The Ultimate Philosophy Handbook - Year 12 Unit 3_4.pdf

The Ultimate Philosophy Handbook - Year 12 Unit 3/4 WOLF: Main Premise of Susan Wolf Wants to propose other reasons to explain action Linking it to an innate desire to view our lives as meaningful Proposing that there is a need for us to be subjectively drawn to the action (love the...

The Ultimate Philosophy Handbook - Year 12 Unit 3/4 WOLF: Main Premise of Susan Wolf Wants to propose other reasons to explain action Linking it to an innate desire to view our lives as meaningful Proposing that there is a need for us to be subjectively drawn to the action (love the act), and it have some objective value False Dichotomy False Dichotomy that people either act in pure self-interest (psychological egoism/egoist) OR people act morally (psychologically altruistic) Suzanne proposes that there are other reasons one acts using the example of caring for her brother in hospital, helping a friend move homes or saying up all night to sew your daughter a Halloween costume Proposes that we justify our choices through a sense of self interest or morals but also to demonstrate to ourselves that we live meaningful lives meaningful as something that is not reducible to happiness or morality **Wolf reflects that what she says is not of much practical use Categories we user to think about what to do or how to be 1. Happiness 2. Morality 3. But there is also meaning that informs those two allows us to develop models of human understand that is attentive to meaningful as it affects how we think about other things. Doing things for reasons of ‘love’ Reasons of love: a distinctive individual, creature, activity, ideal or object that has an important role in our lives. Example: heling our your brother, playing the cello Other models of motivation leave out these reasons explains why people do something against their rational self interest but not for any greater good Because presumably helping your brother is against your self interest, but also not aiding an ‘objective’ greater good. Characteristics not all actions motivated by love are justified not all reasons of love are good reasons (i.e. loving someone doesn’t mean you know is best for them) love can be misplaced Wolf’s thesis: wants to defend the claim that positively engaging with a worthy object of love can be justified even if does not promote self interest or the good of the world The concept of a meaningful life Meaning associated with living well depth reflecting on one’s death bed Meaning is aimed at talking about this abstract idea that we all intimately know. Meaningfulness an idea of a significant way in which a life can be seen as good a dimension of value, which we have a serious reason to want for ourselves and others which is neither subsumable by happiness or morality arises form engaging with objects worthy of love in a positive way subjective part: love ‘objective’ part: worthy of love Conditions of a meaningful life 1. Only meaningful the person care deeply about the thing/individual/idea 2. Objects of love have to be worthy smoking pot or crosswords all day is not meaninfgul 1. Need to be engaging not passively witnessing Wolf’s Two Views: 1. Fulfilment View: only has the subjective conditions 2. The Larger-Than-Oneself-View: objective + subjective conditions meaning is based on the quality of activity (not merely meeting subjective loce) for example: Sisyphus happy but not really doing anything meaningful The Fulfillment View fulfillment = good feeling but not all good feelings = fulfillmenty fulfilment /= just dopamine/happiness spending time on fulfilling activities reduces your ability to engages in activities that are merely fun still hedonism, because positive experience is still the only thing that matters It is not obvious what gives fulfillment For example: someone could have a good job a happy family but still feel as if something is missing from their lives This view is inadequate because it doesn’t take into account the quality of value of the act itself Example: smoking pot People who say this life is meaningful probably doesn’t want to make value judgments about someone else’s life Imagine that Sisyphus loves rolling his rock, it doesn’t mean it is meaningful as it is pointless God’s give him a drug to love rolling the rock The Larger Than Oneself View 1. Interpretation One  ‘more than oneself’ what does this mean? does that mean helping out one person is not worth one for one exchange of time hard to calculate value 1. Interpretation Two outside of oneself The Bipartite View life to be meainfgul fulfilling AND contribute positively to something which lies outside the subkect ‘conception of meaningfulness has both subjective and objective elements fitting together to constitute a coherent feature a life can possess’ it could have second hand effects that are not known by the subjkectiuve then it is not meaningful as they aren’t actively engaged in the objective value of the action Example of Sisyphus: scaring away birds that harmed a town far away but he didn’t know it, it would still not be meaningful because he doesn’t know that he is doing so. Return to Sisyphus If Sisyphus is happy (and can be thought to be leading a meaningful life) it can be reasoned that the substance given by God is actually deluding him, making him dumb so is it really meaningful Different on Perspective better to be a unsatisfied man, than a satisfied pig OR he has to roll the stone anyway might as well be happy OR it is better not to be Sisyphus at all Summary do something that makes you fuillfiled but also has objective worth Because: 1. Need to see what we do as valuable to others 2. Aspire to things without bias 3. Need to have self esteem 4. Need/wish to not be alone in our endeavours (connected to a group) 5. Quells feelings of cosmic insignificance These factors all call upon the fact that there is an innate connectedness which affects the quality of our experiencve while there is a desire to do something with objective value, it may simply be metaphorical e.g. an artist who is working in solitude, but makes stuff with objective worth to them Meaning in life is secondary to survival, however there is no reason to dismiss it Calls upon ideas of Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs (physiological needs before self actualisation ones) A lot of people don’t act like they care about objective value Wolf rebuttal: because they can’t articulate it doesn’t mean it is irrelevant Suzanne hypothesises that someone with a meaningful life might not even think about this  we have a deep need to see our lives as ‘objectively’ meaningful and being a part of a community that recognises that To do this engage in activities with independent value (more than just our own view) When we think about a meaningful life the objective aspect is important we don’t want to feel, but actually ‘be Actually have a life that can be viewed as great ‘objectively’ Conclusion Therefore Wolf proposes that their is of equal importance between something being seen as objectively worthy and also subjectively fulfilling for a life to be meaningful Analogies Used 1. Caring for a sick brother, helping a friend move 2. Sisyphus (drugged up and normal) 3. Smoking pot/cross word puzzles NIETZSCHE: Main Premise of Nietzsche — Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche is examining what are values? instead of proposing a morally just way to live, as he is a moral nihilist Believes that there is no objective right or wrong, but we have to create it for ourselves. The Herd Instinct There has always been groups of people And we have been cultivated for obedience and to fit into the group over millennia The need for obedience is now an innate ‘formal conscience’ Which prescribes good and bad behaviour This need to fit into the group seeks to be satisfied and grasps on to all commands surrounding it (all possible action is also somehow affected by this formal conscience) If we take the herd instinct to the extremes there would be no commanders and if there were commanders? This formal conscience would somehow make them delude themselves into believing that they are obeying something greater than themselves e.g. politicians are serving the citizens… commanding leads to a bad conscience, therefore they delude themselves into thinking they are obeying a higher aim or being a servant to the masses The herd man, the ‘common man; makes it so that their virtues are the only good ones public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, forbearance, pity Places where command are inevitable are substituted by elected officials of ‘herd man’ e.g parliament Napoleon was the last great leader of Europe What is morality? The predominant moral judgement of society is a striving towards usefulness for the herd and its preservation immoral: what endangers the herd… As long as moral judgements exist just to preserve the community moral judgements just to preserve the community lies outside of morality (extra-moral) there can’t be a morality For example: when the herd tells you to love your neighbour it is not a moral statement,. it is a statement designed to protect the community. Continued: Love/pity was not considered good or bad, but disdainful The love or care for one’s neighbour is actually an arbitrarily illusion, and is simply an reiteration of the fear of one’s neighbour. To say to love one’s neighbour, it is actually to fear them because they can bring damage to you. Once the society is relatively safe the moral valuation shift to fear of one’s neighbour When there was external dangers strong and dangerous drives such as revengefulness, ambition were honoured because it protected the society for example: Spartans were honoured for their dangerous drives now these drivers are hated by community as there is no outlet for them to be productive for the community Now the antithetical of those dangerous drives is honoured with the herd valuing the fear of one’s neighbour above all ‘Fear is the mother of morality’ When the highest, strongest drives, break out passionately carrying the individual above and beyond the confidence of the community breaks into pieces these drives are subsequently branded as calumniated definition: calumniated made false and defamatory statements about. Anything that raises the individual above the herd lofty spiritual independence will to stand alone great intelligence which makes others quail is branded as evil The mean and average desires are the ones given names and value for example: compassion And as society becomes more peaceful they are less able to stomach extreme desires severity and sternness serves to trouble the conscience Nobility and self-responsibility is seen as a offense against society and awakens mistrust the lamb is held over the shepherd over tenderness tends to become a virtue and sympathises with criminals rather than punishes them  administers that punishment is dreadful as one cannot stomach severity Supposing all danger/fear could be abolished herd morality would cease to exist Present-day Europeans fell under the spell of herd timidity and wish that one day there will be nothing to fear and call it progress The Will to Power Democracy is not just a system in decay but is result of a man in decay becoming mediocre and losing his values Who will be our saviours? new philosophers who are strong and original that make counterintuitive evaluation and questions the ‘eternal values’ change the will of men of the future into ‘new’ paths To teach man the power of his