The Structure of Ethical Choice in Planning Practice PDF

Richard S. Bolan The Structure of Ethical Choice Boston College In Planning Practice Abstract Introduction Turning to philosophy, the discipline tradi-...

Richard S. Bolan The Structure of Ethical Choice Boston College In Planning Practice Abstract Introduction Turning to philosophy, the discipline tradi- tionally concerned about ethics, one receives only slightly more aid Philoso- The structure of normative influences on The recent increase in talk about planning phers do help us to identify key distinc- planner responsible to?, what is it that practice has been highlighted by the tions and to frame crucial questions, such responsibility obliges him or her to declaration that a professional planner is a however, they seldom undertake sufficient do?, and under what circumstances should moral agent (Marcuse 1976; Klosterman empirical work that would expose the full obligation or responsibility. who is the 1978, Howe and Kaufman 1979; Bolan complexity of ethical experience There is planner responsible to? what is it that 1980; Kaufman 1981). Among the numer- only generalized recognition among such responsibility obliges him or her to ous historical ways that planners have modern philosophers of the impact of the do? and under what circumstances should seen themselves-as architects, designers, growing complexity of social order and such obligations be activated? Answers to engineers, social engineers and, most technology on contemporary ethics these questions create a three-dimensional recently, political actors (bargainers, matrix of obligation where all three dimen- negotiators, seeSch6n 1982) - recent The goal of this paper, then, is to set forth sions comprise a holistic gestalt —some— images have stressed that the planner is the structural framework of social influ- times consistent and sometimes in con- something more than a bureaucrat or mere ences under which today’s professional flict. Within this framework is the notion technical functionary Planners create, planner functions in developing ethical of multiple moral communities, the pulls influence, speak about, encourage, stimu- decisions and ethical justifications of per- between good ends and right actions, and late, or otherwise take part in the setting formance A &dquo;matrix of ethical influences&dquo; the ambiguities and complexities of the of public policy. They thereby do more m professional practice is constructed by situational contexts of ethical choice. than passively carry out the decisions and reference to traditional views of ethics. goals of others, they are active partici- The underlying dynamics of this matrix are From this, analysis of the social cir- an pants in the articulation of and movement then analyzed, and this sets the stage for cumstances leading to unintended conse- toward that which is thought to be good, a concluding discussion that equates pro- quences is explored These include not beneficial and valuable for the planner’s fessional practice with a search for actions only the impact of social and technologi- client community and its citizens (Kauf- that are truly &dquo;valuable.&dquo; cal change but also three key social man 1978). dynamics arising from the interactional The discussion is not about moral reason- contexts of moral choice: (1) the unac- Thus, city planners are closer taking a ing per se. It is neither concerned with the knowledged conditions of action, (2) the look at the ethical or moral dimensions of rationality of ethical discourse (Klosterman "perversity of composition" arising from their practice. Indeed, even the most mun- 1978), nor with the issues of planning for unregulated interdependencies of the dane, everyday technical tasks are recog- equity or justice (Krumholz, Cogger, and "prisoner’s dilemma" type, and (3) the nized as having ethical implications. All Linner 1975, Berry and Steiker 1974, Lucy governing variables of action principles human action has meaning, has to be 1981, Krumholz 1982) As one author sug- that distort communication and create the accounted for, and justified. No matter gests, there is a distinction between a simultaneous existence of overt and covert how technical, specialized, or arcane their &dquo;moral epistemology&dquo; and a &dquo;moral car- ethical systems. work, professionals cannot be exempt tography&dquo; (Cua 1978, pp. 7-8). What from this fundamental condition. follows is mostly concerned about the lat- In the light of the analysis, the discussion ter. It builds primarily from an earlier, is led to the conclusion that ethical choice Having said this, however, one is struck by similar work of Marcuse (1976). It is an in planning practice is less derived from the poverty of understanding of the devel- effort to map the existential framework of the fixed norms of the past and is more a opment of a professional ethos. Discus- professional moral life. Moral reasoning, or search process for new value. Thus, ethi- sion of professional ethics usually focuses the logic of &dquo;moral epistemology,&dquo; gener- cal choice in planning practice is directly primarily on the formally promulgated ally fails when carried on abstractly in linked to the moral creativity of the practi- codes of professional conduct. Formal search of a universal principle of conduct. tioner and such creativity is the preemi- codes, however, typically raise more ques- A professional ethics has to be concerned nent aspect of professional practice. tions than they answer, often seem more about the processes involved in the &dquo;social concerned with courtesies professionals construction of moral meanings&dquo; (Douglas should render each other, and rarely exhib- 1970), and it is to this end that the analy- it sensitivity for the complex, diverse ethi- sis is directed. cal dilemmas that professionals experience in their practice. They offer a false sense of security and obscure the subtle, tacit and unstated norms that are often instru- mental in guiding action. 