Expert Explains: A Year of War in West Asia (2023) PDF

Expert Explains: A year of war in West Asia indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/expert-explains-a-year-of-war-in-west-asia-9607255 The West Asia crisis that began with the terrorist attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023 has now continued for a year. Israel’s ground operations and a...

Expert Explains: A year of war in West Asia indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/expert-explains-a-year-of-war-in-west-asia-9607255 The West Asia crisis that began with the terrorist attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023 has now continued for a year. Israel’s ground operations and aerial bombardment in Gaza and Lebanon have, by conservative estimates, killed more than 41,000 people. Gaza is all but flattened, but Hamas is believed to be still holding 97 of the original 251 hostages. On the anniversary of the October 7 attacks, here’s what the situation looks like from Israel, Washington and other Western capitals, the Arab states in the region, and New Delhi. ISRAEL Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose personal popularity was at its nadir before the attacks, had vowed to wipe Hamas “off the face of the Earth”. Operations by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have since extracted a grossly disproportionate death toll in Gaza. Also Read | Conflicts in West Asia: Iraq in disarray Israel has also sought to press its military advantage against the other Iran-backed “axis of resistance” groups — especially Lebanon-based Hezbollah and the Yemen-based Houthis — who began exchanging rocket and missile attacks with it late last year. The Houthi attacks disrupted international shipping in the Red Sea, and imposed economic costs on countries far beyond the theatre of the conflict. Flames and smoke rise from an Israeli airstrike in Dahiyeh, Beirut, Lebanon, early Sunday, Oct. 6, 2024. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla) In retaliation, Israel has carried out strikes in Syria and Yemen apart from launching a fresh attack on Lebanon — even as it has continued ground operations in Gaza, ignoring a call for ceasefire by the UN Security Council, US advice of restraint, and the fact that Hamas has already been significantly weakened. Israel also retaliated after Iran launched an unprecedented cruise missile and drone barrage against it in April, and has vowed to make the regime in Tehran pay for a second wave of aerial attacks on October 1. International opinion in favour of Palestinian statehood has strengthened over the past year, bolstered by an International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion deeming Israeli occupation illegal. Over this same period, Israel has moved farther away from accepting the two-state solution, and is now perhaps more opposed to it than ever before. In July, the Israeli Knesset overwhelmingly passed a resolution rejecting Palestinian sovereignty. The consolidation of Israeli political opinion against Palestine reflects the evolution of Netanyahu’s own situation since October 2023. Even Benny Gantz, the retired general who left Israel’s war cabinet in early 2024 due to the government’s failure to secure the release of the hostages, favoured the resolution. Netanyahu, who faced huge street protests by Israelis demanding a hostage deal last month, sits secure in the embrace of the extremist far right that holds up his government — which includes the likes of Bezalel Smotrich of the pro-settlement National Religious Party who has called for “starving” Palestinians in Gaza, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir who wants all humanitarian aid to the enclave blockaded. It would be a misjudgment then, to term this as Netanyahu’s war alone — even though Israeli military gains especially in recent weeks may have come as a shot in the arm for him. The initial criticism of the failure of Israel’s security apparatus on October 7, 2023, has faded for now, but will likely re-emerge in the future. Emergency workers use excavators to clear the rubble at the site of Friday’s Israeli strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Lebanon, Monday, Sept. 23, 2024. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar) ARAB STATES Major Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia and UAE seemingly remain committed to the process of a geopolitical and geoeconomics reset in the Middle East that was underway before October 2023. Israel’s expanding war has not undone those foreign policy priorities, underwritten by attempts at economic diversification. The war has, however, pushed the question of Palestinian sovereignty to the centre, with all states in the region increasingly viewing it as a precondition for enduring peace. Instead of abandoning efforts to normalise ties with Israel, therefore, these states appear to be looking to leverage it for a settlement of the Palestine question, removing the oldest hurdle for regional stability.