Iran-Iraq Conflict (Unresolved) PDF

Middle East Iran-Iraq Con ct (Unresolved) Historical Roots fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi As with many other protracted con cts that have been active since the end of World War I, the roots of the Iran/Iraq con ct are deep. Hostilities began as early as 632 Common Era (C.E.), the frst phase culminating...

Middle East Iran-Iraq Con ct (Unresolved) Historical Roots fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi As with many other protracted con cts that have been active since the end of World War I, the roots of the Iran/Iraq con ct are deep. Hostilities began as early as 632 Common Era (C.E.), the frst phase culminating in 638 C.E., when Muslim Arab forces vanquished the Sassanian [Sassanid] Neo-Persian Empire. Violence between Arabs and Persians occurred periodically during the next millennium. Then, in the sixteenth century C.E., the Shiite Safavid dynasty emerged in Persia as a rival of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, which held sway over most of the Arab world in the Middle East and North Africa. The Safavid Shah, Ismail, conquered Iraq in 1510 but was defeated by the Ottoman Sultan in 1514. Several other wars between the two Middle East empires occurred soon after, in 1533–1535, 1548, and 1553, until the Treaty of Amasya in 1555 served as a peace settlement and defned the borders between the two rival major powers in the Middle East. Their most signifcant agreement in the pre-modern era was the Treaty of Zuhab (1639), which “became the basis of all later treaties negotiated between the Ottoman and Persian states”; and, of special relevance to the later Iran/Iraq con ct, “formally incorporated Iraq into the Ottoman Empire and committed both nations not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other” (Abdulghani 1984, p. 5). With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI and the introduction of the League of Nations Mandates system, the UK became the Mandatory Power for Iraq, along with TransJordan and Palestine. Britain formally withdrew from Iraq in 1932 and transferred power to King Faisal, a member of the Hashemite royal family who had been placed on the Iraqi throne by the UK in 1920. Faisal died in 1933. In this context of domestic Iraq instability, Iran made demands the following year for changes in the informal rules governing the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, which had long served as the de facto border between Iraq and Persia. Iraq appealed to the League of Nations in 1934 to resolve 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 237 the boundary dispute. A coup d’état by Bakr Sidqi in Iraq, in 1936, during the negotiations, led to further instability and enabled Persia (Iran) to extract concessions from Iraq. These were incorporated in the 1937 Iraq-Persia treaty governing the Shatt-al-Arab. The dispute over this waterway, beginning in 1934, marked the onset of the Iran/Iraq con ct. The historical roots of the Iran/Iraq con ct can be traced to the Islamic Arab military triumph over the Sassanian (NeoPersian) Empire in 638 C.E., 1296 years before the onset of this post-WWII interstate protracted con ct—the eruption, in 1934, of disputed claims by Iran and Iraq to the Shatt-al-Arab (Arab Waterway), which links/separates the two longstanding rival states, nations, belief systems, and contiguous neighbors. Basic Causes There were three basic causes of the onset of this modern Middle East protracted con ct—territory, identity-religious and ethnic, and ideology. The overriding source of con ct between Iran and Iraq has been the territorial dispute over the Shatt-alArab, which dates to the sixteenth century. For Iraq, this Waterway has been its only viable access to the Persian/Arab Gulf, both during its long-imposed dependent status within the Ottoman Empire and since it acquired formal statehood in 1932, under a UK Mandate from the League of Nations in 1920. Thus sovereignty over the Shatt, which is crucial for the marketing of Iraq’s oil, the most valuable element of its national economy and the primary source of its foreign exchange, has also been vital to Iraq’s national security. For Iran, control over the Shatt was/is the key to its strategy for achieving hegemony in the Persian Gulf. In fact, territorial rivalry has long been closely linked to the struggle for its control. This Waterway also served as an important part of the boundary between the two competitors for primacy in the Gulf region. Their 1937 treaty, as noted, framed a mutually accepted boundary in the middle of the Shatt for its entire length, an agreement that was in force for three decades. It was abrogated by both parties in 1968–1969 and then revived in their Treaty of Algiers in 1975. The Waterway then became ‘fair game’ for both Iran and Iraq in their high-casualty (one million killed), long war of attrition (1980–1988). From 1990 to the present, the Gulf region fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi and the Shatt became enmeshed in the two wars between the US-led Coalition and Iraq (1991 and 2003). The years 238 M. BRECHER since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 have witnessed a renewed rapprochement between Iran and Iraq, with restored diplomatic and trade relations: the process was facilitated by the coming to power in Iraq of Shia parties, religiously akin to Iran, after decades of Sunni domination in Iraq’s politics. The territorial dispute, as a basic cause of the Iran/ Iraq con ct, has long been reinforced by two powerful intangible identity forces— differences in ethnicity and religion. The con ct between Persian and Arab civilization dates to antiquity. Within Islam, the con ct between Sunni and Shia began soon after the passing of the founder of the Muslim belief system in the seventh century C.E. Together, these potent intangible cultural identities have been the sources of deep-rooted hostility, which strengthened their con ct over territory: “real and imagined history, and traditional Iran-Arab and Shi’a-Sunni animosities,” have been integral parts of their con ct relationship (Balkash et al. 2004, 22.). The fact that the Shia was an oppressed majority in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq further embittered Shia Iran, as did frequent denial of access by Iranian Shia to some of their holiest sites in Iraq—in Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra. During the last third of the twentieth century (CE), ethnic and religious differences were further reinforced by ideology. The political systems of Iraq and Iran were highly authoritarian. Saddam Hussein and Ba’ath Arab nationalism clashed with Ayatollah Khomeini and Iranian Islamism from 1979 onward. This ideological component of their con ct contributed “to its intensity and its prolongation, to its destructive force and to its terrible cost in human life,” as evident in the savage Iran/Iraq War (ibid., 23). The setting for the onset of their post-WWI interstate protracted con ct, in 1934, was twofold. One was the death in 1933 of Iraq’s King Faisal, who was a source of stability in a highly factional society, with a Shia majority and a Sunni minority. The other was the decline of UK infuence in the Gulf region, especially the port of Basra, after its transfer of de facto independence to Iraq’s government in 1932. These events provided Iran with an opportunity