will and to prepare for the great enterprising and experiments in discipline and breeding End to domination of ‘history’ on the human race and herd morality These will be the concerns of the strong, and those who have the strengths to do so must have a heart of brass and a steel conscience An individual who see that ‘man’ himself is degenerating And even more so the failings of the Christian-European ethic an individual who can see man for all that is possible from a man and see that the current ethic is reducing man’s potential that is degenerating and tearing down of a being of the highest rank The collective degeneration of man is turning them into sheep (like animals) With the ideal of these socialist — ‘of the man of the future’ is the ideology of equality The individual must be disgusted at these events and adopt the task of changing this ethic as one’s own responsibility Our virtues The ones who assess the value of things through pleasure and pain hedonist, utilitarian, eudaimonia are naïve because are not conscious of the creative process and anyone who are conscious of the creative process would have pity for them Pity not like the pity for social ‘distress’ but pity to see how man is diminishing himself As ‘society’ wants to abolish suffering we pity that we instead want to increase suffering Suffering creates an elevation of man kind the tension of one’s soul in misfortune creates strength Man is both a creature and the creator Pity for the creature within us destroys the creator. Attacks on evaluation of moral philosophy Nietzsche takes the past of moral philosophy as boring but its utility as something boring must not be overlooked because as little people should philosophise about morality as possible because it is dangerous, insidious and seductive English utilitarians don’t even recognise this they don’t come up with new ideas Moralising is immoral the Englishman is a moral hypocrite ‘moral tartuffery’ Calls to Nietzsche’s quote He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And if you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you The English values are of a striving for ‘comfort and fashion’ This is what is called the path of virtue Not one of these philosophers considers that ‘general welfare’ is not ideal one should not think of these moral philosophers very highly A morality for all is impossible as it constricts the independent among us What is noble? Master morality and slave morality exist in the same person and in society Master: distinguish themselves form the he5rd They come up with the good on their own extends from what they admire the most Good and bad are synonymous with the noble and despicable despised as those who abase them and are cowardly and timid separates himself and dislikes slave morality respects tradition even ones of ignoble origins is the determiner of values does not need to be approved of creates values and knows himself Noble man = man of power power over himself understands how to speak and how to keep silent practising severity and harshness the good life is one of self actualisation of using one’s will to power Slave morality: comes up with values in relation to master morality despises values of the noble or masters and the ‘harm’ brought on by them advocates for cowardice, timidity, petty, doglike type liars are suspicious of the virtues of the powerful convinces himself/themselves the happiness felt by them is not genuine are mistrustful The fundamental element of our humanity is a will to power act itself is not wrong, but what it attempts to achieve for example: A Viking someone who is not made for pity believes that pity only weakens us and softens the herd sympathy is okay, as long as your nor weakened by it Nietzsche is not telling you how to be he is simply giving his thoughts on the world (even though he is heavily advocating for it) nobles are for inspiration not emulation seek a noble origin for your actions Characteristics of a noble Belief in oneself Pride in oneself Hostility towards ‘selflessness’ Cautious against sympathy Master Morality Traits Protracted gratitude Protracted revenge Subtly in requital A need to have enemies to have good friends Slave Morality Traits mistrustful/skeptical of nobles want to believe that the happiness of the powerful is false and comes up with values in relation to them so they can handle their conscious pity, helping hand, the warm hard, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness ‘Essentially the morality of utility’ no such thing as evil, only absence of good slave start with what is considered evil and works backwards for the master fear is exactly what is good. A good person to slave morality is harmless good natured easy to deceive not intelligent (a bit stupid) ‘Where slave morality comes to predominate, language exhibits a tendency to bring the words ‘good’ and ‘stupid’ together Love as a passion must have come from nobles close resemblance as it cares out from itself not in relation to something else Slave: love our of fear/need for comfort Nietzsche’s 4 Virtues 1. self possession 2. to be secretive and mysterious 3. politeness (to the point where it is almo0st condescending, distant) 4. remain a master of one’s own virtues courage insight  sympathy solitude which comes from a sublime urge for cleanliness interactions between men in society is ‘unclean; community makes us ‘common’ because it applies herd instinct thinking. Summary 1. Lays out the herd instinct 2. Slave morality and Master morality slave morality is very similar to fear of one’s neighbour morality of utility 1. Nietzsche guide to life (kind of) new philosophers for new evaluations of morals Nietzsche’s 4 virtues Analgies Used 1. Politicians serving their citizens 2. Viking SOCRATES & CALLICLES: Main Premise of Gorgias Basically this whole discussion is Callicles laying out his view on what a good life is, and Socrates reasoning it to the ground (arguing that it is ultimately a bad way to live) Callicles = good life is pleasure, taking from the weak to fulfill ones own desires Socrates = self discipling, living in harmony Laying out the context Beginning with a repugnant conclusion for Callicles It is best to be good If you do bad, then punishment makes you good Therefore one should accept punishment’s 1. You should lead your family and friends to get punishment swiftly using rhetoric 2. And you should ensure that you use rhetoric to best defend your enemies, so that they can continue to do bad Callicles begins by questioning Socrates as he can simply not accept this repugnant conclusion Socrates responds by telling Callicles not to hate him but to hate philosophy which is seemingly telling him these truths I rather be right, when everyone is wrong then do wrong Unlike you which simply will change to please the crowd This rebuttal leads Callicles to lay out his description of the good life Callicles’s Good Life (pt. 1) Begins by arguing that doing wrong is not as bad as being the sufferer of wrong. Callicles attacks’ Socrates as using rhetorical tricks To when someone appeals to nature (occurring similar to how nature does) He appeals to convention (things imposed on us by society) And vice versa Callicles proposes that virtues and morals are determined by the herd to constrict behavior to limit the power of the strong to stop them from getting a larger share It is right for better to have a greater share According to nature, the stronger should dominate the inferior and thusly have more than him Callicles points out that society captures youth like lions and through convention turns them into weaklings A strong man cast off these chains and trample ‘unnatural’ laws into dust ANALOGY: Just like how Heracles drove Gorgon’s cattle without paying for them things are the property of a man who is better and superior Callicles: Philosophy is useless helps you become more culture but don’t take it too far people should only study philosophy later in life it is a fun hobby but they don’t understand the legal system, so they are out of touch with human nature (or real problems) Politics real good Callicles: stronger > weaker (cont.) the weaker is more contemptuous than the stronger Socrates’ deconstruction of Callicles concepts 1. Herd > Individual Socrates seeks to define stronger Socrates proposes that that according to Callicles that we should follow the herd as opposed to the individual as is the herd not stronger than the individual Following the laws of the masses is natural because it is prescribed by the superior Masses states that doing bad is worst than suffering bad. Callicles redefines superior as being a synonym for being more clever 1. Smarter people should get a higher share? Socrates: Doctors are more clever about food, so should they get more food that the rest of us Should a cobbler get access to all the shoes? Reduction ad absurdum Callicles redefines stronger as more political power, and who posses the courage to see through his policies Rulers should have more than their subjects Socrates: Should people not be able to rule themselves Rule: being self disciplined and mastering the pleasures and desires which arise within oneself Callicles Life view (pleasure) Pleasure = Good (hedonism) Being self disciplined is folly ‘Human happiness is incompatible with enslavement to anyone’ What nature sanctions is right, to grow one’s desires until there grow no larger Weaklings praise self discpline Because they are incapable of winning satisfaction for their pleasures Don’t let culture control you ‘the conventions, opinions, and majority rule you’ Socrates  those who are content and need nothing are not happy? Callicles’s answer: they would simply be stone Analogy of a Jar (pt.1) Jar = part of the mind which desires (susceptible and instable) The mind of fools are leaky because they need to continually be filled and are unreliable A jar of a self-restrained individual who is the master of their desires a jar which retains liquid when filled Body = Sieve (the tool which we use to fill our desires) Mind (which holds desires) = leaky jar Change your mind to prefer an ‘orderly life’ to a ‘self indulgent life of insatiable desire’ Analogy of a Jar (pt.2) Imagine everyone both self indulgent and self disciplined people have the same number of jars. The content of the jars are rare and valuable Self-controlled person fills his jars and they stay full Self-indulgent person, cracked and he’s forced all night and day to keep them full Callicles = ‘the one with the full jars can no longer feel pleasure’ stone, neither feel pleasure or distress Socrates: life like a gully bird, eats and poops at the same time fulfilling their desires and gaining new ones at the same time. Lifetime spent scratching your own back is a life of happiness? This is a life likened to a male prostitute Socrates Rebuttal to Hedonism Are all people happy, no matter the source? Not distinguishing between bad and good pleasure? Callicles claims that ‘pleasant and good’ are synonymous and identical to one another courage, knowledge and goodness are different to one another Socrates’ reply: Good and bad don’t coexist with one another Example: a bad eye can not also be a good eye (be healthy) However pleasant and not pleasant do coexist A person who is thirsty and is drinking water is in a state of distress Because one is thirsty but also pleasure because they are relinquishing their thirst Therefore they have different logics which means they are not synonymous with one another “That to feel pleasure is not the same as to live