The Sociology of Globalization (2016) PDF

Introduction: Concepts of Globalization There have been many trends in sociology in recent decades. These have varied from country to country. One was a concern with class and social mobility from the 1950s onwards, in part evident in debates between Marxists and Weberians. In the 1960s and 1970s, f...

Introduction: Concepts of Globalization There have been many trends in sociology in recent decades. These have varied from country to country. One was a concern with class and social mobility from the 1950s onwards, in part evident in debates between Marxists and Weberians. In the 1960s and 1970s, feminists argued that such debates had marginalized another form of social division, gender inequalities. Feminism grew in influence, itself being criticized for failing to appreciate other divisions, for instance ethnic inequalities, identified by those with postcolonial perspectives. In the 1980s, this concern with differences was highlighted in postmodern ideas, and the power of knowledge was analysed by theorists such as Michel Foucault. In the 1980s and 1990s, a more homogenizing idea came to the fore, globalization. This also went on to stress local difference and plurality. The themes of globalization were not new, but the word and the popularity of the idea really came to prominence in the 1980s (an early mention is in Modelski 1972). Why did globalization become a popular idea? One reason is the rise of global communications, especially the Internet, which made people feel that connections across the world were flowing more strongly and speedily, as well as becoming more democratic. With the end of the cold war, it seemed that the bipolar world had become unified, whether through cultural homogenization or the spread of capitalism. People became increasingly conscious of global problems, such as climate change. Economic interdependency and instability were more visible. Money flowed more freely and national economies went into recession together in the 1970s and again thirty years later. From the 1970s onwards, one of the building blocks of the national era, the nation-state, seemed to be under threat. Welfare states became cumbersome and expensive, and economic liberals like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher led the world in rolling them back. The first half of this introduction will look at the sociology of globalization and themes of the book. The second half will discuss the concept of globalization. The sociology of globalization Globalization may appear a macro phenomenon and distant, unlike micro issues that have more of an impact on daily life. Yet large- scale global processes of economic restructuring and international political power have a big impact on our individual lives. The global economy and distribution of wealth affect, for example, our chances of employment, alongside our material circumstances generally. Identity and cultural experience are forged out of global inputs, from media to music, migration and food. Which side you live on in the constellation of global political powers has significant consequences for your life chances. For some, phenomena such as culture and people movements are what sociologists should be concerned about. Culture is sociological and has social effects, whereas economic and political issues are the preserve of other disciplines or maybe just less interesting. Culture is both important and interesting, as we shall see in this book. But so are economics and politics. Culture is affected by economic and political factors. Economic and political factors that seem distant from our lives have a large impact – for instance, mergers and diversification in the media industry and government deregulation impact on our cultural experiences as consumers. The fact that I live in a rich, developed country, one of the core powers in the world, and relatively democratic, peaceful and free, has a great effect on my life compared to what it would be like if I lived in a poorer, developing country, or one with less democracy and freedom, or more conflict and violence. A large proportion of the world’s population lives in places with some or all of these problems. That I can watch cable television or access the Internet, which are cultural experiences, not only is based in economic and political factors, but also pales into insignificance next to economic and political advantages, which give me a privileged everyday experience. Culture is important, it interests us and we are conscious of it. But economics and politics matter on a micro, individual and daily basis in ways that we often don’t think about. Some sociologists think the study of politics and economics is not really sociology. It is the territory of political scientists and economists. But this lacks a sense of an interdisciplinary role for sociology. Furthermore, sociology is the study of social structures, relations and processes, of society. Society includes the political and economic dimensions that affect aspects like culture and migration. This book takes politics and economics seriously, as an important part of sociology, without which globalization cannot be understood. You can’t understand globalization without looking at its economic and political dimensions. And to analyse cultural and social spheres in isolation would be to overlook the economic and political power, inequality and conflict that affect them, making cultural globalization seem more equal and benign than it really is. Some sociologists separate their studies of cultural globalization from their studies of political-economic relations. Consequently, their awareness of conflict, inequality and power in politics and economics becomes separated from the more benign, equal and cosmopolitan picture they have of culture (for instance, see Beck 2000, 2006, and Nederveen Pieterse 2004a, 2004b; for a sociology of globalization that incorporates political economy and so power, inequality and conflict, see Bourdieu 1998a, 1999, 2003a). To take an interdisciplinary perspective is distinctively sociological. Sociology has, from its founding days, drawn on economic and political perspectives and dealt with issues such as capitalism, ownership, the division of labour, economic class and the role of the nation-state. Consequently, sociology is well equipped to deal with modernity, capitalism and the state, some of the main institutions in globalization. Some of the core themes of sociology are at the heart of this book – power, inequality and social divisions and inequalities such as class and gender. Such issues have always been central to the sociological perspective and sociology has played a key role in bringing them to the fore across the social sciences and in public life. So this book looks at some important conventionally sociological topics – migration and the movement of people, the media, culture and social movements – but it also identifies inequality and power as distinctively sociological preoccupations to look out for in globalization. Furthermore it argues that the economy and politics, sometimes left out by some sociologists, are sociological. They are part of society and they affect society, social relations and social structures. To narrow-mindedly rule such things out from being the proper concern of sociology omits major factors affecting social life, and especially behind power, inequality and conflict, leaving sociology with a perspective that turns away from the realities of society, especially its harsher realities. There is a danger of fetishizing the new in recent perspectives on globalization. Old ways of sociology – such as Marxist economic determinism, or perspectives that have a ‘realist’ view of the state (as an actor that pursues its interests in competition with others) – are viewed by some as outmoded. Cosmopolitanism is seen as more appropriate to a new global era requiring new perspectives to fit with a world in which cultures intermingle, where foci on the nation-state or capitalist economic power are too methodologically nationalist or economically determinist, where societies are no longer neatly bounded within national borders, and global identities such as human rights and hybridity are taking over (for instance, see Beck 2006; Urry 2000). There are problems with this advocacy of a cosmopolitan sociology: a. The old sociology was quite international in its outlook (Turner 2006). Cosmopolitan sociologists overstate the novelty of contemporary cosmopolitan views. b. Rejecting classical sociology as too economistic and statist undermines an understanding of the role of economic power and the state in globalization, leading to a picture of culture and social relations which does not show how they are unequal and power-laden because of economic and political structures. c. Economic and political power are omitted in a way that is theoretically elegant and pleasing, but is not empirical enough. The argument is made mainly theoretically in the face of empirical evidence that shows the role of capitalist and state power. d. One empirical bias in cosmopolitanism is the focus of its advocates on their own parts of the world, especially Europe and North America, and to a lesser extent other fast-growing societies, with little attention paid to large parts of the world afflicted by poverty and war. The former fit the cosmopolitan story better than the latter, although even some of the former are distinctly uncosmopolitan when it comes to things like immigration restrictions and economic protectionism. e. Cosmopolitanism is put forward as a fresh perspective in tune with the new global and intermixed world. There is a fetishization of the new over the old such that anything that is old is labelled outmoded, unsophisticated or out of date even if empirical evidence shows it has a stronger hold on explaining things. This categorization of something as old and outmoded is used as a way of dismissing it in place of a convincing critique of its theoretical cogency or, more importantly, empirical evidence. The important thing is not whether an argument is new or old but which is the right argument. f. As well as a lack of emphasis on empirical evidence there is contradiction. Some of those who reject the old approaches combine their new cosmopolitan arguments with other arguments that show the role of state and capitalist power. (Some of these points are developed more in Martell 2008, 2009, and in this book.) Themes of the book There are a number of themes running through this book. 1 Economic bases of globalization As mentioned, some sociological studies of globalization have focused on culture and some have argued for a shift away from economic determinism. Culture has heavily shaped globalization, and globalization has a lot to do with the transnationalization and intermingling of cultures and local cultural responses to global cultures. The interaction between globalization and culture and identities is exciting, important and full of possibilities, and is discussed in this book. But it is difficult to see many areas of globalization that do not have economic structures lying behind them that affect the equality or power relations with which globalization is produced or received, or economic incentives to do with making money. My argument is not just about the economics behind globalization, but about capitalist economics, the pursuit of profit by private owners. Other factors tailor and shape globalization and the economics of profit is not the only causal factor or one that goes in a simple, unilinear direction unaffected by other forces. But it is very often a significant driving force. 2 Globalization as historical/modern Globalization is historical. It started long before the recent years of information technology, the end of the cold war or even the end of the Second World War. It has its bases earlier, in the development of capitalism and industrialism, and in the institutions, technologies and incentives these systems brought along. These provided the biggest qualitative leap in globalization and are behind many forms of globalization today. They were not just the key starting point but also the basis for current forms. At the same time it is less plausible that globalization, or the bases for current globalization, started before this. While Europe and the West were still relatively backward, other more sophisticated parts of the world were practising long-distance trade, religion and expansion, but these were not truly globalization. 