North Korean Nuclear Issue 2024 PDF

10. North Korean Nuclear Issues Prof. Dong-Ik Shin Yonsei University 1. Brief History of North Korean Nuclear Issues A. Before 2018 North Korea’s nuclear development is a matter of serious concern to the world that not only threatens peace and s...

10. North Korean Nuclear Issues Prof. Dong-Ik Shin Yonsei University 1. Brief History of North Korean Nuclear Issues A. Before 2018 North Korea’s nuclear development is a matter of serious concern to the world that not only threatens peace and security but also undermines the international non-proliferation regime. North Korean nuclear issues drew international attention when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. Since then until now, the North Korean nuclear issue has gone through a cycle of progress and set-back in negotiations. The Agreed Framework (Geneva Agreement) of 1994 between the United States and North Korea led to a freeze of North Korea’s plutonium nuclear facilities for several years. However, the agreement eventually collapsed as North’s nuclear development using enriched uranium was revealed and North Korea restarted its plutonium nuclear facilities in 2002. In 2003, the Six-Party Talks was launched, involving South and North Koreas as well as the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. The Six-Party Talks made some progress by adopting the “Joint Statement” on September 19, 2005; “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” on February 13, 2007. However, the Six-Party Talks has not convened since December 2008, as the parties failed to agree on the verification protocol for North Korea’s nuclear programs. 2  Even during the Six-Party process, North Korea sought to possess nuclear weapons, conducting its first nuclear test in 2006 and the second test in 2009.  In 2010 Pyongyang made public about its HEU facilities at Yongbyon. In February 2012, the United States and North Korea reached a deal (the so- called “Leap Day” Deal), which specified North Korea’s pre-steps for resumption of denuclearization talks.  However, the agreement collapsed as North Korea launched a long-range missile on April 13, and proclaimed itself as a nuclear weapons state in its constitution on the same day.  On February 12, 2013 North Korea conducted the third nuclear test. Afterwards North Korea also declared its so called "Byungjin" policy of simultaneously pursuing both economic and nuclear development and enacted a “law that consolidates the nuclear weapons state for self- defense”.  In 2016, despite the repeated warnings from the international community, North Korea further carried out fourth nuclear test in January and, the fifth test in September, while launching various range of ballistic missiles threatening a preemptive nuclear strike.  In 2017 as well, tensions continued to escalate as North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and ICBM-class ballistic missile launches, and claimed to be a “nuclear-weapon state” by testing long-range ICBM(Hwa- sung15) ballistic missile in November. 3 4 (From 2006-2017) 5 B. After 2018: Inter-Korean and US-DPRK Summits  In 2018, the ROK government has emphasized peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear issue through President Moon's "Berlin Initiative" in July, 2017.  The ROK government has also made continued efforts to bring North Korea to dialogue, such as proposing Pyongyang's participation in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games.  As a result, North Korea participated in the Winter Olympic Games in February, to which a high-level delegation also attended.  In the first half of 2018, series of historic milestones were set: Two inter- Korean Summits each on 27 April and 26 May was followed by the first-ever US-North Korea Summit on 12 June in Singapore.  Most importantly, the top leaders of the two Koreas and the US expressed their firm commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  It was stipulated in ‘the Panmunjom Declaration’ on April 27 between two Koreas, and in ‘the US-DPRK Joint Statement at the Singapore Summit’ on June 12.  At the inter-Korean Summit Meeting held in Pyongyang on 18-20 September, North Korea confirmed to take concrete measures for denuclearization in ‘the Pyongyang Joint Declaration’.  North Korea announced that it will permanently dismantle its Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries. 6  And the North indicated its willingness to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures.  The second US-North Korea Summit in Hanoi from 27 to 28 February in 2019. However, the US and North Korea failed to reach an agreement on the denuclearization issue.  Although US-North Korea dialogue has stalled since the second US-North Korea Summit, the two sides continued to express their willingness for engagement.  On June 30, the leaders of the US and North Korea met in Panmunjom for the first time in history. The three leaders of the two Koreas and the US also were able to exchange their views together as well.  These occasions created a new momentum in the dialogue process as the leaders of the US and North Korea agreed to restart the negotiations at a working-level in the near future.  