The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty PDF

The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty Author(s): Derek Croxton Source: The International History Review , Sep., 1999, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), p. 569 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40109077 JSTOR is a not-for-profit servic...

The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty Author(s): Derek Croxton Source: The International History Review , Sep., 1999, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), p. 569 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40109077 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International History Review This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  DEREK CROXTON The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty is described in recent works as 'perforated, defiled, co Sovereignty tinental nered, ballistic missiles, eroded, electronic extinct,technology, communications anachronistic, and even interrogated'.1 Intercon- human rights have led many to doubt whether the sovereign state can or should continue to exist, and some speak openly of moving to a new stage in international relations 'beyond Westphalia'.2 But sovereignty has been central to our understanding of the states system and is the fundamental principle enunciated in the charter of the United Nations.3 What would happen to the states system if sovereignty were removed as an organizing principle? To answer that question, scholars turn to the perceived origins of sover- eignty, asking how the political system was arranged before the existence of sovereign states, and how and why it changed to include them. The search usually leads to the peace of Westphalia, the name commonly used for the treaties of Minister and Osnabriick signed in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War after five years of negotiation. Yet anyone who studies the treaties in detail comes away disappointed, without finding a clear state- ment of the principle of sovereignty. This article addresses the question of whether sovereignty, implicit or explicit, was a principle of the peace of Westphalia. I thank Regina Gramer, Paul W. Schroeder, Stephen D. Krasner, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Norrin Ripsman for helpful criticism, and Richard Ned Lebow and the Mershon Center at Ohio State Univer- sity for a research fellowship. 1 M. R. Fowler and J. M. Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park, 1995), p. 2. 2 Beyond Westphalia?, ed. G. M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno (Baltimore, 1995); The New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the Self-Determination of Peoples, ed. M. Sellers (Washington, 1996), p. 1. On the role of nuclear weapons, see J. Herz, 'Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', World Politics, ix (1957), 473-93; on other technological reasons, S. D. Krasner and J. E. Thomson, 'Global Transactions and Consolidation of Sovereignty', in Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Ap- proaches to World Politics for the 1990s, ed. E.-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau (Lexington, 1989), pp. 195-219- 3 Found in article 2, section 1: 'the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.' The International History Review, xxi. 3: September 1999, pp. 569-852. cn issn 0707-5332 © The International History Review. All International Rights Reserved. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 570 Derek Croxton What is at stake is how we ended up with a so Did everyone agree to it or did it happen by ac when did the notion of sovereignty become wi saying that it was characteristic of the syst questions makes it clear that sovereignty is tak nition by other states of the right to exclusiv territory, as opposed to the exercise of authori F. H. Hinsley's words, as 'the idea that there is ical authority in the political community.. authority exists elsewhere', is the only possibl role of a treaty in establishing the principle o paper can ever establish exclusive authority administrative practice can do that. The most people that states ought to have exclusive te definition, 'sovereignty is not a fact. Autho [Sovereignty] is an assumption about authority states, sovereignty 'signifies a form of legitima eign states, each recognizes the others as the f given territories, and only they can be consider It is precisely on this ground that scholars hav the origins of sovereignty: as a formal statemen eignty, even if the practice was established earli Recent scholarship has seen state sovereign method of organization that accompanied and w other intellectual and cultural changes of the d the contrary, that de facto sovereign states statesmen had anything like the modern conce as the founding notion of the international sy possible to view the workings of a sovereign st ations at the congress of Westphalia, Europ before this form of organization became consci national law. The existence of sovereign states terms, a systemic effect, not in itself predictab 1 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York, 1966), p. 26, emphasis 2 F. H. Hinsley, 'The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations b eignty, ed. W. J. Stankiewicz (New York, 1969), p. 275. 3 J. G. Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World P World Politics, xxxv (1983), 275-6. 4 A. B. Murphy, 'The Sovereign State System as Political-Ter porary Considerations', in State Sovereignty as Social Const (Cambridge, 1996), p. 92; H. Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its 5 Spruyt, Sovereign State, pp. 67, 79-82; J. G. Ruggie, 'Terri Modernity in International Relations', International Organizatio This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 571 individual ruler, but a consequence of these actions when applie the whole international system.1 Therefore, rather than being an was historically constructed and then applied, sovereignty emerges historical fact that was gradually recognized by statesmen and eve acknowledged as reality. A key problem with studying the origins of sovereignty is that an is likely to claim the sole authority to make decisions in his territor unwilling to concede the same authority to his neighbours within The difficulty is not finding a ruler who considers himself to be so but a group of rulers who recognize each other's sovereignty.2 illustrated by the concept of sovereignty understood in the Middle The idea of final authority was natural to the Church, as God authority: his status was expressed on earth through the rival claim pope and the Holy Roman Emperor to represent him. The ques issue between their publicists was not whether there was an earthl eign, but who served the function. In time, as both the pope and t peror lost power, the authority of other monarchs such as the kings land and France increased to the point that, after the defeat of He bid for mastery, a multi-state system existed.3 Its existence did no lenge, however, the theory that authority flowed from God th single earthly representative; in fact, the pope put forward his mos claims in the fourteenth century as his power waned. Thus, al sovereign states existed, they did not recognize one another. Before multiple sovereign authorities could be recognized, the au of pope and Emperor had to be undermined conceptually; either by ing altogether the religious basis of secular authority, or that the C authority flowed through a single individual as opposed, for examp council of believers. The peace of Westphalia is credited with accom ing both of these goals. First, Innocent X issued a brief, Zelo domu condemning the peace on account of its formal recognition of Prot 1K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979), pp. 39-41, 65-7. 