to change their boundary in the Shatt al-Arab, and it pressed Iraq to agree. Precipitating Cause The precipitating cause of the onset of the post-WWI Iran/Iraq con ct was Iraq’s appeal to the League of Nations in 1934 to resolve its boundary dispute with Iran. It took 3 years for the two adversaries to 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 239 conclude a basic and long-lasting agreement on their maritime boundary. However, their con ct was re-ignited in 1955, when the Shah of Iran proclaimed its sovereignty over the Shatt, and both parties sent troops to their land frontier. Dormant since 2003, the Iran/Iraq con ct remains unresolved. However, in a marked shift from a con ct to a cooperative relationship after the departure of the last contingent of US troops from Iraq in 2011, the two Shia Muslim states began to move toward a potential alignment. In 2014, Iran expressed a willingness to provide military assistance to Iraq, if requested: Iraq was then confronted with an existential rebellion by an extremist Sunni movement, the Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS). Discordant Objectives Iran’s feeling of inequity in the division of the Shatt al-Arab (Waterway) can be traced to their agreement of 1937. With the increasing importance of Middle East oil to its economy, Iran’s specifc objective over the subsequent decades was the revision of what it regarded as an imposed agreement, in order to right the wrong by granting Iran a larger part of the Waterway, vital to both its exports of oil and imports of essentials for its economic development. Underpinning this objective was Iran’s sel mage as the pre-eminent Middle East civilization since antiquity, deserving of its recognition by neighbors, notably Iraq, of its claim to regional primacy. Iran’s pursuit of hegemony in the Gulf seemed within its grasp following the UK withdrawal from the Middle East in 1971: only Iraq— continuing to experience political instability, generated by military coups and an on-going Kurdish secessionist movement confronting a newly emergent Ba’ath Party regime in Baghdad—was a potential weaker rival for dominance. Iraq’s objectives during the early years of this interstate con ct were to maintain the favorable status quo in the Shatt-al-Arab (Waterway), as embodied in the 1937 agreement with Iran; to enhance its claim to PanArab leadership; and to establish its dominance in the Gulf region. The frst and third of these goals, related to its rivalry with Iran, remained unchanged until the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party regime in Iraq in 2003, and its claim to leadership of the Arab world was overtaken by the coming to power in 1953 of a charismatic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in Egypt, the largest, fi fi fi fi fi fi most populous and long recognized leader of the Arab world. 240 M. BRECHER Perceptions From the onset of their modern interstate con ct in the 1930s, the issues in contention between Iran and Iraq were the location of their maritime border in the Shatt-al-Arab (Waterway) and, more generally, their competing goal of primacy in the Arab/Persian Gulf. Iran perceived itself as stronger than Iraq until their devastating long war (1980–1988): the heavy casualties and enormous material costs changed revolutionary Iran’s perception in the direction of respect for Iraq’s military capability. Iran’s monarchy (to 1979) viewed Iraq’s postmonarchical regime (1958 ff.), especially under the Ba’ath Party, as driven by a radical ideology and expansionist aims. However, it also recognized the growing military capability of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, with its strong ties to the USSR, the major supplier of modern weapons to Iraq. Iraq perceived Iran’s superior power until its military alliance with the USSR in 1972, and the consequent fow of arms enhanced Iraq’s selfimage regarding its military capability vis-à-vis Iran. The profound mistrust and rivalry between these Middle East powers shaped Iraq’s view that Iran’s primary goal was hegemony in the Gulf and, as such, the major obstacle to Iraq’s claim to dominance in that region. Saddam Hussein’s decision to initiate the Iran/Iraq War in 1980 represented an attempt by Iraq to establish its primacy in the Gulf against a new, vulnerable Islamist revolutionary regime in Iran. The effort failed, with enormous human and material losses suffered by both adversaries. Within 3 years of the end of the Iran/Iraq War, Iraq was further weakened in the frst Gulf War (1991), a prelude to the collapse of the Ba’ath Party regime in the second Gulf War (2003) and years of instability and civil strife thereafter. The zero-sum perceptions by the adversaries in this con ct wreaked havoc for Iraq and severely weakened the Islamic Republic of Iran. Behavior Both of the principal adversaries in this currently dormant con ct made many strategic and important tactical decisions during several postWWI periods of their longstanding con ct. Iraq Decisions and Decision-Makers There were four periods of Iraq’s decisions and decision-makers in this con ct. In Period I (1921–1933), the two key decision-makers of Iraq 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 241 were King Faisal and the UK Representative to the British-created modern state of Iraq, which had long been part of the Ottoman Empire. (Another son of Hussein, a Hashemite ruler of Hejaz, part of what later became Saudi Arabia, was the frst ruler of another British-created Middle East state, Abdullah, the Emir of Trans-Jordan, later, the King of Jordan.) While Faisal was the ultimate constitutional authority in Iraq, decisional infuence was shared with the UK Pro-Consul. As noted, Iraq and Iran had long disagreed about governance of the Shatt-al-Arab. This frst period of their post-WWI con ct was characterized by diplomatic engagement, not with frequent military clashes. Iraq made one strategic decision on this core territorial dispute. With an escalation of tension in 1934, Iraq decided to submit a formal complaint to the League of Nations, alleging Iran’s violation of existing treaty commitments on the Waterway. During a transition, following the death of King Faisal in 1933 and the succession of his weak son, King Ghazali, decision-making power shifted from Iraq’s monarch to its Cabinet and, after a military coup, to the Iraq Army. However, the successor Iraq leadership abandoned Faisal’s Pan-Arabism in favor of Iraqi national goals and domestic unity, leading to a policy of détente with Iraq’s neighbors. This change found expression in two important 1937 Iraq decisions: to sign a boundary agreement with Iran that granted it control of a larger share of the disputed Shatt-al-Arab Waterway; and to form a mutual defense pact with three other Middle East states, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, with commitments to non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, their territorial integrity, and the renunciation of force in their relations. The long Period II of Iraq’s decision-making (1939–1958) began after two unrelated dramatic events—another military coup and the accidental death of King Ghazi. For nearly two decades, decision-making power was shared by a newly appointed prime minister, Nuri al-Sa’id, and the Regent Prince Abd al-Ilah, acting for Ghazi’s infant son. Iraq’s policy toward Iran continued to be