The European Union PDF

HS2024 The European Union THE EUROPEAN UNION INDICE INDICE...........

HS2024 The European Union THE EUROPEAN UNION INDICE INDICE................................................................................................................................................... 1 INTEGRATION HISTORY AND MILESTONES I............................................................................................. 3 INTEGRATION HISTORY AND MILESTONES II.......................................................................................... 11 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY....................................................................................................... 18 THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.............................................................................................................. 19 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EU...................................................................... 24 EUROPEAN COUNCIL.................................................................................................................................... 24 COUNCIL OF THE EU..................................................................................................................................... 26 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT......................................................... 29 POWERS & FUNCTIONS.................................................................................................................................. 30 VON DER LEYEN........................................................................................................................................... 32 HIGH REPRESENTATIVE.................................................................................................................................. 33 ROLE & POWERS.......................................................................................................................................... 36 DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONS.............................................................................................................................. 36 CONFLICTS IN THE EP.................................................................................................................................... 37 INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION MAKING................................................................................................. 38 VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL SEPARATION OF POWERS........................................................................................... 38 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU INSTITUTIONS......................................................................................................... 40 OLP AND OTHER DECISION MAKING PROCEDURES.............................................................................................. 42 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EU LEGAL SYSTEM I.............................................................................. 44 INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME BASICS.................................................................................................................. 44 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LEGAL STRUCTURE................................................................................................ 46 CASSIS DE DIJON.......................................................................................................................................... 48 NEGATIVE & POSITIVE INTEGRATION.................................................................................................................. 48 TAKE-AWAYS FROM TODAY............................................................................................................................. 49 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EU LEGAL SYSTEM II............................................................................. 50 COMPOSITION AND PROCEDURES OF THE CJEU.................................................................................................. 50 RECAP: WHAT HAVE WE DISCUSSED SO FAR ABOUT THE CJEU?............................................................................. 50 CASSIS DE DIJON AND DASSONVILLE................................................................................................................. 52 THE POWER AND LIMITS OF THE CJEU............................................................................................................... 53 QUO VADIS SWITZERLAND? CJEU IN THE INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT AND ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS............................... 54 TAKE-AWAYS............................................................................................................................................... 55 THE EU AND OTHER IOS........................................................................................................................ 56 RECAP: WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT THE EU?......................................................................................................... 56 THE EU & RELATED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS............................................................................................ 56 DISINTEGRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL............................................................................................................ 58 ORDER TAKE-AWAYS..................................................................................................................................... 60 STATE OF INTEGRATION AND CURRENT CHALLENGES........................................................................... 61 Gaia Bignasca 1 HS2024 The European Union BREXIT, THE RUSSIAN WAR IN UKRAINE, AND THE EU............................................................................................ 61 INTEGRATION CHALLENGES............................................................................................................................. 61 COVID-19 AND OTHER CURRENT CHALLENGES.................................................................................................. 63 STATE OF INTEGRATION AND OTHER CURRENT CHALLENGES................................................................................... 64 TAKE-AWAYS............................................................................................................................................... 65 Gaia Bignasca 2 HS2024 The European Union INTEGRATION HISTORY AND MILESTONES I The Historical Backdrop Was Never as Timely Historical analogy: The EU has been built as a reaction to the horrors of WWII (along with the larger international order with, for example, the UN Charter of Human Rights or the Security Council) Nowadays these institutions are under attack, they are under pressure because internation order is not as it used to be ten years ago. First time since 80 years that a powerful nation (Russia) started a war based on a nationalist and imperialistic reading of history. This is very broadly relevant, not just for the EU but also for NATO EU relevance: NATO, not the EU, is the military alliance/response (there have been attempts again and again to build a sort of European defense community, which has failed. In defense what we have is the military alliance of NATO, where you have of course a very strong saying of the US in there.) First, some disagreements among EU member states in respect to sanctions, then coordination and swift, strong, and united response Critical juncture: the values of the EU are under attack on European territory (geopolitics, security/military, migration, energy, etc.) this is a moment where fundamental things do shift. They change (before and after difference) -> in our case the values of the EU are under attack in the Russia-Ukraine war, a problem for the self-understanding of the EU The fact of the matter is that there has been a strong reaction in a field where the EU actually would not have had a strong competence, but it took that competence anyway. So we had coordination with strong and united response from the side of the EU (more on the economic side). PESCO: where the militaries of the EU do common trainings and have sort of common purchases of weapons and other things, also there is a sort of coordination also withing the structure of the EU on the military basis but this is really not comparable to what we have in the NATO case, which is the most important one. The EU is mainly a common market (common economic unit) and so the response, not surprisingly, is also on that economic dimension most severely. Gaia Bignasca 3 HS2024 The European Union The Historical Backdrop of European integration The end of World War II: Creation of the United Nations, the victorious great powers of that time as permanent members of the Security Council (that’s why Russia has a veto right and China doesn’t, and the veto right is actually the main problem in Security Council since most of the time you are stuck to a non-agreement, as a consequence the zone of mutual agreement where you can sort of build a compromise is extremely low -> no basis of acting together anymore actually) Marshall Plan (1948): huge economic aid program of the US to rebuild Europe, huge economic assistance plan of the United States. (Europe is essentially devastated, this plan comes up from the US also in order to create a market) New world order: US and Soviet Union become rival superpowers, Cold War. European integration as means to reconcile European nation states (they are destroyed and fought against each other, there is a lot of post-war anger and suffering) and maybe even create a common identity (surpass the nation state), but how? The idea of European integration is to find a way for European nation states to come together again in some way or the other. EU is a peace project (founded as that) and that has a very strong leaning in its foundation indeed. (we mainly know it nowadays as a crisis reaction machinery) → Three influential ideas and approaches Churchill’s Zurich Speech, 19 September 1946 It’s 1946, so Europe is devastated from the war and Churchill is a giant figure of the war (war hero in the UK, he was a key for also winning the war), but lost re-election and took it personally. So he came to Switzerland and schedules the speech in September. The main expectation of the speech was that he was going to front the Soviet Union, but he did the exact opposite. è What he did was to promote unity and cooperation among nation states in Europe. “The war and devastation has stopped, but the danger has not.” “Yet all the while there is a remedy which [...] would in a few years make all Europe [...] as free and as happy as Switzerland is today.” “It is to recreate the European Family [...] and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.” “The