2 Hinsley, 'Concept of Sovereignty', pp. 275-7; E. Straub, Pax et Imperium: Spaniens Kampf Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635 (Vienna, 1980), pp. 20-4. 3 U. Scheuner, 'Die grossen Fnedensschliisse als Grundlage der europaischen Staate zwischen 1648 und 1815', in Spiegel der Geschichte: Festgabefiir Max Braubach zum 10. Apr K. Repgen and S. Skalweit (Miinster, 1964), pp. 232-40; W. Kienast, 'Die Anfange des eu Staatensystems im spateren Mittelalter', Historische Zeitschrift, cliii (1936), 229-71; W. Ull Medieval Papal Court as an International Tribunal', Virginia Journal of International Law 1), 366-7 and 'Zur Entwicklung des Souveranitatsbegriffes im Spatmittelalter', in Festschri Grass zum 60. Geburtstag dargebracht von Fachgenossen, Freunden, und Schiilern, ed. L. Car Steinegger (Munich, 1974), pp. 9-27; R. Holtzmann, 'Der Weltherrschaftsgedanke des Mittel Kaisertums und die Souveranitat der Europaischen Staaten', Historische Zeitschrift, clix (193 W. Holtzmann, 'Imperium und Nationen', in Relazioni del X Congresso Intemazionale d Storiche: III: Storia delMedioevo (Florence, 1955), pp. 288-303. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  572 Derek Croxton ism in the Empire. Second, the treaty contained validity despite objections from the Church therefore, to have terminated the pope's claim confirmed the diplomatic independence of secu first time Protestantism in the Empire had bee had happened a hundred years earlier by the tre Thereafter, the papacy, while ignoring the tre strategy towards Protestantism in Germany. O wish formally to recognize schismatics; on the o to persuade the Emperor to take a hard line, be to be the Church's most important bulwark in was silence: to support the Emperor without ac of Protestantism. The reason the papacy adopted the opposite po condemning the peace had more to do with Westphalia was no more formal or binding tha Augsburg of 1555. * It was as conditional as its until a universal council could be summoned to reunite the various branches of Christianity - clear evidence of the continuance of the medi- eval conception of Europe.2 If Westphalia did mark the end of papal authority in the Empire, it was the last in a series of retreats during the previous three hundred years in which popes had been forced to yield authority to kings.3 Innocent X's predecessor, Urban VIII, one of the or- ganizers of the congress of Westphalia, recognized the limits to his author- ity and did not try to act as arbitrator; instead, 'in order to spare the sen- sitivity of the warring powers and not to endanger the peace process, [he] fearfully avoided any appearance of influencing the parties.'4 He instructed the papal nuncio to make no proposals himself. The Emperor's authority was, if anything, even more decayed by 1648. The concept of ;rex imperator in regno suo' was already centuries old in both theory and practice. Although fears of a 'universal monarchy' were rife, the Austrian Habsburgs were seen only as auxiliaries to their more powerful Spanish relatives.5 The Emperor, who did not have effective con- 1 See the in-depth coverage of this issue in K. Repgen, Die Rb'mische Kurie und der Westfdlische Frieden: Idee und Wirklichkeit des Papsttums im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert I, pt. 1: Papst, Kaiser, und Reich, 1521-1644 (Tubingen, 1962). See also M. Zimmermann, 'La crise de Porganisation internationale a la fin du moyen age', Academic de droit international: Recueil des cours, xliv (1933, pt. 2), 315-438, on the rise and decline of papal claims to international authority, which he places in the period from 1200 to 1450 (and hence firmly over by the time of the peace of Westphalia). 2 Consolidated] T[reaty] Sferies], 1648-9, ed. C. Parry (Dobbs Ferry, 1969), pp. 136, 214. 3 See the analysis m Zimmermann, La cnse de 1 organisation Internationale. 4 See Dickmann, Der Westfdlische Frieden (Minister, 1959), pp. 80-7, 336-9 (quotation from p. 82). 5 F. Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis: Ein politischer Leitbegriff der friihen Neuzeit (Gottingen, 1988), This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 573 trol over the Empire, let alone the monarchies of Spain, Sweden, and France, had distanced himself long before from the papacy, arguably the source of his universal authority. The electoral procedure codified in the Golden Bull of 1356 made it clear that the pope played no role in the selection of the Emperor, a development formally endorsed by Maximil- ian I in 1506 by the addition of the word 'elected' to his title. Lastly, the title cHoly Roman Empire' was expanded in i486 to 'Holy Roman Empir of the German Nation', further particularizing it and separating it from the universality of the Church.1 Despite the increasingly specific and limited nature of Imperial author- ity, however, scholars have consistently interpreted the steps taken at the peace of Westphalia as, at the least, the decisive final step towards termin ating the Emperor's universal pretensions.2 In a widely used textbook, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr write: The end of the Thirty Years War brought with it the final end of the medieval Holy Roman Empire. Authority for choosing the religion of the political unit was given to the prince of that unit and not to the Hapsburg Emperor or the Pope. No longer could one pretend there was religious or political unity in Europe. Author ity was dispersed to the various kings and princes, and the basis for the sovereign state was established.3 There are several problems with this statement, of which the most important is the fact that the Holy Roman Empire lasted for another 158 years, until 1806. Although the estates were given new rights, including the right to make alliances with outside powers and a 'territorial right' o superiority within their own dominions, the rights demonstrate the limits to their sovereignty rather than its triumph. First, estates had been making treaties with outside powers long before the peace of Westphalia. Imperial sovereignty was more seriously infringed, in fact, by the peace of Passau of 1552, when the Emperor granted nobles the right to serve as mercenaries, even in the armies of his enemies, whereas Westphalia restricted the right to make alliances to alliances not directed against the Empire.4 Second, the pp. 91-2. 1 H. Duchhardt, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 1495-1806 (Berlin, 1991), pp. 16-17, 24"5; W. Becker, Der Kurfurstenrat: Grundziige seiner Entwicklung in der Reichsverfassung und seine Stellung aufdem Westfdlischen Friedenskongrefi (Munster, 1973), pp. 61-7. 2 R. Turrettini, La Signification des traites de Westphahe dans le domaine du droit des gens (Geneva, 1949), p. 68, is unusual in that he points to the German estates as the reason Westphalia founded sovereignty, but he admits that 'les Traites de Westphalie ne contiennent pas d'articles determines sur cette question de la souveraineteV 3 B. Russett and H. Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (San Francisco, 1981), p. 47. 4 F. Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economi and Social History (Wiesbaden, 1964), p. 106. For a view that state control over extraterritorial violence This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  574 Derek Croxton cius territoriale', rendered in German by 'Land stood as we understand sovereignty. Guido B translation of the treaty, including the one pre to the conference, rendered 'ius territoriale French and German legal scholars before an between the territorial authority of a ruler and the Empire as a whole.1 The Holy Roman Empire did not cease to exist in 1648. Had it been abolished, one could arg phalia legitimized the de facto independence of thus took a demonstrable step towards the for eignty. The estates continued after 1648, howev as a single body: they recognized the Emperor overlord, sent representatives to the Diet, pa raised a joint army.2 If they often functioned 1648, they were never sovereign in practice; an legal language used in the treaties of peace. E more difficult, if not impossible, to view th monarchy under the sovereignty of the Emp sovereignty resided with the individual estates that the estates exercised sovereignty as a grou However inefficient and ineffective collective ac the Empire remained a collective sovereign ent Westphalia cannot be considered the founda basis of having granted sovereignty to the i because no one believed that it actually did so. The second aspect of the peace that supposedly for sovereignty is the denial of a role for religio ters by endorsing the principle of cuius regio, has become dominant only in the last two centuries, see J. E. Th spective: The Evolution of State Control over Extraterritorial Vi national and Comparative Perspectives, ed. J. A. Caporaso (Lo aries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterrito (Princeton, 1994). 1 G. Braun, Les traductions francaises des traites de Westphalie XVHe Siecle, cxc (1995), 131-55. On the treaty terms, see the Peac 241. 2 Dickmann, Der Westfdlische Frieden, pp. 167-8; Duchhardt, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 52; K. O. von Aretin, Das Reich: Friedensgarantie und europdisches Gleichgewicht, 1648-1806 (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 19-26. 3 For the problem of sovereignty as applied to the Empire prior to 1648, see Dickmann, Der West- fdlische Frieden, pp. 124-42; J. H. M. Salmon, 'The Legacy of Jean Bodin: Absolutism, Populism, or Constitutionalism?', in History of Political Thought, xvii (1996), 506-14; Becker, Der Kurfiirstenrat, pp. 91-132; J. Franklin, 'Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and His Critics', in The Cam- bridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 309-23. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 575 territorial rulers in the Empire the right to choose the religion of their subjects and denied the Empire and the Emperor any right. Clearly, i religion is separated from politics in this way, the spiritual basis of both the pope's and the Emperor's secular authority is undermined: in Sir Ernes Baker's words, 'we may hear the cracking of the Middle Ages.n The 'right of reformation', however, was neither introduced at Westphalia, nor reaf- firmed there in its extreme form: German estates first gained the right in 1555 by the peace of Augsburg. Although the peace of Westphalia con- firmed the right, an important qualification was added: that all subjects were guaranteed not only the right to emigrate, but also to freedom of con science, to worship in neighbouring territories, and to send their children abroad to school or educate them at home.2 Thus, the endorsement of individual rights at Westphalia limited state sovereignty. The claim that the peace of Westphalia marked the end of Europe organized as a Christian community under the authority of pope or Emperor is, therefore, greatly exaggerated. Although the treaties implicitly endorsed the claim insofar as the pope rejected the treaties and the Em- peror accepted an unfavourable settlement with his nominal inferiors, neither development was novel either legally or in practice; they merely marked another stage in the crumbling authority of both. Likewise, the recognition of Lutherans and Calvinists, the public acknowledgement o schism, was nothing new. And far from making religion an aspect of internal politics, the peace of Westphalia made religious liberty a matter of international responsibility. The treaties may have contributed more to the recognition of sover- eignty through their references to specific sovereign bodies and the legal authority they possessed. Ronald Asch, for example, points to the grant of independence to the Swiss Confederation and the United Provinces of the Low Countries.3 The treaties, however, make no mention of the United Provinces' independence or sovereignty, which are referred to only in a clause which declares that the Burgundian Circle (of which they were part) is to be excluded from the provisions of the treaty until Spain makes peace with France. The clause, which was devised as an expedient to allow France to make peace with the Empire but not Spain, had nothing to do with independence for the Dutch. The treaty explicitly states that the Burgundian Circle shall remain part of the Empire.4 1 Sir E. Baker, cited in Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond'. 2 Treaty of Minister, CTS, 1648-9, pp. 148-9, 228-30; Dickmann, Der Westfalische Frieden, pp. 460-3. 3 R. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48 (New York, 1997), p. 144. Asch specifically says that 'sovereignty' is granted to the Dutch and Swiss, although the treaty use no such word. 4 Treaty of Minister, CTS, 1648-9, pp. 277, 323; Dickmann, Der Westfalische Frieden, pp. 480-2, 486-7 This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 576 Derek Croxton The treaty of Miinster made between Spain an 30 January 1648 may seem the proper place to latter's independence. Spain formally renoun Dutch; the treaty includes a clause by which ensure the neutrality of the United Provinces Emperor recognized Dutch neutrality in 1653. N reasons why the treaty of Miinster should moment in the separation of the United Provinc as the Imperial Diet never ratified Dutch neutr status of law. Second, the Emperor continued t century to invest the king of Spain with feuda inces as well as the Spanish Low Countries. Not ture limited to the provinces still under de fact This is not to argue that the United Provinces to Spain after 1648; everyone, including the Hab not. But the peace of Westphalia cannot be se ation from the Empire. Charles V had removed and north) from most Imperial jurisdiction in Revolt. During it, the Dutch gradually assumed Austrian Habsburgs had forfeited their residual aid the Dutch in their legitimate struggle again formal declaration to this effect was made, authority persisted - even among the Dutch th Union of Utrecht. In the manner typical of th obtained their independence gradually and c scription rather than an official declaration. Although the Swiss, by contrast, were forma jurisdiction, the endorsement of autonomy was the principle. The clause concerning the Swiss i pendence, but the authorization of a Swiss decr mention of sovereignty and states only that th sion of a sort of full liberty and exemption from subject to the tribunals and sentences of the sa vel quasi plenae libertatis et exemptionis ab eiusdem Imperii dicasteriis et iudiciis subie exempt the Swiss from all Imperial laws, but did eignty; they remained nominally subject to 1 For the following discussion, see the in-depth analysis by R inces-Unies sont-elles devenues independantes en droit a Pegar Recktsgesckiedenis, xx (1952), 30-63, 182-218. 