23 A Matrix of Ethical Influences Who Are We Responsible To? tion Each new person we meet extends our ethical world (Levinas 1969, pp. 194-201) and enlarges and diversifies our Grasping the structure of ethical influences The word &dquo;responsibility&dquo; in its strictest range of ethical obligation. We enter into on practice begins with examining the definition implies the &dquo;liability to respond,&dquo; and become members of new &dquo;moral range of implications of what one means or the capacity for answering to Our communities,&dquo; new alliances of shared in- by the concepts of responsibility and operating premise starts from the existen- tentions (Wren 1974, chapter 5, Cua 1978, obligation. Not only professional life, but tialist position where obligation for respond- pp. 11-15, Golding 1981, pp 64-68) life in general, is filled with &dquo;should&dquo; or ing is argued to be a condition of human &dquo;ought&dquo; statements, &dquo;you ought to brush existence. The self-reflexive and tran- Moral communities come into being in your teeth,&dquo; &dquo;you should do everything scendental nature of human life underlies diverse and complicated ways. A moral possible to prevent murder&dquo; and &dquo;you this condition of obligation Schrader community may be created by the first- ought to do a cost-benefit analysis&dquo; Such argues- hand participation of its members. A plan- statements are the foundation of a sense Man is responsible, in the first instance, ning consultant and a developer entering of ethical behavior, an awareness (almost because he is burdened with the onto- into a contract, for example, mutually taken for granted) that each of us is a logical necessity of responding to him- create a new moral community. Even responsible human being. self m the sense of having to answer for though embedded in a broader and larger what he is and does.. To be is not culture, the consultant-developer relation- Any attempt to define what it means to be simply to be liable; it is the original ship has its unique framework of expecta- responsible raises three interrelated ques- human liability (Schrader 1972, p. 270) tions and obligations. A planner accepting tions The answers to these questions pro- In this sense, our own existence is in our employment with a state planning agency vide the basic framework for developing own &dquo;care&dquo;; people do seek to escape this enters into a previously created moral whatI call the &dquo;matrix of ethical influ- responsibility (through drugs, suicide, etc.) community with an existing web of rules, ences&dquo; m planning practice. but such effort to escape would be a con- norms and responsibilities already binding scious choice to opt out of this primary a broad group of people, some of whom First, who are we responsible to? Who is it obligation. Indeed, as Schrader puts it- the planner may never meet. A student that makes a claim on us to be responsible? &dquo;To be irresponsible is not to be non- graduating from a city planning school responsible. One can negate responsibility similarly enters a previously established Second, what is it that our responsibility but one cannot deny it&dquo; (ibid., p. 276). moral community-the city planning pro- obliges us todo? What forms of behavior One may try to push responsibility aside, fession. (Marcuse 1976) Thus, the concept are considered appropriate responses to a but one has not thereby eliminated it. of a moral community embraces the full claim of responsibility? Is there a catalog array of understandings, agreements, of duties or is our responsibility more pro- The responsibility for the self is shaped expectations, loyalties, norms and obliga- found and less well defined? and influenced through interaction with tions of those who comprise its member- other selves. We are born into and live in a ship. Each moral community, if you will, Third, under what circumstances are we social world with other human beings and signifies a particular moral paradigm As responsible? Or, to put it another way, do responsibility for the self is integral with one author puts it, even a den of thieves circumstances and situations affect our the development of a sense of responsibil- has a moral order (Wren 1974, p. 113). responsibility? ity toward others. Such responsibilities are reciprocal. We cannot unilaterally deter- The range of different moral communities In the following discussion, the potential mine our responsibility to others; by their is depicted on Figure 1. This diagram does range of answers to these questions is presence in our social field, others make not intend to convey that moral communi- presented. In so doing, there is also por- claims on us just as we make claims on ties are hierarchical, however. They are trayed the notion that these questions them. Thus, the sense of responsibility is overlapping and, in many respects, inter- cannot really be taken separately (as they socially negotiated. dependent. They form a labyrinth warp- too often are in discussions of ethics) - and-woof that makes up the total fabric of rather they are a whole, a gestalt. Ethical The social field is a structured field. Some each individual’s ethical world. Moreover, professioal behavior simultaneously en- within it live more closely to us and with these many different moral communities gages all three questions. A city planner them our sense of responsibility is more can, and frequently do have points of con- in a practice situation, thereby, continually intimate and more intense. Kin relations, tradiction or inconsistency with one confronts this primary structure of the for example, are the primary frame of ref- ethical milieu. Even the pursuit of techni- erence in our sense of responsibility. They cally prescribed behaviors is done within are the relations from which our earliest this framework. consciousness and sense of self evolves into a mature ethical consciousness. As our circle of acquaintances extends beyond immediate family, we enter into a wider and wider world of ethical obliga- 24 Figure 1 another. What is perceived as good and What Does Our Responsibility Oblige Us beneficial m one community may be per- To Do? The Range of Moral Communities ceived differently in another, and the indi- Of Obligation In Contemporary vidual may frequently feel pulled between Writings on ethics offer two fundamental Professional Life them. Codes of professional ethics seldom views Weber labelled them the &dquo;ethics of overtly recognize the multiplicity of moral ultimate ends&dquo; as against the &dquo;ethics of communities. Even those that do overlook responsibility&dquo; (Feibleman 1967, p. 277) The Professional Has Obligation To: the possibility of conflict. (Howe 1980, pp Philosophers refer to the former as the 179-191) Moreover, as Wren points out- teleological view of ethics in which a The sorts of communities meant by moral action is focused on seeking good ’conflicting communities’ are not loci of ends, regardless of the