Arab-Israeli Conflict: History and Key Events PDF
Document Details

Uploaded by SatisfactoryYew
Open University of Israel
Tags
Related
- Guía Didáctica de Historia Universal Contemporánea 2022 PDF
- ملخص امتحان نهائي القدس PDF 2023/2024
- Unit 3A Inter State Conflicts (Arab-Israeli Conflict) 1948-1979 PDF
- Arab-Israeli Conflict Roots (1880s-WWI) PDF
- Arab-Israeli Conflict (2025) PDF - ASRJC History Past Paper
- Arab-Israeli Conflict History Timeline PDF
Summary
This document appears to be a history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, covering key moments from the late 19th century to the end of the 20th century. It discusses topics like the Ottoman Empire, the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, the Balfour Declaration, the Arab revolt, and the First Intifada. This document will provide a comprehensive look at the conflict, its origins in the region, and its major players.
Full Transcript
Chapter 1: Formative years (end of 19th century to the end of WWII) Guiding Questions 1. What were local Arabs' reactions to Jewish immigration from the late 19th century until 1947? 2. How did World War I affect the Middle East? 3. What British actions facilitate state-building...
Chapter 1: Formative years (end of 19th century to the end of WWII) Guiding Questions 1. What were local Arabs' reactions to Jewish immigration from the late 19th century until 1947? 2. How did World War I affect the Middle East? 3. What British actions facilitate state-building for Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine? 4. How did the Holocaust affect perceptions of Zionism among key international players? The Ottoman Empire By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was in decline. Arab nationalism emerged in response to Ottoman rule and European colonial influence. The empire’s collapse after WWI led to the division of its territories under British and French mandates, with Palestine coming under British control. The empire's fall paved the way for competing national movements, including Arab nationalism and Zionism Hussein McMahon Correspondence 1915-1916 The McMahon–Hussein correspondence is a series of letters that were exchanged during World War I, in which the government of the United Kingdom agreed to recognize Arab independence in a large region after the war in exchange. It did not mention what was the Palestinian territory. The mention of borders was vague. Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916 Signed between the two foreign secretaries of France and Britian. They decided that Palestine will be under the British influence. The Balfour Declaration In 1917 Britian makes the Balfour declaration public (stating that the Jews should have a home in Palestine). In 1920 both the Sykes Picot agreement and the Balfour declation are approved by the league of nations. The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 (not to be confused with 1916) Hitler’s rise to power had, by 1936, resulted in the largest wave of Jewish emigration to Palestine. It also led to the largest ever rebellion by Palestine’s local Arab population, which demanded independence from Britain and an end to British support of Zionist efforts. The rebellion was marked by Palestinian attacks against Jewish civilians and British soldiers, and forceful British measures to suppress the violence. Some 5,000 Arabs, 415 Jews, and 101 British were killed in the clashes. Started with a strike and turned violent eventually. Most of the casualties are Palestians that were killed by the Palestinans themselves. Peel Commission The Arab Revolt events led the British to examine their overall strategy in regards to Palestine with a Royal Commission chaired by Lord Robert Peel. The commission published a report in July 1937 recommending for the first time that Palestine be partitioned into two states: one Jewish, one Arab. They also recommended transfers to ensure “homogenous” states - directly affecting the Palestinans and Jewish lives by forcing them to move. The Arabs would receive 80% of the land, and the Jewish would receive 20%. The Haganah and organizations The Jews created semi-legal self defense orgs. Hashomer - 1909, Haghanah - 1920, etc. Jewish Immigration Waves Zionism brought 5 different waves of immigration of Jews to Palestine, eventually growing from roughly 80K Jews to 600K from 1922 to 1946. The Jewish-Arabs waves of violence started in Nebi-Mussa (1920) and later on there were eruptions of violence the Arabs initiated. The Arabs claimed the reason for those clashes are the waves of Jewish immigration. Haj Amin Al-Husseini Was leading the Arab Revolt in 1936. Fled to Syria after the British closed down the AHC, then Iraq and then Europe. He esteblished the Arab Higher Comittee Chaim Weizman, Emir Faisal Hussein Bin Ali Weizman assists Great Britian’s war efforts. Donated his chemical developments (and patents) to the British Military. In 1919 he signed a secret agreement with Emir Faisal Hussein Bin Ali. The Emir agreed to exclude Palestine from the greater Arab state and Muslim holy sites will stay under their control. In public, however, he made different statements - he denied those statements. Emir Faisal, representing Arab nationalists, initially agreed to the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement, which allowed Jewish immigration to Palestine in exchange for Zionist support in building an Arab state. However, he later reversed his stance, publicly demanding that Palestine be part of Greater Syria and opposing Jewish immigration 1929 Riots ()מאורעות תרפ"ט The 1929 riots were a significant outbreak of violence in Palestine, triggered by tensions over Jewish prayers at the Western Wall. Arab mobs attacked Jewish communities in multiple cities, including Hebron, Safed, and Jerusalem. The violence resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs, with hundreds more wounded. In response, the British forcibly evacuated the Jewish communities of Hebron and Gaza. The Shaw Commission, set up to investigate the riots, concluded that Arab fears of Jewish immigration were a major cause of the unrest. 