FM 5-0 - Military Decision-Making Process PDF

Chapter 5 The Military Decision-Making Process This chapter defines and describes the military decision-making process (MDMP). It provides an overview of the process followed by a detailed explanation for conducting each step of the MDMP. The chapter concludes with techniques for modifying the MDMP in a time-constrained environment. OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 5-1. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). Commanders with an assigned staff use the MDMP to organize and conduct their planning activities. The process helps leaders apply critical and creative thinking to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce an operations plan (OPLAN) or operations order (OPORD). The MDMP is applicable across the range of military operations from military engagement, large scale combat operations, and security cooperation activities to crisis response. The seven steps of the MDMP are— z Step 1 - Receipt of mission. z Step 2 - Mission analysis. z Step 3 - COA development. z Step 4 - COA analysis. z Step 5 - COA comparison. z Step 6 - COA approval. z Step 7 - Orders production, dissemination, and transition. Note. Joint force headquarters use the joint planning process described in JP 5-0. Marine Corps headquarters use the Marine Corps planning process described in MCWP 5-10. NATO allied headquarters uses the operational planning process described in AJP 5 or the tactical planning process described in Allied Procedural Publication (APP)-28. Army commanders and staffs should be familiar with these planning processes because they frequently interact with joint, Marine Corps, and Allied forces in the development of plans and orders. 5-2. Depending on the situation and the complexity of the planning effort, commanders can initiate Army design methodology (ADM) before conducting the MDMP. Army design methodology assists commanders and staffs in understanding an operational environment (OE), framing the problem, and developing an operational approach to solve or manage the problem. The understanding and products resulting from ADM can then guide more detailed planning during the MDMP. (See Chapter 3 and ATP 5-0.1 for more information on ADM.) 5-3. The MDMP facilitates collaborative planning as the higher echelon headquarters solicits input and continuously shares information concerning future operations with subordinate, adjacent, supporting and supported units, and with unified action partners through planning meetings, warning orders (WARNORDs), and other means. Commanders encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected by a pending operation to build a shared understanding of the situation, participate in COA development and decision making, and resolve conflicts before publication of a plan or order. 0D\ FM 5-0 5-1 Chapter 5 5-4. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs conduct a time analysis early in the planning process. This analysis helps them determine what actions are required and when those actions must begin to ensure forces are ready and in position before execution. This may require commanders to direct subordinates to start necessary movements, conduct task organization changes, begin information collection, and execute other preparation activities before completing the plan. These tasks are directed in a series of WARNORDs as the commander and staff conduct the MDMP. MODIFYING THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 5-5. The MDMP should be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and the situation permit. Performing all the steps of the MDMP is detailed, deliberate, and time-consuming. Commanders use the full MDMP when they have enough planning time and staff support to thoroughly examine multiple COAs and develop a synchronized plan or order. This typically occurs when planning for a new mission. Commanders may abbreviate the steps of the MDMP to fit time-constrained circumstances and produce a satisfactory plan. When ADM was previously conducted, the products developed serve as a baseline and help mitigate the risk of not conducting the full MDMP while reducing the time necessary to develop an understanding of the situation and mission. In time-constrained conditions, it is critical for commanders to quickly assess the situation, update their visualization, and direct their staffs to perform the MDMP activities that support rapid development of a plan. 5-6. The full MDMP provides the foundation on which planning in a time constrained environment is based. Before a staff can effectively abbreviate the MDMP, it should first master the steps of the full MDMP. The advantages of using the full MDMP are— z It enables a better understanding of the situation and problem to solve. z It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs to identify the best possible friendly COA. z It produces the greatest integration, coordination, and synchronization of forces in plans and orders. z It minimizes overall risk and the chance of overlooking critical aspects of an operation. z It best identifies contingencies for branch and sequel development. z It results in a more thorough OPLAN or OPORD. 5-7. The primary disadvantage of using the full MDMP is it can be resource intensive for both time and effort. The longer the higher headquarters spends planning, the less time it generally leaves for subordinates to plan and prepare for operations. Additionally, the more time that is devoted to planning versus preparation can allow enemies to improve their posture. This may lead to yielding the initiative, resulting in a loss of momentum or lost opportunities for the friendly force. COMMANDER, STAFF, AND SUBORDINATE HEADQUARTERS INTERACTION 5-8. The MDMP is designed to develop shared understanding through interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters. This iterative interaction allows for a concurrent, coordinated effort that fosters flexibility, efficiently uses available time, and facilitates continuous information sharing. Internally, this interaction allows the staff to receive guidance from the commander and resolve issues as they arise. Additionally, it provides a structure and framework for the staff to work collectively and produce a coordinated plan. Externally, the MDMP facilitates information sharing among headquarters. As decisions, information, and staff products become available, the higher headquarters sends them to subordinates in WARNORDs. WARNORDs facilitate parallel planning by providing critical information to allow subordinates to start necessary planning and preparation activities. Role of the Commander 5-9. The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply decision makers in this process, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide staff planning efforts. While unable to devote all their time to the MDMP, commanders follow the status of the planning effort, participate during critical periods of the process, provide guidance, and make decisions based on the 5-2 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process detailed work of their staff. During the MDMP, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing their commander’s visualization as discussed in Chapter 1. 5-10. Figure 5-1 lists several interactions between the commander and staff to discuss, assess, and approve or disapprove planning products or efforts. The left side of the figure shows key commander actions. However, experience has shown that optimal planning results when the commander meets informally at frequent intervals in addition to identified briefings with the staff throughout the MDMP. Such informal interactions between the commander and staff can improve the staff’s understanding of the situation and ensure the staff’s planning efforts adequately reflect the commander’s visualization of the operation. Informal interactions can also provide answers to concerns prior to briefings, ensuring the best use of available time. Figure 5-1. Commander and staff interaction Role of the Staff 5-11. The staff’s effort during the MDMP focuses on assisting the commander in understanding the situation, making decisions, and synchronizing those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. The chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) coordinates the staff’s work and performs quality control during the MDMP. To effectively supervise the entire process, this officer must clearly understand the commander’s intent and planning guidance. The COS or XO generally approves planning timelines, establishes briefing times and locations, and provides instructions necessary to complete the plan. A lead planner, normally from the assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5), or assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) or battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3) assists the COS or XO, and is responsible for detailed coordination and synchronizing the staff’s work throughout the MDMP. (See paragraphs 1-65 through 1-73 for a discussion of planning cells and teams.) 5-12. Throughout the planning process, staff officers prepare recommendations informed by updated running estimates with accurate information and assessments within their functional areas of expertise. Staffs must seek clarification and guidance as necessary to ensure planning time is not wasted. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis which is informed by updated and accurate 0D\ FM 5-0 5-3 Chapter 5 running estimates brought to planning. (See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of running estimates.) The products that staffs develop during mission analysis often help commanders better understand the situation and develop or refine their visualization. During COA development staffs create options for commanders to review based on the planning guidance provided to them. During COA comparison staffs conduct detailed analysis and provide recommendations to commanders in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order to direct subordinate action that reflects the commander’s intent, coordinating all necessary details. Key staff activities during the MDMP are listed on the right side of figure 5-1 on page 5-3. STEPS OF THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 5-13. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step of the MDMP has a purpose, inputs, substeps, and outputs. The outputs of each step lead to an increased understanding of the situation and facilitate the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however, they may revisit steps. Commanders and staffs consider and apply the fundamentals of planning (discussed in Chapter 1) and operational art (discussed in Chapter 2) as they conduct the MDMP. (See ATP 5-0.2-1 for further information on detailed planning factors, offensive considerations, and defensive considerations.) STEP 1-RECEIPT OF MISSION 5-14. The MDMP begins upon receipt of a mission from higher echelon headquarters or in anticipation of a new mission. Commanders often initiate a planning effort based on their visualization and changes to the situation without a formal directive from their higher headquarters. Even with a higher headquarters’ directive, commanders and staffs often begin the MDMP in the absence of a complete higher echelon OPLAN or OPORD. In these instances, they start planning based on a WARNORD, a planning order, or an alert order from higher headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or order is developed. 5-15. The purpose of this step is to establish conditions for successful planning. This step focuses on alerting the staff, forming the planning team, assessing available time for planning, and deciding on a planning approach. Figure 5-2 lists the key inputs, substeps, and key outputs for receipt of mission. +Figure 5-2. Receipt of mission 5-4 FM 5-0, C1 04 November 2022 The Military Decision-Making Process Note. While step 1 (receipt of mission) and step 2 (mission analysis) are listed as two distinct steps of the MDMP, staff members need not wait until all activities of receipt of mission are complete before starting activities associated with mission analysis. Initiating intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), for example, should begin as early as possible. Alert the Staff and Other Key Participants 5-16. When the unit receives a new mission or a planning requirement is identified, the staff is alerted and begins necessary preparation. There are times when the staff will need to alert the commander to an order. When the commander is alerted, staffs often conduct a backbrief to the commander to share understanding and enable the commander to more quickly develop a visualization. Unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) should establish notification procedures and identify standard planning teams (from large to small) based on the anticipated planning effort. A planning team normally consists of a lead planner from the G-5, G-3, or S-3 sections; administrative support; and representatives from each warfighting function. Additional staff members by area of expertise, liaison officers, and unified action partners are added to the team as required. When trying to plan collaboratively, those organizations or subordinate units must be notified to ensure the right personnel are identified to support the planning effort. Typically, for new missions or large planning efforts, the planning team may consist of representatives from all staff sections and unit liaison officers. For development of a branch plan, the planning team may consist of the core planners from the future operations cell. (See Chapter 1 for a discussion of planning teams.) Gather the Tools 5-17. Once notified of the new planning requirement, the staff prepares for mission analysis by gathering the needed tools for planning. These tools include, but are not limited to— z Documents related to the mission and area of operations (AO), including the higher headquarters’ plans and orders, maps and terrain products, and operational graphics. z Higher headquarters’ and other organizations’ intelligence and assessment products. z Estimates and products of other military and civilian agencies and organizations. z The unit’s and higher headquarters’ SOPs which at a minimum includes the planning SOP. z Current running estimates. z Army design methodology products, including products describing the OE, problem, and operational approach (if applicable). z Appropriate doctrinal publications. 5-18. Planners carefully review the reference section (located before paragraph 1. Situation) of the higher headquarters’ OPLANs and OPORDs to identify documents (such as theater policies and memoranda) related to the upcoming operation. If the pending operation includes relieving or replacing another unit, the staff begins collecting relevant documents—such as the current OPORD, branch plans, current assessments, operations and intelligence summaries, and SOPs—from that unit. Update Running Estimates 5-19. Upon receipt of mission, each staff section verifies and updates its running estimate—especially the status of friendly units and resources that affect each functional area. Running estimates not only compile critical facts and necessary assumptions from the perspective of each staff section, but they also include related information from other military and civilian organizations. All staff sections should also pay particular attention during planning to those aspects of information-related activities or capabilities that impact their functional areas. The information and assessments on running estimates constantly change, and staffs must ensure they remain updated and relevant. Running estimates often form the basis for commanders to make timely and informed decisions throughout the operations process, and they are critical for development of a plan or an order. Running estimates contribute to a unit’s common operational picture, a display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADP 6-0). 0D\ FM 5-0 5-5 Chapter 5 The running estimates that contribute to the common operational picture facilitate collaborative planning and shared understanding (See ADP 6-0 and ATP 5-0.2-1 for more information on the common operational picture.) While listed at the beginning of the MDMP, updating running estimates continues throughout the MDMP and the operations process. (See Appendix C for more information on running estimates.) Conduct Initial Assessment 5-20. The commander and staff conduct an initial assessment of time and resources available to plan, prepare, and begin execution of an operation. Typically the assessment is done with a small group from the planning team. Ideally the initial assessment is done collaboratively with the commander and staff, but there are times when the staff conducts the initial assessment and then later informally briefs the commander. This initial assessment helps commanders determine— z Time available from mission receipt to mission execution. z The time needed to plan and prepare for the mission for both headquarters and subordinate units. z The staff’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress z Guidance on a planning approach to include conducting ADM, abbreviating the MDMP, or using the rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP). z Planning team composition. z Time required to position critical elements, including command and control nodes for upcoming operations. z Which outside agencies and organizations to contact and incorporate into the planning process. z Other preparations the commander, staff, or subordinate units need to conduct before beginning planning. 5-21. The initial assessment also helps determine when to begin certain actions to ensure forces are ready and in position before execution. This may require the commander to direct subordinates to start necessary movements, conduct task organization changes, begin information collection, and execute other preparation activities before completing the plan. 5-22. The commander and staff balance a desire for detailed planning against a need for more immediate action. The commander provides guidance to subordinate units as early as possible to allow subordinates the maximum time for their own planning and preparation of operations. As a rule, commanders allocate a minimum of two-thirds of available time for subordinate units to conduct their planning and preparation. This leaves one-third of the time for commanders and their staffs to do their planning and publish an order. They use the other two-thirds for their own preparation. Time, more than any other factor, determines the detail to which the commander and staff can plan. 5-23. Commanders and staffs consider their higher echelon headquarters’ timeline, their operational timeline, their planning timeline, anticipated enemy timelines, light and weather, and other essential factors. Based on the commander’s initial allocation of time, the COS or XO approves a staff planning timeline that outlines how long the headquarters can spend on each step of the MDMP. The staff planning timeline indicates what products are due, who is responsible for them, and who receives them. It includes times and locations for meetings and briefings. It serves as a benchmark for the commander and staff throughout the MDMP. Note. This is just an initial timeline to start planning. The commander and staff continue to adjust it as they gain a better understanding of time available during the following steps of the MDMP. 5-24. Table 5-1 provides an example planning timeline for a division. It shows how much time can be devoted to each step of the MDMP, based on the time between receipt of mission and execution. This example timeline is based on one-third, two-thirds general rule and uses as an example the following percentages to determine how much time is allocated to each step: z Receipt of mission - 5%. z Mission analysis - 30%. 5-6 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process z COA development - 20%. z COA analysis/comparison/decision - 25%. z Orders production, dissemination, and transition - 20%. 5-25. Since subsequent planning relies on a detailed understanding of the situation and problem, a significant amount of time is allocated for mission analysis. Additionally, significant time should also be allocated to COA analysis as this step aids the commander and staff in thinking through the synchronization, coordination, difficulties, and opportunities of a tentative plan. These are only recommended times, and they will vary based on a variety of factors such as experience of the planning staff, products already available, or commander involvement. 