well, and to live poorly is not the same as to be in displeasure. And therefore pleasant and the good are different’ Socrates continued rebuttal. The degree to which emotions are felt also doesn’t make sense ANALOGY: Cowards in battle are more distressed when enemies come but are more pleased when enemies run away So therefore, because they feel pleasure to a higher degree they live a better life? This is a repugnant conclusion for Calicles Callicles: Changes to admit that there are better and worst pleasures Pleasures which are beneficial with good consequences  are better than pleasures which are harmful and have bad consquences Socrates reply: Then you are coming back to aiming at good action anyway instead of pleasure All actions aim to do something and we want that to be good good should not be a means towards anything else, but should be the goal of every action The difference between a knack and expertise Knack: A skill or action which purpose is for pleasure alone (eg. cooking) Expertise: Aims at a good beyond merely pleasure Some actions are concerned with doing the best for the mind whilst others are simply flattery Knacks are merely flattery For example: political rhetoric is about flattery the masses to earn merit You don’t actually want the best for the audience but to simply please their ears Philosophy on the other hand Is a skill or action which is an expertise because it aims at the good alone not caring about pleasure Speeches by a good man is not aimless but purposed similar to craftsmen do things with a purpose eg. painters, builders, shipwrights Socrates’ Life View Order leads to the good Anything constructed in an orderly manner is alone well We describe processes that ‘organise’ the mind as ‘law’ or ‘convention’ because they make the mind law-abiding and orderly If the mind is bad, we should stop it from doing what it desires keep it to a regime A bad state of mind is ignorant, self indulgent, immoral And through discipline makes it less indlugent Therefore: the life of happiness is practising self disciplkine hasty retreat from self indulgent all efforts which achieve justice and self discipline to guarantee happiness A Disciplined Man acts in an appropriate manner justly (as compared to fellow humans also has courage does not avoid what is appropriate Therefore self disciplined person is courageous, religious, paradigm of goodness A good person, will do things successfully which will bring fulfillment and happiness unrestrained desires leaves one as a predatory outlaw seeking to fulfill them on the other hand a disciplined person acts in accordance with the universe as an ordered whole geometrical equality No one wants to do wrong every wrong act is done unwillingly need to be equipped with the ability and expertise to avoid doing wrong one can avoid doing wrong by being the dictator or be in good terms with the existing government later is way easier Reasoning for ‘order leads to happiness’ A — see section 507c P1 : Self discipline leads to good outcomes P2 : A disciplined mind is a good mind P3: A good mind chooses appropriate actions at the appropriate time and avoids inappropriate ones. P4: A person who does good actions is a good person P5: Success brings fulfillment and happiness C: “Anyone who wishes to be happy must seek out and practice self-discipline and beat as hasty as possible away from self indulgence” Summary (chronological) Callicles basically is like stronger should have more than weaker, better to be stronger Socrates: is the herd not stronger than the individual, so one should listen to the herd and follow convention Callicles is like hedonism is the best life (maximally fulfilling pleasure) Analogy of a jar Life of pleasure is like a gully bird or a male prostitutes Cowards feel pleasure to a greater degree (does it make them better?) The way in which pleasure matters, one can achieve pleasure in a good way or bad way Which means we want to aim at the good anyway and not pleasure Socrates orderly and self disciplined is the best because you act appropriately (and are therefore courageous and brave) and because you act well things go well which means you have success and happiness you also act appropriate or well, so you are a good person Analogies Used 1. Youth like lions, but get molded into slaves 2. Heracles and Geryon’s cattle 3. Analogy of Jar 4. A good eye 5. Cowards in battle 6. Rhetoric vs Philosophy ARISTOTLE: Book 1: The Good For Man All actions are done for some good, those goods are subordinate to another good, therefore there is a chief good to which we all aim. Aristotle uses the example of the end of medical art being health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, and that of economic wealth. Some arts are subordinate to master arts, and therefore all goods are subordinate to the chief good. Aristotle strengthens his point by saying if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (this process would go onto infinity so that our desire would be empty and vain), therefore there must be a chief good The importance of identifying the chief good (archer) Aristotle argues that knowledge of what the chief good will have a great influence on our lives Using the example of an archer who has a mark to aim at, would be much more likely to hit the target Why politics is the science of human good Aristotle argues that politics is the science of human good, as it chooses what should be learned in the state, which class should learn, and up to what point they should learn it legislates what we should do and not do, and this aim must be good for the man While achieving the good for one man is noble and admirable, achieving the good for an entire state appears to be far more so. The nature of political science as imprecise Aristotle makes the point that politics is an imprecise art as any good exhibits a fluctuation that brings harm to people. therefore in the discussion of ethics, we are not looking for demonstrative proofs like mathematics, but only a rough outline. The importance of life experience and education (in achieving human good) To Aristotle, politics is the science of how people can live well. And youth who are ‘inexperienced in the actions that occur in life’ naturally cannot ascribe suitable legislations. He also adds that young people are also too influenced by their passions. And it is not about being young in years or youthful in character But on his living (if he follows his passions) then knowledge holds no profit ‘but tho those who act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit’ Eudaimonia is the chief good (for what all things aim) Happiness is seen as the end for both the general population and those of higher refinement However, happiness to Aristotle is eudaimonia — a kind of living and faring well Reasoning away from the first principles and towards them Aristotle brings up an interesting point, in a short detour, about Plato’s thought about ‘Are we on the way from or to the first principles?’ In this case, Aristotle seems to be doing a bit of both, trying to answer the question of what is good? but also using a mix of self-evident presuppositions that seem evident to him (and the general Greek population) to form a rough outline of a plausible answer. Different Forms of What Brings Happiness? There are three prominent types of life: 1. pleasure 2. political 3. contemplative Why the Good Life Cannot Be the Life of Pleasure Aristotle compares the life of pleasure to a life suitable for beasts that the mass of mankind have a slavish place, citing that it’s also the view of many people in high places. Why it Good Life Cannot be the Political Life Aristotle also makes the point that most people in prominent types of life identify honor with happiness, for that it is the end of a political life However, Aristotle dismisses this as it is ‘too superficial’ as honor is dependent on others who bestow it to someone, then on the person that receives it Furthermore, those who pursue honor according to Aristotle seem to pursue it in order to assure themselves of their merit Men who chase honor, and want to be honored for their virtues, also seem to prefer to be virtuous than honorable, but to Aristotle, this also seems too fickle. Why It Can’t Be The Life of Money-making Aristotle also dismiss the life of money-making as the life of eudaimonia (living well) it is evident that wealth is made for the use of something else money itself is only a means to an end, therefore it can not be the final chief good we are looking for. The Chief Good As Final And Self-sufficient Therefore the Chief Good is Final (the end of all action), Intrinsic (don't for its own sake) Self-sufficient (alone is necessary for the Good Life) and the most desirable of all things. Self-sufficient as it not only for himself but also for his family and friends and his nation (but Aristotle states that we can not extend this too far). Happiness, no one chooses for the sake of something else, but only for itself. The function of a man (not that of plants or animals) something we can only do. Aristotle ascertains the function of a person, to discover what the Chief good for the person is: as he says that saying the chief good for people is happiness seems platitude (not an interesting statement) Here Aristotle argues that something is ‘good’ when it performs its function well ANA: An eye, which has the function of seeing, becomes a good eye when it sees well. So to an ear if it hears well. Aristotle continues by stating that this continues to individuals who are independent of their body parts — just as a carpenter is a good carpenter when they build well, or a lyre a good lyre if they play the lyre well. Hence Aristotle goes on to determine the unique function of a man: Life cannot be it, because plants are alive It is not perception because animals also share this trait Therefore the unique function of an individual must be the reason (following the rational principle) Humans who follow the rational principle (which Aristotle ascribes to the soul) must be ‘good’ However, Aristotle further states that this must be done throughout the whole life, as ‘For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy’ Why not have the main question, subordinate to minor questions Aristotle here goes into the point that these mediations are simply a rough outline and makes an argument about why a rough outline is better as getting too precise about things will be asking the wrong questions. ANA: (Making a point about different ways to answer the same question) That a carpenter and a geometer investigates a right angle in different ways, a carpenter to make something and a geometer for truth. Here Aristotle talks about how we should not put our main question (of what is good) underneath subordinate question (of truly getting precise). That sometimes it is enough in some cases that the facts be well established and from first principles (either by induction, perception, habituation), but also that the principles are properly determined. How our definitions are defined by our beliefs and happiness, To Aristotle, there are three classes of goods. 