moderate, pro-British, reverting to King Faisal’s pro-Arab posture. The result was relative tranquility in relations between Iraq and Iran, with one strategic decision by both principal adversaries—to sign a regional defense pact, with Turkey, Pakistan and the UK, the Baghdad Pact, in 1955; Iraq perceived this pact as enhancing the infuence of Arab nationalism. Iraq’s Period III (1958–1968) witnessed two military coups and several notable decisions that refected a more fi fi fi fi fi fi intense Iraq (Arab) 242 M. BRECHER nationalism which, in turn, reinforced its distrust of, and hostility toward, Iran. It began with a military coup that overthrew the constitutional monarchy in July 1958 and struggles for power among the Army offcers during the following 6 months, leading to the triumph of General Abd al-Karim Qasim, who served as president until February 1963. He, in turn, was ousted in another military coup, led by Colonel Abdal Salam Aref, who was even more committed to Pan-Arab nationalism than his military predecessor. It was during Aref’s presidency that Iraq made three strategic decisions that sharply escalated the tension with its historic rival for domination of the Gulf region: (1) to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact in 1959, highlighting the growing chasm between Iraq’s Arab nationalism and Iran’s Western (Anglo-American) attachment; (2) to reject the 1937 boundary agreement with Iran, by re-affrming Iraq’s ownership of the entire Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, along with the expulsion of thousands of Iranians from Iraq; and (3) to claim the entire Gulf by renaming it the ‘Arabian Gulf’. For Iraq, Period IV of Decisions and Decision-Makers was marked by the coming to power of the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein in 1968–1969, and the overthrow of the Ba’ath, along with the capture of Saddam, by the USA in the second Gulf War, in 2003. This period represented a fundamental change from both its predecessors —the Constitutional Monarchy (1921–1958), especially the King Faisal era (1921–1933), and the decade of military coups and military authoritarianism (1958–1968). In Period IV, Iraq was governed by an ideologically committed Party, with clearly defned objectives and policies, and a much stronger attachment to Arab nationalism than King Faisal or any other Iraq ruler before 1968. This was evident in its aggressive posture on all matters related to the con ct with Iran: the call for ‘liberation’ of Arab Khuzestan; the evocative rhetoric about ‘the Arab Gulf” and its maximalist position on Iraq’s maximum claim to total control of Shatt-alArab. However, the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein in power shared with Qasim and Aref an authoritarian structure of government, with one dominant decision-maker, though Saddam’s variant of authoritarian rule was more absolute than that of Iraq’s military rulers. Moreover, he relied primarily on the Ba’ath Party elite, compared to their reliance on the support of military offcers (Saddam did not assume Iraq’s presidency until 1979 but dominated the major institutions of Ba’ath power—the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the Party, and Iraq’s Cabinet as early as 1969). 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 243 Among the myriad of Iraq decisions during the Ba’ath-Saddam era, fve were strategically signifcant. The frst was a 1971 decision to sever all diplomatic relations with Iran and the UK, in reaction to Iran’s occupation of three Gulf islands claimed by Iraq—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. This act was accompanied by the expulsion of Iranian diplomats and thousands of Iranians from Iraq. The second strategic Iraq decision, not directly related to this con ct, was to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR in 1972; this decision and act intensifed the Iraq/Iran protracted con ct, since the latter perceived Iraq’s alignment with the Soviet Union as gravely threatening to Iran’s vital interests in the Gulf region. The third strategic decision by Iraq in this phase of their con ct conveyed a contradictory message to its principal adversary in 1975: Iraq decided to sign the Algiers Agreement which, for the frst time, granted Iran its longstanding goal in the dispute over the Shatt-alArab, namely, acceptance of the thalweg principle, which accorded equal control to Iran and Iraq in the Waterway. The fourth of these strategic Iraq decisions was to embark on a full-scale war with Iran in 1980; the devastating destruction of the Iran/Iraq War, with at least a million dead, lasted until 1988. The fnal strategic decision in this phase, shared with Iran, was to sign the armistice in 1988 that effectively ended this war in a stalemate. During the next 30 years, this con ct remained unresolved but without a recurrence of war or even lesser degrees of military hostilities between the principal adversaries. Iraq: Decision Process The structure of Iraq’s decision process during this interstate Middle East con ct underwent substantial changes since its onset. During Period I (1921–1958), the formal structure was constitutional democracy, with decisional power shared, initially (1921–1933) by the Monarch and the UK Pro-Consul; then, in the transition following King Faisal’s death (1934–1938), by the Cabinet, followed by the Military; and thereafter (1939–1958), by a duumvirate, Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa’id and the Regent, acting for an infant monarch. In Period II (1958–1968), the structure was military dictatorship, dominated by two Army offcers, Qasim fi fi fi fi fi (1959–1963) and Aref (1963–1968). The structure was civil 244 M. BRECHER authoritarian in Period III (1968–2003), dominated by the Ba’ath Party, with Saddam Hussein as the charismatic leader. The US occupation controlled Iraq during a transition (2003–2007), followed by a Westerntype democracy. In sum, the structure of the decision process varied—constitutional democracy, military dictatorship, and civilian dictatorship, but decisional power related to the con ct with Iran was highly concentrated until 2007, from one to a few decision-makers. Iran: Decisions and Decision-Makers Like Iraq, its arch-rival for primacy in the Persian/Arab Gulf region, Iran has made many decisions relating to their protracted con ct; ten of these were strategic or signifcantly tactical in content, scope, and or impact. These decisions occurred in three periods: the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1921–1941); the reign of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979); and the Islamic Republic (since 1979). Some were ‘the other side of the coin’; that is, they addressed the same issue as Iraq, though from a diametrically contrasting perspective, sometimes with totally incompatible perceived objectives and/or consequences. The frst tangible evidence of modern Iran’s hostile and condescending attitude to its smaller (in population and territorial size) and then less powerful state occurred before the Onset of their post-WWI protracted con ct in 1934: when the UK-created state of Iraq emerged from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, soon after the end of World War I, Iran withheld recognition of Iraq in 1921, on the grounds that the existing boundaries with Iraq were unfair and did not accord with Iran’s national interest. This