Chapter 1 Foundations of Operations PDF

Chapter 1 Foundations of Operations War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. Carl von Clausewitz This chapter describes the range of military...

Chapter 1 Foundations of Operations War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. Carl von Clausewitz This chapter describes the range of military operations and the Army’s focus on readiness to conduct large-scale combat operations. It describes how Army forces meet challenges and conduct multidomain operations as part of a joint and multinational force. Beginning with the Army’s view of war and warfare, this chapter describes key concepts that help leaders understand an operational environment. ARMY OPERATIONS 1-1. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles by providing forces for joint campaigns that enable integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict and the defeat of enemies during conflict or war. The strategic roles clarify the overall purposes for which Army forces conduct multidomain operations on behalf of joint force commanders (JFCs) in the pursuit of a stable environment and other policy objectives. Fulfilling policy objectives requires national-level leaders to orchestrate all instruments of national power throughout the entire government and coalition, in a manner commensurate with national will. (See JP 3-0 for more information on joint campaigns and deterrence. See ADP 3-0 for more information on the Army’s strategic roles.) 1-2. Military operations on land are foundational to operations in other domains because almost all capabilities, no matter where employed, are ultimately based on or controlled from land. While any particular domain may dominate military considerations in a specific context, conflicts are usually resolved on land because that is where people live and make political decisions and where the basis of national power exists. 1-3. Army forces achieve objectives through the conduct of operations. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations vary in many ways. They occur in all kinds of physical environments, including urban, subterranean, desert, jungle, mountain, maritime, and arctic. Operations vary in scale of forces involved and duration. Operations change factors in the physical, information, and human dimensions of an operational environment. 1-4. The complex environment in which operations occur demands leaders who understand both the science and art of operations. Understanding the science of operations—such as combat power ratios, weapons ranges, and movement tables—helps leaders improve synchronization and reduce risk. However, there is no way to eliminate uncertainty, and leaders must exercise operational art to make decisions and assume risk. Intangible factors, such as the impact of leadership on morale, using shock effect to defeat enemy forces, and supportive populations are fundamentally human factors that can overcome physical disadvantages and often decide the outcomes of an operation. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on the art and science of operations.) 1-5. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide range of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis response, and support to security cooperation. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-2 for a depiction of operational categories and the spectrum of violence.) 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-1 Chapter 1 Figure 1-1. Operational categories and the spectrum of violence 1-6. Most operations occur on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, and their objectives do not reach the level of vital national interests or national survival. These operations typically shape operational environments in ways that stabilize global security and facilitate conditions that are generally favorable to the United States. They provide valuable options to JFCs because they achieve objectives best supported by persistent presence, often at relatively low cost. 1-7. While the overwhelming majority of operations conducted by Army forces occur either below the threshold of armed conflict or during limited contingencies, the focus of Army readiness is on large-scale combat operations. The United States always retains the option to employ greater levels of force when less coercive methods are ineffective, and when a vital interest or national survival is at stake. This requires Army forces to be prepared for the most demanding and dangerous types of operations. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence through their demonstrated capability, capacity, and will to wage war on land in any environment against any opponent. Credible combat forces make the other instruments of national power more potent, and they help deter the enemy’s escalation of violence during other types of operations. 1-8. Credible combat forces are those able to overcome the advantages peer threats generate within a specific regional context. Enemies typically initiate their aggression under conditions optimal for their success, requiring U.S. forces to respond at a disadvantage. U.S. combat operations typically involve force projection over long distances, providing advantages for enemy forces operating closer to their bases of support. Enemies typically have a degree of popular support cultivated through decades of propaganda and isolation from the free flow of information. This increases the enemy's will to fight and can make local populations hostile to U.S. forces and objectives. Although a combatant command and theater army may accrue a variety of advantages as they set the theater and prepare for armed conflict during periods of competition, Army forces are typically faced with challenges they have to overcome at the onset of hostilities and throughout the conduct or armed conflict. MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS 1-9. Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes. 1-10. Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which for the most part occur as part of a larger coalition operation. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects 1-2 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations of combined arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment. 1-11. All operations are multidomain operations. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from air and maritime strategic transportation and space and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including global positioning, satellite communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Lower echelons may not always notice the opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however, leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision making, and risk assessment. 1-12. During operations, small advantages can have Army forces must accurately see themselves, significant impacts on the outcome of the mission, see the enemy or adversary, and understand particularly when they accrue over time. Creating and their operational environment before they can exploiting relative advantages are therefore necessary identify or exploit relative advantages. for all operations, and they become even more critical when opposing sides are evenly matched. A relative advantage is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective. Commanders seek and create relative advantages to exploit through action, and they continually assess the situation to identify ways to expand opportunities. (See paragraphs 1-106 through 1-117 for more information on physical, information, and human advantages.) 1-13. Army leaders are accustomed to creating and exploiting relative advantages through the combined-arms approach that traditionally focuses on capabilities from the land, air, and maritime domains. The proliferation of space and cyberspace capabilities further requires leaders who understand the advantages those capabilities create in their operational environment. The ability to integrate and synchronize space and cyberspace capabilities at the most effective tactical echelon expands options for creating advantages to exploit. 1-14. Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, Some combination of maneuver and isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and attrition is typically necessary to achieve formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions victory during armed conflict. This is provide to defeat enemy forces in detail. Army forces reflected in the defeat mechanisms therefore require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive which encompass both ideas. intelligence to understand threat characteristics, capabilities, objectives, and courses of action. Intelligence initially drives what combinations of defeat mechanisms commanders pursue as they employ the capabilities of their forces in space and time against enemy forces. Army forces combine maneuver and targeting methods to defeat enemy formations and systems. Army forces employ maneuver to close with and destroy enemy formations in close operations. Targeting generally sets priorities for information collection, fires, and other key capabilities to disintegrate enemy networks and systems. Leaders execute the targeting process to create advantages that enable freedom of maneuver and exploit the positional advantages created by maneuver. Targeting is a key way for leaders to integrate the joint capabilities required to create depth in the battlefield and protect friendly formations. CHALLENGES FOR ARMY FORCES We don’t maintain a strong military force to conquer or coerce others. The purpose of our military is simple and straightforward: We want to prevent war by deterring others from the aggression that causes war. President Ronald Reagan 1-15. The joint force deters most adversaries from seeking to achieve strategic objectives through direct military confrontation with the United States. As a result, adversaries pursue their objectives indirectly through malign activities and armed conflict targeting others in ways calculated to avoid war with the United States. These activities include subversive political and legal strategies, establishing physical presence on the 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-3 Chapter 1 ground to buttress resource claims, coercive economic practices, supporting proxy forces, and spreading disinformation. However, several adversaries have both the ability and the will to conduct armed conflict with the United States under certain conditions, which requires Army forces to be prepared at all times for limited contingencies and large-scale combat operations. 