1930 White Paper Following the findings of the Shaw Commission, the British government issued the Hope Simpson Report and the Passfield White Paper in 1930. These documents recommended limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine and restricting land sales to Jews. The White Paper reflected growing British concerns about maintaining stability in Palestine and addressing Arab opposition to Zionist activities. The policy shift angered Zionist leaders, who saw it as a betrayal of British commitments under the Balfour Declaration 1939 MacDonald White Paper Issued in response to the failed St. James Round Table Conference, this policy statement aimed to resolve the escalating Jewish-Arab conflict by proposing a unitary Palestinian state with both Jews and Arabs within ten years. It imposed restrictions on Jewish immigration (10,000 per year for five years, plus 25,000 refugees) and banned land transfers from Arabs to Jews in most of Palestine. The Zionist movement and the Arab Higher Committee rejected the White Paper, though some Arab factions, like the Nashashibi camp, supported it Sheik Izz a-Din al-Qassam Declared Jihad (holy way) against British and Zionsists in 1935. 1. Challenges the traditional national leadership in Palestine 2. Claimed the (British) mandate is the root cause to all problems - only violence will bring the mandate to an end 3. The “cause” for Jihad was in the name of Islam; not in the name of Palestinian nationalism After killing a British police officer, he was killed by the British police. His ideas remained and the leadership of Jihad changed. Difference in narratives in Britain's roles The Jewish say the British “betrayed” the Jews after they promised the Jews the land, and won’t let them protect themselves from Arab violence. The 1939 Macdonald white paper the British published also supported that claim as the Britians didn’t allow Jewish immigration to Israel as the Holocaust was happening. The Palestinians claimed the British promised Hussein the Greater Syria Plan. However, they published the Balfour declaration and they are “pro Jewish”. They claim the British are demanding the Palestians to compromise but are eventually trying to “trick them”. Chapter 2: the partitioning of Palestine: Nakba and Independence Aftermath of WWII The Holocaust made dramatic change in the international world - sympathy towards the Jewish people. The Jewish leaders in Israel “used” the sympathy and the felt this is the right time to demand a state. Decline of Great Britain and the rise of the US (later causing the Cold War). The need for oil was rising, which raised the importance of the Middle East because of the benefits that come out of it (oil). Importance of the UN - a powerful international tool that steps into the conflict in 1947. New States are now independent - Jordan, Lebanon, Syria (all during the 1900s). Displaced persons: 250K DP (displaced persons) - Jewish in Austria, Germany, Italy etc. after the Holocaust. It became a problem for the international world - where should those people go to? Truman (US president) tries to solve it and approaches the British gov in Palestine. Anglo American Committee & Mirison-Grady Plan 1946 recommendations Two moves that try to solve the DP issue. The committee goes to Palestine to try and see where the DPs can go. They recommend to cancel the 1939 white paper (reverting the no-Jewish immigration to Palestine whitepaper), allow 100K Jewish DP to immigrate to Palestine, divide Palestine into 3 states (Jewish is 20%). The Arabs and Zionists reject the proposals.This effort eventually failed. UNSCOP In Feb 1947 Britian gives back the mandate and the UN creates the United Nations Special Committee of Palestine (UNSCOP). (2 is the )מרי העברי Resolution 181 and 1948 war 29 November 1947 - the partition of Palenstine resolution. The jews accept while the Arabs reject, leading to the intercommunal war. The Arab Liberation Army infiltates Palestine. The 1948 war is divided to two stages: 1. Intercommunal war: Nov 30 1947 - May 14th, 1948 2. Total War: May 15 1948 - 20 July 1949 Stage I of the war: Plan D Turning point of the war: April 1948 (Plan D). Deir Yassin Massacre was a Jewish massacre where 130 Palestians were killed. The Jews captures most of the terroritory that was allocated to them in the Resolution 181. Plan D’s objective: “Take Control of the Territory of the Hebrew State, defend its borders and the settled blocs and Hebrew population outside the borders”. The method: Stage II of the War The five Arab armies invade Israel when the British mandate ends: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. The second stage had three stages: 1. Invasion - May 15 to June 11: a. The agreed plan of the Arab countries: start with Haifa and then Tel Aviv. First objective was Haifa port (Israel’s gateway to the world) while Egypt will try to threaten Tel Aviv. The second objective was Tel Aviv (Israel’s political center) b. The actual action was different from the plan. They all went after their own needs/wishes. E.g., Jordan started with Jerusalem, the Iraqis failed to enter, the Syrians remained in the Golan (as they feared it would be conquered) and the Lebanese stayed in the Galilee. Egyptians stopped at Ashdod and diverted to Jerusalem. 2. 10 days battle - July 1948: didn’t make big differences 3. October 48 - Jan 49: Israel forces Egypt into a ceasefire, Operation Yoav, Operation Hiram The end of the war: Israel signed agreements with all countries except for Iraq. Failure to stop the Israeli independence and the results of the war 1. Determination of Jews and their unity 2. Effective leadership of the Jews 3. Superior organization and military tactics of the Jews Results of the war: the UN saw the results of the war as a temporary state. 