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End of Module Objective Based on experience and current Condition information on aviation security Performance Specify the nature of the threat against the air transport industry In accordance with Annex 17 and the Standard...

End of Module Objective Based on experience and current Condition information on aviation security Performance Specify the nature of the threat against the air transport industry In accordance with Annex 17 and the Standard ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 – Restricted)  Intermediate Objectives ❑ Explain the importance of understanding the threat ❑ Describe the nature of the threat to civil aviation  Acts of unlawful interference  Characteristics of offenders ❑ Describe industry counter-measures  Importance of Understanding Threat ❑ Impossible to put in place 100% security to counter every threat ❑ By identifying level of existing threat it is possible to develop counter-measures under normal situations ❑ Security measures must be flexible to meet changes in threat  Acts of Unlawful Interference ❑ Sabotage of aircraft / airport ❑ Acts of unlawful seizure ❑ Acts of attempted unlawful seizure ❑ Use of aircraft as weapons  Acts of Unlawful Interference ❑ Acts of in-flight attack ❑ Acts of facility attack ❑ Acts against the safety of civil aviation  Acts of Unlawful Interference 3525 100 acts of unlawful interference 2000 90 Number of fatalities 1800 80 1600 70 1400 60 1200 50 1000 40 800 30 600 20 400 10 200 0 0 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 2… 2… 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 1… 2… 2… 2… 2… 2… 2… H 2.1  Categories of Offenders ❑ Two main categories  Hijackers  Saboteurs ❑ In two forms  Individuals  Groups  Individual Offenders ❑ Characters  Criminals, refugees, psychotics  Limited resources  Limited technical expertise  Unpredictable ❑ Objective  Monetary gain, criminal  Personal  Political asylum  Group Offenders ❑ Characters  Considerable resources  Extensive technical expertise  Special training ❑ Objective  Political  Hijacking Techniques ❑ Smuggling of weapons onboard  Concealment in hand baggage  Collusion with airport or airline staff  Armed assault  Hijacking Techniques ❑ Terrorist groups  Organized with high visibility  Command through flight deck  Defined objectives ❑ Individuals  Less organized  Confused objectives  Unpredictable behaviour  Sabotage ❑ General definition:  An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property, endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities  Sabotage Techniques ❑ Devices  Explosive  Incendiary ❑ Triggers  Timers  Pressure-sensitive devices  Sabotage Techniques ❑ Means  Devices in checked baggage  Collusion with airport or airline employees  Subterfuge through unsuspecting dupe  Suicide bombers  Target for Sabotage ❑ Airport Vulnerable Points  Runways  Passenger terminals and vital terminal services  Navigational aids  Electrical supplies  Target for Sabotage ❑ Airport Vulnerable Points  Air traffic control installations  Aviation fuel installations  Rescue and firefighting systems  Other Attacks at Airports ❑ Aim to cause maximum casualties ❑ Result in dramatic impact on aviation and reduced confidence in security  Industry Counter-Measures: Aviation Security ❑ Annex 17 (10th Edition) defines Aviation Security as: “Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This objective is achieved by a combination of measures and human and material resources.”  Other Entities ❑ Airline operators ❑ Airport operators ❑ Air navigation service providers ❑ Policing authorities  Other Entities ❑ National civil aviation appropriate authority ❑ Aviation fuel suppliers ❑ Airline agents and service providers ❑ Airline cargo and catering operations  Module Summary ❑ Understanding the threat to civil aviation is essential for developing flexible counter- measures against the changing levels and nature of existing threat ❑ The two main categories of offenders are hijackers and saboteurs in the form of individuals or groups  Module Summary ❑ Saboteurs tend to use explosive or incendiary devices triggered by timer or pressure-sensitive devices ❑ The airport, being a good sabotage target includes various vulnerable points ❑ Various contributing entities have developed international counter-measures MODULE REVIEW ACTIVITY  MODULE EVALUATION H 2.2  Intermediate Objectives ❑ Define Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) ❑ Describe the process for developing SOPs  Programme Development ❑ WHAT is required  Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices ❑ WHY it is required  The threat to civil aviation ❑ HOW requirements can be met  ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 - Restricted)  Programme Development ❑ WHO implements the program  The airport security unit  Responsible for developing and implementing procedures  Meet the requirements set by national legislation  SOP Definition ❑ General definition “A rule or instruction issued by a person in authority to ensure that a specific security task is performed in accordance with the prescribed requirements necessary for the achievement of the task objective.” ❑ Requirement  Active working documents that are periodically reviewed and changed.  Reasons to Change SOPs ❑ Changes or modifications to a task requirement ❑ Improved methods of meeting requirements are recognized ❑ Redesigning of a facility or process  SOP Content A SOP should: ❑ Be in written form ❑ Clearly establish the objective ❑ Detail methods by which the objective will be achieved  SOP Content A SOP should: ❑ Establish standards to be met ❑ Indicate how compliance with the standards will be achieved  SOP Advantages ❑ Promote the meeting of objectives ❑ Maintain the achievement of standards for the task ❑ Form the basis for measuring security unit and individual performance  Discussion: SOP Requirements ❑ Prepare a list of tasks of a typical airport security unit that require SOPs to be developed ❑ What is your own experience with SOPs for any of these tasks? H 4.1 PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING SOPs  Formulating a SOP ❑ Responsible person  Fully conversant with all aspects of the task ❑ Assisting team  Security personnel and supervisor ❑ Peer review  Other supervisors  Persons unfamiliar with the task  Creating a SOP – Example ❑ Example security task:  Walk-through metal detector screening and additional screening with a hand-held detector.  Creating a SOP – Example ❑ Format  Commence with “objective”  State “standard” to be achieved  Detail the procedure  Specify the means for compliance with the standard ❑ All SOPs should be dated and be on revision schedules H 4.2  Module Summary ❑ SOPs are documents specifying why and how a task is to be carried out to meet the standards and requirements of the security programme ❑ SOPs are reviewed and changed periodically as needed  Module Summary ❑ A SOP may be developed for each security task ❑ SOPs ensure compliance with standards and provide a means to measure performance  Intermediate Objectives (1/2) ❑ Define the term “Acts of unlawful interference” ❑ Explain the risks of unlawful interference to air cargo as a threat to civil aviation ❑ Recognize the purpose of the Conventions and Protocols that constitute legislative countermeasures Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.1  Intermediate Objectives (2/2) ❑ Define the terms “Standard” and “Recommended Practice” ❑ List the key responsibilities of each State in meeting ICAO requirements for aviation security ❑ For a given State, describe the roles and responsibilities of the national authority and other stakeholders in meeting ICAO requirements for air cargo and mail security Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.2  