1-16. Global and regional adversaries apply all instruments of national power to challenge U.S. The notion of integrated deterrence goes beyond preventing armed conflict. It includes preventing interests and the joint force. Militarily, they have adversaries from increasing the scope and intensity extended the battlefield by employing of their malign activities conducted below the network-enabled sensors and long-range fires to threshold of armed conflict deny access during conflict and challenge friendly forces’ freedom of action during competition. These standoff approaches seek to— z Counter U.S. space, air, and naval advantages to make the introduction of land forces difficult and exploit the overall joint force’s mutual dependencies. z Increase the cost to the joint force and its partners in the event of armed conflict. z Hold the joint force at risk both in the U.S. and at its overseas bases and contest Army forces’ deployment from home station to forward tactical assembly areas overseas. 1-17. Adversaries increase risk to the U.S. joint force in order to raise the threshold at which the United States might respond to a provocation with military force. By diluting the joint force’s conventional deterrence, adversaries believe they have greater freedom of action to conduct malign activities both within and outside the U.S. homeland. Adversaries exploit this freedom of action through offensive cyberspace operations, disinformation, influence operations, and the aggressive positioning of ground, air, and naval forces to support territorial claims. Adversaries employ different types of forces and capabilities to attack private and government organizations, threaten critical economic infrastructure, and disrupt political processes, often with a degree of plausible deniability that reduces the likelihood of a friendly military response. Conducting these activities in support of policy goals threatens allied cohesion, weakens responses, and creates additional opportunities. (See paragraphs 2-40 through 2-44 for description of enemy information warfare.) 1-18. Threat standoff approaches intensify other friendly challenges. These challenges include— z Gaining and maintaining support of allies and partners. z Maintaining the continuous information collection needed to determine composition, disposition, strength, and activities of enemy forces. z Integrating and synchronizing intelligence at all echelons, distributed across large operational areas with diverse requirements. z Preparing forward-stationed forces to fight and win while outnumbered and isolated. z Protecting forward-positioned forces and those moving into a theater. z Minimizing vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. z Maintain C2 and sustainment of units distributed across vast distances in noncontiguous areas and outside supporting ranges and distances. z Maintaining a desirable tempo while defeating fixed and bypassed enemy forces. z Defeating threat information and irregular warfare attacks against the United States and strategic lines of communications. 1-19. Army forces prepare to conduct operations in contested theaters prior to and during armed conflict, including in the United States. Army forces must account for being under constant observation and the threat’s ability to gain and maintain contact in all domains, wherever they are located. Army forces must be ready to deploy on short notice to austere locations and be capable of immediately conducting combat operations. During the initial phases of an operation, Army units may find themselves facing superior threats in terms of both numbers and capabilities. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves and continuously collect information on threat activities, as they provide reaction time and freedom of maneuver for follow-on forces. Army units with limited joint support may have to defend while at risk from enemy long-range fires. Forward-stationed forces may defend critical terrain with other coalition forces to delay enemy offensive operations. Some forward-stationed forces may defend joint bases to mitigate 1-4 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations the impact of enemy attacks against strategic and operational lines of communications. In both cases, forward-stationed Army forces must be prepared to fight while relatively isolated in the early stages of an enemy attack. 1-20. The likelihood of the enemy force’s use of massed long-range fires and weapons of mass destruction increases during large-scale combat operations—particularly against command and control (C2) and sustainment nodes, assembly areas, and critical infrastructure. To survive and operate against massed long- range fires and in contaminated environments, commanders ensure as much dispersion as tactically prudent. Army forces seek every possible advantage using dispersion, deception, counterreconnaissance, terrain, cover, concealment, masking, and other procedures to avoid detection and mitigate the impact of enemy fires. In the offense, Army forces maneuver quickly along multiple axes, concentrating only to the degree required to mass effects, and then dispersing to avoid becoming lucrative targets for weapons of mass destruction and enemy conventional fires. Although dispersion disrupts enemy targeting efforts, it increases the difficulty of both C2 and sustainment for friendly forces. Success demands agile units that are able to adjust dispositions rapidly, assume risk, and exploit opportunities when they are available. 1-21. The high tempo of large-scale combat operations creates gaps and seams, generating both opportunities and risks as enemy formations disintegrate, disperse, or displace. After generating sufficient combat power for offensive operations, friendly forces may intermingle with or fix and bypass enemy formations. This requires follow-on and supporting units to protect themselves and to defeat enemy remnants in detail within the rear area as part of consolidating gains. 1-22. Army forces deploying from the United States and elsewhere face a wide range of threats that are difficult to counter without joint support. The disruptive effects of enemy action may occur at unit home stations, ports of embarkation, while in transit to the theater, and upon arrival at ports of debarkation. Army forces may not have the capability, or the authority, to preempt these attacks, although counterintelligence may aid in early identification of threats. The threat’s ability to contest the deployment of forces may degrade combat power available to forward forces and cause unit personnel and equipment to arrive in piecemeal fashion at ports of debarkation. (See Appendix C for more information on deployments contested by threat forces.) LETHALITY: OVERCOMING CHALLENGES 1-23. Army forces overcome challenges posed by threats and the environment with credible formations able to employ lethal capabilities. Lethality is the capability and capacity to destroy. Employing and threatening the employment of lethal force lies at the core of how Army forces achieve objectives and enable the rest of the instruments of national power to achieve objectives. 1-24. Lethality is enabled by formations maneuvering into positions of relative advantage where they can employ weapon systems and mass effects to destroy enemy forces or place them at risk of destruction. The speed, range, and accuracy of weapon systems employed by a formation enhance its lethality. The demands of large-scale combat rapidly deplete available stockpiles and require forces to retain large reserves of ammunition, weapons, and other warfighting capabilities. Leaders multiply the effects of lethal force by employing combinations of capabilities through multiple domains to create, accrue, and exploit relative advantages—imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces and overwhelming their ability to respond effectively. Overcoming challenges in the operational environment further requires lethal Army forces that employ all available capabilities to— z Continuously cultivate landpower networks with allies and partners to facilitate interoperability. z Be demonstrably prepared for large-scale combat operations to deter conflict on land. z Employ capabilities in a combined arms manner to create exploitable opportunities. z Maneuver, mass effects, and preserve combat power to defeat threats to other Service components of the joint force. z Defend forward-positioned critical joint infrastructure and key terrain. z Conduct offensive operations to create and exploit opportunities and achieve objectives. z Consolidate gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict to enable sustainable political outcomes. 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-5 Chapter 1 1-25. The effective employment of Army forces depends on leaders who understand war, warfare, and the environment within which military forces fight. Gaps in understanding are often causes of failures to achieve sustainable political outcomes with military means. WAR AND WARFARE [W]e now need another voice of wisdom to tell us, “Technology is not enough.” War is not one big engineering project. There are people on the other side—with strengths and will that we never bothered to measure. As a result of that omission we have been drawn into a greater, and certainly more ruinous, belligerent action than we intended. To fight without understanding the opponent ultimately serves neither the repute of the military nor the repute of the nation. Barbara W. Tuchman 1-26. War is a state of armed conflict between different nations, state-like entities, or armed groups to achieve policy objectives. Wars are fought between nations locally, regionally, or on a global scale. Wars are fought within a nation by a central government against insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups. Armed groups in semiautonomous regions also fight wars to achieve their objectives. Wars range from intense clashes between large military forces—sometimes backed by an official declaration of war—to more subtle hostilities that intermittingly breach the threshold of violence. 