2 Treaty ot Minister, CIS, 1048-9, pp. 157, 239. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 577 ('Anverwandte').1 Lest this seem an obscure detail, note that the Sw tinued to think of themselves as somehow connected with the Empi century or more after Westphalia. Doctoral dissertations in law University of Basel, which recognized de facto Swiss autonomy in tration, consistently legitimized the system of government on the the 'translatio imperii' and the Imperial connection. A more con clear conception of Swiss sovereignty in the modern sense only bu the scene in the mid-eighteenth century unconnected with the Westphalia. Nowhere do the treaties mention the word 'sovereignty' itself, as there is no such word in Latin. Statesmen used many different Latin words to express rulership, but only one was commonly translated as 'sovereignty': 'supremum dominium'.2 This term plays a prominent role in the sections of the treaty transferring territory- Pinerolo, Breisach, and parts of Alsace and Lorraine - to France. The wording used to effect the transfers appears to support the idea of a new and more sharply defined notion of sovereignty. In the 'Three Bish- oprics' of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, France was granted 'supreme domin- ion, rights of superiority, and all other rights'; in Pinerolo 'right of direct lordship and sovereignty'. France was also granted Breisach and parts of Alsace with 'all rights, proprieties, lordships, possessions, and jurisdic- tions'.3 France demanded and received these territories absolutely, and not as fiefs, unlike Sweden, which accepted its part of Pomerania as a fief.4 Despite the apparent lack of ambiguity, however, three qualifications need to be made. First, the French felt obliged to specify that, in Alsace, 'vassals, subjects, people, towns, boroughs, castles, houses, fortresses, woods, copses, gold or silver mines, minerals, rivers, brooks, [and] pastures' should be trans- ferred. Is this evidence of a transition to a new, more absolute transfer of rights, or of an older conception of royal authority in which even the minutest entitlements must be specified?5 A look at treaties from earlier centuries shows that, although the list of territories included in the peace of Westphalia is unusually comprehensive, the legal terms used are less so. The treaty of Cambrai of 1529, for example, states that Francis I 'leaves and surrenders each and every right of jurisdiction, appeal, and sovereignty' that he has or could claim in Italy; but adds more detailed enumeration 1 Dickmann, Der Westfdlische Frieden, pp. 438-9. 2 Braun, 'Les traductions francaises', pp. 111-13. See also N. Onuf, 'Sovereignty: Outline of a Concep- tual History', Alternatives, xvi (1991 ), 435-7. 3 Treaty of Minister, CTS, 1648-9, pp. 294-5, 340-1. 4 Ibid., pp. 161-6, 244-9. 5 It is significant that a similar listing was given for the Pomeranian rights transferred to Sweden. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 578 Derek Croxton explicitly designed to anticipate quarrels.1 Fran homage, peerage of France, oaths of fidelity and superiority, appeal, sovereignty, and all other sovereignty over the 'prelates, nobles, vassals, l ants, and inhabitants of the said County, prese 1280, when Louis IX surrendered the county of exactness to Jaime I of Aragon, he left, ceded, and altogether yielded whatever of righ had them, if indeed he had them; or was even able to in his domains or in the lands that he ruled as in the lands in the aforesaid [territories]... with all hono dictions, and universal rights and appurtenances incomes and products.2 In legal terms, then, the territorial transfers s Westphalia were not only not particularly clear, precisely as in earlier treaties. A glance forward to two treaties drawn up century reveals a similar pattern, in which list prehensive. By the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of France included 'their bailiwicks, castellanies, g territories, domains, lordships, appurtenanc nexes, by whatever name they may be called'. L same rights of sovereignty, propriety, regal ri ship, jurisdiction, nomination, prerogatives, an as had belonged to the king of Spain and w disturbed... under whatever pretext or opport said sovereignty'.3 The terms of the treaty of Ryswick of 1697 a Louis XIV shall return Alsace, including whatev war, and places and rights occupied under the n claimed as reunions';4 and although this list is d more precise delimitation follows. The Elector receive 'the city and prefecture of Germersheim 1 CforpsJ Ufniversel du] D[roit des] G[ens], iv. 9-10. The clau France simply claimed that the treaty was invalid in all its clauses. 2 4... quittavit, cessit, et omnino remisit quicquid juris et pos habebat vel habere poterat seu dicebat etiam se habere tarn in do et in aliis quibuscunque in praedictis [territories]... cum omnib jurisdictionibus, et juribus universis ac pertimentis eorundem, e tibus[etc.]':C£/Z)G,ii. 135. 3 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, articles iii and iv, CTS, 1668-71, pp. 4 Treaty of Ryswick, article iv, CTS, 1697-1700, pp. 10, 82. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 579 and the subprefecture, with all citadels, cities, towns, villages, estates, fiefs, and rights as they were restored by the peace of West and even all written documents taken from the archive, the chance feudal court, the chamber of accounts, the prefectures, and th Palatine offices, no place, thing, right, or document to be exceptedV All of the treaties are trying to be as definitive as possible. T changes over time - in the thirteenth century, feudal rights were th prominent; in 1648, territorial rights; and in 1697, legal documents the principle remains the same. The emphasis on territory in the p Westphalia may be evidence for a changing conception of the state rule over people to rule over territory, but is hardly a definitive ind of sovereign statehood. Not only did the treaty of Miinster include in the list of things transferred, but three different categories of per listed based on their legal status - vassals, subjects, and people - the being a catch-all for anyone who might be excluded from the first Compare this list with the list of territories returned by France to t peror, which specified 'monasteries, abbeys, prelacies, deaconries knights' fees, with all their bailiwicks, baronies, castles, fortresses, ties, barons, nobles, vassals, men, subjects, rivers, brooks, forests, and all royalties, rights, jurisdictions, fiefs, and patronages, and all things collectively and singly belonging to the lofty right of territor patrimony of the House of Austria'.2 The two lists barely overlap. F includes copses, mines, and minerals, but leaves off abbeys, monast baronies, and barons. Evidently, the two sides disagreed about the it they thought it necessary to specify. The ambiguity is crucial to an understanding of contemporary vie sovereignty and the attempts made to implement transfers by trea shift in subject matter was accompanied by a shift away from attem comprehensiveness towards airtight clauses that excluded the possib something being accidentally left out. In the treaty of Aix-la-Chapell itional clauses transfer everything cby whatever name they may be and pre-empt 'whatever pretext or opportunity that may arise'. fifty-three of the treaty of Ryswick carries the development a stage f it declares that fcall things agreed to by this peace shall be valid and s firmly valid in perpetuity, and shall be observed and executed as ag and all things that could ever be believed, alleged, or devised to the trary shall be no obstacle, but shall be abrogated and made void withstanding that such things should have been more specially o fully mentioned, and that it may seem as if they ought to be ca 1 Treaty of Ryswick, CTS, 1697-1700, article viii, pp. 11, 83. 