means that might ideals but real force fields of intentions be used to gain such ends A revolution-... Each.. is a community of action, ary terrorist, for example, is so convinced a context of absolute obligations (Wren of the ultimate worth of his cause that kill- 1974, p. 120). ing an opponent is a justifiable means of serving that cause. On the other hand, the Moral communities are directly experi- &dquo;ethics of responsibility,&dquo; or what is enced insofar as they extend to the range technically termed deontology, argues that of personal contacts of the professional there is intrinsic nghtness and wrongness dunng the course of everyday activities. in individual acts of human conduct Good However, obligations go beyond these ends cannot be justified by wrong actions contacts and extend to responsibilities that In this view, killing is wrong even if the transcend both space and time. We ultimate ends to be served might be possess a sense of obligation to larger judged good. One should forego good moral communities, all of whose members ends if they can only be achieved by we are not likely to meet or cannot pos- wrong acts. The wrongness of the acts sibly meet. These larger moral com- will, in a sense, contaminate the good munities are the larger society and culture ends and make their ultimate attainment of which we are a part. They embody the less valuable. Fried vigorously gives this general and fundamental moral ideals that argument: inhere in the culture. These ideals have We must do no wrong-even if by been found to have widespread con- doing wrong, suffering would be vergence over many different kinds of reduced and the sum of happiness societies (Ginsberg 1968, p 757).’.~ increased. Indeed, we must not do wrong even in order to prevent more, The important point for this discussion, greater wrongs by others (Fried 1978, p 2) however, is that, whether engaged in pro- fessional or other types of activities, we are a part of these broader moral com- munities. As such, responsibility extends to those who have lived m the past, those who are now alive but not within our gen- eral sphere of activity, and those yet unborn. As one author puts it, &dquo;To speak of man’s shaping his destiny is to talk of human continuity across generations. It is to set forth the obligation of those alive to build for the sake of those to come&dquo; (Derr 1981, p. 37). Another writer argues we are obligated to &dquo;species-responsible be- havior&dquo; (Feibleman 1967, p. 284). Indeed, responsibility to successors is one of the primary obligations of the city planning profession. Every plan presupposes a sense of obligation to the future and those who will live in it. 25 Consider the debate about urban renewal Under What Circumstances Are We The attention to situation ethics reem- m the 1960s. Planners with a teleological Responsible? phasizes a focus on the key aspect of perspective argued that a good city as an ethical behavior, a concern for ethics is a ultimate goal was a worthy objective, and In the 1960s, it was argued that ethical concern for action. As the situationists that actions to bnng it about were quite judgement wasnot a case of &dquo;either / or&dquo; argue, moral judgements are decisions, ethical even if harm should fall on some between distant ends and proximate acts. not conclusions. Decisions are reached in people (particularly those who suffer the Instead, a number of authors suggested the light of one’s estimate of the circum- hardships and trauma of being forced to that ethical choice really centered around stances, not on the basis of ready-made move from their homes and neighbor- an integral relationship between the two prescriptions or a prefabricated catalog of hoods). In contrast, planners with a deon- (Fletcher 1966, pp. 26-31). From this duties. In this view, therefore, right and tological perspective argued that the harm emerged what was popularly known as wrong depend upon the situation; rules done by the forcible relocation of families situation ethics which, rather than ascrib- cannot be created in advance to fit was wrong regardless of the worthiness of ing to either absolute ends or rules of con- reality-&dquo; ’situation ethics’ puts its the ultimate goal. Doing harm is a wrong duct, attempts to take into account all the premium on freedom and responsibility&dquo; action and cannot be justified by good in- complex facts and aspects of a given (ibid., p. 25). tentions. In the same manner, Bok argues situation. Fletcher, one of the leading that lying by a professional in the service writers on situation ethics, notes: &dquo;Situa- This situational dimension of professional of worthy professional goals are wrong, as tionists are chary about abstractions and practice has seldom been adequately when a physician lies about the true con- generalizations, especially in the absence examined. Through this dimension we dition of a patient because, presumably if of concretion and circumstance&dquo; (1967, realize the poverty of professional codes of the patient were told the truth, his illness p.8) Fletcher admits to only one ultimate ethics. They presuppose only the most might worsen (Bok 1978, chapter 15). intrinsic good-love-and all actions obvious (and least likely) circumstances of should, after taking into account all of the practice situations. In these situations it While engaged in professional practice, facts of the situation, be focused on in- often appears simple to determine how our conscious awareness of activities creasing or enhancing love2 Thus, in one’s ideals or norms are to be followed demanding foreground of our attention the situation ethics, all values are relative (save and how the moral obligations of various is accompanied by the background aware- that of love), all prescriptions and codes communities are to be met. However, ness of received ideals or norms, which are qualified &dquo;depending on the circum- once the complexities of a given situation simultaneously reflect both notions of stances&dquo; Rigid, legalistic rule-following is are given full consideration, one often ultimate good and rules. of conduct. We eschewed in favor of doing the best one finds deep conflicts among ideals and are continually pulled and pressured by can within the constraints, contingencies, norms and the claims of the various moral these two poles. Moreover, these ideals and possibilities of the situation. communities. This was well illustrated by emerge in relation to the multiplicity of Rittel and Webber’s characterization (1973) moral communities with which we are of planning problems as &dquo;~,mcked pro- engaged. blems&dquo; - problems arising in situations with no &dquo;stopping points,&dquo; no established The question of whether a staff planner of decision rules, no correct or incorrect a public agency should leak information answers, no opportunities to be wrong, to, say, an environmental interest group and no final solutions. illustrates not only the pull between teleology and deontology, but also simul- taneously reflects the pulls of multiple moral communities: e.g. the moral com- munity created by the employment con- tract, that of the profession, that of the environmental ethos, that of the commu- nity, and, indirectly, that of one’s self and family (particularly if there is fear that such action might result in loss of employment). 