1-27. The object of war is to impose a nation’s or group’s will on its enemy in pursuit of policy objectives. Regardless of the specific objectives, the decision to wage war represents a major policy decision and changes how Army forces use military capabilities. The nature of war, its principles, and its elements remain consistent over time. However, warfare, the conduct and characteristics of war, reflects changing means and contexts. 1-28. The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war and the changing character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces operate across the competition continuum given the prevailing characteristics of anticipated operational environments now and in the near future. Doctrine for the conduct of operations begins with a view of war and warfare that includes the— z Nature of war. z Principles of war. z Characteristics of warfare. z Methods of warfare. z Offense, defense, and stability. z Large-scale combat operations. z Combined arms. z Levels of warfare. z Army strategic contexts. z Consolidating gains. (See Chapter 3 for more information on the multidomain operations concept.) THE NATURE OF WAR 1-29. While the term war has multiple uses depending on the context (for example, the war on drugs or the war on poverty), it is the threat or use of violence to achieve political purposes that distinguishes war in the military context from other human activities. This distinction accounts for three elements of the Army’s view of war. War is— z Fought to achieve a political purpose. z A human endeavor. z Inherently chaotic and uncertain. 1-6 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations Note. War, by definition, includes at least two opposing sides. However, not all violence for political gain causes a war. For example, in the current security environment China imposes low levels of violence and new types of violence (including space and cyberspace attacks against government, economic institutions, private industry, and infrastructure) that do not trigger significant military responses. In these cases, China sees itself in a state of war with its adversaries, but its adversaries do not. Such a disparity in perspective is dangerous for those nations opposing China that may endure low levels of violence for long periods, while slowly ceding interests until it is too late to respond effectively. Responding to such situations requires a comprehensive government approach supported by joint and Army forces. Political Purpose 1-30. All U.S. military operations share a common purpose—to achieve or contribute to national policy objectives. As a principle Objective—to direct every military of war, objective reinforces the proper relationship between operation toward a clearly defined, military operations and policy. War must always be subordinate decisive, and attainable goal—is a principle of war. to policy and serve a political end. In conjunction with political leaders, military leaders develop strategies to achieve the desired policy outcomes. Policy outcomes often relate to the nation’s ability to influence, control, or secure populations, civil infrastructure, natural resources, and access to global commons in all domains. (See Appendix A for a discussion of the principles of war.) Human Endeavor 1-31. War is shaped by human nature and the complex interrelationships of cognition, emotion, and uncertainty. National sentiments are often targets to be affected or manipulated by one or both sides. Values and ethics are some of the cognitive factors that motivate both the cause for going to war and restrictions in the conduct of war. Fear, passion, camaraderie, grief, and many more emotions affect the resolve of a war’s participants. They affect the behavior of combatants, including how and when leaders decide to persevere and when to give up. Individuals react differently to the stress of war; an act that may break the will of one enemy may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another. Human will, instilled through commitment to a cause and leadership, is the driving force of all action in war. The human dimension infuses war with its intangible moral factors. (See paragraphs 1-115 through 1-117 for more information on the human dimension.) Inherently Chaotic and Uncertain 1-32. War is inherently chaotic and uncertain due to the clash of wills and intense interaction of innumerable factors. Orders are misunderstood, enemy forces do the unexpected, units make wrong turns, unforeseen obstacles appear, the weather changes, and units consume supplies at unexpected rates. This friction affects all military operations, and it must be anticipated by leaders. The chaotic nature of war makes discerning the precise cause and effect of actions difficult, impossible, or delayed. The unintended effects of operations are difficult to anticipate and identify. Such chaos imposes a great deal of uncertainty on all operations and drives the importance of leaders who are skilled at assuming risk. PRINCIPLES OF WAR 1-33. From a U.S. military perspective, war involves nine principles, collectively and classically known as the principles of war. The nine principles of war represent the most important factors that affect the conduct of operations, and they are derived from the study of history and experience in battle. (See table 1-1 on page 1-8 for a concise listing of the principles of war.) 1-34. The principles of war capture broad and enduring fundamentals for the employment of forces in combat. They are not a checklist that guarantees success. Rather, they summarize considerations commanders and their staffs account for during successful operations, applied with judgment in specific contexts. While applicable to all operations, they do not apply equally or in the same way to every situation. (For more information on the principles of war, see Appendix A.) 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-7 Chapter 1 Table 1-1. Principles of war Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal. Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Surprise: Strike at a time and place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Economy of force: Expend minimum-essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on the main effort. Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. Unity of command: Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Security: Prevent the enemy from achieving surprise or acquiring unexpected advantage. Simplicity: Increase the probability that plans can be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and orders. CHARACTERISTICS OF WARFARE 1-35. Warfare, the conduct and characteristics of war, is affected by changes in technology, national policy, operational concepts, public opinion, and many other factors. Warfare may retain similarities over time, but it inevitably also has great variations. Rapid advances in, and the proliferation of, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities with military applications are changing warfare. Space technology enables persistent overhead surveillance and global communications, navigation, timing, missile warning, and environmental monitoring. Cyberspace technology is integrated into most military capabilities, and it enables near-instantaneous communications and information sharing, creating both opportunities and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by both sides during competition, crisis, and conflict. METHODS OF WARFARE 1-36. Although the nature and principles of war reflect the continuity of war, the conduct of warfare, like dynamic operational environments, reflects wide variation. Therefore, depending on the situation, strategic actors pursue their objectives in war through different methods of warfare. There are many different methods, but they generally fall into two broad categories: conventional and irregular. Each method of warfare serves the same strategic purpose—to defeat an enemy—but they take fundamentally different approaches to achieving their purpose. Both methods share one characteristic, which is that they involve the use of lethal force to achieve a political end. Warfare rarely fits neatly into any of these subjective categories, and it almost always entails a blend of both methods over the course of a conflict. Note. These broad categories describe the overall approaches to warfare. Other categories attempt to describe the dominant means used in a particular application, for example “information warfare,” “cyber warfare,” or “anti-submarine warfare,” In these cases, the terms “warfare,” “operations,” and “activities” are often used interchangeably. 1-8 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations Conventional Warfare 1-37. Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states. Conventional warfare is generally carried out by two or more military forces through armed conflict. It is commonly known as conventional warfare because it means to fight enemy forces directly, with comparable military systems and organizations. A nation-state’s strategic purpose for conducting conventional warfare is to impose its will on an enemy government and avoid imposition of the enemy government’s will on it and its citizens. Joint doctrine refers to conventional warfare as “traditional” because it has been understood that way in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. However, irregular warfare has a longer history, and it has been just as common as the “traditional” method of warfare in some societies. 1-38. Conventional warfare normally focuses on defeating enemy armed forces, enemy warfighting capabilities, and controlling key terrain and populations to decisively influence an enemy government’s behavior in favorable ways. During conventional warfare, enemies engage in combat openly against each other and generally employ similar capabilities. Conventional war may escalate to include nation-state use of weapons of mass destruction. Like the other branches of the armed forces, the Army is organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct or deter conventional warfare, especially its most lethal manifestation— large-scale combat operations. 