unconcealed snub by Iran was not quickly forgotten by Iraq’s political elite. Iran’s second hostile act 5 years later also preceded the Onset of this con ct: in 1926, Iran decided to establish a military presence in the Shatt-al-Arab, thereby violating the extant 1914 Protocols, which recognized Iraq’s exclusive ownership of this vital Waterway. A decade later, Reza Shah Pahlavi participated with Iraq in the formation of a four-state Middle East Defense alliance—the 1937 Sa’adabad Defense Pact among Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey; in terms of the Iran/Iraq con ct, it reinforced the positive atmosphere generated by the Iran/Iraq boundary agreement earlier the same year, as discussed above. The frst major Iran decision by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was also shared with Iraq’s decision—to join the US-inspired, Cold War-oriented Baghdad Pact, along with Pakistan, Turkey and the UK, in 1955. This 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 245 further act of cooperation between long-term principal adversaries was facilitated by their shared political structure, a constitutional monarchy in both Iran and Iraq, and their alignment with the USA and the UK in the on-going Cold War with the Communist superpower, whose ideology and perceived hostility both Middle East monarchies, neighbor and near-neighbor, feared. Four years later, the cooperative Baghdad Pact spirit gave way to another, initially verbal, deterioration in Iran/Iraq relations: Iraq’s publicly expressed hostility to the construction of an Iranian port in what was deemed Iraq’s sovereign territory led Iran’s parliament, in 1959, to accuse Iraq of violating treaty commitments on the disputed Waterway and aggressive behavior towards its neighbor. This, in turn, led to an escalation of verbal hostility from Iran and its growing pressure to replace their 1937 boundary agreement with an equal division of rights in the Waterway. Two strategic decisions by Iran in the 1960s accentuated the tension and rivalry with Iraq. One was to activate the ‘Kurdish card’: in 1966, Iran signed an agreement with the Kurds to enlarge its supply of weapons and intelligence assistance to Iraq’s Kurdish community, which was engaged in a long-term struggle for greater autonomy in Iraq. The other decision, in response to an Iraqi rule in April 1969 that obliged Iranian ships to lower their fags and their crews to disembark before entering the Waterway, was to abrogate their 1937 boundary treaty, unilaterally. Nevertheless, the pendulum in Iran/Iraq relations swung to the cooperative dimension once more, in 1975: Iran and Iraq made a strategic decision, the Algiers Agreement, to apply the thalweg principle to the Shatt-al-Arab, thereby granting Iran’s long-sought goal of equal division of the Waterway. The quid pro quo was an Iran commitment to cease military aid to Iraq’s Kurds. Cooperation was short-lived. In 1980, Saddam Hussein, miscalculating the likely impact of the turmoil in Iran created by the Islamic Revolution a year before, launched the Iran/Iraq War: it caused enormous material damage and very high casualties for both of the principal adversaries, until exhaustion and stalemate led to termination of the human slaughter in 1988. One of the many consequences was pre-occupation of both Iran and Iraq with fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi reconstruction of shattered economies and societies for a decade or more, leading to diversion of attention away from their protracted con ct. By then, Iraq became immersed in a con ct relationship with Kuwait and, more dangerous, an unresolved 246 M. BRECHER con ct with the sole superpower and the coalition arraigned against Iraq in the frst Gulf War, 1991; persistence of the con ct with the USA and the UK in the 1990s, and then Gulf War II in 2003; the destruction of the Ba’ath regime and the capture of Saddam Hussein; and the long US occupation of Iraq. In Iran, the highest priorities of the Islamist regime were rehabilitation of a wounded society and economy, and the transformation of a secular society, under Pahlavi rule for almost 90 years, into the goal to which the Islamic Revolution aspired, an Islamist society, governed by Sharia law and re-shaped by Koranic principles. The protracted con ct with Iran was not resolved but it was dormant. Then, unexpectedly, perhaps wondrously for Iran, the longsuppressed Shiite majority in Iraq attained political power in Baghdad. The shared belief system by the overwhelmingly Shiite Iranian nation and the Shiite majority in Iraq, now politically empowered, created a new constellation of power and potential friendship between the two long-time adversaries. National interests and cultures were not easy to reconcile, and the scope of Islamist infuence on the behavior of the two states differed. However, the core issues of their interstate protracted con ct did not generate hostile decisions or crises, with frequent escalating tension, as they did during the post-World War I era as independent states. Iran: Decision Process The political structure and decision-making process in Iran was highly authoritarian during the three periods in which its protracted con ct with Iraq unfolded. From 1921 to 1941, the structure and the process were dominated by the frst Pahlavi Shah: the ultimate power of decision on all aspects of public policy, including the overriding domain of national security and foreign policy, rested with the Shah. Given his military background before he achieved the power of a Shah, his advisors, to the extent that, as an absolute ruler, he consulted specialists, were drawn from the Military. His son and successor as Shah, Mohammed Reza, was no less authoritarian. However, he was more constrained by external and internal forces in the exercise of ultimate authority in Iran. Indebted to the USA and the UK for his assumption of the Persian throne in 1941, he relied heavily on Western advice on policy and government throughout the 38 years of his reign. The most dramatic illustration of that dependence relationship occurred in a context in which his authority was challenged by a 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 247 popular prime minister, Mossadegh, who had the support of Iran’s legislature, the Majlis, in 1953 and was challenging the Shah’s economic, specifcally petroleum policy, in which the Western Powers had a vital interest; the Shah survived the challenge only by the effective intervention of the US and UK Intelligence agencies. In Period III of Iran’s involvement in the con ct with Iraq, the political structure and decision process were dominated by Islamic authoritarianism, initially with Ayatollah Khomeini as the ultimate authority in all issues of public policy, from 1979 until his death in 1989, and thereafter, Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Ruler. Islamist Iran has an elaborate set of institutions that perform governmental functions—a president, a legislature, the Military, the bureaucracy. However, on any major substantive issue of domestic and foreign policy, requiring a decision by Iran since 1979, authority and power have been concentrated in the Supreme Leader. Discordant Objectives: Material Benefts and Power The core issue of discord between these Gulf region rivals was control over their shared international waterway, the Shatt-al-Arab. Iran’s objective for almost 