1. Atl east 710K Palestinian refugees 2. UN Resolution 194: “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date” 3. UNRWA is created: UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees Nakba Displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestenians. Means “catastrophe” in Arabic and shows the feelings and resentment of Palestinans towards Israel. Count Folke Bernadotte ? Chapter 3: 1956 Israeli-Egyptian war Gamal Abdel Nasser, Nationalism of the Suez Canal Originally a military officer who led the Free Officers Movement that overthrew King Farouk in 1952 Emerged as Egypt's actual leader in 1954, though initially Muhammad Naguib was the figurehead president Officially became president in 1956 Egypt's Nasser saw Egypt as a regional leader - and he wanted to “get rid of” the British. The Brits controlled the Suez canal and benefited from it (taxes, etc). In 1954 the British finally agreed to withdraw from the Suez base. Israel wanted the British to continue to control the Suez canal, leading to an escalation in the relationship with Egypt: - Lavon Affair ()עסק הביש: Israel’s failed attempt to create a “terror attack” against British and American targets in Egypt, to create instability and induce the British government to retain its occupying troops in Egypt's Suez Canal zone. - Bat Galim ship: Israel tries to see if Israeli ships will be able to go through the canal. The Egyptians take over the ship and imprison the crew. - Gaza raid (black arrow operation, )חץ שחור: a response to the Fedayeen that was “too successful” with 39 Egyptian casualties, forcing Egypt to respond. The Egyptians ended up training the Fedayeen and providing them supplies. On July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the canal. This directly affects the British and the French as they now lose revenue from the canal. Fedayeen The Fedayeen were Egyptian-backed (after the Black Arrow operation) guerrilla fighters who conducted raids into Israel from the Gaza Strip in the 1950s. They were actively supported by Nasser's government, which used them to pressure Israel. Their attacks on Israeli civilians and military targets were a major factor leading to the 1956 Suez Crisis, as Israel cited the need to stop Fedayeen raids as one justification for joining Britain and France in attacking Egypt. After the 1956 war and Israel's brief occupation of Gaza, the Fedayeen attacks from Egyptian territory largely ceased, though the term would later be used for other Arab militant groups. Czech-Egyptian arms deal In 1950, the US, GB and France issued the Tripartite declaration: in order to stabilize the Middle East and keep it “balanced”, they will not sell arms to them. Nasser doesn’t want the Western assistance (i.e., American). The Soviet Union reached out to Nasser and promised him advanced weapons through Czechoslovakia, and Nasser signed the deal. The US withdraws from its promises to construct the Aswan dam. Nasser decides to nationalize the canal in order to fund the project instead. Protocol of Sevres A secret agreement made in October 1956 between Britain, France, and Israel to coordinate their attack on Egypt. The plan called for Israel to attack first on a small scale, followed by Britain and France issuing an ultimatum to both sides to withdraw from the canal. When Egypt would inevitably refuse, this would give Britain and France a pretext to intervene militarily to "protect" the canal. Britain and France Israel - Regain control of water passage - Open Tiran Straits for Israeli ships - Protect Jordan - Arms balance after Czech-arms deal - Stop Egyptian involvement in Algeria - Stop anti-Israeli Arab unification effort - Termination of Fedayeen attacks - Improve relationships with Britian, France While the plan was executed, it ultimately failed due to strong U.S. opposition under Eisenhower, international condemnation, and Soviet threats, marking a significant decline in British and French influence in the Middle East. Operation Kadesh + Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza, 1957 Oct 29, 1956 - under Ariel Sharon’s command, paratroopers capture 3 Egtpytians military bases. The Brits issue the ultimatum, and the Brits and French destroy Egypt’s airforce in response. Sharon did not follow the original plan, and conquered more land than planned to. Israel conquers Sinai and Gaza. The French and the UK control portions of the canal and northern ports. International pressure forced the European’s withdrawal from the canal. The UK economy is damaged and its government falls. Israel will withdraw from Gaza and Sinai by March 1957. There are UN forces in Sinai. Israeli ships can now go through the canal. David Ben Gurion From 1921 until 1935, Ben-Gurion served as the general secretary of the Zionist Labor Federation. From 1935 until Israel’s independence in 1948, he was the chairman of the Jewish Agency – the de facto shadow government of the Yishuv. On May 14, 1948, Ben-Gurion declared Israel’s independence and led the newly established state to victory in the 1948 War. He influenced the partition plan (resolution 181) by The Eisenhower Doctrine In 1950, the US, GB and France issued the Tripartite declaration: in order to stabilize the Middle East and keep it “balanced”, they will not sell arms to them. In 1955, the UK and other counties formed the CENTO (Baghdad pact) to secure against Soviet Aggression. Finally, in 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine said that the US will send troops to assist any country in the Middle East that is threatened by Communism. Narratives Israel A sense of regional and international isolation. A sense of strategic vulnerability: One little country against many Arab countries; Small territory (no “strategic depth”); a weak population. Military doctrine: Lightning wars; Preemptive wars; Taking war into enemy territory; Disproportionate use of Force. Aftermath of 1956: Securing free passage in Suez and Tiran; End to Fedayeen attacks from Gaza; Defeating Egyptian army; Ending international isolation; Nuclear arms. Palestinian Palestinians removed from conflict with Israel; Taken over by Arab states. Sense of helplessness and leaderless. Fedayeen and keeping refugee problem alive as resistance; as a way to force Arab states to take up Palestinian cause. WB Palestinians support Jordanian annexation. Support for Nasser, Pan-Arabism, the USSR and socialism. Chapter 4: The 1967 War - the Victory and Naksa The Six Days War Developments leading to the 1967 war: The war is affected by the cold war. There’s a division in the Arab world between Nasser (supported by the Soviet Union) and the Saudis (supported by the USA). There was also a “spirit” of defiance that influenced the Palestinas. There was a crisis in Lebanon in 1958 and they “called for help” as they were threatened by the Muslims. The Americans assist them (the Soviets assist Nasser, who is also involved in Lebanon). The struggle against communism shows by the French leaving Algeria in 1961, and the Civil War erupting in Yemen in 1962 (the Saudis support the kings, whereas the Egyptians support the rebels). The war on the water: In 1963 Israel opened the National