1. External 2. Soul (Psychical Action) 3. Body Therefore Aristotle states that in defining the good, it is to be defined with actions and activities as these are among goods of the soul and not external goods. Why it makes ‘no difference whether we place the chief good in possession, or in use — in the state of mind or in activity’ The state of mind may exist without producing any good results. We may know what we need to do, but if we do not do it then it makes the knowledge we know obsolete Eg: sleeping Gandhi is as virtuous, as sleeping Hitler ANA: Aristotle uses the example of the Olympic Games, as it is not the most beautiful and the strongest who are crowned but those who compete. Why lovers of what is noble find pleasure in pleasant things, Aristotle makes the case that individuals who are virtuous and good also live pleasantly As no one would call a man just if he did not enjoy acting justly Aristotle makes the point that being good is not just about doing good but also about acting well like how good people act Therefore virtuous actions must therefore be pleasant But they are also good and noble since the good man judges well what is good and noble. And happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world. The good life requires external goods too — the equipment for acting virtuously Aristotle, however, argues that to act well there is a need for external good As it is not easy to do noble acts without the proper equipment In many cases, it could be political power, friends, or instruments However, misfortune can bring unhappiness such as not having good children, losing loved ones, or being very ugly would mean it would be hard to be happy. Therefore some identify happiness with good fortune and others virtue (as it takes good fortune to be virtuous) Book 2: Moral Virtues Intellectual and Moral Aristotle states that there are two kinds of virtue: intellectual and moral.  We learn intellectual virtues by instruction, and we learn moral virtues by habit and constant practice. Moral virtues As A Habit (Stone example, Build access) Unlike intellectual virtue, moral virtue is built by habit. One becomes a good builder or a good lyre player by building and playing respectively So does, one become a good man by acting virtuously Moral virtue is not built into us by nature, as what is made in us by nature we cannot change (form a habit contrary to) A stone which nature is to move downwards can not be habituated to move upwards Conversely for we can act virtuously we can also do the opposite being, vice 1. First, we acquire the potentiality 2. Then we act virtuously 3. Also, that is the same as vice As a good or bad builder/lyre player becomes good or bad, by their good or bad actions So for the individual to become good, they have to habituate good rather than bad actions. The need for teachers As previously mentioned one state of character comes from acting as an individual becomes just or unjust as a result of acting just or unjustly Therefore the habit for good action needs to be taught to the youth, and teachers are very important in establishing a habit. Actions can’t be prescribed exactly, but excess and defect must be avoided Achieving the good is a matter of finding the intermediate between two extremes Although correct actions cannot be prescribed as it depends on circumstances Individuals should be guided to avoid excess and defect ANA: Too little or too much exercise, as well as too little food or too much food, will ruin one’s health. Health is achieved by achieving the intermediate Pleasure in doing virtuous acts is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired Aristotle argues that those who find pleasure in doing virtuous acts signals that they have developed a virtuous disposition ‘for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent’ Moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains. As people do bad things for pleasure and are afraid to do good things out of pain. Therefore people from youth should be guided to feel pleasure and pain for the right things. There are three objects of choice and three of avoidance The objects of choice 1. the advantageous, 2. the pleasant 3. the noble Their opposite 1. the base, 2. the injurious, 3. the painful We must from infancy be habituated to feel pleasure and pain correctly Aristotle argues from infancy we have to be trained to feel pleasure correctly, as many of us falsely measure our actions through pain and pleasure. Using the example of Heraclitus’ phrase that it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger making an argument about how fallible our feelings can be in helping us find what is good. One cannot be virtuous by acting virtuously, they have to be in a certain state of character Aristotle points out that arts are different from virtue, as art have goodness in the result of activity, whilst virtue is in the activity itself Therefore individuals have to be in a certain state of character for them to be virtuous and it is not something that happens simply by chance (unlike art where you can create something good by change) Aristotle lays out three things to be able to act virtuously 1. knowledge 2. chose the act (and for their own sakes) 3. must proceed with the firm and unchangeable character Another reinterpretation: 1. virtuous people know they are behaving in the right way; 2. second, they choose to behave in the right way for the sake of being virtuous; and 3. third, their behavior manifests itself as part of a fixed, virtuous disposition. ‘actions are just and temperate when they are performed exactly how a just and temperate man would do it’, not merely the result’ Moral virtue is not a passion, nor a faculty it is a state of character definition: passion emotions or feelings definition: faculties the capacity to feel emotions or feelings Aristotle makes the point that moral virtue is not a passion nor a faculty and instead of a state of character by pointing out that We are neither praised and blamed for our passions, but praised simply for our virtues and vices. That we have no control over what emotions we do, but what we do with those emotions is what we are judged on. He takes this reasoning similarly to faculties, as we are not judged on our ability to feel anger, but being able to be temperate despite anger. As faculties exist in us naturally, but not moral virtues. The differences in moral virtue are the capacity to choose the mean Here Aristotle proceeds wanting to answer, not that it is only a state of character. But precisely what state of character it is? He determines this to be a state of character which makes him good, and what he does well. ANA: He uses the analogy of an eye, which is considered excellent, when it itself is good and that it can see well. As well as a horse is called excellence when the horse is good in itself and good at running (achieving its aims) The intermediate is not an arithmetic proportion Aristotle makes the point that the mean/intermediate is relative to us and differs based on who it is  Using the example that too little food for a wrestler would be far more than enough for an ordinary man, so too a naturally cowardly person would consider bravery much differently to one less so. Art is also aiming at the intermediate Aristotle makes the point, comparing virtue with art ANA: Art is also said to aim at a mean, As people say with a great piece of art that nothing can be taken away or added to it, implying it destroys the goodness of the painting if there is excess or deficiency Aristotle continues with the point that Virtue is better than art, therefore it must have the quality of aiming at intermediates Moral virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and in these, there is an excess, defect, and the intermediate Aristotle makes the point, alongside many other philosophers that, There is only one way to be good, but many ways to be bad Bringing up the point of why the intermediate is so hard to aim at CON: Therefore virtue. is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in the mean, where the mean is relative to us, Properties of the intermediate, excess, and deficiency Not every action/passion admits of a mean There is simply something that in their name implies badness (eg: murder, adultery, shamelessness), and for these acts that are bad there is no excess or deficiency. Because if there were an excess, mean, and deficiency for everything. It would go on infinitely as there would be an excess, mean and deficiency for some excess (eg, cowardess) The two vices are opposed to each other, and to the mean the greatest difference is of the vice to each other, and then they are both opposed to the mean In some cases, one vice is closer/further to the intermediate than another Given that this is not something with arithmetical quantity some means are closer to one vice than the other. For instance, courage is closer to rashness than cowardice, which makes one vice worst than the other (cowardice, being worst than rashness) Aristotle’s Examples Here there is a long passage, Aristotle moves away from theory to bring his thoughts to the real world by giving examples Pleasures and pains; insensibility, temperance, self-indulgence Confidence; cowardice, courage, rashness Giving Money; meanness, liberality, prodigality Honor and dishonor; undue humility, pride, empty vanity The things to which we normally tend are more contrary to the intermediate Aristotle makes the point that things overtime tend to move towards excess or deficiency rather than the mean As there are many ways to be wrong and only one way to be right This is why he makes the point that finding the middle is not an act of reasoning but also perception, The mean is hard to obtain: At least two of the helpful tips/guidelines given by Aristotle on how to go about ensuring you achieve the mean. 1. Avoid the worse vice 2. Consider our natural tendencies and aim for the contrary extreme  3. Pleasure is to be most guarded against — hence habituate insensibility 4. Deviate a little bit if needs be but not a lot 5. Consider our natural tendencies and aim for the contrary extreme, 6. The mean is individualized and thus we may deviate a little from it on a personal level A Reformulation Of The Above Points. 1. first, avoid the extreme that is farther from the mean; 2. second, notice what errors we are particularly susceptible to and avoid them diligently 3. third, be wary of pleasure, as it often impedes our judgment. AOS 1 — Mind and Bodies. 1. Consciousness The main problems of consciousness 1. The Descriptive Question What is consciousness? What are its features? and by what means can it be modeled, explained, or described? 2. The Explanatory Question How does consciousness come into existence? Is consciousness an aspect of reality (the spirit) or does it come from non-conscious entities (materialism)? 3. The Functional Question Why does consciousness exist? Does it have a function and what? Does it causally fit and if so what are its effects (free will)? Does it make a difference in the operations of a system (free will? 2. the Hard Problem definition: the hard problem of consciousness is the explanatory question of why we have qualia or phenomenological experiences. This is contrasted with David Chalmers’s ‘easy questions’ of what physical systems allow us to discriminate, integrate, report mental states, focus, attention, etc... 3. Dualism Dualism is the theory that the mind and the body are separate entities. That something psychical is above and over simply the body. 1. Predicate Dualism mind things and statements are not reducible to physical ones i.e: water is H20 (mind statements can not do this) 2. Property Dualism property dualist ‘the ontology of physics is not enough to describe what there is’ 3. Substance Dualism there are two types of substances (Descartes) mind stuff and physical stuff 4. Materialism/Physicalism Philosophical monism that holds ‘matter is the fundamental substance of nature’ and that mental states consciousness are a result of material interactions 5. Behaviourism  insist on confirming ‘hypotheses about psychological events in terms of behavioural criteria’ A way of looking at the constraints of knowing of psychological states. 