first step in the recreation of the European Family must be a partnership between France and Germany.” “Therefore I say to you: Let Europe arise!” (he has a European family idea, starting from France-Germany cooperation) He says that war and devastation has stopped, but he also says that danger has not. It is a speech to explain not to continue but to be aware what that aggression has led to and to make sure that his is not happening again. (peaceful approach) And towards the end he has a positive approach to the future. Gaia Bignasca 4 HS2024 The European Union Altiero Spinelli: The Idea of a Federal European Union Imprisoned by the fascist Mussolini regime during the war (he was a communist) In prison, he read several federalist theorists and became an advocate of supranational integration, proposing European-wide federalism to overcome the destructive force of nationalism (in prison he abandoned the communist party and became the advocate of a federalist European continent during the 40s and 50s, he developed these federal ideas together with other prisoners) On the islands Ventotene (prison island), he wrote with other prisoners a manifesto, arguing for a European constitution and a supranational European federation of states “The European Federation is the single conceivable guarantee that relationships [...] can exist on the basis of peace and cooperation [...] while awaiting a more distant future, when the political unity of the entire globe becomes a possibility.” – Altiero Spinelli, The Manifesto of Ventotene, 1941 The idea here is of course based on these federalist ideas is to translate that to the European context and to sort of say that’s the federalist moment of the European continent. What we need now is then a sort of supranational integration, bringing the nation states of Europe together with federal logic. è European wide federalism is what was essentially needed. This is Spinelli’s answer to overcome the destructive force of nationalism which has led to World War I and II especially. We can call this the translation of that inspiration to the European context, much more precise than Churchill, because we have here the recipe actually spelled out: we have a common constitution, a supernational order and a new political structure on top of the nation states. The federal component always tries to bring the individuals, the citizens of that order together (constitutional nature, we have a common origin). è That0s the single conceivable guarantee that relationships can exist on the basis of peace and cooperation while awaiting a more distant future when the political unity of the entire globe. Career: - Advisor of De Gasperi (prime minister), Monnet, Member of the European commission (COM) (1970– 1976) and the European Parliament (1979–1986) o This is again sort of an idea of creating a political union on the basis of a constitutional moment where the European Parliament said this was what they want. This has not been confirmed or adopted by the member states un the Council, so this is something which just the European Parliament has expressed its support for this Spinelli Plan. - 14 February 1984: the European Parliament adopted the so-called Spinelli plan (“Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union”) Gaia Bignasca 5 HS2024 The European Union Jean Monnet: “The Father of Europe” The plan for starting and developing integration: Tensions between FRA and GER over coal and steel industries, because coal and steel you need to produce heavy weaponry which was what they have fought with at that time. The idea was we need a common coal and steel market for France and Germany so that they don’t have the material resources to fight against each other. Schuman Declaration (1950, prime minister, Monnet was his advisor), beginning of FRA-GER cooperation: that was basically the beginning of the European cooperation European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1951: first European community that we know. One important feature of that European coal and steel community is not just what it combines, but also what type of institutions it creates. The idea of Jean Monnet was always if you start cooperating, if you start building institutions which work, that will actually take on a life on its own and will extend. Monnet as the first president of the High Authority: that essentially became the blueprint for what is later known as the commission. There is also a sort of assembly where the ministers meet, a legal component and all of these institutions already then pushed for and is then taken as a blueprint for a common economic market. He pushed for the European Economic Community (Common Market), established by the Treaty of Rome (1957): essentially builds the institutions on the blueprint of the European coal and steel community and extends the whole idea to the common market. Advocate of a gradualist, incremental, functional approach of European integration (in contrast to Spinelli for tactics and strategy). Still with a very ambitious goal, it’s not just about doing day-to-day business, but about having a goal which is here the common market, which has clear components which are similar to what Spinelli wanted, but it’s in a different way. We don’t start with a constitution but with a much more pragmatic, granular, incremental functional approach to also create that translational element of which Spinelli was a great advocate. “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.” – Schuman Declaration, May 1950 (Neo functional approach) Gaia Bignasca 6 HS2024 The European Union The 1950s After World War II: Various attempts and ideas for cooperation among European states (to make sure that what happened in WWI and WWII doesn’t happen again), including the call for a federation of European states (Altiero Spinelli) and a more functional approach (Jean Monnet) → Political union vs. economic coordination? We can already see here a very basic tension of the European union which we still can observe today: some are thinking about the European Project (European Union) essentially as a functional thing (you have a problem and institutions that try to deal with it). This is a very sort of incremental, gradualist, reactive logic in some way, and that’s the contrast to the political union, to the federal idea; for Spinelli this was not what the EU at the end is all about, just being reactive to functional needs, but it has sort of to create a common identity, a common constitutional component. The incremental, gradual approach of Jean Monnet at that time was to create a common market, have economic coordination. You don0t think about citizens in the first place, but about producers, workers and consumers. Market exchange is the goal, where you as a citizen or as a firm transnationally operate (transnational rules). 1951: The six avant-garde states go ahead with the ECSC, with which the first institutions were created (Special Council, High Authority, European Assembly and Court of Justice) 1954: Other ambitions failed: European Political Community and European Defence Community (EDC blocked by French Parliament) There was a plan written out as a European Political Community Plan and equally important particularly nowadays a European defense community, so the plan here is not just having coal and steel production jointly organized, but to actually really have a common defense army. It’s written out as a Plan but the French Assembly blocked it. 1957: The Treaties of Rome established the European Economic Community (six members) based on the institutions of the ECSC (Monnet method of starting with economic integration) Since the idea of the defense community was blocked, they were just left with the plan of the common market, which was the blueprint then for the treaties of Rome, which established a European economic community. è The Treaties of Rome established the goal for a common market and the idea is just to have then common rules so you have institutions who redefine the common rules for every economic area (not just coal and steel) Gaia Bignasca 7 HS2024 The European Union The 1960s Treaties of Rome with an ambitious plan to remove tariffs and to create common rules for a common market The Treaties or Rome said you cannot have any tariffs, and it also adds that you cannot have any type of law which is similar in terms of effect to a tariff. This essentially means each member state cannot have any type of regulation which hinders trade. We need common rules, a common type of product standard or whatever is done in economic sphere from that logic has at some point to be done jointly. 1960s: empty chair crisis (bargain between FRA and GER on CAP), Charles de Gaulle opposed move to QMV, political stagnation (intergovernmentalism) This crisis is the implosion of the institutions at the Security Council, they still sit together in this room, but they just veto one another and then it implodes. French representatives don’t come. The problem was here agriculture. When we talk about the common market, we can talk about different sectors, and we will have several examples illustrating that, but the pattern is always the same: we essentially have a member state, a country, which has for its own reasons an important sector, and something would happen on the European level that the representatives of that sector don’t like. Then as a government, you’re responsive to your own economy so this is something you cannot ignore. Here it was all about CAP, that0s the Common Agricultural Policy, and that was essentially a power play of the Franch to oppose, qualified majority voting in CAP so it was not a single issue but a very general opposition of the French government to say “we will not accept a decision-making rule in that sensitive policy area, where the other member states can agree on something which we don’t like” In terms of political integration, QMV is what distinguishes the European Union from a standard international organization This is essentially the intergovernmental way how things play out. A member state essentially blocking, saying this is not something we want, and then it’s difficult to continue at that time. 1965/66: Luxembourg compromise: ensured that important decisions in the European Economic Community (EEC) required unanimous agreement. This meant that no member state could be forced to accept a decision it opposed, emphasizing national sovereignty while allowing for flexible cooperation among countries. → QMV = no veto for individual member states = giving up some national sovereignty = pooling sovereignty on the European level The way they kind of solved the empty chair crisis with this Luxembourg compromise, was essentially successful to get French back on board, but the main problem was still there and QMW was sort of the conclusion from that. What was really clear here: if you want to get to a real common market, you have to make sure that there is a decision-making rule which enables that. Gaia Bignasca 8 HS2024 The European Union Eurosclerosis in the 1970s 1973: Accession of UK, IRL, and DEN (after France twice opposed accession of UK). This was sort of the first extension. 