Acts of Unlawful Interference Annex 17 definition: “Acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation…” H 2.1; H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.3  Offenders and Motivations Terrorists ❑ Individuals or groups ❑ Motivation: High visibility through the media Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.4  Offenders and Motivations Non-terrorists ❑ Individuals or groups Difficult to categorize attacks ❑ Motivation: Personal reasons Monetary gain Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.5  Offenders and Motivations TERRORISTS NON-TERRORISTS Well organized Lack knowledge Well trained Mental instability Less resources Unpredictable Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.6  Air Cargo as a Target – AVSEC Focus ❑ Cargo may move between all-cargo and passenger aircraft ❑ Significant expansion of the cargo business Need for additional and stronger measures Increased awareness of the vulnerabilities in the supply chain Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.7  Air Cargo as a Target - Vulnerabilities ❑ Highly diverse nature of cargo shipments ❑ Intermodal and complex routing ❑ Remote locations of some cargo operations ❑ Presence of multiple actors in the supply chain ❑ “Insider threat” Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.8  Risk Context Statement – 1 Aim: ❑ Assist ICAO in improving Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and guidance material ❑ Offer States information and a framework to conduct risk assessments at the national level Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.9  Risk Context Statement – 2 Output: ❑ Reinforces the importance of risk- based approach ❑ Provides risk assessment method and process map ❑ Emphasizes importance of States’ reporting and sharing of relevant information ❑ Provides ranking of specific risks (global perspective) Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.10  Risk Context Statement - 3 IEDs in Cargo – Matrix 4 Likelihood (Medium) Consequences (High) Apply mitigation measures… Residual vulnerability (Medium) Residual risk (Medium-High) Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.11  AVIATION INDUSTRY COUNTERMEASURES Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.12  Aviation Industry Countermeasures Example: Legislative National Civil Aviation Security Programme Example: Concept of the Technical Secure Supply Chain Physical Example: Screening Defined at both the international and national level Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.13  Legislative Countermeasures 1/3 ❑ Chicago Convention -1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation Led to the formation of ICAO Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.14  Legislative Countermeasures 2/3 ❑ Tokyo Convention – 1963 ❑ Hague Convention – 1970 ❑ Montreal Convention – 1971 H 2.5 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.15  Legislative Countermeasures 3/3 ❑ Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts – 1988 ❑ MEX Convention – 1991 ❑ Beijing Convention – 2010 ❑ Beijing Protocol – 2010 ❑ Montreal Protocol – 2014 H 2.5 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.16  Technical Countermeasures ❑ There are 19 Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 17 (Aviation Security) Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.17  Annex 17 - Security ❑ Definitions ❑ Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) ❑ Extracts of other Annexes relating to security are appended to Annex 17 H 2.1; H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.18  Annex 17 - Definitions ❑ Standards: Necessary or mandatory  Contracting States will conform ❑ Recommended Practices: Desirable  Contracting States will endeavor to conform ❑ Contracting State: Signatory to the Chicago Convention Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.19  ICAO Manuals ❑ Security Manual (Doc. 8973 - Restricted) Supports States in the implementation of Annex 17 Ch 13: Air Cargo and Mail ❑ Facilitation Manual (Doc. 9957) Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.20  Physical Countermeasures ❑ Control of access to security restricted areas ❑ Screening of passengers and their baggage ❑ Screening of crew members and staff ❑ Security measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods ❑ Protection of aircraft ❑ Protection of airport and navigation facilities Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.21  AVSEC Objective Annex 17 – Standard 2.1.1 “Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.22  AVSEC Objectives and Organizations Annex 17 – Standard 2.1.2 “Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.23  AVSEC Objectives and Organizations Annex 17 – Standard 2.2.2 “Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference are applied to domestic operations to the extent practicable, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.24  NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY OF AIR CARGO Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.25  National Legislation States are obligated to establish and maintain a legislative infrastructure to support the implementation of technical and physical countermeasures Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.26  National Legislation Annex 17, Standard 3.1.1 “Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written national civil aviation security programme to safeguard civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference, through regulations, practices and procedures which take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.27  National Legislation Annex 17, Standard 3.1.2 “Each Contracting State shall designate and specify to ICAO an appropriate authority within its administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation security programme.” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.28  National Legislation Annex 17, Standard 3.1.3 “3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its territory and airspace above it, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.29  National Legislation Annex 17, Standard 3.1.4 “Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators, air traffic services providers and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP.” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.30  National Legislation Annex 17, Standard 3.1.5 “Each Contracting State shall establish a national aviation security committee or similar arrangements for the purpose of coordinating security activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP.” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.31  National Legislation Annex 17, Standard 3.1.6 “Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure the development and implementation of a national training programme for personnel of all entities involved with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme. This training programme shall be designed to ensure the effectiveness of the national civil aviation security programme.” H 2.2 Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.32  National Aviation Security Committee ❑ Government agencies and industry representatives Advises on security policy/regulation Reviews and monitors current procedure Makes recommendations ❑ Model national civil aviation security programme is found in the Security Manual Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.33  Appropriate National Authority Responsibilities (1/2) ❑ Develop, implement and maintain the NCASP ❑ Define and allocate tasks ❑ Coordinate activities Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.34  Appropriate National Authority Responsibilities (2/2) ❑ Monitor security compliance ❑ Develop and disseminate proactive practices and procedures Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.35  Organization of Security Appropriate Authority Policy Section Oversight Implementation Quality Control of NCASP Measures Regulated Entities (Airport and Aircraft Operators, Regulated Agents and other entities) Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.36  Organization of Security National National National Civil Aviation Civil Aviation Civil Aviation Security Security Security Quality Control Training Programme Programme Programme (NCASP) Regulated Entities Security Programmes Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.37  International and Regional Organizations Regional: ❑ European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) ❑ Latin American Civil Aviation Conference (LACAC) ❑ African Civil Aviation Conference (AFCAC) ❑ Arab Civil Aviation Commission (ACAC) Promote co-ordination of air transport including security within their regions Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.38  Industry Organizations (1/2) ❑ International Air Transport Association (IATA) ❑ Airports Council International (ACI) Air Cargo and Mail Security Course - Module 2 S2.39 Special Handling Techniques Examples of Trafficking Drugs Weapons Animals Humans  Trafficking BEHAVIOR DOCUMENT WHY ASSESSMENT CONTROL  Terrorist groups engage in HUMAN trafficking Terrorism of persons for three primary reasons: Funding and Fear (suicide bombers) Recruitment (forced marriages) Trafficking  Trafficking of organs by ISIS and affiliated armed groups for financing Boko Haram’s use of child beggars for fundraising Terrorist Forced marriages in Mali by Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Groups Forced marriages of females abducted by Boko Haram involving sexual exploitation Trafficking Kidnapping of Eritrean migrants in Libya by ISIL for sexual exploitation, including in forced marriage Trafficking of Yazidi women and girls by ISIS for sexual exploitation and slavery. Human Trafficking  ‫اللجنة الوطنية التنسيقية لمكافحة‬ ‫ومنع الهجرة غير الشرعية‬ ‫واالتجار بالبشر‬ ‫ تأسست رسميا ً بموجب القانون‬ ‫رقم ‪ 82‬لسنة ‪.2016‬‬ ‫ تضم في عضويتها ‪ 30‬وزارة‬ ‫وهيئة ومجلس قومي‪.‬‬ ‫ تتبع اللجنة رئيس مجلس‬ ‫الوزراء ويقع مقرها بوزارة‬ ‫الخارجية‪.‬‬ ‫اللجنة الوطنية التنسيقية لمكافحة ومنع الهجرة‬ ‫غير الشرعية واالتجار بالبشر‬ ‫التنسيق بين كافة جهات‬ ‫وضع إطار تشريعي‬ ‫الدولة المعنية بمكافحة‬ ‫لمكافحة االتجار‬ ‫االتجار بالبشر‪.‬‬ ‫بالبشر‪.‬‬ ‫حماية الفئات االكثر‬ ‫تفعيل التعاون مع‬ ‫عرضة لمخاطر‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫منظمات األمم المتحدة‬ ‫االتجار بالبشر‪.‬‬ Partnership  The Palermo Protocol is a UN Palermo binding legal instrument that creates an obligation for all countries that ratify it to Protocol prevent, suppress, and punish human trafficking.  Trafficking is not a single one-off Difference event, it is process involving different between phases: recruitment human transportation trafficker control of human beings with the and scope of exploitation. migrant PURPOSE smuggler  Purpose Trafficking is the trade in humans most commonly for: sexual slavery forced labour commercial exploitation for the trafficker or others the extraction of organs or tissues.  Human trafficking is a multi-billion dollar enterprise affecting 24.9 million men, women and children Profit globally, with intersections across all modes of transportation, including the aviation sector.  ICAO Doc 10171 A Comprehensive Strategy for Combatting Human Trafficking in the Aviation Sector Recent investigations indicate a clear link between human trafficking and international terrorism where trafficking is used as a means of funding terrorism. Preventing trafficking may indirectly deter or reduce the ability of terrorists or criminal groups seeking to take advantage of aviation and thus Mitigating Risk. AVSEC Role in Preventing trafficking activities ?  Recognizing behaviours typically Identification of associated with potential behavior suspected human key indicators trafficking is the FIRST step in identifying suspected victims. Indicators: Is the person disoriented or confused, or showing signs of mental or physical abuse? Is the person fearful, timid, or submissive? Does the person show signs of having been denied food, water, sleep, or medical care? Does the person appear to have suffered injuries as result of an assault or aggression?  Does the person defer to another person to speak for him or her or someone who seems to be in control of the situation, e.g., where they go or who they talk to? Is the person (especially children) accompanied by someone claiming to be a parent or guardian who is in fact not related to the child? Is the person in control of their own travel documents?  Does the person appear to be coached on what to say? Does the potential trafficker appear to have rehearsed what to say in relation to the victim? Does the person have freedom of movement? Does the person avoid eye contact? Or on the contrary, do they try to establish eyes contact? Does the person have few or no personal possessions?  Are the answers provided by this person consistent? Is the person branded with tattoos indicating adherence to somebody else? This could also be a departmental function whether the airline prefers to avoid key person dependency. Does the person provide inconsistent responses from the person(s) travelling with him/her when asked questions?  Is the person wearing appropriate clothing? Does his/her appearance fit the route of travel or weather? Is this person speaking of modelling, dancing, singing, hospitality job or something similar in a location (without knowing who will be meeting him/her upon arrival, and with few details about the job); or Is this person speaking of living in the same household of employer, being in debt to employer, living under inhumane conditions (cramped spaces, etc.,)? Are there any unusual circumstances that just do not feel right to you?  Professional Identification Distracting Aggression Genuine Aggression Profilers are Threats to Possible Perpetrators Sympathetic arousal, also commonly known as the When the brain perceives a emergency, or “fight or flight” THREAT, it prepares the body to system, through neural and survive it by enervation of the chemical (adrenaline) stimulation sympathetic nervous system. causes many physiological changes in the body.  Genuine Aggression is often born out of frustration. There are times when an interviewee will fake aggression in an attempt to Handling create an argument and Aggressive escape the interview. Passengers Interviewers should be able to recognize genuine aggressive intent through understanding its psycho- physiological roots.  Why do people get angry? Here are some reasons: oMisunderstanding oFeel they are not being heard oBeing fatigued or hungry oFeeling like they are getting a runaround oBaggage (bad prior experience) oHaving suffered a loss oFeeling they are not being treated fairly oLack of feeling empowered Warning signs that lead to physical violence 1. Passenger becomes anxious. 2. Passenger starts acting nervous, or demonstrating a lot of displacement activity. (When you see these early signs that may lead up to violence, you need to be supportive and continue to offer help to the Passenger) 3. Face blanches or pales. 4. Speech becomes incoherent. 5. Passenger becomes defensive. 6. Passenger begins to act irrational or belligerent, or challenging.  “SOFTEN” Protocol o Smile with discretion : nonverbally let the suspect know you care about them and that you are not becoming angry. Diffusion o Open body positioning : demonstrates that you are being truthful with the suspect and of Genuine open with them. o Forward body lean : shows you are interested in what they are saying. Aggression o Territory : do not forget the rules of proxemics. o Eye Contact : proper eye contact is a sign of truthfulness. o Nod Attentively : to show the suspect you are paying attention.  