2 Treaty of Munster, CTS, 1648-9, pp. 298, 344. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 580 Derek Croxton abrogation or that they be a null or invalid ann sents a more systematic attempt to anticipate co The attempt to draft an all-inclusive clause to that the continued existence of multiple layers simple list insufficient; that no single concept in place of all of the others. Instead of declaring t simple and unambiguous clause, the framers of clause to exclude any rights contrary to the tr international system characterized by a desi biguous control, but in which complementary ri The other two qualifications of French sov specific, legal limitations set out in the transfer to France is restricted by the phrase 'neverthe and immunities previously obtained by the said Austria'.2 Although sovereignty presupposes the laws, and France above all other states claimed t century, France accepted the transfer of a c authority would be restricted, and by prior agr power. France was also required by the treat Alsace, 'and to abolish all innovations which had The third qualification is so serious that it saps of the treaty apparently transferring Alsace to To understand it, an explanation of the poli required, as it was not a unified province, but mosaic. It was conventionally divided into tw Alsace. In Upper Alsace, the Habsburgs, who he exercised something approaching overall author was limited and they were excluded from some of the bishopric of Basel. Lower Alsace, too, ha bishop of Strasbourg, but he had virtually no p separate units including the city of Strasbou bourg, Imperial knights, and a number of inde the two parts of Alsace was a loosely unified gr the Decapolis, which recognized the Habsbur over them but little else. Authority in Alsace w plicated and few people at the conference unde exercised limited and often ambiguous rights, what they could legally transfer to France. In a that saw themselves being negotiated out of th 1 Treaty of Ryswick, article liii, CTS, 1697-1700, pp. 26, 97. 2 Treaty of Miinster, CTS, 1648-9, pp. 295, 341. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 581 highly decentralized government of the Empire and into the ab monarchy of France, bargained hard to protect their rights. Thus, Louis XIV, in a famous clause, was expressly required to certain enumerated political units in Alsace 'in that liberty and poss of immediacy in regard to the Holy Roman Empire, which the hitherto enjoyed: so that he may not claim any royal superiority ove but shall rest content with those rights that have belonged to the H Austria, and which are ceded to the French crown by this treaty of The reservation may appear to resemble the one governing Breis which France is limited in its rights over a conquered territory. Th plication arises from the number of political units specifically menti protected. They include some, such as Strasbourg and Basel, tha clearly not transferred to France and over which France claimed no diction until Louis XIV s reunions - the peaceful but forceful annex to France of a number of adjacent territories in the 1680s - but also such as the Decapolis, which were transferred. As the clause defi rights of these units 'in that liberty and possession of immediacy in to the Holy Roman Empire', it makes nonsense of the idea that sover is being transferred: how could France possess sovereignty over which remained immediate to the Holy Roman Empire? That the intended to preserve rather than break off the Imperial tie is shown fact that the political units of Alsace continued for decades to send sentatives to the Imperial Diet, pay Imperial taxes, and be subject to Imperial laws.2 As a final complication, this section of the treaty of Westphalia en a famous clause which states: 'In such a manner, nevertheless, that present Declaration, nothing is intended that shall derogate fro Sovereign Dominion already hereabove agreed to'. Sovereignty i granted and reserved: France's authority is not only limited by the but the estates themselves - both the territories France governed la those it did not - also remain members in some fashion of the E Given the ambiguity, the peace of Westphalia would have helped to sovereignty rather better if it had transferred Alsace to France as a more comprehensible form of mixed jurisdiction. * * * If the grounds for attributing the origins of soverei Westphalia, either owing to its repudiation of me forms or to its explicit endorsement of the concept weak, did it implicitly recognize sovereignty, insofar 1 Treaty of Minister, CTS, 1648-9, pp.300, 345. 2 G. Livet, L'intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV, 1648-1715 (Paris, 1956), This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 582 Derek Croxton treaty among equals? Both political scient claim that Westphalia 'sanctioned' or 'con already in existence. Justin Rosenberg, for Westphalia as having begun 'an overt process ing of the state-system' in the 'alternation of had happened previously was not the alter Similarly, Stephen D. Krasner and Janice E. 'went some way toward domesticating and and civil conflicts generated by religious dif inclusive European treaty to that time tacit existence as an interstate document that reg arrangements between states. The peace of Westphalia was not in fact a m lateral treaties, one signed at Osnabrii Emperor, the other at Miinster between Fra treaties were not new; the Emperor himself European monarchs nominally his subord Westphalia recognize the equality of the sign sovereignty is usually held to imply equal dence at Miinster is legendary. In spite of French and Swedish embassies to meet in 16 ating strategy, they failed because they could meeting.2 The French offended the Dutch b title; and, although not solely responsible fo separate peace with Spain at Miinster nin Westphalia, the French action was impolit negotiating position.3 Amidst all the dispute challenged the Emperor's primacy, the on unity in the Middle Ages. One can hardly re 'Austriae est imperare orbi universo' ('Austr with the mutual recognition of sovereignty a Even without these qualifications, howev could not be seen as a treaty between sov endorses the concept of exclusive spheres of precisely the opposite notion: France and 1 J. Rosenberg, 'A Non-Realist Theory of Sovereignty? Gidd Millennium, xix (1990), 253; Krasner and Thomson, 'Gl Sovereignty', p. 198. 2 See D. Croxton, Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Card phalia, 1643-8 (Selinsgrove, 1999), ch. 6. 