Arab-Israeli Conflict (2025) PDF - ASRJC History Past Paper

ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 1 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1948-1979) 2 CAUSES, DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF CON...

ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 1 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1948-1979) 2 CAUSES, DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT Questions to Guide Understanding: 1. Why did the Arab-Israeli conflict break out in 1948? 2. Why did the Arab-Israeli conflict remain protracted from 1948 until 1979? 3. How effective were attempts at managing the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 until 1979? Overview of Topic 1. Causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict (1947-1972) 2. Role of the Actors in the Development of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict (1947-1972) 3. Effectiveness of Conflict Management of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict (1947-1972) 2.1 Overview of the Frames of Understanding the Conflict 2.1.1 Understanding the Causes of the Conflict A critical learning point is our consideration of the causes shaping the development of the conflict. We can understand this in terms the role of different historical actors, Historical Actor / Player We can think about how various historical actors participated in terms of the actions they took and the impact of their actions that resulted in shaping and influencing the development of the conflict. An important point to note is their motivations that shaped their actions. These actors can cause, intensify, protract, or abate the conflict. i. Local Actors: Jews/Israelis Palestinians Arab nations – Egypt, Syria, Jordan ii. External Actors: USA USSR Britain France United Nations Nature / Category of Cause We can also understand the causes by looking at the different categories of causes. Possible factors include: i. Colonialism ii. Decolonisation iii. Security / Strategic iv. Territorial sovereignty v. Nationalism vi. Religious vii. Economic interests  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 2 Events When examining the key events shaping the development of the conflict, we should consider the significance of these events, specifically in considering the impact of these historical events that shape the pace and direction of the conflict. We should take note of how these events contributed to the intensification, de-escalation of tensions, protraction of the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations. i. UN partition in 1947 ii. First Arab-Israeli War / War of Independence in 1948 iii. Suez Crisis in 1956 iv. Six-Day War in 1967 v. Yom Kippur War in 1973 vi. Camp David Accords 1978 vii. Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979 2.1.2 Overview of the Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Date Main Events Feb 1947 Britain brings the Palestine issue to the UN 29 Nov 1947 UNGA passes resolution to adopt the UN Partition Plan 14 May 1948 Israel declares its independence 15 May 1948 Outbreak of the War of Independence (Al-Nakba) May 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) is established 1949 Israel signs separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 29 Oct 1956 Israel invades Sinai resulting in the outbreak of the Suez Crisis Nov 1956 UNSC passes resolution to create United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) June 1967 Israel launches attacks on Egypt, Jordan and Syria resulting in the outbreak of the Six Day War Nov 1967 UNSC passes Resolution 242 (Land-for-Peace formula) 6 Oct 1973 Egypt and Syria launch attack Israel resulting in the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War 21 Oct 1973 UNSC passes Resolution 338 that called for a ceasefire on the Yom Kippur War 25 Oct 1973 Creation of United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) 18 Jan 1974 Israel-Egypt Disengagement Agreement (Sinai I Accord) 1 Sept 1975 Second accord signed between Israel and Egypt (Sinai II Accord) May 1974 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is established to ensure a buffer zone between Israel and Syria Sept 1978 Camp David Accords Mar 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty 2.1.3 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Conflict Management Another critical point in our examination of the Arab-Israeli conflict is assessing the effectiveness of efforts managing the conflict. While the conflicting countries tried to negotiate for peace, their own interests led to deadlocks. This required the intervention of the superpowers and the United Nations to broker peace between the two nations. Some examples of the efforts to manage the conflict are bilateral negotiations, mediation assisted by external powers or international organisations such as the UN, ceasefires, agreements and treaties.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 3 It is important to consider what the indicators of effectiveness conflict management are to determine the extent of effectiveness. We can do so by first considering some indicators of effective conflict management. i. Long-term resolution of the conflict – Combatant countries are not in conflict with each other and peace is sustained. ii. Short-term resolution of the conflict – Resolution of the conflict with short-term peace achieved. These can be indicated by signing of peace agreements and treaties and general peace in the region. iii. Negotiations to foster peace – Bilaterial negotiations, mediation. These might not necessarily have positive outcomes but the efforts to negotiate shows a decline in tensions. iv. Ceasefire between combatants – can be temporary or long-term ceasefires 2.1.4 Overview of the Arab-Israeli Conflict The Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East manifested most clearly in several wars fought between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states, beginning with the War of Independence or Al Nakba in 1948. This complex conflict necessarily emerged out of a complex web of factors. Both long-term factors, such as the rise of competing Jewish and Arab nationalisms in the late 19 th and early 20th centuries, and short-term ones, such as the 1947 United Nations (UN) Partition Plan, interacted to shape the outbreak of the conflict. Likewise, the conflict also grew out of the interaction between the local actors – the Jews and the Arabs – and external ones like the British, the superpowers (who were driven by their Cold War interests), and the United Nations. As such the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be simply understood as a regional conflict, but also one that was part of the larger Cold War conflict between the superpowers. Clashing Nationalisms Outbreak UN of the Partition Arab-Israeli Competing Economic Conflict Plan Religious Divisions Identities Great Power Emerging Interests Cold War Late 19th Century - 1947 1947 - 1948 1948  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 4 After the outbreak of war in 1948, more wars followed, in 1956, 1967, and 1973. Despite attempts to resolve each war, many fundamental issues remained unresolved (such as issue of Israeli sovereignty and the Palestinian issue), and the Arab-Israeli conflict became more and more embroiled in the Cold War between the superpowers. Moreover, each Arab-Israeli war not only represented the protracted nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict but also left an imprint on the development of the conflict itself. Eventually, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979, which effectively brought an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, this did not resolve the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people. 2.1.5 Context to the Conflict: The Land and Its People The area of land in the Middle East upon which the Arab-Israeli conflict would erupt is called Palestine by some, and Israel by others. It lies between the eastern Mediterranean coast and the River Jordan. Today, the state of Israel comprises about 80% of what historically was called Palestine, and Israel also controls much of the rest of this land. Going back to the 1st century CE and earlier, the Jews lived in Palestine, along with other peoples such as the Philistines. From the 1st century CE, Palestine was effectively under Roman rule. The Romans crushed Jewish resistance and expelled most of the Jews in 135 CE. After this, Jewish communities were dispersed throughout the Middle East, Europe, and North Africa, constituting the Jewish Diaspora. Map of Israel and its neighbours in the Middle East in 2023. Israel has occupied the Thereafter, until the 7th century CE, most of the people West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights living in Palestine were Christian, although there was a since the 1967 War. small number of Jews. Then, in 636 CE, the area was conquered by Arabs inspired by a new religion – Islam – that had emerged in the Arabian peninsula. The Arabs established a vast empire, which eventually stretched as far as Spain in the west and the Himalayas in the east. In 1516 CE, Palestine became part of the Ottoman Empire, when the Ottoman Turks, from their heartlands in modern-day Turkey, conquered a large part of the Arab empire in the Middle East and North Africa. Palestine remained part of the Ottoman Empire for the next 400 years. Most of the population were Arabic-speaking Muslims, who called the land Filastin or Palestine, although small Jewish and Christian communities continued to live there. By the end of WWI, the regional balance of power had been altered considerably. The Great War brought about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and its division into several smaller political units. These would later become the independent Arab states of the contemporary Middle East. Map of the Ottoman Empire at its greatest extent in 1683 CE.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 5 Britain and France assumed direct administrative responsibility for the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. Britain was given the authority by the League of Nations to administer the land known as Palestine as a Mandate between 1920 and 1948 but struggled to maintain order in the face of rising nationalist demands and growing conflict between the Arab and Jewish communities for control of Palestine. Britain itself was partly responsible for stoking this situation by giving contradictory assurances of support to both the Arabs and Jews during WWII (this will be covered in the following sections). The historical land of Palestine therefore provided the context for the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The indigenous Arab population, which comprised two-thirds of the population by the mid- 1940s, opposed for a variety of reasons the increasing immigration of Jews to Palestine. This struggle would eventually explode into open conflict in 1948. 