1-39. Conventional deterrence creates the paradox that although combat-ready forces reduce the probability of large-scale combat, they increase the frequency of adversaries pursuing irregular warfare and malign activity short of armed conflict to achieve objectives. The tradeoff is acceptable because conducting irregular warfare with forces prepared for large-scale ground combat incurs less risk than conducting large-scale ground combat with forces unprepared to do so. Irregular Warfare 1-40. Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, proxies, or surrogates to achieve shared or complementary objectives. The main objective of irregular warfare varies with the political context, and it can be successful without being combined with conventional warfare (for example, the Cuban Revolution). While it often focuses on establishing influence over a population, irregular warfare has also historically been an economy of force effort to fix enemy forces in secondary theaters of conflict or to cause enemy leaders to commit significant forces to less critical lines of effort. Two characteristics distinguish irregular warfare from conventional warfare: z The intent is to erode a political authority’s legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly entities engaged in the struggle. z The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives. 1-41. JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces), in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces. OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND STABILITY 1-42. Offense, defense, and stability are inherent elements of conventional and irregular warfare. Divisions and higher echelons typically perform some combination of all three elements in their operations simultaneously. However, the lower the echelon, the more likely it is for that formation to be focused on one element at a time. 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-9 Chapter 1 1-43. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations are how commanders impose their will on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. Offensive operations typically include a sudden action directed toward enemy weaknesses, capitalizing on speed, surprise, and shock. The offense compels an enemy force to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of the offense.) 1-44. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, retain key terrain, gain time, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Normally the defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek to destroy as many of the enemy forces as possible. Defensive operations preserve control over land, resources, and populations, and they protect lines of communications and critical capabilities against attack. Commanders can conduct defensive operations in one area to free forces for offensive operations elsewhere. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of the defense.) 1-45. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action. (See ADP 3-07 for more information on stability operations.) LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS 1-46. The focus of Army readiness is on large-scale combat operations. Large-scale combat operations are The Army is manned, equipped, and trained to extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and operate in all operational scenarios or size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign categories, starting with the most lethal aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives conditions first—large-scale combat against a peer threat. (ADP 3-0). During ground combat, they typically involve operations by multiple corps and divisions, and they typically include substantial forces from the joint and multinational team. Large-scale combat operations often include both conventional and irregular forces on both sides. 1-47. Conflicts encompassing large-scale combat operations are more intense and destructive than limited contingencies, often rapidly amassing heavy casualties. Peer threats employ networks of sensors and long- range massed fires that exploit electromagnetic signatures and other detection methods to create high risk for ground forces, particularly when they are static. Army forces must account for constant enemy observation, including the threat from unmanned systems that saturate the operational environment. Army forces take measures to defeat the enemy’s ability to effectively mass effects while creating exploitable advantages to mass effects against enemy capabilities and formations. 1-48. Urban areas are high risk areas that are a factor in many operational environments. Avoiding urban areas during large-scale combat through deception or other means is ideal, but generally not possible. Commanders may conduct urban operations because they provide a tactical, political, or economic advantage, or when not doing so threatens the joint campaign. Army forces conduct large-scale combat operations in urban areas either as specific, unique operations, or more typically, as one of a larger series of operations in a joint campaign. Urban operations focus on the threat to or within the urban area and allow other forces to conduct operations elsewhere. Conducting operations in dense urban terrain is complex and resource intensive. Combined arms operations that integrate joint capabilities, allies and partners, and conventional and irregular forces are essential to success. Commanders voice concern to higher headquarters when they do not have sufficient forces for the task issued, and they must arrange their forces and operations according to purpose, time, and space to accomplish the mission. Success in defeating enemy forces in large urban areas typically requires the ability to isolate them from physical, information, and human support. (See ATP 3-06 for more information on urban operations.) During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team, and they contribute to the defeat of forces in other domains. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in all types of terrain, exploit 1-10 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations success, and break the enemy’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, perform stability tasks, and continuously consolidate gains to accomplish objectives that support a desirable political outcome. Corps and divisions are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s capability and will to continue a conventional conflict. Conflict resolution requires Army forces to consolidate gains with unified action partners as long as necessary to accomplish national objectives. 1-49. Planning for large-scale combat operations must account for possible enemy use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and allied retaliatory response options. Planning must also account for toxic industrial hazards caused by combat operations. Enemy employment of CBRN weapons and the allied response would affect all domains, but they present disproportionate effects in the land domain. Some adversaries plan for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons by incorporating them into their doctrine and training, and they maintain delivery systems for their employment on the battlefield. Furthermore, the use of these weapons does not terminate a conflict and may cause it to escalate. Units must be prepared to operate in, around, and through contaminated environments. This is fundamental to deterring adversaries from employing weapons of mass destruction. CBRN considerations should inform both operational planning and force readiness. (See FM 3-11 for doctrine on operating in a CBRN environment, and see ATP 3-72 for more information operations in a nuclear environment.) COMBINED ARMS 1-50. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADP 3-0). Leaders combine arms in complementary and reinforcing ways to protect capabilities and amplify their effects. Confronted with a constantly changing situation, leaders create new combinations of capabilities, methods, and effects to pose new dilemmas for adversaries. The combined arms approach to operations during competition, crisis, and armed conflict is foundational to exploiting capabilities from all domains and their dimensions. 1-51. Complementary capabilities compensate for the vulnerabilities of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different one. Infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems, while tanks provide mobile protected firepower for the infantry. Ground maneuver can make enemy forces displace and become vulnerable to joint fires, while joint fires can disrupt enemy reserves and C2 to enable operations on the ground. Cyberspace and space capabilities and electromagnetic warfare can prevent enemy forces from detecting and communicating the location of friendly land-based fires capabilities, and Army fires capabilities can destroy enemy ground-based cyberspace nodes and electromagnetic warfare platforms to protect friendly communications. 1-52. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities to amplify the overall effects a formation brings to bear in a particular context. During urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and armor units working in close coordination reinforce the protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of each unit type while creating cascading dilemmas for enemy forces. Army artillery can be reinforced by close air support, air interdiction, and naval surface fire support, greatly increasing both the mass and range of fires available to a commander. Space and cyberspace capabilities used to disrupt enemy communications can reinforce a brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) ground-based jamming effort to increase the disruption to enemy C2. Military information support operations can amplify the effects of physical isolation on an enemy echelon, making it more vulnerable to friendly force exploitation. 1-53. The organic composition, training, and task organization of Army units set conditions for effective combined arms. Throughout operations, commanders assess the operational environment and adjust priorities, change task organization, and request capabilities to create exploitable advantages, extend operational reach, preserve combat power, and accomplish missions. LEVELS OF WARFARE 1-54. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). While the various methods of warfare are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the four levels of warfare—national strategic, theater 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-11 Chapter 1 strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives as shown in figure 1-2. Figure 1-2. Levels of warfare 1-55. The levels of warfare distinguish four broad overlapping activities—providing national direction and creating national strategy (national strategic), conducting continuous theater campaigning (theater strategic); planning and conducting campaigns and major operations (operational); or planning and executing operations, battles, engagements, and actions (tactical). Some commanders act at more than one level of war. For example, a combatant commander (CCDR) formulates theater strategy and designs the campaign plan. A land component commander assists a CCDR in campaign design and may lead a field army during major operations. The levels of warfare are conceptual, without finite limits or boundaries. They do, however, correlate to specific activities and responsibilities. They help commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic objectives, military operations at various echelons, and tactical actions. Among the levels of warfare, planning horizons, methods, and products differ greatly. Without this context, tactical operations become disconnected from operational end states and strategic objectives. There are skills and practices related to strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical level that differ from each other and are enhanced by specific training and education. National Strategic Level of Warfare 1-56. The national strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which the U.S. government formulates policy goals and ways to achieve them by synchronizing action across government and unified action partners and employing the instruments of national power. The instruments of national power are all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. The national strategic level of warfare focuses on developing global strategy and providing global strategic direction. Strategic direction provides context, tasks, and purpose for the employment of the instruments of national power. The specifics of strategic 1-12 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations direction address long-term, emerging, and anticipatory issues or concerns that may quickly evolve due to rapidly changing circumstances. Strategic direction is always evolving and adapting. 1-57. The theater strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners and employ all elements of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of the national strategy. Based on strategic guidance, CCDRs with assigned areas of responsibility and staffs—with input from subordinate commands, including theater armies and supporting commands and agencies—update their strategic estimates and develop theater strategies. A theater strategy is an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance. The theater strategy serves as the basis for development of the combatant command campaign plan (CCP). Operational Level of Warfare 1-58. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives (JP 3-0). The operational level links the employment of tactical forces to the achievement of strategic objectives. 1-59. The operational level of warfare generally is the realm of combatant commands and their Service or functional components and subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters and their Service or functional components. This includes the theater army headquarters as the Army Service component to a combatant command and any other echelon operating as an ARFOR, JTF headquarters, or land component command. The focus at this level is on operational art—the design of campaigns and operations by integrating ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on operational art.) 1-60. Actions at the operational level of warfare usually involve broader aspects of time and space than tactical actions. The theater army’s activities continuously support the CCDR in shaping the operational and strategic situation. Operational-level commanders need to understand the complexities of the operational environment and look beyond the immediate situation. Operational-level commanders seek to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders by preparing for future events. 1-61. The operational level of warfare demands leaders with a unique set of skills. Because the operational level is fundamentally about linking tactical action to strategic objectives, leaders must understand both strategy and tactics. They must have some expertise in the capabilities and operations of all Services and components and those of allies and partners. Leaders at the operational level must be able to assess large, complex operational environments and be expert planners. They must understand the application of warfighting functions on a large scale and how this application differs from application at the tactical level. The elements of operational art help operational leaders understand, visualize, and describe their campaigns and major operations. (See ADP 3-0 for details on the elements of operational art.) Tactical Level of Warfare 1-62. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military objectives (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on tactics—the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90). Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations. Tactical-level commanders plan and execute operations to include battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. 1-63. Tactical-level combat operations rise to the level of battles or engagements. A battle is a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement (ADP 3-90). Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation, and they are typically conducted by corps and divisions over the course of days or months. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade echelons and below. They are usually short, executed in minutes or hours. 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-13 Chapter 1 1-64. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations devolve into a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Likewise, tactical operations inform strategic and operational objectives, ensuring that those objectives remain tethered to reality and adjust, when necessary, according to the situation. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how the achievement of objectives in one or more battles contributes to winning a major operation or campaign. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on tactics.) ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS 1-65. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Each relationship is defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims. Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different parts of the world. Because of this, the needs of CCDRs and Army component commanders in one area are affected by the strategic needs of others. (See JP 3-0 for more information about the joint competition continuum.) Note. This manual uses “competition” to mean “competition below armed conflict.” 1-66. Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces conduct operations: z Competition below armed conflict. z Crisis. z Armed conflict. 1-67. The Army strategic contexts generally correspond to the joint competition continuum and the requirements of joint campaigns. Because cooperation is generally conducted with an ally or partner to counter an adversary or enemy, Army doctrine considers it part of competition. Army doctrine adds crisis to account for the unique challenges facing ground forces that often characterize transition between competition and armed conflict. (See figure 1-3 for an illustration of Army strategic contexts.) Figure 1-3. Army strategic contexts and operational categories Competition Below Armed Conflict 1-68. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or non-state adversaries have incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete with each other using all instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their goals. Low levels 1-14 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations of lethal force can be a part of competition below armed conflict. Adversaries often employ cyberspace capabilities and information warfare to destroy or disrupt infrastructure, interfere with government processes, and conduct activities in a way that does not cause the United States and its allies to respond with force. Competition provides military forces time to prepare for armed conflict, opportunities to assure allies and partners of resolve and commitment, and time and space to set the necessary conditions to prevent crisis or conflict. Examples of competition include return of forces to Europe (known as REFORGER) exercises conducted during the Cold War, security assistance provided to Ukraine since 2014, and Pacific Pathways activities to improve readiness in the Indo-pacific region. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of Army forces during competition.) Crisis 1-69. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). Commanders have to consider the possibility that overt military action may escalate a crisis towards armed conflict. The use of space and cyberspace capabilities provides other options that are less likely to cause escalation. The context of crisis is relative to an adversary, which is different from crisis response, which can result from a natural or human disaster. During crisis, armed conflict has not yet occurred, but it is either imminent or a distinct possibility that requires rapid response by forces prepared to fight if deterrence fails. Note. A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous transition to armed conflict. Leaders do not assume that a crisis provides additional time for a transition to armed conflict. 1-70. Army forces contribute to joint operations, seeking to deter further provocation and compel an adversary to de-escalate aggression and return to competition under conditions acceptable for the United States and its allies or partners. Through rapid movement and integration with the joint force, Army forces help signal the readiness and willingness to prevail in combat operations. When authorized, Army forces can inform or influence perceptions about an operation’s goals and progress to amplify effects on the ground during a crisis; however, commanders ensure their message aligns with reality and that their narratives are truthful and credible. 