3 Sceptical perspectives on globalization Sociology is historically a critical discipline, and a critical but open- minded approach is healthy and in part what academic research should be about. Applied to globalization this leads to some sceptical conclusions, including doubts about whether what is called globalization really is that, or whether international structures and processes in the world match up to the criteria for globalization. What many people describe when they talk about globalization is happening. But it’s not clear that it is globalization. Describing it as such gives it a meaning that is misleading as to its true character. The sceptical view is linked to another theme of this book. Globalization is structured by power, inequality and conflict. Some people play a greater role in globalization than others, and some are more integrated and others excluded. So, while there may be globalizing processes, they are sometimes not global because some people are not as influential or included as others. Structures and processes described as globalization are significant, so the study of these is important. But, as a result of the unevenness of inclusion, and because of power, inequality and conflict, these are not always ‘global’. It’s important to recognize the significance of international processes but also to not assume they are necessarily globalization. 4 Power, inequality and conflict Many analyses of globalization have been critical and see it as a problematic process – to take a couple of examples, neoliberalism imposed on parts of the world by the West leading to negative consequences, or American imperialism played out through the media, exploitative multinational corporations (MNCs) or military power. Others in sociology, reacting against this view, see globalization as a more positive, equalizing, democratic and benign process that brings an intermingling of cultures in a new cosmopolitanism, with the generalization of positive values such as universal human rights. One of my aims is to investigate some of these latter perspectives and, in doing so, themes of power, inequality and conflict come to the fore. This book takes distinctive concerns from sociology. It has an emphasis on critical analysis, examining power, inequality and conflict in global relations. It puts arguments about globalization to the test of theoretical coherence and empirical evidence. It looks for interdisciplinary links and a holistic view, outlining important social relations of culture and migration but seeing these as not separable from political and economic structures. I have also tried to be broad in the range of areas of globalization discussed, from hybrid cultures to worldwide poverty or power. The book aims to be accessible to an audience that is relatively new to this area, but without sacrificing its own arguments. Being critical can lead in different directions. In this book it leads to some partly pessimistic conclusions. Globalization may not be as developed as it seems. Insofar as it is, the picture is not as rosy as it might appear. The aim of solving world problems through global politics is well meant, but optimistic. It is important to be negative if this is the most accurate conclusion to come to. But, alongside doubts about globalization and global politics, positive political arguments are put forward, for instance about how things could be made better in relation to migration, global poverty and international politics. The book argues that it is necessary to include national politics while going beyond them. At the level of global politics consensus and commonality cannot always be achieved because of inequalities, power and conflicts of interest and ideology. A politics of conflict between different sides might be necessary. This may involve the poorer and less powerful allying internationally against the richer and more powerful. This involves a politics that is international (rather than just national or global) and conflictual (rather than cosmopolitan or consensual). Political and pluralist perspectives on globalization One of the striking things about the literature on globalization is that positions that see globalization happening or are sceptical about its existence do not break down along clear ideological lines. There are neoliberals and Marxists who see neoliberal globalization going on, although they may not agree on its consequences (for instance, whether it will solve global inequality and poverty or not) or whether it is good or bad. Normatively and prescriptively there are divisions between neoliberals and Marxists, and sometimes empirically on the consequences of economic globalization, but, at the descriptive level concerning the fact of whether it is happening, the split between globalists and sceptics is not along the lines of political ideology. I have outlined some political ideology perspectives on globalization in table 0.1. These will come up again throughout the book. Table 0.1 Political ideologies and globalization Globalization Globalization good or bad? happening? Normative Descriptive Neoliberals Yes. Good. Globalist Yes. Bad (for socialist reasons). Marxists Conservative Yes. Bad (for nationalist reasons). nationalists Social No. Bad because: (a) unequal, i.e., not democratic global; or (b) not a route to solving sceptics poverty (protectionism better). Social Yes. Good, if subjected to global democratic regulation. globalists One issue discussed in this book is the tendency towards pluralist, hybrid and multidimensional views of globalization. Such views see globalization as operating at different levels, from the economic to the cultural or political. Sometimes emphases on multidimensionality are trying to get away from perspectives that focus mainly on economic globalization. Some views emphasize globalization as a hybrid and mixed phenomenon with inputs from many different parts of the world – one that is not just Westernized or homogenizing. For others, globalization is pluralistic and localized in its effects, with its reception varying depending on where it is received. Globalization is also driven by a multiplicity of factors rather than being reducible to single or selected causes. Globalization is multidimensional, hybrid, localized in its effects, and multicausal. Seeing globalization in these plural ways is helpful and an antidote to monocausal, over-Westernized, homogenizing views, some of which focus on the economy at the expense of culture, or have a simplified view of its effects. Pluralistic views of globalization are an improvement on earlier sweeping general theories, less popular nowadays, which see globalization rolling out in a similar manner across the world. But there is a danger of being pluralist without analysing if there is primacy or greater causality at some levels, and ascertaining whether amongst the plural factors some are more dominant or have a causal effect on the others. To say globalization is multidimensional is helpful and brings out its mix. But there are dangers in seeing it as an equal and hybrid mix without seeing the primacy, dominance or determination of some factors over others. It is also important not to separate off these plural factors, focusing on each as if separate from others and distracting from causal relations between them. Table 0.2 Pluralist views of globalization Multicausal Globalization not just caused by one chief factor, e.g., economy. Multilevel Economic, political, cultural, military, environmental. Hybrid Mixture of inputs from East/West/North/South. Localized Form globalization takes varies where it is received. Concepts of globalization The rest of this chapter looks at the meaning of globalization. Defining globalization is important because this affects other issues discussed in this book, such as when globalization started. Globalization is a powerful discourse or ideational force. It has an impact on how we see the world and behave. If an idea has this power it’s important to pin down what it means and see if what it refers to lives up to the definition. The picture of globalization as inclusive, unifying and general makes it seem positive, whereas other definitions are more pessimistic. So it’s important to identify what globalization means and how this fits with reality. Globalization – beyond internationalization, liberalization and universalization? Scholte (2005) argues that a new word should not restate what is already known with other terminology but has to mean something different. He rejects four meanings of globalization – as internationalization, liberalization, universalization or Westernization. These, he says, do not add anything new and do not capture what is different about globalization. Internationalization involves the growth of transactions and interdependencies between countries. Things cross borders between states or national territories; for example, messages, ideas, goods, money, investments, pollutants and people. But Scholte says that inter-national transactions are nothing new, and that as the word ‘international’ captures what this describes we don’t need a new word for these sorts of processes. Scholte says that globalization is also not liberalization. The latter refers to the removal of constraints on movements of resources between countries – an open, borderless world. Liberalization involves abolishing regulatory measures such as trade barriers, capital controls and visa requirements, and is linked in part with neoliberalism. Both supporters and critics of neoliberalism define globalization in this way. Scholte says this liberalization has happened and has facilitated globalization. But, he argues, liberalization and globalization are two different things. Globalization can and could take different forms, including non- neoliberal ones. We don’t need the new word ‘globalization’ for this as this has long been debated as liberalization. Globalization is also not universalization. This involves the dispersion of objects and experiences to all parts of the earth, ‘global’ here meaning worldwide or everywhere. Examples provided by Scholte include tobacco, clothes, the state, food, education, children’s toys and arms. Sometimes this gets extended into globalization as standardization or homogenization. But Scholte says there is nothing new about this. It is age-old, for instance, in world religions and trade. There is no need for new terminology for something we already have a word for. Globalization also has to be more than Westernization. This is a particular type of universalization, of Western structures such as capitalism, industrialism, rationalism, urbanism, individualism and democracy; or put more critically, colonization, Americanization and imperialism. Again, Scholte says these are part of globalization but not the same as it. Globalization can go in non-Western directions. It need not be imperialist if emancipatory movements can guide it. And Westernization existed long before globalization, so let’s call this Westernization and not invent a new word for it. For Scholte, globalization is deterritorialization or supraterritorialism. These involve more than just transplanetary links. Transplanetary connectivity, connections between parts of the world, has been around for many centuries. Supraterrritoriality, however, is relatively new and breaks with territorialist geography, with territories and borders being important. In the first edition of his book Scholte defined globalization as deterritorialization. In the second he replaces this with the idea of supraterritorialism. This, he says, is because the word ‘deterritorialization’ suggests that territory doesn’t matter any more, which is putting it too strongly. Transplanetary relations are more dense now than before, involving more people, more often, and are more extensive, intensive and of greater volume. Supraterritorial relations, however, are more recent, and involve not just an intensification of links across the world but different types of global connectivity. This intensification of links across boundaries also involves the decline of those boundaries. Links transcend and are detached from territory. They involve things like transworld simultaneity (e.g., people in lots of places doing the same thing, such as consuming the same brand of coffee) or transworld instantaneity (e.g., the telephone, where distant people talk to each other at the same time). Other examples of supraterritorialism for Scholte include jet planes, telecommunications, global media, finance, ecological problems and global consciousness (e.g., sports and human rights consciousness). In such cases more is involved than compression of time over space, for instance, where communications or travel over the same distances are quicker. There are, he says, social relations beyond territorial space. The difference between time–space compression and supraterritoriality is qualitative. It involves not just an intensification of existing relations, but new sorts of relations. For Scholte, territorial domains remain important but don’t define the whole framework where there is supraterritorialism. Scholte lists other examples of supraterritorialism, including communications (e.g., books, post, telegraph, phone, fax, texting, Internet, newspapers, radio, TV, film); the movement of people (e.g., tourists, migrants/refugees, business travellers); production processes (e.g., production that occurs in many places, global sourcing, global trade); consumption; global money/finance; global organizations (e.g., MNCs, faith-based organizations, unions, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), charities); military globalization (e.g., weapons that have global reach, wars carried out from global locations); ecology (in both causes and effects); health (e.g., illnesses that spread globally); law (e.g., international laws); and global consciousness (e.g., sports competitions, global tours and events, conferences). A problem is that these are all examples of transplanetary connections as much as supraterritoriality, and Scholte makes a number of qualifications to what he is saying, including that globalism has not eliminated territorialism, which remains important, for instance, in production, governance, ecology and identities. The world is both territorial and global; no pure globality exists independently of territorial spaces. The global is not a domain separate from regional, national, provincial and local levels, and there is an intersection of all these. This is what Scholte says and these are quite big qualifications that seem to take the edge off ideas of deterritorialization and supraterritorialism. Furthermore, many things described as globalization fall into the categories of internationalization, liberalization or Westernization. Scholte himself says that these are part of globalization but just not the same as it. So it’s not clear how different globalization is from these, as he suggests. The exception is universalization. Few of the processes Scholte mentions are universal. So, while globalization encompasses internationalization, liberalization and Westernization as much as it breaks from them, it rarely achieves the universalization he also differentiates globalization from. The qualifications that Scholte makes undermine his concept of globalization. They suggest that globalization is intertwined with territory rather than something above, beyond and separate from it. It might be better to say that what people talk about when discussing globalization are forms of Westernization, internationalization and liberalization, but that it is not above and beyond these. Sociologists and historians define globalization Waters (2001: 4) mentions definitions of globalization made by Robertson and Giddens. For Robertson (1992: 8): Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole... both concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole. Here the compression of space is mentioned. Things that are at a distance as great as ever before are, because of technological developments, nearer in terms of the speed of communications and travel. We can see media from the other side of the world or communicate with someone there as if they are in the next room. This is also sometimes called the annihilation of space (Harvey 1991), where spatial distances no longer matter because of the possibility of communicating, moving and seeing over them fully and quickly. There is a cultural emphasis in Robertson’s concern with consciousness of globality. As we will see in future chapters, consciousness of globalization is, for some, as important as the reality of it. For Giddens (1990: 64): Globalization can... be defined as the intensification of world- wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanciated relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space. Here worldwide relations are seen as becoming more intense, with a stress on the importance of interactions between the local and global, in which the local is not just shaped by globalization but may react to it in an alternative way. Waters (2001: 5) sees globalization as a social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social and cultural arrangements recede and people become increasingly aware of this and act accordingly. Waters sees globalization as a process rather than an end, and he emphasizes culture and consciousness and the effect it has on action. Holton (2005) also stresses globalization as a process and defines it as: 1. Interconnection – the intensified movement of goods, money, technology, information, people, ideas and cultural practices across political and cultural boundaries. 2. The interdependence of these activities across boundaries, and convergence and integration, for instance, in prices and markets. Globalization must be more than movement that is episodic, or involves few people (e.g., as in early trade), or has few consequences for those not involved in it. 3. Involving consciousness and identification of the world as a single place, for instance as in cosmopolitan culture, religions and environmentalism. There are overlaps here with Robertson’s consciousness-focused definition. 4. Emphasizing agency and process in globalization, as opposed to being an external or fixed structure. Held et al. (1999) have what they call a transformationalist view. This sees globalization as: new but not unprecedented; open-ended, as it may go in many different directions; and varying in the form it takes by place, by class and over time. This is compatible with local, regional and national relations continuing but interacting with globalization and taking global forms, or forms affected by globalization. Globalization transforms human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. It involves: 1. The stretching of activities across frontiers so activities in one part of the world have significance for others in distant regions. There is transregional interconnectedness and a widening of networks. 2. The regularization of world relations, with the consequence that there is an intensification or growing magnitude of interconnections, interactions and flows across societies and states. 3. The speeding up of global interactions and processes as a result of the development of transport and communications. The global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people is faster. 4. The impact of distant events being magnified. Local developments can have big global consequences, so the boundaries between domestic and global affairs become blurred. Held et al. show that globalization is complex. It includes numerous processes rather than one activity or end, and involves both agency and structure, the input of actors into making it and external constraints on them. It is differentiated in the sense that it develops to different extents and in varying patterns in different areas. It is aterritorial, in that it can involve deterritorialization (where the stretching of activities goes beyond being coterminous with territories) but also reterritorialization (where globalization becomes established in regions and subnational areas, and even encourages nationalism). Some significant complexities and qualifications are added to the concept of globalization here. Held et al. distinguish between flows, which are movements of things, people, symbols, tokens and information across space, and networks, which are regularized or patterned interactions. This involves an important distinction between things moving across space and those movements becoming established or even a system. Held et al. also make some important qualifications about what globalization is not. They argue that globalization should not be confused with interdependence, integration, universalism or convergence. It is not interdependence because, they say, that involves symmetry rather than hierarchy and there is plenty of the latter in globalization; not integration because that implies shared community and that does not exist; not universalism because globalization is not shared by all people or communities in the same way; and not convergence because this assumes growing homogeneity and harmony, while globalization could lead to conflict. So this is a complex definition of globalization with some similarity to points voiced by sceptics about globalization. Some of the complexities and qualifications added here make what is described something less than what others might see as globalization. The historians Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) also stress regularization and stability in global relations as a prerequisite to globalization. They say that globalization is different from imperialism. While the idea of empire is revitalized in some concepts of globalization – for instance, those that stress American power – globalization is also more global and postcolonial. It includes the inputs of nonimperial sources, and involves the end of self-contained societies. These writers make the distinction between: (1) world history, which is the study of different civilizations, their internal dynamics and comparisons between them; (2) global history, which is the study of contacts and interactions between societies; and (3) globalization, which may grow out of some of those contacts and interactions. Globalization grows where the contacts and interactions become networks and interaction spheres. Not all interactions become networks. This requires longevity, and sometimes institutional reinforcement so that they gain the sort of stability also found in hierarchical organizations. Osterhammel and Petersson say institutions such as diplomacy and trade help to turn interactions into networks. Other factors in globalization they mention include range, importance, intensity and speed. These are enabled by technology and organizational and institutional support. The durability and frequency of relations affect whether interactions become a stable network, and this can be restricted by space, or frozen or reversed. As such, globalization is a process rather than being fixed or static at one moment.For Osterhammel and Petersson, the features that fit their definition started about 1500 or so and became established in the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The concept summarized When the definitions of globalization supplied by these authors are put together, what does it all add up to? Globalization involves the compression of space such that distance is less of a factor than it used to be in terms of knowledge, communication and movement. Geography and territory are undermined and things start to develop at a level that is more than, and above, inter-national relations. What more has to happen for this to become globalization? 1. Globalization needs to be global in distance. Long-distance or transnational extensions of economy, politics and culture that are regional are not global because they do not extend globally. It would be a lot to say that to be globalization something has to reach every part of the world but it is reasonable to say that it needs to reach all continents and most parts of those continents. 2. Globalization needs to be globally inclusive in inputs as well as reach. So something that extends ideas or products from one part of the world to another is merely the extension of one part of the world, e.g., Westernization. Again, it would be a lot to say that absolutely all parts of the world need to have an input of equal weight. But globalization, to be ‘global’, needs to have inputs from across continents and many countries within them,  rather than be just a one-way or very unequal process from one place to another. 3. There needs to be interdependency rather than just interconnection. So, if a stoppage of trade in luxury goods such as jewels or silk has no significant repercussions, maybe this is not real interdependency. But if a decline in trade has significant effects for the exporting society’s workers and economy, or for the access of the receiving society to goods, then there appears to be an interdependency. 4. There needs to be stability and regularity in relations so that, rather than being intermittent or temporary, these establish a structure or system. 5. Some other aspects could be added to make a more demanding concept of globalization – for example, that it needs to involve more than elites and include the masses, or that there needs to be not just globalization but also global consciousness. People need not just to be doing things globally but to have an awareness of the globe as one place. As we shall see when we look at the history of globalization and sceptical perspectives on globalization, the use of such criteria leads some to decide that what is taking place internationally is not globalization. At the same time, these are tough criteria – it would be difficult for anything to ever match up to all of them fully. If you see globalization as a process moving towards such criteria, rather than as an end, then globalization may well be something that is going on. Does defining globalization matter beyond the issue of just deciding when something is globalization or not? This is not just a question of academic definition. There are other things that make defining globalization important. One is that it ensures we see the power, inequality and conflict in globalization. Seeing some situations as globalization – as inclusive, integrated, two-way and globally extended – gives an impression of inclusivity and equality that is inaccurate. Questioning whether phenomena meet the definition of globalization helps to show the power, inequality and lack of inclusion in the processes being outlined. At the same time, saying that certain things are not globalization, such as flows of capital or MNCs, is not to deny their existence or importance. What is being described by globalists may not be globalization but may still be happening and significant, and thus something which should be studied and analysed carefully. This is why globalization is important even if you don’t think it is happening! Practical note on reading chapters You can read this book by looking at chapters on areas of most interest to you and not reading the others. However, while individual chapters stand alone they are overlapping and interlinked. To avoid repetition, I have sometimes only mentioned briefly in some places issues that are developed more in other chapters. At the same time, some issues are of such significance in more than one chapter that they are mentioned, to some extent, in more than one place. Further Reading The literature on globalization is enormous. I haven’t tried to give a full range of references in the chapters of the book. However, at the end of each chapter there are suggestions for further reading. These are primarily for those who are relatively new to globalization and would like to go a bit further on any of the topics. Popular textbooks on globalization include Ritzer and Dean’s (2015) Globalization: A Basic Text, a shorter version of which is Ritzer’s (2011) Globalization: The Essentials. Jones’s (2010) Globalization takes a different approach of exploring globalization through key thinkers. There are lots of valuable readers on globalization. A useful critical reader is Appelbaum and Robinson’s Critical Globalization Studies (2005). Lechner and Boli (2015) The Globalization Reader, Lemert et al (2010) Globalization: A Reader, Benyon and Dunkerley (2001) Globalization: The Reader, Ritzer and Atalay (2010) Readings in Globalization: Key Concepts and Major Debates and Ritzer (2007) The Blackwell Companion to Globalization are all very useful, as is Smith’s Sociology of Globalization (2013). Held et al.’s (1999) Global Transformations is quite an old book, but is an introduction to areas of globalization, with a historical perspective and both theoretical and empirical information. It argues for a transformationalist perspective, in between more globalist and sceptical views. It has a useful companion reader edited by Held and McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader (2003). Sociologist Robert Holton has written a number of books – Globalization and the Nation-state (1998), Making Globalization (2005), Global Networks (2007), Global Finance (2012) and Global Inequalities (2014) – that illuminate issues in a concise way. Scholte’s Globalization: A Critical Introduction is a good book at an introductory level (2nd edn, 2005). Sociological perspectives that have a cultural and positive view of globalization have been mentioned in this introduction. For a powerful critical view from a sociologist who brings in politics and economics whilst also paying attention to media and culture, see Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market (1998a), The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society (1999) and Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2 (2003a), by the French writer Pierre Bourdieu. 1 Perspectives on Globalization: Divergence or Convergence? Perspectives on globalization have been separated into four waves. Three waves initially identified in discussions of globalization were globalist, sceptical, and postsceptical or transformationalist (e.g., Held et al. 1999 and Holton 2005). More recently it has been argued that there is a fourth perspective that goes beyond these. However, the three waves need to be looked at again rather than seen as redundant or out of touch. The fourth wave is important, but not as novel as its advocates argue. Contributors to the third wave defend the idea of globalization from criticism by second-wave sceptics. They also try to construct a more complex and qualified theory of globalization than provided by the first wave. But the third wave defends the idea of globalization while including qualifications that unwittingly reaffirm sceptical arguments. This has political implications. Third-wavers propose globalist cosmopolitan democracy, but their arguments in practice bolster a sceptical view of politics. The latter involves inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional blocs, and alliances of common interest or ideology, rather than cosmopolitan global structures. Globalization theory, seen to have emerged about the 1980s, is said to have begun with strong accounts of the globalization of economy, politics and culture, along with the sweeping away of the significance of territorial boundaries and national economies, states and cultures. Ohmae (1990, 1996) is picked out as an example of this approach, and other proponents are said to include writers such as Reich (1992) and Albrow (1996), as well as discourses in the business world, media and politics (Hay and Marsh 2000: 4; one example is Blair 1997). The first wave in globalization theory is said to have a ‘hyper’-globalist account of the economy where national economies are much less significant, or even no longer exist, because of the free movement of capital, MNCs and economic interdependency. Reduced political restrictions on the movement of money, and technological change in the form of the computerization of financial transactions, mean that large amounts of money can be moved almost instantly with little to constrain it within national boundaries. Many corporations are seen now to be multinational in their ownership and worldwide production facilities, workforces and consumers, from Coca-Cola and McDonald’s to News Corporation. Consequently, the global economy has opened up, integrated and included more parts of the world, although whether this has been a positive thing or not is debated. Marxists and economic liberals have agreed that the world is globalized, while disagreeing on whether it is a good thing (e.g., Sklair 2002; Wolf 2004). The globalist perspective is sometimes seen as economistic (Held et al. 1999: 3–4), with economic changes having political and cultural effects. Nation-states lose power and influence or even sovereignty because they tailor their policies to the needs of mobile capital. Social democracy and the welfare state are curtailed to fit in with the wishes of business interests (e.g., Gray 1996; Cerny and Evans 2004). Nation-states are superseded by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), social movements that are global, or even a global civil society (e.g., Gill 2000; Keane 2003). Globalization is said to lead to homogenized or hybridized global cultures, where national differences become less marked as people consume culture from around the world rather than exclusively from their own nation (e.g., Tomlinson 1999). This is facilitated by global electronic communications, such as the Internet, globalized TV broadcasts, migration and tourism. The role of new technologies has made globalization seem to some a relatively recent thing, perhaps of the post-1960s or post-1980s periods (e.g., Scholte 2005). Economically, politically and culturally, globalists see transnational, global forces taking over from nations as the main sources of economy, sovereignty and identity. For some, this means that social science has to move away from methodological nationalism, even from ideas of society, to more cosmopolitan and global perspectives on social relations (e.g., Beck 2006; Urry 2000; but see a response from Outhwaite 2006). Then, it is said by writers on the three waves, there was a more sober set of accounts. These reacted with scepticism to argue that globalization is not new and that the processes being described are not very global either (e.g., Hirst et al. 2009; Krugman 1996). Sceptics argue that globalist perspectives can be quite abstract and thin on empirical substantiation, making sweeping claims about processes as if they affect all areas of the world evenly and with the same responses. The sceptics see evidence of the continuing role of nation-states, within their own boundaries and as agents of globalization, through which they both lose and maintain power. In the case of core countries, for instance in North America and Europe, states continue to be very powerful in global affairs. National identities have a history and a hold on popular imagination that global identities cannot replace, evolving rather than being swept away. There may even be evidence of a resurgence of nationalism as old nations come under challenge, but from strongly held smaller nationalisms, for instance in Spain, Scotland and Canada, as much as from transnationalism (e.g., see Smith 1990; Kennedy and Danks 2001). Sceptics want to test the claims of globalism against evidence, and when they have done so have sometimes found it wanting. They are also concerned to see whether globalization is received evenly and with the same response everywhere and, not surprisingly, have found signs of differentiation in its spread. Sceptics tend to see the global economy as not globally inclusive. For instance, areas of sub- Saharan Africa are much less integrated than East Asia, Europe and North America. Global inequality is rising and protectionism still rife, for example, in Europe and the USA in response to imports from growing Asian economies. As we shall see, sceptics argue that the global economy is inter-nationalized and triadic rather than global, and that its internationalization in recent years is not unprecedented. In fact, it may even have been more internationalized in the early twentieth century than now. It is questioned whether globalization or free trade, insofar as it really is free, is the answer to global poverty. Liberal policies and integration into the global economy may have helped some parts of the world, such as China, India and other parts of Asia. But in these places protectionism and state intervention have also been part of the success. Other parts of the world – parts of Africa, for example – remain afflicted by inequality and poverty while globalization has progressed. These areas are less likely to stand a chance against stronger competitors in the open global economy which some see as the solution to their problems (e.g., Wolf and Wade 2002; Kaplinsky 2005). Politically, the effects of globalization are uneven – states have gained as well as lost power in processes of globalization. Many states are more globally powerful than others, and some are able to continue with more social democratic policies despite hyperglobalist perspectives that see globalization requiring compliance with neoliberalism (Mann 1997; Mosley 2005). This suggests nation- states retain autonomy and sovereignty in some ways, and unevenly so. Bodies like the UN seem to be as much inter-national as transnational, composed of nation-states and driven by them. Global bodies can be seen as being determined by the balance between competing interests as much as above such interests. This happens in cases of global governance from the UN Security Council to agreements on global warming, nuclear proliferation and international justice. The UN is seen as the tool of the most powerful nations, which bypass or exempt themselves from its rules when it doesn’t suit them, and which use such bodies to impose their will for their own benefit when it does (Zolo 1997, 2002). Culturally, it is said that nations respond to globalization differently. McDonald’s may have proliferated around the world, but the ingredients vary to fit in with local customs (from shrimp burgers in Japan to kosher burgers for Jewish customers). Depending on location, the consumers of individual outlets are either mainly working class or middle class, while eating customs vary from fast to leisurely in different contexts. From France to parts of the Middle East not everyone responds positively to the globalization of American culture. In fact, in some places, a retreat to fundamentalism and greater rather than less nationalism are seen to be notable reactions to globalization (Robins 1997). It is the culture of one nation, the USA, that is often talked about in relation to cultural globalization, as much as culture originating from all around the world (Beck et al. 2003). As such it is not very global. There have even been (flawed) predictions of clashes of culture arising from globalization, against hyperglobalist assumptions about the homogenization or hybridization of culture (Barber 1996; Huntington 1996). There has been another set of reactions alongside and in response to the sceptics. There are those who share the concerns of the sceptics about evidence and differentiation but despite this can’t help but see globalization before their eyes, moving ahead at unprecedented levels in recent times. Economic interdependency, for instance, is seen as having grown significantly so that national economies are no longer contained within national territorial boundaries. Third-wavers have been keen to critically reassess the claims of globalism, but without throwing out the baby with the bathwater (e.g., Held et al. 1999, and Held and McGrew 2003, who call themselves ‘transformationalists’). The outcome of this has been a departure from some conclusions of the sceptics, with instead a more complex picture of globalization in which it is seen to occur without just sweeping all away, as hyperglobalists have pictured it. The global nature of structures such as finance, environmental problems, drugs and crime, and developments in international communications and transport, have led to more global political forms to deal with these issues. National economic, political and cultural forces are transformed and have to share their sovereignty with other entities of global governance and international law, as well as with mobile capital, MNCs and global social movements. But they are not removed. Globalization may have a differentiated effect depending on type (e.g., economic, cultural or political) or location where it is experienced, while still being a force. Global inequality is seen as having moved from a simple core–periphery shape, discussed in chapter 3, to more of a three-tier structure, including a middle group of rising economies from Brazil to China. All of these involve both the continuation and transformation of existing structures, something in between what is described by sceptics and by hyperglobalists. Globalization’s future may be uncertain and open-ended. It could take different forms (perhaps more neoliberal or more social democratic) or even be reversed, rather than the future being unavoidable globalization or just continuity with unaffected nation- state structures. With recognition of uncertainty comes an acknowledgement of the importance of agency in deciding what happens to globalization, rather than an assumption that it is predetermined or inevitable as suggested in some first-wave accounts (Holton 2005). In short, the third-wave contributions are critical of hyperglobalism and wish to formulate a more sophisticated picture but feel, contrary to scepticism, that globalization is changing the world. They do not go as far as the sceptics in that they say that real, significant changes have happened. Third-wavers acknowledge the reality of globalizing changes and so defend a globalist position but one that is modified to be more complex than that of the hyperglobalists. Table 1.1 summarizes the three waves. These are models. Individual contributors do not always fit only into one wave, and, as we shall see, although the third wave presents itself in one way, when looked at more closely it seems to actually reinforce the sceptical wave it seeks to criticize. So the emphasis in this table is on models of the three waves (see also Held et al. 1999: 10). Beyond the second wave? Kofman and Youngs (1996) made an early outline of perspectives on globalization but discussed two waves rather than three. In their outline, transformationalist and sceptical views are combined. This relates to a problem I wish to highlight, that third-wave theories reinforce the scepticism they seek to undermine. I will focus here more (but not only) on economic and political dimensions of globalization that are a main emphasis of authors I am looking at, and will discuss cultural dimensions more fully in chapters 3 and 4. Third-wave theorists distance themselves from both radical globalists and outright sceptics. They defend an idea of globalization, and so separate themselves from the sceptics. But they do so in a more complicated way than put forward in the first wave. However, in doing this they add qualifications and complexities that actually bolster second-wave sceptic arguments. This is not always the case and there are differences between third- wavers and sceptics. But if it transpires that third-wavers are confirming the second wave, intentionally or not, then it is important that the sceptical view is validated rather than seen as less adequate. Getting a correct understanding of what the third wave is actually saying is important to understanding globalization properly. This has political implications. In reaching globalist conclusions, albeit more complex ones, and arguing they have shown the flaws in scepticism, third-wavers conclude that globalist forms of politics such as cosmopolitan democracy, discussed in chapter 10, are the most appropriate way for directing globalization along more progressive paths. This is against the sceptical analysis of politics that has a more realist view of a world where such global forms are not possible. This is because of the superior power of advanced states, especially rich core states, the conflicting interests and ideologies of global actors, and the importance of politics at the level of nation-states, regional blocs and other alliances. Table 1.1 Three waves in globalization theory Sceptics stress power, inequality, conflict and the importance of the nation-state. These point to a politics other than, or in addition to, global democracy. This might involve states. Or it could involve alliances below the global level between states with similar objectives or interests, for instance a shared antipathy to neoliberalism or US imperialism, and with global social movements that have related objectives. This is rather than, or as well as, global universal structures in which common agreement may not be possible and which are liable to being hijacked by more powerful actors. If third-wave analysis leads more in the direction of the sceptics’ findings than it says it does then an analysis of global power inequalities and nation-state power in political strategy, of the sort highlighted by the sceptics, should become more part of the picture, and the outlook for global democracy seems more problematic. To look at the implications that third-wave arguments have for the second wave, I will set out in more detail some of the claims of the second wave. Hirst and Thompson are frequently cited as leading proponents of the sceptical point of view (see Hirst et al. 2009) and have engaged directly in discussions with third-wavers, for instance in Paul Hirst’s debate with David Held (Held and Hirst 2002). Hirst and Thompson’s analysis of globalization claims is mainly economic and uses empirical data to test an ideal type of globalization. The ideal type they use is, they say, an extreme one. But it represents what globalization would be if it were occurring, and they say it is one that shapes discussions in business and political circles. What are their main points? There has been internationalization of financial markets, technology and some sections of manufacturing and services, especially since the 1970s. This puts constraints on radical policies being pursued by national governments. Internationalization allows investment to flee across national boundaries more easily, something it may well do if confronted with a radical left government where it is invested. The current internationalized economy is not unprecedented. The international economy was more open between 1870 and 1914, its international dimensions are contingent and have been interrupted or reversed in the past. Hirst and Thompson’s data shows high levels of trade and migration before 1914, much of which was reversed in the interwar period, showing how globalization is not going along an evolutionary or predetermined path, but can stop or go into reverse. Greater international trade and investment are happening but within existing structures rather than as part of a new global economic structure. What is happening is between nations, i.e., international, especially between dominant states or regions, rather than something that has extended globally or gone above and beyond nations or the international or interregional. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are rare. Most companies are nationally based and trade multinationally (i.e., MNCs rather than TNCs). There is no major tendency towards truly global companies. A company may be based in one country and sell its goods or services abroad. But this makes it a national company operating in the international marketplace, rather than a global company. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated amongst advanced industrial economies, rather than any massive shift of investment and employment occurring towards ‘third world’ countries. The latter remain marginal in trade. Exceptions to this are ‘newly industrializing’ countries (NICs) in Latin American and East Asia. The world economy is not global. Trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the triad of Europe, East Asia and North America. Something that falls so short of being inclusive on a worldwide scale cannot be seen as a global economy. The world’s most powerful states have the capacity to exert economic governance over financial markets but choose not to for reasons of ideology and economic interest. They have an ideological commitment to unfettered finance or find that they benefit from it. These are the reasons for any restraint in economic governance rather than because it is impossible. States, by themselves, or in regional or international  collaborations, have the capacity to regulate the global economy and pursue reformist policies if they choose to do so. Radical expansionary and redistributive national economic management is not possible because of domestic and international requirements, such as norms that need to be met to satisfy international financial markets. Capital would flee if governments were to pursue policies that were too radically socialist. Governments and other actors have to behave differently because of internationalization. But globalization theory leads to excessive fatalism, and the injunction that neoliberalism is unavoidable because of globalization is as much ideological as an actual inevitability. Politicians say that neoliberalism is inevitable as much to justify policies they are ideologically committed to as because the policies really are inevitable. Reformist strategies at national and international level are possible, using existing institutions and practices. Hirst and Thompson argue that in some respects the world economy is very inter-nationalized (see also Hirst and Thompson 2000 on the ‘over-internationalization’ of the British economy). But they use the word ‘internationalization’ rather than ‘globalization’ and argue that evidence of the former is used to justify claims about the latter. They see the world as internationalized rather than globalized because of conclusions such as those I have mentioned. Let’s look now at the third perspective on globalization. This tries to maintain a globalist outlook, one that does not retreat from globalist claims as the sceptics do, but attempts to outline a more complex globalism than the one outlined by the first wave of hyperglobalists. Held et al. – transformationalists, a modified globalism I am focusing here on Held et al.’s transformationalist approach. They distance themselves from the sceptics. But they also argue that globalization is more complex and uncertain than first-wave hyperglobalists say (e.g., Held et al. 1999; Held and Hirst 2002; and Held and McGrew 2003). Held et al.’s arguments go in different directions. They defend globalization theory by putting forward a modified version of it. But the qualifications and complexities they add confirm claims of the sceptics. As such, these arguments do not undermine scepticism or support globalization as much as is claimed. Let us look at examples of what Held et al. set out as the transformationalist position and what they criticize about scepticism. According to this perspective (Held et al. 1999: 7–14): Contemporary globalization is part of a long-term historical process but is unprecedented. There was trade and migration, for instance between Asia, the Middle East and fringes of Europe, in pre-modern times. But technological and political changes since the Second World War have led to an unprecedented growth in the extent, velocity, volume and intensity of, for example, global media communications, economic interdependency between countries and international political organizations. Globalization is a driving force behind changes reshaping the world. There are not clear distinctions between the domestic and the international in economic, social and political processes. For instance, aspects of national culture such as media, film, religion, food, fashion and music are infused with inputs from international sources so that national culture is no longer separate from the international. This is a transformatory driving force because it changes people’s life experiences. Economies are becoming deterritorialized, global and transnational. This is happening through, for example, the mobility of capital across national boundaries, the role of MNCs and interdependency between nations’ economies. While they are legally sovereign, nation-states’ powers, functions and authority are being reconstituted by international governance and law, by global ecological, transportation and communications developments, and by non-territorial organizations such as MNCs and transnational social movements. The nation-state is not a self-governing, autonomous unit and authority is diffused. Held et al. also say that states have become more activist and their power is not necessarily diminished but is being reconstituted. This is unlike the globalists’ claim that nation-state sovereignty has ended, or what is regarded as the sceptics’ position that nothing much has changed. Territorial boundaries are still important but the idea that they are the primary markers of modern life is more problematic. Economic, social and political activities are locally rooted but become disembedded from territory or reterritorialized in new forms of localization and nationalization. So a company may have roots in a particular territorial area but become detached when its workforce is internationally located or its products sold internationally. It is reterritorialized in the new places the workforce is located or where its products are tailored for markets in different areas. Types of music start off from a locality but can become disembedded as they are performed or sold globally, or take on global influences. They influence or spread into other types of music globally, or to other national places where fusions of music then create new forms of local or national culture in that area, i.e., new forms of localization and nationalization. Transformationalists say they do not reduce the world to a single, fixed, ideal type, as other perspectives do, and that they recognize it is contradictory and contingent. They feel that globalists and sceptics reduce the world to global or non-global types respectively, without realizing how contradictory it is, with aspects of both types alongside middle elements where, for example, cultures may stay national but what the ‘national’ is becomes changed by global inputs – so a mixture of the national and global. And they see globalists or sceptics as suggesting inevitabilities when whether the world becomes more or less global is not predetermined but is open to going in different possible directions. Sceptics are said to see the world as a singular process when actually it is differentiated, with different patterns in different areas of life. So, for instance, some types of globalization (e.g., finance) may be more globalized than others (e.g., corporations), and some countries in the world (e.g., those with more inward investment) may experience the impact of global finance more than others. Held et al. argue that sceptics are empiricist because statistical evidence is taken to confirm, qualify or reject the globalization thesis when more qualitative evidence and interpretive analysis is needed. Migration or trade, for example, may (arguably) be no more globalized now than in the belle époque (the period between 1870 and 1914), in terms of quantitative indicators such as value of goods exchanged or numbers of people on the move. But the qualitative impact of migration and trade on economies, politics and culture could be greater. Quantitative indicators of limited change do not necessarily demonstrate lack of qualitative impact. There is a global system that most societies are part of, but not global convergence or a single world society. National societies and systems are enmeshed in interregional networks. But this is different from global integration, which does not exist, because it implies too much singularity, and from convergence, which would involve homogeneity. For example, there is global economic interdependency but that does not mean there is convergence on economic factors such as prices or interest rates. Globalization involves new patterns of stratification across and within societies, some becoming enmeshed and some marginalized but in new configurations that differ from the old core–periphery model of North–South and first world–third world classifications. It follows that globalization is not universalization because globalization is not experienced to the same extent by all people. In place of the core–periphery model of global inequality there is now one that shows a middle group of developing countries in Latin America and Asia. These have grown significantly and become more integrated into the global economy, so lifting themselves out of the periphery. But others – some African countries, for example – remain left out. So a bipolar model is replaced by a more complex stratification with greater inclusion of some but also exclusion along with greater polarization between the top and bottom, revealing the uneven effect of globalization. Transformationalists claim that, unlike hyperglobalists and sceptics, they recognize the direction of globalization is uncertain rather than teleological and linear with a given end- state. Instead of globalization being destined to sweep ahead, or the status quo being the predetermined future, transformationalists say that what will happen internationally is open and could go in a number of directions, depending on factors such as the choices of big corporations and governments or the influence of civil society and social movements. Government strategies for dealing with the globalized world are said to include neoliberalism, the developmental or catalytic state, as well as more outward-looking approaches based on international regulation, an approach to government action favoured by global cosmopolitan democrats such as Held et al. (Held and McGrew 2002). The openness in paths that globalization could take in the future mean governments have a number of options to influence its direction, including economic liberalism, greater state intervention in guiding the future of economies and societies, or global governance of the world economy and global problems. Transformationalists and sceptics compared How much does this transformationalist third wave rescue globalization in a modified form and undermine the sceptics? There are differences between the transformationalists and sceptics: on definition (should the processes they see be defined as internationalization or globalization?); on history (is current globalization unprecedented or the period between 1870 and 1914 the most globalized?); and proposals (divergence between seeing nation-states and international blocs or global democracy as the bases for future political action). Hirst and Thompson are accused of attacking an ideal type to undermine the case for globalization. They agree this is what they do. But their ideal type is what globalization would be if it existed, and they use it to assess whether it does. This seems right if you are testing the extent of globalization. But I want to leave aside models and compare what Hirst and Thompson say is going on in the world – internationalization– with what Held et al. say is happening, i.e., global transformation. Then we can see if there are differences in their understanding of the world. Held et al. say that contemporary globalization is historically unprecedented but that there were earlier, pre-modern forms of globalization. This means there are precedents for globalization but none as intense, extensive and fast and of such great volume and impact as at present. Sceptics and transformationalists agree that globalization is long-running. However, there is a difference between Hirst and Thompson’s view that its heyday was the 1870– 1914 period and that it is less intense now, and Held et al.’s view that the current period is the most advanced. Held et al. argue that there are not clear differences between domestic and international processes. This is something sceptics agree with. As can be seen from the summary I’ve given of the sceptics’ position, they see domestic economies as inter- nationalized, for instance, in terms of finance, trade and investment. Where there is a difference is on whether international processes are characterized as ‘global’ or not. But their view of the interpenetration of the national and international does not mark transformationalism off from scepticism. Held et al. argue that economies are becoming deterritorialized, global and transnational. This sounds like a more radical position than that of the sceptics, but Held et al. qualify this with the view that territorial boundaries are still important. Economic, social and political activities are locally rooted and become territorially disembedded or reterritorialized in new forms of localization and nationalization. How different is this from the sceptics’ position that there are national economies trading internationally, and companies with local bases whose production, trading and investment activities go on beyond this location? The emphasis on deterritorialization and disembeddedness goes beyond the sceptical position, but the idea of rootedness and reterritorialization reaffirms rather than rejects sceptical arguments. The view of nation-states that Held et al. have is of agents, legally sovereign with their power as much reconstituted as diminished. They are activist, but with authority diffused, and lacking self- governing autonomous powers. For example, a nation-state may have reconstituted itself as a part of regional and international organizations, resulting in both its authority and self-governing power being diminished by this and by global economic pressures. But it is still legally sovereign, taking an active role in reconstituting itself in a more globalized world in a way that maintains or enhances its powers. This view is said to be unlike the sceptics’ position that nothing much has changed. However, this distinction from the sceptical position is problematic for three reasons. First, the claim that nothing has changed is not one that the sceptics make. They say a lot has changed, in the belle époque period, and the 1970s and 1980s, but that this does not mean we live in a globalized era. They argue that there have been big transformations in the international economy, although within existing structures. Companies have to act differently and the norms of international financial markets restrict what it is possible for nation-states to do, for instance, ruling out radical macro-economic policies. Second, sceptics agree that nation-states lack complete sovereignty and have to share this. For instance, sceptics outline the role of international organizations, international finance and constraints on radical redistributional politics. Their qualification is that this is not new and is partly reversible. But they agree there is not clear sovereignty and that this has to be shared. Third, they agree with the view of the activist state. The transformationalists’ emphasis on this gives credence to the sceptics’ case that nation-states are important actors on the world stage, with the power at national and international levels to determine the form that globalization takes. Sceptics argue that nation-states have the autonomy to affect the future of globalization. Held et al.’s outline of alternative strategies, such as neoliberalism, the developmental state, the catalytic state and cosmopolitan democracy, reinforces the view that nation-states have some autonomy and power to determine the future, in the way that Hirst and Thompson argue. Transformationalists and sceptics are not in complete harmony on the role of the nation-state in the global or international world. But qualifications in the transformationalist analysis affirm arguments of the sceptical case as much as rebutting them. For Held et al., one difference between transformationalists and sceptics is that the former recognize the multidimensional, contingent and contradictory nature of the world and its uncertain direction, whereas sceptics see it as singular and linear with a given end-state. But this misinterprets the sceptics. Hirst and Thompson argue that internationalization has varying effects in different parts of the world, with much activity concentrated in advanced economies, while other areas of the world are less integrated. These writers state that internationalization is not linear but is subject to reversals, such as that after the belle époque. Hirst and Thompson argue that the idea that globalization is predetermined and inevitable is a myth used to justify neoliberal policies, the reality being that nation-states, individually or organized internationally, have the power to alter the course of internationalization. The claim of difference from scepticism made by transformationalists is based on a misunderstanding of what sceptics say. What transformationalists argue on these points seems to be in accordance with the sceptics and to confirm rather than undermine their case. Finally, transformationalists argue that there is a single global system in which all societies are enmeshed, something that appears to differ from the sceptical position that claims significant activity in the international economy is concentrated in the triad of East Asia, the European Union (EU) and North America, with other parts of the world much less integrated. However, the differences are smaller when it is considered that transformationalists outline a situation in which, while there is a world system, there is not global convergence or a single world society. They see stratification across and within societies involving some becoming enmeshed and some marginalized, in which globalization is not universal because it is not experienced to the same extent by all. The unevenness of integration into the global system comes closer to confirming than breaking with the sceptics’ outline, which leads the latter to the conclusion there is no global economy because of such patterns of inclusion and exclusion. The politics of globalization So attempts to rebut scepticism and defend a modified globalism seem to actually share ground with the sceptics’ analysis. This raises doubts about the reality of globalization and reaffirms sceptical claims. Rhetorically, transformationalists are stronger in defending globalism, despite such commonality with the sceptics, and this may be partly what leads to one area of significant difference. Transformationalists remain committed to a globalist outlook, and their prescriptions of a politics which can respond to globalization put strong emphasis on cosmopolitan global democracy (see Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Archibugi 2004). This involves global political fora in which different communities and interests participate to reach agreements on issues that have a global character and cannot be solved purely at national levels. Human rights and war, ecological problems, drugs and crime, economic instability and inequality are seen as global rather than national, and require global coordination to be solved. Cosmopolitans look to global fora or international interventions, based in global cosmopolitan consciousness, to solve such problems. Sceptics whose analysis does not lead to globalist conclusions do not share this faith in global politics (e.g., see Zolo 1997, 2002). Sceptics do not believe that powerful Western states will be willing to put up with the political equalization that global democracy would allow. They will resist political equality and inclusivity and try to maintain their superior power in global fora. They will use global politics against others when in their interests and evade being subjected to it when it is against their interests. There are conflicts of interest and ideology, and over resources, between nation-states, increasing as a consequence of problems such as climate change. Solutions to global problems would have to involve the interests or ideologies of some being favoured, while those of others were opposed. There are no win–win solutions to such problems. So conflict is more likely in global politics and the cooperative consciousness on which cosmopolitanism relies is unlikely. An example of these issues has been the role of the USA in international politics. It has tried to maintain its power against equality in international institutions (e.g., in the UN Security Council). It has used those international institutions as a basis for pursuing its interests against others, but exempted itself or bypassed them when they are not supportive (e.g., in the war against Iraq). It has supported or undermined international agreements (e.g., on global warming, international justice and rights, and nuclear proliferation) on a selective basis, depending on its ideology and interests. A sceptical view that sees the international sphere as important, but affected by power, inequality and conflicting interests, suggests that global cosmopolitan politics is unlikely. Cosmopolitans are well intentioned and right to be concerned about issues such as ecology, rights and inequality. They are correct to see such problems as global and often requiring transnational solutions. But if cosmopolitan politics is unlikely or undesirable for the reasons mentioned, what might an alternative political approach to such issues involve? For sceptics, the future lies in nation-states acting alone, or, because such problems are transnational, acting together multilaterally – for instance, in regional blocs or alliances of the like-minded – rather than globally. This involves not universal or global agreements, but bilaterally and multilaterally agreed blocs and alliances between those with shared objectives, interests and ideologies. This may be better than trying for cosmopolitan consciousness at a global level where many have opposed interests and ideologies and some are more powerful. This politics would work more with the reality of divisions, antagonism and state alliances than the global commonality and agreement required for global cosmopolitan democracy. Such alliances can be forged, for instance, between states or movements that see themselves as anti-neoliberal or anti- imperialist, such as, in the past, left-wing governments in Latin America and other places, the Non-Aligned Movement of governments, or the global justice movement (e.g., see Gill 2000; Gills 2000; Motta 2006). International institutions exist and have to be engaged with, so actors should participate in them. But these institutions also represent particular as much as global universal interests and are a tool for the powerful as much as for equality and democracy. As such, politics has to operate outside as well as inside them, agents forming alliances using what resources they have (e.g., energy resources and human expertise) for mutual assistance. This is in a politics of conflict (rather than cosmopolitan universality) against powerful forces that preserve inequality or lack of democracy, or transgress human rights, and whose policies lead to ecological problems or war. This politics is neither statist nor globally centralist (although it uses both levels). It does not ally scepticism about cosmopolitan politics with anti-interventionism or passivity. It favours activism and intervention transnationally in issues of global concern and relevance, but through recognition of conflict because issues involve opposed as much as common interests and objectives. It can be done internationally beyond the state through bilateral and multilateral blocs of actors with common agendas and interests where they exist, or can be forged, rather than through the isolated state or global universals. This is an alternative to both statism and centralism/ globalism, operating at both these levels but also at a level in between of conflictual politics and selective transnational multilateralism. The differences between sceptics’ and transformationalists’ political prescriptions stem more from transformationalists’ globalist conclusions than from the substance of their arguments, which in practice often share ground with the sceptical approach. Transformationalists give a picture of: unevenness of integration; inequality, stratification and power; nation-states (albeit reconstituted ones) for which there are different possible activist strategies; and reterritorialization and regional blocs. On this basis, the politics of cosmopolitan global democracy that transformationalists favour seems unlikely. Their analysis shows up inequalities and conflicts that would make it difficult for global agreements to be realized. These are often between nation-states that remain, according to the transformationalists’ outline, powerful actors. The more appropriate political conclusion from such a picture of the world order is one which recognizes inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional or multilateral like-minded blocs, as identified by sceptics as more likely structures in future politics. Transformationalism affirms sceptical analyses about globalization and the political conclusions these lead to, more than the globalist analyses and politics it rhetorically supports. The fourth wave in globalization theory For some, the three-waves debate is old hat. What matters is less what’s happening in the world and more globalization as a discourse (Cameron and Palan 2004; Fairclough and Thomas 2004; Bruff 2005; Scholte 2005). What we think about globalization is more important than globalization itself. We interpret the world as globalizing, whether it is or not. This may even have a self-fulfilling effect. Because we think the world is globalizing we act as if it is. Globalization then has an ideational force on us. It starts to happen when we behave in a globalized way because of what we think as much as because of what is actually there. Whether globalists, sceptics or transformationalists have got it right in describing globalization isn’t that important. The fourth wave in globalization theory analyses globalization as a discourse. This approach is influenced by post-structuralist, postmodern and social constructionist perspectives, as well as by the work of thinkers like Foucault. Post-structuralism and postmodernism emphasize the role of symbols and consciousness of the world as much as the world itself. The emphasis is on signifiers (the symbols which signify something) as much as on signifieds (the objects the signifiers refer to). What we experience and so believe and act upon is in discourses or ideas about society, which mediate between us and the world, and, in effect, are the world itself as far as we experience it. It is from discourses that we know the world or through which our experience of the world is constructed. For Foucault, discourses such as psychiatry or medicine create bodies of knowledge through which we interpret and understand society and which consequently constitute the world for us (e.g., Foucault 1979). So knowledge and those who construct and control it – psychiatrists and doctors, for instance – are very powerful. The labelling of mental illness or homosexuality, for example, provides categories for making sense of the world. People only become mentally ill or gay or lesbian when discourses classify them in these ways. Before such discourses and classifications were used to label people in these ways, madness and homosexuality effectively did not exist as such. This signifies a shift from economic and political perspectives on globalization to ideational ones. Symbols, consciousness and cultures are seen to have a force of their own rather than being determined purely by, for instance, the capitalist economy. Ideas are detached from politics and economics, having an autonomy and power of their own. So discourse approaches involve in part a reaction against economic determinism. The ideational perspective is idealist as opposed to materialist in terms of where it sees causality coming from. It plays a greater role in understanding globalization for disciplines like anthropology, media studies and sociology than for those such as economics and political science. The former put more stress on subjective meanings in explaining social life, as well as studying objective structures. From this point of view, one of the key developments in the history of globalization was the popularization of the idea of globalization from the 1980s onwards as much as any actual processes of globalization. This was more important than whether globalization started in the pre-modern era, with capitalism, after the Second World War or whenever. When we developed a consciousness of globalization, rather than globalization itself, is the important thing. At this point people started to move away from national identities to global identities, and global imaginings led to globalization. People interpreted the world as globalized and acted in accordance with this. The key argument is that with the arrival of a discourse of globalization, it becomes a new symbolic experience. Having more plural and hybrid identities made up of sources from around the world, which make us think of ourselves more as people with global identities than national ones, allows other things to develop – such as global governance. If we see ourselves as having global identities we can identify more easily with such global forms. Global imaginings precede and help constitute substantive globalization. Ideational types underpin political and economic forms of globalization. However, discourses of globalization may be based on real globalization and economic and political interests more than is allowed by arguments that stress the discourses’ autonomy and power to construct the world. The idea of globalization is facilitated by real globalizing developments that make discourses of globalization and the idea of global identity a possibility – migration, global media and the Internet, for example. These enable us to have identities which are diasporic or hybrid, or not connected to nationality or multinationality at all – e.g., as a woman, a member of the peace movement, a worker, a follower of a religion, or a person with a particular sexuality, for instance – and they bring us into touch with identities, culture and media beyond the national level. So real developments of globalization facilitate the discourse of globalization. Here a discourse of globalization is based on the reality of globalization, rather than being purely ideational. The social constructionist idea about the world being made in our discourses about it, rather than in objective reality, can also be allied with a power analysis as it is in Foucault’s theories. Discourses of reality determine what can be known and how we know the world. So constructions of globality determine how we make sense of the world and act within it. Power over discursive constructions is, therefore, an enormous power to have. It is power over truth. Foucault saw this as positive rather than negative power, or power over life rather than over death, because it creates the categories through which we positively make sense of the world rather than being a prohibitive power as law and the judiciary are. For some, this power over the mode of production of ideas is more important than ownership of the means of production of material things that Karl Marx highlighted. The former may have taken over from the latter in importance in what is sometimes called a post-industrial or information society (Kumar 2004). Discourses about global neoliberalism lead business people and politicians to see the world as governed by the movement of capital and MNCs, and to make business or policy decisions in accordance with these apparent structures and imperatives. For instance, politicians may lower business taxes or weaken regulations to protect workers and the environment because they believe the world is constituted by the free movement of capital and that they need to take such neoliberal policy decisions to keep capital in their country. There is a danger in putting forward ideational perspectives over economic ones. Discourse theories are often set up as a sophisticated step forward from crude, outmoded economic determinism. But economics may be the decisive factor that brings ideational discourse to the fore. Economic expansionism creates global media and structures on which global imaginings are based and from which they develop. There is real globalization behind the idea of globalization, as much as the idea constituting reality. It may be a desire to expand business opportunities abroad that leads corporate leaders to stress globalization and free trade as a necessity we must go along with. There are ideational drivers to globalization but they are based on material economic expansionism or interests. Economic liberalism, for instance, or global human rights, are ideas that justify Western expansionism, economically or politically. Furthermore, they disguise something beneath the surface of what they say. For example, economic liberalism involves a huge discrepancy between more wealthy and powerful nations and those less so. Free trade gives the richer and more powerful the freedom to compete openly with those at a large competitive disadvantage to them. So free and open trade disguises something less than free and open. Global human rights involve Western and individualist values (which, as with free trade, Western advocates adhere to inconsistently, depending on whether it favours their interests or not). Others stress collectivist or economic ideas of rights, such as the right to food and water, more than individual or political rights. Or they see other values, such as collective obligations or economic equality, as above individual rights. So what appears to be a universal idea that stresses the rights of all disguises a Western idea that contrasts with alternative values. Global human rights, important as they are, disguise their own lack of globality and rights. Globalization involves economic and/or political projects to which meanings are attached to gain the consent or acquiescence of groups in society, legitimating or justifying them through categories such as ‘globalization’. So they are rooted in underlying political- economic objectives and interests. As we have just seen, some disguise inequalities and power as equality and freedom. If discourses and political-economic relations were put into a causal hierarchy where you saw which was rooted in the other you might find that discourses are rooted in political and economic interests. So an explanation of them would have to emphasize the political- economic basis of discourses as much as the discourses themselves. As such, discourse and ideational arguments do not break so much with political and economic analysis as it may at first appear, or as is sometimes claimed by them. Ian Bruff’s (2005) outline of ideational perspectives reacts to the importance of political-economic understandings by bringing them more into discourse analysis. For him, from a discourse perspective the idea of globalization influences how reality is understood. A complex and multidimensional world is open to going in different directions, and which one it goes in may be affected in part by how globalization is perceived. It does not matter if the sceptics are right about globalization if discourses of globalization are effective and create the reality of globalization. But Bruff argues for a neo-Gramscian perspective which brings in an economic grounding for discourses of globalization, explaining why they happen on the basis of material interests. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who wanted to get away from overly economically determinist understandings of the world by developing the idea of hegemonic ideologies that could mobilize people and dominate understandings of the world. In doing so, he showed that ideas, and not just economics, are determinant. But he maintained his perspective of seeing these as linked to material interests and agents in society rather than just being free-floating and unrelated to economic and political bases. For Bruff, there needs to be more cross-pollination along these lines between Marxist materialist critical theories and the critical theories that come from discourse and ideational analysis. Bruff also tries to bring agency in. He argues that globalization is not an external force out of our control, but a discourse which is produced and to which we can provide alternative accounts. We can look at which groups and interests are invoking the idea of globalization – from capital that will benefit from free trade reforms, to governments that want to invoke external global pressures as a reason for reducing the amount spent on welfare. There are many discourses about reality, and looking at the power behind them helps in understanding why some are selected, retained and implemented in different circumstances. So the ideational perspective on globalization is combined by Bruff with agency and political economy, rather than making those redundant and overlooking their importance for understanding discourses,