2.2 Long-Term Causes of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 2.2.1 Long-Term Origins: Conflicting Nationalisms At the very heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict lies the dispute between two opposing nationalisms vying for exclusive political and territorial control over Palestine and demographic supremacy within it. Jewish immigrants and their descendants, guided by the nationalist ideology of Zionism (this will be explained in the following section), collided with the Palestinian Arab majority inhabiting the land, whose nationalist sentiments developed in response to the arrival of Zionism upon their shores. The political dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict can thus be traced to the fact that Palestine was a ‘twice-promised land’, one that the British promised to both Jews and Arabs. Source 2.2.1 A The struggle for control over some or all of the territory in Palestine pits two nationalist movements against each other. In spite of their claims to uniqueness, all nationalist movements bear a remarkable resemblance to one another. Each constructs a historical narrative that traces the unbroken lineage of a group – a nation – over time. Each endows the site of the nation’s birth or greatest cultural or political movement with special meaning. Each uses its purported “special relationship” to some territory to justify its right to establish a sovereign state in that territory. This is where nationalism differs from mere nostalgia or collective memory. Whereas all sorts of religious and ethnic groups feel sentimental attachment to places, nationalism converts sentiments into politics. The adherents of a nationalist movement demand exclusive sovereignty over the designated territory and, for their nation, membership in the global order of nation-states. When it comes to connecting history and geography to political rights, neither Zionism nor Palestinian nationalism is a slacker. Historian James Gelvin explains the significance of nationalism in the struggle for Palestine in his book, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, 2005.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 6 2.2.1.1 Jewish Nationalism (Zionism) After their dispersal from Palestine at the hands of the Romans in 130 CE, the focus of Jewish life eventually shifted to Europe. For many centuries, the Jews suffered persecution, much of it being religious persecution by Christians based on their prejudice about the religious beliefs of the Jews. However, with the rise of nationalism in Europe along ethnic and racial lines, nineteenth- and early- twentieth-century anti-Semitism1 was primarily directed at Jews as an alien national group within nations rather than as a religious group among other religions. By stigmatising Jews as an alien nation rather than as a religious group, the new anti-Semitism inspired the birth of modern political Zionism as Jews came to consider whether consider whether, if they were a national group, they needed a land-based nation of their own. The father of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, advocated a territorial solution to the Jewish ‘problem’. He argued that, since the Jews were a people who had not been allowed to assimilate into European life, they had to unite in a state of their own. Under his leadership, the first Zionist Congress was held in 1897, which aimed at creating a “home” for the Jews in Palestine – the land of their ancestors. Theodor Herzl Source2.2.1 B The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end: 1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonisation of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers. 2. The organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance to the laws of each country. 3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness. 4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism. The First Zionist Congress: Basel Declaration, August 1897. During WWI, British Zionists, led by Chaim Weizmann, worked hard to win the support of the British government for a Jewish homeland. In 1917, they received a great boost. The British were bogged down in their fighting with Germany and were very keen to bring the US fully into the war. In part because of this, the British declared their support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. They believed that this would persuade American Jews to wield their significant influence to press the US government to pursue war with vigour. The British declaration was made in the form of a letter by British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, a leading British Jew, in November 1917. The wording of this letter, which came to be known as the Balfour Declaration, was carefully chosen. It spoke of a “national home” rather than “state” and it Arthur Balfour specified that nothing should be done to “harm the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”. However, it conflicted in spirit, if not in detail, with the commitments that Britain had already made to the Arabs. 1 Anti-Semitism refers to hostility to, prejudice towards, or discrimination against Jews.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 7 The Balfour Declaration gave the Zionist movement the legitimacy and international recognition needed to gain a foothold in Palestine and progress towards establishing their homeland there. Furthermore, when Britain was granted Mandatory authority over Palestine by the League of Nations, it subsequently turned the Balfour Declaration into a legally binding statute in 1922 and backed Jewish immigration to the territory. Source 2.2.1 C Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by the Cabinet. His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. Yours Sincerely, Arthur James Balfour The Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917. Faced with the ascendancy of Hitler’s regime and rabid anti-Semitism in Europe during the 1930s, Jews left the continent in significant numbers for Palestine. Between 1930 and 1936 alone, the Jewish population rose from 164,000 to 370,000, coming to form over 25% of the population of Palestine. The culmination of anti-Semitism in the Jewish Holocaust, which devastated Europe’s Jewry during WWII, proved instrumental in generating a strong desire amongst its survivors to secure their future in their own hands, through Jewish statehood. The early Zionists in Europe had coined the slogan, “A land without a people for a people without a land”, due to their perception of Palestine’s desolation under the Ottoman Empire. “Zion”, however, was not an empty land waiting for the Jews to simply claim and possess it. It was the home of another increasingly politically conscious people, the Palestinian Arabs. 2.2.1.2 Arab Nationalism Arab nationalism is the belief that the Arab people constitute a single political community or nation, which should be either independent and united under common government or a set of independent allied Arab states. Modern Arab nationalism emerged within the context of the Arab renaissance or awakening which began at the end of the eighteenth century. This renaissance was in part a response to the challenge of modernisation but also an engagement with European nationalist ideas of freedom, independence, equality, and progress. During WWI, Britain also made pledges to Arab warlords and nationalist groups, promising to support their independence from Turkish rule if they aligned themselves with the British against the  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 8 Ottoman Empire, which was allied to Germany. During 1915 and 1916, there was an exchange of letters (the McMahon letters) between the Arab leader in Mecca, Sherif Hussein bin Ali, and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon. McMahon informed Hussein that Britain was “prepared to recognise and support the independence” of the Arabs. Assured of British support, the Arabs began their revolt against Turkish rule in June 1916. Together with a British force from Egypt, they succeeded in defeating the Turks by the end of WWI. The Arabs now expected the British to honour the commitment they had made to support Arab independence. The McMahon letters were vague, however, about the precise geographical details of this future Arab state. In short, the British desire to gain political allies to win allies resulted in Sherif Hussein bin Ali contradictory commitments that intensified political differences between the Arab nations and Jews. Source 2.2.1 D I am convinced...this…will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them. Excerpt from the McMahon Letter, 24 October 1915. Moreover, even before the 1916 Arab Revolt had started, Britain had made a conflicting deal with France. In the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement reached in 1916, both countries agreed to divide up the Ottoman Empire. Part of the Arab lands would come under direct British or French rule, while the rest would be made up of self-governing Arab states under indirect British or French control. By the terms of this agreement, Britain would control Palestine, an arrangement that contradicted the undertakings made in the McMahon letters. Further complicating matters was the Balfour Declaration. The Arab nationalist movement was by no means unified. Not only did it have to contend with different views on the type of political system the Arab people should aim for, it also had to deal with leadership contests and the emergence of separate localised nationalisms. A distinct Palestinian nationalism was one such split. However, this did not start to develop until Palestine came under British mandate, and Jewish immigration and institution-building became perceived as a threat to the local Arab population. To the local Arabs, Palestine was an Arab land whose soil they had cultivated for generations and entitled to independence as any other Arab country. They felt that their political aspirations for self-government and control over their own lives and destinies were frustrated by the growing influx of Jews (to them a religious Map of the Middle East after the First World War showing the British and French mandates.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 9 minority and not a nationality, who thus did not qualify for self-determination). Source 2.2.1 E The whole Arab people is unalterably opposed to the attempt to impose Jewish immigration and settlement upon it, and ultimately to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Its opposition is based primarily upon right. The Arabs of Palestine are descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the country, who have been in occupation of it since the beginning of history; they cannot agree that it is right to subject an indigenous population against its will to alien immigrants, whose claim is based upon a historical connection which ceased effectively many centuries ago. Moreover they form the majority of the population; as such they cannot submit to a policy of immigration which if pursued for long will turn them from a majority into a minority in an alien state; and they claim the democratic right of a majority to make its own decisions in matters of urgent national concern… Excerpt from “The Arab Cause for Palestine” authored by the Arab Office, a public relations team for the Palestinians, March 1946. Arab opposition to increased Jewish immigration into Palestine found expression in the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. In 1936, Hadj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti2 of Jerusalem, called for a general strike. During the strike, the Arab community stopped cooperating with the British authorities or the Zionists (for example, by refusing to pay taxes). The strike ended after six months but it was followed by an uprising that lasted for three years. Arab bands engaged in guerrilla warfare against the British and attacked Jewish settlements, and widespread fighting broke out. Over the next three years, many on both sides were killed in what was effectively a civil war, making it clear that the political contest over the territory of Palestine was going to be an intractable one, between two opposing nationalisms, for national survival. Hadj Amin al-Husayni Arabs in Palestine vote to endorse a general strike calling for the end of Jewish immigration and the non-payment of taxes to the British administration, 1936. 2 A Mufti is a Muslim scholar who interprets Islamic law.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 10 2.2.2 Long-Term Origins: Economic Divisions Apart from their clash over national self-expression, the economic disparities that emerged between the Arabs and the Jews further fuelled their intensifying differences. Following in the wake of Zionist settlement in Palestine were land purchases, which led to the economic marginalisation and dispossession3 of the Palestinian Arabs, and this served to compound the difficulties between the two peoples. Zionist purchases of land from the Arabs were facilitated by the fact that most land had not been registered by the peasants working it, but by wealthy city merchants or absentee landowners4 residing in Syria and Lebanon willing to sell it at vastly inflated prices. Financial contributions from abroad, as well as the arrival of middle-class Jews from central Europe who brought with them capital, enabled the Zionists to make such purchases. Seeking economic autonomy, the Zionists then refused to hire Arab labourers on the lands they purchased, resulting in the dispossession of Arab tenant farmers. Over the course of the 1930s, some 30% of Palestinian farmers became totally landless and many others did not have enough land to support themselves. Those who migrated to cities were relegated to the bottom of the economic ladder. Jewish rabbis receiving the title deed for lands that they purchased By the post-WWII years, the inequitable distribution of from the Arab landowner in resources between the two peoples within Palestine had Mandatory Palestine, 1920s. brought the Arabs to the brink of economic disaster. They were now even more determined to halt the Zionist enterprise, to them not just a political but also an economic evil, an alien source of economic peripheralisation and impoverishment stifling their economic development. Source 2.2.2 A The superior capital resources at the disposal of the Jews, their greater experience of modern economic technique and the existence of a deliberate policy of expansion and domination have already gone far towards given them the economic mastery of Palestine. The biggest concessionary companies are in their hands; they possess a large proportion of the total cultivatable land, and an even larger one of the land in the highest category of fertility; and the land they possess is mostly inalienable to non-Jews. The continuance of land-purchase and immigration, taken together with the refusal of Jews to employ Arabs on their lands or in their enterprises and the great increase in the Arab population, will create a situation in which the Arab population is pushed to the margin of cultivation and a landless proletariat, rural and urban, comes into existence. This evil can be palliated but not cured by attempts at increasing the absorptive capacity or the industrial production of Palestine; the possibility of such improvements is limited, they would take a long time to carry out, and would scarcely do more than keep pace with the rapid growth of the Arab population; moreover in present circumstances they would be used primarily for the benefit of the Jews and thus might increase disparity between the two communities. Excerpt from “The Arab Cause for Palestine” authored by the Arab Office, a public relations team for the Palestinians, March 1946. 3Dispossession is a state of having something taken away from you, particularly your home or land. 4An absentee landlord is a person who owns and rents out a profit-earning property but does not live within the property’s local economic region.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 11 2.2.3 Long-Term Origins: Competing Religions While the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict were not primarily religious in nature, religion also played a role in shaping the struggle. The religious dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is most clearly seen with regard to the spiritual connection that both Jews and Muslims claim to the land of Palestine, and especially the city of Jerusalem. 2.2.3.1 Competing Religious Claims to Palestine and Jerusalem For Jews, the land of Palestine is considered sacred due to its association with Biblical history, particularly as the ancient homeland that God promised to the Israelites in the Old Testament. Jews also consider the city of Jerusalem religiously significant as a Judaic religious centre and pilgrimage site for centuries. Jerusalem features prominently in the Hebrew bible and, according to the Jewish tradition, it is the place where Abraham, the first Patriarch of Judaism, nearly sacrificed his son Isaac to God thousands of years ago. Jerusalem was also the capital of King David’s biblical kingdom, Israel, in the Hebrew Bible, as The Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. well as where David’s son Solomon built his temple. Furthermore, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem is the site of the Western (Wailing) Wall, which is the only remanent of Judaism’s Second Temple, and is considered the holiest site in Judaism today. Zionists referred to the Hebrew Bible as evidence to support their claim over Palestine. Similarly, for Muslims, the land of Palestine, and especially Jerusalem, holds great importance as it is where the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary) marks the site of the Al Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, two of the holiest sites in Islam. It is where, according to Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad miraculously ascended to heaven on his winged horse during his Night Journey, when he met Allah and received the Islamic commandment to pray five times a day (Jerusalem was the first direction of prayer for Muslims before it was changed to Mecca). The sanctity of the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary to Jews and Muslims has meant that both communities want guaranteed access to it for religious reasons, so control over the area has been highly contested. From the earliest days of the conflict until now, the area has been a flashpoint for protests and violence. In fact, the first incidence of large-scale violence between Jews and Arabs occurred in 1929 when a longstanding dispute over access to the Western Wall escalated into violence.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 12 The Temple Mount compound in Jerusalem. 2.2.3.2 The Relationship between Religion and Nationalism According to the scholar Dov Waxman, “fundamentally, the conflict is not over religion. It is not about which religion is right or superior, and religious disagreements have not been the main source of strife”. Waxman highlights that, in fact, Judaism and Islam (the majority religion of the Arabs) have a lot in common, and both religions accept the validity of the other as monotheistic5 faiths. Although Islam regards itself as the final successor to Judaism and Christianity, holding that everyone should convert to Islam (Judaism, by contrast, is non-proselytising), the Quan and subsequent Islamic tradition describe Jews and Christians as “People of the Book”6. As such, they were afforded the status of “dhimmi” (protected people) under Muslim rule, a lesser status than Muslims, but one that allowed Jews and Christians to practise their religion, relatively freely. Historically, Muslims have generally been more tolerant of Jews than Christians have, and large Jewish communities have existed and even flourished, in Muslim states and Islamic empires. From the outset, then, the conflict has been driven by ideology – Zionism and Palestinian nationalism – much more than by theology 7 , though religion has played a supporting or secondary role. 5 Monotheism refers to the belief that there is only one God. 6 “People of the book” is an Islamic term referring to followers of those religions which Muslims regard as having been guided by previous revelations from God, generally in the form of a scripture (i.e. a sacred religious text). Muslims believe that God had previously revealed Himself to the earlier prophets of the Jews and Christians, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Muslims therefore accept the teachings of both the Jewish Torah and the Christian Gospels. They believe that Islam is the perfection of the religion revealed first to Abraham (who is considered the first Muslim) and later to other prophets. Muslims believe that Jews and Christians have strayed from God’s true faith but hold them in higher esteem than pagans and unbelievers. 7 Theology is a set of beliefs about a particular religion.