40 years (1937–1975) was the revision of their formal 1937 agreement, which allocated most of the waterway to Iraq: Iran regarded the agreement as an inequitable imposition that led to disproportionate material benefts to Iraq because of the steadily increasing fow of oil-carrying ships through this waterway, which was indispensable for economic growth in many regions and states. Thus, the objective of Iraq, by far the main benefciary of the constantly escalating worldwide export of oil from the Middle East, was to maintain the status quo embodied in the 1937 agreement on the Shatt-al-Arab. Iran benefted from the moderate revision of the 1937 agreement in 1975 (the Algiers Agreement), but this was short-lived: Saddam Hussein disavowed Iraq’s commitment to the 1975 revised agreement on the Shatt (Waterway) in 1980, precipitating the mutually devastating carnage of the Iran/Iraq War (1980–1988). The second persistent discordant objective of the two long-time Persian Gulf region and Middle East fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi adversaries in this unresolved but dormant con ct was the closely related competing goal of power. For both Iran and Iraq, the extent of their control of the Shatt-al-Arab was not only a valued source of material beneft: it also enhanced Iraq’s claim to leadership in the Arab world; and it was inextricably related to the 248 M. BRECHER Iran/Iraq competition for primacy in the Gulf region and the Middle East as a whole. Con ct Management and Con ct Resolution The historical roots of this interstate protracted con ct date to 638 C.E., as noted, when the Muslim Arabs destroyed the four-century Sassanid (Neo-Persian) Empire. However, the modern, post-World War I phase of this unresolved con ct began in the second decade of the inter-world war period (1919–1939). Iraq accused Iran in 1930 of building dams that, it declared, illegally diverted water from the Iraqcontrolled Shatt-alArab—their longstanding maritime con ct over the ‘Arab Waterway’— which separated, and joined, the two regional major power Gulf rivals. This led to military incidents and the initial internationalization of a multi-faceted interstate con ct over territory (the ShattWaterway) and power (primacy in the Gulf region), superimposed on profound differences in culture and ethnicity (Persian-Iranian vs. Arab), religion (Shia vs. Sunni Islam), and the historic rivalry between Middle East empires (Mesopotamia vs. Persia). In 1934, Iraq complained to the League of Nations, whose Council attempted to mediate a seemingly minor material dispute. Iran, then the stronger Gulf power, made its acceptance of mediation conditional on Iraq’s cession of territory—three miles of anchorage area, in accord with several earlier Iran/Iraq treaties, to enable Iran’s use of the port of Abadan in the Shatt. Iraq rejected the demand, and the frst of many mediation efforts by the global organization failed. Despite this inauspicious attempt at multilateral con ct management, Iran and Iraq succeeded in reaching a bilateral agreement via direct negotiations three years later: the adversaries re-affrmed their adherence to the 1913 Constantinople Protocols in their 1937 Boundary Treaty, reconfrming Iraq’s ownership of the Shatt, which had been established in several earlier treaties between the Ottoman Empire, of which Iraq was a part until 1920, and Persia, as well as the results of the 1914 Border Delimitation Commission. Moreover, reversing its rejection of Persia’s minor territorial demand in 1934, Iraq ceded a four-mile anchorage area to Iran in the Waterway and agreed to establish a joint Iraq-Persia administrative commission to supervise all practical matters related to the Shatt. They also signed a symbolically relevant Treaty of Good Neighbor Relations in 1949. While disagreements about the Shatt administrative body caused tensions, the protracted con ct was relatively quiescent 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 249 for three decades, except for a minor crisis over competing claims to the Waterway, with minimal border clashes (November 28, 1959–January 4, 1960). A re-escalation of their protracted con ct was triggered in 1968 by the Ba’ath Party’s assumption of power in Iraq and its imposition of stringent, humiliating rules for any Iran ship traversing the Waterway, e.g., the requirement that it lower its fag when entering the Waterway. This led to a sharp Persian response: on April 19, 1969, it abrogated the 1937 boundary agreement and demanded its re-negotiation. Iraq again sought mediation by the successor to the League of Nations, the UN, and proposed a joint Iran–Iraq submission of the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) [World Court]. Iran, knowing Iraq’s much stronger legal claims to the Waterway, refused both submission to the World Court and direct negotiations. Both adversaries sought UN support, to no avail. The crisis lasted 6 months (April 15–October 30, 1969). In that hopeful atmosphere, four Middle East states attempted to mediate the Iran/Iraq con ct— Saudi Arabia (in April 1969), Kuwait (May 1969), Jordan (May–June 1969), and Turkey (1960)— but, as often, they were rebuffed by Iran, aware, as always, of its weak legal position on matters relating to the Waterway. During the early 1970s a very costly civil war, in casualties and material damage, raged in Iraq between the Ba’ath regime and the large Kurdish community in northern Iraq, supported with weapons and economic aid from Iran. On February 12, 1974, an exhausted Iraq, with an estimated loss of more than 60,000 soldiers and civilians, requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. The Council appointed a Special Representative at the end of February to attempt to end the violence and to seek a more far-reaching political agreement between Iran and Iraq. In that setting, a skillful mediation effort by Algeria’s President Boumedienne, acting on behalf of the UN, was highly successful in achieving both successful con ct management and fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi near-con ct resolution, where so many earlier and later mediation efforts failed. A ceasefre agreement between the Iran and Iraq governments was signed on March 7, 1974, providing for a mutual withdrawal of forces along their joint frontier and a renewal of negotiations on the core issues in their protracted con ct. However, violent clashes continued along their border, largely because of Iran’s continuing support for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq: they ended only a year later. 