To further demonstrate that you are interested and paying attention to the passenger, ask questions and restate his Diffusion concerns. of Genuine Use phrases that begin with, “I want to help you,” preceded or followed by the suspect’s Aggression name. Continue to use alternatives. The rules of proxemics Proxemics is the understanding and use of interpersonal body distances. Breaking any of these rules could be interpreted as impolite or even threatening. Thank You  ‫المخاطر والتهديدات ‪THREATS AND‬‬ ‫‪RISKS TO CIVIL‬‬ ‫الموجهة للطيران‬ ‫‪AVIATION‬‬ ‫المدني‬  OBJECTIVES ‫األهداف‬ “‫ لشرح معنى مصطلح”التهديد‬ ‫و”المخاطر“والعالقة بينهما‬ To explain the meaning of the terms “Threat” and “Risk”, and the relationship ‫ توضيح كيفية تأثير عوامل‬ between the two ‫ التهديدعلى اإلجراءات‬/‫المخاطر‬ Demonstrate how threat/risk factors ‫األمنية‬ affect security measures Understand current threat levels ‫ إدراك مستويات التهديد الحالية‬ operating in the aviation industry ‫الموجودة في صناعة الطيران‬  ‫ شرح األسباب وراء إستهداف الطيران‬ ‫المدني وكيفية تنفيذ الهجمات‬ ‫ تحديد أنواع األشخاص والمنظمات التي‬ ‫تمثل تهديدا ً للطيران المدني ودوافعهم‬ Explain reasons why civil aviation is an attractive target and how the ‫ مراجعة األحداث األمنية السابقة‬ attacks are carried out State what are the types of people or organisations who may pose a threat to civil aviation and their motives Examine past security incidents  ‫ ايكاو‬17 ‫ملحق‬ ICAO ANNEX 17 Standard 3.1.4 4-1-3 ‫القاعدة‬ ‫على جميع الدول المتعاقدة مراجعة‬ Each Contracting State shall keep ‫مستويات التهديد الموجه لعمليات‬ under constant review the level of ‫ داخل‬،‫الطيران المدني بشكل مستمر‬ threat to civil aviation operations within its territory and adjust relevant ‫ وتعديل العناصر المعنية‬،‫أراضيها‬ elements of its national civil aviation ‫بمستويات التهديد في برنامج أمن‬ security programme accordingly. ً ‫الطيران المدني الخاص بها وفقا‬.‫لذلك‬  THREAT ‫التهديد‬ ،‫ ” التهديد“ هو قياس ترجيح‬ ‫أو إحتمال القيام بمحاولة للهجوم‬ “Threat” is a measure of the likelihood, or probability that an attempt will be ‫على هدف معين‬ made to attack a particular target ‫ ويتم تعريفه بأنه " احتمال‬ It is defined as “the probability of an attack being attempted against the target ‫القيام بمحاولة للهجوم على‬ within a specified time frame” ‫هدف ما في حدود إطار‬ "‫زمني محدد‬ The threat depends :‫يتوقف التهديد على عنصرين‬ on 2 factors: ‫ النية أو الرغبة في الهجوم على‬ The intent or desire to attack the )‫ مدى جاذبية الهدف‬:‫الهدف (مثال‬ target (i.e. the attractiveness of the target) ‫ القدرة على القيام بذلك‬ The capability to do so ،‫ ولكي يحدث تهديد فعلي لهدف معين‬ For there to be a credible threat to a.ً ‫يجب أن يتوافر العنصرين معا‬ target, both factors must exist.  RISK ‫الخطر‬ ‫ الخطر هو إحتمال نجاح هجوم موجه إلى‬.‫هدف محدد‬ Risk is a judgment of the probability of an attack being successfully carried out against a target ‫ ولكن أيضا ً مدى‬،‫ وال يتضمن التهديد فقط‬ ‫سهولة الهجوم على الهدف ـ نقاط الضعف‬ It involves not only threat, but also the ease by which the target may be attacked — the vulnerability RISK = THREAT + VULNERABILITY ‫ نقاط الضعف‬+ ‫الخطر = التهديد‬ CONVENTIONAL ‫الحكمة التقليدية‬ WISDOM Very little one can do.‫قد ال نتمكن من القيام بشئ للتأثيرعلى التهديدات‬ to affect the threat. ‫ فإن األداء يتركز على تقليل نقاط‬،‫ولذلك‬ Therefore, action.‫الضعف‬ concentrates on reducing the vulnerability. VULNERABILITY ‫نقاط الضعف‬ Passengers and crew ‫ الركاب واألطقم‬ The aircraft ‫ الطائرة‬ Airline staff ‫ العاملين بشركة الطيران‬  THREAT ‫الجماعات التي توجه‬ GROUPS ‫التهديدات‬ ‫ اإلرهابيين‬ Terrorists ‫ المجرمين‬ Criminals ً ‫ المختلين عقليا‬ The mentally disturbed Employees (disaffected, and ‫ والذين‬،‫ الموظفين (المعارضين‬ those with criminal motive) )‫لديهم دوافع إجرامية‬ Refugees ‫ الالجئين‬ Other Governments ‫ الحكومات األخرى‬  MOTIVES OF ‫دوافع جماعات التهديد‬ THREAT GROUPS ‫ لكسب الدعاية لقضيتهم‬ To gain publicity for their cause / ‫ لإلفراج عن بعض المسجونين‬ To gain release of prisoners or other ‫إرهابيين آخرين‬ terrorists ‫الدولية‬/‫ لتغييرالسياسة الحكومية‬ To change government or international policy ‫ للتقليل من أو تكذيب السلطات التي‬ To undermine and discredit authorities ‫تعارض قضيتهم‬ who oppose their cause  To target individuals for ‫ إلستهداف األفراد الذين قد ال يتعاطفون مع‬ assassination who are ‫قضيتهم وقتلهم‬ possibly unsympathetic ‫ لتخويف الجمهور وتعطيل الحياة العادية‬ to their cause / ‫ للحصول على األموال عن طريق التهديد‬ ‫اإلبتزاز‬ To frighten the public and disrupt normal life To obtain money by threat or blackmail WHY IS CIVIL AVIATION ‫لماذا يتم إستهداف الطيران‬ AN ATTRACTIVE ‫المدني؟‬ TARGET? ‫ال‬/‫القيمةالتجارية‬/‫ اإلنتشارالواسع‬ ‫نفوذ‬ High profile/commercial value/prestigious ‫اع‬ ‫إلرتف‬ ً ‫ وجود نقاط ضعف نظرا‬ ‫مستويات حركة الركاب‬ Vulnerable due to high passenger traffic levels ‫ سوف يتسبب الحادث في حدوث‬ Incident may force a government reaction, e.g. will increase security ‫ مثل رفع‬،‫رد فعل من الحكومة‬ Limited risk to terrorist ‫مستوى األمن‬ (possibly remote from incident) ‫ وجود خطر محدود على‬ ‫اإلرهابيين (يمكن التحكم عن بعد‬ )‫في الحادث‬  ‫التهديدات التقليدية‬ TRADITIONAL THREAT ‫ خطف طائرة‬ ‫ تخريب طائرة‬ ‫ تخريب المطارات‬ Hijacking of aircraft ‫ الهجمات اإلرهابية على المطارات‬ Sabotage of aircraft ،‫ منطقة إنهاء اإلجراءات‬،‫(الصاالت‬ Sabotage of airports )‫مناطق تفتيش الركاب والحقائب‬ Terrorist attack at airports (terminal concourse, check- ‫ الهجمات الموجهة للمواقع البعيدة عن‬ in, passenger and baggage search areas) ‫ مكاتب‬،‫المطار (أماكن إعاشة األطقم‬ Attacks against off-airport locations (crew ‫ معدات ال‬،‫ مباني البضائع‬،‫بيع التذاكر‬ accommodation, ticket offices, cargo facilities, ANS ) ANS equipment) ‫ األعمال اإلجرامية أو التخريب‬ Criminal Acts or Damage ACTS OF UNLAWFUL‫أعمال التدخل غير المشروع‬ INTERFERENCE ‫ وهي عبارة عن أعمال أو محاوالت‬ ‫تؤدي إلى تعريض سالمة الطيران‬ There are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation and air :‫ مثل‬،‫المدني والنقل الجوي للخطر‬ transport, i.e.: ‫ السيطرة غير المشروعة على إحدى‬ Unlawful seizure of aircraft in flight ‫الطائرات أثناء الطيران‬ Unlawful seizure of aircraft on the ground ‫ السيطرة غير المشروعة على إحدى‬ Hostage-taking on board aircraft or on ‫الطائرات على األرض‬ aerodromes ‫ إحتجاز رهائن على متن الطائرة أو في‬ ‫المطارات‬  Forcible intrusion on board ‫ في‬،‫ اإلقتحام بالقوة على متن الطائرة‬ an aircraft, at an airport or ‫إحدى المطارات أو في داخل حدود‬ ‫منشآت الطيران‬ on the premises of an ‫ تقديم سالح أو أداة أو مادة خطرة على‬ aeronautical facility ‫متن الطائرة أو في المطار ألغراض‬ ‫إجرامية‬ Introduction, on board an aircraft or at an airport, of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes  Communication of false ‫ اإلبالغ عن معلومات وهمية‬ information such as to ‫من أجل تعريض سالمة‬ jeopardize the safety of an ،‫الطائرة المحلقة أو الرابضة‬ aircraft in flight or on the ‫ الموظفين‬،‫األطقم‬،‫الركاب‬ ground, of passengers, ‫ أوالجمهورللخطر‬،‫األرضيين‬ crew, ground personnel or ‫في مطار أو داخل حدود‬ the general public, at an.‫منشآت الطيران المدني‬ airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility  ATTACKS AT ‫الهجوم على المطارات‬ AIRPORTS LOD Airport, Tel Aviv, )1972( ‫ إسرائيل‬،‫ تل أبيب‬،‫مطار اللد‬ Israel (1972) )1973( ‫ إيطاليا‬،‫روما‬ )1978( ‫ فرنسا‬،‫باريس‬ Rome, Italy (1973) )1983( ‫ الفلبين‬،‫مانيال‬ Paris, France (1978) Manila, Philippines (1983) © 2003 International Air Transport Association - International Civil Aviation Organization  ‫ النمسا‬،‫ إيطاليا وفيينا‬،‫ روما‬ Rome, Italy and Vienna, )1985( Austria (1985) Seoul, South Korea )1986( ‫ كوريا الجنوبية‬،‫سول‬ (1986) Algiers, Algeria (1992) )1992( ‫ الجزائر‬،‫الجزائر‬ Johannesburg, South Africa (1994) ‫ جنوب إفريقيا‬،‫ جوهانسبرج‬ )1994(  ‫ مطار هيثرو‪ ،‬المملكة المتحدة‬ ‫‪ Heathrow Airport,‬‬ ‫(‪)1994‬‬ ‫)‪England (1994‬‬ ‫)‪ Reus, Spain (1996‬‬ ‫ ريوس‪ ،‬أسبانيا (‪)1996‬‬ ‫‪ Lahore, Pakistan‬‬ ‫)‪(1996‬‬ ‫ الهور‪ ،‬باكستان (‪)1996‬‬ ‫‪ Colombo, Sri Lanka‬‬ ‫)‪(2001‬‬ ‫ كولومبو‪ ،‬سري النكا (‪)2001‬‬  ‫‪HIJACKING‬‬ ‫طرق اإلختطاف‬ ‫‪TECHNIQUES‬‬ ‫الوسائل األساسية‬ ‫‪Basic Techniques‬‬ ‫ تهريب األسلحة إلى الطائرة ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ Smuggle arms on‬‬ ‫ إمكانية التواطؤ أو رشوة العاملين بالمطار أو‬ ‫‪board‬‬ ‫شركة الطيران‪.