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 13 Dominant actors from both sides have been motivated by secular8 political aspirations, above all, national self-determination, rather than theological ones, such as the creation of the sharia or halachic state.9 Theodor Herzl, for example, regarded as the father of political Zionism, made it clear in his highly influential book, Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State), published in 1896, that the future Jewish state should follow a western liberal model of religion and state. Indeed, he dedicated a whole section to the theme. Still, from the beginning of the conflict, the Zionist movement and the Palestinian national movement have used religion to promote their interests. Both national movements selectively drew upon religion to mobilise popular support, and both have employed religious concepts, language, and imagery in the service of the nationalist cause, as many other nationalist movements have done. The use of religion could be seen as a rallying point for these movements and fuelling the religious tensions that further exacerbated tensions between the Jews and Arab nations. Source 2.2.3. A Shall we end by having a theocracy? No, indeed. Faith united us, knowledge gives us freedom. We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks. Army and priesthood shall receive honours high as their valuable functions deserve. But they must not interfere in the administration of the State which confers distinction upon them, else they will conjure up difficulties without and within. Every man will be as free and undisturbed in his faith or his disbelief as he is in his nationality. And if it should occur that men of other creeds and different nationalities come to live among us, we should accord them honourable protection and equality before the law. Excerpt from Theodore Herzl, Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State), 1896. The instrumental use of religion to serve secular, nationalist goals was most apparent in the case of Zionism. While the Zionist movement always included religious groups and parties within it, was overwhelmingly a secular movement. Many early Zionist leaders were anti-religious and stridently opposed to Judaism, regarding it, at best, as simply a means to preserve Jewish identity in the diaspora that would become redundant once Jews returned enmasse to their “homeland”. In the homeland, they wanted to create a secular society. Yet, ironically, the homeland had immense religious significance as the land that Jews traditionally believed had been given to them by God and to which diaspora Jews had always prayed to eventually return to. The Land of Israel had an emotional appeal for Jews that no other territory had, so the Zionist movement relied upon a religiously sacred territory to achieve its secular, nationalist ambitions. To spur mass Jewish emigration, the leaders of the Zionist movement chose the Land of Israel (Palestine) as the territory for settlement. Even the Hebrew word for immigration to Palestine (and now Israel) – aliya (“to ascend”) – carried a religious connotation. Furthermore, when it came to justifying the Zionist movement’s claim to Palestine, secular Zionist leaders also drew upon religion, presenting the bible as an ancient national history of the Jewish people and proof that the land belonged to the Jews. Religion has played an even greater role in Palestinian nationalism. Unlike their secular Zionist counterparts, the early Palestinian leaders were themselves religious. The Palestinian national movement was initially led by a cleric, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, and a religious preacher Izz al-Din al- Qassam, launched the first Palestinian armed struggle against the Zionists,. Palestinian nationalist 8 Secular means not being connected with religious or spiritual matters. Any concept or ideology promoting the secular may be termed secularism, a term generally applied to the ideology dictating the separation of religion from civil affairs and the state. 9 A sharia/halachic state is one that endorses Islam/Judaism in an official capacity and derives most or all aspects of governance from Islamic/Jewish religious laws (sharia/halacha).  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 14 leaders have regularly employed Islamic rhetoric and symbols to mobilise the Palestinian masses in support of the national cause. In the 1920s and 1930s for example, Husseini frequently tried to stir up popular sentiment against the Zionists by alleging a Jewish threat to Muslim Holy sites, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Yet, Hajj Amin’s religiously-inspired appeals were never the dominant trend, nor did they reflect the key political aspirations and demands of the Palestinian Arabs. For example, when Arab delegates presented their claims to an outside body for the first time, at the King-Crane Commission 10 in 1919, both the reasoning and the language they employed was deeply infused with the 14 principles articulated by President Wilson, in particular, that of self-determination. They called for a Palestine whose autonomous and potentially independent political bodies would be based on majoritarian rule that reflected the culture and o of the vast majority of its inhabitants. 2.3 Short-Term Causes: British Decolonisation, the Cold War, and the United Nations 2.3.1 British Decolonisation: Mounting Pressure on Britain to Withdraw from Palestine in the Post-WWII Period With the threat of another war looming, Britain's commitment to the Jews ended in 1939 as she sought to win the favour of the Arabs to secure the oil of the Middle East, as well as communications to Asia. A new policy laid out in the 1939 White Paper limited Jewish immigration and affirmed their minority status. After WWII, the British remained pro-Arab as the oilfields of the Middle East were deemed crucial to economic reconstruction. They announced that there would be no change in their policy in Palestine: that is, there would be no big increase in immigration and no separate Jewish state. It could be seen that British action, though contradictory, as aimed at preserving its interests to recover after the war. Outraged by Britain’s ‘betrayal’ of Zionism, the Jews in Palestine began openly confronting the British. WWII had toughened the Zionists: six million Jews had been killed in the Nazi Holocaust and the Zionists were not in a mood to be patient. Radical Zionist groups like the Irgun and Stern Gang unleashed terror attacks on the British, including blowing up their headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on 22 July 1946. Meanwhile, the British were exhausted after WWII, with food shortages and rationing at Wreckage of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, home, and could hardly afford to keep 100,000 1946. troops and police in Palestine to maintain the peace. By February 1947, Britain placed the Palestine issue before the newly founded United Nations in despair. The actions of the British left the region in a mess, leaving a political vacuum and socio-economic disorder in Palestine that set the stage for the conflicting parties to utilise to pursue their own political interests. 10The 1919 King-Crane Commission had been formed at the request of US President Woodrow Wilson during the Peace Paris Conference to determine the attitudes of the inhabitants of Syria and Palestine towards the post-WWI settlement of their territories.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 15 2.3.2 Role of the United Nations 2.3.2.1 The UN Partition Plan (1947) Palestine was the first serious regional conflict that the newly formed United Nations had to face. In response to the British request, the General Assembly of the United Nations appointed a special committee to investigate the Palestine issue. This was the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). UNSCOP presented its report in August 1947. The UNSCOP plan, which was supported by most of its members, recommended that the British mandate should be terminated, and that Palestine should be partitioned into separate Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem under international control. The plan divided Palestine in accordance with the existing settlement patterns ad population centres. Although the Jews numbered under one-third of the population, they were to receive 56% of the land, in anticipation of further Jewish immigration. Much of the fertile coastal land, including the ports of Tel Aviv and Haifa, would be part of the Jewish state. The Arab state would be divided into three sections and would have no major outlet to the sea. Jaffa – the main Arab port – would be cut off from the rest of the Arab territory and surrounded by the Jewish state. Due to conflicting interests of the P-5 members regarding Palestine, the British brought the matter to the General Assembly. The partition plan was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as UN Resolution 181 in a vote on 29 November 1947. Map of the 1947 UN Partition Plan 2.3.2.2 Responses from Jews and Arabs However, the Arab Higher Committee, representing the Palestinian Arabs, rejected the plan, especially as Jews were to be given the larger area and many of the Palestinian cities designated as part of the Jewish state, such as Haifa and Jaffa, contained large Arab majorities. On the other hand, while Zionist politicians did not like the status of Jerusalem or the lack of territorial contiguity11, they accepted the plan as a first step to statehood. A few days after the UN voted for partition, the Arab Higher Committee, representing the Palestinian Arabs, proclaimed a three-day strike that then sparked off inter-communal clashes between Jews and Arabs. 2.3.2.3 Response from the British In December 1947, when the British announced that they would leave Palestine in May 1948, the fighting between Arabs and Jews intensified. At first, the Jewish forces acted defensively: they sought to hold on to and defend the land they had been allocated by the UN. However, they soon 11 Contiguity describes a territory that is all of one piece, in which all parts of the territory are connected to one another and contained within a single, continuous boundary line.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 16 also went on the offensive and fought to gain control of Jewish settlements in the land allocated to the Arabs and of the roads leading to them. Biding their time until their complete withdrawal, the British authorities were unable and unwilling to either curb the unfolding civil war or implement partition. British cited Arab opposition (and the possibility of the loss of oil supply) as the justification for why they did not want to enforce the partition. 2.3.3 The Cold War: Role of the Superpowers in the Formation of Israel Superpower support for the formation of Israel helped to catalyse the war that was to break out between Israel and the Arab states in 1948. Their political support legitimised and strengthened Jewish determination to establish their own state, which the Arab states were unable to accept and saw no choice but to turn to war to destroy. Both the US and the USSR voted in favour of the November 1947 UN resolution for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state in what was one of the rare occasions of agreement between them during the Cold War. Both immediately recognised Israel’s declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, the day that the last British forces withdrew. In fact, the US was the first country to recognise the new state of Israel 11 minutes after its existence was proclaimed. Once war broke out between Israel and the Arab states, Soviet military support to Israel also fuelled the conflict by reinforcing Israel’s ability to fight back. At Soviet direction, Czechoslovakia provided $22 million in arms to Israel in 1948, including 50,000 rifles, 6,000 machine guns, 90 million rounds of ammunition, and Supermarine Spitfire and Avia S-199 fighter aircraft. 