Water carrier. The Arabs see it as a change of power, and plan a diversion project to divert the water from the Sea of Galilee; Israel attacks the project leading to its stop by 1965. Arms race in the Middle East. The Arabs want to get stronger and gather arms so they can eventually take over Israel. The Syrians supported the Palestinan’s terror attacks by training them and funding them; they did not allow the attacks to originate from Syria as they didn’t want to be blamed for it. Road to war Operation Focus Start on June 5th, with the IAF attacking Egyptian runways and then Air Force planes, later continuing to Syria and Jordan. It allowed the ground forces to move smoothly. The aftermath of the war Israel tripled its size and was in charge of 1.5M Palestinans post the war. Khartoum Deceleration The Khartoum Resolution, August 1967 ()ועידת חרטום: the Arab leaders convened and agreed to the three No’s - no recognition, no negotiation, no peace. It’s a denial of the Arab defeat. 242 Security Council Resolution The only resolution that was accepted by both sides of the conflict (not the Palestinans themselves, and not the Syrians). It mentions: 1. Withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in recent conflict: does not mention the entire territories, and allows room for negotiation between the parties (Israel doesn’t have to leave ALL the territories gained) 2. Termination of all claims or states belligerent ( )מעשי לוחמהand respect for the acknowledgment of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area, and their right to live i peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force: doesn’t align with Khartoum Resolution as the Arab countries are recognizing Israel and won’t be in a state of war with it. 3. [...] achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem 4. Establishment of demilitarized zones Israeli Settlements In 1967–68, Israeli settlement construction began in Gush Etzion, the location of a former cluster of Jewish settlements from the 1920s that were destroyed during the 1948 War, and in the historically and religiously important city of Hebron. The settlement enterprise gained a significant boost when the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel (known abroad as the Movement for Greater Israel) was established almost immediately after the 1967 War ended. It articulated the demand that Jews should be allowed to settle in any part of “Greater Israel” in order to assert Israel’s sovereignty. By September 1967, the Israeli government authorized the establishment of a settlement outpost in Al-Arish in the occupied Sinai. Six settlements were authorized in the Golan Heights. Fatah Some Palestinian youth reached the conclusion that ther Arab countries were not prepared to commit themselves to as serius confrontation with Israel. Fatah was established in 1959 by Ahmed Shukeiry in East Jerusalem. It represents a new leadership and generation. In 1965 they initiated the armed struggle with the goal of creating a Palestinian state in Israel (all over the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza). Arafat takes over in 1969 as it merged with the PLO. Gamal Abdel Nasser His policies, such as mobilizing military forces and his dramatic decision to close the Straits of Tiran in May 1967, were pivotal in escalating regional tensions, directly contributing to the conditions that led to the 1967 war—a conflict the Arab world would later call the Naksa, or setback Levi Eshkol Israel’s prime minister during this era, steered the country through a complex landscape of threats and limited allies. Throughout the 1960s, Eshkol’s government balanced the need for military readiness with a cautious approach to diplomacy. Faced with intelligence of mounting Arab forces and with secret dialogues hinting at possible negotiations, Eshkol managed a delicate balance: his administration prepared Israel for a preemptive strike while simultaneously engaging in back-channel talks with leaders like King Hussein. His leadership was crucial in the run-up to the 1967 conflict, as his decisions helped define Israel’s defensive and offensive postures during a time when the threat of encirclement and regional isolation loomed large. King Hussein Initially, Hussein attempted to explore diplomatic channels with Israel—reflected in discreet contacts with Israeli officials—in hopes of mitigating conflict and safeguarding Jordan’s interests. However, as tensions escalated and pressures from radical Arab factions and military provocations intensified, he shifted his stance. By committing Jordan to the Arab war effort in 1967—ordering his forces to engage in military operations against Israel—King Hussein underscored the tough choices faced by regional leaders during this volatile era. His decisions during these years illustrate the difficult balancing act between preserving Jordan’s internal stability, honoring Arab nationalist sentiment, and maintaining relations with Western allies. The Naksa (a setback) The outcome of the 1967 war. The Arab leaders and publics reframed the war defeat not as a total collapse, but as a temporary setback. They were determined to eventually reverse the losses. Narratives Israel The Israeli narrative centers on vulnerability and encirclement. Israelis viewed their nation as persistently exposed—surrounded by hostile neighbors and facing the dual threats of military buildup and diplomatic isolation. This perspective justified a preemptive strike as a defensive necessity against what was seen as inevitable aggression from Arab states, bolstered by Soviet backing. Palestine The Palestinian narrative portrays Israel as an illegitimate force that dispossessed Palestinians of their homeland. Here, Israel is seen not merely as a state but as an extension of Western colonial ambitions, with its expansionist policies leaving Palestinians marginalized. Palestinians lament the abandonment by their Arab allies—especially after resolutions like UN 242 were accepted without addressing their core issues—thus fueling a belief in the need for an independent armed struggle. Arab world The broader Arab narrative, which includes Egypt’s and other Arab states’ viewpoints, is characterized by a mixture of collective defiance and pragmatic reinterpretation. While the military defeat in 1967 was a blow, it was reframed as a "Naksa" (or