3 Dickmann, Der Westfdlische Frieden, pp. 208-9. 4 J. Burkhardt, Der Dreifiigjdhrige Krieg (Frankfurt, 1992), p This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 583 that they fought not against the Empire, but only against the Em his capacity as ruler of hereditary lands in Central Europe.1 than fighting against the Empire, France claimed to be fighting^r defending the German estates from an assault on their constitu defined privileges and immunities.2 France interpreted the war as tempt to resist the Habsburgs' unlawful absolutism. Implicit in the ation is the claim that one state may legitimately intervene in the a another to defend the other's fundamental laws. This conception of national law grants subjects and intermediate bodies an intern status. Far from restricting sovereignty to a few independent states fore, the peace of Westphalia entrenched its extension to politic clearly not sovereign in the sense of being independent, but subjec higher authority. The view was not unique to the Empire, however difficult an ent may have been to explain in seventeenth-century legal terms, and contained political sub-units more independent and de facto 'so than any other European state. France did not restrict to the Empi claim to defend the rights of peoples. It intervened in Catalo Portugal on the same legal grounds: that of protecting the constitu the Spanish monarchy against illegitimate attempts to impose abso In part, the claim was based on the existence of 'composite monarc Europe, cobbled together out of different kingdoms and princip France might easily claim a right to defend Portuguese immunities, were explicitly protected by the Spanish crown. But France itse composite monarchy containing several provinces d'etats with privileges in relation to the crown. One French diplomat at the con Westphalia told Alsatian politicians that as France already respe liberties of free provinces such as Languedoc, it would respect liberties in the same way. That Alsace, Brittany, and Provence wer ually incorporated into France and today form what we think of a dissoluble national unit should not obscure the limited and con nature of French authority in the 1640s.5 In short, the French pol 1 See Scheuner, 'Die grossen Friedensschliisse', pp. 245-6; also H. Duchhardt, 'Westfalisc und Internationales System im Ancien Regime', Historische Zeitschrift, ceil (1989), 529-43. 2 See, e.g., the original instructions to the French plenipotentiaries, A[cta] P[acts] Wfestphali 1, 58-9; Swedish instructions, p. 248. 3 F. Dickmann, 'Rechtsgedanke und Machtpolitik bei Richelieu: Studien an neu entdeckte in Friedensrecht und Friedenssicherung: Studien zum Friedensproblem in der Geschichte (G 1971), pp. 42-6; D. E. Carmack, cLaw in French Diplomacy: From the Treaty of Westpha French Revolution, 1648-1789' (Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia, 1963), pp. 18-19. 4 J. H. Elliott, 'A Europe of Composite Monarchies', Past and Present, exxxvii (1992), 48-71. 5 On the limitations of royal authority in France, see W. Beik, Absolutism and Society in Se Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (New York, 1985). This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 584 Derek Croxton recognizing provinces of other monarchies - s and all of the estates in the Empire - as indepe cannot be explained as following inherent f None of the provinces that France recognize sovereign unit; some, such as Portugal, succ Catalonia, failed. In all cases, however, their ex to justify intervention in the affairs of a for concept of sovereignty. A second concept underpinning the peace of W ably, which also implicitly questions state sove viding that all signatories jointly guarantee the and agree to fight to restrain them if neces national league so dear to Cardinal Richelieu an successor, Cardinal Mazarin, never amounted t objected and the clause was never invoked as league, had it existed, would not rule out the i would only have enforced voluntary agreemen the idea highlights seventeenth-century notion eignty, at least among states such as France w statesmen still thought of themselves as be Christiana', or had begun to think in more sec assumed that they shared a common culture wi the states system should be regulated by agreem of an international league was not too far remo 'Grand Design' published in 1638 or Emeric Le Nouveau Cynee in 1623, f°r pacifying Europ lying all three are similar to those of internatio As the peace of Westphalia contributed little t sovereignty, either explicitly or implicitly, a be cance is to consider the views of the statesmen 1 Treaty of Munster, CTS, 1648-9, pp.309, 354. 2 See A. Dupront, lDe la Chre"tiente a TEurope: La passion w Forschungen und Studien zur Geschichte des Westfdlischen F franzosischer und deutscher Historiker vom 28. April-30. April 49-84; R. H. Foerster, Die Idee Europa, 1300-1946 (Munich, 196 im Frankreich des 17. Jahrhunderts: Vorstellungen und Wirkli 305; Turrettini, La Signification des traites de Westphalie, pp. 8 3 See Sir J. A. R. Marriott, Commonwealth or Anarchy? A Survey o to the Twentieth Century (London, 1937); E. V. Suleyman, The and Eighteenth-Century France (New York, 1941), pp. 9-30; Max des sages et royales Oeconomies d'Estat', Nouvelle Collection France, ed. J. Fr. Michaud and J.-J.-F. Poujoulat: XVI, XVII (Par This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 585 they thought about sovereignty and how they hoped to embody the in the peace. This approach has the advantage of recognizing W for what it was, a compromise peace, and thus helps to explain the guities and contradictions in the text. That French statesmen understood the meaning and utility of eignty in various ways is illustrated by their stance towards Alsace. A Mazarin proposed to annex the province as a fief, which wou allowed France to participate in Imperial affairs, including sitting Diet. In the end, however, the French preferred to take Alsace in s eignty. The change can be attributed to a memorandum by the envoy, Abel Servien, in which he set out the arguments in favour o fief and sovereignty, before concluding that sovereignty was prefer hold a territory in sovereignty was better suited to the dignity of th monarchy: 'There is no advantage', wrote Servien, 'that equals that depending on anyone, and of being an absolute sovereign.'1 Imperial officials were as happy to let France acquire Alsace in eignty as France was to have it; in fact, they had suggested it. wished to prevent France from acquiring more rights of interfere Imperial affairs, they, too, preferred a more or less modern conce sovereignty to the feudal conception of interlocking jurisdicti loyalties.2 Servien also differed from his colleagues, Count d'Avaux and the duke de Longueville, in his interpretation of the clauses transferring Alsace and the Three Bishoprics to France. D'Avaux reported in October, shortly after the preliminary treaty had been signed, that 'in Lower Alsace we have only acquired the provostship of Haguenau with sixty villages; the towns belonging to the clergy and all the nobility being immediate to the Em- pire.'3 He must not have supposed that it was legally impossible to acquire the immediate estates by treaty, as Wolfgang Hans Stein and Klaus Malettke have claimed,4 because in an earlier letter about the Three Bish- oprics, he reported that he and Servien would try to obtain sovereignty over them.5 His statement does imply, however, that France may not 1 Servien to Lionne, 14 June 1646, Die Franzosischen Korrespondenzen: 1646, APW, [series] II [section] B, iv, no. 12. I thank Anuschka Tischer, Konrad Repgen, and the Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte for allowing me to use this volume prior to its publication. Much of this went directly into the plenipotentiaries' common memoir to court on 9 July (Negotiations secrUes touchant la paix de Munster et d'Osnabrug, iii. 244-5). 