2.3.3.1 Soviet Motivations The Soviets supported partition and the formation of Israel because they believed that the Zionist movement, then dominated by the socialist-oriented Labour Party, was open to good relations with Moscow, and represented a potential ally in the Middle East. They reckoned that an independent Jewish state would serve as a progressive counterweight to what Moscow saw as Britain’s pawns, the reactionary British-aligned Arab monarchies of Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, thus helping to break the stranglehold of the Western powers over the region. 2.3.3.2 American Motivations President Truman’s policy towards Palestine proved to be inconsistent and reactive given that he was subjected to conflicting advice from different corners of his administration, as well as various pressures. On one hand, the US State Department opposed partition as it was wary of antagonising the Arabs, which would threaten the supply of Middle Eastern oil to the West, undermine America’s ability to maintain its base at Dharan, Saudi Arabia, and drive the Arabs into the Soviet orbit. On the other, Clark Clifford, Special Advisor to President Truman, warned that if the US President Truman did not favour partition, the Soviets, who did, would gain Israel as a powerful ally in the Middle East. Influenced as well by his sympathy for Jewish suffering and the need to satisfy the domestic Jewish lobby to ensure his success in the upcoming elections in 1948, Truman supported partition. However, when faced with strong Arab anger, he accepted an embargo on all American arms sales to either side as fighting erupted following the UN vote on partition. As many Zionists bitterly pointed out, this amounted to a de facto intervention on the side of the Arabs as the Arabs were well supplied with arms from Great Britain. Nonetheless, when Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948, Truman went ahead to recognise Israel.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 17 2.4 The War of Independence / Al Nakba (1948) 2.4.1 Outbreak of the War The day after the Jews proclaimed the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, the regular armies of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, supported by Saudi Arabia, invaded Israel. This turned what had until then been a civil war into an international war – the first in a series of Arab-Israeli wars. The coalition of Arab states that invaded Israel on 15 May 1948 did so ostensibly in support of the Palestinian people. Securing a state for them along the lines of UN Resolution 181, however, had been less of a motive for the Arab leaders. They were driven to war largely due to popular pressure, as well as their own ambitions over territory (or thwarting those of their Arab rivals). Across Arab societies, Israel was viewed as a beachhead for Western imperialism and thus an illegitimate regime that threatened the independence of the Arab world. Afraid of losing their political legitimacy if action was not taken, Arab leaders therefore intervened in Palestine. Inter-Arab politics also played an important role behind the first Arab-Israeli war. In 1948, the Arab states were divided into two rival camps. Jordan and Iraq were on one side; lined up against them were Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia on the other. The leaders of Jordan and Egypt both aspired towards leadership over the Arab world, which included territorial designs over Palestine. Jordan wanted the West Bank and Egypt wanted Gaza. Map of the Arab attacks on Israel, 15 May 1948.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 18 2.4.2 The Results of the War of Independence/Al-Nakba (1948) The Israelis succeeded in defeating the Arab armies and extending their frontiers considerably beyond those outlined in the UN Partition Plan. Internal conflicts amongst the Arab states considerably weakened the Arab cause. For example, although Jordan had the best-equipped and best-trained army in the Arab world, its troops did little more than occupy the area of the designated Palestinian state west of the Jordan River, as well as defend the Old City of East Jerusalem. They never crossed into the Jewish state to fight the Israeli army there. As has since been revealed, King Abdullah of Jordan met secretly with Jewish representatives and discussed a future partition of Palestine between Israel and Jordan. As a result of its victory in the war, the state of Israel thus acquired 78% of Palestine, instead of the 56% allocated to its by UNSCOP. The borders of Israel in January 1949 included many areas intended for the Palestinian Arabs. Israel also controlled half of the city of Jerusalem, which had been designated in the Partition Plan as international territory. The Palestinian Arabs in turn paid a high price for Israeli sovereignty. With the dispersion of some 760,000 Palestinians, the Palestinian refugee problem was born. Palestine subsequently became a convenient battle-cry for the entire Arab world, acting as the cohesive glue of pan-Arab nationalism. This exiled Palestinian population thus formed a core element of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To the Arabs, the events of 1947-1949 are therefore known as Al-Nakba. In Arabic, this term means “the disaster” or “the catastrophe”. It refers especially to the dispossession and flight of the Palestinian Arabs. Map of Israeli gains in the 1948-9 war. Map of the flight of Palestinian refugees, 1947-9.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 19 2.4.3 Conflict Management and the War of Independence/Al-Nakba (1948) [When reading this section, take note that efforts to respond to the conflict were concurrent.] 2.4.3.1 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), 1949-Present In response to the outbreak of the war between the Arabs and Israelis in 1948, the UNSC responded on 20 May 1948 with Resolution 50, which called for the cessation of hostilities in Palestine and established the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), consisting of military observers, to supervise the truce12. The UN also appointed a mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte to manage the conflict. Bernadotte arranged for a 4-week truce which took effect on 11 June under the supervision of international military observers. On 15 July, the UNSC decided that the situation in Palestine constituted a serious threat to international peace. It ordered a ceasefire and declared that failure to comply would bring an immediate consideration of enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (allowing the UN to respond with force). A second truce came into force on 18 July, but sporadic fighting would continue later in 1948 into early 1949, through which Israel was able to take over even more of Palestine. This allowed Bernadotte to continue pursuing a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Amid renewed negotiations, radical Jews who believed his plans were unfavourable to Israel, murdered him on 17 September 1948. Bernadotte’s successor, Ralph Bunche, continued mediations between February and July 1949 resulting in the signing of the armistice agreements. In August 1949, UNTSO was called by the Security Council to supervise the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements. Close to six hundred observers were eventually deployed, including from Belgium, France, the US, and Sweden. The failure to reach a permanent peace agreement led UNTSO observers to remain on Israel’s borders for the coming decades and UNTSO served as the basis for an uneasy truce between both sides until the next crisis. UNTSO observers performed a variety of important tasks, including setting up demilitarised zones along the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian borders and establishing Mixed Armistice Commissions, comprising equal number of representatives from each side, along each border to investigate complaints of armistice violations. Unarmed and operating with the consent of the parties involved, the observers had no power to prevent a violation of the armistice or to A group of UNTSO observers conferring in enforce any decisions on the parties. To exercise their the no-man’s lines between Arab and duties without relying on military might, they relied on Israeli lines, January 1948. the moral authority of the United Nations as an impartial organisation, as well as on the awareness by both sides that their violations would be objectively reported to UN headquarters in New York for possible further action, which produced a restraining effect on the parties. At the political level, UNTSO also provided a crucial means of contact between states that did not have diplomatic relations with each other. As scholar Alan James concluded about UNTSO’s effectiveness: “It was probably essential for the maintenance of overall stability – which, for most of the time, was what both sides wanted. If war was sought – as it was by Israel in 1956 and 1967 – UNTSO could do nothing about it. But short of that situation, its impartial presence was a huge help in preventing unwanted conflagrations”. 12Strictly speaking, a truce is an informal halt in fighting, whereas an armistice is a formal agreement to cease all military operations in a conflict permanently. However, while an armistice ends the war, it does not establish peace; for that, a peace treaty must be negotiated and ratified. But in an armistice, the parties make a commitment to stop trying to settle their differences on the battlefield.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 20 Unfortunately, UNTSO also contributed to a freezing of the conflict. From 1949 to 1956 and then to 1967, the main parties were unwilling to use major force to break apart the stalemate. With UNTSO acting to police the status quo, the parties were freed from major military violence and lacked the necessary motivation to make concessions for a more genuine peace. Stalemate in the peace- making process eventually led to a weakening of the armistice regime and, as the armistice regime broke down, UNTSO’s effectiveness also declined. 