5-26. The “R” in table 5-1 represents the receipt of mission time. All R+ times represent the time that the action should be completed. For example, given 48 hours to plan and prepare for a mission, mission analysis should be completed by 4 hours, 48 minutes after the mission is received. Unit planning SOPs should contain generic planning timelines to assist decision makers to quickly develop the staff planning timeline. Example timelines serve as a guide are adjusted based on mission variables of METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations. Table 5-1. Example military decision-making process time allocation. Time Available Before Execution 8 hours 24 Hours 48 hours 72 hours 96 hours Time Time Time Time Time R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ For For For For For Mission 0:45 0:45 2:24 2:24 4:48 4:48 7:12 7:12 9:36 9:36 Analysis COA 0:30 1:15 1:36 4:00 3:12 8:00 4:48 12:00 6:24 16:00 Development COA Analysis and 0:45 2:00 2:24 6:24 4:48 12:48 7:12 19:12 9:36 25:36 Comparison Decision Orders 0:30 2:30 1:36 8:00 3:12 16:00 4:48 24:00 6:24 32:00 Production Total Time 2:30 8:00 16:00 24:00 32:00 Used COA course of action R receipt of mission time Issue Commander’s Initial Guidance 5-27. After doing the initial substeps of receipt of mission, commanders issue their initial planning guidance. Although brief, the initial guidance includes— z Initial time allocations. z Guidance on the planning approach (initiate ADM, conduct the full MDMP, abbreviate the MDMP, or conduct RDSP). z Necessary coordination to perform, including liaison officers to exchange. z Authorized movements to initiate. z Information collection guidance, including reconnaissance and surveillance instructions. z Initial information requirements. z Additional staff tasks. 0D\ FM 5-0 5-7 Chapter 5 Issue the Initial Warning Order 5-28. The last task in receipt of mission is to issue a WARNORD to subordinate and supporting units. This order includes as much relevant information as the staff knows, and at a minimum it includes the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial timeline, and any movement or information collection to initiate. (See Appendix D for the WARNORD format.) This WARNORD generally contains— z The type of operation. z The general location of the operation. z The initial operational timeline. z Any movements necessary to initiate. z Any collaborative planning sessions directed by the commander. z Initial information requirements or commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). z Initial information collection tasks. STEP 2-MISSION ANALYSIS 5-29. The MDMP continues with an assessment of the situation called mission analysis. The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly why—he purpose of the operation. Based on this understanding, commanders issue their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance to guide the staff in COA development. Figure 5-3 lists the key inputs, activities, and key outputs for this step. 5-8 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process +Figure 5-3. Mission analysis 04 November 2022 FM 5-0, C1 5-9 Chapter 5 Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Plan or Order 5-30. Commanders and staffs thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or order. They determine how their unit—by task and purpose—contributes to the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the higher headquarters. The commander and staff seek to completely understand— z The commander’s intent and mission of the higher headquarters’ two echelons above the unit. z The higher headquarters’— Commander’s intent. Mission. Concept of operations. Available assets. Timeline. z Their assigned AO. z The missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units and their relationships to the higher headquarters’ plan. z The missions or goals of unified action partners that work in the operational areas. 5-31. When developing the concept of operations, commanders ensure their concept is nested in that of their higher headquarters. They also ensure subordinate unit missions are unified by task and purpose to accomplish the mission. A way for the commander and staff to understand their unit’s contribution to the higher headquarters’ concept is to develop a nesting diagram. The nesting diagram assists the staff in reviewing the horizontal and vertical relationships of units within the higher echelon commander’s concept. A nesting diagram provides a snapshot of the relationship of shaping operations to the decisive operation. The staff may choose to use this technique as a possible way to help analyze the higher headquarters’ order and understand its mission, the commander’s intent, and concept of operations. (See figure 5-4 for an example of a nesting diagram.) Figure 5-4. Example nesting diagram 5-10 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 5-32. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and informational considerations in each of the other factors, in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). The IPB process provides numerous outputs used throughout the MDMP and consists of four steps— z Define the OE. z Describe environmental effects on operations. z Evaluate the threat. z Determine threat COAs. 5-33. In addition to developing understanding, IPB identifies critical gaps in the commander’s knowledge of an OE. As a part of the initial planning guidance, commanders use these gaps as a guide to establish their initial CCIRs and intelligence requirements. IPB products enable the commander to assess facts about the OE and make assumptions about how friendly and threat forces will interact in the OE. The description of the OE’s effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs. It also identifies key aspects of the OE, such as avenues of approach, engagement areas, and landing zones, which the staff integrates into potential friendly COAs and their running estimates. For mission analysis, the intelligence staff, along with the other staff elements, will use IPB to develop detailed threat COA models, which depict COAs available to the threat. The threat COA models provide a basis for formulating friendly COAs and completing the intelligence estimate. 5-34. The intelligence staff, in collaboration with other staffs, develops other IPB products during mission analysis and uses them throughout the MDMP. That collaboration should result in the drafting of initial priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), the production of a complete modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), a list of high value targets, and unrefined event templates and matrices. IPB should also provide an understanding of the threat’s center of gravity. Oftentimes a discussion and better understanding of the center of gravity, relationships, and critical vulnerabilities can then be exploited by friendly forces. When preceded by ADM, the center of gravity analysis should be reviewed and used as a starting point for discussion and incorporation into IPB. (See ATP 2-01.3 for details on conducting IPB.) 5-35. During defining the OE step of the IPB process, the intelligence staff identifies for further analysis the significant characteristics or activities within the OE that may influence friendly and threat COAs and command decisions. An OE for any specific operation has numerous interacting variables. It involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (such as politics and economics) that affect OE conditions and operations. Thus, each commander’s OE is part of a higher echelon commander’s OE. Defining the OE results in the identification of significant characteristics of the OE that can affect friendly and threat operations, and it identifies gaps in intelligence holdings to determine additional information needed to complete IPB, initiating processes necessary to acquire the information necessary to complete IPB. The outputs of this step include recommended changes to the area of interest, identification of information gaps, assumptions for information gaps, staff requests for information, and information collection. 5-36. During the describing environmental effects on operations step of the IPB process, the staff determines how significant characteristics of the OE can affect friendly and threat operations. Characteristics of the OE include terrain, weather, and civil considerations. The outputs of this step include threat overlay, threat description chart, MCOO, terrain effects matrix, operational climatology chart, light and illumination data table, weather effects matrix, civil considerations data file, civil considerations overlays and assessments, and initial objectives for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and security operations. 5-37. During the evaluate the threat step of the IPB, the staff determines threat force capabilities and the doctrinal principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures threat forces prefer to employ. This may include threats that create multiple dilemmas for friendly maneuver forces by simultaneously employing regular, irregular, and terrorist forces and criminal elements using a variety of traditional and nontraditional tactics. The outputs of this step include threat data files, the threat template, the high-value target list, and the threat capability statement. 0D\ FM 5-0 5-11 Chapter 5 5-38. During the determine the threat COA step of the IPB process the staff identifies and describes threat COAs that can influence friendly operations. The outputs of this step include a situation template, threat COA statement, event template, and event matrix. (See Appendix G for further discussion on integrating IPB within the MDMP.) Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks 5-39. The staff members analyze their higher echelon headquarters’ order and their higher commander’s guidance to determine their specified and implied tasks. In the context of operations, a task is a clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority (JP 1). The “what” of a mission statement is always a task. From the list of specified and implied tasks, the staff determines which ones are essential tasks for inclusion in the recommended mission statement. 5-40. A specified task is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the higher headquarters’ OPLAN or OPORD state specified tasks. Some tasks may be in paragraphs 4 and 5, with additional specified tasks listed in annexes and overlays. They may also be assigned verbally during collaborative planning sessions or in directives from the higher echelon commander. 