6. Qualia The distinctive subjective character of experience. synonyms: a subjective experience, the personal experience of life, consciousness 7. Mental States The mental state is a state of mind that an agent is in, ie: love, hate, pleasure and pain. Different from brain state (the physical) 8. Monism The theory that everything is made up of one thing (physicalism = monism, just matter) 9. Immaterialism/idealism A theory of dualism that things are based on a perfect form of something The brain is a representation of the perfect brain (Plato) 10. Epiphenomenalism That there are distinct psychical properties, however, physical can affect mental but mental can not go the other way Dualism. 11. Interactionism Dualism but they affect one another. Epiphenomenalism (but both ways instead of just one-way street) 12. Parallelism Dualism but no causal interaction between the two. 13. Functionalism Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution, but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive system of which it is a part. More precisely, functionalist theories take the identity of a mental state to be determined by its causal relations to sensory stimulations, other mental states, and behavior 14. The mind-body problem The mind-body problem is the debate concerning the relation between thought and consciousness in the human mind, and the brain as a part of the physical body. DESCARTES: First Meditation (radical skepticism) GOAL: Descartes with his first meditation calls us to bring everything we know into doubt so we can be confident that the foundations will be stable and likely to last. Descartes proposes to dispel anything in our beliefs that have even fooled us once for the purpose of rejecting all opinions. Belief is a product of sensory experience. ARG: Descartes makes the point that everything we have acquired is from sensory experience, and that sensory experience is fallible often deceiving us Eg: things that are very small, or in the distance Madman Analogy ARG: Descartes compares our senses to that of a madman, who is confused into believing that the reality that they perceive is real. And brings forth the question of whether our senses are similar to that of this madman? Dreaming Analogy OBJ: “Surely such people are insane, and we aren’t madmen” ARG: He supports his Madman analogy by convincing us that even if we don’t believe that we are Madmen (and that our senses can be an illusion) that every night we have the ‘same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake’. Adding to the point, ‘I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep’ Real Even When Asleep (colors, sirens, satyrs) PRE: Descartes makes the point that we may be asleep and that when we move our hands in our dreams we aren’t really moving our hands, but something cannot come from nothing. The visions which we see in our dreams are a synthesis of many different things like colors, objects, perspective… therefore these things must be real even if our sensory perceptions are wrong. ANA: Painters when painting a picture of sirens or satrys with the most extraordinary bodies, ‘cannot give them natures which are new in all respects’, and even if they do by inspiration more simple things such as colors must be real as compared to general things like eyes, head, hands… CON: Disciplines that deal with composite things (such as physics, astronomy, medicine) are doubtful while arithmetic, geometry, and other subjects that deal with the most abstract and simplest things (even if they don’t really exist in nature) contain something certain and indubitable. ANA: Whether I am awake or asleep, 2+3 = 5, or a square has 4 sides. God As a Great Deceiver OBJ: What if god was a great deceiver that made us go wrong every time we added 2 + 3 or said that a square has 4 sides? OBJ: But God is supremely good and it would be inconsistent with his goodness to have created me to be deceived all the time? OBJ: Then it would be equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be deceived occasionally (but this he certainly does do). And for those who don’t believe in an omnipotent God, the less powerful my cause (not god) therefore the more I shall be deceived. PRE: Therefore Descartes having no answer to these arguments, compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs that doubts cannot be raised. CON: Therefore Descartes attempting to turn his will in the opposite direction imagining that there is not a supremely good God, but a supremely evil demon that uses its power in order to deceive him. GOAL: Descartes uses this analogy to try to rid of his habit of accepting highly probably opinions, and guard himself against assenting to any falsehoods. However, he states that due laziness brings him back to normal life and reimbues his mind with falsehoods even if they are doubtful. ANA: Like a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginary freedom while asleep; and as he suspects being asleep, he dreads being woken up and goes along with the pleasant illusion. Second Meditation (Cogito, Ergo Sum) GOAL: To find one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable Deep Whirlpool ARG: Descartes meditates on the fact that his previous line of reasoning has left him in an untenable position, where he is left without ground to stand all his knowledge atop of. No Senses Or Thoughts ARG: Continuing on from the last meditation, from the point where Descartes points out that all his senses are fallible. However, he extends this by throwing doubt onto his thoughts imagining if a god was to put him into the thoughts that he is currently having, Cogito, Ergo Sum PRE: However, even if his thoughts are imbued into him by an evil demon and that nothing is real. Even the fact that Descartes can be convinced of something means that he certainly exists. CON: Therefore, ‘I am, I exist’ is true whether it is conceived in my mind. What does “I” mean? PRE: Descartes proposes the idea that I am a ‘rational animal’ OBJ: But quickly dispels this claim as it requires him to enquire about what an animal is, and what rationality is, and that would lead him down a slope of subtleties. What is “I” (cont.) ARG: Descartes proposes these possible options for I. 1. Face, hands, arms, and the whole mechanical structure of limbs can be seen in a corpse. determinable shape and a definable location and occupies space excluding other objects; can be perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell and can be moved CON: However Descartes using the analogy of the demon comes to the conclusion that he cannot assert that even an insignificant attribute pertains to the nature of the body because he may be simply being deceived. 2. Nourished, Move About, Sense-Perception (which Descartes attributes to the soul) ARG: Sense Perception as the I OBJ: Sense Perception clearly does not occur without a body, and during dreaming, you are tricked into sensing things that you truly did not sense. 3. Thinking (which Descartes attributes to the soul) ARG: Descartes comes to the realization that this alone is inseparable from me. I am — I exist this is certain. PRE: Descartes makes the argument for as long as he is thinking he can be certain that he exists CON: Therefore it is necessarily true that in the strictest sense, that ‘I am a mind, intellect, reason’ Grasping the I through Imagination PRE: Descartes proposes that I am a thinking thing and that everything I grasp related to sensory perceptions (corporeal things) is doubtful CON: Using his imagination to invent a conception of I that would provide a clearer representation of I would simply be putting thinking in terms of sensory perceptions that he has already deemed as fallible. Qualities of a thinking thing ARG: Descartes proceeds to propose some qualities of a thinking thing being that it doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions because even if the objects of thought can be cast into doubt the fact that one is doing so is evident, and this is what constitutes thinking The Wax Analogy ARG: Descartes uses the wax analogy to mount a rebuttal against the common perception of identity that the mind attaches to corporeal bodies. PRE: The wax is usually identified by the properties it has; shape, color, scent, taste… but the wax in the process of being transformed by the fire it loses the properties that it once held. However, most would agree that the wax is still wax. This point brings into question what distinctness of the wax, that makes it wax? It is not the fact that it is a changing thing, as the imagination cannot imagine through all the possible iterations of the wax CON: Therefore Descartes proposes the nature of the wax is not revealed by the imagination or its qualities but by the mind alone (but through mental scrutiny). Automatons/Men in Hats ARG: Descartes uses this analogy to bring focus to the process the mind uses to make inferences about objects outside of what is purely sensed. ANA: Descartes when he looks out his window says that he sees ‘men crossing the square’ but really he does not see anything except hats and coats which could be concealed robots. But that he judges they are men, but instead says that there are men crossing the square. CON: One can get closer to the nature of objects (like the automatons, or the wax) through a more careful investigation of the nature of the wax. Consideration Brings About a knowledge of “I” ARG: Descartes makes the claim that consideration of these objects, also provides evidence for the existence of the thinking mind. ‘For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exists’ PRE: Judging the existence of the wax to be true, and that the existence of the wax comes from a thinking mind. CON: Therefore the mind must exist. EXT: By extension by understanding the nature of the wax more distinctly and precisely (in many different ways), one also has a better understanding of the thinking mind. As the nature of bodies is not experienced by the senses or the faculty of the imagination but by the intellect and by the process of understanding. CON: Therefore as the nature of things is found through the process of understanding, and the mind is the thing most readily able thing to be scrutinized and understood, for Descartes achieving an evident perception of the mind is easier than anything else. Sixth Meditation (Dualism) ARG: Descartes proposes the argument that given god exists (and everything is created by God) his idea that two objects are distinct from one another and can be separated must also be created by God. Therefore the idea that two things are distinct makes them different from one another. Combining that with the idea that he is nothing but a thinking, non-extended thing, and that he has a distinct idea of the body (as an extended, non-thinking thing). To Descartes, this means that he is distinct from his body, and can exist without it. P1: the mind is a non-extended, thinking thing P2: the body is an extended, non-thinking thing P3: these concepts are separable and distinct, by god, which means they are different from one another. CON: these things are not the same. SMART: Yellowish-orange After Image Example Smart uses the example of a yellowish-orange after image (for example someone looking at the sun and back) to draw attention to a phenomenological experience that is purely subjective. A yellowish-orange after image compared to the experience of seeing a chair is very different as the chair can be said to have an existence outside of that perception compared to an after-image which is only true from that person's point of view. He furthers this point by saying that one’s report of such an image is merely a temptation to report something which is visible to others but does not actually represent a phenomenon in the physical world. By drawing focus to this example, Smart wants to discuss the inability of the physical sciences to effectively explain it. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein states that language is a method of representing phenomena, it does not explain the phenomenon, only giving a limited insight into the thing itself. An example of this would be the reporting of pain, one is not explaining what the pain is, but really it is just replacing crying. Why Pain Is A Poor Example. Smart justifies his choice of using a yellowish-after image to demonstrate his hypothesis instead of pain because Smart believes the report of pain to him entails reporting a state of distress and a state of distress is subject to behaviouristic analysis And this could mislead us into concluding that pain is irreducibly psychical. Smart wants to avoid the suggestion that pain or an afterimage is something irreducibly psychical as it puts it outside of the realm of physical observation which he doesn’t agree with. Why Smart Doesn't Want To Posit A Realm Of Psychical (Dualism)? Smart appeals to Occam’s razor (that the simplest explanation is usually the explanation that is the most accurate). He argues that science is increasingly giving us the view whereby organisms can be seen as physio-chemical mechanisms: and that it seems that the behavior of humans will be explained in mechanistic terms. Smart posits the view that everything so far seems to be able to explain in terms of physics, and that states of consciousness should lie outside of this system of explanations seems to be absurd (calling in a nomological danger). definition: nomological danglers a thing which does not fit within the system of established laws — in this case, Smart is referring to the example of sensations. Smart proceeds to tackle the objection “Why can’t there be psycho-physical laws which are of a novel sort, just as the laws of electricity and magnetism?” This to Smart because first of all, it presupposes to realms and that there are laws in which we can relate these realms And that these laws would have to explain how billions and billions of particles are put together to affect the psychical realm As Smart imagine laws to relate simple constructs not complex systems of particles to a separate non-physical realm. Smart Against the Expressive Account Smart takes issue with the expressive account of sensations as he believes that when someone reports that ‘they are in pain’ There is something that they are actually reporting And it is not a “replace pain-behavior” However Smart wants to make this distinction that it is a genuine report without claiming that there is a non-physical realm in which these sensations occur. Smart’s Main Hypothesis Smart’s main claim is that when we experience a sensation, such as an afterimage, and when we report that sensation to someone who is not/cannot be experiencing it what we are reporting to them is that our brain is in a particular state. However, this is not to say that the brain state is the afterimage. It is merely saying what it is to experience the afterimage, is the combination of neurons that is occurring in our brain. Smart makes this claim not to explain our qualia through physical terms, but place the qualia purely in the realm of the physical. He does this to argue against the objection just because we cannot nail down subjective experience that means there must be something other than physical phenomena. Smart’s Main Hypothesis (cont.) Smart is very clear in his thesis that he is not saying that sensations (X) can be pinpointed to brain process (Y), but merely that a report of sensation (X) is a report of a process, and that process happens to be a brain process. that statements of sensation can be translated into statements of brain processes. nor that the logic of a brain process statements can be translated into the logic of sensation statements. The Nations Analogy Smart uses the analogy of a nation to draw similarities between what he means by sensations are brain processes A nation is nothing over and above its citizens, even though it has a different identity Even though sensations and brain processes appear to be different, it does not mean one is the other. Remarks on Identity Smart is proposing that brain processes are sensations in the strictest sense of the word: ie: a general is the same as a little kid that stoke the apples means that the general is the same 4D time slice as the little child is a 4D time slice of the same person from the past he does not mean that somehow one is simply spatially or temporally continuous with another, but one is the other… Objections + Smart’s Reply Objection One (Bridge of Understanding) 1. One can know about one (describe their sensations) without knowing anything about neurophysiology therefore they can not be the same thing. Smart’s Reply: Morning/Evening Star 1. Smart’s reply is that there can be statements of the form “A is identical with B”, where the person knows something is A but not B. He uses the example that someone can talk about lightning without knowing anything about electricity  Or the example of how early rising Englishmen, and slug abed New Zealanders can both call something the “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” respectively, with both these things being the same thing whilst both are ignorant of that fact. Objection Two 1. Objection Two is the objection that sensory experience is only contingent (could be true or false) on brain processes. We can not be certain that brain processes are sensory experiences because potentially our neuroscience could be wrong. Smart’s Reply 1. Smart’s reply is that the objection does not show that when we report (having an after-image) it is not in fact a brain process. It only shows that when we say “I have an after image” we cannot mean something of the form “I have such and such a brain process”. 2. He refers to the Fido theory of meaning. If the identity of something were what it named then the fact that “sensations” and “brain process” have different meanings that they cannot name one and the same thing. Objection Three 1. When we talk about qualia there are certainly subjective properties to our experience (for ie. the experience of color). These properties seemingly lie outside of the physicalist framework therefore sensations cannot be brain processes. Smart’s Reply 1. His reply is simply that properties of objects (the experience of seeing yellow) still lie within the physical realm (eg: the concept of color is merely the ability to distinguish objects apart from each other). 2. Smart is not proposing that sensations and brain processes have the same logic. 3. Defines properties of experience: When someone is reporting that they are seeing something (ie. a yellow afterimage) they are merely saying that I am seeing something which is of the sort of the images I would see if these conditions would apply (I am awake, my eyes are open, and the yellow is like the color of a banana) 4. The logic of sensations is metaphysically neutral (not presupposing a materialistic or dualistic sense because of how he defines properties of experience are above). 5. Therefore this objection does not disapprove of the claim that sensations are merely brain processes. 6. However Smart does acknowledge that his claim is based on the abstraction of to the extent someone is able to say X is Y, without knowing how they relate to each other. Objection Four 1. The after-image is not in physical space. The brain-process is. So the after image is not a brain process. Smart’s Reply 1. Smart’s reply is simple. He calls this objection an ignoratio elenchi. He is saying that the experience of seeing the after-image is a brain process, not that the after-image is a brain process. Definition: ignoratio elenchi a logical fallacy which consists in apparently refuting an opponent while actually disproving something not asserted Objection Five 1. The description we would use for brain processes (fast, slow) are different from those we use to explain sensations. Smart’s Reply 1. He is not saying the properties or logic of these two brain processes, and sensations are the same 2. He uses the example of “somebody” and “doctor”. These two expressions have different logics and properties but it does not mean that they are not the same 3. Great summary of all objections and replies: When someone is talking about their experience (that something is going on), they leave open as to what sort of thing is going on whether it is a material solid medium, or a dualistic medium. Smart is simply saying that the medium is material based on the best evidence. Objection Six 1. Sensations are private, brain processes are public. One can be wrong about brain processes but not sensations (if they aren’t lying). Moreover, multiple people can observe a brain process, but it makes no sense for multiple people to observe a sensation. Smart’s Reply 1. This simply shows that the language of introspective reports has a different logic from the language of material processes. But that does not mean they aren’t the same. 2. When we are sophisticated enough there could be potential to say look at a brain process and say someone is having such and such experience, other than introspective reports. Objection Seven 1. I can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having images, aches, pains, and so on. 2. If sensations are brain stuff are just physical Smart’s Reply 1. Smart states that imaginative power isn’t valuable in determining if X is Y. 2. This is a knock against Descartes's argument for dualism (that one can see a distinction of two things means they must be separate) in Descartes's physical and brain stuff. 3. Smart is simply saying that he is switching the dualist conception of ghost stuff by just saying it's brain stuff. 4. An indivisible atom is “made of” stuff, that being itself. Objection Eight 1. Beetle in the box objection (Wittgenstein) if everyone had a beetle in a box, and could only look at their box. How does one know that we are all referring to the same thing? There could be nothing in the box or something different for every person. This objection is different from the others as it is not arguing that sensations are not brain processes. But more than the language we use (ie the word pain) refers to this public definition of the word and is not truly representative of what ‘pain’ is to each person. This is because we can never be certain that my pain, is the same pain that you feel. This objection does not say there is no such thing as sensations, but merely language doesn’t track sensations but merely their own utility and other words. Objection 8. 1. Smart counters this objection by saying that the individual is merely switching frames when they are talking about sensations. Going from a ‘there is a pain’ to which imply  the phrase ‘it feels to me to be painful’. Switching from terms that deal with the environment around us, to the private experience of our senses. 