2.4.3.2 The 1949 Armistice Agreements In its endeavour to maintain international peace and security, the United Nations actively sought to find a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1949, with UN mediation, Israel signed separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (but not Iraq). The agreements formally ended the hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and also demarcated the Green Line, which separated Arab-controlled territory from Israel until the latter’s victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In the armistice agreements, the following points were agreed upon: (i) The Gaza area of Palestine would come under Egyptian control, but that the Negev (in the south) would be part of Israel. (ii) The eastern part of Jerusalem and the large area west of the Jordan River, which had been designated as part of the Palestinian state in the UN Partition Plan, went to Jordan. This area became known as the West Bank, confirming its status as an extension of Jordan. (iii) The western part of Jerusalem went to Israel. The UNSCOP Partition Plan was thus abandoned because of these UN-sponsored armistice agreements, and there were no attempts to create a Palestinian state. The areas originally set aside for Palestine in the Map of the 1949 Armistice Lines Partition Plan had been swallowed up by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Assessing the effectiveness of the 1949 Armistice Agreement While some degree of peace had been restored, the armistice agreements was an attempt to abate tensions in the region. The armistice agreements were supposed to lead to permanent peace treaties but there was to be no such treaty between Israel and an Arab nation for nearly 30 years. The two key issues on which no agreement could be reached were borders and refugees. Some Arab states were willing to negotiate over borders but all of them stuck to the policy formulated by the Arab League13 on refugees: that Israel had created the problem, and the refugees had the “right to return” to their homes or to be compensated by Israel. The Israelis, for their part, claimed that the Arabs had created the refugee problem by invading Israel and starting the war. The Israelis would only negotiate if it was agreed that most of the refugees should be settled outside Israel. At a more critical level, because the Israel and Arab nations had swallowed up Palestinian territory, the issue of the establishment of a Palestinian nation was not fully addressed. This went on to fuel further tensions in the region. 13The Arab League was created in 1949 as a regional organisation to represent the interests of Arab states and to promote political, economic, and cultural coordination among them.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 21 2.4.3.3 The Role of the US in Conflict Management The US and its allies Britain and France were keen to maintain stability in the Middle East and in turn, the free flow of oil. To achieve this, the US sought to convince the Arabs and Israelis to work with the West against the threat of Soviet expansionism. This formed the context for the Tripartite Agreement (May 1950), which guaranteed the territorial status quo that had been determined by the 1949 Arab- Israeli Armistice Agreements. The US, Britain, and France pledged to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East and reject the use or the threat of force. They also pledged to act within and outside the United Nations to prevent violations of the frontiers or armistice lines. In addition, they reiterated their opposition to the development of an arms race in the Middle East. THINKING PITSTOP Was the Arab-Israeli Conflict at its roots a territorial, political, economic or religious struggle? 2.5 The Suez Crisis (1956) Following the First Arab-Israeli War, many fundamental issues plaguing Israel and the Arab states, whether their clashing nationalisms or their competing territorial claims, remained unaddressed, even as these issues manifested in new ways. In the absence of peace, another war between both sides seemed all but inevitable, and in 1956, the Second Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Suez Crisis, broke out, when Israel went to war with its largest Arab neighbour, Egypt, then under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Suez Canal pivotal maritime route that connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, facilitating direct trade between Europe and Asia. Opened in 1869, this 193-kilometer waterway significantly reduces travel distances for ships, eliminating the need to navigate around the southern tip of Africa. As such, the canal held significant economic importance. The Suez Crisis had far wider implications and significance than just another conflict between Israel and the Arab states. It was also a clash between Arab nationalism and the colonial powers, Britain and France, which wanted to maintain their power and influence in the region. The Suez Crisis also extended the Cold Map of the Suez Canal oil route from the Middle War into the Middle East when the US and the East to Europe. USSR were drawn into the conflict.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 22 2.5.1 Context of the Suez Crisis 2.5.1.1 Egypt and the Suez Crisis Amidst continuing tensions between Israel and Egypt, the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a staunch Arab nationalist, heightened Israel’s perception of the threat that Egypt posed to it. So too did Britain and France perceive Nasser as a threat to their interests, and this drove them to collude with Israel to invade Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis. The Rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arab Nationalism Gamal Abdel Nasser became President of Egypt in 1954 after he and a group of fellow young army officers known as the Free Officers staged a military coup that sent King Farouk into exile and established Egypt as a republic. The Free Officers were driven by a sense of revolutionary Arab nationalism, a sentiment also prevalent amongst the Arab masses. This was in part fuelled by their anger at King Farouk for failing to wrest true Egyptian independence from the British. The Free Officers therefore saw need for a revolution to overthrow King Farouk and establish a government that could ensure Egypt’s true independence. British imperial control over Egypt began when Britain invaded it in 1882 and established it as a British “protectorate”. Britain wanted to ensure stability in the country to safeguard the operation of the Suez Canal, which directly linked the Gamal Abdul Nasser Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, reducing the journey from Europe to India by 8200 km. After the discovery of oil in the Persia Gulf region, the Suez Canal became the main route for oil supplies to Europe. The Suez Canal Company owned, operated, and profited from the canal and the British and French were major shareholders in the Company. Even though Britain formally recognised Egypt’s independence in 1922, the country remained under strong British influence. After the Second World War, Britain continued to maintain a garrison (a military post) of 70,000 troops in the Canal Zone. This was intolerable to many Egyptians who saw it as evidence of continuing British imperialism. Revolutionary Arab nationalism was also fuelled by anger at the failure of the Arab states to prevent the establishment of Israel, as well as Israel’s victory in the 1948-1949 war. The Free Officers accused the Egyptian authorities of supplying them with poor equipment and incompetent commanders, which led to the Egyptian army’s defeat by the Israelis in 1949. These feelings of revolutionary nationalism eventually culminated in the 1952 military coup. Under Nasser, pan-Arab nationalism became a powerful political force during the 1950s and 1960s. Egypt became the centre of the pan-Arab nationalist movement, which had broad aims for a closer union of the Arab states and non-alignment in the struggle between the superpowers. The charismatic Nasser appealed to ordinary Arab people across national borders, bypassing their rulers using the new medium of transistor radios. The Egyptian radio station, the “Voice of the Arabs”, spread the rhetoric of Arab unity, progress, and anti-colonialism into the most remote corners of the region. Nasser’s radio broadcasts were heard by millions and were used as a means of strengthening Egypt’s position in the Arab world and Nasser’s leadership of pan-Arabism. Nasser was also a founder of Non-Aligned Movement that was established in 1955. Hence further entrenching the Arab nationalist and anti-western imperialism.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 23 2.5.2 Causes of the Suez Crisis 2.5.2.1 Sustained Tensions due to Palestinian Raids and Israeli Reprisals In the years preceding the second Arab-Israeli war, border tensions between Israel and the surrounding Arab states increased as a result of ‘infiltration’ by the disinherited Palestinians. These developments kept Arab-Israeli tensions high, despite the existence of an armistice. Some crossed the 1949 armistice line to reclaim their property by harvesting crops or carrying away moveable property. Others did so to commit acts of sabotage and terror against their Israeli oppressors. The Israelis, however, did not distinguish between the two and launched reprisal raids against Arab states from which such ‘infiltration’ occurred, to induce them into policing their borders more diligently. In 1955, an Israeli raid on an Egyptian military post in Gaza left 38 soldiers dead and about 40 wounded. This initiated a chain of events that fuelled animosity between Arab and Israeli nations. 2.5.2.2 Relations between Egypt and Israel (1949-1956) Egyptian Blockade of Israeli Trade Relations between Israel and Egypt remained hostile since the 1949 armistice agreements that ended the first Arab-Israeli war. Egypt refused to recognise Israel or trade with it. It would not allow Israeli ships, or indeed any ships trading with Israel to use the Suez Canal. With the cooperation of Saudi Arabia, Egypt also blockaded the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. All of these actions increased the tension between Israel and Egypt. Israel’s Concerns about the Threat of Nasser Map of the Middle East in 1956. After Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1954, there were concerns in Israel about how this would affect relations between the two countries. Military leaders such as Moshe Dayan, the chief of staff of the defence force, regarded Nasser as a threat to Israeli security and favoured subversive action to discredit Nasser. In 1954, Israeli agents tried to damage Egypt’s relations with the US by attacking American-owned buildings in Cairo and blaming it on the Egyptians. Although this plot failed, it led to strained relations between Israel and Egypt after two of the Israeli agents were tried and executed. Fedayeen Attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip In the Gaza Strip, 300,000 Palestinians lived in a narrow coastal area under Egyptian military control. Frequent raids by Palestinian fedayeen14 fighters across the border into Israel brought harsh and instant reprisals from the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Israel accused Egypt of supporting these fedayeen raids and claimed that the Israeli reprisals were a justifiable response to them. On 28 February 1955, the IDF launched an attack against the Egyptian military headquarters in Gaza, destroying it and killing 35 Egyptian soldiers. They wanted to teach Nasser a lesson and, perhaps, remove him from power. One way to do that was to show him up as militarily weak. The Gaza Raid had significant repercussions. It was humiliating for Nasser, and he knew that it could have a very damaging effect on his leadership of Egypt and his image in the wider world. It also fuelled Egypt’s 14Palestinian fedayeen are militants or guerrillas of a nationalist orientation from among the Palestinian people.