26 Figure 2 One approach to examining the influences The most difficult end of the situational and demands created by the particular continuum is that situation where harm A Continuum of Diversity of Contexts situation is to conceive of a continuum will result no matter what we do, even if for Ethical Choice in Planning ranging from the simplest of situations at we do nothing. These are situations where one pole and the most difficult and com- there are only bad options, the &dquo;Catch- plex at the other. This is the continuum 22,&dquo; &dquo;Hobson’s Choice,&dquo; a choice &dquo;be- portrayed on Figure 2 At the simplest tween a rock and a hard place.&dquo; As one pole, we are faced with the choice of author put it, &dquo;there are situations where either doing good (or nght) or doing bad the best we can do is evil&dquo; (Bennett, (or wrong). Our choice is obvious, we quoted in Fletcher 1967, p. 15). act so as to do good (right) and reject the bad (wrong). We are likely to encounter situations that fit the simplest extreme of the continuum At the next point on the continuum, we only rarely in our professional livesI are able to conceive of a range of actions would also estimate that the second situa- appropriate to the situation, all of which tion, where we are only faced with the would be good, or right. Planners may im- problem of choosing the best among mediately recognize this as the usual cir- many good alternatives, is only slightly cumstance from which we draw theoret- less rareThe third situation is that most ical discussion of rational problem-solving, likely to be encountered in practice, in our we seek methods of calculating the &dquo;best&dquo; efforts to do good, we inevitably do both course of action among a number that are good and harm. The fourth situation, already presumed good A benefit-cost while possibly not frequent, probably analysis, for example, is one technique for occurs more often than the first two choosing the &dquo;best&dquo; among a number of &dquo;good&dquo; alternatives. The next level of complexity, however, in- troduces the possibility that our choices may concurrently produce some good and some harm. Enticing a new chemical plant to the community will create a large number of new jobs and new taxes, but will also increase health hazards due to toxic wastes; building an expressway will ease traffic congestion and provide con- struction jobs but will displace large number of families and increase air pollu- tion In the last twenty-five years, planners have become increasingly aware of these conflicting results of their practice. We have even developed methods of analysis that more explicity identify the winners and losers of a given policy or plan (Hill 1968). Of course, even after carrying out such identification, we are still not sure, given the goods and bads, whether we should proceed with the planned action or not 27  Figure 3 The Three-Dimensiorial Matrix of Ethical Choice in Planning 28 Summarizing, the concept of responsibility Some of this dynamism can be attributed The first of these perspectives is primarily has been examined m the light of three to the same forces that create dynamism the acknowledgement that we are never particular questions. who are we respon- in social life in general. Population growth, fully capable of perceiving all of the rele- sible to?, what does our responsibility social and technological innovation, and vant circumstances of a decision situation oblige us to do?, and how do circum- increasing degrees of specialization, differ- This has been pointed out by Giddens. stances influence our responsibility? In any entiation and complexity create not only He argues that a primary source of unin- decision process, we always encounter social change but also changes in ethical tended consequences in action lies in the these three quesions simultaneously; they perspectives. The bioethics debate is one unacknowledged conditions in the deci- are, in effect, a gestalt of the structure of shaped and influenced by the present sion situation (Giddens 1979, pp. 53-59) responsibility. They cannot be thought of state of medical technology as well as the To put it another way, there are limits to m isolation any more than a single beat of social and economic conditions in which our perceptual capacities Just as we can- a musical rhythm can be isolated and contemporary medicine is practiced. The not see all sides of a cube simultaneously, analyzed. Together they form a single ethics of organ transplants have no mean- so it is that we cannot &dquo;see&dquo; all sides of a &dquo;matnx of ethical influences&dquo; in city plan- ing m a society that does not have the situation at the instant a decision is called ning practice. This three-dimensional capacity to perform such operations. Simi- for. We always act in real-time circum- matrix is portrayed in Figure 3. All per- larly, the ethics of transportation planning stances on the basis of limited information. spectives embraced by the matrix are takes place within a context of the current This may not only inhibit the effectiveness operative m the search for ethical action. and immediately foreseeable technologies of our action, it may also inhibit the value of ground transportation systems and their of our action. Thus, limited perception role m contemporary social and economic yields limited rationality. Dynamics Within The Ethical Matrix life. The best balance between mass transportation and auto transportation The second perspective is that of Boudon could obviously never have been debated (1982) who offers a socio-economic ex- The foregoing implies a notion of ethics prior to the invention of the automobile. amination of what he terms &dquo;perverse that is dynamic and ever-changing. This Neither the medical nor the planning effects.