2. He goes on to consider the question of what is the difference between brain states that cause experiences, and ones that don’t end with the conclusion is that at our present state we don’t know 3. Smart really doesn’t tackle the beetle in the box objection, as it seems not to really be an objection to his hypothesis at all. Epiphenomenalism VS Materialism definition: epiphenomenalism there are psychical things, but it cannot affect the physical. Only the physical can affect it. physical causes you fear (mental state), but fear doesn’t cause you to run away only the physical reaction does Smart makes the claim that there are two things he is trying to claim, 1. the empirical view that mind-stuff occurs in the brain, not the liver or the heart… (which is purely scientific 2. but more important the non-empirical claim between epiphenomenalism and materialism Phillip Gosse Smart uses the example of Phillip Gosse to explain why the epiphenomenalism seems like an inaccurate explanation of the mind-body problem Phillip Gosse makes the argument that the world was made in 4004BC but all the anthropological evidence that date the Earth much earlier also came into existence in 4004BC Smart argues that even though this explanation agrees with all the facts, it could never be accepted by scientist because it offends the principles of parsimony and simplicity Conclusion As there are no cogent philosophical arguments that force us into accepting dualism, and if the brain process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the facts then by virtue parsimony and simplicity seem to overwhelmingly be in favor of the brain-process theory. Smart thinks that dualism involves too many irreducible nomological danglers, that to have to be taken on trust that it would serve to be a poor theory similar to Phillip Gosse’s LOCKE: Laying out the problem of identity Locke lays out the problem of identity by laying out when we try to identify an object we compare it in its current state (in time and space) with ‘itself’ existing at another time, and this is the idea of identity and diversity. It is self-evident that two things of the same kind cannot exist in the same place at the same time, When we compare the identity of something, we compare it with something which is the same with itself (so not multiple things temporally or spacially present) in this instant of time and space.  The difficulty comes when there are little care and attention in having precise notions of things to which it is attributed. Different Types of Substance To Locke, there are 3 types of substances 1. God 2. Finite intelligence 3. Bodies Things of each type can be in the same space, but things of the same type can not concurrently exist in the same space at the same time. Because if multiple things could be in the same place at the same time of the same type, there could be an infinite number of things there and take away the notion of identity (making it obsolete) Identity of Modes Locke thinks things such as motion and thought, are different in every moment and do not have a temporal identity like substances as they all have different beginnings of existence. Principle of Individuation Locke states that 1. the identity of simple things is self-evident, like an atom, we know that it is itself and nothing else 2. however, when we talk about compound things it gets very difficult 3. because let’s say we replace the atoms something, there are certain cases when we still ascribe it having the same identity 4. Analogy: an oak growing from a plant into a great tree, or a colt growing up into a horse sometimes fatter sometimes leaner we still ascribe these things to be the “same” across time even though the matter that makes them up has changed Locke, therefore, concludes that in this case a mass of matter, and a living body, identity is not applied to the same thing. Meaning that matter is not the determinant of something’s identity. Identity of a Plant & Animal Locke argues that for a plant 1. A plant also differs from that of being a bundle of matter, because it is organized in a specific way to fit an aim of receiving and distributing nourishment so as to partake in the same “life”, even if that life is communicated to different particles. 2. Sharing a common “life” forward and backward in time. This organization that brings about life is imbued into any changes of material serving to make a plant a plant. For an animal, Locke makes a similar claim Locke uses the example of a watch, that is organized to fit the same purpose. Even if its parts are replaced or repaired it is the same watch, and when a force is applied it serves the same aim (of telling the time) Locke distinguishes the difference between the watch and animal, saying that the watch works from external forces while the animal generates its own force/motion. Identity of A Man Similarly, with a man, Locke believes that the identity of something is based on the organization of such thing to partake in the “same continued life” even with the changing practices, in one fitly organized body Here Locke mounts an argument against the second view of identity, that the same soul is what makes something that it is by using the imagining that there is nothing stopping one spirit to be in many different bodies, making it that men living in different ages, of different personalities somehow the same person Locke extends this argument by saying that there are also those philosophers who believe that the soul is also carried to other life forms, and Locke’s counter to this is that the language used if this was the case would be so counter to our everything we know. for ie. to say that the soul of Heliogabalus was one of his hogs, or to say a hog was a man or Heliogabalus. The distinction between of the same substance, man, or person Locke furthers his point that the identity of something is that of a partaking of continued life and organization by using the example of philosophizing, reasoning parrot He argues that it would still be a parrot (even though an intelligent, rational one) rather than calling it a man Locke then adds a humorous example of Prince Maurice’s story with a rational parrot (to prove the point that it is still seen as a parrot, even though it can philosophize) TLDR by Locke “For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people’s sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.” — page 39 Personal Identity Locke believes that a person stands for which is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider ‘itself’ as ‘itself, the same thinking thing, in different places He thinks consciousness and thinking are inseparably linked as it is impossible to perceive without knowing one is perceiving And it is by this consciousness that what one calls themself a self, and thereby distinguishes themselves from all other things therefore ‘the sameness of being for a person’ is consciousness that can be extended backward to any past action or thought Consciousness Makes Personal Identity Locke here claims that consciousness is what makes personal identity He raises his own objections saying what about in moments of forgetfulness or sleep does that mean they are not the same person then He dispels this claim by saying his claim is that consciousness is what makes someone a self, TO THEMSELF. He does consider that doubts are raised whether consciousness makes the same thinking thing (man or not) but Locke says that this is different from the question of personal identity. The ability to extend the same consciousness can extend to actions past or come, which is what makes a self to themselves. Personal Identity in Change of Substances Locke states that changes to the matter of a man (i.e getting their hand cut off) doesn’t change one’s personal identity  however, he does state the body while it is connected to the consciousness is a part of himself; he sympathizes and is concerned for it as one is conscious of the good or harm that is done to them. Changing of Consciousness Effect on Personal Identity Locke states that this is (attack against materialists) Firstly this is no question at all for those who believe that thought is a purely material constitution and is void of an immaterial substance. These materialists must conceive personal identity in something else than purely material substances, as they still take animals to be the same when they are materially changed. Also stating (attack against spiritualists) And spiritualist have to explain why the personal identity is NOT preserved when the immaterial changes or that animal identity stays the same when matter changes as they do not want to assume that brutes and man have the same immaterial spirit because it would assume that brutes think (Descartes) Transferring consciousness Locke takes the view that if it was possible to transfer the consciousness of one man, to another man, then it would be possible for two men to be the same person He leaves the question of whether it's possible to the people who think they know what constitutes the immaterial thinking substance. How personal identity works when one has no memory? Locke takes the view that if one were to forget everything about their previous actions, that they would be a completely different person as they cannot form any causal connection or contemplate their past ANA: If a man was confident that he was Socrates but without consciousness of any of Socrates’ actions or thought, could he be the same person as Socrates? Or with Nestor/Thersites, if the same material spirit that was in them is now in another man but without any conscious behavior can it be deemed that they are all the same person? Locke’s answer would be no. The Analogy of the Prince and Cobbler Locke uses this analogy to draw the distinction of personal identity in the subjective sense, and in the social (objective sense). If the soul of a prince (with all his memories) were to be transmuted into a cobbler then they would be the same person but no one in their right mind would consider the cobbler (from an outside point of view) to be responsible for the prince’s actions as the body also goes to the making the man. Little Finger Analogy Locke goes on to use the little finger analogy to explain that where the consciousness lies, that is where personal identity lies. If our consciousness was only held in our little finger and it was cut off and separated (with all the self-identified memories of what it would mean to be us) then our personal identity would also be in the little finger. This analogy is used to explain the point that self-concern is heavily contingent on personal identity. As if the little finger had no concern for the body anymore, then the personal identity of whatever it was would lie in the finger alone. ie. if had a body, committed a crime, then your little finger was cut off along with your consciousness, the little finger would have to admit that the crime was it's own. Socrates Analogy You cannot punish waking Socrates for sleeping Socrates actions it would be like punishing a twin for what his brother did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, and could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen. The Drunkard The question arises if I lose the memories of a whole part of my life, am I not the same person that did those actions? Locke’s reply would be that we are conflating the difference between man and person (I in the sense of the question conflate the two definitions that he has laid out) That it