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 24 desire for revenge. Egypt thus began in earnest to train and arm the fedayeen fighters to carry out attacks on Israel. The raid also caused Nasser to try almost immediately to strengthen Egypt’s defences by seeking supplies of armaments. He had already approached the US and had been rebuffed. He therefore turned to Soviet arms, which he secured through the USSR’s communist ally, Czechoslovakia. The Czech arms deal was announced in September 1955. Despite these actions, Egypt remained clearly non-aligned to any superpower. 2.5.2.3 The Cold War and the Suez Crisis Events in the Middle East in the early 1950s must also be seen in a global context, namely, the Cold War. The Cold War, which had started in Europe after 1945, had extended to Asia. The French were trying to re-establish colonial control over Indochina and were fighting a losing battle against the communist-led Viet Minh. The Chinese Communist Party came to power and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Between 1950 and 1953, many Western countries became involved in the Korean War, as part of the United Nations operation to support non-communist South Korea against communist North Korea. Western Cold War suspicions of Nasser led them to suspend loans to Egypt for building the Aswan Dam. In retaliation, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, which catalysed Britain and France’s decision to collude with Israel to invade Egypt. Western Cold War Suspicions of Nasser Nasser’s actions caused the West to fear that he was leading Egypt into the Soviet camp. When Nasser attended the Bandung Conference in April 1955 and professed his support for non-alignment, Western countries became suspicious, associating non-alignment with communism. When Egypt signed the arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955, Western fears about Nasser (centre) at the Bandung growing communist influence seemed to be confirmed. Conference in 1953. On his right is President Sukarno of Indonesia. Withdrawal of Western Loans for the Aswan Dam Project The Czech arms deal was a shock to the West, as well as to Israel. However, Britain and the US thought they could still control Nasser because he depended on them for money to build the Aswan High Dam. This was a huge project on the River Nile which would create hydroelectric power for Egyptian industry and allow vast areas of agricultural land to be irrigated. It was proclaimed as a symbol of the new, dynamic Egypt which would allow the country to modernise and become stronger. Meanwhile, Nasser continued to show that he would not be pushed around, and that Egypt was determined to be neutral. In May 1956, he recognised Communist China. At this time, Western countries did not allow China to take its place at the UN and claimed that Taiwan, which was non- Communist, represented China. In July 1956, the US and Britain decided to cancel their loans to Egypt for the building of the Aswan. They hoped to send a signal to Nasser that what they perceived to be anti-Western policies were not in Egypt’s best interests.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 25 2.5.3 Outbreak of the 1956 Suez Crisis 2.5.3.1 Nasser’s Nationalisation of the Suez Canal (July 1956) Nasser reacted quickly to the announcement that Western loans for the Aswan Dam project had been suspended. On 26 July 1956, he declared that Egypt would nationalise the Suez Canal Company. Egypt would pay compensation to the shareholders. The Canal revenues, worth about US$100 million annually, would be used by Egypt to finance the dam project. This bold and defiant move would also prove that Egypt really was independent. Britain and France reacted angrily to Nasser’s announcement. Their economies depended on oil from the Middle East, much of which was A cartoon titled “The Man at the Tap” shipped through the Suez Canal. The British published in a German newspaper, August Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, stated that the 1956. two countries did not want to be at the mercy of Nasser. Britain began to consider taking military action. Eden explained his views in correspondence with the US President, but President Eisenhower indicated that the US did not support the use of force. 2.5.3.2 The Secret Alliance between Britain, France, and Israel (October 1956) At this stage, it became apparent that Britain and French interests coincided with those of Israel. Israel wanted to break the restrictions on its economy by forcing Egypt to lift its blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and to allow Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal. An invasion of Gaza and Sinai would also give Israel the opportunity to destroy the fedayeen bases in those areas. Israel was also concerned about the growth of Egypt’s military strength, especially after the Czech arms deal. At a meeting held at Sèvres, France, on 24 October 1956, Britain, France, and Israel agreed to a plan that they hoped would bring about Nasser’s downfall. They drew up a controversial document called the Sèvres Protocol, which was a detailed plan and a precise timetable on how they hoped to achieve this. They planned a joint campaign against Egypt, based on the basis that a war between Israel and Egypt would present the Anglo-French forces with an opportunity to intervene. The agreement was that Israel would launch an attack into Egypt across the During the Suez Crisis, Egypt scuttled its Sinai Peninsula, with the aim of reaching the Suez ships to block the Suez Canal and Canal as quickly as possible. Britain and France would prevent the Anglo-French seizure of the then step in to “protect” the canal from both the canal. Egyptians and the Israelis by using an ultimatum calling on both sides to withdraw their troops from the canal. They knew that Nasser would certainly reject this demand, and this would be the pretext for armed Anglo-French intervention. This would take the form of air strikes, followed by a seaborne invasion. While British and French forces occupied key positions in the Canal Zone, Israel would have the opportunity to occupy the whole of Sinai and extend Israeli control as far as the Suez Canal.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 26 2.5.3.3 The Sinai War and the Anglo-French Invasion (October 1956) On 29 October 1956, Israel launched its attack, and in doing so, began the Sinai War. Israeli paratroopers were dropped near the Suez Canal, while army units made their way across Sinai. Other army units moved southwards to capture Sharm el-Sheikh, the port that controlled the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. The following day, Britain and France issued an ultimatum calling for a ceasefire and demanding that both sides withdraw their troops to 16 km east and west of the canal. They threatened to use force if either side rejected the ultimatum. At that stage, Israeli forces were nowhere near the canal, but they accepted the terms of the ultimatum. As all three A map showing the course of the 1956 Suez War. countries had expected, Nasser rejected it. He refused, understandably, to withdraw Egyptian troops from Egyptian territory. Using this as a pretext, Britain and France bombed Egyptian airfields and Port Said at the northern end of A map showing the course of the 1956 Suez War. the canal. Meanwhile, Israeli forces advanced a further 350 km across Sinai and reached the canal. They were able to do so without fear of air attacks, as the British and French air strikes had destroyed many Egyptian planes on the ground. On 5 November 1956, Britain and France dropped paratroopers into the Canal Zone. On the following day, these two countries launched a full-scale invasion. The Egyptians sank ships filed with concrete in the canal to slow the British and French advance. A young Egyptian boy and a British tank amid the rubble of a war-torn street during the Suez Crisis.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 27 2.5.4 Conflict Management and the 1956 Suez Crisis By December 1956, Britain and France withdrew their troops from Egypt. Israel also reluctantly agreed to withdraw its forces from Sinai early in 1957. The superpowers and the United Nations played key roles in bringing about this quick resolution of the Suez Crisis. It is important for us to understand that while we examine the efforts of different actors at managing the conflict, efforts were happening concurrently. 2.5.4.1 The Role of the Superpowers The combined diplomatic and financial pressure of the superpowers forced the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw their troops from Egypt. The US issued a stern warning to the British, French, and Israelis to give up their campaign and withdrew from Egyptian soil. The US also threatened all three nations with economic sanctions if they persisted in their attacks. Following the outbreak of hostilities, Arab countries had attacked the direct pipelines carrying oil to the terminals on the Mediterranean, effectively cutting off Europe’s oil supplies. President Eisenhower urged Latin American countries, which were Britain and France’s only remaining source of oil, to suspend their oil shipments to Western Europe. To pressure Israel, he threatened to restrict American citizens from sending private aid payments to Israel. The USSR was also quick to condemn the British and French invasion. It warned that it was willing to use military power, and even hinted at nuclear strikes on London and Paris if British and French forces were not withdrawn. Under superpower pressure, the British government quickly agreed to a UN ceasefire and the withdrawal of its troops. This left France no option but to do the same, as its soldiers were under British command. Israel eventually followed suit. Both the superpowers condemned British and French actions because both wanted to demonstrate their anti-imperialist credentials to win the favour and support of countries in the Third World in their bipolar competition with one another. For Eisenhower, 1956 was also an election year and he was running for re-election. He did not want the US to be involved in any world conflict that might influence his position with the voters. 