Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War - BA3 WMD Intro - PDF

10/6/2023 6SSW0020 Dr Susan Martin 1 Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War>> 13 Oct Next week’s class is devoted to an overview of some of the key issues surrounding nuclear weapons in the Cold War Nuclear deterrence (and issues of credibility) Extended Deterrence Nuclear diplomacy/coercion/blackmail Esca...

10/6/2023 6SSW0020 Dr Susan Martin 1 Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War>> 13 Oct Next week’s class is devoted to an overview of some of the key issues surrounding nuclear weapons in the Cold War Nuclear deterrence (and issues of credibility) Extended Deterrence Nuclear diplomacy/coercion/blackmail Escalation Understandings of Stability/Instability 2 1 10/6/2023 Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, 2 Everyone is asked to read the Kimball and Burr piece on nuclear diplomacy from August 1945-January 1969 You have then each been assigned a second article, dealing with one of the other issues. Please come to class prepared to share an overview of the article (its thesis, arguments, whether you find it convincing) and the key takeaways from the article about the issue it addresses. 3 Outline Competing Views of Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Concepts and Deterrence Issues Crises Escalation Stability Proliferation The Actors Evolution Involved of US Policies 4 2 10/6/2023 5 SSPP/War Studies Code of Conduct https://keats.kcl.ac.uk/pluginfile.php/4832060/mod_book/chapter/408523/SSPP%20COC%20Poster_V2.pdf * Members of the War Studies community are expected to: Recognise and respect different experiences, assumptions and perspectives, particularly when discussing controversial issues, in order to enhance our ability to engage critically with the issues we study; Focus debates on the strengths and weaknesses of arguments rather than on the gender, sexual orientation, ability or disability, race or ethnicity, sex, age, class, religion, nationality, or other characteristics of those presenting the arguments; Listen respectfully to others, encourage diversity in perspectives, and foster continuing discussion; Refrain from making comments on dress and appearance; Constructively challenge inappropriate comments and behaviour when it is safe to do so; Avoid intimidating, dismissive, hostile, or offensive interactions; Use appropriate language and images. Note that this applies to all interactions—in-person, online, email and written communication, etc. * Please see the link for the full wording 5 6 3 10/6/2023 Deterrence Deterrence by punishment as an attempt to stop someone from doing something by threatening or frightening them Versus deterrence by denial: Deterring an attack by decreasing the likelihood that the attack will succeed Strategic deterrence refers to the deterrence of an attack upon a country’s vital interests For deterrence by punishment to work: (costs of punishment) (likelihood that punishment will be carried out) > (benefits of action) (likelihood that action will succeed) 7 Warfighting versus Retaliation, Credibility versus Stability Warfighting view of nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons can be used in war and can be used to coerce in peacetime>>>need to prepare forces and doctrines for warfighting—to ‘win’ in some way/avoid worst outcome This will enhance the credibility needed for deterrence Retaliatory capability: Nuclear warfare is unwinnable due to the immense destructive capability of nuclear weapons. Leads to focus on deterrence through punishment. For some that hold this view, because of the immense destruction that would be inflicted by use, credibility is not (much of) an issue. If both sides have secure retaliatory forces, system will be stable—neither side with have an incentive to use nuclear weapons or to initiate conflicts that could escalate to the nuclear level. 8 4 10/6/2023 What was being assumed about the other side? The worry was that the Soviet Union would not be deterred by the US nuclear retaliatory capability—in particular, that the Soviets might undertake conventional actions, including actions in Western Europe [nuclear deterrence fails when the USSR is the aggressor] And there were worries that the US itself would be deterred from initiating nuclear use by the Soviet ability to carry out a nuclear strike against it [nuclear deterrence succeeds against US retaliation when the USSR is the defender] Soviets were seen as highly motivated to change the status quo and as less sensitive to costs (and, in effect, as more motivated to change the status quo than US would be to defend it) 9 10 5 10/6/2023 Nuclear Strategists 11 The Military 12 6 10/6/2023 Congress 13 The Public 14 7 10/6/2023 15 After World War II (1945-1949) Immediately after the war, US attention focused on maintaining and increasing its lead in nuclear weapons US use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been influenced by strategic bombing during the war; this same experience influenced thinking about use after WWII—plans were for mixed conventional and nuclear attacks. Fear of Soviet conventional superiority (US had rapidly demobilised after the war)—US nuclear weapons could compensate for its conventional weakness. 