250 M. BRECHER On March 6, 1975, the two principal adversaries in this Middle East con ct signed the Algiers Accord, among the most signifcant advances in the quest for con ct resolution, as well as effective con ct management, during the entire Iran/Iraq protracted con ct. In April, they reinforced the general thrust to a relationship of peace and cooperation in the Accord by signing four implementing documents spelling out commitments on boundaries and on security measures to prevent the formation of subversive groups in the territory of both states. These preliminary agreements were formalized in their Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighborly Relations, signed on June 13, 1975. What made possible this achievement of con ct management and near-con ct resolution, by a combination of skillful diplomacy and third party (UN) mediation? One crucial inducement was the perception by leaders of both states that the relative equality in their then-existing balance of military capability made a costly stalemate highly likely in a full-scale war; neither would beneft, both would suffer massively, from such a military escalation, as occurred later, during their long and bitter war from 1980 to 1988. The perceived likelihood of war in 1974 had approached high probability, with an additional shared perception that their oil production and income earned from the export of oil would be seriously undermined by a prolonged war. These perceptions were reinforced for Iraq by the drain on resources caused by the persistent Kurdish rebellion, abetted by Iran, and were reinforced for Iran by concerns about the potential spill-over from its support for the Kurds in Iraq to Kurdish irredentist claims in Iran. (Ironically, none of these perceptions served to deter Saddam Hussein from launching a full-scale war against Iran in September 1980, or served to deter Ayatollah Khomeini from rejecting several opportunities to end their war earlier: Saddam was persuaded that the dislocation in Iran attending the fall of the Shah and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 portended a profound shift in the balance of military power in Iraq’s favor; and Khomeini was incapable of accepting termination of the war without Iraq’s admission of responsibility from setting the war in motion. Thus, the promise of con ct resolution in 1975 was destroyed by the reality of full-scale war in September 1980.) The UN role in attempted mediation pervaded the Iran/Iraq con ct from 1969 to 1988. In some instances, this was initiated by an Iraq appeal for intervention by the Security Council, as in 1969 and 1974, replications of Iraq’s complaint to, and request for mediation by, the League of Nations at the onset of the modern phase of this protracted 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 251 con ct in 1934. In most cases, the UN, acting through the Security Council or the Secretary-General, took the lead. Resolutions by the former and interventions by SecretariesGeneral abound, among them the following, all but the frst and last related to attempts to wind down the Iran/Iraq War (1980–1988): Resolution 348 (March 7, 1974) Called upon Iran and Iraq to adhere to the terms of their agreed-upon March 7 ceasefre, and offered the adversaries mediation by the Secretary-General. Resolution 479 (September 28, 1980) After UN Secretary-General Waldheim’s offer of good offces to the principal adversaries was declined, he brought the matter to the Security Council; this resolution noted the beginning of the Iran/Iraq War and called upon Iran and Iraq “to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law.” Resolution 514 (July 12, 1982) Call ed for an end to the Iran/Iraq War. Resolution 522 (October 4, 1982) Called for an end to the Iran/Iraq War and the withdrawal of the armed forces of both combatants to internationally recognized boundaries. 252 M. BRECHER Resolution 540 (October 31, 1983) Condemned violations of international law in the Iran/Iraq War. Secretary-General Initiative (June 9, 1984) Called upon the adversaries to agree to a truce, in order to protect civilians; this led to a truce in the ‘war of the cities’ that the combatants honored for nine months. Resolution 582 (February 24, 1986) “Deplores” the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq War. Resolution 588 (October 8‚ 1986) Called for implementation of Resolution 582. Resolution 598 (July 20, 1987) Demanded an fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi immediate ceasefre by both combatants, the release of POWS by both adversaries, and the termination of military actions against neutral ships, and it requested the SecretaryGeneral to begin an investigation to determine how the war started. Iraq accepted these terms; Iran demurred, declaring that it would not accept the resolution until Iraq’s responsibility for starting the war was acknowledged. Iran formally accepted this resolution on July 17, 1988, marking 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 253 the end of the Iran/Iraq War. Resolution 612 (May 9, 1988) Condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq War—by implication, both adversaries, and offered mediation by the Secretary-General. Resolution 619 (August 9, 1988) The Security Council created the U.N Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)—“to establish the ceasefre line, monitor compliance, investigate violations, confrm the withdrawal of forces, and seek agreement of the parties for other arrangements to help reduce tensions.” This resolution was extended by a series of later Security Council Resolutions—631, 642, 651, 671, 674, and 685. The Observer Group functioned from 1988 to 1991. Resolution 620 (August 26, 1988) Renewed its condemnation of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq War. As noted above, Algeria played a crucial role in mediating this con ct in 1974–1975, culminating in Iran’s and Iraq’s signing the Algiers Accord in 1975. In May 1983, the foreign ministers of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) offered to mediate the end of the Iran/Iraq War, and there was one attempt by the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to mediate, passively—a 1985 call for peace negotiations between 254 M. BRECHER Iran and Iraq, based on UN Security Council Resolutions. Among these mediation episodes only the role of Algeria’s President Boumedienne had a profound effect on this protracted con ct, for the years 1975–1980. Assessing the UN role during the Iran/Iraq con ct, its contribution was notable for the volume of attention given to this protracted con ct from 1969 to 1991, especially during the Iran/Iraq War (1980–1988), and for the persistence of attempts to achieve effective con ct management, measured by the plethora of Security Council resolutions and frequent mediation efforts by several Secretaries-General on that war. In terms of substantive contribution to con ct management, there were three important episodes in which the UN performed a valuable service. One was its role in achieving a ceasefre in 1974, with a mutual withdrawal of forces. This, in turn, became a prelude to its second (indirect but most valuable) contribution: mediation by a Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral in producing the landmark Algiers Accord of 1974 and the follow-up treaty signed by Iran and Iraq in 1975. The third, high pro e, contribution was the formula for ending the 8-year war, embodied in Security Council Resolution 598, approved by Iraq in July 1987 and by Iran in July 1988. That UN achievement was the culmination of a long complex process because of Iran’s traditional rejection of any form of mediation. However, because of sustained losses and costly military errors in 1982– 1983, Iran began to search for a face-saving path to make war termination acceptable. It became more amenable to UN initiatives and reached out to other third parties, notably Persian Gulf states, and in 1986 entered into secret negotiations with the USA, Iraq’s principal supporter in the Iran/Iraq War. In 1986, the UN produced a peace plan, as did the USA, favorable to Iraq, calling for a withdrawal of Iran and Iraq forces to their internationally recognized borders, which would