2.5.4.2 The Role of the United Nations and the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) It was with superpower support to resolve the crisis that facilitated a prompt response from the United Nations. On the day after the Israeli attack on Egypt, the United Nations Security Council met to discuss a resolution condemning the action and demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, Britain and France used their vetoes to defeat the resolution. On the following day, they launched their attack on Egypt. To bypass the British and French use of the veto, the matter was then referred to the General Assembly (where no country held a veto). The General Assembly met in a special emergency session and adopted the US-sponsored resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of all forces from Egypt. This was accepted by Britain, France, and Israel.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 28 In another resolution, the General Assembly created the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) to be sent to the Middle East to oversee the ceasefire and withdrawal of the invading armies. The aim of UNEF I were as such: (i) Ensure the cessation of hostilities between Egypt, Israel, Frane and UK. This included ensuring all military actions ceased. (ii) Withdrawal of foreign forces (Israel, France and UK) Canadian members of UNEF I on the border (iii) UNEF to act as a buffer between conflicting between Egypt and Israel, 1962. parties (iv) To provide impartial supervision of ceasefire (v) Clearing blockages and minefields in order to restore international shipping routes and facilitating trade. Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations The UNEF I positioned itself on the ceasefire lines between Egypt and Israel, so that negotiations for a peace settlement could take place in a less hostile atmosphere. The details of the peacekeeping operation were discussed at length between Nasser and the Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold. In these talks, it was agreed that, in terms of the UN Charter, Egypt would have the right to demand the withdrawal of the UN force at any time in the future. After the UNEF I successfully oversaw the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt, it served as a buffer to prevent another conflict between Israel and Egypt, especially in the potential flashpoints of Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh. For the next ten years, UNEF I succeeded in maintaining relative stability in the Sinai. However, UNEF I completely broke down when Nasser ordered it out in 1967 amidst high Arab- Israeli tensions that would lead to the momentous 1967 Six-Day War. However, the scholar Paul F. Diehl argues that while the 1967 war might be regarded, on first impression, as strong evidence that UNEF I was unable to stop serious armed conflict, such a conclusion is somewhat misleading. This is because the war occurred only after UNEF I was asked to withdraw, suggesting that the presence of the peacekeeping force exercised some restraint on Nasser. In Diehl’s words: “Why else would he want it withdrawn, when he could have easily overrun UNEF I position and gained the advantage of surprise?”  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 29 2.5.5 The Impact of the Suez Crisis on the Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 2.5.5.1 Protracting the Arab-Israeli Conflict The Suez Crisis deepened the tensions between Israel and the Arab states and therefore protracted the conflict between them. Israel’s alliance with the former colonial powers confirmed Arab suspicions that Israel was a springboard of Western imperialism in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Suez Crisis boosted Nasser’s position and his championing of pan- Arab nationalism that was opposed to Israel. Although Egypt was defeated, the Suez Nasser, hero of the Arab world, in the wake of the Suez Crisis. affair increased Nasser’s enormously. He was hailed as the hero of the Arab world, who had stood up to the bullying tactics of the former colonial powers. Under Nasser’s leadership, Egypt now had complete control of the Suez Canal, as well as British military stores in the Canal Zone. Source 2.5.5 A For Egypt, the Suez Crisis was the classic example of a military defeat turned to political victory. The very act of survival was deemed a major political victory. Nasser knew that his nationalisation of the Suez Canal would face no further challenge and that Egypt had achieved full sovereignty over all of its territory and resources. Adapted from Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History, 2009. 2.5.5.2 Shifts in the Cold War Context As President Eisenhower had feared, the Soviets moved into the Middle East to fill the gap left by the disorderly retreat of British, so the Americans felt compelled to get in as well. With the Suez Crisis seriously damaging Anglo-French and Western prestige in the Middle East, the leading Arab opponents of continued Western dominance in the area, Egypt and Syria, turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for the arms and aid they needed, which the West was reluctant to supply. The USSR now began to supply most of Egypt’s weapons and pay for the building of the Aswan Dam and many other projects. As Suez gave the USSR a foothold in the Middle East, Israel became ever more closely tied to the US.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 30 Nasser and Khrushchev at the ceremony to divert the Nile during the construction of the Aswan High Dam on 14 May 1964. On this occasion, Khrushchev called it “the eighth wonder of the world”. 2.6 The Six-Day War (1967) Tensions between Israel and the Arab states increased for several reasons after the 1956 Suez Crisis. These included a massive arms build-up on both sides, fedayeen raids and Israeli reprisals, and disputes over water. Superpower interest in the Middle East region added to the volatile situation. This tension became a crisis in May 1967, after Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UN forces from Sinai and closed the Straits of Titan to Israeli shipping (details of this will be noted in the sections below). Propaganda in the Arab media increased Israeli fears of an imminent attack, and the Israeli government sought confirmation of American support. In June 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In six days, it destroyed their Israeli soldiers approaching the Dome of the air forces and defeated their armies. In the Rock in East Jerusalem on 7 June 1967. process, Israel occupied vast areas of Arab territory – including the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. 2.6.1 Causes and Context of the Six-Day War 2.6.1.1 Border Clashes and the Six-Day War Fedayeen raids on Israel, supported in particular by Syria, as well as Israel’s reprisals, greatly escalated tensions between Israel and the Arab states in the lead-up to the Six Day War.  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 31 Fatah Fedayeen Raids on Israel and Israeli Reprisals The 1956 Suez Crisis had once again shown the focus of Arab leaders to be on their own foreign and domestic problems rather than on the conviction to liberate Palestine. The Arab world and the international community seemed to have forgotten about the plight of the Palestinian refugees. It was this realisation that led to a Palestinian political and military revival. Building on earlier underground nationalist groups, Fatah (Palestinian-based) was formed in 1957 in Kuwait and had its bases in three of the Arab countries that bordered Israel: Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. In 1965, Fatah carried out its first raid on Israel and thereafter carried out many other armed raids into Israel over the next few years. Israeli retaliation for Fatah raids was usually A young girl holding an AK-47 assault rifle, with other swift and harsh. children who received basic paramilitary training, in 1970 at a Palestinian refugee camp which gave strong support to In an attempt to control the Palestinian Fatah. fedayeen and to prevent their actions from completely destabilising the region, Nasser established the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), an umbrella organisation for various Palestinian groups, including Fatah. This new Palestinian organisation also provided Nasser with leadership credentials in his regional rivalry with Syria and Iraq. Thus, it is not surprising that the PLO soon became the object of an inter-Arab struggle for influence between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, as well as an Arab-Palestinian struggle for control. This effectively intensified the tensions between the Arab nations and Israel given how the actions of the Arab nations were intended to provoke and undermine the Israelis. Border Clashes between Syria and Israel The governments of Lebanon and Jordan tried to restrict PLO activities because they were afraid of Israeli reprisals. The Syrians, however, were keen to support the PLO. In February 1966, a new, radical, and aggressive Ba’ath government came to power in Syria. It demanded “revolutionary struggle” against Israel and called for the “liberation of Palestine”. The Syrians now stepped up their support for the Fatah guerrillas and accused the Egyptian government of not supporting them. Nasser was in a difficult position: he wanted to retain his position as the perceived leader of the Arab world, but at the same time he had a more realistic assessment of the strength of the Arab military forces in comparison with those of Israel. In November 1966, he signed a defence pact with Syria, which provided for the establishment of a joint command over the armed forces of the two countries. Each agreed to come to the aid of its ally in case of war with Israel. In this way, Nasser hoped that he would be able to use his influence to restrain the ambitions of those in the Syrian government who wanted to pursue military action, but all this did was to encourage them. On 7 April 1967, an Israeli tractor was ploughing land in the demilitarised zone which the UN had established on the Israeli side of the border after the 1948-49 war. The Syrians opened fire and the Israelis fired back. The Syrians then started shelling other Israeli settlements in the area. Israeli tanks went into action but could not reach all the positions from which the Syrians had been firing. So Israeli planes were called up. These were then intercepted by Syrian fighter planes and, in the  ASRJC Theme III: Conflict and Cooperation (1945-2000) History Page 32 dogfight that ensued, six Syrian planes were shot down, two of them over the Syrian capital. The Israeli planes roared low over Damascus, further humiliating the Syrians. Some historians, such as Avi Shlaim, believe that this incident started the countdown to the Six-Day War in June 1967. The Israeli Raid on Samu, Jordan, November 1966 Although the Jordanian government discouraged PLO guerrilla raids into Israel, another area of tension was the border between Israel and Jordan. After a border incident in which three Israeli soldiers were killed by a mine planted by Fatah guerrillas, the IDF launched a massive raid into Jordan in November 1966, targeting the village of Samu. In the attack, a numbe