setback) rather than a total collapse. This narrative underscores that, despite the loss of territory, the revolutionary spirit of regimes like Egypt’s endured. The Arab states, in this view, remain united in the long-term goal of overturning Israeli gains, even if immediate military reversal was not possible. Chapter 5: Lesson 5: From Limited War to Limited Accommodation The Allon Plan (October 1967) Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank during this period were guided by the Allon Plan. The plan proposed that Israel would give the main Arab populated area in the West Bank to Jordan, while retaining the Jordan Valley under Israeli control. In 1973, Gush Emunim was formed to initiate settlements in areas exempted from such activity by the Alon plan. War of Attrition ()מלחמת ההתשה Three main phases: 1. Egyptian Sporadic bombing: June 11th, 1967: Bar-Lev line, commando raids 2. Israeli air dominance: bombing the canal cities leads to evacuations of cities like Port Said, Suez and Isamaliya (1 million Egyptians), Israel also targets infrastructure 3. Soviets: Egyptians invite Soviets (airplanes, air-defence), leading to Rogers plan The Rogers Plan (June 1970) Rogers was the secretary of defense of the US. Rogers suggests a few months' ceasefire in order to bring back Resolution 242. The US promises Israel that it won’t need to withdraw from all the territories, won’t need to withdraw any troops until an agreement is reached, and won’t need to “accept” ALL the refugees. The Egyptians eventually accept the plan, probably to get a brother and finish setting up an air defense system. On August 8, 1970, the ceasefire began. A day later, on August 9th, the Egyptians breach the agreement and deploy SAM (surface to air) missiles near the canal. This limited the air superiority of Israel and Egypt. The breach stopped the talks about Resolution 242 for a year and a half. Black September The Palestinians shifted to consolidating their position in Jordan in the hope of using it as a base for conducting border war with Israel. Some Palestinians believed that they were becoming strong enough to challenge Jordan’s King Hussein without being attacked by the Jordanian army. Thus, a fragmented PLO found itself in conflict with its environment as the Palestinians, in attempting to use Jordan as a launching pad for war against Israel, now showed insensitivity to Jordan’s priorities. As a result, the Hashemites now saw the Palestinians as threatening the survival of their kingdom. In September 1970, the Jordanian army reacted to these developments – a turning point that has since become known as “Black September.” During the next ten months, the army destroyed all Palestinian guerrilla groups in Jordan. The Palestinian guerrilla groups moved their bases to Lebanon. They carried out terrorist attacks under the name “Black September Organization” against Israel, Jordan and international targets; including the assisnation of Jordan PM, hijacking an aircraft and the attack on the Israeli Olympics in Munich. Yasser Arafat The leader of the Palestinian struggle. He was the founder and leader of the Fatah movement, chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the first president of the Palestinian Authority. In 1974, he orchestrated the adoption of the PLO Provisional Program. In 1988, he accepted the two-state paradigm for future negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Arafat agreed to Palestinian participation in the 1991 Madrid Conference, accepting a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation. He later oversaw the negotiations of the 1993 Oslo Accords, earning him the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize. In July 2000, he participated in the failed negotiations with Israel at Camp David. Anwar Saddat Egypt President Nasser died in September 1970 and was replaced by Saddat. As new President, he took three important steps: 1. Offered Israel a 30 day ceasefire: Israel would withdraw from Sinai and the Suez canal would be reopened 2. Endorse the Jarring mission (UN-led diplomatic effort aimed at resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict following the Six-Day War by facilitating negotiations under UN Security Council Resolution 242) 3. Expelled roughly 7.5K Soviet advisors and closed some Soviet military bases in Egypt Was assisnated in Egypt in OCt 1981 after the Camp David accords. Yom Kippur War (Oct 1973 War) Began on October 6th, 1973 with a coordinated Egtpytian-Syrian attack. The phases: 1. The surprise attack, the capturing of the Bar Lev line and Golan Heights. Israel fails to counterattack 2. Second phase: Israel focuses on on the Syrian front and pushed the Syrian army beyond the 1967 lines 3. Third phase: the Egyptians attempt to assault in Sinai and fail. The IDF units follow up by crossing the Suez Canal and battling. The Arab countries impose an oil embargo targeting Western countries that seen as supporting Israel: a. They agree to reduce their oil production by 5 percent each month b. Countries supporting Arabs to pressuring Israel to withdraw from the 1967 captured territories were exempted c. Boycotting direct oil export to the US and the Netherlands 4. Fourth phase: Israeli attempts to hold the west side of the Suez canal and capturing Suez city. The Soviets send a nuclear ship to the area, and US responds with sending one of its own as well. Fighting stops on October 22nd when the parties accept a ceasefire. The aftermath of the war incuded Kissinger’s visit and the talks with Egypt, along with the failed Geneva peace conference. United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 Resolution 338 called for a ceasefire, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242, and negotiations “aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.” It was accepted by Israel and the relevant Arab states including Syria, which had rejected UNSC Resolution 242 when it was first adopted in 1967. Henry Kissinger and the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreements US Secretery of State. He visited the area after the end of the 1973 war and launched direct Israeli-Egyptian talks. He also led the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements. The first agreement was signed on Jan 18, 1974. Egypt agreed to reduce its troops on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from the and west of the canal. the signing of the second Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement on September 1, 1975. The agreement stipulated further Israeli withdrawals to the Sinai passes, the establishment of an early warning system, the deployment of a UN monitoring force, and the passage of non-military goods through the Suez Canal. The two countries also agreed that their dispute would be resolved solely by peaceful means and that both parties “consider the agreement an important step towards a permanent and just peace.” Narratives Palestinian Narrative: 1. Self-Reliance: Palestinians increasingly felt abandoned by Arab states and emphasized independent decision-making in their struggle against Israel. 2. Violence as a Tool: Acts of violence, including hijackings and the Munich attack, were seen as ways to gain international attention rather than to provoke all-out Arab-Israeli war. 3. Betrayal by Arab States: The Jordanian crackdown in 1970 (Black September) and subsequent Arab negotiations with Israel reinforced the perception that Arab leaders prioritized their national interests over Palestinian liberation. 4. Israeli Occupation: The post-1967 focus shifted from refugee return to opposing Israeli occupation, which was seen as a systematic effort to erase Palestinian national identity through settlement expansion. 5. Shift to Diplomacy: While "armed struggle" remained central, the PLO gradually explored diplomatic engagement, leading to the 1974 "Phased Program" that introduced pragmatic elements to their strategy. Egyptian Narrative: 1. Restoring Sovereignty: Egypt’s primary goal was reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula, lost in 1967, through both limited war (War of Attrition and 1973 War) and diplomacy. 2. Superpower Constraints: Egypt viewed the U.S. and USSR as limiting its military options, prompting efforts to break away from Soviet influence, including the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. 3. War as Leverage: The 1973 War was seen as a necessary step to re-engage the world diplomatically and show Israel that continued occupation was unsustainable. 4. Arab Solidarity: While the oil embargo and some Arab military participation helped, Egypt believed it carried the main burden of the war and that Syria did not contribute enough. 5. Victory and Diplomacy: Despite Israeli counterattacks, Egypt viewed the war as a success because it forced Israel into diplomatic concessions, setting the stage for peace talks. Syrian Narrative: 1. Betrayal by Egypt: Syria felt that Sadat misled them by not fully committing to an all-out offensive in 1973, allowing Israel to focus on defeating Syria. 2. Focus on the Golan Heights: Unlike Egypt, Syria’s primary objective was recovering the Golan Heights rather than broader territorial or diplomatic goals. 3. Skepticism of Diplomacy: Syria remained unconvinced that negotiations could bring results, initially rejecting UNSC Resolution 338. 4. Superpower Distrust: Assad was wary of Soviet control over Syrian policy and refused to sign a treaty of friendship, fearing it would limit Syria’s military independence. 5. Limited Engagement: By 1975, Syria reluctantly engaged in U.S.-led diplomacy but did so out of necessity rather than a shift in ideology. Jordanian Narrative: 1. Palestinian Challenge: Jordan saw the Palestinian guerrilla movement as a direct threat to its sovereignty, culminating in the 1970 Black September crackdown. 2. Hashemite Legitimacy: Jordan argued that its loss of the West Bank in 1967 legitimized its continued claim to represent the Palestinians. 3. Arab Isolation: The 1974 Rabat Summit, which declared the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinians, sidelined Jordan diplomatically. 4. Limited War Participation: Jordan hesitated to join the 1973 War but eventually sent troops to Syria, seeking a role in post-war diplomacy. 5. Failed Diplomatic Hopes: Jordan’s attempt to regain influence over the Palestinian question through negotiations failed when Kissinger’s diplomacy focused on Egypt and Syria. Chapter 6: Camp David and the Lebanon War Camp David Accords (1978), Begin, Carter The two disengagement agreements signed in 1974 and 1975, that allowed Israeli withdrawals from Egypt, were important positive developments in the Israeli-Egyptian relationship. Begin was elected as PM in 1977 as a part of the Likud ()המהפך. He met with Carer (US President) and agreed to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Assad refused to participate, and Israel refused for any PLO presence it such conference. Sadat said he would “go to the end of the universe” to end the conflict and on Nov 19, 1977 he traveled to Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset. He called for the establishment of peace predicated on Israel's withdrawal from the 1967 territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Arab states suspended the relationships with Sadat in response. President Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to Camp David on September 6-17. It produced two agreements: (1) principles for a peace treaty and the return of Sinai to Egypt and (2) a format of negotiating a five year autonomy regime in the West Bank and the Gaza regions. The Fahd Plan (Saudi Arabia) A plan proposed by the Saudi Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz in 1981. It came after the Camp David accords and aligned with the shift of some countries that started believing the a military solution to the Israeli conflict is impossible, and a political settlement was inveitable. It called on Israel to withdraw from all the territories it conquered in June 1967 and dismantle the settlements it constructed in these territories, including those in East Jerusalem. The Fahd Plan also proposed that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip be held under UN supervision for a transitional period that would not exceed a couple of months. It also called for the establishment of a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and it affirmed the Palestinians’ right of return in addition to guaranteeing the right of worship for all religions in the Holy Places. Israel was not mentioned by name; instead, the plan affirmed “the right of all countries in the region to live in peace.”16 It was adopted by the Twelfth Arab Summit held in Fez on September 9, 1982, where it won the endorsement of the Arab League. Israeli Knesset Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel On July 30, 1980, Israel passed a new legislation that stated Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel. It didn’t mention the boundaries of the city, of changed the status of Palestininas living in East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 478, declaring it was a violation of international law, and that the law is “null and void”. Lebanese Civil War, Operation Litani Political, religious, and socioeconomic divisions and a growing Palestinian “state within a state” fueled the descent into a civil war that divided the country into numerous political and religious factions. It lasted from 1975 to 1990. The Palestinans set base in the country’s south, and started firing Katyusha rockets against Israel. In March 1978, the IDF advanced to the Litani River to clear the PLO (mostly Fatah) fighters and weapons. It then tried to create a “security zone”. First Lebanon War (1982) The PLO led multiple operations against Israel, leading to many deaths on the Israeli side. The Israelis launched operations themselves that caused deaths and led Lebanese to leave their villages. The First Lebanon War (1982) was launched by Israel under the leadership of IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Raphael Eitan with the goal of expelling Palestinian groups from Lebanon, defeating Syrian forces, and empowering Israel’s Maronite Christian allies. It started with Operation Peace for Galilee - “a preventive war” as seen in Israel. However, Syria resisted more than expected, and Israel's Maronite allies lacked the strength to control Lebanon. After the assassination of Bashir Jumail, Maronite forces massacred civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, leading to global condemnation. Israel began withdrawing from Beirut, with foreign forces, including U.S. Marines, intervening to oversee the evacuation of Palestinian fighters. The war achieved its goal of expelling the PLO, relocating its headquarters to Tunisia, but it also destabilized Lebanon and contributed to the rise of Shi’a militancy in the region. The Amman Accords (Jordan and the PLO), Reagan Plan, Sabra and Shatila Massacre, London Agreement In September 1982, the US announced the Reagan plan, which called for negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinan federation. Israel immediately rejected the plan, and after Jordan failed to find partners within the Palestinans it also rejected it. The plan’s implementation was aborted after the Sabra and Shatila Massacre and the bombing of US marines barracks in Lebanon. Following an Egyptian mediation, Jordan and the PLO were able to reach an understanding: the Amman Accord. It was signed in February 1985 and its core was an agreement to reach a settlement with Israel based on Israel’s withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories. Arafat (and the PLO) eventually refused to endorse the UN two states resolution. EVentually, King Hussein of Jordan opened a secret negotiation with Israel in 1986, while the country’s leadership still had the Labor Party (in a unity government). It led to the London Agreement in April 1987, calling for the Palestinian issue to be resolved based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. It required all parties to denounce terrorism and violence, implying the PLO won’t take part in the negotiations. Israeli withdrawal to the security zone The Israeli withdrawal to the security zone followed a series of events that undermined its ability to maintain control in Lebanon. Initially, Israel attempted to establish a "security zone" in southern Lebanon by supporting a local militia led by Major Saad Haddad, composed mainly of Shi’a and Christians. However, this militia had limited effectiveness, as the PLO was able to rebuild positions just north of the zone and continue launching Katyusha rockets into Israel. The turning point came with the international outcry following the Sabra and Shatila massacre, which forced Israel to begin withdrawing from Beirut. The involvement of foreign troops, including U.S. Marines, to secure the Palestinian evacuation further reduced Israel’s control over the situation Osiraq bombing The Israeli narrative with regard to the June 1981 bombing of Osiraq reactor was Holocause-driven. Sadam Hussesin, the Iraqi president, seemed committed to the acquisioon of nuclear weapons, which put the Zionism idea at risk. Narratives Israeli Narrative Israel viewed the Lebanon War as a necessary operation to eliminate the PLO’s military presence in Lebanon and protect northern Israeli communities from rocket attacks. Initially presented as a limited operation (pushing the PLO 45 km north), it expanded into a broader conflict aimed at restructuring Lebanon’s political landscape. However, as the war escalated, Israel lost control of the situation, leading to international condemnation, particularly after the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The withdrawal was seen as a reluctant response to mounting pressure, with the security zone maintained as a buffer against continued threats. Palestinian Narrative Palestinians saw the invasion of Lebanon as an extension of Israeli aggression, aimed at destroying their national movement. The PLO's forced evacuation from Beirut to Tunisia was interpreted as an attempt to politically and militarily weaken Palestinian aspirations for statehood. The Sabra and Shatila massacre was viewed as further proof of Israeli complicity in Palestinian suffering. The Israeli withdrawal to the security zone did not alter the perception that Israel continued to exert military control over Lebanon’s south, preventing full Palestinian sovereignty. Arab World Narrative The Arab states were divided in their responses. Some, like Syria, resisted Israeli advances directly, while others, like Jordan and Egypt, distanced themselves. The broader Arab world saw the war as another example of Israeli expansionism and an effort to reshape the region to its advantage. The withdrawal was interpreted as an Israeli failure to control Lebanon, proving that military force alone could not impose a new political order. However, Arab nations remained concerned about continued Israeli influence in the security zone and its impact on regional stability. Chapter 7: from the First Intifada to Madrid and Oslo The First Intifada Broke out after the November 1987 Arab League Summit. The term refers to a collective action taken by masses to demonstrate their rejection of the status quo. For the Palestinian, it meant spontaneous action in response to the occupation. It begun after an Israeli settler was stabbed to death, to which an Israeli truck ran over and killed 4 in response. The Palestinans started large demonstrations, which started nonviolent and slowly became violent. The first Intifiada harmed Israel’s reputation, caused the death of 160 Israelis and 2,000 Palesttinans, and helped both Hamas and Fatah rise. Hamas Founded shortly after the eruption of the First Intifada, in 1987. Because the PLO was driven out of Lebanon, the “inside Palestinians” took matter to their own hands. While it started by providing social services, it turned violent after the Oslo Accords. In the Second Intifada, it played a central role in a large number of suicide bombing in Israeli cities. It also won the Palestinan elections in 2006 and took over the Gaza Strip in 2007. Islamization of the Palestinian Political Scene Madrid Peace Conference (1991) After the success of the American-led coalition in the first Gulf War, the Bush administration launched a major effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. On October 30th, 1991, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation attended the Madrid Peace Conference under a joint sponsorship of the US and the Soviets. Israel was led by the Likud party, which clashes with the Bush administration. The administration threatened to deny the $10 billion dollars loan guarantee that Israel needed to absorb the Soviet Union immigrants to Israel. The talks led to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Yitzhak Rabin The Architects of Oslo and the Oslo Accords (1993) In 1993 Arafat authorized the PLO and non-PLO officials to engage some non-officials from Israel and negotiate. Those talks led to the Oslo Accords, and some of the architects of the accords were: 1. Abu Mazen - second in command in Fatah 2. Abu Ala - chief Palestinan negotiatior 3. Yossi Belin - deputy foreign minister By September 1993, the talks produced a Declaration of Principles for resolving the Palestinan-Israeli conflict - the Oslo Accords. It included: 1. Israel would transfer jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians for up to five years, excluding permanent status issues. 2. The interim period would start with Israel withdrawing from Gaza and Jericho, followed by further West Bank withdrawals. 3. Permanent status negotiations would begin by the third year and resolve key issues like refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, and security by the end of the interim period. 4. Palestinians would hold free elections, form a governing council, and rule democratically. 5. The Palestinian Authority would establish a police force for internal security, while Israel remained responsible for external defense and Israeli security. 6. Israel would retain control over areas not transferred to the Palestinians and ensure overall security in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israeli settlements. Arafat and Peres later exchanged letters. Arafat affirmed the PLO recognized Israel and Resolutions 242 and 338, along with renouncing violence. Peres recognized PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty A year after Oslo. Israel and Jordan agreed to establish peace and full diplomatic relations, along with: 1. An agreement of international borders, along with an exchange of territories and a lease of areas 2. An agreement of water, where Israel committed to make some water available for Jordan every year 3. A pledge that neither side would permit its territory to be used as a staging area by a third country for military strikes against the others 4. Israel would give Jordan high priority in claims to Islamic sites in Jerusalem when it’s negotiation with the Palestinians 5. A commitment to resolve the Jordan refugees problem 6. A commitment by the two sides to broad cooperation in tourism, water, energy, transportation, environmental protection, agriculture and economic development Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Narratives Israeli Narrative Israel initially viewed the First Intifada (1987) as a strategic shift by the Palestinians, presenting themselves as underdogs (David) against the heavily armed Israeli forces (Goliath). While Israelis perceived the uprising as violent, it also signaled a turning point—convincing many that controlling the West Bank and Gaza indefinitely was unsustainable. The Oslo Accords (1993) were seen as a pragmatic compromise, with Israel agreeing to limited Palestinian self-rule in exchange for peace and the PLO's commitment to end armed struggle. The peace treaty with Jordan (1994) was welcomed as a strategic and economic gain, further legitimizing Israel in the region. Palestinian Narrative Palestinians saw the First Intifada as a necessary response to Israeli occupation and economic exploitation. It demonstrated that nonviolent resistance could shift global perception and pressure Israel into negotiations. The PLO’s 1988 Declaration of Independence marked a pragmatic shift, embracing a two-state solution to gain international legitimacy. Palestinians had mixed feelings about Oslo—many saw it as a step toward sovereignty, but others believed it granted Israel too much without securing key Palestinian rights, particularly regarding settlements and Jerusalem. Arab World Narrative The Arab world largely supported the First Intifada, seeing it as a resurgence of the Palestinian cause after diplomatic failures in the 1980s. The Madrid Peace Conference (1991) and Oslo Accords were cautiously welcomed, as they signified Israel's engagement in peace talks with the Palestinians and Arab states. However, there were concerns that separate peace treaties, such as Jordan’s with Israel, could weaken collective Arab bargaining power. Egypt, having pioneered peace with Israel, saw the peace process as vindication of its earlier diplomatic efforts. Jordan navigated shifting alliances, ultimately embracing peace with Israel to regain favor with the U.S. and stabilize its economy.