1979: Direct election of the European Parliament (continuous empowerment ever since; session on EP, October 28) The election was a big moment because from 1979 on we have members of the European Parliament who are directly elected by the citizens of the people. (Usually we have the national parliaments, and you may have five seats or so for a country and then the national parliament decides who they send to that higher up parliament. So, they are not elected to become members of the European Parliament or some other international parliamentarian assembly, but they are sent by the international parliament.) We have this sort of direct connection in European Parliament elections to what extent that has fulfilled the promise that many have put into that. The 1970s were times of economic crises. Werner report very ambitious plan for common monetary union, snake and EMS (with Ecu as a more modest version of exchange rate pegs) Essentially what was sort od the defining element was the so-called stack inflation, you have economic stagnation so you have a bad economy and inflation as well. This is something that sort of the Keynesian logic of the post WWII did not foresee, did not expect. For them if you had a bad economy, you lower the interest rate to boost the economy and you do the other thing if you have high inflation, but the problem is if you have both. Then the monetarism came up, so in the monetary economic field the idea became prominent that you can actually not control the economy because at some point you’re going to produce inflation anyway. We have a crisis time here and we don’t know how to react in terms of the economic paradigms we had at that point. Werner report: a very ambitious plan for a common monetary union already in the 70s. what they practically introduced was a so-called SNAKE and the European Monetary System (EMS) - SNAKE: This system was introduced in 1972 to limit exchange rate fluctuations among European currencies. It allowed currencies to move within a specific range, or "snake," to maintain stability without fully fixing rates. The German anchor currency was the main component of that snake. - The European Monetary System (EMS): Launched in 1979, the EMS aimed to create a more stable exchange rate mechanism among European countries. It included the European Currency Unit (ECU), a composite currency used for transactions, serving as a modest version of fixed exchange rate pegs. But standstill in creation of common market and predominant national responses to economic problems (Eurosclerosis) you don’t just have political stagnation but also serious economic problems and besides that sort of monetary response you have very little common joint action on the European level. 1960s and 1970s: legal revolution with the constitutionalization of EU law (in the sense that you have a change of the legal composition towards a much more constitutional logic) through the activist jurisprudence of the CJEU (November 18 and 25) è 70s were the times of desecration and you have had economic crises there and that you have had common European action there and already an idea of what you actually wanting to introduce a monetary union to stabilize the economies of the European community. Gaia Bignasca 9 HS2024 The European Union European Integration History Milestones and failures: What has worked: ECSC, Treaties of Rome, SEA What has not worked: Constitutional character (in a political, not legal sense) and EDC (European defense community) Empty chair crisis, Eurosclerosis: resistance from member states Take-Aways from Today What you should have learned from today’s session: Basic knowledge on the historical and ideational backdrop Milestones of integration from the 1950s to the 1970s: ECSC, Rome Treaties, political stagnation Giving up national sovereignty was (and still is) contested for EU member states The approach to integration was contested from the beginning Integration has a political, legal and economic dimension Gaia Bignasca 10 HS2024 The European Union INTEGRATION HISTORY AND MILESTONES II Re-launch in the 1980s with the SEA 1981: Accession of GRC 1986: Accession of ESP (Spain had a dictatorship regime until 1975 and joining the European community just 11 years later had a strong democratic consolidation component) & PRT There is this idea that joining the EU is a process of consolidating the democracy and had worked very well for Spain and Greece. 1979-1984: Thatcher wants her money back Big Friction with the UK for the first time, the prime minister Thatcher essentially wanted to renegotiate the allocation of the European Community budget because she came to the conclusion that UK was paying too much and getting too little and that’s why this conflict has been called “Thatcher wants her money back” conflict, because essentially it was a demand from the UK to redistribute the payments that the UK has made. Early 1980s problems of Keynesian macro-economic policies of the Mitterand government in FRA (he basically tried to boost the economy/to activate it with low industries, with low impact and low spending and so on) The Problem is that this didn’t really work very well and Margaret Thatcher had a really different approach about more liberalization of the state. Mid-1980s ideational convergence of deregulation and liberalization as new economic paradigms (Delors as Commission President, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Germany as trade-dependent country) Since the Keynesian approach didn’t work out really well in France, the Thatcher approach became more prominent. So the 1980s was a really high time for this approach and this also became an important point of orientation for the European Integration Process. Essentially as a paradigm to re-launch the single market to come up with the new program in order to really create the common market. (which was already the plan but there were problems in actually fulfilling the plan during the 60s and 70s) The French case is important because the approach essentially failed on the national level but Mitterand had the idea to go on the international level and try something else so also the French agreed on a more liberalization path. The man guiding it was also a French: Delors, he became the sort of champion in trying to re-launch the single market economic policy on the European level with the single market. è There was a sort of ideational contextual change important that laid the ground for creating the single market. 1986: SEA (single European market), completion of the single market, re-launch of the Community based on QMV and the principle of negative integration (mutual recognition of rules of others, Cassis de Dijon ruling of the CJEU, we will come back to this, mainly trying to get rid of the barriers of trade) → deep economic integration! The SEA had the goal to actually fulfil the promise of a common market that we already had in the Rome Traits though a bit of a different approach (combination of regulation and liberalization but mainly also to give the community based on qualified majority voting, really the authority to rule the economic affairs in the single market) Gaia Bignasca 11 HS2024 The European Union Maastricht Treaty and the 1990s Maastricht Treaty (1991): The Treaty of the EU (three pillar structure: Single Market, CFSP, JHA, combination of supranational and intergovernmental decision making, EMU, opt-outs, fragmentation/differentiation) è Negotiated in 1991 and implemented in 1992 The Three Pillars of Maastricht 1) First Pillar: single market, four freedoms, transfer of authority with co-decision and QMV + Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) This was a further push of deeper integration in the single market. Important is that the single market pillar it’s clearly the most integrated and still that was already the idea of Masstricht 2) CFSP: additional pillar (more intergovernmental, shared competencies, hybrid, gradual extension of EU level, SLP with limited EP involvement) Clear attempt of the member states to maybe do mor together but not necessarily with the involvement of the European parliament but by keeping it with the governments of the member states. 3) JHA: additional pillar (same as CFSP) These two additional pillars have a combination of supernational and intergovernmental decision-making procedure, so here it’s not so clear that this is completely shifted authorities, but this is an attempt to also shift these areas more to the level of the EU. That’s essentially the three pillars structure that then also became the final logic of many thoughts about the EU. 1995: Accession of AUT, FIN, and SWE 1996: IGC (inter-governmental conference) negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty: co-decision procedure (it means co-decide by the European parliament and the council, so by the member states and the parliament) as “community method”, some shifting in pillars, creation of high representative, enhanced cooperation as option The idea that it should not just be possible to have opt out of the European union but there should also be the possibilities for some countries to actually do things together in a smaller group. (more differentiations) Preparing for enlargement! Why and how to enlarge? What does this process mean for the CEE (central eastern European countries) countries and the EU? That was clearly a very new scale of enlargement that has been debated here because we see from history, we have had single countries joining, maybe three together but here we have a whole region that also have a different context with the soviet republic imploding just a few years before. They wanted to modernize their institution. Treaty of Amsterdam did not sufficiently prepare for enlargements (reforms of institutions) This was in a way an attempt to do so but did not delivered enough and essentially a really clear example of that is the number of commissioners in the commission because with the addition of states it became larger and larger and the organization needed to change but there was no agreement on that in Amsterdam. Gaia Bignasca 12 HS2024 The European Union The 2000s: Enlargements and Institutional Challenges Enlargement and the questions of QMV (qualified majority voting), size of the Commission, policy-focus, competence allocation There are countries that can form a blocking majority and it’s clear that whatever you keep on a limit with enlargements just becomes even more difficult to actually find a solution. (too big of a community and different ideas to agree with) For the policy-focus it is difficult to sort of anticipate what exactly we want the EU to have a strong authority and we have learned in the last crisis years that with very difficult challenges in the health sector, the EU might not be well prepared because it has not the authority in health or security (Ukraine war) Consolidation, deepening vs. enlargement (increased heterogeneity) è It becomes more and more difficult with every enlargement, this was the political challenge of the time Treaty of Nice (2001): IGC starts with big (federal) ambitions (e.g., Joschka Fischer speech), but very limited progress in the Treaty of Nice (heavy criticism, some more QMV) Similar to Amsterdam, there was a really limited progress in the specific Treats revision that then came out of the negotiation. There was of course more qualified majority voting and a shift in that direction but many believe that this is not enough. 