Munich 1972 Olympic Games Rescue Attempt PDF

RESCUE ATTEMPT AT FURSTENFELDBRUCK **Source: http://www.munich11.org/** The leader of Black September, sensing that negotiations had reached a standstill \[in the Olympic Village\], requested safe passage for them and their hostages via airplane to a friendly country. Without consulting the Israel...

RESCUE ATTEMPT AT FURSTENFELDBRUCK **Source: http://www.munich11.org/** The leader of Black September, sensing that negotiations had reached a standstill \[in the Olympic Village\], requested safe passage for them and their hostages via airplane to a friendly country. Without consulting the Israeli government, the Germans obliged. A second rescue attempt, involving an ambush of the terrorists as they walked 180 yards to the helicopters that would take them to the Furstenfeldbruck air field where they would transfer to a plane, failed when one of the terrorists first examined the route and was alerted to the presence of police snipers. Ultimately, the terrorists successfully left the building via a shuttle bus which took them to the nearby helipad where they boarded the helicopters with their hostages (Reeve 98-100). Having then made their way to Furstenfeldbruck via helicopter, the terrorists and Israeli hostages were to be taken by a Lufthansa jet to Libya. The German police had one final, but poorly planned and executed, rescue attempt left: to ambush the terrorists during the transfer on the tarmac from helicopter to airplane (Schiller 199-200). Again without consulting the Israeli government, and seemingly without any expertise in such tactics, the operation pressed ahead despite many of the involved parties feeling that it was doomed from the start. A group of policemen posing as Lufthansa crew abandoned the mission at the last minute **(Reeve 108-109).** Details about the actual number of terrorists involved did not emerge until they had boarded the helicopters, and the information was never relayed to the airbase. The German sharpshooters were general policemen and had received no special training in marksmanship or special operational tactics **(Reeve 106-107).** They were given rifles not suitable for a sniper operation, and were not given the benefit of adequate lighting on the airfield. The police were unprotected and undermanned **(Klein 83-85).** When the helicopter landed at Furstenfeldbruck, Issa and Tony, the two terrorist leaders, emerged to inspect the recently deserted airplane. Realizing that something was amiss, they returned quickly to the helicopters, while the German snipers were given the order to fire (Reeve 113). In the initial firefight, one terrorist was injured, while another was killed. As the gunfight ensued, the terrorists also held the German helicopter pilots at gunpoint, raising the number of hostages from 9 to 13 (Reeve 112). Sensing chaos, Israeli officials, who had been reduced to onlookers, pleaded with the German police to do something. Eventually, they were allowed to climb the tower where the German snipers were camped, and attempt to negotiate with the terrorists using a megaphone. The terrorists responded with more gunfire. Meanwhile, after about 20 minutes, the German police called for backup from armoured vehicles, which ultimately wound up stuck in a massive traffic jam, the result of thousands of onlookers flocking to the air base to witness the events **(Reeve 118-119).** About an hour later, the armoured vehicle finally arrived and approached the helicopters with the remaining terrorists and hostages. One terrorist, sensing the end was near, opened fire on the hostages at point-blank range, killing three of the Israelis (Reeve 120). Moments later, he jumped from the helicopter and tossed a hand grenade inside behind him. Snipers then shot down Issa and another terrorist, who fell to the tarmac just as the hand grenade went off, killing the remaining hostages inside that helicopter (Reeve 121). As flames engulfed the scene, another terrorist began gunning down the bound hostages inside the other helicopter. Another terrorist was killed by snipers fleeing from underneath the second helicopter. A final armoured car arrived to rescue the German helicopter pilots who had volunteered to participate in the operation and had been given a promise of safety by the terrorists. The police officers inside the car, though, had not been in communication with the authorities already present at the scene. Seeing a figure in the shadows holding a rifle not far from a downed terrorist, a police officer in the armoured vehicle opened fire. The police officer struck and killed the figure, only to tragically discover that it was one of the German snipers. Another officer was also struck by friendly fire but survived. Ambulances, which had not originally been present, were ordered to the scene but did not arrive for another 30 minutes **(Reeve 121-122).** As the battle raged on past midnight, the four remaining terrorists opened fire on the unarmed firemen who arrived to put out the helicopter fire. As they attacked on the brave but defenceless firemen attempting to blanket the helicopter in foam, a sniper was able to take out one more terrorist. Finally, the gunshots stopped at 12:30 a.m. (Reeve 122). As authorities approached the scene, they found two surviving terrorists playing dead among the foam, while a third had been captured trying to flee the area (Reeve 133). [The victims' families and onlookers from around the world breathed a momentary but misplaced sigh of relief following a late-night announcement. Government spokesman Conrad Ahlers appeared on television, stating mistakenly that all of the hostages had been freed **(Reeve 129).** The mysterious source of this information is still unknown, and no sufficient explanation for this erroneous announcement has ever been offered. Early morning newspapers picked up the announcement, including the Jerusalem Post, running headlines that the Israeli athletes were free. In reality, this couldn't be farther from the truth **(Schiller 201).**] **HOW DID IT HAPPEN?** Lax security surely was partially responsible for Black September being able to conduct their operation. But German authorities had not suspected that security threats would arise from abroad. Likewise, British, American, French and Israeli intelligence agencies were also in the dark about any specific terrorist plans targeting Israelis at the Games **(Schiller 202).** Shmuel Lalkin, the Israeli delegation head, had inspected the facilities that the Israelis would occupy in the Olympic Village ahead of time. After doing so, he complained to the Shin Bet (the Israeli security service) that the security provisions of the Germans were insufficient; his pleas went unanswered. A later investigation revealed that a variety of Israeli security officials had been given the opportunity by the Munich organizing committee to change the Israeli delegation's dorm assignment but had declined to do so **(Klein 91-21).** Additionally, the Israeli team chose to come to Munich without its own security team; high-ranking Israeli security officials were later fired as a direct result (Schiller 206-207) No one person or missed assignment was responsible for the attack. Given the nature of and approach to security at the Games, preventing the attack would have required a heavily armed police presence, which the police chief, Manfred Schreiber, acknowledged would have "compromised the serenity of the Games" **(Schiller 205)**. Had a few armed guards, for example, been present at the entrance to the Olympic Village, it is doubtful they would have been able to hold off or prevent the attack given the number of terrorists and the weapons they possessed. In all, only \$2 million was spent on security at the 1972 Munich Games (compared to \$1 billion in 2004) **(Klein 26)** **[Task:] Highlight (or underline) in different colours: Specific examples of German incompetence when it came to the rescue attempt** **[References:]** Klein, Aaron J. *Striking Back: the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response*. New York: Random House, 2005.  Reeve, Simon. *One Day in September: the Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation "Wrath of God"* New York: Arcade, 2000. Schiller, Kay, and Christopher Young. *The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany*. Berkeley: University of California, 2010.