Martin BA3 Nuclear Revolution (Intro) PDF

10/19/2023 31 October 1952 A Nuclear Revolution? 8 May 1951 Dr Susan Martin BA3 WMD in IP 1 Debate over the Nuclear Revolution Have nuclear weapons ‘revolutionised’ international politics—and if so, why, in what ways, and how do we know? Implies comparison (before and after introduction of nuclear w...

10/19/2023 31 October 1952 A Nuclear Revolution? 8 May 1951 Dr Susan Martin BA3 WMD in IP 1 Debate over the Nuclear Revolution Have nuclear weapons ‘revolutionised’ international politics—and if so, why, in what ways, and how do we know? Implies comparison (before and after introduction of nuclear weapons) 2 1 10/19/2023 Before and after Occurrence of major power war Lack of major power war since 1945, of major war among nuclear powers While war has still occurred, major power war has not Next week one of the cases we will be looking at is the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and whether/how that differed from conventional bombing in World War II 3 ‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.’ --Bernard Brodie, 1946 4 2 10/19/2023 What’s necessary for deterrence? A key argument for the nuclear revolution has to do with the ability of nuclear weapons to serve as a deterrent. What is it about nuclear weapons that allows them to act as a strategic deterrent, and is this unique to nuclear weapons? 5 Offense: aims to move rapidly and to take and hold territory Defense: aims to protect territory and to ward off aggressors (focus on denial) Deterrence: aims to dissuade an attacker through the costs or punishment that will be imposed if it does attack (focus on punishment) 6 3 10/19/2023 Deterrence by punishment (pure form) Does not to try to deny (block, blunt, limit) an attack Instead, relies on retaliation to persuade potential aggressors not to attack If an aggressor does attack, its gains from that attack will be outweighed by the punishment inflicted by the retaliatory strike 7 For a deterrent threat to be effective: the threat must promise to do more harm, and thus impose more costs, than the benefits that would be gained through the action to be deterred. 8 4 10/19/2023 In other words, for deterrence to work the following must hold: (probability of retaliation)*(damage done) > (expected gains from attack) 9 Three requirements for a deterrent weapon 1. Destructive power 2. No effective defence that can protect the aggressor from the retaliatory blow 3. Costs that will be inflicted by the punishment are clear 10 5 10/19/2023 The Destructive Power of Conventional versus Nuclear Weapons --is the destructive power of nuclear weapons enough to outweigh the prospective benefits of an attack? --does the destructive power of nuclear weapons give them greater deterrent power than conventional weapons? 11 The Destructive Power of Conventional versus Nuclear Weapons, cont. Source Type of attack Fetter Attack by a missile warhead, without civil defense Conventional Dead: 5 Injured: 13 (1 tonne of high explosive) Dead: 2 Attack by a missile warhead, Injured: 6 with civil defense (1 tonne of high explosive) SIPRI A 5-6 ton bombload dropped by a single aircraft (urban area target) Area over which 50 per cent casualties (half of these fatalities) can be expected is 22 hectares (High explosive) Nuclear Dead: 40,000 Injured: 40,000 (20 kilotons) Dead: 20,000 Injured: 20,000 (20 kilotons) Area over which 50 per cent immediate casualties can be expected is 200,000 hectares (Fusion bomb, 10 Mt. airburst) 12 6 10/19/2023 ‘The bomber will always get through. The only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.’ --Stanley Baldwin, House of Commons, 1932 13 Utility as Strategic Deterrent: Nuclear versus Conventional Characteristics of Strategic Deterrent Conventional Weapons Nuclear Weapons Destructive Power Not massive Massive Defense against? Yes No Clarity of Costs Low High Serve as a Strategic Deterrent? NO YES 14 7 10/19/2023 According to nuclear revolution theorists: Nuclear weapons change the ways that states can use force; the ability to inflict punishment no longer depends on progress on the battlefield >>>> deterrence of war by the threat of punishment becomes possible (more viable) (going to back to Brodie, with nuclear weapons, deterrence needs to become chief purpose of military establishments) 15 Nuclear Revolution theorists include Kenneth Waltz, e.g. ‘Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.’ Robert Jervis, e.g. ‘The Poltiical Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment.’ The Meaning of The Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon 16 8 10/19/2023 Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myths and Political Realities’ “Two pervasive beliefs have given nuclear weapons a bad name: that nuclear deterrence is highly problematic, and that a breakdown in deterrence would mean Armageddon. Both beliefs are misguided and suggest that nearly half a century after Hiroshima, scholars and policy makers have yet to grasp the full strategic implications of nuclear weaponry. I contrast the logic of conventional and nuclear weaponry to show how nuclear weapons are in fact a tremendous force for peace and afford nations that possess them the possibility of security at reasonable cost." 17 Waltz, 2 A meaningful defence against nuclear attack is not possible. Pure deterrence, unmixed with offense, made possible by nuclear weapons. Deterrence depends on what one can do, not what one will do (733-4); credibility not important in a nuclear world. Absolute nature of NW—absolute capability, not relative, is what matters (e.g. 738). There are limits to nuclear deterrence—’works only against major aggression at the centre’ (733). Political behaviour—rulers want to continue to rule (737). Military action has to be related to an objective (not just winning) (733). 18 9 10/19/2023 Waltz, 3 ‘How could the Soviet Union-or any country, for that matter-somehow bring itself to run stupendous risks in the presence of nuclear weapons? What objectives might its leaders seek that could justify the risks entailed?’ (736) 19 Waltz, 4 In a conventional world, ‘strategies may do more than weapons to determine the outcomes of wars. Nuclear weapons are different; they dominant strategy’ (738). War-fighting strategies imply that nuclear weapons are not absolute but relative, so that the country with more and better nuclear weapons could in some unspecified way prevail. No one, however, has shown how such a war could be fought’ (740). Nuclear stalemate limits the use of conventional forces and reduces the extent of the gains one can seek without risking devastation’ (739). 20 10 10/19/2023 Waltz, 5 ‘Nuclear states continue to compete militarily. With each state tending to its security interests as best it can, war is constantly possible. Although the possibility of war remains, nuclear weapons have drastically reduced the probability of its being fought by the states that have them’ (744). 21 Jervis, ‘The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment.’ Nuclear weapons a. make war unimaginable destructive; b. create situation of mutual kill; c. devastation can occur quickly –possibility of escalation induces more caution. 22 11 10/19/2023 Jervis, conventional versus nuclear weapons Jervis argues that conventional weapons cannot substitute for nuclear weapons and create the same effects: 1. Potential scale of destruction is greater with nukes (84); only one side was destroyed in WWII (85)—with conventional weapons one side can hope to profit, can hope to win at least relatively; 2. In conventional world, possible to imagine a path to victory (87); without nukes, states devote resources and energy to reducing the cost of victory (86); conventional deterrence is difficult if Blitzkrieg is possible (86); 3. The threat that leaves something to chance in a nuclear world induces caution (87-88). 23 Or, as Jervis puts it in another article: ‘Nuclear weapons have led to the replacement of brute force by coercion, or as it is more frequently put, of defence by deterrence….. The result is what can be called, without exaggeration, the nuclear revolution.’ (Jervis, ‘The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense,’ PSQ 1986, 689690). 24 12 10/19/2023 So what does the nuclear revolution do? If nuclear revolution arguments are right, wars should be more difficult to start—at least among nuclear weapons states --why? 25 One reason wars are more difficult to start The enormous destruction entailed in nuclear war narrows the range of things that are worth fighting for --limited to vital interests, existential conflicts? 26 13 10/19/2023 A second reason is that the enormous destruction entailed in nuclear war makes it easy for state leaders to calculate the likely outcomes of war; it is much easier to calculate who will lose a nuclear war than it is to calculate who will win a conventional war. This reduces our reliance on leader rationality to prevent war-nuclear weapons reduce the ‘burden’ of rationality required to calculate the utility of war (compared to a conventional world). 27 Nuclear weapons may also reduce the likelihood of war by making the balance of power easier to calculate. Exact numbers of weapons each side has may not matter, as long as each side has a secure second-strike capability. 28 14 10/19/2023 Nuclear revolution may also mean states with assured second-strike force should have little strategic incentive to acquire more and more nuclear weapons—they don’t add additional security. This implies that arms competition/arms races are wasteful and unnecessary. [But, nuclear armed states have not ‘stopped’ at second-strike nuclear forces. Does this mean that nuclear revolution theorists are wrong?] 29 Some other views… 30 15 10/19/2023 John Lewis Gaddis ( ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’ 1986) ‘Stability in the postwar era still might not have resulted if there had been, among either of the dominant powers in the system, the same willingness to risk war that has existed at other times in the past’ (120)…. ‘It seems inescapable that what has really made the difference in inducing this unaccustomed caution has been the workings of the nuclear deterrent’ (121). 31 Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (p. 367) Nuclear vulnerability was a reality from the late 1960s onward-- “MAD was a reality from which there was no escape short of the most far-reaching arms control.” “Nuclear vulnerability distinguished the Soviet-American conflict from conventional conflicts of the past or present.” “Fear of the consequences of nuclear war …made [US and Soviet leaders] extremely reluctant to take any action that they considered would seriously raise the risk of war.” “Over the years they developed a much better appreciation of each other’s interests. In the last years of the Soviet-American conflict, leaders on both sides acknowledged and refrained from any challenge of the other’s vital interests.” 32 16 10/19/2023 Challenges to the nuclear revolution What is being challenged? The lack of major power war or the explanation for that lack? The effect of nuclear weapons on how states can use force? The difference between nuclear weapons and other weapons? And/or is it the effects on broader strategic competition among nuclear weapons states that are being challenged? 33 Questions…. Are nuclear weapons revolutionary, and if so why? For those who answer no, what is the basis of the challenge and are you convinced? What do you think—to what extent do you think nuclear 34 17 10/19/2023 Two version of Nuclear revolution: Narrow versus Broad understandings? Nuclear revolution, narrow view: Nuclear weapons ARE different, act to discourage war through nuclear deterrence—replacement of brute force by coercion. Nuclear revolution, broad view: Nuclear weapons do more than discourage war; while they do not end conflict and competition among states, for NWS they shift that competition away from military competition (or at least nuclear and major war competition) to other arenas. 35 Other views Mueller, ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons.’ (Noel, Hiro, Linda, Joaquin) Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory.’ (Clem, Connor, Tanmaya, Rayyaana, Klaudia) Trachtenberg, ‘Strategic thought in America, Chapter One (Clara, Isabelle, Juliette, Spenser, Benjamin) 36 18