would be the man that did those actions, but not the same person. Locke uses the example of a drunk person and the same man who was once sober They are not the same person (as either is not conscious of the actions of each other) But legally we are not able to determine if there is continuity of consciousness so that the courts will use the identity of a man to pass judgment. Locke adds that however morally (according to God), one can not be punished for the actions of another person. Self Awareness In his conclusion, Locke is very aware that he could have made some suppositions, accounting them to the inability for us to know much about the immaterial substance that passes through us Locke restates that most of the problem of identity is a failure to use the correct terms to identify what we are talking about and that if we were to clear up these terms that the problem would mostly disappear. MICHAELS: TLDR: Michaels Meredith in this piece does not really form a theory of personal identity but brings up two analogies as too why the traditional answers to the philosophy question is unsatisfactory Through the Schwanda and Wanda example she reevaluated Locke’s Memory Theory And through her Dr.Nefarious example brings arguments to support the body theory of personal identity However her conclusion is that personal identity is not ‘all-or-nothing’ but more questions of degrees Wanda and Schwanda Example PRE: Your friend Wanda has her body destroyed via an unfortunate steamroller accident You have a stroke A famous neurosurgeon is able to put Wanda’s brain into your body The question is who pays tuition for this new person? What is the identity of this new individual (let’s call her Swanda) Is this person Wanda, as they have all of Wanda’s thoughts, memories and mental capacities?  Or is this person someone who is simply deluded into thinking they are Wanda? Attack against Locke’s Theory of Memory Meredith brings light to the problems by simply assuming that the self identity of Swanda is Wanda purely because Swanda ‘has’ Wanda’s memories because that is exactly the question we are trying to answer? That is if the memories that Swanda’s currently had are genuine. “In other words, in attempting to establish that Schwanda’s Wanda memories are genuine memories, we cannot argue that they are genuine in the grounds that Schwanda is Wanda” – pg 2 Objection of identity as purely mental OBJ: Why couldn’t we say that Schwanda’s Wanda memories are genuine because the brain that is remembering is the same brain that had the original experience? REB: Michael Meredith calls forth the example of Schwanda is Wanda remembering to riding a bike Though the brain is the same Brains alone do not learn how to ride bikes So the question is if Schwanda (remembering to ride a bike) is the same as Wanda (who learnt to ride it) ‘The appeal to the fact that the same brain is involved in each event does not provide us with a way out of a Lockean circle’ – pg 3 Aristotelian Position – Bodily Identity If the Body Theory is true then The person lying in the Health Center is you deluded into thinking you are Wanda Dr. Nefarious ANA: Dr. Nefarious will torture you at 5pm tomorrow. You are nervous Even if he says that at 4:55 he will erase your memory of the conversation, you are still anxious Even at 4:57, when he says he will replace all your memorise (it will still be you experiencing the pains of torture) Even if he says at 4:58, saying he will replace all your memories with that if Ronald Reagan (it will still be you experiencing the pain) CON: Meredith states that this example does not conclusively support the superiority of the Body Identity Theory over the Memory Theory, but rather the importance of our bodies to our self identity. As anyone who dismiss the possibility would have to dismiss the possibility that the person who undergoes the torture is you, deluded you are Ronald Reagan Conclusion We do identify ourself with our thoughts, BUT ALSO our body It is not all or nothing but about is about admit of degrees If this is the case we are not talking about an all for nothing concept but a relationship between psychological and physical connectedness HUME: Laying out the problem Hume starts by pointing out that philosophers and people alike are intimately conscious of the idea of the ‘Self’ feeling that its’ existence is certain of perfect identity and simplicity However, Hume lays out the key observation that this idea that people have is opposed to the very experience which is presented to them. Arguing that this idea is not representative of anyone or many impressions that are present to us Impressions Hume makes the observation that the impressions (an experience we have of pain, pleasure, grief, joy, passion, and sensation) we have are all distinguishable and separable from one another that they simply succeed one another, never two existing at one time and that when he thinks of what ‘himself’ is it is simply anytime an impression, and nothing else but an impression. Using the analogy of when he is sound asleep that he is insensible of himself, and may truly be said not to exist Bundle Theory of Identity The bundle theory of identity claims that our conceptions of ourselves are nothing but a bundle of perceptions that succeed one another at an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux. To ask the question of what is the criterion that forms personal identity? To Hume doesn’t make sense, because there is not one thing that unites all these bundles of perceptions together as a thread across them as they are simply succeeding one another The analogy of the Theatre Hume uses the analogy of a theatre, where the mind is successively playing perceptions, in infinite variety, and that there is no proper simplicity that unites them. However, Hume observes that we should not be misled by the theatre room as something that unites us, but simply that the analogy is meant to demonstrate the nature of our perceptions. Why we have an idea of identity (and what is it composed of)? Hume pinpoints the idea of identity as the idea of different objections existing in succession and connected together by close variations that they are invariable and uninterrupted And that the idea of diversity is the opposite of this, where there is no obvious relation between the objects. Imagination Hume argues that the nature of the mind to attribute identity to things is because of our imagination relating one object to another, rendering its passage as smooth 1. Resemblance, contiguity, or causation is the cause of the confusion and mistake and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of related objects Even though if we see them as related for one moment, the next moment we are likely to attribute them uninterrupted (because of habit, as it is hard to sustain our philosophy or take off our biases from the imagination) The last thing we do is yield to this bias and justify it with unintelligible principles like the soul, self, and substance to disguise the variation. Furthermore, Hume takes that, when we make this mistake with attributing an underlying criterion that unites the identity of objects, it is not only a mistake of language but to justify that habit, we invent fictions of something invariable and uninterrupted across mere impressions Small Alterations (Resemblance) Hume uses the analogy of a mass of matter that we added or subtracted too, 1. This would completely change the mass of matter 2. However, we would not call it something different as it is ‘so trivial’ of an alteration 3. The passage of thought from the object before the change to the object after it, is so smooth and easy, that we scarcely perceive the transition, and are apt to imagine it's the same thing. Proportion (Mountain) Hume makes a further point, that even though a small addition or subtraction completely changes the identity of an object Our ability to prescribe it the same identity is subject to the proportion of the change compared to the whole. ANA: The addition or subtraction of a mountain would not be sufficient to produce diversity in a planet But the change to some bodies by a few inches would change the identity of some bodies Hume takes this to be the case by saying that the change operates on the mind and if a change is big enough in proportion, it breaks or interrupts the flow of the mind. therefore making an object cease to appear the same, it must be the uninterrupted progress of thought, which constitutes this prescription of imperfect identity Gradual and Insensible (Body) Hume proves his point further that the prescription of imperfect identity is related to the mind’s ability to smoothly pass that object through thought by using the example of gradual and insensible changes. An example is the gradual changes of a human body, the mind feeling that an easy passage from surveying its condition one moment to another, at no particular time perceives any interruption in its action. Final Cause (Ship) Another factor is that if the change is not considerable enough to change the common end or purpose of something Hume using the example of a ship, which parts are changed but is still seen as the same ship even though it is materially different. Causation (Plants and Animals) Furthermore, Hume might add, is when the sympathy of parts serve the same common end and that there are a relational cause and effect between the objects ANA: Hume uses the example of plants and animals to prove this point, where not only do several parts have reference to the same purpose but a mutual dependence on each other Allowing us to attribute the same identity to plants and animals even though they endure a total change, in form, size, and substance. Numerical vs Specific Identity (Noise, Church) Another phenomenon Hume recognizes is when we conflate numerical and specific identity with one another (even though we usually distinguish them) ANA (Noise): Hume uses the analogy of a man who hears a noise that is interrupted and renewed, to say that it is the same noise. Even though they are only specifically resembling each other and not numerically the same, other than that they come from the same source. ANA (Church): Hume uses the analogy of a parish that is destroyed and rebuilt in a different manner maintaining the same identity because their relation to the inhabitants of the parish are the same while they are formally and materially different. Nature of Things to be in Motion (River) Lastly, Hume observes that things where their ‘nature’ are said to be in constant flux For example, a river, which consists of constant motion and alteration can be called the same river even though it is constantly changing Leading him to make the statement that: “What is natural and essential to anything is, in a manner, expected; and what is expected makes less impression, andappears of less moment, than what is unusual and extraordinary.” — pg 306 What is the idea of personal identity/ sameness of persons? Hume proceeds by arguing that the identity of the mind, is a fictitious one not unlike the identity of vegetables and animal bodies Saying that the illusion of the identity of the mind comes from the same source, being the imagination Making the same claim, that the identity of something is nothing but a bundle of perceptions which no true criterion joining them together to form an unwavering identity. Why the mind cannot render many changing perceptions into one “Each perception has its own distinct nature which is different and separable from the others. The