&dquo; His analysis is an attempt to syn- contrasts sharply with views where the debate is purely technical-both are inher- thesize the efforts of a number of analysts propositions of ethics are seen as universal ently ethical. concerned with the paradoxes experienced and enduring. Core ethical norms such as through the phenomena of interdepend- prohibitions against murder, lying, steal- In the first instance, then, changes in ethi- ency among active social agents. He ing, etc. endure, but even with these, cal perspective are driven by changes m begins with Rousseau and goes on to nuances and permutations ebb and flow situations. Whether or not one subscribes examine the work of Mancur Olsen (1965), with changing circumstances and shifting to &dquo;situation ethics&dquo; as a guiding credo, it Albert Hirschman (1970), Buchanan and social and economic conditions. Concepts is clear that changing circumstances Tulloch (1962) and Thomas Schelling such as &dquo;justice&dquo; and &dquo;equity&dquo; are simi- create the conditions for new ethical (1971 ).3 larly elusive as social change constantly issues and concerns. The structure sug- pushes us toward their continuing redefini- gested in Figure 3 is a dynamic, moving, The beginning paradigm for analysis is tion. The complexities of human interaction pulsating structure. The forces for change basically the familiar &dquo;prisoner’s dilemma&dquo; require that we consider the sociological push us into forming new moral com- problem, situations in which individuals and psychological dynamics of ethical munities and thereby creating new con- attempt to weigh rationally the benefits choice (Mandelbaum 1955) flicts between values, new perceptions as and costs, in a given circumstance, of to what is valuable, and new varieties of cooperating with another individual (or possible action. Human creativity and group) as against acting alone The innovation, in a real sense, represent con- benefits from cooperation may be greater stant challenges to old orders of morality. butso may the risks &dquo;Should I be loyal to my collaborator in the absence of any cer- These statements may seem obvious and tainty that he will be loyal to me?&dquo; trite.Yet, even with this awareness many of our actions turn out to be perverse. As our plans are implemented, things go awry, people we intended to help are hurt, people we assumed would be innocent bystanders become implicated in harmful ways. Three writings offer different perspectives on this and, in so doing, give insight on deeper aspects of the dynamics of the formation of ethical concepts that lie beneath the surface and entail underly- ing sociological and psychological forces. 29 The prisoner’s dilemma shows that Some aspects of the interdependency of Argyns and Sch6n do not directly examine cooperative action presupposes loyalty, social agents are such that regulation and the ethical origins of the phenomena they and if loyalty cannot be guaranteed then enforcement of ethical norms can be car- describe However, in a recent publication independent self-serving action may prom- ried out, while others cannot. The dynam- (Argyns 1982), these norms become more ise more certain (even though less) payoff. ics of these latter interdependencies exert evident. They are variations on traditional From this it can be seen that each individ- pressure on the former and create chal- ethical strictures that state it is wrong to ual’s pursuit of what he perceives as his lenges to conceptions of what is right and threaten the autonomy, integrity or dignity own interest may result in the perverse wrong, good and bad. These anarchic inter- of others; it is wrong to confront or chal- effect of impeding the good of the society. dependencies, thereby, in subterranean lenge others; it is wrong to hurt others not If loyalty (or other ethical action) can be fashion, push toward reformulation of the only with physical violence but also with uniformly coerced, predictable cooperation norms of regulated interdependencies. psychological insults. Argyns and Schon’s and social order can take place; if not, Model I behavior reflects an array of strat- unpredictable perversity is possible. A third view, focusing on social-psycho- egies for getting one’s way or defending logical processes, comes from the work one’s own autonomy, integrity and dignity A familiar exampleis the case of public of Argyns and Sch6n (1974, 1978). Their without overtly violating any of these goods versusprivate goods, where public interest in protessional ettectiveness has norms In some ways, it could be viewed goods are those which cannot be divided evolved a theory which distinguishes as a hypocritical stance that gives a sur- up for the private use of individual con- between &dquo;espoused theory&dquo; and &dquo;theory- face appearance of &dquo;loving one’s neigh- sumers. Thus, their provision cannot rely in-use&dquo; as two contrasting images of bor,&dquo; even though actually fending for on the voluntary cooperation of individuals action. After noting the potential for oneself through covert (but accepted) to donate funds for their support. There incongruity between the two, they seek to forms of aggression and competition. is no incentive for me to pay, given that explore the source of the disparity. They Moreover, everyone is aware that everyone others are paying andI can enjoy the ser- claim to find it in a group of what they else is following these same rules (Argyns vices for nothing. Taxation is then intro- term &dquo;governing variables,&dquo; principles of points out that this too is undiscussable) duced as a form of coerced loyalty. action which implicitly guide our behavior. Thus, the overt ethical norms of a given In their &dquo;Model I&dquo; behavior (their &dquo;ineffec- moral community may coincide with those Some social interdependencies can be tive&dquo; modell, these governing variables of larger moral communities, but the organized so that loyalty toward cooper- are: (1) unilaterally define goals and control governing covert ethical system is quite ative action can be assured, as in the case tasks, (2) maximize winning and minimize another picture. Given the propensity for of taxation. Many others, however, can- losing, (3) minimize generating or express- fallacious assumptions and