2001: European Convention starts with Leaken Decleration on the Future of Europe (led by Giscard d’Estaing): address questions of legitimacy, power allocation, democracy, human rights... The idea was that this group tries to come up again with the federal logic, with the consolidation of what the EU stands for, with a clear transfer in this policy areas where the EU should have authorities, changes of the institutions, commission sizes and so on. There was still the question what should the European parliament do? How much should they be involved? And with every IGC the European parliament got more power, there was more co-decision but still for some it was not enough and the question was to change the European Union towards a more parliamentarian system where actually the Parliament should get more and more power and that would be a way for some to legitimize democratically the European union, because we have democratically elected parliaments. 2004: Accession of CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN, MLT, CYP A really huge enlargement not seen before, and essentially the 00’s was the attempt to consolidate, clarify and also enlarge the EU all at the same time. → Attempt of doing both at once: consolidation and enlargement Gaia Bignasca 13 HS2024 The European Union Enlargement and Deepening Dilemma Try to go back in history: what approach would you (have) support(ed)? 1) Prioritize deepening/consolidation, also with limited (and demanding) enlargement As long as Europe is not ready and Amsterdam has failed of IGC so we have not really a preparation of institutions in enlarge to a sufficient level, the argument would be to first do that and then you will have a limited enlargement and it’s very demanding and it will take longer for other countries to join but this is what is prioritized here. 2) Prioritize enlargement, also with set-backs and permanent constraints to consolidation Historical obligation of the European union to also welcome for example in the eastern European countries due to the values of democracy. This might set back the consolidation and create problems but this is at the end of the day what the EU is about (open to countries who want to join his path) 3) Try to do both: inclusive enlargement and consolidation (risk of failure in both) → Really difficult trade-off Gaia Bignasca 14 HS2024 The European Union The 2000s: Finalit ́e of the EU? No Public Approval The question of consolidation keeps being an important focus of the European union after the enlargement. Due to the “no public approval” we don’t have a supranational institution with constitutional character but we’re stuck with language of treaties and revisions. 2004: Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: clearer structure (pillars), revised competence allocation, directives and regulations are called law, Treaty clauses constitution (consistent with legal standing, we will discuss this next week) The outcome of the European convention was to come up with a constitution (politically established) that would be the replace of the treaties we don’t talk about anymore, so a new treaty. This constitution is also a revision of the treaties and should clear the structure, competence allocation and a revision of it. It was an attempt to call it constitution but failed because it was blocked due to the vote e several member states. (with the no vote of France, we couldn’t continue) 2005: The European Constitution is defeated by the Dutch and French (electorates in ESP, LUX approved it) il progetto di Costituzione Europea, che mirava a creare un quadro legale comune per l'Unione Europea, è stato respinto tramite referendum dai cittadini di Francia e Paesi Bassi. Nonostante l'approvazione in Spagna e Lussemburgo, l'opposizione olandese e francese ha bloccato l'adozione della Costituzione, segnando una battuta d'arresto per l'integrazione europea. 2005: Period of “reflection” starts: dopo il rifiuto della Costituzione Europea da parte di Francia e Paesi Bassi, l'Unione Europea ha avviato un periodo di "riflessione" per valutare le ragioni del fallimento e considerare nuovi approcci per il processo di integrazione 2007: Accession of BGR & ROU (enlargement goes on, as the EU struggles in consolidating and preparing) 2007: Lisbon Treaty (amended Constitution without constitutional language and symbols, more QMV, ordinary legislative procedure, ratified after a second referendum in Ireland) The period of reflection essentially ended with a new Treaty revision. It is still not called law, we don’t have a constitution, but the direction of a more qualified majority voting, ordinary legislative procedure, more power also for the parliament, more is decided together by the council and the parliament. è Several elements have been taken up from the constitution but not in a constitutional language. è Here is basically a struggle of the EU to clarify and to consolidate but then again, a solution with the Lisbon Treaty and this one is the last treaty revision that they have had. Since then, the EU has not been reformed anymore based on the revision of its foundation. The main reason is that now the EU is much bigger and for every treaty revision you need first the agreement of all the member states and also you need to have majority of the people of the public vote. Gaia Bignasca 15 HS2024 The European Union Political and Legal Structure of the EU Political Structure: We will discuss all institutions, based on the three pillars of Maastricht (very deeply integrated single market, the euro-zone, security policy and Schengen) è It is important that these institutions do exist to face new challenges and opportunities, a reactive machine Legal Structure: acquis communautaire (accumulation of legislation, accumulation of legally binding laws that the EU produces) Primary law: Treaties (ECSC, Rome, IGCs, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), heads of states, unanimity From a lawyer perspective we can call it a constitution Secondary law: Directives, Regulations, Decisions (decision making rules vary: Council & EP, co-decision in OLP, QMV in Council, SLP (special legislative precision)) The most important element here is that there is a qualified majority voting in the council, which makes the council actually able to act in terms of not being blocked just by a veto. Case law: CJEU (court of justice of the EU) interpreta il diritto dell'UE per garantire la sua applicazione uniforme in tutti gli Stati membri e risolve le controversie legali tra governi nazionali, istituzioni europee, aziende e cittadini in materia di diritto europeo. The Crises since 2010 2010 to 2015: Eurocrisis (several reform measures) We have the adoption of the euro in several countries and the extension of the eurozone and then a crisis that started in 2009/10 and several reforms with more power given to the EU level, particularly to the ECB (European central bank) which played a central role but also the political institutions in essentially cooperating together to restructure several economies with the great packages of several facilities programs. è All these crises started as a crisis that seemed to really challenge the Europe in its foundation but it has changed the way Europe is governed with more power taken by the ECB and more measures taken on the EU level. 2013: Accession of HRV (MKD, SRB, MNE, ALB, TUR are candidate countries) European migrant crisis: peak in summer 2015 (implosion of the Schengen and the migration policy and that also had to be held by the European institutions) 2016: Brexit referendum (2020 UK withdraws from EU) 2019: France (i.e., Macron) blocks opening negotiations for North Macedonia and Albania (from Macron point of view Europe is not ready to further enlarge) Since 2020: Corona and now the Russian war in Ukraine (Ukraine and Moldova candidate status, Georgia not yet) More about current challenges/priorities at the end of the lecture Gaia Bignasca 16 HS2024 The European Union Why Is Knowledge About History Important? A basic understanding of the history of European integration is necessary for understanding: What the EU is (and is not) Common norms and legacies Legacies of World War II and breakdown of the Soviet Union Discussions on the future of the EU (current challenges), dysfunctionalities, path-dependencies Theories of integration Interaction between legal, political and economic developments Take-Aways from Today What you should have learned from today’s session: Milestones of integration from the 1980s to today Trade-off between deepening and enlargement Deep economic integration (single market with the SEA and Eurozone) Gaia Bignasca 17 HS2024 The European Union EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY What Is a Theory? The map before is a simplification (i.e., abstraction), like models and theories in political science (they are all “false”, but some are useful for specific purposes; in our case: for a better understanding of political developments) It’s never an intention of a theory to explain everything. A theory is... an abstraction (reduction of complexity) seeking general validity (not restricted to one case) why do we theorize? We theorize because we have a pattern of milestones, several developments and then we try to see what are our systematic patterns that we see here. (observable systematic) è a theory tries not to be restricted by specific case but provide a general logic, general validity that we can then always test with the empiric. providing causal arguments with testable implications that we can empirically evaluate (i.e., falsifiable hypotheses) Theoretical Level of Abstraction Theories serve different purposes and are on different levels of abstraction: General validity: a theory of human behavior (e.g., homo oeconomicus) or the emergence of international cooperation (e.g., intergovernmentalism: states that do cooperate out of a rational logic because they all serve what the member states want) The more you add to a theory the more precise it becomes but then the less it’s a theory then. The more you move in that direction, the more you get into an explanation of what it’s exactly going on. è The highest level of abstraction is a super slim theory with not a lot of things explaining it all, so a general validity is attempted with a really parsimonious set of assumptions or just theoretical logic. (homo economicus) Abstract reflections, but more tailored to a specific case (e.g., liberal intergovernmentalism for the EU case) Even more tailored, e.g., drawing on some analytical building blocks (this is often referred to as a framework, not a theory: it’s still and abstraction of what we see, but it’s extremely tailored to what we try to explain) → How parsimonious and