1-71. Army forces help the joint force maintain freedom of action and associated positions of relative advantage through the activities they conduct and their presence on the ground. They operate in a way that disrupts adversary risk calculations about the cost of acting contrary to U.S. national interests, compels de- escalation, and fosters a return to competition conditions favorable to the United States. If deterrence fails to end a crisis, Army forces are better postured for operations during armed conflict. Examples of crisis include the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, North Korean missile and rocket provocations in 2017-2018, and the Russian attacks into Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of Army forces during crisis.) Armed Conflict 1-72. Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict can range from irregular warfare to conventional warfare and combinations of both. Entering into and terminating armed conflict is a political decision. Army forces may enter conflict with some advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during competition. How well Army forces are prepared to enter into an armed conflict ultimately depends upon decisions and preparations made during competition and crisis. 1-73. At the onset of armed conflict, forward-positioned Army forces may defend key terrain or infrastructure while seeking opportunities to gain the initiative or reposition to more favorable locations with partner forces. Army forces help JFCs gain and maintain the initiative, defeat enemy forces on the ground, control territory and populations, and consolidate gains to establish conditions for a political settlement favorable to U.S. interests. Army forces provide landpower to the joint force and conduct limited contingency 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-15 Chapter 1 or large-scale combat operations to ensure enduring political outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Examples of armed conflict include the Vietnam War, OPERATION DESERT STORM, and OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. (See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of Army forces conducting operations during armed conflict. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of Army forces in large-scale combat in maritime environments.) CONSOLIDATING GAINS 1-74. Army commanders must exploit successful operations by continuously consolidating gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any initial operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of competition, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Successful consolidation of gains requires a realistic and pragmatic assessment of strategic conditions, ally and partner legitimacy, friendly and adversary relative advantages, and the viability of a sustainable political outcome. Operations to inform and influence foreign audiences also play a key role in achieving lasting outcomes. 1-75. During competition, Army forces may consolidate gains from previous conflicts for many years as JFCs seek to maintain relative advantages against a specific adversary and sustain enduring political outcomes. U.S. forces in Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Middle East remained in place for decades to consolidate gains made in earlier conflicts. Army forces also consolidate gains by continuously developing multinational interoperability and readiness for large-scale combat operations. 1-76. During armed conflict, Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation as part of defeating the enemy in detail to accomplish overall policy and strategic objectives. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation performed while other operations are ongoing, and they enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span. Tactical units consolidating on an objective can be the first step in consolidating gains. In some instances, Army forces will be the lead for integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other situations, Army forces will be in support of allies and partners. Army forces may consolidate gains for a sustained period over large land areas. Military governments in occupied territories stabilize civilian populations. Military authorities may temporarily govern areas until populations are stable enough for transition to legitimate civilian authorities. This transition of control to civil authorities reduces demands on combat power. 1-77. While Army forces must continuously consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the overall focus of Army forces when large-scale combat operations have concluded. During competition, Army forces may consolidate gains from previous conflicts for many years as JFCs seek to maintain relative advantages against a specific adversary. During crisis, Army forces seek to consolidate whatever gains are made relative to a specific adversary so that the crisis does not occur again. UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest of cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. Sir Julian Corbett 1-78. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains understood through three dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by their physical characteristics. Cyberspace, a manmade network of networks, transits and connects the other domains as represented by the dots shown in figure 1-4. 1-16 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations Figure 1-4. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment Note. Joint doctrine describes the components of an operational environment as the physical areas of the land, maritime, air, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. (See JP 2-0 and JP 5-0 for more information on describing and analyzing an operational environment from a joint perspective.) 1-79. The operational environment model aids in accounting for the totality of factors, specific circumstances, and conditions that impact the conduct of operations. This understanding enables leaders to better identify problems; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions and the effects these actions have on achieving the military end state. A description of an operational environment includes all the factors that the commander and staff need to capture and understand to inform the conduct of operations. 1-80. Knowledge of the operational environment is the precursor to effective action. Obtaining knowledge about an operational environment requires aggressive and continuous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations to acquire information. Information collected from multiple sources and analyzed becomes intelligence that answers commanders’ intelligence requirements. Using all available relevant information to determine how the operational environment affects operations is essential to understanding which courses of action are the most feasible, suitable, and acceptable. Throughout the course of operations, commanders and staffs rely on an integrated information collection effort to develop an accurate picture of their operational environment. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets and as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). 1-81. An operational environment is the totality of factors that affect what occurs in an assigned area. These factors include actors, events, or actions that occur outside the assigned area. How the many entities behave and interact with each other is difficult to discern. No two operational environments are the same, and all of them continually change. Changes result, in part, from opposing forces and actors interacting, learning, and adapting. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-17 Chapter 1 between cause and effect challenging, and it contributes to the uncertain nature of war and human competition. This requires that commanders, supported by their staffs, develop and maintain the best possible understanding of their operational environment. Several tools and processes assist commanders and staffs in understanding their operational environment. They include— z Domains. z Dimensions. z Operational and mission variables (detailed in FM 6-0). z Running estimates (described in ADP 5-0). z Army design methodology (described in ATP 5-0.1). z The military decision-making process (described in ADP 5-0). z Building intelligence knowledge (described in FM 2-0). z Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (described in ATP 2-01.3). z Sustainment preparation of the operational environment (described in FM 4-0). DOMAINS 1-82. Within the context of an operational environment, a domain is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. Each military Service and branch trains and educates its leaders to be experts about operations in a primary domain, although each Service has some capability in each of the domains, and each develops shared understanding of how to integrate capabilities from different domains. Land operations require mastery of terrain and ground maneuver. Cyberspace operations require mastery of digital information systems and computer code. Space, air, and maritime operations likewise require specific capabilities and skills, which manifest themselves in separate Services within the joint force. Although most domains align with the skills developed in a particular Service, no Service focuses entirely upon or exerts total control of that single domain during operations. Joint commanders assign responsibilities and task-organize based on mission requirements. However, the domains present very different conditions of warfare and require the specialized warfighting skills developed by the different Services and subcomponents within each of the Services. Army leaders do not need to understand all the Understanding the strengths and technical components of what the joint force does in other dependencies of joint capabilities in domains, but they do need to understand the complementary each domain is fundamental to a multidomain, combined arms approach and reinforcing ways in which they can request and employ to operations. those capabilities and methods in support of operations on land. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of convergence.) Land Domain 1-83. The land domain is the area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). Variations in climate, terrain, and the diversity of populations have a far greater impact on operations in the land domain than in any other domain. The most distinguishing characteristic of the land domain is the human dimension. Humans transit the maritime, air, and space domains, but they ultimately live, make political decisions, and seek conflict resolution on land. 1-84. The nature of combat on land is unique due to the impacts of terrain on all warfighting functions and the application of combat power. For example, terrain provides forces opportunities for evading detection and increasing survivability. It also provides enemy forces the same opportunities. Although technology increases the range of capabilities, complex terrain causes opposing forces to fight at close ranges. Land combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments containing all types of terrain and potentially nuclear, biological, and chemically degraded environments. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them through close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADP 3-0). The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat. 1-18 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations 1-85. Land-based domain capabilities are able to use or alter the terrain, operate in all forms of weather, and operate among populations. Land capabilities extend operational reach and provide options for enabling joint operations. Long-range artillery provides the joint force with a fires capability that is more survivable in some circumstances than air and maritime fires. Land-based electromagnetic capabilities are capable of jamming enemy communications and C2 systems. Land-based air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities, enabled by space and cyberspace capabilities, provide protection for Army and joint forces. 1-86. The other four domains depend, in some way, on land. Airfields, ports, servers, ground control stations and land-based radars support or enable operations in other domains. Most cyberspace capabilities and all the electricity that powers them depend on land-based networks. The energy that fuels air, space, and most maritime platforms comes from locations on land. 1-87. Operations on land depend on capabilities from other domains. Air lift, sea lift, cyberspace networks, and all non-land based examples of ISR and fires enable operations on land. (See JP 3-31 for information on joint land operations.) Maritime Domain 1-88. The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). It overlaps with the land domain in the seaward segment of the littoral. Maritime capability may be viewed as global, regional, territorial, coastal, and self-defense forces. Only a few navies are capable of sustained employment far from their countries’ shores. However, whether or not their navies are capable of global power projection, most maritime nations also maintain air forces capable of conducting operations over the adjacent maritime domain. This air capability, combined with land-based long-range fires, greatly impacts operations in the maritime domain. 1-89. The Navy and its partners employ five functions in a combined arms approach to provide a unique relative advantage for the joint force. These functions are deterrence, operational access, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. 1-90. Maritime forces move strategic fires capabilities globally, conceal strategic capabilities below the surface of the ocean, transport personnel and equipment over vast distances, and sustain maritime operations for long periods. Maritime forces depend on or require support from the joint force to— z Protect maritime capabilities from enemy interdiction. z Protect ports. z Secure geographic choke points. z Influence populations. z Mitigate long timelines associated with maritime movement. z Compensate for the limited number of available maritime platforms. z Mitigate the inability to replace ships lost during a conflict. 1-91. Army forces rely on maritime capabilities for deployment and sustainment. Additionally, maritime fires and AMD complement and reinforce land-based systems. Army forces assist maritime forces with sea control, projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or control terrain in the landward portion of the littorals. Army long-range fires, attack aviation, AMD, and cyberspace capabilities contribute to local and regional maritime superiority. 1-92. For intratheater operations, Army watercraft provide a capability to move maneuver formations and sustain operations in a maritime environment. Army watercraft systems support joint and combined seabasing and joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). In some circumstances, Army watercraft capabilities can mitigate enemy antiaccess (A2) or area denial (AD) approaches by providing access to shallow coastal waters, rivers, and narrow inland waterways where mature ports or road networks are unavailable. (See JP 3-32 for information on joint maritime operations.) Air Domain 1-93. The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The speed, range, and payload of aircraft, rockets, 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-19 Chapter 1 missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles operating in the air domain directly and significantly affect operations on land and sea. Likewise, advances in AMD, electromagnetic warfare, directed energy, and cyberspace capabilities increasingly contest freedom of maneuver in the air. 1-94. Control of the air and control of the land are often interdependent requirements for successful campaigns and operations. Control of the air provides a significant advantage when attacking strategically valuable targets at long ranges. However, control of the land is necessary for operating secure airfields and protecting other key terrain that enables air operations. The desired degree of control of the air may vary geographically and over time from no control, to parity, to local air superiority, to air supremacy, all depending upon the situation and the JFC’s approved concept of operations. 1-95. Army forces rely on the Air Force and other joint and multinational air capabilities for ISR, strategic attack, close air support, interdiction, personnel recovery, communications, sustainment, and mobility. Air platforms are unencumbered by terrain, but they are vulnerable to detection and interdiction. Effectiveness of air platforms can be contingent upon weather conditions. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance cannot always detect enemy capabilities concealed by vegetation or terrain. The number of sorties air platforms can conduct depends on having control of airfields and their proximity to targets. 1-96. Army aviation provides ground commanders and the joint force with land-focused air capabilities. Joint force commanders and land component commanders establish control measures to enable Army forces to operate unimpeded in the air domain, coordinated when necessary with air capabilities from the other Services. Army aviation (including fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft) provides reconnaissance and surveillance, fires, intelligence, communications, and movement capabilities to Army, joint, and multinational forces. Army rotary-wing aviation uses terrain to protect it from enemy detection. Army forces also have aerial ISR capabilities that support security operations, targeting, delivering precision fires, and information collection. Army land-based AMD capabilities provide protection against enemy air and missile attack. (See JP 3 30 for more information on joint air operations.) Space Domain 1-97. The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical domain in which military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. The U.S. Space Command (known as USSPACECOM) has an area of responsibility that surrounds the earth at altitudes equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers (54 nautical miles) above mean sea level. It has responsibility for planning and execution of global space operations, activities, and missions. 1-98. Proliferation of advanced space technology provides access to space-enabled technologies to a global audience. Some adversaries have their own space capabilities, while commercially available systems allow almost universal access to some level of space-enabled capability with military applications. 1-99. Space capabilities provide information collection; early warning; target acquisition; electromagnetic warfare; environmental monitoring; satellite-based communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing information for ground forces. Activities in the space domain enable freedom of action for operations in all other domains, and operations in the other domains can create effects in and through the space domain. 1-100. Army forces rely on space-based capabilities to enable each warfighting function and effectively conduct operations. Commanders and staffs require an understanding of space capabilities and their effects and the ability to coordinate activities between involved agencies and organizations. Commanders cannot assume that U.S. forces will have unconstrained use of space-based capabilities, including data communications. Therefore, Army forces must be prepared to operate under the conditions of a denied, degraded, and disrupted space domain. (See FM 3-14 for doctrine on Army space operations.) Cyberspace Domain 1-101. For Army forces, the cyberspace domain is the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Cyberspace is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting 1-20 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations nodes that permeate every domain. Cyberspace networks cross geographic and political boundaries to connect individuals, organizations, and systems around the world. Cyberspace allows interactivity among individuals, groups, organizations, and nation-states. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. Cyberspace is congested, contested, and critical to successful operations. 