Diverse diplomatic efforts for continuous dialogue are on-going to achieve substantial progress towards complete denuclearization and establishing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. 7 8 C. North Korea 'destroys' Punggye-ri nuclear test site (2018.5.24)  North Korea claims to have dismantled its only known nuclear test site, detonating explosives and collapsing its entrances in front of international television crews in a highly symbolic move.  Reporters at the scene described a series of explosions throughout the day, three of them in entry tunnels to the underground facility, followed by explosions that demolished a nearby barracks and other structures.  But no international inspectors were allowed to survey the site. Experts have said that if only the entrances were sealed at the closing ceremony, the tunnels could easily be reopened if Pyongyang decides to resume nuclear tests.  After the Punggyer-ri event, based on the Panmunjom Declaration of 27 April, the US-North Korea Joint Statement of 12 June, the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of 19 September, and other past agreements with North Korea, the ROK government has focused on promoting U.S.-North Korea as well as inter- Korean dialogue.  In April 2022, satellite imagery is showing some of the signs that North Korea is tunneling again at its remote underground nuclear test site in a way that could potentially shorten the time it needs for its next nuclear test. 9 2. The Basic Position of the ROK(Republic of Korea) Government on North Korean Nuclear Issues  The international community will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state under any circumstances.  The unified resolve of the international community to not tolerate North Korea’s repeated provocations and violations of international obligations is clearly reflected in UN Security Council resolutions : 2270(March 2016), 2321(November 2016), 2356(June 2017), 2371 (August 2017), 2375 (September 2017) and 2397 (December 2017).  While thoroughly implementing these UNSCR sanctions measures, the ROK government has been encouraging North Korea's more forthcoming for a brighter future, once the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula will be achieved.  The ROK government, through the ROK-US alliance and close cooperation with the international community, will continue its efforts to achieve complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue.  The ROK looks forward to continued support of international community on the complete denuclearization and permanent peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. 10 A. President Moon Jae-In :proposed DMZ as future ‘peace and cooperation district’ on the Korean Peninsula at the UN General Assembly (September 24, 2019) 11 B. President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s Initiative  On August 15, 2022, South Korean president proposed an “audacious initiative” to provide economic compensation in return for North Korea’s “substantive process for denuclearization.”  The economic incentives include providing large-scale food aid and assistance for power generation, and infrastructure and technical support programs to enhance agricultural productivity in North Korea.  But North Korea rejected President Yoon’s plan as the height of folly, describing it as nothing but a copy of the former conservative Lee Myung- bak government's approach, called the Vision 3,000 for Denuclearization and Opening, which ended in failure.  Instead on September 20, President Yoon called on U.N. member countries to stand together to defend freedom and peace without mentioning on North Korea, saying South Korea will step up contributions to solving global issues and problems. 12 3. Inter-Korean Summits  Inter-Korean summits are meetings between the leaders of North and South Korea. To date, there have been five such meetings so far (2000, 2007, April, May and September 2018), three of them were in Pyongyang with another two were in Panumjom in the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone).  The importance of these summits lies in the lack of formal communication between North and South Korea, which makes discussing diverse political and economic issues difficult.  The summits' agendas have included topics such as the ending of the 1950- 53 war (currently there is an armistice in force), the massive deployment of troops at the DMZ (approximately two million in total), North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and human rights issues. A. April 2018 Summit  The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula was adopted between Chairman Kim Jong Un, and the President Moon Jae-in, on April 27, 2018, on the South Korean side of the Peace House in the Panmunjom(Joint Security Area).  According to the declaration, the governments of North Korea and South Korea agreed to cooperate on △officially ending the Korean War and the Korean conflict, △beginning a new era of peace and △sharing commitments in ending divisions and confrontation and △improvements to inter-Korean communication and relations. 13  This declaration agreed that both sides would "make active efforts to seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula". Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un raise their hands together after signing the Panmunjom Declaration (2018.4.27) 14 B. September 2018 summit  The September 2018 inter-Korean summit was the third inter-Korean summit in 2018. It was held in Pyongyang for three days from 18 to 20 September. [Pyongyang Joint Declaration]  (1). The two sides agreed to expand the cessation of military hostilities in regions of confrontation such as the DMZ to the substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean Peninsula and a fundamental resolution of the hostile relations.  (2). The two sides agreed to explore substantial measures to further advance exchanges and cooperation based on the spirit of mutual benefit and shared prosperity, and to develop the nation’s economy in a balanced manner.  (3). The two sides agreed to actively promote exchanges and cooperation in various fields so as to rejuvenate the sense of reconciliation and unity and to demonstrate the spirit of the Korean nation both internally and externally. (4). The two sides shared the view that the Korean Peninsula must be turned into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats, and that substantial progress toward this end must be made in a prompt manner. 15  ① First, the North will permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries. ② The North expressed its willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement. ③ The two sides agreed to cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 5. Chairman Kim Jong Un agreed to visit Seoul at an early date at the invitation of President Moon Jae-in. (September 19, 2018) 16 2018.2.12, Singapore 17  The 2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit meeting between North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump was held on February 12 in Singapore.  This was the first-ever meeting between leaders of North Korea and the United States in history.  They signed a joint statement, agreeing on four main areas including denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as follows:  (1). The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.  (2). The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.  (3). Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  (4). The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified. 18 5. The Second U.S.-DPRK Summit  President Donald Trump and North Korea's Kim Jong Un cut short their second summit in Hanoi from February 27-28 in 2019 without reaching an agreement.  White House said the leaders had a "very good and constructive meeting" and discussed ways to advance "denuclearization and economic driven concepts."  Further it said their teams looked forward to meeting in the future, but offered no specific time frame.  The breakdown came just hours after Trump and Kim appeared to inch toward normalizing relations between their still technically-warring nations.  However, expectations were high that an agreement will be reached to take concrete steps toward ending North Korea’s nuclear development programs.  It was known that no tangible progress was made due to gaps between two side over the extent of North Korea's denuclearization (Yongbyon plus alpha), veryficaiton and the lifting sanctions on North Korea. (2019. 2.27-28, Hanoi, Vietnam) 19 *Why did Hanoi Summit fail ? Kim Jong Un put sanction relief first — and why North Korea is not Vietnam  The February 2019 summit, Kim apparently insisted on sanctions being lifted before committing to significant progress on denuclearization.  This sequencing issue comes as no surprise. Trump said that “Vietnam is thriving like few places on earth. North Korea would be the same, and very quickly, if it would denuclearize.”  The “maximum pressure campaign” to apply full U.S. economic, political and military clout on North Korea did not have the anticipated effects.  Typical indicators of an economy in distress, such as the black-market exchange rate and the price of rice, proved surprisingly stable in North Korea.  There are various theories why — including a vibrant smuggling and sanctions evasion industry, stockpiling of key commodities, drawing down of financial reserves or invisible financing from China. But North Korea was doing more than muddling through. Still, Kim was not altogether immune from external pressure.  It’s likely that a settlement with the United States looked increasingly attractive to Kim. North Korea was willing to talk, but it was unlikely to take significant steps toward denuclearization before getting sanctions relief.  In the summit document, which put “denuclearization” third on the agenda after normalization of relations. If the United States wanted progress on the nuclear front, it would think about “corresponding measures,” namely, sanctions relief. 20 (North Korea faces very different obstacles to reform than Vietnam did.)  Kim faces a much tougher challenge than the scenario that played out in Vietnam. On a divided Korean Peninsula, economic reform might bring the North closer to the successful South Korean model, raising fundamental issues of political legitimacy.  Why would North Korean citizens accept being a third-rate South Korea when you can just be the real thing through unification?  