and when neutral information and information systems will be vulnerable to exploitation and attack by others. Identifying components of information infrastructure or nodes of information systems that neutral forces will consider for destruction and disablement, or will leave in place. Informational aspects relevant to threat forces Where, how, and when information can be employed to support threat operations. Those that enable threat capabilities, including each warfighting function or system. Where, how, and when threat information and information systems will be vulnerable to exploitation and attack by others. Identifying components of information infrastructure or nodes of information systems that threat forces will consider for destruction and/or disablement, or will leave in place. Informational aspects relevant to populations Information capabilities that enable population support systems. Sources of information that inform and influence decisions. THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 8-37. The electromagnetic spectrum is the entire range of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. The EMS is a continuum of all electromagnetic waves arranged according to frequency and wavelength. The frequency range suitable for radio transmission (the radio spectrum) extends from 10 kilohertz to 300,000 megahertz, which is divided into a number of bands. Below the radio frequency spectrum, and overlapping it, is the audio frequency band, extending from 20 to 20,000 hertz. Above the radio frequency spectrum are heat and infrared, the optical (visible) spectrum (light in its various colors), ultra-violet rays, x-rays, and gamma rays. Within the radio frequency range, from 1 to 40 gigahertz (1,000 to 40,000 megahertz), between the ultrahigh frequency and extremely high frequency are additional bands, defined as follows: ⚫ L band: 1 to 2 gigahertz. ⚫ Ku band: 12 to 18 gigahertz. ⚫ S band: 2 to 4 gigahertz. ⚫ K band: 18 to 27 gigahertz. ⚫ C band: 4 to 8 gigahertz. ⚫ Ka band: 27 to 40 gigahertz. ⚫ X band: 8 to 12 gigahertz. 8-38. Maritime radar systems commonly operate in the S and X bands, while satellite navigation system signals are found in the L band. The break of the K band into lower and upper ranges is necessary because the resonant frequency of water vapor occurs in the middle region of this band, and severe absorption of radio waves occurs in this part of the spectrum. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 8-7 Chapter 8 8-39. EMS-based operations must be understood to accurately depict possible threat COAs and how these COAs may impact friendly operations. EMS effects and the systems that use the EMS are critical IPOE considerations that highlight the multi-domain nature of friendly and threat operations. Although interrelated by the EMS, each domain has different functions and objectives. 8-40. SIGINT, cyberspace operations, EW, and spectrum management operations all operate within the EMS. When performing IPOE, considering the EMS maximizes the employment of friendly SIGINT and EW assets by providing direction to the collection management effort, electronic node analysis, and decision making, as well as a thorough understanding of the threat’s communications and SIGINT and EW asset noncommunications, electronic surveillance, and electronic countermeasure capabilities. 8-41. SIGINT is the interception and collection of signals in the EMS. Electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). SIGINT and EW information is integrated into the threat, situation, and event templates developed during the IPOE process and the DST developed during the MDMP. These templates graphically portray threat dispositions, vulnerabilities, and capabilities, including capabilities to employ electronic systems throughout the AO for electronic countermeasures, C2, target acquisition, maneuver, and CAS and airspace management. (+See ATP 2-22.6 and ATP 3-12.3 for more in SIGINT and EW, respectively.) 8-42. EMS considerations are integrated into DSTs during the MDMP to assist commanders and staffs in the decision-making process by depicting critical points on the battlefield and identifying HPTs, which, when exploited, provide friendly forces with an advantage. The intelligence staff integrates electronic data into the IPOE process to verify threat unit identification, locations, and types and sizes. 8-43. The intelligence staff conducts the initial electronic data assessment, to include developing the intelligence portion of the DST. The EW officer integrates SIGINT and EW information into the DST with enough detail to satisfy targeting priorities and determine the effectiveness of threat EW systems. The DST, together with the MCOO, is forwarded to subordinate elements, where they are further refined to meet functional mission requirements. 8-8 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024