‬‬ ‫ اإلعتداء المسلح‪.‬‬ ‫‪ Possible collusion with‬‬ ‫‪airport or airline staff‬‬ ‫‪ Armed assault‬‬  ‫‪WEAPONS‬‬ ‫األسلحة‬ ‫‪ Pistols‬‬ ‫ المسدسات‬ ‫‪ Automatic weapons‬‬ ‫ األسلحة اآللية‬ ‫‪ Explosive charges‬‬ ‫ العبوات الناسفة‬ ‫‪ Knives‬‬ ‫ األسلحة البيضاء‬ ‫‪ Flammable material‬‬ ‫ المواد المشتعلة‪.‬‬ INITIATED USUALLY ‫يبدأ عادةً بعد اإلقالع‬ AFTER TAKE-OFF Groups: :‫المجموعات‬ Organised ‫ منظمة‬ High visibility ً ‫ أكثر وضوحا‬ Take control of flight deck ‫ السيطرة على مقصورة القيادة‬ ‫ اإلكراه والتخويف للسيطرة‬ Intimidation and fear used to ‫على الركاب واألطقم‬ control crew and passengers  ‫‪Individuals:‬‬ ‫األفراد‬ ‫ قد يكونوا متحفظين‬ ‫ قد يكونوا عدوانيين‬ ‫‪ May be uncommunicative‬‬ ‫ ال يمكن التكهن بتصرفاتهم‬ ‫‪ May be violent‬‬ ‫‪ Unpredictable‬‬  SABOTAGE ‫وسائل التخريب‬ TECHNIQUES Devices: ‫األجهزة‬ ‫ تفجير‬ Explosive ‫ إشعال‬ Incendiary Combination ‫ المزج بين البندين السابقين‬  TRIGGERS ‫فجر‬ ِ ‫ال ُم‬ Time (clock, chemical, mechanical) ،‫ كيماويات‬،‫ زمني (ساعة‬ )‫آلية‬ Barometric ‫ بارومتري‬ Vibration (not common on ‫ ذبذبات (غير شائع على‬ aircraft) )‫الطائرات‬ ‫ المزج بين السابق‬ Combination  PLACING OF ‫أماكن وضع األجهزة‬ DEVICES Infiltration into / ‫ تهريب األداة في الحقائب‬ baggage/freight/stores ‫ السلع‬/ ‫البضائع‬ Possible collusion with ‫ التواطؤ مع العاملين بالمطار‬ airport or airline staff ‫أو شركة الطيران‬ Subterfuge (unsuspecting ‫ التحايل (عن طريق استخدام‬ dupe) )‫شخص ساذج غير مريب‬  SUICIDE BOMBER ‫اإلنتحاريين‬ Carrying device on their ً ‫ حمل األداة معهم شخصيا‬ person ‫ نقل الجهاز داخل الحقائب‬ Boarding device via checked ‫المسجلة‬ baggage ‫ إخفاء الجهاز في مخزن‬ Device could be concealed in ‫الحقائب بعد التوفيق بينها وبين‬ a reconciled hold baggage ‫الركاب‬ ‫ المخرب على إستعداد ألن يكون‬ Saboteur is prepared to be a ‫ضحية لألداة التي يحملها‬ victim of device  SABOTAGE OF ‫تخريب المطارات‬ AIRPORTS Vulnerable Points: :‫نقاط الضعف‬ ‫ ممر الطائرات‬ Runway Passenger terminal buildings ‫ صاالت الركاب‬ On-site and off-site ‫ مباني المالحة الجوية في‬ navigational aids ‫المطار أو خارجه‬  Electrical power supplies ‫اإلمدادات الكهربائية‬ Air Traffic Control ‫إتصاالت مراقبة الحركة الجوية‬ communications ‫خزانات وقود الطائرات‬ Aviation fuel storage ‫خدمات اإلنقاذ وإطفاء الحريق‬ Rescue and fire-fighting systems  EXAMPLES OF ‫أمثلة عن تخريب المطارات‬ AIRPORT SABOTAGE Colombo Airport, Sri Lanka (2001): :)2001( ‫ سري النكا‬،‫ مطار كولومبو‬ Aircraft destroyed ‫تدمير طائرة‬ Heathrow, United Kingdom (1994): ‫ هجمات‬:)1994( ‫ المملكة المتحدة‬،‫ هيثرو‬ Runway and terminal building mortar attacks ‫بقذائف الهاون على ممر الطائرات ومبنى‬ ‫الصالة‬ Narita, Tokyo, Japan (1978): Air Traffic Control tower ‫ برج‬:)1978( ‫ اليابان‬،‫ طوكيو‬،‫ ناريتا‬ Medellin and Baranquilla, Colombia: ‫مراقبة الحركة الجوية‬ Navigational aids ‫ مبنى المالحة‬:‫ كولومبيا‬،‫ مدلين وبارانكيا‬ ‫الجوية‬ ‫خصائص الهجوم على ‪CHARACTERISTICS‬‬ ‫‪OF AIRPORT‬‬ ‫المطارات‬ ‫‪ATTACKS‬‬ ‫الهدف من وراء هذه األعمال‬ ‫‪ Intent to cause‬‬ ‫هو التسبب في‬ ‫أعداد ضحايا كبيرة‬ ‫‪maximum casualties‬‬ ‫‪ Explosive devices‬‬ ‫ إستخدام أجهزة تفجير‬ ‫‪ Automatic weapons‬‬ ‫ إستخدام أسلحة آلية‬ ‫‪ Perpetrated in public‬‬ ‫ يتم تنفيذها في المناطق المفتوحة‬ ‫‪areas‬‬ ‫للجمهور‬ ‫‪ Weapons smuggled‬‬ ‫ يتم تهريب األسلحة إلى داخل‬ ‫‪into terminal‬‬ ‫الصاالت‬ ‫ يتم جمع المعلومات اإلستخباراتية ‪ Pre-attack intelligence‬‬ ‫‪gathering through‬‬ ‫قبل الهجوم من خالل اإلستطالع‬ ‫‪reconnaissance and‬‬ ‫والبحث‬ ‫‪research‬‬  MOTIVES OF ‫دوافع الجماعات من‬ THREAT GROUPS ‫وراء التهديد‬ ‫ لكسب الدعاية لقضيتهم‬ To gain publicity for their cause To gain release of prisoners or other ‫إرهابيين‬/‫ لإلفراج عن بعض المسجونين‬ terrorists ‫آخرين‬ To change government or international policy ‫الدولية‬/‫ لتغيير السياسة الحكومية‬ To undermine and discredit authorities who oppose their cause ‫ للتقليل من أو تكذيب السلطات التي تعارض‬ ‫قضيتهم‬  To target individuals for ‫ إلستهداف األفراد الذين قد ال يتعاطفون‬ assassinations who are ‫مع قضيتهم وقتلهم‬ possibly unsympathetic to ‫ لتخويف الجمهور وتعطيل الحياة العادية‬ their cause ‫ للحصول على األموال عن طريق‬ ‫اإلبتزاز‬/‫التهديد‬ To frighten the public and disrupt normal life To obtain money by threat or blackmail  DEMANDS OF ‫طلبات الجناة‬ PERPETRATORS Criminal extortion of money Seeking asylum from ‫ إبتزاز األموال‬ persecution ‫ طلب اللجوء للهروب من‬ ‫اإلضطهاد‬ Political purposes: - ‫ اإلفراج‬- :‫ ألسباب سياسية‬ release of prisoners - ‫الدعاية‬- ‫عن مسجونين‬ propaganda  MODULE SUMMARY ‫ملخص النموذج‬ Trainees can now: ‫سوف يتمكن المتدربون اآلن من‬ :‫اآلتي‬ ،“‫ شرح معنى مصطلحي ”التهديد“ و ”المخاطر‬ ‫والعالقة بينهما‬ Explain the meaning of the terms “Threat” and ‫ المخاطر على‬/‫ عرض كيفية تأثير عناصر التهديد‬ “Risk”, and the relationship between the two ‫اإلجراءات األمنية‬ ‫ فهم مستويات التهديد الحالية الموجودة في‬ Demonstrate how threat/risk factors affect ‫صناعةالطيران‬ security measures Understand current threat levels operating in the aviation industry  ‫ شرح أسباب إستهداف الطيران‬ ‫المدني وكيفية تنفيذ الهجمات‬ Explain reasons why civil aviation is an attractive target and how the attacks are carried out ‫ تحديد أنواع األشخاص‬ State what are the types of people or organisations who may pose a threat to ً ‫والمنظمات الذين يمثلون تهديدا‬ civil aviation and their motives ‫للطيران المدني ودوافعهم‬ Appreciate how the problem has evolved ‫ إدراك كيفية تطور المشكلة‬ 1  Behavior Detection IMPACT OF A NEW TECHNIQUE ON HUMAN FACTORS Introducing new techniques / technologies in aviation security : ➔Not a guarantee for an increased performance ➔Arouses new expectations from the operators ➔Impact on Human Factors The introduction of Behavior Detection in TSA is one example 2  Behavior Detection BEHAVIOR DETECTION Doc 8973 - 11.3.6 Assessing threat posed by persons through behavioral detection Risk-based approach to aviation security Identify persons who may pose a threat ➔ Additional security measures Recognition of behavioral characteristics Can be applied to the general public, passengers and other 3  Behavior Detection BEHAVIOR DETECTION IN FRANCE 2009 : Pilot project at Paris - Charles de Gaulle Airport 2011 : extension to Paris - Orly Airport Based on the TSA BD Programe : SPOT Objective : to adapt SPOT in a different culture and organization Complementary measure at the checkpoint 4  Behavior Detection BEHAVIOR DETECTION AND HUMAN FACTORS Two major considerations : 1. Designing a new set of tasks, with dedicated staff : ➔ An opportunity to reconsider Human Factors good practices 2. Behavior Detection relies 100% on the human competency : Raises the question of efficiency and reliability ➔ Need of carefull thinking on : the staffing overseeing of activities performance evaluation 5  Behavior Detection BEHAVIOR DETECTION AND HUMAN FACTORS 1. Consideration given to Human Factors good practices Interest in the task Responsibility, autonomy Professional reward Work identity Perception of control by passengers Change in role Team work Further investigations : Feed-back activities Fatigue management Monotony 6  Behavior Detection BEHAVIOR DETECTION AND HUMAN FACTORS 2. Technique relying 100% on the human competency -Observation, decision making, investigation : ➔ What to observe ? How to decide ? -Human factor : strengh or weakness ? ➔ What can be observed, what human limitations ? Two axes for answers : -Grounded premises : provide a framework ➔ Validity of the disposal Ex. « Terrorists don’t fear to die but to fail their mission » -Thorough work on the professionnalisation and the implementation conditions ➔ Selection, training, monitoring, decision-support tools Further investigations : What measurement of performance ? 