North Korea’s economic path starts from a different point than Vietnam in the 1980s, when Hanoi began its reform program.  Reform was “win-win,” in that Vietnam’s farmers, as well as employees in new light manufacturing and old industrial facilities, were all better off. (The U.S.-North Korea reconciliation process will be different from Vietnam’s.)  The Vietnam War ended in 1975 with one side winning and unifying the country. The Korean Peninsula will continue to be divided for the foreseeable future.  The 2019 Hanoi summit ended without an end-of-war declaration. An actual armistice would involve the United Nations and would require normalizing relations — all of which remains a long way off.  For Kim, nuclear weapons are regime insurance. Prying them loose is going to be a long, gradual process at best. Still, the summit apparently ended without rancor. 21  If North Korea can show serious intent to restrain its nuclear program, the United States and South Korea could dangle the benefits that are on offer as some version of “denuclearization” gains momentum.  These benefits could include not only political statements but also partial sanctions relief that would abet a reform process as well: humanitarian assistance, people-to- people exchanges and first steps toward a revival of North-South trade.  Stephan Haggard is the Director of the Korea-Pacific Program at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California at San Diego.  Marcus Noland is executive vice president and director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. 22 7. After Hanoi US-DPRK Summit (October 2019-Now) A. North Korea’s continuous warning  Expectations of results from the denuclearization negotiations were high after the Singapore summit in June 2018, but the failure of the Hanoi summit in February 2019 brought back a certain level of tension.  On October 5, North Korea's top nuclear envoy Kim Myong Gil spoke to reporters in Stockholm, that "the negotiations have not fulfilled our expectation and finally broke off".  Since the fruitless ending of the Stockholm talks, North Korea has warned the U.S. would make an enemy of North Korea if it maintained the sanctions. It asked the U.S. to come up with "a new method" and "creative solution North Korea's top nuclear envoy Kim Myong Gil and US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen E. Biegun in Stockholm on October 5, 2019. 23   Beginning from April 2019, North Korea has conducted various missile tests including a submarine-launched ballistic missile(SLBM) and long-range projectiles. In 2020, North Korea also tested short-range missiles and multi-rocket projectiles several times.  Even after US President Biden inaugurated in January 2021, North Korea has continued to test short-/medium-range ballistic missiles.  It is a way for North Korea to send a message of "defiance and resolve," to show their will to "continue to upgrade its nuclear capabilities until issues are resolved to its satisfaction(lifting sanction).  North Korea ramps up missile test with 7th launch in January 2022 including a suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile in violation of UNSC resolutions. B. U.S. Response  Former US Secretary Pompeo has repeatedly stressed that the U.S. remains focused on denuclearizing North Korea regardless of what may happen inside the regime.  It means that the U.S. objective is still the "final and fully denuclearized North Korea (FFVD)."  In June 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin expressed joint statement on a "unified and firm" response to North Korea's unprecedented number of ballistic missile tests and nuclear threats. (Chronology of US-DPRK relations):  https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron 24  (Biden Administration’s North Korea Policy)  The Biden administration completed its North Korean policy review earlier this year, which pitched a “calibrated, practical” approach as a middle path between President Obama’s “strategic patience” and President Trump’s “grand bargain”, which reasserted the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization.  On May 21, 2022, President Biden and President Yoon emphasized their shared commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and their intent to address the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. They call for the full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions by the international community.  They also stressed that the path to dialogue remains open toward peaceful and diplomatic resolution with the DPRK and call on DPRK to return to negotiations. U.S.-ROK Summit (May 21, 2022) 25 7. Nuclear Threats by the DPRK A. Possibility of North Korea’s Nuclear Attack and Test  In April 2022, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has threatened South Korea with nuclear retaliation if provoked after Seoul highlighted its supposed pre-emptive strike capabilities against the North.  “Our nuclear combat force will have to inevitably carry out its duty … a dreadful attack will be launched and the (South Korean) army will have to face a miserable fate of total destruction and ruin.”  