2 K. Ruppert, Die Kaiserliche Politik aufdem Westfd'lischen Friedenskongrefi (1643-8) (Munster, 1979), pp. 135, 174-7, 182-3. 3 D'Avaux to Mazann, 23 Oct. 1646, APW, II B, iv, no. 217. 4 W. H. Stein, 'Das franzosische ElsaBbild im DreiBigjahrigen Krieg' ', Jahrbuch fur westdeutsche Landeskunde, v (1979), 131-53; K. Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahr- hundert (Marburg, 1994), p. 384. 5 D'Avaux to Mazarin, 3 Sept. 1646, APW, II B, iv, no. 141. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  586 Derek Croxton acquire rights over the immediate estates; t resolved by negotiation. Servien, on the other hand, stated that the im included in the rights transferred. Imperial off The immediate estates found in the Three Bishop longed directly to the Empire will remain so in th contradiction, it not being possible that they cede rights of the Emperor and the Empire over the Th and on the other that they retain those rights which Empire.1 As these letters were written at slightly different times, the differences might be attributable to the clauses under negotiation. In that case, the clauses transferring Alsace to France would have to exclude the immediate estates more clearly than those transferring the Three Bishoprics, which is not the case: the Alsatian clauses are more comprehensive. The Three Bishoprics are disposed of in a single paragraph which acknowledges France's 'supreme dominion, rights of superiority, and all other rights'. In Alsace, the Emperor not only cedes 'all rights, properties, domains, pos- sessions, and jurisdictions that have belonged to him, to the Empire, or to the family of Austria', but is also enjoined, 'for the greater validity of the said cessions and alienations', specifically to abolish all previous laws to the contrary, 'and in the same way to exclude in perpetuity all means of restitution whatever, whatever right or title they might be founded on [simulque in perpetuum excludunt omnes et restitutionis vias quocunque tamdem jure titulove fundari possent]'.2 Although a later clause does make an exception of the immediate estates, what sense, as Servien asks, does it make to transfer all rights and yet not transfer them at the same time? The complexity of the negotiations over Alsace obscures the consensus among French policy-makers about sovereignty. They agreed that France was an absolute monarchy with sovereignty concentrated in the hands of the king, whose power was theoretically unlimited except by obedience to God and natural law. Whereas other states were 'sovereign', in none of them was sovereignty located, as in France, in a single person. Whether they were limited monarchies, oligarchies, or republics, their subjects shared in the exercise of sovereignty and hence had a status in international law. Thus, France might legitimately intervene in the Empire's internal affairs to protect the princes' rights against the Emperor's illegal actions, and might also insist that the Imperial Diet ratify the peace of Westphalia, because the Imperial estates enjoyed the right of deciding for war and 1 Servien to Lionne, 11 Sept. 1646, APW, II B, iv, no. 152. 2 Treaty of Munster, CTS, 1648-9, pp. 295, 297, 340-2. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 587 peace ('ius belli et pads'). On the other hand, the French resisted the peror's attempts to require the parlement of Paris or the Estates-Gen France to ratify the treaty. Although similar claims had been enfo France previously, by the 1640 s the royal government had succeed depriving all other institutions, especially representative ones, of r sibility for foreign policy and war.1 Thus, French officials clearly fined the principle of sovereignty as the independence of the gove from foreign interference, but they applied the principle to France Not only did French officials assume that the royal governme sovereign and possessed a right of intervention in other states, but also assumed that France had a legitimate claim to most of Europe. fourteenth century, French jurists discovered the 'Salic Law', which clared that since the foundation of the monarchy women might not the throne. Gradually, a second 'fundamental law' of the kingd developed: that the royal demesne was inalienable. At first, the res applied only to the king's personal lands, and was intended to preve monarchy from weakening itself. In Richelieu's day, however, extended to all of France. In essence, the law stated that France mi cede territory; a treaty that did so was invalid. By this ingenious means, France extended its rights over most of E by redefining the inalienable kingdom to include everything t ancient Gauls had ever occupied. The claim was the last and mos tious in a series of self-serving interpretations by French jurists in lieu's service.2 As a consequence, Richelieu - who seems to have b what he was told - acted as if France had a right not only to borde tories such as Alsace, but also to Portugal, Castile, Catalonia, A Roussillon, Sicily, Naples, Milan, and Lorraine. The French showed how seriously they took the claims by giving subjects, acquired by conquest, not a 'lettre de naturalite', or natur paper, as were foreigners, but a 'lettre de declaration de naturalite' in effect ^-incorporated them into the French state.3 Richelieu that he refrained from enforcing France's rights only out of a 'juste ation': Europe was prevented from becoming French by the grace o king of France.4 Hermann Weber convincingly argues that Richelieu strove f 1 At the treaty of Arras in 1435, Burgundy had required that France obtain ratifications from t towns and nobles of the realm: J. G. Dickinson, The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Med macy (Oxford, 1955), pp. 193-6. The parlement also ratified almost every other seventeenth treaty, including the treaties of the Pyrenees, Aix-la-Chapelle, Nijmegen, Ryswick, and Utrec 2 Carmack, 'Law in French Diplomacy', pp. 297-8. 3 Dickmann, 'Rechtsgedanke und Machtpolitik', pp. 54-65. 4 Ibid., pp. 65-70. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  588 Derek Croxton permanent peace in Christendom.1 This point one can imagine someone else - for example, a army as his profession, the kind of adventurer w Italy - who valued glory over peace, acting as w a wolf: a predatory state with unlimited aims w more than what it possesses.2 Richelieu, noneth statesman who worked to create a society of fre His foreign policy followed from the premis dangerous power in Europe; accordingly, Fra alliances to block Spanish aggression. Once Spa Richelieu hoped to put France in Spain's place Richelieu was a realist insofar as he assumed ments by themselves would not ensure peace. 