7  Behavior Detection BEHAVIOR DETECTION AND HUMAN FACTORS Key factors for success : Rely on academic studies Ensure close follow-up of the operations ➔ Support the construction of this new activity 8  Behavior Detection 9  Behavior Detection Kind of Passenger 10  Behavior Detection KINDS OF PASSENGERS 01 - JOINING The joining passenger is the passenger traveling from the point of origin or resuming his journey from the point of stopover. 02 - TRANSIT PASSENGER A transit passenger is continuing his journey by the same flight of the same carrier. 11  Behavior Detection KINDS OF PASSENGERS 03 - TRANSFER PASSENGER A - On-line transfer passenger A passenger who is transferred to another flight of the same carrier, without stopover. B - Interline transfer passenger A passenger who is transferred to a flight of another carrier, without stopover. 12  Behavior Detection KINDS OF PASSENGERS 04 - Premium Customer (JOINING - TRANSIT - TRANSFER) Egyptair Premium Customers are separated into two categories : A) By cabin class Customers First Class & Business Class B) By Frequent Traveler Cards Star Gold & Star Silver 13  Behavior Detection Egyptair Plus Frequent Flyer Program (FFP) Card offered after 1st flight with Egyptair or Airline Card offered upon accumulating 30,000 Miles partner Card offered upon accumulating 60,000 Miles Card offered upon accumulating 1000,000 Miles 14  Behavior Detection BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE Piece Concept Max Number of Class Max Dimension Weight Pieces F 32 KGS 2 158 CM C 32 KGS 2 158 CM Y 23 KGS 2 158 CM Star Alliance Gold in F 32 KGS 2+1 EXTRA 158 CM Star Alliance Gold in C 32 KGS 2+1 EXTRA 158 CM Star Alliance Gold in Y 23 KGS 2+1 EXTRA 158 CM 1+1 COLLAPSIBLE Infants in F,C ,Y 23 KGS 115 CM STROLLER N.B.**Egyptair Silver Plus cardholder are only permitted for one extra piece on online MS flights only.** ** Max Dimension calculated as sum of three dimensions (length+wide+height) ** 15  Behavior Detection BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE Carry-On Policy Max Weight Per Class Number of Pieces Piece F 8 KGS 2 C 8 KGS 2 Y 8 KGS 1 Star Alliance Gold in F 8 KGS 2 Star Alliance Gold in C 8 KGS 2 Star Alliance Gold in Y 8 KGS 1 Max Measurement Per Piece 8 KGS 23 x 40 x 44 cm 16 Behavior Detection Scope: All passenger (originating and interlined from an aircraft operator or another air carrier) must be subjected to a security interview 17  Behavior Detection Basic Rules:- During the interview, originating passenger must have possession of all their accessible property and checked baggage. The passenger and interviewer must be able to communicate in a common language. 18  Behavior Detection Basic Rules: Miscommunication: A passenger who cannot communicate in a language understood by the interviewer must a extra security procedures 19  Behavior Detection Basic Rules: Interpretation: The interviewer may interview the passenger through an interpreter if : The interpreter is an Egyptair employee. The interview is conducted with no more than one passenger (or family unit) at a time. The interpreter is fluent in the passenger’s language. 20  Behavior Detection Upon initial contact with each passenger: o The interviewer must determine whether the passenger, documentation, and/or accessible property and checked baggage. o If not, the interviewer must proceed with the security interview, review the passenger documentation, and observe the passenger’s appearance and behavior. 21  Behavior Detection Purpose The purpose of the security interview is to resolve or confirm suspicious signs detected in the course of this interview and observation. A suspicious sign is resolved when the passenger provides a satisfactory explanation and/or documentation corroborating his or her story. 22  Behavior Detection Confirmation of the suspicious sign A suspicious sign is confirmed when the passenger’s explanation or documentation fails to resolve the suspicious sign In which case the passenger must have extra security procedures. The determination of extra security proceduresstatus is made on a case-by-case basis 23  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures All passengers have Extra security procedures and their accessible property must be screened as outlined below at either : Checkpoint Or Boarding gate Or Gate hold area by Egyptair and Cairo Airport Police Authority. 24 Heads of State Permanent Representatives to the United Nations and the Organization of Heads of Government Egypt presenting a valid non-EGYPTION. Dignitaries at the level of Cabinet diplomatic passport. Department of Ministers or above State, certifying that the individual are accredited to the EGYPT or to a United Ambassadors Nations mission. Possible Exemptions The spouse, and/or children of a When the spouse and/or children of Head of State, Head of Government, a Head of State, Head of provided that they are traveling with Government, or dignitary are not the Head of State, Head of traveling, Egyptair may exempt one Government, or dignitary. other individual (chosen by the Head of State, Head of Government, or dignitary) from the extra security procedures.  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures Each passenger designated as a extra security procedures must be screened using Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) following one of these options: I. Option 1: Wearing disposable gloves collect a sample of the passenger’s hands, top of socks, belt buckle, and pockets when applicable. In addition, collect a sample of the disposable gloves worn by the screener who conducted the sampling and immediately process the sample through the ETD. Resolve any ETD alarm by conducting a full-body pat down and by screening the accessible property of the passenger. All ETD alarms must be resolved before allowing the passenger to board the aircraft. 26  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures ii. Option 2: Wearing disposable gloves, conduct a full-body pat down of the passenger. In addition, collect a sample of the passenger’s hands and the disposable gloves worn by the screener to conduct the pat down and process the sample through the ETD. Resolve any ETD alarm by contacting local law enforcement authorities and screening the accessible property of the passenger. All ETD alarms must be resolved before allowing the passenger to board an aircraft. 27  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures When ETD is unavailable or inoperable, extra security procedures passengers must be screened with a full-body pat down using the procedures described below: Pat down around the entire waist, including the belt and the belt buckle if the passenger is wearing one. Pat down the centerline in front and back of pant legs from waist to bottom of pants, including the zipper/buttons/crotch area by patting down the inner thighs from the knee to the crotch area until you meet resistance. 28  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures For skirts and dresses, contour the skirt fabric to the passenger’s body to enable the pat down, pat down the front and back of leg area from waist to the lower end of the garment, and pat down the inner thighs upward from the knee to the crotch area until you meet resistance. Pat down the vertical center line (buttons/zippers) of clothing worn above waist area and also the vertical center of the back of these articles of clothing. 