In September 2023, North Korea has officially enshrined in a new law, the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself. Kim Jong Un said the law makes its nuclear status "irreversible" and ends denuclearization talks with the US.  In February 2024, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Aleksandr Matsegora said that North Korea may decide to conduct a seventh nuclear test if the US continues taking "provocative steps" in the region. 26 B. Continued Tests of ICBM and Real Nuclear Threat ?  The nuclear alarm has rung again this time the country to issue the threat is North Korea. Pyongyang says the legal conditions under which it would use its nuclear weapon have been fulfilled.  The potential trigger is the current Port visit of a US nuclear-capable submarine to South Korea. North Korean defense minister has issued the warning that deployment of US aircraft carriers, bombers or missile submarines in South Korea could meet criteria for its use of nuclear weapons.  Kim Jong Un has dramatically increased the speed and scope of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program since he came to power in 2011 — raising international condemnation and alarm.  Since adopting an escalatory nuclear doctrine in 2022, Kim Jong Un has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively.  But some experts say North Korea has yet to obtain functioning nuclear missiles and is also unlikely to use its nukes first because it's outgunned by the US and its allied (conventional and nuclear) forces.  Most experts assess that its provocations are still mostly aimed at getting other countries to negotiate and that Kim may be timing them to coincide with US Presidential and South Korean general elections in 2024. 27 North Korea unveils new ICBM /SLBM (2020.10-now) 28 29 8. US-ROK Washington Declaration (2023.4.26) 30  A. Main Points(Commitment for the NPT) Reaffirmed the ROK’s longstanding commitment to its obligations under the ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT)’ as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime as well as to the ‘U.S.-ROK Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy’. Announced the establishment of a new ‘Nuclear Consultative Group’ (NCG) to strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning. Work to enable joint execution and planning for ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency and improve combined exercises and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, as evidenced by the upcoming visit of a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine(SSBN) to the ROK. Strengthen standing bodies for consultations on extended deterrence, including the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group(EDSCG), to better prepare the Alliance to defend against potential attacks and nuclear use. 31 32 B. President Yoon’s Statement on Nuclear Weapons at Harvard University(2023.4.28) Sufficient technology to develop nuclear program -but complex equation of political, economic area Lose various value and (national) interests -domestic opinion not take consideration of such loss Obligation in the Washington Declaration(WD) -(US) Strengthen Extended (Nuclear) Deterrence -(Korea) Respect NPT, not develop nuclear weapon - Upgraded version of the US-ROK Defense Treaty -including nuclear deterrence capability countering North Korea NCG is more effective than NATO’s NPG -NCG(Nuclear Consultative Group): bilateral(US-ROK) -NPG(Nuclear Planning Group): Multilateral (NATO members and US) 33 C. Nuclear Consultative Group(NCG) for Extended Nuclear Deterrence (Purpose) Nuclear and strategic planning to manage NK’s threat Joint execution and planning for ROK conventional support to US nuclear operation Improve exercises and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence (Function) Regular meetings: 4 times in a year -High level (Deputy minister) of Foreign and Defense Ministry Prepare roadmap to implement Extended Deterrence -Establish bilateral, interagency table-top simulation (July 2024) President Biden and President Yoon the U.S.-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula (“Guidelines document”) 34 D. Visit of US Nuclear Assets to South Korea o Evidence of extended deterrence: nuclear submarine/bomber o US nuclear ballistic missile submarine visit Korea(July 2023) -‘Kentucky (Ohio-Class)’ -Regular visit and in emergent situation(NK provocation) *SSBN: Ballistic nuclear missile(SLBM)- ‘Trident’ o B-1B is modified bomber with stealth features -blended contours and radar-absorbing materials o US strategic assets: visible tools to strengthen extended deterrence(US nuclear umbrella) (President Yoon at US Kentucky) (US B-1B bomber and F-16) 35  7. Lessons Learned from Negotiating with North Korea A. Former US negotiator Robert Gallucci The most important lesson to learn from the negotiation is that we have a tendency to approach with the North Koreans with a strange combination of ignorance and arrogance. We think that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program reflected a desire to deter the US from attempting regime change, and perhaps also to deter us from intervening in an eventual war of national unification launched by the North against the South. But we have not