5-41. An implied task is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is not stated in the higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters’ order, the enemy situation, the terrain, and civil considerations. Additionally, analysis of doctrinal requirements for each specified task might disclose implied tasks. 5-42. When analyzing the higher echelon order for specified and implied tasks, the staff also identifies any on-order or be prepared missions. An on-order mission is a mission to be executed at an unspecified time. A unit with an on-order mission is a committed force. Commanders envision task execution in the concept of operations; however, they may not know the exact time or place of execution. Subordinate commanders develop plans and orders and allocate resources, task-organize, and position forces for execution. A be-prepared mission is a mission assigned to a unit that might be executed. Generally a contingency mission, commanders execute it because something planned has or has not been successful. In planning priorities, commanders plan a be-prepared mission after any on-order mission. 5-43. Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure understanding of each task’s requirements and purpose. The staff then identifies essential tasks. An essential task is a specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s mission statement and reviewed after COA development, as they help define mission success. Review Available Assets and Identify Resource Shortfalls 5-44. The commander and staff analyze the current task organization, command and support relationships, and status (including current capabilities and limitations) of all units, specifically identifying changes. This analysis also includes capabilities of civilian and military organizations (including joint, special operations, and multinational) that operate within their unit’s AO or are otherwise designated to support. During planning it is challenging, and at times prohibited, to discuss classified capabilities, activities, or programs in unclassified venues. Discussing the technical effects as describing one or more capabilities, activities, or programs planned, coordinated, or executed that use classified means to accomplish an objective or operation assists planners with this challenge. They consider relationships among specified, implied, and essential tasks and available assets. From this analysis, staffs conduct an initial assessment to determine if they have the resources needed to complete all tasks. If obvious shortages are identified, they request from higher headquarters additional resources believed necessary for mission success. Staffs also identify any deviations from the normal task organization and provide them to the commander to understand and consider when developing the planning guidance. A more detailed analysis of available assets occurs during COA development. 5-12 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process Determine Constraints 5-45. The commander and staff identify any constraints placed on their command. A constraint is a restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander. Constraints are found in paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or OPORD. Annexes to the order may also include constraints. The operation overlay, for example, may contain a restrictive fire line or a no-fire area. Constraints may also be issued verbally, in WARNORDs, or in policy memoranda. 5-46. Constraints could also be based on resource limitations in the command, information release restrictions, or legal constraints. Resource limitations may include the number of capabilities provided or the availability of collection capabilities to support an operation. The staff judge advocate provides review of legal constraints. The constraints may include rules of engagement or authorities in the OPLAN, OPORD, or related documents. Identify Facts and Develop Assumptions 5-47. Plans and orders are based on facts and assumptions. Commanders and staffs gather facts and develop assumptions as they build their plan. A fact is a statement of truth or a statement thought to be true at the time. Facts concerning the operational and mission variables serve as the basis for developing situational understanding, for continued planning, and when assessing progress during preparation and execution. 5-48. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge that are critical for the planning process to continue and allow commanders to make the best COA decision. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity and challenged if they appear unrealistic. Staffs continually review and collect information on assumptions to turn into facts as quickly as possible. Subordinate commanders must not develop assumptions that contradict valid higher echelon headquarters assumptions during planning. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include— z List and understand all assumptions received from higher headquarters. z State expected conditions over which the commander has no control but are relevant to the plan. z Assumptions must be logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true. z Assumptions are necessary for continued planning. z Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be invalid. z Using assumptions initiates development of branches to plans and orders. z Often, an unstated assumption or an assumption mislabeled as a fact may prove more dangerous than a stated assumption proven wrong. 5-49. Having assumptions requires commanders and staffs to continually attempt to replace those assumptions with facts. Assumptions are not stagnant, and all efforts should be made as early as identified and possible to confirm or deny the validity of assumptions. This includes linking to the information collection plan and conducting reconnaissance as needed and when possible until replaced by a fact. The commander and staff should list and review the key assumptions on which fundamental judgments rest throughout the MDMP. Rechecking assumptions is valuable at any time during the operations process prior to rendering judgments and making decisions. Begin Risk Assessment and Management 5-50. Risk is the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss, and it is inherent in all operations. Because risk is part of all military operations, it cannot be avoided. Identifying, mitigating, and accepting risk is a function of command, supported by the staff, and it is a key consideration during planning. (See paragraphs 2-74 through 2-76 for a discussion of risk as an element of operational art.) 5-51. Planners conducting a preliminary risk assessment must identify the obstacles or actions that may preclude mission accomplishment and then assess the impact of these impediments to the upcoming mission. Determining military risk is more an art than an exact science. Planners use historical data, 0D\ FM 5-0 5-13 Chapter 5 intuitive analysis, and judgment to determine risk. Based on judgment, military risk assessment is an integration of probability and consequence of an identified impediment. 5-52. Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from the presence of an adversary or a hazardous condition. The probability is generally categorized as— z Very likely—occurs often, continuously experienced. z Likely—occurs several times. z Questionable—unlikely, but could occur at some time. z Unlikely—can assume it will not occur. A method to assess risk is based on probabilities, military risk (consequence) may be— z High—critical objectives cannot be achieved. z Significant—only the most critical objectives can be achieved. z Moderate—can partially achieve all objectives. z Low—can fully achieve all objectives. 5-53. Planners and commanders must be able to explain risk to both military commanders and civilian leaders as necessary. Since military risk is often a matter of perspective and personal experience, commanders must be able to describe how they evaluated the probability of accomplishing objectives and the characterization and sources of risk. 5-54. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). During mission analysis, the commander and staff focus on identifying and assessing hazards to the mission. They developing specific control measures to mitigate those hazards during COA development. The risk management process, typically done by the operations officer, planner, or safety officer consists of the following steps: z Identify hazards. z Assess hazards. z Develop controls and make risk decisions. z Implement controls. z Supervise and evaluate. (See FM 6-0 for staff organization and responsibilities.) 5-55. Units conduct the first four steps of risk management in the MDMP. Steps 1 and 2 make up risk assessment. In step 1, the commander and staff identify the hazards that may be encountered during a mission. In step 2, they determine the direct impact of each hazard on the operation. The commander issues planning guidance at the end of mission analysis with risk mitigation measures for the staff to incorporate into its COA development. Risk assessment enhances situational understanding and contributes to complete planning guidance. (See Appendix G for further discussion of conducting risk management within the MDMP.) Develop Initial CCIRs and EEFIs 5-56. Mission analysis, including IPB, identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decision making during preparation and execution. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements. Some information requirements are of such importance that staffs recommend them to the commander to become a commander’s CCIR. (See Appendix G for further discussion on the IPB process.) 5-57. A CCIR is an information requirement the commander identifies as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. CCIRs are situation-dependent and specified by the commander for each operation. Commanders continuously review CCIRs and adjust them as the situation changes. The initial CCIRs developed during mission analysis focus on information gaps a commander needs to understand to assist in planning. Once a COA is selected, CCIRs generally shift to information the commander needs to make decisions during preparation and execution. Typically, commanders seek to minimize the number of CCIRs to assist in prioritizing the allocation of limited resources. The two elements are PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). A CCIR directly influences decision-making and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. A CCIR is— 5-14 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process z Specified by a commander for a specific operation. z Applicable only to the commander who specifies it. z Situation dependent and directly linked to a current or future mission. z Time sensitive. 