29  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures Remove footwear worn by PAX extra security procedures and conduct screening using physical search. If the passenger is wearing socks, continue patting down the area covered by the socks. Notify a law enforcement authority for any threat indications that cannot be resolved. 30  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures The screening of PAX extra security procedures passengers must also include the removal and screening of: Footwear: Footwear must be screened for signs of alteration, tampering, and unusual weight, the existence of any component of an improvised explosive device (IED) or the existence of any item on the TSA Prohibited Items List using X-ray. 31  Behavior Detection Extra security procedures Outer coats and jackets: Outer coats and jackets must be removed prior to search and physically examined to determine if the garments are unusually heavy or there are any inconsistencies with the general appearance or feel of these garments. The contents of the garments and the existence of any item on the Prohibited Items List. The contents of the garments (such as items in the pockets) must also be examined as described in the screening of accessible property. 32  Behavior Detection Egyptair must ensure that no one other than its employees, and representatives, the Police Authority have access to the contents or any compartments of PAX extra security procedures checked bags after they have been screened. 33  Behavior Detection General A forged or altered passport Documents An invalid passport Multiple passport or other substitute travel documents that contain conflicting data Any unauthorized type of explosive, Property incendiary, weapon, ammunition, or other prohibited or dangerous item. 34  Behavior Detection Notification of Authorities The passenger may be transported ONLY after being screened as an extra security procedures AFTER the authorities have notified Egyptair that the passport/ substitute travel document is valid or the item in question is not prohibited or dangerous. 35  Behavior Detection Application of Interview Elements of Interviewees Selection 36  Behavior Detection Elements of Interviewee Selection Elements noted during observing a passenger’s Action documentation, appearance Specified and behavior 37  Behavior Detection Elements of Selection Critical signs. Suspicious signs. Positive signs. Elements Mandatory baggage control questioning. Criteria to designate passengers as PAX extra security procedures. Procedures to clear selectee items. Procedures to clear baggage. 38  Behavior Detection Elements : Critical Signs 39  Elements : Critical Signs Passport/ticket Multiple Travel Documents Personal ID information in valid passport does not match passenger Passenger presents multiple and/or name on ticket, except when: passports or travel documents which the ticket contains minor typographical errors contain conflicting data. that can be readily clarified or resolved The ticket contains variant transliterations of foreign names. The passenger has gone a legal name change and has not had the opportunity to update his or her passport. The passenger must provide legal documentation of his or her legal name change.  Behavior Detection If cleared of critical signs, passenger must be checked for Suspicious signs in appearance and behavior 41  Elements: Appearance and Behavior Suspicious Signs Non- apparent Apparent The passenger is checked for any POSITIVE SIGNS 42  Elements: Appearance and Behavior Suspicious Signs Passenger rushes security staff to complete procedures Passenger maintains covert ties (secret contact) with others Passenger refuses to cooperate with security staff Passenger unable to speak the language of country of passport Passenger displays exceptional interest in security Passenger arrives unusually late for flight Passenger or those accompanying passenger display unusual nervousness or fear. Baggage and/or contents of baggage inconsistent with passenger’s appearance, stated profession, ticket class, or description of content 43  Elements: Appearance and Behavior Suspicious Signs Passenger insists on boarding a specific flight for no valid reason Passenger claims not to have baggage keys or does not know how to open baggage Name on baggage does not match name on ticketed itinerary Amount of baggage unusual for ticketed itinerary Passenger appears to be lying or withholding information Passenger possesses prohibited items ( for example : explosives, incendiaries, weapons) Passenger unfamiliar with passport and/ or ticket data 44 Positive Signs  Elements: Appearance and Behavior Suspicious Signs Proceed directly to the Identification of a mandatory baggage positive sign control questioning Passenger No positive sign Check for and resolve the identified suspicious signs in passenger documentation 46  Elements: Positive Signs Family members traveling together, limited to mother or father and one or more children 12 years of age and under Diplomats representing the country of embarkation or disembarkation or serving in either country. The valid diplomatic passport must contain appropriate visas or be accompanied by a valid diplomatic ID card issued by the country of embarkation or disembarkation Designated “best customers”, officers, directors, managers, or guest of the foreign air carrier according to data provided by it to station 47  Elements: Positive Signs Employees of the foreign air carrier providing transport whose foreign air carrier employee IDs have been examined by the foreign air carrier Egypt military or UN personal who are nationals of the country of embarkation. These individuals must present valid military ID and travel or leave orders. This positive sign extends to accompanying family members who present dependent ID cards Passenger 12 years of age and under 48  Elements: Positive Signs Frequent flyers who present a valid U.S. passport or valid passport from the country of embarkation and have an established membership in that airline’s frequent flyer program and who meet one of the criteria listed below. The name on the frequent flyer account must match that listed on the passenger’s ticket and valid passport The passenger presents a frequent flyer membership card with his or her name embedded in it, which matches the name shown on the ticket and passport. The foreign air carrier establishes the passenger has been a member of its frequent flyer program for a minimum of one year and verifies the passenger has accumulated at least 20,000 actual flight miles in his or her frequent flyer account.(Actual flight mils include award/bonus miles only when the award/bonus miles are associated with air travel.) The passenger has traveled on at least six one-way or round-trip tickets. 49  Elements: Positive Signs Consists of eight or more individuals Has a designated group leader Groups Each members of the group must be meeting known to the leader all of the following Tickets must be issued from a common criteria source No additions or substitutions to the group while on the current itinerary without a valid reason Members must have a common background (for example: church, school, and company group) 50  Elements: Positive Signs Beginning of itinerary from a common source Passenger is using a round-trip ticket on the same foreign Passengers air carrier as the flight from the united states meeting all of the following criteria Passenger presents a valid U.S. passport or valid passport from the country of embarkation Time between the conclusion of the flight from the united states and the beginning of the flight back to the united states spans at least 48 hours. 