actually known what the North’s grand strategy is. Without really knowing what the North is about, it has been hard to be certain about what they really want. It can be relief from the economic pressure of sanctions so that the Kim dynasty can continue in not-so-splendid isolation, or economic and political engagement with the international community and a route to becoming a normal state without hostile relations with the US. Essential elements in the North’s strategic goals include its perceptions of the great powers, about which we speculate with a confidence we should not have. 36  China may be the DPRK’s dependable ally in confrontation with the US and the ROK, a role it has played since the Korean War and assumes it will continue as long as the North is China’s essential buffer state. The North pursues a “wedge strategy” constantly trying to create fissures in the ROK-US alliance and drive the US from the peninsula. But sometimes there have been indications that the North would like more political freedom and less economic dependence on China and is not so enthusiastic about an American departure from the region. It would be particularly useful to know what the North thinks it has actually achieved with its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs. What should matter to the US and its allies are deterrence and extended deterrence. The big lesson from the long negotiation and the engagements in the following decades is that we ought to enter future discussions with the North with an open mind about what its goals, calculations and perceptions really are. When we look back on the roadblocks to a settlement, we should remember that one important element in the solution turned out to be the use of time. Both parties’ benefits and concessions spread out over months and years could work to both sides’ advantage: not every move in a negotiation reflects a zero- sum calculation. There is much talk now about reciprocal steps or an “action for action” strategy which would benefit from the creative use of the dimension of time in a settlement. 37  It would also be a good idea to keep in mind that North Korea loves a crisis (brinkmanship) and will create one if important elements are not going its way. This is a lesson we seem to keep learning, but we also need to learn to respond better. Giving the DPRK their crisis may be important on some occasions but refusing to rise to the bait may be the wiser course on others. The crisis over an IAEA inspection in June 1994 that almost brought us to war was of the second kind. Some of the actions the DPRK threatened to take in 2017 would be of the first kind. Learning lessons from history seems to be a good idea, but only if you understand the history you propose to learn from. US Negotiator Robert Gallucci 38  B. Seven Lessons for Dealing With North Korea Nuclear Crisis - Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci “Mark Twain once observed that by sitting on a hot stove, his cat learned not to sit on a hot stove again. But the cat also learned not to sit on a cold stove.” Lesson 1: Set strategic priorities, then stick to them Lesson 2: Integrate carrots and sticks into a strategy of coercive diplomacy Lesson 3: Use multilateral institutions and forums to reinforce U.S. diplomacy Lesson 4: Use bilateral talks to probe diplomatic alternatives Lesson 5: South Korean support is crucial to any lasting solution of the North Korean nuclear problem Lesson 6: Take full advantage of China’s continuing sway over North Korea Lesson 7: Negotiated arrangements can advance U.S. interests even if the other party engages in cheating. 39  C. North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations -by a South Korean Negotiator At the end of the Cold War, North Korea changed its approach to negotiations. Toward the United States it continued to use a strategy of brinkmanship; toward South Korea it used a number of tactics that it did not use with the United States, such as insults and slander, ignorance, propaganda, and delay. There were some commonalities: the use of extortion to attempt to gain concessions by salami tactics, and generating issues and manipulating the agenda to maximize negotiation gains. The negotiator recommends that (1) future talks be held outside the Korean peninsula to minimize negative psychological effects; (2) South Korea ignore North Korea’s propaganda and focus on the main agenda; (3) South Korea should try to keep the negotiations insulated from domestic political pressure and maintain consistency in is policy; (4) the United Sates should use a balanced "carrot and stick" approach toward North Korea. 40  D. North Korea’s unique negotiation style End Goal(Ambition): Nuclear Weapon Sate Different Tactics but Never-changing goal -So denuclearization goal of removing North Korea’s nuclear weapons seems to be not easy to realize unlike cases of Kazakhstan or South Africa. Ideological Dogma (Juche) Delaying Tactics Salami-Sliced Tactics Brinkmanship Tactics Compensation Demand Tactics Top-down Decision-Making Process One man control regime North Korea’s Brinkmanship with nuclear and hydrogen weapons, ICBM/SLBM 41 Nuclear Weapon Countries (SIPRI) 42 43 Nuclear Weapons Tests in the World 44