attributions, not. Consumer protest movements suffer ing negative feelings, and (4) be rational any given action by an individual thus in this regard; it someone else works hard might easily have perverse and unforseen and wins the consumer cause then I, as a The authors also focus on the problems consequences. bystander consumer, siand to benefit at created by assumptions and attributions no cost or effort. Consequently, there is that are never tested or spoken about. One example of this can be found in the no reason for me to join. Obviously, Communication, lacking such testing, is recent revelations about the Environmental however, if everyone thinks as I do, there inhibited in effective feedback; norms, Protection Agency, referring particularly is no consumer movement. There is thus values and assumptions get driven under- to those instances where reports from re- built in a &dquo;perversity of composition,&dquo; akin ground. What results from the combina- gional staff scientists were ignored, omit- to the logician’s &dquo;fallacy of composition.&dquo; tion of implicit governing variables, inade- ted or altered by superiors at policy levels. Rational individual behavior can yield irra- quate communication, and limited and Such actions are not likely to be a surprise tional social effects. Good social effects ambiguous information is a set of undis- to the professional city planner. Most prac- may depend on irrational individual be- cussable norms that are tacitly accepted titioners in public planning agencies have havior. Even though no ethical norms have even though camouflaged. In short, the experienced this happening to their own been overtly violated, different individual Argyns and Sch6n view suggests the work. There is widespread acceptance of perceptions of the virtues and payoffs of existence ot a covert ethlcal system. In ourr such practices as part of the &dquo;normal&dquo; loyalty and cooperation yeld perverse frame of reference, this would mean that operation of public bureaucracies; thus, results. there lies within a moral community both such behavior is a well established part of explicit and implicit rules of conduct the ethos of public planning. To assert 30 that it is &dquo;normal&dquo; is to assert that it is the Conclusion: The Ethics Of Practice As art, then, we cannot approach the &dquo;norm&dquo;, that it is embedded in the tacit method of ethical judgment in the same ethical fabric of the moral community of manner as though it were a scientific planning. Such cavalier handling of &dquo;the With the foregoing analysis, we begin to problem. We face ethical puzzles, it is truth&dquo; is condemned m the larger political grasp why there is no easy or precise true, and one might conclude that such moral community, but it is expected method of ethical calculation that might puzzles ought to be able to be reduced to behavior in the smaller, immediate micro- guide and inform practice We are some form of precise calculation. moral community immersed in a world of multi-layered, However, the premises with which one ap- countervailing norms. Those likely to be proaches a scientific problem are not near- In public planning offices, the covert ethos most operative are the most immediate, ly so mischievous and tend to remain fix- is usually political in nature. In the midst intimate, personal, and tacit. Professionally, ed. Rules of procedure are similarly stable. of political games, everyone is guided by a we espouse to act beneficially for macro- Ethical judgement, however, has no such norm designed to camouflage the exist- level moral communities: the city, the firm anchor points. ence of the games. Following Argyns and region, the state. But such actions are Sch6n, we thus hypothesize the existence always taken within the prescribed norms In the first instance, the language of of an &dquo;espoused&dquo; public ethos in a given of micro-level moral communities the ethical judgements-the terms and their moral community, underlain by an &dquo;ethos- planning department, the mayor’s office, meanings-immediately put such judg- in-use&dquo;-a covert, hidden, unspoken the city council. We ideally aspire to have ments on slippery footing. Brennan notes, ethos that each member of the commun- our professional practice contribute to &dquo;moral terms, unlike geometric terms, ity tacitly accepts and almost subcon- broad-scale social improvement, but, on a are ’open-textured’-which means sciously employs as a guide to action In practical level, we learn the behaviors that that one cannot state the necessary and addition, there is the even deeper sublayer will help us to defend, survive and have sufficient conditions for their correct appli- norm which prescribes that the covert effect in our immediate organizational set- cation&dquo; (1977, p. 104). To speak, for exam- ethos is not to be talked about. tings. We learn the difference between an ple, of the duty of a &dquo;father,&dquo; or of a ideal ethic and a practical ethic quickly. &dquo;professional,&dquo; or of a &dquo;professional city In summary, we perceive the matrix of planner,&dquo; is not to speak of a class of ethical influences being impacted by multi- But what do we mean when we speak of beings whose characteristics are precisely layered forces. On the most visible level, a &dquo;practical ethic&dquo;?I suspect this means specified. One could not, thereby, deduc- our ethical consciousness is impacted by we search for strategies and tactics forr tively infer an inexhaustible set of rules innovation, complexity and the turbulence dealing with both the overt and covert that would wholly and unmistakeably delin- of a rapidly changing world. At other dynamics within situations where &dquo;good&dquo; eate the actions of a &dquo;professional city levels more subtle and more deeply rooted and &dquo;bad&dquo; are not really clear and where planner.