\ This would explain the sustenance of the 2020 Abraham Accords despite the highest death toll in Gaza in decades. Even Riyadh now uses the potential normalisation framing to call for the two-state solution — a far cry from its traditional visceral aversion to Israel. The regional stability needed for economic development requires peace with not just Israel, but also Iran. Just as the Abraham Accords have held, so has the rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh. The Arab aversion to another ‘forever war’ was evident in the Saudi call for US restraint against the Houthis, and in its staying out of the US- and UK-led naval coalition to strike at the Yemeni group. Both the Saudis and Emiratis were focused on pulling back from their involvement in Yemen before the ongoing crisis gave the Houthis new priorities. The clamour in the Arab street for Israel to cease its assault has, meanwhile, increased. Consequently, Middle Eastern powers have adopted either a mediatory or a confrontational position vis-à-vis Israel. While Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has intensified his anti-Israel rhetoric, Qatar has shown a proclivity to reprise its mediatory role between Israel and Hamas despite limited success so far. For Qatar’s primary mediating partner Egypt, the cost of the war is more direct, since it shares a border with Gaza. Both Jordan (bordering the West Bank) and Egypt strongly seek to avoid a refugee influx, and Egypt has been sparring with Israel as it pushes more and more Gazans towards the southern border. Cairo remains opposed to potential Israeli control over the Philadelphi Corridor straddling Gaza and Egypt. US & THE WEST The US-Israel relationship is ironclad. The approach of the West, led by the US, has been to consistently warn all actors against further escalation, commit to humanitarian aid for Gaza, but staunchly stand by Israel even if it breaches any perceived red line. The Biden administration has been deeply frustrated with Netanyahu, but remains committed to Israel’s defence. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has made at least nine visits to the Middle East in 12 months, but failed to help negotiate a ceasefire in Gaza. Washington, which successfully mediated a controlled engagement between Iran and Israel in April, continues to focus on restraining Israel’s hand. However, the space for the US to exert influence on Israel has diminished. The US presidential election is now less than a month away, and Netanyahu would be waiting to see whether the incoming administration seeks to enable (under Donald Trump) or curb (as Kamala Harris might) Israel’s war effort. The war has caused an outcry in Europe, with the European Union’s foreign policy chief even calling for sanctions against Israel. Major European states have, however, followed the US’ lead — calling for escalation control while reiterating Israel’s right to defend itself. These states also remain sensitive to US commitments against Russia in the other war that is ongoing in Ukraine, and which probably makes them more nervous. For instance, just after French President Emmanuel Macron implicitly called for an arms embargo on Israel, Netanyahu’s public rebuke forced the Élysée to reiterate France’s ‘steadfast’ friendship with Israel. The war in Ukraine also limits President Vladimir Putin’s ability to influence Middle Eastern events, despite Moscow having shown interest — including hosting Hamas and Iranian leaders in October 2023. China, on the other hand, has made significant diplomatic and economic inroads in the Middle East over the past year, which includes brokering a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement in July. Amid the crisis, Beijing has focused on nourishing its economic and strategic relationship across the Arab/ Iranian aisle in the Gulf, while harshly criticising Israel. However, China remains restrained in its security/ military involvement — a long-standing position that has ensured continued US dominance in the Middle East. What is the view from New Delhi? Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to Netanyahu on the phone both in October 2023 and 2024, expressing concern and offering solidarity. Modi also spoke to President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine, reiterating India’s commitment to the two-state solution. India’s blossoming relationship with Israel has not led to New Delhi being openly supportive of the Israeli position on Gaza or Lebanon. Rather, India has chosen to silo terrorism as a distinct issue — which needs to be condemned and mitigated — from the political question of Israel and Palestine. This has allowed New Delhi to express sympathy and support for Israel after the October 7 terrorist attacks while refraining from backing it wholesale on the question of Palestinian sovereignty. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has been vocal in highlighting the inextricable relationship between enduring peace and a two-state solution based on the recognition of Palestine’s legitimate aspirations of sovereignty. India has consistently voted in favour of recurring UNGA resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Its recent abstention was triggered by attempts to impose a 12-month deadline for such withdrawal, as New Delhi believes that a negotiated settlement among Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab leaders is the only viable approach. Prior to the new crisis, India sought to spearhead the effort to capitalise on the regional reset through the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. While the character of the reset has not changed, its terms have. The future of India’s connectivity plans depends not only on a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, but also on how Arab states navigate the post-war environment, with or without a Palestinian state. In the long term, Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state will take the wind out of Iran’s ability to draw support for the so-called resistance, and remove all significant hurdles in the Arab-Israeli relationship. However, Israel has not only moved away from the two-state relationship, it has actively embarked on a fresh settlement expansion programme in the West Bank. On the issue of settlements, international opinion in both the West and the East is critical. Should Israel sustain its fait accompli, the long-term prospects of peace in the Middle East will remain under threat, even if the Arab states show an ability to abide in the short term.