5-58. A PIR is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, which the commander and staff need to understand about the threat or the OE. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the staff, manages PIRs for the commander. PIRs serve as the framework for the information collection plans. 5-59. An FFIR is information the commander and staff need to understand on the status of friendly forces and supporting capabilities. FFIRs identify the information about the mission, troops, support, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages FFIRs for the commander. 5-60. In addition to recommending CCIRs to the commander, the staff also identifies and recommends essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs). An EEFI establishes an element of information to protect rather than one to collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize mission success. Commanders and planners consider those operations security measures necessary to protect this information. The operations security (OPSEC) process is used to develop measures to protect EEFI from compromise. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority as CCIRs and require approval by the commander. Like CCIRs, EEFIs change as an operation progresses. 5-61. Depending on the situation, the commander and select staff members may meet prior to the mission analysis brief to review and approve the initial CCIRs and EEFIs. This is especially important if the commander intends to conduct information collection early in the planning process. The approval of the initial CCIRs early during planning assists the staff in developing the initial information collection plan. The approval also supports early collection of assumptions which are often CCIRs, as they are critical to the development of the plan. Approval of an EEFI allows the staff to begin planning and implementing measures to protect friendly force information, such as military deceptions and OPSEC measures. Develop the Initial Information Collection Plan 5-62. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). An initial information collection plan relies on gaps identified during IPB to identify information collection requirements. The initial information gaps are generally identified from the entire staff analysis and input during IPB. 5-63. The initial information collection plan is crucial to help answer information requirements necessary in developing effective plans and orders to execute operations. The intelligence staff evaluates significant characteristics to identify gaps and initiate information collection efforts. The initial information collection plan sets reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations in motion. The initial information collected and analyzed is then incorporated into COA development to further refine and develop the plan. The initial information collection plan issued by the operations staff tasks units and may be issued as part of a WARNORD, a fragmentary order (FRAGORD), or an OPORD. As more information is analyzed, it is incorporated into a fully developed and complete information collection plan (Annex L) to the order or plan. 5-64. The intelligence staff creates the requirements management tools for the information collection plan. During this step, the operations and intelligence staff work closely to ensure they fully synchronize and integrate information collection activities into the overall plan. 5-65. The operations and intelligence staff consider several factors when developing the initial information collection plan. These include— z Requirements for collection assets in subsequent missions. z The time available to develop and refine the initial plan. 0D\ FM 5-0 5-15 Chapter 5 zThe risk the commander is willing to accept if information collection missions are initiated before the information collection plan is fully integrated into the scheme of maneuver. z Insertion and extraction methods for reconnaissance, security, surveillance, and intelligence collection assets. z Contingencies for inclement weather to ensure coverage of key named areas of interest or target areas of interest. z The communication plan for transmission of reports to command posts. z The inclusion of collection asset locations and movements into the fire support plan. z The reconnaissance handover with higher or subordinate echelons. z The sustainment support. z Legal support requirements. FM 3-55 and ATP 2-01 contain additional information on information collection, planning requirements, and assessing collection. (See Appendix G for further discussion on information collection throughout the MDMP.) Update Planning Timeline 5-66. As more information becomes available, the commander and staff refine their initial plan for the use of available time. They compare the time needed to accomplish tasks to the higher headquarters’ timeline to ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time. They compare the timeline to the assumed enemy timeline with how they anticipate conditions will unfold. From this, they determine windows of opportunity for exploitation, times when the unit will be at increased risk for enemy activity, or when action to reduce deterioration in the local civilian population may be required. 5-67. The commander and COS, XO, or planning lead also refine the staff planning timeline. The refined timeline reflects an understanding of time available and the battle rhythm of the commander to ensure briefings and updates are best planned. The updated planning timeline should also consider and nest whenever possible with external processes, such as the air tasking order, that are likely to impact the plan. At division echelons and higher, ensuring the plan has the details and decisions to support target nominations is an important consideration in developing the refined timeline. The refined timeline includes the— z Subject, time, and location of briefings the commander requires. z Times of collaborative planning sessions and the medium over which they will occur. z Times, locations, and forms of rehearsals. Develop a Proposed Problem Statement 5-68. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal, assigned mission, or task. The problem statement is the description of the primary issue or issues that may impede commanders from achieving their desired end states. Note. The commander, staff, and other partners may develop a problem statement as part of ADM. If identified, the problem statement is reviewed during mission analysis and revised as necessary based on the increased understanding of the situation. If ADM activities did not precede mission analysis, then the commander and staff should develop and approve a problem statement prior to moving to Step 3—COA Development. 5-69. How the problem is formulated leads to particular solutions. It is important that commanders dedicate the time to identify the right problem to solve and describe it clearly in a problem statement. Ideally, the commander and staff meet to share their analysis of the situation. They talk with each other, synthesize the results of the current mission analysis, and determine the problem. If the commander is not available, the planning staff members discuss the problem among themselves. As part of the discussion to help identify and understand the problem, the staff— 5-16 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process z Compares the current situation to the desired end state. z Brainstorms and lists issues that impede the commander from achieving the desired end state. z Analyzes and provides proposed or revised problem statement. 5-70. A problem statement, while required during problem framing in ADM, is typically developed during the MDMP. However, when the situation, tasks, and mission from higher headquarters are clearly defined, it may be unnecessary to develop a problem statement as it is already framed. How much time is spent defining the problem is generally proportional to the necessity of developing further understanding of an OE as it relates to the mission and perceived complexity. Develop a Proposed Mission Statement 5-71. The COS, XO, operations officer, or planning lead prepares a proposed mission statement for the unit based on the mission analysis. The unit mission statement, along with the commander’s intent, provide the primary focus for subordinate actions during planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. The commander receives and approves, modifies, or rejects the unit’s proposed mission statement. Generally the mission statement is approved during the mission analysis brief or shortly after the brief prior to moving forward in the process. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why (JP 5-0). The five elements of a mission statement answer these questions: z Who will execute the operation (unit or organization)? z What is the unit’s essential task (tactical mission task)? z When will the operation begin (by time or event) or what is the duration of the operation? z Where will the operation occur (AO, objective, or grid coordinates)? z Why will the force conduct the operations (for what purpose)? Example 1. Not later than 220400 August 19 (when), 1st Brigade (who) secures ROUTE SOUTH DAKOTA (what or task) in AO JACKRABBIT (where) to enable the movement of humanitarian assistance materials (why or purpose). Example 2. 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what or task) AREA NOTIONAL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO SPARTAN (why or purpose). 5-72. The mission statement may have more than one essential task. The following example shows a mission statement for a phased operation with a different essential task for each phase. Example. 1-509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what or task) AREA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO SPARTAN (why or purpose). On order (when), secures (what or task) OBJECTIVE GOLD (where) to prevent the 2nd Guards Brigade from crossing the BLUE RIVER and disrupting operations in AO SPARTAN (why or purpose). 