internally consistent is a theory? How much does the theory explain? Main goal (and trade-off) of theorizing: Explain as much as possible with as little as possible (adding more elements makes you theory more precise but also less applicable to other cases) Gaia Bignasca 18 HS2024 The European Union THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Essential question: why would nation states actually do that? Lots of different theoretical approaches in terms of perspectives (constructivism vs. realism) and also in terms of levels of abstraction (from grand theories (they try to explain European integration processes) to mid-range theories) We cover the (grand) theories seeking to explain integration: Federalism Neo-functionalism Liberal) intergovernmentalism Post-functionalism See the book by Wiener, Börzel, and Risse (2019), for a more detailed discussion of various theoretical approaches Federalism A Federal Europe as finalité politique (vision of Altiero Spinelli, this is what Europe should become) Multiple meanings of the term federalism, some core principles: Union of individuals, as opposed to a confederation (which is a union of states): the citizens of the European union are bound together as citizens of a political system, and this is opposed to a confederation which is an organization of states. Ambition for a polity with a federal level (member states are under a central, supranational government structure) This is sort of what has been the ambition since the beginning. Unity in diversity (inherent ambiguity), subsidiarity principle: you want to do everything you can on the lowest level of government (being as closed as possible to the people) and if it doesn’t work you go on a higher level but this is decided from the lower level There is a unity component fighting the gaps due to diversity. Political unification, coming together, a common demos and identity (sense of belonging together) but we don’t really have a legal document, we still call it treaty. For this you need a constitutional “moment” and document → As a theory descriptive and normative, does not explain the dynamics of integration (i.e., why would states do this?) For us, as a theory, helps in telling us what the Spinelli logic is and it’s also telling us what many wants or have always attempted for the EU to be. In that sense it is more a descriptive theory trying to explain what type of political system it is but not explaining us the dynamic of integration, so it’s not telling us why it is happening but it’s telling us that it would be a different political system, and some have wanted to do that. It’s a template of where people want to go but doesn’t explain us how to get there. Gaia Bignasca 19 HS2024 The European Union Neo-Functionalism Main alternative theory to Federalism in the early stages of integration (Spinelli vs. Monnet) Neo-functionalism is the first European integration theory, dating back to Haas (1958): he essentially theorized the Monnet approach. è Theorizes the Monnet approach to integration: start with economics, do it incrementally (starting from something practical and incrementally spread it to other fields) Core elements of neo-functionalism: Spill-over from one policy field to another, from economics to politics (the more you integrate one the more pressure you have to integrate others) Elite socialization: the federal logic tries to get individual citizens together, the neo functional theory also says is also important that the elite start to interact, politicians, companies etc. so that you have not just a level of cooperation in terms of institutions but also have certain people interacting on that level which can also start to identify with that cause. (they internalize the perspective and reinforce spill over dynamic) Supranational institutions and transnational actors are powerful (start to actually think as transnational actors) Neo-Functionalism / Supranationalism (synonymous) Neo-functionalism shares with intergovernmentalism (see next slide) the assumption that governments are powerful actors in the integration process But with important qualifications: Transnational and supranational actors are also influential players States cannot anticipate the dynamics of rules and institutions (ambiguity of rules, unintended consequences, emphasis on the power of agents in the principal-agent logic (rapporto principale-agente che può diventare conflittuale quando idee¹uguali), path-dependency → historical institutionalism) Member states may still have a lot of control but cannot anticipate the developments. (like Putin starting a war in Ukraine). You cannot anticipate all the dynamics happening in the world but also not all the dynamics within the institutions. Rules or goals are not that clear! If you say “our goal is the common market” you then need to define what all is meant by market activity. This is not defined. You could essentially extend the market logic of a common market to all other policy fields as well (the definition has been a constant development because it defines the EU authority as well) Integration is not fully in the control of member states (may against will of few member states) Self-reinforcing dynamics at the European level (against the will and interests of some member states) There is a specific logic: the rival is intergovernmentalism, the common sort of source is that both see the government as important actor, so it’s not that neofunctionalism supernationalists will say “the government doesn’t matter anymore, the member states don’t matter anymore” but they have a more complex view: there are also other actors and central dynamic which goes beyond the control of the member states, the governments. (this is the essential difference) It's not that supernationalists and neo-functionalists say member states and government do not matter at all, but they say that there are certain things that governments cannot control anymore. Important qualifications of governments which sort of start a process that they don’t control anymore. Gaia Bignasca 20 HS2024 The European Union Intergovernmentalism Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are since the 1960s the main rival theories seeking to explain European integration. On an ideational level we had the difference between federalism and neofunctionalism but in terms of explaining European integration process the rival logic is between a neo-functional and supranational logic on one side and the intergovernmental one on the other side. Intergovernmentalism dates back to Hoffmann (1966) Core elements of intergovernmentalism: Member states (essentially mean the governments of the member states) are the dominant actors (all that what matters) European integration strengthens (not undermines) the nation states Rules and institutions serve the interests of the (most powerful) member states (completely in the will of the member states, not in a will of a supranational figure) Supranational institutions are the obeying agents of the member states (which are the principal) At the end of the day there might be different things that go in one or the other direction, but if we look at the big lines, member states are dominant, and they do decide the most important key aspects and decision that have to be taken during the whole European integration process. The logic here is that nation states governments cannot solve certain problems, but together as a European Union it creates a common market to have a stronger market power on the global stage. From that perspective, the European union is just the extension of the interests of the nation states, and they move certain things to higher level because they are not capable to do that on their own, but completely in their own self-interest. If we take the principal-agent logic again, the argument is the principle may not control the agent all the time, but essentially the principle is deciding on the direction and the most important issues. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) LI is Moravcsik’s version of intergovernmentalism and serves as a baseline theory for integration The theory has three elements: National preference formation (liberal part): explaining how governments define their interests, based on their nation will Bargaining theory (relative power): they try to find a common ground, a solution on which they agree. Theory of institutional choice (credible commitments): they all have a common interest, that is what they decide is credible, and for that they create institutions like the commission in order to reinforce what they have decided. è Heated academic debates, particularly in the 1990s. The debate is outdated, but it highlights the core empirical and normative questions of European integration (was able to show that the consequences of all treaties were in the interest of the most powerful member states) Gaia Bignasca 21 HS2024 The European Union Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism Both theories have been refined and updated. A good empirical case for each theory (constant redefinition): Empty chair crisis in the 1960s: France refused to show up at intergovernmental meetings, Haas himself declared neo-functionalism obsolete è This is a good case of intergovernmentalism: if member states don’t want, nothing happens anymore on the level of the EU The transformation of the legal system through the jurisprudence of the ECJ, which was neither intended nor formally approved by member states’ governments è Moment where the Neo-Functionalism theory became prominent: the way the legal system has developed is really not explainable by what intergovernmentalists will say. è Development in a legal constitutional system which is very different of what we have in any other IO and is a good case to be explained with neo-functional logic, because we have supranational actors and we have a development which has not been stopped by member states governments. The core difference between the two theories: Power is assigned to different actors (power is assigned differently based on the actors) Both theories stand for a specific (and distinct) model of the EU (there is room for the EU but that’s just the extension of the interests of the member states. Whereas the normative on the pending of Neo- functionalism is of course bypassing the member states, there are other institutions which also become important) Different normative underpinnings and empirical implications Post-Functionalism: Hooghe and Marks (2008) Post-functionalist theory: Neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism generalize from the first three decades of integration: period of permissive consensus → deals cut by insulated elites The problem of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism is that they are both elite theories. This might have been the case for the 60’s-80’s (period of permissive consensus) but since the 90’s it’s becoming more complicated because on the domestic level the common opinion becomes more important (EU becomes politicized) and this was more visible with referendums. Since 1991 constraining dissensus: elites must