1-102. Cyberspace is dependent on the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Cyberspace operations use links and nodes located in these domains and perform functions to gain access and create effects first in cyberspace and then, as needed, in the other domains. Virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace bandwidth can only be provided via space operations. These interrelationships are important considerations during planning. 1-103. Army forces conduct cyberspace operations and supporting activities as part of both Army and joint operations. Because cyberspace is a global communications and data-sharing medium, it is inherently joint, interorganizational, multinational, and often a shared resource, with signal and intelligence organizations maintaining significant equities. 1-104. Commanders can use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to gain situational awareness and understanding of the enemy through reconnaissance and sensing activities. These reconnaissance and sensing activities augment and enhance the understanding a commander gains from other forms of information collection and intelligence processes. Cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities enable decision making and protect friendly information. They are a significant means for informing and influencing audiences. 1-105. Leaders maintain situational understanding of friendly electromagnetic signatures to assess vulnerabilities. By protecting friendly information systems and signals from disruption or exploitation by an adversary or enemy, a commander can ensure C2 and maintain operations security. Conversely, a commander might use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to slow or degrade an enemy’s decision-making processes by disrupting enemy sensors, communications, or data processing. To achieve an information advantage, a commander must plan early to integrate cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare activities into the overall scheme of maneuver. (See FM 3-12 for more details on cyberspace.) DIMENSIONS 1-106. Understanding the physical, information, and human dimensions of each domain helps commanders and staffs assess and anticipate the impacts of their operations. Operations reflect the reality that war is an act of force (in the physical dimension) to compel (in the information dimension) the decision making and behavior of enemy forces (in the human dimension). Actions in one dimension influence factors in the other dimensions. Understanding the interrelationship enables decision making about how to create and exploit advantages in one dimension and achieve objectives in the others without causing undesirable consequences. Physical Dimension 1-107. The physical dimension is the material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and manufactured, within an operational environment. While war is a human endeavor, it occurs in a material environment, and it is conducted with physical things. Each of the domains is inherently physical. Terrain, weather, military formations, electromagnetic radiation, weapons systems and their ranges, and many of the things that support or sustain forces are part of the physical dimension. Activities or conditions in the physical dimension create effects in the human and information dimensions. 1-108. The electromagnetic spectrum is one of the material characteristics that crosses all the domains. It consists of a range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. The electromagnetic spectrum is relevant in the land, maritime, and air domains because capabilities in those domains depend on electromagnetic spectrum-enabled communications and weapon systems. The electromagnetic spectrum plays a key role in the ability to detect enemy forces that can be identified by their electromagnetic signatures. Conversely, friendly forces must take efforts to mask their electromagnetic signatures to degrade enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts. 01 October 2022 FM 3-0 1-21 Chapter 1 1-109. A physical advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in terms of a combination of quantitative capabilities, qualitative capabilities, or geographical positioning. Physical advantages are most familiar to tactical forces, and they are typically the immediate goal of most tactical operations. Finding enemy forces, defeating enemy forces, and seizing land areas typically requires the creation and exploitation of multiple physical advantages, including occupation of key terrain, the physical isolation of enemy forces, and the destruction of enemy units. While this dominates tactical operations, leaders understand that physical advantages both complement and are complemented by human and information advantages. 1-110. Examples of physical advantage include favorable geography, superior equipment, quantity of resources, and favorable combat power ratios. Superior equipment and favorable geography provide options for seizing the initiative. Superior combat power allows friendly forces to engage enemy forces on favorable terms. The exploitation of physical advantages reduces an enemy force’s capacity to fight, creating information and human advantages. Physical advantages implicitly communicate a message that can influence enemy forces’ will to fight, sway popular support, and influence enemy risk calculus. Information Dimension 1-111. The information dimension is the content, data, and processes that individuals, groups, and information systems use to communicate. Information systems include the technical processes and analytics used to exchange information. The information dimension contains the information itself, including text and images. It also includes the flow or communication pathways of information. Information exchange may be in the form of electromagnetic transmission, print, or speech. The information dimension connects humans to the physical world. 1-112. Information transits through all domains in some way or another, whether in electromagnetic transmissions through cyberspace, radar data collected by a destroyer, leaflets dropped from aircraft, social media messaging, books, or satellite photography collected in and transmitted from space. Information, whether true, false, or somewhere in between, is used by friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actors to influence the perceptions, decision making, and behavior of individuals and groups. Effective employment of information depends on the audience, message, and method of delivery. 1-113. Information is available globally in near-real time. The ability to access information—from anywhere, at any time—broadens and accelerates human interaction, including person to person, person to organization, person to government, and government to government. Social media enables the swift mobilization of people and resources around ideas and causes, even before they are fully understood. Disinformation creates malign narratives that can disseminate quickly and instill an array of emotions and behaviors among groups, ranging from disinterest to violence. From a military standpoint, information enables decision making, leadership, and combat power; it is also a key component of combat power necessary for seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative and consolidating gains. 1-114. An information advantage is the operational benefit derived when friendly forces understand and exploit the informational considerations of the operational environment to achieve information objectives while denying the threat’s ability to do the same. Army forces employ human and physical aspects of the operational environment to gain information advantages. Most types of information advantage result from physical and human factors or activities intrinsic to the operations Army forces conduct. The side possessing better information and using that information more effectively to understand and make decisions has an information advantage. A force that effectively communicates and protects its information while preventing the enemy from doing the same has an advantage. A force that uses information to deceive and confuse an opponent has an advantage. Using information to influence relevant actor behavior more effectively than an adversary or enemy is another information advantage. Human Dimension 1-115. The human dimension encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and groups, how they understand information and events, make decisions, generate will, and act within an operational environment. The will to act and fight emerges from the complex interrelationship of culture, emotion, and behavior. Influencing these factors—by affecting attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and perceptions—underpins the achievement of military objectives. 1-22 FM 3-0 01 October 2022  Foundations of Operations 1-116. Commanders and staffs identify relevant actors and anticipate their behavior. Actors are individuals, groups, networks, and populations. Relevant actors are actors who, through their behavior, could substantially impact campaigns, operations, or tactical actions. From this understanding, commanders develop ways to influence relevant actor behavior, decision making, and will through physical and informational means. 1-117. A human advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in terms of training, morale, perception, and will. Human advantages enable friendly morale and will, degrade enemy morale and will, and influence popular support. Examples of human advantages include leader and Soldier competence, morale of troops, and the health and physical fitness of the force. Forces with a cultural affinity to the population in which they operate are also a form of a human advantage. For Army forces, the mission command approach to C2 is a significant human advantage that enhances the friendly decision cycle. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on mission command.) OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES 1-118. The operational and mission variables are tools to assist commanders and staffs in refining their understanding of the domains and dimensions of an operational environment. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). The operational variables help leaders understand the land domain and its interrelationships with information, relevant actors, and c