5-73. The who, where, and when of a mission statement are straightforward. The what and why are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The what is a task, and it is expressed in terms of action verbs. The why puts the task into context by describing the reason it is performed. The why provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task and how it is intended to contribute to the higher echelon headquarters’ success or the decisive operation. It is integral to mission command and mission orders. With discussion and coordination from higher headquarters, subordinate commands may adjust the task, but not the purpose. 5-74. Commanders should use tactical mission tasks, or other doctrinally approved tasks contained in combined arms field manuals or training plans, in mission statements. These tasks have specific military definitions that differ from standard dictionary definitions. A tactical mission task is the specific activity 0D\ FM 5-0 5-17 Chapter 5 performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed as either an action by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force (FM 3-90-1). FM 3-90-1 describes each tactical mission task. FM 3-07 provides a list of primary stability tasks which military forces must be prepared to execute. Planners should carefully choose the task that best describes the commander’s intent and planning guidance. Develop and Issue Initial Commander’s Intent 5-75. The initial commander’s intent, as defined and discussed in Chapter 1, is a short and concise statement that describes the purpose of the operation, initial key tasks, and the desired end state which in planning guides COA development (See ADP 5-0 for more details on commander’s intent.) When ADM was conducted prior to or simultaneously with the MDMP, the initial intent produced with the operational approach is a starting point for the development of initial commander’s intent. 5-76. The higher echelon commander’s intent provides the basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each commander’s intent nests within the higher echelon commander’s intent. The commander’s intent explains the broader purpose of the operation beyond that of the mission statement. This explanation allows subordinate commanders and Soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted. 5-77. Based on their situational understanding, commanders summarize their visualization in their initial commander’s intent statement. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with conditions that define the desired end state. Commanders may change their intent statement as planning progresses and more information becomes available. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by leaders two echelons lower in the chain of command. The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Present the Mission Analysis Briefing 5-78. The mission analysis briefing informs the commander and staff of the results of the planning staff’s analysis of the situation. It helps the commander further understand and visualize the operation. Throughout the mission analysis briefing, the commander, staff, and other partners discuss the various facts and assumptions about the situation. The staff members present a summary of their running estimates from their specific functional areas and discuss how their findings impact or are impacted by other areas. This helps the commander and staff as a whole to focus on the interrelationships among the mission variables and to develop a deeper understanding of the situation. The commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on situational understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing, experience, and communication with other commanders and staff members. 5-79. Ideally, the commander holds several informal meetings with key staff members before the mission analysis briefing, including meetings to assist the commander in developing CCIRs, or the mission statement as examples. These meetings enable commanders to issue guidance for activities (such as reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations) and develop their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. 5-80. A comprehensive mission analysis briefing, with discussion and feedback, helps the commander, staff, subordinates, and other partners develop a shared understanding of the requirements of the upcoming operation. To ensure a common understanding, the staff briefs the commander on the results of its mission analysis which can be modified based on preferences of the commander. The mission analysis briefing may include— z Mission and commander’s intent of the headquarters two echelons higher than the unit. z Mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of the headquarters one echelon higher than the unit. z Review of the commander’s initial guidance. z Initial IPB products that impact the conduct of operations. z Specified, implied, and essential tasks. z Pertinent facts and assumptions. 5-18 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process z Constraints. z Forces available, including known command and support relationships and resource shortfalls. z A proposed problem statement. z A proposed mission statement. z Proposed commander’s intent for approval or commander’s intent issuance. z Proposed CCIRs and EEFIs. z Initial information collection plan. z Initial risk assessment. z Recommended collaborative planning sessions. z Proposed COA evaluation criteria. z Updated timeline. z Review or issue commander’s planning guidance. 5-81. During the mission analysis briefing or shortly thereafter, commanders generally approve the mission statement, problem statement, initial information collection plan, and CCIRs. They also develop and issue their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. Develop Course of Action Evaluation Criteria 5-82. Evaluation criteria are standards the commander and staff will later use to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs. Developing these criteria during mission analysis or shortly after the mission analysis brief helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison and identifies what data needs to be captured in COA analysis. Evaluation criteria addresses factors that affect success and those that can cause failure. Criteria change from mission to mission, and they must be clearly defined and understood by all staff members before starting COA analysis (or war gaming). 5-83. To adopt into a plan, a COA is evaluated against two sets of criteria. The first set of criteria requires that a COA is feasible, acceptable, suitable, complete, and distinguishable, which is discussed in further detail in COA development starting on paragraph 5-91. This second set is intended to identify which COA among those that passed the first test is best based on an analysis of the criteria developed. This second set of criteria may include— z Limitations on casualties. z Defeat of enemy forces or adversary COAs. z Speed. z Opportunity to maneuver. z Risk. z Logistic supportability. z Force protection. z Time available and timing of the operation. z Political considerations. 5-84. Normally, the COS or XO initially determines each proposed criterion with weights based on the assessment of its relative importance and the commander’s guidance. Commanders adjust criteria selection and weighting according to their own experience and vision. Higher weights are assigned to more important criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area ranks each COA using those criteria. The staff presents the proposed evaluation criteria to the commander at the mission analysis brief for approval. Evaluation criteria must be measurable and easily and clearly defined. Well-defined evaluation criteria have five elements: z Short title—the criterion name. z Definition—a clear description of the feature being evaluated. z Unit of measure—a standard element used to quantify the criterion. 0D\ FM 5-0 5-19 Chapter 5 z Benchmark—a value that defines the desired state, or “good” for a solution in terms of a particular criterion. z Formula—an expression of how changes in the value of the criterion affect the desirability of the possible solution. Planners state the formula in comparative terms (for example, more is better) or absolute terms (for example, a night movement is better than a day movement). (See Chapter 3 for further discussion on developing COAs. See table 5-2 for an example of operational evaluation criteria.) Table 5-2. Example operational evaluation criteria Short Title Definition Unit of Measure Benchmark Formula Casualties Casualties taken during Number of 136 casualties Less than 136 is an the entire operation casualties advantage. Greater than 136 is a disadvantage. Less is better. Tempo How long it will take the Hours 3 hours Less than 3 hours is an enemy forces to reach advantage. PL RED Greater than 3 hours is a disadvantage. Longer is better Complexity Number of task Number of task 7 task Less than 7 is an organization changes organization organization advantage. required changes changes Greater than 7 is a disadvantage. Less is better. 5-85. The process used does not in any way diminish the importance of the decision maker’s judgment. Rather, it enables leaders to bring judgment to bear with greater precision and in problems of greater complexity than might otherwise be possible. Regardless of the method used to assign criteria weights, leaders state the rationale for each when recommending a solution to the decision maker. Develop and Issue Continued Planning Guidance 5-86. Commanders provide planning guidance along with their initial commander’s intent. This guidance may be broad or detailed, depending on the situation. The initial planning guidance outlines an operational approach which is a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish it. The initial planning guidance may outline specific COAs the commander directs the staff to analyze, or it identifies COAs the commander will not accept. That clear guidance allows the staff to develop several COAs without wasting effort on things that the commander will not consider. It reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher echelon commander’s intent. 5-87. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing the latitude necessary to explore different options. This guidance provides the basis for a detailed concept of operations without dictating the specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions. 5-88. Commanders issue additional planning guidance after mission analysis which guides COA development. This is not the only time the commander issues guidance during the MDMP. The commander issues guidance throughout the MDMP including, but not limited, to the following: z Upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission (initial planning guidance). z Following mission analysis (planning guidance for COA development). z Following COA development (revised planning guidance for COA refinements). 5-20 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process z COA approval (revised planning guidance to complete the plan). z Receipt of new information that invalidates assumptions or changes understanding of the OE. 5-89. Table 5-3 on page 5-22 lists example commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function. This list is not intended to meet the needs of all situations nor be all-inclusive, and providing guidance by warfighting function is not the only method. Commanders tailor planning guidance to meet specific needs based on the situation rather than address each item. Each item does not always fit neatly in a particular warfighting function, as it may be shared by more than one warfighting function. For example, although rules of engagement fall under the command and control warfighting function, each warfighting function chief has a vested interest in gaining guidance on rules of engagement. 0D\ FM 5-0 5-21 Chapter 5 Table 5-3. Examples of commander’s planning guidance by warfighting function Commander’s intent Risk acceptance guidance Course of action development guidance Planning and operational guidance timeline Command and Control Number of courses of action to Type of order and rehearsal consider or not consider Branches and sequels Phasing considerations Commander’s location Succession of command Operational framework considerations Command post positioning, survivability, and Commanders critical information displacement requirements Liaison officer guidance Critical events Communications guidance Task organization Civil affairs operations Rules of engagement Emission control and status Requests for information Information collection guidance Scheme of intelligence Intelligence Information gaps Critical terrain and weather factors Most likely and most dangerous enemy Critical local environment and civil considerations courses of action Intelligence focus during phased operations Task and purpose of maneuver units Tactical deception Movement and Scheme of maneuver including forms of Friendly decision points Maneuver maneuver Information collection direction Reserve composition, priorities, and Collateral damage or civilian casualties control measures Any condition that affects achievement of end Passage of lines state Reconnaissance and surveillance Mobility and countermobility Priority of fires Scheme of fires Synchronization and focus of fires with Suppression of enemy air defenses maneuver Fire support coordination measures High-value targets Attack guidance High-payoff targets No strike list Fires Special munitions guidance Restricted target list Target acquisition zones Information operations Observer plan Cyberspace electromagnetic activities and Air and missile defense positioning electromagnetic warfare Task and purpose of fires Desired enemy perception of friendly forces Initial themes and messages Protection priorities Protection and control of civilians Scheme of protection development Vehicle and equipment safety or security Priorities for survivability assets constraints Air and missile defense positioning Environmental considerations Operations security Unexploded ordnance Protection Terrain and weather factors Acceptable risk and risk management Intelligence focus and limitations for Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons security Counterintelligence Protected persons and places Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and Anti-fratricide measures and friendly force explosives guidance recognition Force health protection measures Personnel recovery Cyberspace network protection measures Detention operations Sustainment priorities Construction and provision of facilities and Sustainment Health service support installations Sustainment of detention and dislocated Detainee movement civilian operations Anticipated requirements of Classes III, IV, and V Controlled supply rates 5-22 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process Issue a Warning Order 5-90. Immediately after the commander gives the planning guidance, the staff sends subordinate and supporting units a WARNORD. (See Appendix D for a sample WARNORD.) It generally contains— z Updated situation. z The approved mission statement. z The commander’s intent. z Changes to task organization. z The unit AO (using a sketch, overlay, or some other description). z Tasks to subordinate units as applicable. z CCIRs and EEFIs. z Risk guidance. z Priorities by warfighting function. z Deception guidance. (If for military deception, it is sent separately as need to know information.) z Essential stability tasks as appropriate. z IPB results. z Initial information collection plan. z Specific priorities. z Updated planning and operational timelines. z Movements. STEP 3-COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 5-91. A COA is a broad potential solution to an identified problem. After receiving the restated mission, commander’s intent, and updated commander’s planning guidance, the staff develops COAs for the commander’s approval. The COA development step generates options for subsequent analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander’s intent and planning guidance. During COA development, planners use the problem statement, mission statement, commander’s intent, planning guidance, and products developed during mission analysis. The COA begins conceptually, but by the end of the step the COA develops many of the details necessary for subordinates to take action. (See figure 5-5 on page 5-24 for a depiction of COA development.) 0D\ FM 5-0 5-23 Chapter 5 +Figure 5-5. Step 3-course of action development 5-92. The commander’s direct involvement in COA development greatly aids in producing comprehensive and flexible COAs in the time available. To save time, the commander may also limit the number of COAs staffs develop or specify particular COAs not to explore. Planners examine each prospective COA for validity and meeting the following screening criteria: ⚫ Feasible. The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resources available. ⚫ Acceptable. The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained. ⚫ Suitable. The COA can accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent and planning guidance. ⚫ Distinguishable. Each COA must differ significantly from the others (such as scheme of maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, use of the reserve, or task organization). ⚫ Complete. A COA incorporates— ▪ How the decisive operation leads to mission accomplishment. ▪ How shaping operations create and preserve conditions for success of the decisive operation or effort. ▪ How sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations or efforts. ▪ How to account for offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks. ▪ How it describes transforming current conditions to the desired end-state. 5-93. The COA includes the tasks to be performed and the conditions to be achieved. It is important in COA development that commanders and staffs appreciate the unpredictable, uncertain, and ambiguous nature of the OE. Some problems that commanders face are straightforward, as when clearly defined guidance is provided from higher echelon headquarters, or when resources required for a mission are available and can easily be allocated. In such cases, the COA is often self-evident. However, for problems that are unfamiliar or ambiguous, ADM (described in Chapter 4) may assist commanders in better understanding the nature of the problem and afford both the commander and staff a better level of understanding coupled with completion of mission analysis to more effectively complete COA development. Staffs tend to focus on specific COAs for specific sets of circumstances, when it is usually 5-24 FM 5-0, C1 04 November 2022 The Military Decision-Making Process best to focus on flexible COAs that provide the greatest options to account for the widest range of circumstances. 5-94. Commanders and staffs must be cautious not to attempt to identify and resolve every perceived possible outcome to military operations. The interaction of multiple variables within an OE can and will lead to countless possible options and outcomes. Commanders and staffs should focus their efforts around known variables and assumptions and analyze COAs that provide flexible options to the commander during execution. If commanders and staffs focus on what is known about a situation, it often becomes clear that the known information provides sufficient information to develop flexible COAs. It is important to clearly identify which variables the unit can control, which it does not control, and the implications of those that it does not control. Even when there are few facts available, it is often possible to reduce key issues to either an ability to do “X”, or an inability to do “X” as a starting point. Such a reduction is preferred over trying to derive a wide range of possibilities. It is just as important not to see facts as constraining flexibility, but seek to use them to generate flexibility. Staffs work to confirm or deny facts and as many assumptions as possible before developing options. Staffs must also determine what risks are associated with various COAs. 5-95. As an example, a commander may know with reasonable certainty that an enemy force is positioned on the outskirts of a town. The commander may not be certain of the exact size of the enemy force, all the resources available to the enemy force, or actions the enemy may take over time. Such unknowns are a reality in an ambiguous OE. But, by focusing on the known information, that is, the position of the enemy at a point in time, the staff can develop COAs that provide maximum flexibility for the commander. Known information can also apply to friendly actions, such as an established time for crossing a line of departure, or transition to a subsequent phase of an operation. COAs should allow for variances in timelines and resources as additional information on enemy and friendly forces becomes available. Variances may also occur as changes in guidance from the higher echelon headquarters arrives, or significant national policy decisions are made. Staffs identify risks associated with both friendly and enemy actions, who is accepting the risk, and what resources should be allocated to mitigate the risks. 