&dquo; The label is imprecise-deduced dynamic forces are at work as well The received ideals are contradictory and rules of behavior are similarly imprecise. limits of human consciousness, perception inconsistent. As Feibleman suggests and awareness are primary sources of (1967, p. 275), we seek to know how to de- In ethical many of the assump- judgments, limited rationality, such that good inten- ploy moral force, how to perform moral tions we make about a problem cannot be tions often end up with bad effects. The maneuvers. He argues that such skills are tested in any systematic way. Many are &dquo;perversity of composition&dquo; suggests a an art: more precisely, he suggests the only tacit-that is, we are consciously paradox between individual and social necessity for the &dquo;art of indirection, and aware of them but we could not easily action, so that not only perverse social ef- the indirection is made necessary by the describe them in words. Many are so fects of good actions may occur, but also fact that the external environment is partly taken for granted that they fail to occupy a good actions may be entirely foregone or friendly and partly hostile&dquo;(ibid., p. 281, prominent influence in our consciousness. missed because of unregulated structures emphasis added·.I would add as well that of interdependency. Finally, the potential the environment is partly obvious and for a two-faced system of ethics, an overt partly camouflaged, partly logical and ethics and a covert ethics, results from the partly absurd. As a result, ethical profes- limitations of symbolic communication and sional practice involves traversing treacher- the reciprocal psychological processes of ous and difficult pathways, and the &dquo;art of defense. indirection&dquo; suggests that the most direct, or obvious, pathway may not always pro- duce the desired result; circuitous routes may be more ethically effective. 31  Ethical judgements also implicate the per- We are born mtoa matrix of value created In this way, ethics is never complete- son(s) engaged in ways not encountered by others, and it is a dynamic matrix Our neither for the individual nor for the many when solving a scientific problem. As pre- impulse is not to copy the values or valu- moral communities to which the individual viously noted, an ethical judgement is a able actions of those that preceded us, is obligated. Ethical knowledge is not a decision, not a conclusion. It is a basis for but to create new values. The artist’s &dquo;thing,&dquo; but a continuously unfolding action, not a statement to be filed. This search for new forms of expression, new process-constantly opening out to new means that the person making the judge- plateaus of beauty, is analogous, we seek conceptions of value and images of new ment is implicated in the judgement in to live ethical lives and carry out ethical what is good. It is an inherent condition of ways that a scientific problem-solver is careers uniquely our own, we seek to give all human action. Thus, we might argue not. As Ross points out: those to whom we are obliged our own that the Socratic dialogues are more the Science seeks facts and manipulates individual style of value As Cua (1978, exemplar of ethics than Plato’s Republic events to gather information. Action p. 4) has pointed out: &dquo;the agent is con- (Ross 1973, p.20). looks to the events themselves... cerned with what he will do, not merely in We may disconfirm a scientific theory terms of his governing moral principles, From this, we can infer that we will not without prejudice to the scientist who but m light of the question ’What will be likely to be able to devise a single, gen- proposed it. But our condemnation of I be?’ &dquo; eral ethical theory of planning practice. A a man’s deed includes him within it. A search for universals and stable anchors person is at stake in action as he is not For some, this is expressed m an effort at such as Newton’s laws or Planck’s con- m science&dquo; (1973, p 29) total negation of past values. For most, stant is likely to prove futile. It is this implied liability that truly differen- however, the striving is to establish one’s tiates the professional practitioner from the own unique sense of value and potential Thus, in the same way that the practi- pure scientist. for creating new value, within the context tioner is the theorist (Bolan 1980), the of prior expressions of value Past rules, practitioner is the moralist. It is an in- In overview, then, our linear, cause-and- then do not so much confine us as they escapable, existential condition of profes- effect, mechanistic and mathematical orient us. It is in this sense that many sional practice. It is also the major forms of reasoning do not help. Similarly, authors suggest that rules are both con- challenge. As moralist, the practitioner is our stock of historically accumulated straining and enabling (Giddens 1979, pp. continually pushed to make ethical knowledge is of limited value. In our 67-68; Brittan 1973, p. 118). judgments and decisions in a social field search to create equity, justice, beauty that is characterized by a thicket of con- and value there are simply not the avail- In the process of acting,I have an impact flicting claims and pulls, some clearly ap- able guideposts that the scientifically- on my immediate world and, through the parent while others are ambiguous, covert, oriented mind is accustomed to. reflexivity of action, I also have an impact hidden or unspoken. The practitioner’s on myself in ways thatI cannot easily role of moralist, then, is actually the more The reason is that ethical practice does predict. From the transcendental quaiity of prominent in terms of professional creativity not come from a stock of knowledge, or action (i.e., the capacity today to surpass and imagination as distinct from the scien- a pre-formed code of conduct, or a or go beyond what I was yesterday) is tific, &dquo;puzzle-solving&dquo; role. The true task previously cataloged list of duties. Ethical derived the ability to create and live with of the professional is not to display professional practice is intrinsically a proc- a new sense of value. As Ricoeur points cleverness and intellectual dexterity but, ess. It can be seen as a way of being in out, &dquo;what I shall be is not already given rather, to create a new sense of value. the world; or, rather, it is finding a way of but depends on whatI shall do,&dquo; and Thus, the true challenge for every practi- being m the world (Ross 1973, p. 19). We this includes how I, and others, sense tioner is to become a creative moralist. live lives in search of value as we our or &dquo;appreciate&dquo; my &dquo;value&dquo; (Ricoeur perceive it. We fundamentally want our 1966, p. 64). actions to be effective not only in the sense that they produce a predicted effect, but that they are valuable. 