have nullifed Iran’s territorial gains during the war. When the UN–USA plan was approved by the Security Council as Resolution 598 (July 20, 1987), Iran avoided acceptance or rejection. Only after another year of punishing casualties, Iran relented and accepted this resolution in July 1988. This was an impressive achievement in con ct management, formalized in Security Council Resolution 598. However, there was no direct UN contribution to the goal of con ct resolution, except for the role of a mediator appointed by the UN, a respected political leader of a Muslim state. Causes of Non-resolution The absence of con ct resolution in the Iran/Iraq con ct is evident, despite the end of their very-high-casualty and grave-damage war 30 years 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 255 ago. There was no formal peace treaty, only a mutually accepted and respected ceasefre, signed in 1988 under UN Security Council auspices, actively supported by the USA. What then, were the basic causes of the failure to resolve the Iran/Iraq protracted con ct during the eight decades since the onset of its post-WWI phase? What explains the inability or unwillingness of the principal adversaries to resolve their con ct? Does the absence fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi of any, some or all of the six postulated conditions for a likely achievement of con ct resolution, in the Resolution Model—exhaustion, changes in the balance of capability, domestic pressures, external pressures, reduction in discordance of objectives by the principal adversaries, and decline in con ct-sustaining acts—explain the non-resolution of this con ct, although it has been dormant since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the replacement of a predominantly Sunni regime by the long-suppressed Shia majority in Iraq? Or does the presence of one or more of these conditions indicate partial, informal con ct resolution? Or are there other basic causes that perpetuate a passive interstate con ct? Exhaustion—There is no doubt that both of the principal adversaries suffered grievously from the carnage of the Iran/Iraq War, with a million or more fatalities and massive material losses, along with profound psychological consequences in both societies, compounded by the absence of any human, political, or economic gains or compensation from a meaningless, purposeless mutual slaughter. Collective and individual exhaustion pervaded both nations, more than suffcient to induce a shared interest in resolving their con ct, on acceptable terms, far beyond a ceasefre agreement. Certainly this postulated basic causal condition of a favorable attitude to con ct resolution was evident in both nations during the eight-year war and for many years thereafter. The Balance of Capability between Iran and Iraq experienced several changes during their con ct. Traditionally, before the 1980s war, Iran perceived itself, and Iraq acknowledged Iran, as the superior power: this was refected in Iraq’s frequent choice of UN intervention during their frequent disputes, and Iran’s disposition to avoid commitments to such intervention. The balance shifted during the long war, but not fundamentally. By the end of the war, they had reached relative equality in military capability. These two conditions—acute exhaustion and mutually perceived relative equality in military capability after many years of punishing combat —were the basic causes of war termination in 1988, buttressed by an active UN peace-oriented posture throughout the war. However, war termination and con ct resolution are not synonymous, 256 M. BRECHER not conceptually nor in reality. (In the France/Germany con ct, wars ended in 1871, 1918, and 1945, but their protracted con ct thrived during that three-fourth of a century; so too in the Arab/Israel and India/Pakistan wars and protracted con cts, among many other cases; protracted con cts often persisted long after wars ended.) Domestic Pressures—In contrast with exhaustion and relative equal military capability, there were no apparent domestic pressures for con ct resolution in either Iran or Iraq. Acute exhaustion and pain ultimately were crucial in persuading the leaders of both states to accept war termination, that is, con ct management, though Iran did so only a year after the Security Council ceasefre resolution had been approved and accepted by Iraq. Con ct resolution was not contemplated in 1988 or later, for the war had generated deep mistrust and hatred of the enemy. These negative attitudes were accentuated in Iran by the widespread conviction that they alone were the victims of Iraq’s chemical weapons, from which, it was widely known, Iraq’s Kurdish and Shia communities had suffered before and soon after the war. Thus, in the Iran/Iraq con ct, whatever domestic pressures existed, especially in Iran, were directed against, not in favor of, con ct resolution. External Pressures—As indicated in the above presentation of evidence on con ct management and con ct resolution, there was persistent pressure from the UN Security Council and several UN SecretariesGeneral. However, most of that external pressure was verbal, especially calls for a cessation of hostilities by the combatants. Sanctions of any kind were avoided throughout—before, during and after the war. There were three tangible acts of successful UN pressure on Iraq and Iran— to acquiesce in con ct management by signing ceasefre agreements in 1974 and 1987, and a 1984 truce in the ‘war of the cities’ that lasted 9 months. There were also mediation attempts by UN SecretariesGeneral, individual Middle East states, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as noted. However, only one had a profound effect on the quest for con ct resolution, the 1975 Algiers Accord. Most signifcant in this context was the absence of external pressure from either of the superpowers; rather, the USA supported Iraq during the long war, and the USSR supported Iran. Thus, while external pressure was abundant, all of it was verbal, mostly in the form of UN resolutions, which never imposed any sanctions and did not induce or constrain acts by Iran or Iraq that were favorable or unfavorable toward con ct resolution. 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 257 Decline in Con ct- fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Sustaining Acts—Since the end of the Iran/Iraq War nearly thirty years ago, state-organized, directed and implemented violence between the principal adversaries has ceased: the decline in hostile acts against the longstanding rival and enemy has been notable, especially after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. A new era between Shia Iran and Shia majority Iraq was a notable consequence of the US’s regime change in Gulf War II. However, that change, a muted, de facto resolution of this con ct has not yet translated into formal peace, normally a pre-requisite to con ct resolution. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—This change too has occurred but is more muted than the more visible decline in con ctsustaining acts. Moreover, as with a decline in con ct-sustaining acts, reduced discordance does not guarantee con ct resolution, just as formal con ct resolution does not ensure reconciliation. This difference between changes in behavior—a decline in hostile acts—and changes in attitudes toward a long-time enemy is also evident in other interstate protracted con cts. War termination is not synonymous with a transformation in attitudes to a former enemy; for example, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, as did Jordan and Israel in 1994. In both relationships, a peace agreement led to a signifcant decline in con ctsustaining acts, though it is doubtful that this has been accompanied by a marked reduction in discordance over objectives between the adversaries. Similarly, war termination in the case of Iran and Iraq has not automatically led to a reduction in discordance over objectives, not even to a formal peace agreement, the pre-condition to con ct resolution. In sum, several basic conditions, postulated in the Resolution Model as likely to serve as basic causes of con ct resolution, were present in the Iran/Iraq con ct. The most notable was collective exhaustion, experienced by both principal adversaries during their devastating war, 1980– 1988, with consequences for both societies and political elites long after the winding down of a very long, high-casualty-grave damage military catastrophe from which neither adversary beneftted. Moreover, as noted, external pressures from the United Nations were abundant. In addition, there emerged a considerable decline in con ct-sustaining acts decades after that war, including a cessation of military hostilities after 1988. And the coming to power of Iraq’s majority Shia community provided an opportunity for a healing of wounds by both Iran’s and Iraq’s Shia societies, raising the possibility of active cooperation between the historical adversaries and competitors for primacy in the Gulf region. The hostile behavior between Iran 258 M. BRECHER and Iraq has clearly diminished during the last three decades. However, formal con ct resolution of this interstate con ct remains elusive, despite the presence of three conditions favorable to con ct resolution, even to reconciliation—exhaustion, a notable decline in con ct-sustaining acts, and a reduction in the level of hostility and discord of objectives. This change in the political and military environment suggests a likelihood that con ct resolution of the Iran/Iraq con ct would ensue. However, the legacy of exhaustion persisted. Moreover, the impact of exhaustion was signifcantly enhanced, for both principal adversaries, by domestic pressures that were expressed as intense bitterness, distrust, hostility, and hatred for ‘the enemy’ by the leaders, elite, and population at large, especially in Iran, which had suffered the most from the relentless war. That domestic pressure would seem to offset whatever inducement to con ct resolution would normally be generated by mass exhaustion. Moreover, hatred for ‘the other’ was reinforced by deep-rooted mistrust and cumulative hostility based upon several sources: con cting narratives of historic con cts between Persian and Arab civilizations during more than a millennium; longstanding rivalry for primacy in the Gulf region; unrestrained competition in religion—the often explosive hostility between Shia and Sunni Islam, as long as Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party held power in Iraq; differences in ethnicity, culture and language; and specifc longstanding sources of discord, notably over the Shatt Waterway, Iran’s military support for Iraq’s Kurds in their perennial quest for greater autonomy, and memory of the long war. These material and psychological obstacles to con ct resolution of the Iran/Iraq protracted con ct remain. Reconciliation Conceptually, as noted, and in practice for the most part, con ct resolution precedes reconciliation between con ct adversaries. However, there are exceptions to this sequence; the Iran/ Iraq protracted con ct is one of them, with evidence of accommodation and incipient reconciliation. Since the end of their disastrous war in 1988, relations have been correct—no full-scale crises or outbreaks of interstate violence. Iran’s public reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was fi fi fi muted—mild condemnation and support for all UN Security Council resolutions on that destabilizing event in the Gulf region. In the 1990s, many of the residual topics of their long war were dealt with amicably, notably the exchange of POWs and war reparations. A lingering border dispute was slowly being settled. The longstanding rivals in the Gulf region re-affrmed acceptance of their 1975 Algiers Agreement, which incorporated the thalweg principle (mid-point in the 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 259 Waterway) as their maritime boundary. The Waterway has been free of Iran-Iraq discord (though not free of discord between Iran and Western powers). Trade has grown considerably, even during, in part because of, the steady growth of economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the USA and other Western states since 2009. Most important among the signs of détente were political changes in both states. Three reform presidents in Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997– 2005), and Hassan Rouhani (since August 2013) contributed to the emerging détente between the two rival states. Most important for the beginnings of societal reconciliation has been the empowerment of the long-oppressed majority Shia Muslim community in Iraq, symbolized by the electoral victory and assumption of power in 2006 by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, head of a Shia Coalition. Since then, many Iranians have focked to Shia Holy Places in Iraq; and the shared attachment to the precepts and values of Shia Islam has generated a degree of mutual understanding between the overwhelming Shia majority population in Iran and the substantial Shia majority in Iraq, though such shared religious beliefs have not translated into shared policy preferences and decisions on many sources of Iran/Iraq discord. The ethnic, language, and cultural differences between Iranian and Iraqi societies have not become submerged as a result of shared religious beliefs of the majority populations. Nor has the mutual inheritance of historic rivalry between Persians and Arabs, or the interstate competition for domination of the Gulf region, or rivalry over the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway yielded to the positive atmosphere created by their shared religious beliefs. Moreover, the memory of their long and bitter war in the 1980s has not been forgotten, especially in Iran, a national and individual memory accentuated by the grievous losses from Iraq’s assaults of chemical weapons, a highly emotional obstacle to reconciliation by Iran’s mass public. A formal peace treaty, that would mark the resolution of their protracted con ct, would be an important signal of a shared wish to enhance the process of reconciliation. Thus far, notwithstanding reports during 2013 that Iraq’s government (informally) granted over ght permission to Iran, a major supplier of weapons and non-military aid to Syria’s embattled government during its unresolved civil war, and an (informal) Iran offer of tangible support for the Iraq government’s attempt to overcome the serious threat posed by the militant Sunni ISIS non-state actor to Iraq’s continued existence as a Shia majority state, in 2014, the principal adversaries in this dormant con ct have not yet begun the arduous task of ascending any of the multiple stages of a Reconciliation Pyramid.