5-96. To provide the commander with additional time before making a decision, COA development should also identify decision points, the authority responsible for making decisions, and what measures to take. These decisions are then captured in a decision support template and matrix. Good COAs provide commanders with options based on anticipated and unanticipated changes in the situation. Staffs should highlight to the commander options that may be critical to mission success. Staffs should also identify points in time when options may no longer be viable while working to keep options open to the commander as long as possible. In all cases, staffs provide commanders and senior leaders with options that are flexible while clearly identifying risks associated with committing to options. Staffs also assess how possible options may impact on a commander’s options at a higher echelon. (See Chapter 1 for a discussion of decision points. See Chapter 6 for further discussion on decision making in execution.) 5-97. The unpredictable and uncertain nature of an OE should not in itself result in temporary paralysis or hesitancy in military operations. By focusing COA development around known information, staffs can better develop COAs that provide maximum flexibility and viable options for the commander in the execution of military operations. Assess Relative Combat Power 5-98. Combat power includes the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a formation or unit can apply at a given time. It is a command’s ability to fight and win in large-scale combat or accomplish the mission in stability operations or defense support of civil authorities. Commanders combine the elements of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, command and control, information, and leadership to meet constantly changing situations and defeat the enemy. The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power at the decisive point to accomplish the mission at the least cost. 5-99. Several variables can stand between a unit and mission accomplishment, such as enemy forces, restrictive terrain, or unit limitations. A way to visualize the interaction of the variables is to create a sketch. Planners can create a sketch in a variety of ways, including a white board, digital systems, a slide, an overlay on a map, or even chalk on the side of a vehicle as examples. When using a sketch, it normally 0D\ FM 5-0 5-25 Chapter 5 includes the area to cover, easily identified physical terrain, key known higher headquarters’ graphics, significant obstacles, dense urban areas, and other population areas that would impact the COA. Based on output of IPB, a sketch also includes the known threat COA. The sketch then aides the planning team in understanding and visualizing the assessment of relative combat power and COAs. Using information to visualize the variables in an OE is more important than the method used to present the information. 5-100. Planners should ensure they update the current friendly situation prior to moving forward with COA development, which was initially assessed during mission analysis. This helps commanders and staffs understand the starting point for the operation, and it identifies potential challenges planners must identify and assess as part of COA development. It is best to depict friendly forces using task organization graphics. With a better developed sketch, planners can better assess relative combat power and make better estimates. 5-101. Assessing relative combat power is difficult; it requires applying both military art and science. Relative combat power analysis involves assessing tangible factors (such as equipment, weapons systems, and units) and intangible factors (such as morale and training levels). It also considers the mission variables of METT-TC (I) that directly or indirectly affect the potential outcome of an operation. It is important to consider external planning processes and cycles, such as the development of the air tasking order, and the unit capabilities when assessing relative combat power. Incorporating an understanding of these additional capabilities can have a significant impact when developing a unit’s assumed combat power. Although some numerical relationships are used, assessing relative combat power is not just the mathematical correlation of forces. Rather, relative combat power is an estimate that incorporates both objective and subjective factors. Comparing the significant strengths and weaknesses of each force in terms of combat power gives planners insight into— z Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation. z The types of operations possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives. z How and where enemy forces may be vulnerable. z How and where friendly forces may be vulnerable. z Additional resources not previously identified that may be required to execute the mission. z How to recommend the allocation of existing resources. 5-102. Planners initially make a rough estimate of force ratios of combat maneuver units two levels below their echelon. Other types of units such as field artillery, air defense, aviation, enablers, and sustainment may be broken down further. For example, corps level planners compare all types of brigade combat teams, while at division level planners compare all types of combat battalions with equivalent enemy combat battalions. Corps separate brigades may be broken down to the battalion level, while division units may be broken down to the battalion or company level. Planners then compare friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element of combat power. At the brigade and battalion level planners may study, in detail, the personnel and weapons of each side. From these comparisons, they may deduce particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploited or may need additional considerations or protection. These comparisons provide planners insight into effective force employment recommendations. 5-103. In troop-to-task analysis for stability and defense support of civil authorities, staffs determine relative combat power by comparing available resources to specified or implied stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. This analysis provides insights into available options and needed resources. In such operations, the elements of security, sustainment, movement and maneuver, nonlethal effects, and information may dominate. 5-104. Planners must not develop and recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analysis of force ratios. Although the process uses some numerical relationships, the assessment is also largely subjective. Planner may also consider time and space when developing force ratios to more accurately assess where and when engagements could occur and how to determine appropriate force ratios. Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible and intangible factors, such as morale, levels of training, or will to fight. Often the human factors are more important than the number of tanks or tubes of artillery. 5-105. After computing force ratios, the staff analyzes the intangible aspects of combat power. A technique for this analysis is comparing friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa for each element of combat power. By comparing strengths against enemy weaknesses, planners may identify 5-26 FM 5-0 0D\ The Military Decision-Making Process vulnerabilities of each force that may be exploitable or may need protection. This can lead to planner’s effectively identifying decision points for the effective employment of forces. 5-106. A relative combat power assessment identifies exploitable enemy weaknesses, identifies unprotected friendly weaknesses, and determines the combat power necessary to conduct essential stability or defense support of civil authorities’ tasks. This assessment provides insight into options available and identifies resource shortfalls. In such operations, the elements of maneuver, nonlethal fires, leadership, and information may dominate. Generate Options 5-107. Based on the commander’s guidance and the results of the initial relative combat power assessment, the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks and ensuring the unit is positioned to meet unanticipated events during execution or sequels. In an unconstrained planning environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs. Depending on available time, commanders may limit the planning options, consistent with the commander’s guidance. The commander’s intent helps determine whether the force is terrain or enemy focused, which is critical for planners to understand. Options focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption. 5-108. Brainstorming can be used for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest range of options. The staff (and members of organizations outside the headquarters) remains unbiased and open-minded when developing proposed options. 5-109. In developing COAs, planners determine the doctrinal requirements for each proposed operation, including tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a breach force, a support force, and an assault force. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a level of civil security, civil control, and certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers possibilities created by attachments and other unified action partners. 5-110. Commanders and leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources to generate acceptable options. ADP 3-0 describes the Army operational framework as a visualization tool. The operational framework provides an organizing construct for how commanders intend to organize their AO geographically (in deep, close, rear

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