'E wrote in the preface to the instructions to the Westphalia, 'that the Spaniards only keep their ful to them and they do not have any occasi tageously.'3 He had three means in mind to b habit. First, on the most idealist level, France w Europe against Spanish aggression by internatio of a peace treaty similar to the one signed at W would ally with every European state willing to alliances a basis in international law by organizin one created by the peace of Westphalia. Third right to intervene militarily throughout Eur structing Spanish violations. Although the right treaty, to give effect to it France would occupy and south of the Alps (they turned out to be Br would enable it to project its troops into areas S Christendom would be united and live in peac power and historical role, would provide pro ception of sovereignty was traditional in that it other states. * * * A great deal of creativity is required to attribute sove Westphalia in the way scholars have traditionally don 1 H. Weber, '"Une Bonne Paix": Richelieu's Foreign Policy and the Peac lieu and His Age, ed. J. Bergin and L. Brockliss (Oxford, 1992), pp. 45 europeen dans la politique du Cardinal de Richelieu', XVIIe Siecle, xlii ( prompte: Die Friedenspolitik Richelieus', in Zwischenstaatliche Frieden FriiherNeuzeit, ed. H. Duchhardt (Cologne, 1991), pp. 111-29. 2 R. L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of 1998), p. 89. 3APW,i.pt. 1,71. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 589 able to treat the negotiations at the congress (as opposed to the treati followed) as an important and identifiable stage in the evolution states system towards sovereignty. Nobody began or even ended the tiations at Westphalia with the idea of creating an international sys sovereign, independent states. Many, however, wished to protec own sovereignty. France not only wished to exclude the parlement the ratification, but also to extend French authority into other terri For Sweden, however, securing its own sovereignty was work enoug Although Gustavus Adolphus no doubt wished to be elected Em after his great victories in the early 1630s, his chancellor, Axel Oxen had no illusions ten years later about the likelihood of Sweden eminence. He wrote to his son Johann, who led the Swedish delegat the peace conference: 'As far as the peace talks are concerned, do no yourself be disturbed that they go so slowly... Powerful and c enemies, ill-willed allies, the interests of all the powers and republi Europe struggling with each other can make a confusing negotiation disguise the outcome... but... great negotiations require a long tim great men.'1 Oxenstierna's goal was not international harmony, secure adequate power to preserve Sweden's independence. 'We m our security from God, and, next to him, ourselves,' he explain other promises are nothing other than winning time and circumsta form other plans contrary to our interests.'2 Rather than meet disho with dishonesty, he planned to be well prepared. He told his son to as far as possible malicious activities. But remain none the less reali all your actions.'3 Sweden, with around two-and-a-half million people and not we was preoccupied with protecting itself. Owing to Oxenstierna's reali ception of international politics, Sweden was more determined France to obtain material security (in the form of provinces and fort to institutionalize its status as an independent state. Whereas Frenc cials spoke of controlling the gateways into Germany and Italy,4 Sw second plenipotentiary, Johan Adler Salvius, compared its territoria institutional ambitions at the congress to a fortress: for Sweden, 'the Sea will be the ditch, Pomerania and Mecklenburg will serve as coun scarp, and the other Imperial estates will be, so to speak, the outer w 1 A. Oxenstierna to J. Oxenstierna, 27 April 1647, Die Schwedischen Korrespondenzen: 16 APW , iii. 396, same to same, 4 May 1647, APW, II C, iii. 402. 2 A. Oxenstierna toj. Oxenstierna, 11 July 1646, Die Schwedischen Korrespondenzen: 1645-6 C, ii. 370. 3 A. Oxenstierna toj. Oxenstierna, 10 March 1646, APW, II C, ii. 189. 4 G. Zeller, 'Saluces, Pignerol et Strasbourg: La politique des frontieres au temps de la preponderance espagnole', in Aspects de la politique francaise sous Vancien regime (Paris, 1964), pp. 114-27. 5 S. Goetze, Die Politik des schwedischen Reichskanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegeniiber Kaiser und Reich This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 5Q0 Derek Croxton In pursuit of this goal, Sweden opposed the le worked to have it left out of the treaty because i by France. It sought to make territorial gains in Verden despite strong opposition from Branden did not offer to indemnify states from which it ac Finally, Sweden pursued a policy of balance of Empire and without, by helping to organize con lysed the Imperial constitution, and by refusing against Spain. For Oxenstierna, Sweden's goa liberty, to re-establish [good relations] with nei publics, and in this manner to conserve the equ Salvius expressed Sweden's interest in a bala plainly: 'The first rule of politics is that the sec equilibrium of the individuals. When one begins the others place themselves, through unions or balance in order to maintain the equipoise.'3 Swe defence and independence, by contrast with Fra as the international mediator and guarantor of ju The idea of sovereignty was not new in the whether sovereignty should be multipolar. The eignty no longer came from the Emperor and t and, increasingly, France; not because they theories of hegemony, but because they had Richelieu's hopes of making France the arbiter o failed owing to the resistance of the numerous independence. States able to limit France's power United Provinces and Sweden - were aware of th anticipate it. Although many statesmen had to co-operate were helped by the increasing number of diplom teenth century, following from the introduction Italy in the fifteenth, and by the insecurity of g of religion.5 As more states were kept abreast of home, they could more easily find allies agai consciously adopt the balancing policies evident (Kiel, 1971), pp. 244-6. 1 See, e.g., the French admonition in Oxenstierna to Christina, 23 J 2 Ibid. 3 G. Parker, Thirty Years' War (2nd ed., New York, 1997), p. 164; principer och Svensk Jamviktspolitik', in Historiska Studier tilla and A. Stille (n.p., 1942), pp. 337-56, which concentrates on Swedi 4 On France's self-description, see Dickmann, Der Westfalische Fr 5 On the role of the intensification of diplomatic relations, see On This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  Sovereignty at Westphalia 591 all mid-seventeenth-century states.1 Although no one yet conce sovereignty as the recognition of the right of other states to rule the territory, the increasingly complex diplomatic milieu shows how a polar system was able to develop. In this sense, one may locate the o of sovereignty around the peace of Westphalia, but only as a conseq of the negotiations, not of an explicit or implicit endorsement of the sovereignty in the terms of the treaties. Ohio State University 1 Cf. K. Repgen, 'Der Westfalische Friede und die Urspriinge des europaischen Gleichgew Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart: Beitrdge zu Grundfragen der neuzeitlichen Geschicht Gotto and H. G. Hockerts (Paderborn, 1988), pp. 53-66. This content downloaded from 124.106.157.101 on Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:07:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms