Technology and Global Affairs PDF 2011

International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 27–45. Technology and Global Affairs Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire...

International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 27–45. Technology and Global Affairs Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 Stefan Fritsch Bowling Green State University Technology has always played an important role in global politics, eco- nomics, security, and culture. It has continuously shaped the structure of the global system, its actors, and the interactions between them and vice versa. However, theories of International Relations (IR), and in particular those of International Political Economy (IPE), have performed little to theoretically conceptualize technology as a powerful factor within explanations of change in global affairs. Although tech- nology often is implicitly present in the theories of IR and IPE, it is often interpreted as an external, passive, apolitical, and residual factor. This essay argues that to develop a better understanding of transforma- tion in global affairs, technology has to be integrated more systemati- cally into the theoretical discussions of IR ⁄ IPE. Technology should be understood as a highly political and integral core component of the global system that shapes global affairs and itself is shaped by global economics, politics, and culture. This paper makes the case for an interdisciplinary approach, which systematically incorporates insights of Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) to provide a better under- standing of how technology and the global system and politics interact with each other. In so doing, it opens the field to a richer understand- ing of how global systemic change is impacted by technology and how global politics, economics, and culture impact technological evolution. Keywords: Technology International Relations, International Political Economy, systemic change, theory, interdisciplinarity Technology has always been a powerful driver of change in global society’s economic, political, military, and cultural development. Its consequences often have been mixed. Continuously improved production, communication, and transportation technologies have contributed to the development of a global economic system, which has been providing a source of unprecedented economic prosperity, and in countless ways has helped improve the living condi- tions of billions. But technology also has multiplied the destructiveness and global reach of armed conflict, as in the case of nuclear weapons or cyberwar. Many technologies unfortunately have yielded dramatic and often unintended negative side effects like environmental pollution, global climate change, and loss of biodiversity. In various ways, technology has also caused new forms of socioeconomic, political, and cultural exclusion, such as the ‘‘digital divide’’ between information haves and have-nots, and the potential marginalization of many languages in the global electronic media sphere caused by English’s hege- mony as lingua franca. Although much scholarly work has been devoted to the narrow study of cer- tain technology-related policies in areas of security, welfare, and identity, only a few notable studies have investigated the more fundamental relationship between technology and global affairs (Ogburn 1949; McNeill 1982; Sanders doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00417.x  2011 International Studies Association 28 Technology and Global Affairs 1983; van Creveld 1989; Skolnikoff 1993; Herrera 2006; Hanson 2008). Given the diverse consequences of technological evolution for global affairs, the theo- retical neglect by mainstream IR and IPE is all the more astonishing because the fundamental relationship between technology and IR seems so obvious. Address- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 ing these conceptual shortcomings, Talalay, Tooze, and Farrands (1997:2) conclude: ‘‘It [technology] clearly is not the only factor involved in explaining change. It is however a potent one. Moreover [...] it is a factor that has too often been ignored or defined away by those who seek to explain International Rela- tions (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE).’’ The paper argues that standard explanations of systemic changes in global affairs usually focus on polit- ical or economic variables, neglecting technology’s core role as a driving force behind systemic transformation as well as its reciprocal relations with politics, economics, and culture. These conceptual gaps have contributed in significant ways to IR ⁄ IPE’s strug- gle to explain systemic change in global affairs. Long criticized by various authors, the drive for theoretical parsimony (Katzenstein 1989; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996) resulted in technology’s relegation to a residual factor in theo- retical accounts of system change. Technology, often narrowly defined as mate- rial artifact, is considered to influence actors and interaction patterns by more or less being ‘‘added’’ to the structures, actors and processes that make up the study of global affairs. However, by conceptualizing technology in the form of more encompassing socio-technical systems, this essay argues that it is possible to conceptualize technology as an endogenous and political factor that is deeply embedded into the global system. Technology not only has been ascribed diverse values but also has been defined in different ways (Hughes 2004:2), a fact that complicates all discussions about technology and its role in global affairs. For this analysis, I draw from a broad definition proposed by Brooks, who defines technology as accumulation of knowledge and artifacts for the realization of human purposes in a specifiable and reproducible way (Brooks 1980:66). While a narrow definition of technology focuses on material artifacts, which would better be termed ‘‘tools’’ or ‘‘tech- nique,’’ as well as technological know-how directly related to the construction and usage of technology, the broad definition of technology also encompasses ‘‘soft’’ aspects like technology-related norms and ethics, organizational aspects as well as the general belief in progress, which together constitute a ‘‘technologi- cal practice’’ (Pacey 1983:6) or what could also be called a ‘‘technological sys- tem.’’ Figure 1 offers a summary of narrow and broad technology conceptions. By using this broader definition, I try to avoid the reductionist position that technology just consists of the direct practical application of hard science in the (material) form of technical tools (Kaplan 2004:XIV). To introduce technology into global affairs more effectively, it seems necessary to develop a more nuanced understanding of technology and its relationship with society. S&TS provide IR ⁄ IPE with the necessary tools to understand and analyze the mutual relationship between technology, the global system, and global affairs to develop better explanations for systemic change. Particularly, the discussions between technological determinism and the social constructivist conception of technology, as well as the evolving middle ground between them, have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the interrelations between human society and technology that revolve around issues of human agency and technology-based imperatives. By incorporating insights from S&TS, IR ⁄ IPE can develop a better understanding of the reciprocal relationship between technology, global affairs, and systemic transformation. This study therefore strongly reinforces Yetiv’s (Forthcoming) as well as Koopman, Wernimont, and McDermott’s (Forthcoming) arguments for an integrated approach, in which combinations of disciplines are encouraged to  Stefan Fritsch 29 Cultural aspects: Organisational aspects: - Goals - Economic & industrial activities - Norms & ethic codes - Professional activities Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 - Believe in progress, concsiousness - Consumers & users & creativity - Workers unions Technological Practice Broad understanding of technology Technical aspects: - Knowledge - Capabilites & technics Narrow understanding of - Tools & machines technology - Raw materials/ressources - Products and waste FIG 1. Narrow vs. Broad Understanding of Technology (Note. Adapted from Pacey 1990; Modifications by author.) obtain a more comprehensive understanding of how systemic structures and interaction patterns either evolve or transform radically. To make the case for in- terdisciplinarity, this paper will first discuss results from S&TS research to develop a technology concept that is analytically useful for IR ⁄ IPE. In a second step, the study will show how the results of this discussion can be applied to the study of global affairs. In a final step, the article shows how the incorporation of more elaborate technology concepts helps improving the explanatory capacities of IR ⁄ IPE for more nuanced accounts of systemic change by comparing technol- ogy conceptions and explanations for systemic change of various theories of IR ⁄ IPE. S&TS: Perspectives on Technology and Politics Science and Technology Studies are a highly interdisciplinary research field that has experienced remarkable growth in recent decades. For Sismondo (2004:VI) ‘‘the field is a result of the intersection of work by sociologists, historians, philos- ophers, and anthropologists studying the processes and outcomes of science and technology. Because it examines science and technology, its findings and debates have repercussions for almost every understanding of the modern world,’’ including scholars of IR ⁄ IPE who so far have not systematically investi- gated those issues on a broader scale. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish two major perspectives on technology and society that have influenced S&TS for the last decades: technological deter- minism and social constructivism. Both perspectives highlight different aspects of the technology-society nexus and come to different conclusions regarding technology’s impact on society and our ability to govern technological evolution. By synthesizing findings from both sides, a newly emerging middle ground has provided more balanced explanations that offer a pragmatic avenue for incorpo- rating technology into IR ⁄ IPE explanations for change in global affairs. Technological Determinism Technological determinists’ perception of technology builds upon a meta- narrative, which has penetrated Western industrialized societies since the beginning 30 Technology and Global Affairs of the industrial revolution. According to Smith and Marx (1994:X), this meta- narrative (...) conveys a vivid sense of the efficacy of technology as a driving force of his- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 tory: a technical innovation suddenly appears and causes important things to happen. (…) Whether the new device seems to come out of nowhere, like some deus ex machina, or from the brain of a genius like Gutenberg or Whitney, the usual emphasis is on the material artefact and the changes it presumably effects. (…) Unlike other, more abstract forces to which historians often assign determi- native power (…) the thingness or tangibility of mechanical devices—their acces- sibility via sense perception—helps to create a sense of causal efficacy made visible. Taken together, these before-and-after narratives give credence to the idea of ‘‘technology’’ as an independent entity, a virtually autonomous agent of change (italics by author). Technological determinists worry about technology’s proliferation into practi- cally every sphere of life, which, in their view, has dramatically increased society’s overall dependence on technology to a point where society’s reproduction com- pletely relies on technology. In his political-economic writings, Marx was one of the first social scientists to observe that ‘‘Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand- mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the indus- trial capitalist’’ (Marx 1847 ⁄ 1977:202). For Marx, technology represents ‘‘a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being subordinate to a self-regulated moving force’’ (Marx 1867 ⁄ 1995:259). Based on the first quotation, Marx has often been described as an exponent of hard deter- minism, which sees in technology the sole force of historical change. The second quote, however, points to his broader perspective on technological evolution and its mutual relationship with politics and economics, in which soft aspects such as ideologies or class interests do play an equally important role. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the growing dominance of technology fostered fears of losing control over technology and technological evolution in general (Winner 1977:202). Observers expressed fears of machine domination in the sense that the ‘‘…imperatives of technology and organization, not the images of ideology, are what determine the shape of economic society’’ (Galbraith 1967:7). Especially, the growing impact of large socio-technical systems on indus- trialized society triggered inquiries into the political aspects of technology (Winner 1986; Smith 1994:28). A modified perception of technology that emphasized its potential for domination and oppression drove the exploration of interrelations between society and technology (Vig 1988:8). Technology was not seen as a solution to socioeconomic problems, but rather as a generator of new problems. According to Mumford’s influential thesis on technology, man ‘‘[...] will become a passive, purposeless, machine-conditioned animal whose proper functions, as technicians now interpret man’s role, will either be fed into the machine or strictly limited and controlled for the benefit of de-personalized, collective organizations’’ (1966:3). Technology’s homogenizing force emerges from its inherent scientific rationality that pushes technology to continuously increased efficiency (Mumford 1934; Heidegger 1954 ⁄ 1977; Ellul 1964). Moreover, scholars such as Mumford assumed that these cumulative develop- ments would result in a mega-machine, defined as an all-encompassing yet invisi- ble unified whole, which not only contains technical and scientific artifacts, but  Stefan Fritsch 31 also organizational and control systems of bureaucratic hierarchy (Mumford 1966). This ultimately global techno-structure would also limit the range of avail- able (alternative) technological options and thereby exert converging pressures on people and states (Feenberg 2002:136). Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 One facet of technology’s partial uncontrollability is unintended side effects (Skolnikoff 1993). Social actors, no matter how aware they are or how carefully they plan, cannot anticipate every effect, which results out of the practical appli- cation of technology. The resulting thesis states that technology, at least in a lim- ited way, acts autonomously (Winner 1977). Every society hoping to effectively steer its structural development should consider all technological options with a good portion of skepticism (Winner 1977:77). It is a widespread impression that technological determinists see technology as an autonomous, all-encompassing structural force, which strictly follows its inherent ‘‘natural laws’’ of constant progress and higher efficiency (‘‘the one best way’’) and leaves almost no room for human agency unless within the tightly defined boundaries set by technology’s requirements (Heilbroner 1967; Vincenti 1995). However, closer reading reveals that most determinists do not argue on the basis of strict determinism. They are well aware of the social, cul- tural, political, and economic aspects of technological society (Heilbroner 1994). Because of its inherent political qualities, stemming from their development by human beings, technology can never be value-neutral. It always promotes the interests of certain social groups, while neglecting the interests or rights of others (Winner 1986:22). No representative of technological determinism mentioned earlier neglects the broader social settings into which technology is nested (Cohen 1980; Bimber 1994). What unites them in their diverse work is the general observation that technology has become a globally dominating force of constant change as well as the concern about real or perceived loss of socio- political control over transformative processes set off by technology. Their great- est weakness, though, is their inability to open the black box of technology and explain what drives technological evolution: Is it technology’s inherent push toward the one best way of ever higher efficiency based on scientific progress? Or is technological evolution driven rather by capitalist profit interests, sociopolitical power considerations of various interest groups, or governmental policies? This gap has been of central concern for social constructivism. Technology as Social Construct From the late 1970s on, social constructivist concepts of technology developed in reaction to technological determinism. In contrast to deterministic positions, exponents of this approach tried to formulate more practical and contextual interpretations of technological evolution and its interactions with politics, eco- nomics, and society. Constructivism ‘‘treats technology as a social construction that interacts with other social forces rather than as an autonomous entity with its own unique rationality’’ (Kaplan 2004:89). Technology is not different or dis- tinct from any other social phenomena. It is part of our social reality and only gains meaning when described and interpreted in social terms. Generally, most constructivists dismiss the existence of an overarching techno- logical complex. They reject any separation of technology and society. For them, technology represents a materialized result of cultural, political, economic, and social structures and power (Weingart 1989:9). Constructivists emphasize the social determinants in processes of invention or innovation as well as in the way technology is actually used (Weingart 1976). By interpreting processes of inven- tion and innovation as negotiation processes between various social actors, con- structivists open up the black box of technological evolution for political and social guidance, design, and control (Teusch 2000:413). Technological evolution 32 Technology and Global Affairs is no longer seen as autonomous, but rather as result of interconnected political, social, or economic interests, norms, or identities. This perception has most radically been expressed by Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (1989). According to them, the social construction of technology can Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 most clearly be seen during the development of new technologies. Their research program pursues three goals, namely ‘‘moving away from the individual (or ‘genius’) as the central explanatory concept, from technological determin- ism, and from making distinctions among technical, social, economic, and politi- cal aspects of technological development’’ (Bijker et al. 1989:3). The irrelevance of any distinction between technical and non-technical aspects is marked by their coinage of the phrase ‘‘seamless web,’’ which refers to ‘‘socially constructed natural phenomena, socially constructed social interests, socially constructed artifacts, and so on’’ (Bijker and Pinch 1989:109). In Bijker and Pinch’s opinion, there ‘‘is no grand plan to history—no economic, technical, psychological or social ‘last instance’ that drives history’’ (1994:8). Instead, ‘‘technology, the social world, and the course of history should all be treated as rather messy contingencies’’ (Bijker and Law 1994:8). This means that any deterministic assumptions are broadly rejected, while issues such as inter- subjective meaning, interests, ideologies, and agency take center stage. Not surprisingly, social constructivists repudiate the fears of technological determinists concerning the loss of control and technology’s autonomous exis- tence (i.e., quasi-outside of social systems). Because constructivists emphasize the influence of external factors, technical development as a complete process is nei- ther a superhuman destiny nor a natural auto-movement, but the result of human decisions and actions, and is wide open for purposeful planning, guid- ance, and control (Ropohl 1979; Misa 1994). There is no ‘‘one best way’’ in technological developments that is determined by technology’s internal scientific logic. Instead, technology is the result of explicit and implicit choices by actors (scientists, engineers, managers, bureaucrats, politicians, and consumers) among a given number of technological alternatives, based on ideological, normative, economic, and political considerations (Ropohl 1985; Noble 1999; Pacey 1999). The existence of technological alternatives does not automatically result in the application of alternative technologies. Those decisions depend on political and economic considerations. There also exists no alternative to the industrial or information society but only life within it. Instead of generally criticizing tech- nology, one should critically evaluate the contexts within which specific technol- ogies are developed and applied (Scranton 1994). Social constructivists have been criticized for being unable to deliver convinc- ing answers to the question of how technology then could be meaningfully distinguished from other social phenomena. This perception rather represents an underestimation of technology’s social significance and complexity, because it portrays technology as a medium through which social relationships can easily be established and sustained (Böhme 1986:23). However, the diffusion and application of technology not only results in more efficient, but rather in com- pletely new social structures as well as forms of social action (Böhme 1986:55). The Middle Ground As the survey has shown so far, the discussions within S&TS offer diverse insights concerning the relationship between technological evolution and society. At this point, the question arises about how insights from S&TS can help us to better understand the relationship between technology and global affairs. Both techno- logical determinism and the social constructivist perspective of technology have strengths and weaknesses. By avoiding a detailed analysis of invention and innova- tion processes, determinists underestimate sociopolitical influences in the early  Stefan Fritsch 33 stages of new technological developments as well as society’s ability to address the challenges posed by increasing proliferation of technology (Noble 1984). On the other hand, social constructivists tend to focus on the early stages of technologi- cal evolution (invention, establishment, stabilization, and distribution) in which Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 social agents’ decisions decisively impact design and characteristics of a technol- ogy, but neglect their long-term consequences (Winner 1993) or issues such as path dependency, that is, the availability of a limited range of known technologi- cal options based on previous decisions. A synthesizing approach has been offered by Hughes (1969), who represents a ‘‘middle ground’’ in S&TS, by combining deterministic and constructivist argu- ments while adding a time-sensitive perspective. He is well aware of the strengths of each approach, which he tries to combine in his concept of the ‘‘technologi- cal system’’ (Hughes 1969). For him, a ‘‘technological system can be both a cause and an effect; it can shape or be shaped by society. As they grow larger and more complex, systems tend to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it. […] The social constructivists have a key to understanding the behavior of young systems; technical determinists come into their own with the mature ones’’ (Hughes 1994:112). Technological systems are based on networks in which technological artifacts, individuals, organizations etc., ‘‘become interacting entities’’ (Hughes 1986:282). With regard to global affairs, certain weapons sys- tems (nuclear weapons), as well as communication, transportation, and energy systems might qualify as particularly relevant. Their distinct qualities, such as their network character, their tendency to diffuse globally over time, their vital backbone function in global economics, security, and culture, and particularly their impact on time-space compression in global social relations make them so relevant for any in-depth exploration of the mutual relationship between tech- nology and global affairs. Combining Technology and IR ⁄ IPE: A Systems Approach Hughes’ perspective offers a viable avenue to the integration of technology studies and IR ⁄ IPE. As Herrera (2006) shows convincingly, the middle ground provides IR ⁄ IPE with an avenue to integrate technology and global affairs without neglecting social agency nor technological path dependencies. As histo- rians of technology remind us, technological systems have life cycles (Hughes 1983). It is important to retrace their historical development to assess their impact on the system at various points in time throughout their life cycle (Herrera 2006). To highlight how technology actually becomes relevant at the global level, Herrera borrows two concepts from innovation studies that can help to investigate the relationship between technology and system. First, one has to look at invention and innovation, i.e., the development of new technologies and their improvement. This requires us to look at institutions such as scientific and technical organizations, educational systems, state involvement via national innovation policies, markets, and individuals or companies. Disciplines such as S&TS, economics, economic geography, or comparative political economy have produced a steadily growing body of research that investigates these processes at the various levels of analysis (individual ⁄ firm; state and global) (Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg, and Soete 1988; Rosenberg 1994; Herrera 2006; Polenske 2007). Second, diffusion can be defined as the mechanism or transfer of technolo- gies or technological knowledge domestically or across borders by emulation, theft, mobility of ideas, or physical transfer and the actors that enable those transfers (Herrera 2006). Archibugi and Michie (1997:1) observe that ‘‘Innova- tion is far more than just a series of isolated events shaped by enlightened inventors, forward looking entrepreneurs or dynamic corporations. Certainly 34 Technology and Global Affairs individuals and firms play a crucial role in the development of specific innova- tions, but the process which nurtures and disseminates technological change involves a complex web of interactions among a range of different subjects and institutions.’’ The development of new technological systems rarely is confined Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 to the domestic sphere. National technology policies emphasizing domestically oriented research and development incentives for individuals and firms are often accompanied by policies that try to attract foreign research potential, thereby transnationalizing the technological innovation processes (Metcalfe 1997). Moreover, economic or military competition as well as cooperation between countries and firms has always significantly contributed to the diffusion of technological knowledge (McNeill 1982; Casson, Pearce, and Singh 1992; Fransman 1997). Innovation and diffusion are the basis for changes in systemic ‘‘interaction capacity,’’ the dependent variable that describes the ability of various actor in the system to interact with each other. Its roots go back to Durkheim’s sociology, which assumes that the nature of any social system depends on the ability of its actors to interact: ‘‘The more closely knit the members of a society the more they maintain various relationships with one another or with the group collec- tively. For if they met together rarely, they would not be mutually dependent, except sporadically and somewhat weakly’’ (Durkheim 1933 ⁄ 1984:25). The driv- ing forces behind the growing interaction between members of society are means of communication and transmission, which sharply reduce time and space constraints for societal interaction processes and increase a society’s over- all density (203). Buzan and Little highlight the importance of interaction capac- ity for global affairs: Between technological and societal elements of interaction capacity the former is both prior and more basic. Technology determines the level of interaction in a very fundamental sense. Without a substantial impact from technology on levels of interaction it is difficult to see how or why common norms and communal institutions could develop other than in geographically limited subsystems. Once they do develop, however, they become an important element of interaction capacity. (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:69) It is important to point out that interaction capacity is not a characteristic of the system units, but a feature of the system. However, one can observe a close rela- tionship between system and units, agent, and structure. Although technological evolution often begins within a national context, new technologies quickly dif- fuse throughout the system and begin to change the system as well as the units (Deudney 1993, 2000). However, the emphasis lies on the mutual dependency between agent and structure. Deterministic positions, which give priority to either technologies or social actors, have to be avoided. Each technology gener- ates different qualitative impacts on the system (and ultimately on the units) depending on its age and development stage as well as on the system and unit features that impact the development of new technologies. System features such as anarchy and interstate competition or market competition between firms have often been core factors in the development of new technologies. New system fea- tures such as complex interdependence, driven by technology, have also resulted in new unit features, such as modified political arrangements (Deudney 1993, 2000), new firm-structures (Chandler 1977; Castells 2000), or increasing skill- levels at the individual level (Rosenau and Fagan 1997) to cope with the system- wide effects of new technologies. The relationship is visualized in the model presented in Figure 2. As the model highlights, technology does not dictate certain development paths. Actors can, but do not have to, opt for certain technologies or paths.  Stefan Fritsch 35 Actors States IGOs MNCs NGOs Global system Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 Individuals Interaction Structures Innovation capacity Actors Diffusion Time Interaction Space processes Issues Technological System Security Economics Identity FIG 2. Technology and Global Affairs: An Integrative Model However, because of certain systemic aspects, such as anarchy, interstate compe- tition, emulation, or diffusion of technology, the pressure to do so might be very high. This raises two important aspects. First, the investigation of technology’s impact on global affairs calls for an historical perspective, as pointed out in Yetiv’s contribution (Forthcoming). As mentioned earlier, technological systems have life cycles. Different development stages generate different impacts on the system and its units. Second, because technologies generate such diverse effects on global affairs, sweeping generalizations might be problematic. Both points create several methodological challenges. To retrace the various development stages of technological systems and their impact on system and units, an historically informed approach can help in investigating issues such as timing, sequencing, positive feedback loops, and technological and institutional path-dependencies. Attention to these issues enables us to retrace how certain technological and institutional choices at particular points in time push techno- logical evolution in certain directions, leaving alternative paths behind. Positive feedback loops fortify previously made choices and over time impede the pursuit of alternative technological or institutional options (Pierson 2004). A case study approach favoring thick description and in-depth process tracing seems more promising in exploring complex relationships between technology, units, and system(s) (Gertz 1973; Gerring 2007). Technology and Change in Theories of IR and IPE Building on this concept for the systemic integration of technology into the analysis of global affairs, the next section will assess how major theories of IR ⁄ IPE have so far dealt with technology and change in global affairs. The goal is to demonstrate how these theories provide valuable insights for the technol- ogy-global affairs topic and to propose modifications to improve the discipline’s explanatory capacities. Realism ⁄ Neorealism: Technology and the Pursuit of Power According to proponents of the Realist tradition, interstate relations are defined by fierce interstate competition over power and influence (Morgenthau 1948). The hierarchy among states is the result of the system-wide distribution of power, which itself is the result of the distribution of capabilities. The emphasis lies on states’ relative equipment in various power categories. Although not explicitly mentioned, technology implicitly represents one of those capabilities (Waltz 1979:131). In most Realist accounts, technology seems to occupy the role 36 Technology and Global Affairs of a passive, neutral, and exogenous instrument. It represents one among many power factors that states try to maximize. Systemic change is explained as the result of a modified power distribution among states. Technology defined as power capability might contribute to a shift Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 in power relations, but it does not qualify as a core component of the system (Herrera 2006). Classic Realists are more likely to acknowledge that technological progress has considerably changed international politics, especially in the field of high politics (security), because the invention of weapons of mass destruction has rendered total war a very irrational option for the realization of most political goals (Morgenthau 1961; Aron 1966). The instrumental understanding of tech- nology was modified by a more critical perspective, which discussed the dangers of naı̈ve faith in technological evolution and the consequences of what Herz called the ‘‘acceleration of social speed’’ for global affairs (Herz 1959, 1976). Beyond the implication of nuclear arsenals on global security politics, Neoreal- ism or Structural Realism assumes that the basic conditions of international poli- tics have not changed, because the system is solely defined by the distribution of power (capabilities). In the wake of economic globalization, many have simply extended the great power game from security politics to economic competition. Here, too, technology plays an important role, because it is a basic requirement for economic power (Rosecrance 1986, 1999; Gilpin 1987; Brzezinski 1997). How- ever, Neorealism’s drive for theoretical parsimony combined with its instrumental and narrow conception of technology impedes its ability to conceptualize system change generated by the emergence and diffusion of new technologies, interac- tion patterns, actors, and institutions. Waltz (1979:45) observes that ‘‘to call changes within systems changes of systems makes developing the notion of systems into a theory of some explanatory power wholly impossible.’’ Because the Realist tradition mostly works with political concepts (national interest, power accumulation, anarchy, etc.), there remains little room for elaborate technology concepts. The state of nature and the forces of politics are more influential than any technology (Waltz 1979:173). Waltz’ instrumental conception of technology and its impact on global affairs culminated in his proposal that more nuclear weapons may be better, because deterrence works particularly well for states with nuclear capabilities. This naı̈ve perception has recently generated growing criticism (Sagan and Waltz 1995; Scheuerman 2009). Based on the previous discussion, it is not surprising that most Realists ⁄ Neorealists reject the assump- tion that technological progress has favored the emergence of new actors and policy issues on the international stage, or has radically altered the structure of and interaction processes within the global system (Gilpin 1975, 2002; Weiss 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Rugman 2001; Held and McGrew 2007). The major Realist ⁄ Neorealist contribution to a better understanding of the relationship between technology and global affairs lies in the acknowledgement of the material underpinnings of global society, in the form of perceived needs (survival, prosperity), as well as the role of interstate competition for power and influence as the major driving force behind technological evolution. Realism also correctly points to the central role of the state for the development and global ⁄ national governance of technological systems. Particularly with regard to large technological systems, national governments often provide vital initial resources. The Realist tradition’s main weakness, however, derives from its static model of the global system and its instrumental understanding of technology as passive force in a country’s power capabilities-mix. This undifferentiated perspec- tive tends to neglect the reciprocal relationship between technological evolution and structural change in world politics. Interesting to ponder, as part of the critique of Realism ⁄ Neorealism, are results from neuroscientific experiments that focus on the degree of trust exhib- ited among strangers (Zak with Kugler, Forthcoming). Relatively high levels of  Stefan Fritsch 37 trust under various experimental conditions are unexpected from a Realist point of view. These interesting findings should catalyze further research efforts to explore the basic dispositions people hold towards one another and which in turn impact foreign policy decision making. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 Liberalism and Technology-Driven Interdependence Liberals often perceive transformations of the international system as the result of technological influences. Liberals understand interdependence, globalization, and transnationalization as resulting from ‘‘[…] a long accumulation of techno- logical advance which has given human beings the ability to conduct their affairs across the world without reference to nationality, government authority, daytime or physical environment’’ (Langhorne 2001:2). Technological progress in infor- mation and communication technologies (ICTs) and transportation has caused intensified and more complex economic, social, and cultural interactions and structures, which resulted in a partial decoupling from physical surroundings like state territory and borders. Technological progress in the military sphere drives military globalization, defined as tremendously increased levels of potential destruction as well as capacities to deliver destruction to any point on earth (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999). Therefore, the Westphalian core principles of political sov- ereignty, territoriality, and state autonomy have been significantly modified (Strange 1994, 1995, 1996) or eroded (Ohmae 1995). Some even go so far as to ascribe to technology, in combination with a global capitalist ideology, a remark- able homogenizing impact across cultures (Fukuyama 1992:108). To cope with the effects of growing interdependence, state and nonstate actors increasingly have to cooperate on the international level, which often takes place within international governmental organizations, regimes, and pri- vate non-governmental forms of cooperation-like strategic alliances between MNCs (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999). Cumulatively, these processes further the establishment of new as well as the restrengthening of older spheres of authority or polities, which cause increasingly complex structures on the global level (Rosenau 1990, 1997, 2003; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 2004). The state-centric world, represented by the Westphalian state, is enriched by a multi- centric world consisting of actors who are less bound by sovereignty or territory, but rather organized along the logic of global networks in which concepts of time and space are radically modified (Castells 2000). In some aspects, the resulting patterns of global politics resemble earlier forms of political organiza- tion during medieval times with complex and overlapping patterns of politico- economic governance (Friedrichs 2001; Slaughter 2004). Therefore, liberals make a strong case that globalization, to a considerable part, is caused by technology. Although the assumptions presented above could be described as leaning toward deterministic explanations, most liberals explicitly reject techno- logical determinism (Singh 2002:11). For many, technology is not the only driving force behind globalization. Politi- cal and social aspects like liberalization policies, infrastructure programs, deci- sions concerning the application of certain technologies in relation to specific social and ⁄ or cultural conditions play an equally important role (Jones 2000). ICTs, for example, can be used by MNCs to efficiently control transnational production and distribution networks. They can also be used by NGOs to improve cooperation on various policy issues or for the coordination of terrorist operations (Arquila, Ronfeldt, and Zanini 2000) as well as for states’ cyber war attacks against important public infrastructure in other countries (Halpin, Tre- vorrow, Webb, and Wright 2006). Liberals also admit that technology-induced globalization processes influence nearly every aspect of human life (Ferguson 38 Technology and Global Affairs and Mansbach 1999). Nevertheless, they tend to see technology as an exogenous factor that projects its influence from outside into the international system (Rosenau 1990). Liberal scholars contribute to a better understanding of tech- nology’s role as an agent of systemic transformation in global affairs by investi- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 gating phenomena such as interdependence, military, economic, and cultural globalization, the emergence of new actors, and power configurations. However, they highlight the consequences of technological evolution for global affairs, instead of investigating the driving forces behind it (military and economic com- petition, MNCs, profit, etc.), thereby underestimating the reciprocity in the rela- tionship between technology and global system. Social Constructivism: Technology and Identity Constructivists, especially those of the so-called middle ground, do recognize technology as occasionally influential factor in global affairs (Adler 1997). Brute material forces frame the general conditions in which social, political, and economic interactions take place. These forces thereby play an important but not determining role. Siding with the constructivist critique of liberalism’s oversimplified perceptions of globalization-driving forces, Shaw postulates that it ‘‘is simply implausible that there could have been significant technical, commer- cial or cultural change without important political antecedents and concomit- ants, as well as effects’’ (Shaw 2000:13). Shaw raises the important point that technological evolution and its impact on global affairs cannot be fully under- stood by following crude deterministic accounts. Instead, normative or identity issues have to be incorporated to evaluate the nonmaterial factors that contrib- ute to technological developments. Therefore, constructivists tend to focus on the normative, discursive, and insti- tutional foundations of global affairs. Palan et al. interpret globalization as ‘‘(…) a created social order and as such a product of human agency. This, of course, is in marked contrast to the ‘politics of reaction’, which represents globalization as an externally generated social order, a product of technological determinism and other changes’’ (Palan, Abbott, and Deans 1996:27; emphasis by author). Ruggie also expresses skepticism regarding the idea of a linear relationship between technological and social change. He admits that technological progress has increased the demand for more international organizations to effectively manage interdependence between states. However, ‘‘(…) when it comes to the international management of technology there is a hole in the technological whole, one which can be filled only by introducing political purpose’’ (Ruggie 1975:558). While technical instruments might help in dealing with often tech- nology-induced problems, choosing between options ultimately is ‘‘not a ques- tion of physical and technological determinants; it is a question of social choice’’ (Ruggie 1975:558; emphasis by author). Surely, social choice is central; however, as has been shown earlier, path dependence can often lead to severely limited options from which social actors can choose, especially in later development stages of large technological systems. According to constructivists, technology can only acquire meaning by being embedded within social norms (Wendt 1995:73). Technology as material phe- nomenon per se has no explanatory power (Der Derian 1992, 2001). Change therefore is rather the result of changing norms and identities, not technologi- cal evolution. Adler reaches similar insights: ‘‘Whereas structural factors [such as technology] may generate the potential for events to happen in a certain way, human intervention (read: interpretation of reality) may cause the events to hap- pen quite differently’’ (1986:676, 2001; see also Tannenwald 1999). Moderate constructivists in IR explicitly criticize postmodernists and radical con- structivists who mostly declare material artifacts and limitations to sociopolitical  Stefan Fritsch 39 agency as irrelevant and usually expel them from their research designs (Wendt 1999). As Onuf (1998:64f) points out: ‘‘Agency is always limited. Agents are never free to act upon the world in all the ways that they might wish to. Many limits have a material component. We need air to breath; we do not have wings Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 to fly. […] The freedom that agents do have depends on their ability to recog- nize the material and social limits that apply to them.’’ Often, moderate con- structivists acknowledge that the diffusion of technology has increased the density of the international system. This is an important prerequisite for interac- tion between social actors, which in turn establishes structures. Without (techno- logical) interaction capacities, interaction between different actors of the international system would hardly take place. This connection is often implicitly present in many constructivist arguments, but rarely mentioned explicitly. Con- structivists also show some difficulties in acknowledging technology’s role in IR ⁄ IPE. By often concentrating on norms, ideas, values, and identities, construc- tivists tend to underestimate material ⁄ structural variables and their constraints on human agency (Winner 1977; Vincenti 1995; Herrera 2006). Constructivism’s strength lies in demonstrating the impact of identities, culture, norms, and values on global affairs as well as technological evolution. Technology is never value-neutral. Different technological options always serve particular purposes while excluding others. However, as technological systems mature and expand, it becomes harder and harder to modify the deeply embed- ded norms and values embodied in a system’s structures and functional ele- ments. The constructivist emphasis on norms, rules, and identity tends to underestimate material constraints such as costs, range of technological options, path dependencies, or unintended consequences. Conclusion The goal of this contribution to the symposium was to show that so far technol- ogy has been insufficiently discussed by major theories of IR ⁄ IPE, although it is often implicitly present in many arguments. The paper tried to develop a con- cept of technology and its mutual relationship with global affairs that goes beyond the traditional conceptions so far applied. It argued for a conceptualiza- tion of technology as an integral core part of the global system that is a funda- mental prerequisite for systemic change, which in turn impacts the character and behavior of system actors and modifies existing, as well as newly emerging, policy issues. The major findings from the preceding analysis are summarized in Table 1, which presents basic assumptions of the three perspectives analyzed in this paper as well as their technology conceptions in two policy areas of security and wel- fare. Most Realist scholarship perceives technology as a passive and exogenous factor that contributes to the power capabilities of states, which strive for security and welfare in an anarchic environment. States as the only relevant actors in global affairs find themselves in fierce competition with other states over power. Technological leadership and the mastering or control of large technological systems is necessary to maintain or improve a relative power position in the international system. Technology is instrumental in achieving political goals. It does not transform the basic interaction patterns between the system units or the character of the system at large. Liberalism has often been accused of following deterministic arguments. Technology is often described as one—if not the most important—driving force behind the emergence of new actors, interaction patterns (integration and cooperation), or system structures such as interdependence. More nuanced accounts, provided, for example, by postinternationalism, acknowledge the diverse impact of various technologies on the capabilities of a wide range of  TABLE 1. Technology and Theories of International System (IS) ⁄ IPE 40 Theory of Explanation of change ⁄ IR ⁄ IPE Policy area Technology-conception Main actors of the IS Structure of IS transformation Realism ⁄ Security Passive artifact; exogenous factor; States Billard-ball-model, respectively, Redistribution of power Neorealism technology as military power source uni-, bi- or, multipolar models between units of the (i.e. state capabilities) according to the distribution of international system Welfare Passive artifact; exogenous factor System (?), states capabilities between states; technology as economic power source and to some anarchical self-help-system (i.e. state capabilities) extend MNCs Liberalism Security Technology as interdependence States, IGOs, Multicentric character of Interdependence creates fostering power; enables global INGOs, MNCs, international system; partially incentives for interstate potentials for destruction; global individuals anarchic; partially regulated; cooperation to solve processes of technology diffusion; different actors with different distributional conflicts in skill-revolution at individual level; identities, interests and economic and ⁄ or social exogenous factor capabilities ⁄ resources spheres; creation of solid Welfare Economic globalization as result of States, IGOs, frameworks for exchange technological progress and its global INGOs, MNCs, diffusion; reduced transaction costs individuals and larger interaction volume; transnationalization; exogenous factor Constructivism Security Technology as material artifacts Individuals and States and other social actors; Modification of norms, influences social structures; collectivities lack of clear hierarchy; ideas and rules, and actor identities Technology and Global Affairs technological progress as result of meaningful context structures as knowledge and ideas; technological basis for interpretation of artifacts gain meaning by being (material) reality: ‘‘anarchy and embedded in ideas and norms; globality is, what social actors technology is socially determined make of it’’ Welfare Technology fosters interdependence Individuals and between actors in international system; collectivities interdependence fosters the transformation of actors’ identities, thereby changing ideas and norms; technology is socially determined (Notes. IPE, International Political Economy; IR, International Relations.) Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024  Stefan Fritsch 41 actors (state and nonstate actors) as well as the transformative power of large technological systems on policy areas and structures in the global system. Despite its explicit emphasis on technology’s contribution to growing interdependence, Liberalism stops short of conceptualizing technology as an integral core compo- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/12/1/27/1786474 by Bibliotheek Instituut Moleculaire Plantkunde user on 28 October 2024 nent of the global system. Rather, it is often conceptualized as an exogenous factor that exerts influence from outside the system. As has been argued in this paper, however, technology is deeply embedded in the structure of the global system and technological evolution is at least partly driven by factors such as anarchy and competition between states. As has been pointed out by many Real- ists, states most likely will continue to play a relevant role in the development, application, and diffusion of new technologies. Social constructivists emphasize the role of norms and identities for global affairs. Technology as a brute material force is an important component of the environment or structure in which social actors have to maneuver. Technologi- cal artifacts can contribute to the emergence of new structures and modified actor identities, followed by new behavior patterns. However, technology can only gain meaning if it is embedded in social norms and identities, that is, socially determined. Constructivism contributes to a better understanding of technology’s role in global affairs by emphasizing the importance of norms and identities in the creation and application of technology as well as the interpre- tation of technologies’ consequences for social actors. What constructivism underestimates are the often limited choices that social actors face, when dealing with the dilemma of technological alternatives or the modification of existing technological systems. This paper has selectively analyzed three theoretical perspectives of IR ⁄ IPE. Further inquiry should investigate additional theories (Marxism and Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Green Theory) and their contribution to a fuller understanding of the issues presented here. Systematic accounts of the relation- ship between technology and global affairs should take into account the relative strengths and weaknesses of various theoretical perspectives to strengthen the explanatory power of IR ⁄ IPE with regard to technology and its impact upon global affairs. Several general observations seem to make the case for why IR ⁄ IPE should, on the basis of already existing insights from various theoretical perspectives, engage with the issue of technology more thoroughly: First, technological evolu- tion creates new challenges that often can only be solved by new technological means, therefore intensifying the need to understand how technology shapes and is shaped by sociopolitical environments on all levels of analysis. Second, although we have witnessed closer cooperation between practitioners, engineers, and political scientists during the last few decades, each one still prefers to concentrate on his ⁄ her own discipline and work within that discipline’s set of variables, categories, and theoretical concepts. Third and finally, technological progress continuously confronts human beings with new challenges, which in sum also generates challenges for global politics. The global diffusion of technology certainly has intensified and extensified the economic, social, political, and cultural interdependence between all system actors. The increase in political conflicts concerning technology-specific questions of design, distribution, and regulation is just another symptom for techno-globalism and its central role for prosperity, security, identity, and the reproduction of a global human society. 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