1946 McMahon Act put US atomic weapons under civilian control; it also ended atomic cooperation with UK. The assumption was that the USSR was a long way from getting nuclear weapons. US nuclear forces increased: 13 weapons in 1947, 170 in 1949 Targets included both counterforce (military) and countervalue (urban-industrial). 1948-49 Berlin Crisis : Truman transferred B-29 bombers to Europe to signal (threaten) the possible use of atomic weapons in the crisis. 16 8 10/6/2023 Massive Retaliation (1953-1961) First Soviet test (1949) Korean War (1950-53) USSR conventional superiority in Europe >>>>Worries about credibility of US deterrent/threat of first nuclear use emergence of credibility issue. US H-Bomb test (1952) Massive Retaliation: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (Jan. 1954): US strategy would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing.” Nuclear variants of conventional weapons, build-up of “tactical” battlefield weapons. Growth in number of weapons: 1,169 (1953) to 22,229 (1961). Culminated in the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-62) an integrated strike against Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. 17 The McNamara Revolution (1961-1965) Nuclear strategists: criticised Massive Retaliation for leaving the US with a choice of suicide or surrender. Technology: Soviets tested first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 1957, made US seem newly vulnerable to a “missile gap”  new credibility crisis. John F. Kennedy & Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: would apply new methods to revamp U.S. strategy in a cost-effective way. Huge build-up in new inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs. Attempt to increase credibility through flexible response & more targeting options (e.g. avoiding cities, hitting Soviet forces in first strike). 18 9 10/6/2023 Flexible response seeks to deter through a range of military capabilities that allow response to any attack at the appropriate level—conventional, theatre nuclear or strategic nuclear; Inherent possibility of escalation, with the aim of convincing the adversary of unacceptable risk involved, causing him to cease attack and withdraw Assumes adversary is less motivated (risk is unacceptable to adversary but not to you) Effort to complicate adversary’s calculations about whether it can win, and to put onus on him to escalate to where risks get out of control 19 The Rise of Stability through MAD (1965-1972) Berlin (1961) and Cuban Missile Crises (1962)  McNamara to think more about stability problem instead of credibility. Develops idea of Assured Destruction. From 1965: Soviets began deploying large numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs – building 200 ICBMs per year by late 1960s. Late 1960s: Vietnam War sapped resources available as well as domestic political will for the nuclear competition. 1972: ABM Treaty banned two sides from having more than two missile defence sites each – recognised/enshrined mutual vulnerability. 1972: Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms capped offensive forces at 1,054/1,618 ICBMs and 656/740 SLBMs. Both sides at approximate parity, able to destroy each other in a second-strike>> stability. Attacked politically as “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). 20 10 10/6/2023 Maintaining Credibility in an Age of Parity (1972-87) Quantitative caps in SALT I  greater focus on technology (qualitative) increases: e.g. multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Soviets began catching up with MIRVs in 1970s  fears of a first strike and return of credibility problem. U.S. warfighting strategies: NSDM 242 “Schlesinger Doctrine”, PD-59 “Countervailing Strategy” (1980). Reinforced by domestic backlash against détente, which reached a peak with Ronald Reagan. Fears on both sides that adversary would launch a first strike. Reality: neither side really believed they could launch a first strike, nor did they want to. 21 Further questions to think about:  Did the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union challenge the ability of the US to deter war, once the USSR had a retaliatory nuclear capability?  Can nuclear weapons have a role beyond ‘existential deterrence’ and/or deterring the use of nuclear weapons in relations among nuclear states?  Can nuclear weapons be used as an instrument of national policy vis‐à‐vis other nuclear weapons states (NWS), to advance goals other than deterrence of an attack on vital interests or to deter the use of nuclear weapons?  How does one devise a military strategy when total destruction is possible but total victory is impossible? 22 11 10/6/2023 Questions? 23 12