32 Notes References Douglas, J.D 1970. Deviance and Respec- tability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings. In Deviance and Respectability, Ginsberg reports anthropological 1 research Argyris, C. 1982. Reasoning, Learning and ed., J.D. Douglas New York: Basic finds a common base of moral concern in Action: Individual and Organizational. San Books. every society, primitive and advanced Francisco Jossey-Bass. alike. These common elements concern Drucker, P.F. 1981 What is "Business admonitions against murder, violence, Argyris, C. and Schön, D.A. 1974. Theory Interest 63:18-36. Ethics"? The Public. stealing, lying, breaking promises (in short in Practice: Increasing Professional Effec- life, property and trust). In addition, every tiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Feibleman, J.K. 1967. Moral Strategy: An society studied has moral codes concerned Introduction to the Ethics of Confronta- with reproductive drives; sexual behavior. 1978. Organizational Learning. tion. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff and family relations seem to be universally Reading: Addison-Wesley Press. regulated in some form. (Ginsberg 1968, Fletcher, J. 1966 Situation Ethics: p.757). Berry, D. and Steiker, G. 1974. The Con- The New Morality. Philadelphia: cept of Justice in Regional Planning: Jus- The Westminster Press. F2letcher implies a theological conception tice as Fairness. Journal of the American of love rather than a personal or erotic Institute of Planners. 40:414-421.. 1967 Moral Responsibility: conception. It is a social attitude rather Situation Ethics at Work. Philadelphia: than a romantic emotion (Fletcher 1967, Bok, S. 1978. Lying: Moral Choice in The Westminster Press. p.34); for love, "the essential ingredients Public and Private Life. New York: are caring and commitment" (1967, p.39). Random House Vintage Books. Fried, C. 1978. Right and Wrong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 3 T he pertinent cases here include: Olson’s Bolan, R.S. 1980. The Practitioner as demonstration that an unstructured group Theorist: The Phenomenology of the Pro- Giddens, A. 1979. Central Problems in (such as consumers), with its members fessional Episode. Journal of the American Social Theory: Action, Structure and Con- aware of their common interests and Planning Association. 46:261-274. tradiction in Social Analysis. Berkeley: similarly aware of the means to bring The University of California Press. about those interests, will still fail to take Boudon, R. 1982. The Unintended Conse- action as a group (Olson 1965). Hirschman quences of Social Action. New York: Ginsberg, M. 1968. Comparative Ethics. applies his concepts of desertion, protest St. Martin’s Press. In Encyclopedia Britannica. Volume 8. and loyalty to a variety of examples to Chicago: William Benton. suggest different perverse results flowing Brennan, J.M. 1977. The Open-Texture of from each (Hirschman 1970). Buchanan Moral Concepts. London: The Macmillan Golding, M.P. 1981. Obligations to Future and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent (1962) Press Limited. Generations. In Responsibilities to Future explores the zone or threshold where freely Generations: Environmental Ethics, ed., given consent breaks down and is re- Brittan, A. 1973. Meanings and Situa- E. Partridge. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. placed by coerced regulation of behavior. tions. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Schelling’s analysis (1971) shows how, Hill, M. 1968. A Goals-Achievement Matrix even though no individual advocates seg- Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. 1962. for Evaluating Alternative Plans. Journal of regation, in circumstances where each The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: the American Institute of Planners. individual is free to move and each seeks a University of Michigan Press. 34:19-29. location where he is not in a minority, the resulting pattern would be highly segregated. Cua, A.S. 1978. Dimensions of Moral Hirschman, A.O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Creativity; Paradigms, Principles and Loyalty Cambridge: Harvard University.. University Park: The Pennsylvania Ideals Press. State University Press. Derr, T.S. 1981. The Obligation to the Future. In Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, ed., E. Partridge. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. 33 Howe, E. 1980. Public Professions and the Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Private Model of Professionalism. Social Action Cambridge: Harvard University Work. 25:179-191 Press Howe, E. and Kaufman, J. L. 1979. The Ricoeur, P. 1966. Freedom and Nature. Ethics of Contemporary American Plan- The Voluntary and the Involuntary ners. Journal of the American Planning Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Association. 45:243-255. Rittel, H.W.J. and Webber, M.M 1973 Kaufman, J.L. 1978 The Planner as Inter- Dilemmas in a General Theory of Plan- ventionist in Public Policy Issues. In Plan- ning Policy Sciences 4:155-169. ning Theory in the 1980’s: A Search for Future Directions, eds., R.W. Burchell and Ross, S.D. 1973. In Pursuit of Moral Value. G. Sternlieb. New Brunswick: The Center San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and for Urban Policy Research. Company.. 1981. Teaching Planning Ethics. Schelling, T. 1971 Dynamic Models of Journal of Planning Education and Segregation. Journal of Mathematical. 1:29-35. Research Sociology. 1:143-185 Klosterman, R.E. 1978. Foundations for Schön, D.A. 1982. Some of What A Plan- Normative Planning. Journal of the ner Knows: A Case Study of Knowing in American Institute of Planners. 44:37-46. Practice. Journal of the American Plan-. 48:351-364 ning Association Krumholz, N. 1982. A Retrospective View of Equity Planning: Cleveland 1969-1979 Schrader, G.A. 1972. Responsibility and Journal of the American Planning Existence. In Existential Phenomenology. 48 163-174. Association and Political Theory: A Reader, ed., H.Y. Yung. Chicago: Henry Regency Company Krumholz, N., Cogger, J M.; and Linner, J.H. 1975. The Cleveland Policy Planning Wren, T.E 1974. Agency and Urgency: Report. Journal of the American Institute The Origin of Moral Obligation New York: of Planners. 41:298-304. Precedent Publishing, Inc. Levinas, E. 1969 Totality and Infinity. Pittsburgh: Duquesnes University Press. Lucy, W. 1981. Equity and Planning for Local Services. Journal of the American Planning Association. 47:447-457. Mandelbaum, M. 1955. The Phenomen- ology of Moral Experience. Glencoe: The Free Press. Marcuse, P. 1976. Professional Ethics and Beyond: Values in Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 42:264-274. 34