51  Elements: Suspicious Signs Documentation Documentation Documentation Suspicious Suspicious Signs Signs NOT IDENTIFIED / Identified RESOLVED Passenger must be questioned in order to Mandatory baggage resolve the sign or be control questions screened as a PAX extra security procedures 52  Elements: Suspicious Signs Documentation Passport of a country other than that of embarkation or disembarkation. Transit stops are not considered points of disembarkation Ticket purchased in country other than that of embarkation or passport nationality. Ticket purchased or changed within 24 hours of scheduled flight Tickets purchased in manner unusual to place of issue (for example: credit card transactions are made but a cash payment is received  Elements: Suspicious Signs Documentation Ticketed routing is out of the ordinary On-way ticket Ticket/travel authorization appears to have been forged, altered, or stolen.  Elements: Mandatory Baggage Control Questioning Prior to interviewing the passenger, the interviewer must inform the passenger of the reason for the questioning. The preferred statement is, “ I am going to ask you some questions about your baggage because it has happened in the past that passengers have received, without their knowledge, items which turned out to be dangerous to passengers and the flight (such as bombs or weapons).” The purpose of this statement is to sensitize the passenger of the need to answer the interview questions honestly. 55  Elements: Mandatory Baggage Control Questioning The interviewer must next question all passenger so the following determinations can be made. The interviewer must pose the baggage control questions to each individually. The only exception is that a family group traveling together may be interviewed together. Parents may answer for children 12 years of age and under; children who are 13 years of age and older must be asked the questions individually. The interviewer must determine if any aspect of the responses about baggage control are suspicious. 56  Post-Questioning Procedures Determine if the passenger owns the baggage to be checked or carried onboard and all of its contents. In the event of a negative response that cannot be satisfactorily resolved, process the baggage in questions. If the baggage has remained In the passenger’s control from the time the baggage was packed until the time of check-in. in the event of a negative response that cannot be satisfactorily resolved, process the baggage in question. If the passenger has received and is carrying any articles received from others. These articles may be packages, medicine, books, or any other items. In the event of a positive response not augmented by a reasonable and credible explanation Determine if the passenger has any battery-operated, electrical, or electronic items or items that were purchased, repaired, or out of the passenger’s control during his or her trip. 57  Behavior Detection Questions 58  M3.1 SCREENING ‫إجراءات أمن نقطة‬ POINT AND ‫وبوابة الكشف‬ BOARDING GATE ‫الصعود‬ SECURITY PROCEDURES  M3.2 MODULE OBJECTIVES ‫أهداف الوحدة‬ Describe passenger and baggage ‫ وصف عملية الكشف األمني‬ screening process ‫على الركاب والحقائب‬ Explain procedures ‫ شرح إجراءات التعامل مع‬ for dealing with security removed ‫البنود المستبعدة أمنيا‬ items  M3.3 MODULE OBJECTIVES ‫أهداف الوحدة‬ Describe supervisor’s ‫تحديد دور المشرف في مراقبة‬ role in monitoring passenger boarding ‫إجراءات أمن صعود الركاب‬ procedures Explain role of ‫شرح دور المشرف في‬ supervisor in responding to security ‫اإلستجابة للطوارئ األمنية‬ emergencies  M3.4 THE SECURITY SCREENING ‫عملية الكشف األمني‬ PROCESS Passenger screening and ‫ الكشف على الركاب وتفتيشهم‬ search of passenger ‫ فحص الحقائب بواسطة األشعة‬ X-Ray examination of ‫السينية‬ baggage ‫ التفتيش اليدوي للحقائب‬ Physical search of baggage ‫ تفتيش وتأمين منطقةاإلنتظار‬ Searching and securing a sterile holding area ‫المعقمة‬  ‫‪M3.5‬‬ ‫‪THE THREE BASIC‬‬ ‫‪SCREENING‬‬ ‫األساليب الثالث األساسية‬ ‫‪CONCEPTS‬‬ ‫للكشف‬ ‫قبل الدخول إلى منطقة إنهاء‬ ‫ ‬ ‫‪ Concourse plan‬‬ ‫اإلجراءات‬ ‫‪ Holding area plan‬‬ ‫قبل الدخول إلى قاعات‬ ‫ ‬ ‫‪ Boarding gate plan‬‬ ‫اإلنتظار‬ ‫عند بوابة الصعود‬ ‫ ‬  ‫‪M3.6‬‬ ‫‪THE THREE BASIC‬‬ ‫‪SCREENING‬‬ ‫األساليب الثالث األساسية‬ ‫‪CONCEPTS‬‬ ‫للكشف‬ ‫هذه األساليب تحتاج إلى‬ ‫‪All plans require a sterile‬‬ ‫منطقة معقمة قبل السماح‬ ‫‪area before screened‬‬ ‫‪passengers are allowed‬‬ ‫للركاب الذين أتموا الكشف‬ ‫‪into the area prior to‬‬ ‫بالدخول إلى قاعات اإلنتظار‬ ‫‪boarding‬‬ ‫الموجودة قبل الصعود‬ ‫للطائرة مباشرةً‬  M3.7 CONCOURSE PLAN 1 2 3 Concourse TERMINAL PIER 4 7 6 5 Screening Boarding Gates Point  M3.8 HOLDING AREA PLAN 1 2 3 TERMINAL Concourse PIER 4 7 6 5 Screening Boarding Gates Point  M3.9 BOARDING GATE PLAN 1 2 3 Concourse TERMINAL PIER 4 7 6 5 Screening Point Boarding Gates © 2003 International Air Transport Association - International Civil Aviation Organization  ‫‪M3.10‬‬ ‫نظام الكشف قبل الدخول إلى منطقة ‪CONCOURSE (OR‬‬ ‫)‪CENTRALISED‬‬ ‫إنهاء إجراءات السفر (أو المركزية) ‪SCREENING SYSTEM‬‬ ‫ يكون موقعها في مدخل‬ ‫‪ Located at the entrance‬‬ ‫‪to a concourse‬‬ ‫منطقة إنهاء اإلجراءات‬ ‫‪ Continually operated,‬‬ ‫ تشغيل مستمر‪ ،‬وتخدم‬ ‫‪serving many gates with‬‬ ‫العديد من بوابات الصعود‬ ‫‪no relationship to specific‬‬ ‫‪flight‬‬ ‫دون اإلرتباط برحلة معينة‬  ‫‪M3.11‬‬ ‫نظام الكشف قبل الدخول إلى منطقة ‪CONCOURSE (OR‬‬ ‫)‪CENTRALISED‬‬ ‫إنهاء إجراءات السفر (أو المركزية) ‪SCREENING SYSTEM‬‬ ‫‪ More personnel and‬‬ ‫ تحتاج إلى زيادة عدد الموظفين‬ ‫‪equipment required to‬‬ ‫والمعدات للتعامل مع كثافة حجم العمل‬ ‫‪ ،‬ولكن ينتج عنه مزايا عديدة نتيجة ‪handle increased volume‬‬ ‫عدم اإلحتياج لنقاط كشف قبل الدخول ‪but significant savings can‬‬ ‫‪result due to screening‬‬ ‫إلى قاعات اإلنتظار أو عند جميع‬ ‫‪points not required at‬‬ ‫بوابات الصعود‬ ‫‪holding area or individual‬‬ ‫‪gates‬‬  M3.12 HOLDING AREA ‫نظام الكشف قبل الدخول‬ SCREENING SYSTEM ‫إلى قاعات اإلنتظار‬ Area specially designed to ً ‫ منطقة مصممة خصيصا‬ hold passengers awaiting ‫إلستيعاب الركاب الذين ينتظرون‬ particular flight ‫رحلة معينة‬ Area is sterile and access is ‫ منطقمة معقمة ويوجد سيطرة‬ controlled ‫على الدخول‬ Door leading to jetway/ramp is ‫ إغالق البوابة المؤدية إلى‬ kept locked until actual ‫ المهبط لحين بدأ‬/‫الجسر‬ boarding begins ‫الصعود الفعلي للطائرة‬  M3.13 HOLDING AREA ‫نظام الكشف قبل الدخول‬ SCREENING SYSTEM ‫إلى قاعات اإلنتظار‬ Less staff and equipment required ‫ تحتاج إلى عدد أقل من‬ as more time is ً ‫الموظفين والمعدات نظرا‬ available to screen ‫لوجود وقت كافي للكشف‬ Screening point manned only when ‫ تواجد الموظفين فيها أثناء‬ screening is in ‫عملية الكشف فقط‬ progress  M3.14 BOARDING GATE ‫نظام الكشف عند بوابة‬ SCREENING SYSTEM ‫الصعود للطائرة‬ Requires screening ‫ تحتاج إلى نقطة كشف عند كل بوابة‬ point at each boarding ‫صعود‬ gate Passengers screened ‫ يتم الكشف على الركاب قبل الصعود‬ immediately before ً‫مباشرة‬ boarding Screening takes place in airline time ‫ يتم الكشف من وقت شركة الطيران‬  M3.15 BOARDING GATE ‫نظام الكشف عند بوابة‬ SCREENING SYSTEM ‫الصعود للطائرة‬ Staff and equipment must be available to ‫ توافر الموظفون والمعدات بشكل كافي‬ handle optimum ‫للتعامل مع أقصى حمولة ركاب خالل‬ passenger load in ‫فترة محدودة‬ limited time Screening point ‫ تواجد الموظفين فيها أثناء عملية‬ manned only when ‫الكشف فقط‬ screening is in process  M3.16 SCREENING POINT IDEAL STAFFING ‫المتطلبات النموذجية‬ REQUIREMENTS ‫للعمالة عند نقطة الكشف‬ No. 1 1 ‫رقم‬ Travel document/tickets - checker/passenger /‫ضابط أمن لفحص وثائق السفر‬ risk assessor ‫التذاكر – تقييم خطورة‬ ‫الراكب‬  ‫‪M3.17‬‬ ‫‪SCREENING POINT‬‬ ‫‪IDEAL STAFFING‬‬ ‫المتطلبات النموذجية‬ ‫‪REQUIREMENTS‬‬ ‫للعمالة عند نقطة الكشف‬ ‫‪No. 2‬‬ ‫رقم ‪2‬‬ ‫‪X-Ray loader passenger‬‬ ‫ضابط أمن لوضع الحقائب على‬ ‫‪searchers‬‬ ‫جهاز األشعة السينية ‪/‬‬ ‫تفتيش الركاب‬  ‫‪M3.18‬‬ ‫‪SCREENING POINT‬‬ ‫‪IDEAL STAFFING‬‬ ‫المتطلبات النموذجية‬ ‫‪REQUIREMENTS‬‬ ‫للعمالة عند ن