take public opinion into account when negotiating European issues This new element was most visible in the referendums on Maastricht (rejection in DNK and almost in FRA) and on the Constitution (rejection in NLD and FRA) è There is a new development that is needed to take into account. Gaia Bignasca 22 HS2024 The European Union Post-Functionalism: Hooghe and Marks (2008) The preferences of the general public and of national political parties have become decisive for integration; but how? Identity is critical in shaping contestation on Europe (cosmopolitan-communitarian divide, not left-right) A more cosmopolitan, supranational (typically in urban areas) view of the EU vs. a more communitarian, a more conservative, more nationally oriented view. This division translated into different views of the EU. è Cultural division, not left and right anymore and this new has to be taken into account The debate on Europe has been framed by opponents of European integration, particularly populists and nationalists The European Union becomes framed and sort of attacked from populist and nationalist parties that disliked the EU but particularly the development that attached to it. This is a new phenomenon that has to be considered. Public opinion, political parties and domestic politics matter: what are the consequences for integration? è They add new actors, new dimensions but essentially, it’s not so clear what type of hypothesis/predictions/explanations Take-Aways from Today What you should have learned from today’s session: Better understanding of what a theory is Main differences and logics of federalism, neo-functionalism / supranationalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism → Read Chapter 2 & 3 Leuffen et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (you can ignore the reference to differentiated integration) Linking theory to empirics (i.e., integration history, but also to current EU politics) and to ideas (normative dimension), for example, Federalism to Spinelli Gaia Bignasca 23 HS2024 The European Union THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EU EUROPEAN COUNCIL Short recap You know the basics on the structure, layers, powers, etc. of the Council system from the book chapter (which you read before listening to this podcast) Here are some key points (to get us started): The Council system is at the epicentre of EU decision making –> Represents the member states Has executive and legislative functions Collective decision making versus intergovernmental gridlock European Council è Somehow the most important, is the one who really gives the direction, who makes the most important decisions Scharpf, Fritz W. (2007), Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy, MPIfG Paper: The EU is legitimized as a “government of governments” è To start here we have to understand here the profound reason why the European Council can be labeled as the politically most important institution within the setting of the EU. The highest political authority: Heads of states and governments, the highest authority in the Council system What the EU can do or cannot do (authority) is determined in the Treaties, the EU Treaties are signed by the heads of states and governments, so essentially who is part of the European Council. The European Council then constantly direct what is the priority and how the EU should develop. Whatever the EU is doing or is not doing, is legitimized by the common joint voice of the governments. At the end of the day the EU is a government of governments and is legitimized by that. (highest politically authority that we have) IGCs: Reform of EU Treaty (→ primary law: SEA 1986, Maastricht 1992, Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2000, Lisbon 2007) The treaties are sometimes revised in intergovernmental conferences (IGC’s), they are special meetings of the European council, but the actors are always the same. “EU is legitimized by its own pets” At least 2 formal and 2 informal meetings a year (plus IGCs), Euro Summit twice a year It is a regular format but doesn’t happen often/daily but still regularly. What to keep in mind is that the question of what they produce there is the most difficult. Essentially the agenda is always the most pertinent and important but also most difficult question they end up with, because whatever can be solved before is done by the lower-level institutions. Gaia Bignasca 24 HS2024 The European Union è The European Council doesn’t solve the issues in a way of saying “this is the new law” but more negotiations, bargains and problem communications. It is not a formal law, but a very important document in the sense that it lays out what the European Council expect to happen. Output of meetings are lengthy communiqué It is an informal document, but it is really important since it gives a general direction in which the other institutions will act. Gives general direction, created in the early 1970s, acknowledged in the SEA, with own Presidency since 2009 Power and Political Conflict Inter-institutional conflict (and coalitions) with: The Commission, EP (they might form a coalition for the most progressive reform and the European Council might be a bit more reluctant) ECB (European central bank, might be doing things that some member states like but others don’t, on the economic level), CJEU (Court of Justice, may be doing things that some block and other likes, on the political and integration level) Domestic Parliaments Also among the European Council and the Council (e.g., Eurozone), it is the same government represented in both but it’s not the same persons. -> example for Greece The European Council also depends on other institutions, and sometimes it is in conflict with other institutions of the EU or in the domestic arena. The EU Council is acting in relation of the commission and the Parliaments, so in interaction to the other EU institutions, but it also has to do with domestic parliaments and media etc. Intra-institutional conflict and coalitions (within the European Council): A matter of policy salience (some issues might be more important for Germans or Danish than others for example), competence, and power It is hard to simplify but the important point is that it varies, according to the policy areas, to whether you have good coalitions with others, how competent you are, how much you understand and how able you are to find solutions that also fit others. Policy-specific conflicts (Visegrad states in immigration policy, North-South divide in Eurozone) The immigration policy might vary a bit in terms of what country is in or not. Whereas for the North-South division in Eurozone there is a group with Germany in it who want more restrictive policies in the Eurozone (low deficit and discipline), but the South believes that you need to balance differences, and you cannot just regulate a monetary economic union though physical discipline. Unanimity as decision rule (veto) -> hardest rule to find solutions Which member states are most powerful? State (structural), institutional, and individual sources of power (Tallberg, 2008) There is a structural component, some member states are bigger and have a bigger economic power, more political stability, populations etc. but then there is also an institutional component so how stable is that country, how stable is the government? How often is it changing? What about their political stability? Gaia Bignasca 25 HS2024 The European Union COUNCIL OF THE EU The Council of the European Union EUROPEAN COUNCIL → COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION → COREPER → WORKING-GROUPS The Council of the European Union: Executive and legislative responsibilities The members of the council are members of an executive, so the ministers, they are part of the government (executive in their own country), but they legislate here (produce communiqué) a bit like a parliament in some extend. This is the production of law. è Every law/legislation comes with a very substantial say voice by the council Ministerial level: 10 configurations, ECOFIN (Eurogroup as informal body), JHA etc. Like 10 different councils in the council system itself. General Secretariat of the Council (organization, keep records etc.) Here we have a much bigger secretariat than in for the European Council, because it is doing much more work QMV voting rule: 55% of member states representing 65% of EU population (a larger member state has actually more power in terms of population) In some areas we still have unanimity, but that’s not the rule. In Majority is QMV but they still actually everyone to agree, they still listen to others and that’s why very often we don’t have a vote. è The point here is not to always vote, pr just to try to pass the vote, but to know that you can vote at this is enough. (everybody knows that this is a possibility) Rotating Presidency: every 6 months, agenda, chair of meetings It essentially means that it chairs the meetings, it typically has an agenda and kind of fix the most important priorities (it’s a small sort of power, but they cannot dictate or nominate the agenda, but still the way you chair the meetings can make a difference) Collective EU decision making (COM and EP, ordinary legislative procedure (parliament and council essentially legislating together, both chambers have to agree), directives and regulations → secondary law) It is the core of collective EU decision making, not just in terms of states agreeing with one another, but in terms of interaction with other institutes, so very strong constant interactions with the commissions and also the European Parliament. Gaia Bignasca 26 HS2024 The European Union Coreper: Key Function in the Council System Heads of states and ministers are supported by their national administration, plus their representations in Brussels A national administration is working on behalf of these ministers and the head of states, but they also have a bigger administration in Brussels, so there is a bigger representation of each member states. (Coreper) There are two sorts of expertise: some who are anchored in the national context (a lot of contact with the national players) and then for the same policy questions (finance or agriculture for example) someone who is working also in Brussels with the same type of dossiers. They always meet with their counterparts in Brussels. Coreper and working-groups prepare the meetings of the ministers Coreper as a key body that consists of the Permanent Representation of Member States (PermReps, EU ambassador of each country plus deputy which are all supported by staff based in Brussels) There is a building in Brussels where you have the permanent representation with a lot of people working there. The PermRep (not a specialist, is comparable to the head of states and head of governments in the European council but on a lower level) is a sort of super ambassador of each country and they meet weekly with their counterparts in Brussels. Coreper meets weekly, negotiates across issues (the ministerial level is more focused on particular sectoral issue) 62’000 officials who regularly meet in Brussels are part of the Council system (as compared to 24’000 COM officials) National interests (mort important for those in the capitals) versus elite socialization hypothesis That is an interesting body to look at to what extend you have national interest representation also sort of the feedbacks of the European perspective back to the capitals. Coreper funge da ponte tra l’Unione Europea e i governi nazionali, trasmettendo una visione europea che spesso influenza le posizioni delle capitali. In questo modo, contribuisce a trovare un equilibrio tra la coesione dell'UE e la difesa degli interessi nazionali, rendendo le politiche europee più integrate senza sacrificare le priorità dei singoli Stati membri. Gaia Bignasca 27 HS2024 The European Union Final Remarks on the Council System Power, Transparency, and Efficiency: Separation of powers on the European and domestic level Important here is how powerful it is but also how is the power allocations among the member states. Here the biggest point is that the whole council system makes sure that the member states are really strongly anchored and represented within the EU institutions but it’s also clear that however we look at it, it really empowers very much the national government. The whole Council system strongly empowers national governments and administrations vis-à-vis national parliaments The national governments have also sort of, with the Europeanization, with the European integration project and progress, more power received vs. a vis-à-vis with national parliaments. è The whole Council System doesn’t just make sure that member states are represented but also empowers national governments organizations. Double role of governments in two-level game: blame shifting The two-level game of knowing what is going on, you having the part of that position making in Brussels but then pretending that the others have been doing that. Shifting blame to others for thing you have been part of but you don’t want to take responsibility but on the other hand you can also take credits for things you didn’t do. Little information: questions of negotiation dynamics, transparency, accountability There is actually high transparency compared to other institutions in domestic, but still you won’t get some information, some questions on negotiation dynamics are difficult to get resulting in a lack of transparency. It is actually hard to find full solutions if everything is completely transparent. Efficiency versus accountability You are more efficient, more capable in finding solutions but that can also go with the price that not everything is completely transparent and then you have a bit of an accountability problem because at the end of the day you don’t really know what precisely has happened. Capacity of consensus model with increased heterogeneity through enlargements (differentiation and enhanced cooperation) Take-Aways What you should have learned from today’s session: Importance and Hierarchy of the Council System Functions of the European Council and Council of the EU Power distribution, coalitions and conflict within the European Council and Council of the EU (i.e., among member states) Power distribution, coalitions and conflict with other institutions (COM, EP) Gaia Bignasca 28 HS2024 The European Union THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Short Recap You know the basics on the functions, powers, and structure of the Commission from the book chapter (which you read before listening to this podcast) Here are some key points (to get us started): The COM competes with the European Council for the leadership role (setting objectives and priorities for action) The commission is not just doing daily business, but it also wants to influence the direction of the European Union and of the European Integration and in that sense, it competes with the European Council for this leadership role of representing the EU and of defending what are the main priorities, but this is mainly what the European Council does. The European Council doesn’t meet often but when they do, they want to give sort of the objectives, the goals, the priorities for action but that’s also something the Commission want to do and the Commission has the mandate to do that so in that sense it is also a guardian of the Treaties, it has been mandated by the Member States to also keep an eye on what are the supranational EU priorities. The best thing is if the member states and the European Council agree with the Commission on the most important priorities and objectives for action, but if not, then there is a bit of a competition in that leadership role. Some similarity to governments (head of bureaucracy) In the daily business you can think of the Commission as being similar to a national government in the sense that it is heading the EU bureaucracy, so every government in a national state is also the administrative head of the national bureaucracy of the national administration. Involved in all stages of the policy cycle (problem definition, policy formulation, decision making, implementation) If you want to understand why the Commission is influential, it’s not very helpful to identify one source of power and one specific power that it has, but to understand what the accumulation, the sum of all its powers actually means. The way we can look at that is with the policy cycle (essentially a public policy framework, it has the idea that policymaking is never ending, it is and endless progress. The first stage is where problems are defined, where something happens and where there are some problems, then we have the definition of the problem. Secondly there is a policy formulation stage, which essentially is the stage where you try to address the problem that you have defined before with different possibilities of addressing it. After that you have a decision making process, where you produce new laws and programs which try to address that problem, mainly the decision of what has to be done. Finally, this new rules are implemented and then you try to understand what is working or not and then you start again from zero for the things that didn’t work out) è The Commission is important in all of the steps. It is extremely important to have an influential role in each of the stages because it is important that you are able to define the problem and implement solutions. è It is not one single power of the Commission, but the accumulation in all these stages in different ways, but important in all of them together as a sum, as an accumulation of power. This is what makes the commission special compared to others. Gaia Bignasca 29 HS2024 The European Union POWERS & FUNCTIONS Mandate and Powers of the COM Agenda-setting (exclusive right of drafting legislation is a very strong power in policy making, particularly vis-à-vis the Parliament -> having a parliament which cannot on its own start the initiation or initiate a legislation is really unique) è The Commission is the only institution who can draft (prepare, initiate) a new legislation This is sort of unique, because typically to initiate a new legislation, to decide on a new law, to initiate that process in a national system can always also be done by the parliament. So, if you are a member of a parliament, of a national parliament, you can either as some reports from the national administration or you essentially have different ways to ask for information and also initiate a process for a new law. Here in the EU case, you cannot do that as a member of the European Parliament, you can also not do that as a member state within the Council (the Commission is the only institution that can do that) Agenda-setting: you put a problem on the agenda, you frame the problem, you define the problem and you also say how it could be addressed. Management of programmes, but implementation lies with national administrations (comitology committees as bodies overseeing implementation, strong role of the Council and thus member states) The first proposal comes from the commission, but then the member states of the parliament and the Council can change all the content within that proposal. (it is an agenda setting, but it also doesn’t mean that they can sort of define what the outcome of the decision-making process is) The implementation is with national administration, usually, so practically all EU law is implemented at the end of the day by a national bureaucracy, by national public servants, not EU officials. That is also a bit the reason why that number of EU officials, people working for the commission is that low, because the law that is produced in Brussels is not implemented by EU officials, but by national administrations. (the commission oversees whether that’s happening in a way that is consistent with the EU law -> comitology committees). Principal-agent constellation with European Council (some characterize the COM as fairly independent; search for lowest common denominator vs. agent who is successfully pursuing its own agenda) One extreme says that the commission is really capable and strong in also making sure its own proprieties are fulfilled, and on the other side why would the commission do that? The only thing the commission is interested in finding solutions and for doing that, it tries to find everything that is possibly to be agreed upon by member states and majority of the European Parliament. (completely acting in the search for lowest common denominator solutions for compromise) High influence when formal powers are combined with a smart use of informal powers (expertise, setting focal points, steering discussions) The commission has a low of information, it’s important in the problem definition, it has a lot of expertise. It is all informal power but all very important. It is an institution which a lot of formal and informal power and the better it is capable of combining them into a good sort of working modem particularly with the parliament and the member states, the more influential the commission at the end of the day is. Strong expertise; facilitator and translator between member states and institutions (EP, Council, European Council, CJEU) Gaia Bignasca 30 HS2024 The European Union Structure of the COM College: 1 President, plus 26 Commissioners (some designated Vice Presidents) We have a hierarchy from the president ot the vice presidents to the normal commissioners President has a Secretariat-General (has been strengthened as the role of the President in general) The formal, the staff, the formal role of the president within the commission, including the secretariat generally has become more and more important also because of the enlargement. It is more difficult to head a larger commission. Key roles: President (von der Leyen), High Representative, VPs, 24’000 officials work for the Commission Each Commissioner has a cabinet (personal staff) and heads one or several Directorates-General (policy portfolio with more or less important DGs) The commissioner is next to the cabinet who is supporting the work of the commission is the head of a DG (directorate general). Some of these directorates generals are more important than others. Commissioners are nominated by national governments (stronger role of EP and COM President in appointments) Each state has a commissioner, and each member state has a commissioner (nominated by the national government) Still, the European parliament has an important role and also the commission president. The European Parliament at the end of the day has to confirm the commission, so each nominee for the commission needs a majority support in the European Parliament and it has again and again rejected some commissioners for different reasons. (there is a clear checking of the candidates). The what happens is that the national government has to nominate someone else, so they can be rejected but the European Parliament cannot say itself “this is the person we want”, because it always in the hands of the national governments. Gaia Bignasca 31 HS2024 The European Union VON DER LEYEN The von der Leyen Commission(s) ’Geopolitical Commission’, Baracani and Kassim (2024): Centralized crisis management, expanding EU competence and Commission influence (COVID-19 & Russian War in Ukraine) → Going beyond being a simple “agent” of national governments What er have observed is a very centralized crisis management, the common joint reaction from EU member states with using EU institutions, also in policy fields where the EU doesn0t have a lot of authority. “Europe must also learn the language of power” since “soft power is no longer enough” (von der Leyen, 2019): Strategic autonomy: own energy and defense (not depend on others) Created a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG-DEFIS), it is related to the security threat that has a longstanding history. Here there has been a need and also opportunity to do that. Green agenda: reduced reliance on Russian gas, renewables Fast-tracked EU enlargement (Ukraine) The 2nd von der Leyen Commission Thierry Breton resigned: Von der Leyen allegedly offered France (Macron) a stronger portfolio in exchange for Stéphane Séjourné as replacement (DG’s vary in prestige, internal power) She offered France a bit more important role within the commission if there is another nominee in exchange. The commission president is visibly important and influent. France secured the key portfolio of Prosperity and Industrial Strategy (strategic independence) → As you saw earlier, nominating Commissioners was conceived to be in the domain of national governments The new COM composition for 2024 – 2029: Von der Leyen improved gender balance Strong shift to the right with weakening of the left (in terms of political affiliations) Gaia Bignasca 32 HS2024 The European Union HIGH REPRESENTATIVE The High Representative for Foreign Affairs The High Representative for Foreign Affairs as a hybrid position: it is not clear what it is exactly doing but is an important position. Not called, but thought of by many, as “Foreign Minister of the EU” Appointed by the European Council (qualified majority with the agreement of the President of the COM) Vice-President of the COM (directly) Represents the EU externally Javier Solana (1999-2009), Catherine Ashton (2009-2014), Federica Mogherini (2014-2019), Josep Borrell (2019-2024), Kaja Kallas (2024-2029) The Role of the Commissioners Commissioners are servants of many principles (both individually and as a college): Common (European) good Nationality (national government) European Parliament Party (ideology) Portfolio (policy) interests è All of these are part of the goal, and the way you combine them is essentially also the ways you execute your duty as a commissioner. We can see a commissioner has to defend or think about the common European good (what is the supranational EI perspective), he has a nationality (proposed by the national government, has influence) and also has to serve the interest of not just member states but also the European Parliament. And also commissioners are typically members of certain parties, so that’s also influential. How Commission Officials Conceive Their Institution’s Role Gaia Bignasca 33 HS2024 The European Union Take-Aways for European Commission What you should have learned from today’s session: Powers (formal and informal) of the COM Hybrid (shared) and central functions Structure of COM Multiple roles and points of orientations of the Commissioners and the College as a collective Short Recap European Parliament You know the basics on the historical evolution, role, and decision-making powers of the European Parliament and the discussions on the democratic deficit from the book chapter (which you read) Here are some key points (to get us started): Ever increasing powers (1979: first direct elections; 1992: co-decision, approval power over COM nominations; 1997, 2000, 2007: extensions of scope of co-decision with Council) The European Parliament, most important sort of development is the first direct election in 1979, that was the moment where the European Parliament really has become a parliament of the citizens, in the sense that the members of the parliament have not been delegated by national parliaments, but they have been directly elected by citizens, the people of the European Union. A big step for more formal power came several years later, with the co-decision procedure in 1992. This is institutionally speaking really putting the European Parliament on the same footing as the council. It is a serious parliament because it has the same rights in decision-making like the member states in the co-decision procedure where a majority of the European Parliament has to agree on a new lay together with a qualified majority in the council. Also it’s leading the commission in the sense that it has to approve the commission nominations. It can also force the commissioners to step down (has a n oversight rule over bureaucracy and administration, typical for parliament) Everything that is put into the decision-making process of the co-decision essentially increases the power of the European Parliament. The parliament has become more and more influential with every IGC and with every move towards co-decision withing the EU. Democratic function (representation) the European Parliament provides an extremely important function in terms of the democratic anchoring, so the question of why would you have more and more power for the EU and the government only deciding upon that is democratically a problem because the governments are the executives and you need a genuine legislator which is connected and gets a mandate form the citizens, from the people and that’s of course straightforward with the members of the European Parliament, because they are voted in by or elected by the people of the EU, by the citizens, to do exactly that. è That’s the reason why with all the increasing powers, more power is given to the EU and there was also pressure to give more power to the European Parliament (the member states give up powers actually) Gaia Bignasca 34 HS2024 The European Union Elections 2019 and 2024 2019 EPP (European People Party’s, central right) and S&D (social democratics, central left) lost their majority (their vote share combined decreased from 48.9% to 38.9%) ALDE (liberals), Greens and ENF win (pooulists), radical left lost Increased fragmention of EP 2024 Far-right parties surged (notably in France, Italy & Germany) Rassemblement National won 31.5% in France; Macron dissolved parliament, calling snap elections Centre right’s (EPP) position strengthened; but most pro-EU parties lost ground It was strengthened but they didn’t win the election in terms of votes and seats, but it became more important because the right, the radical right became more important. So now the EPP is sort of in between the left, the social democrats and the Liberals with whom they can from majority. Von der Leyen re-elected President of the Commission Some General Comments Some general observations and remarks on the elections: Second-order elections, but high turn-out 2019 & 2024 (slightly above 50%) -> people do care Second order because they are driven by national dynamic, so you may like your government or not, or a party wins a lot of ground or is not popular at all in the national context, this then translates also into European party elections, so that this is not detached. So you don’t support one party in the European election, but not in a national election, so you pay much more attention to national developments and from that perspective the European elections would be second-ordered. Lots of country-specific dynamics, difficult to integrate national dynamics in EU party system No strong European leadership, party blocs with internal divisions (that makes them less powerful as united forces and also for the voter who doesn’t know which other European parties that is voting are actually working together) Pro-EU camp has been slightly weakened The trend is more and more fragmentation, so the bid parties groups are becoming smaller but we actually have also potentially more possibilities for different coalitions EP increasingly fragmented, which makes compromise, coordination and coalition-building more difficult because there are more players, but the positive side is that if there are different forms of coalitions that can work in different policies area together. Gaia Bignasca 35 HS2024 The European Union ROLE & POWERS Role and Powers of the EP Role and powers of the European Parliament: Control and oversight over COM, budgetary power, legislation Budgetary power and legislation (shared with Council) The EP and Council as co-legislators in the OLP is similar to a two-chamber system of Switzerland Often the EP stands (with the COM) against the Council (Council represents the member states, EP the people) That’s because the council represents the member states and the European Parliament the people. Direct connection to voters (how strong is it?) It is very clear that this is just for forma reasons the case, because the member of the European parliament are directly elected by the European voters, so they are directly representing the European, the Eu electorate. What it is a bit more unclear is how strong is the connection, how well is the EP really providing that democratic representative function. That’s a long-standing debate and just the will to provide that is the essential reason why the EP has been empowered. DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONS The Empowerment of the EP and Its Democratic Function Empowerment through democratic norms: The EP as the only democratically elected body of the EU According to Rittberger (2012) “Institutionalizing Representative Democracy in the European Union: The Case of the European Parliament”, the norm that the empowered EP provides democratic legitimacy when member states give up sovereignty (with the introduction of QMV) institutionalized representative democracy on the EU level (see Journal of Common Market Studies 50(1): 18–37). He says that the main source of legitimacy from a democratic perspective has to come from the European parliament, because he looks at the EU as a representative democracy which has to be improved and institutionalized. He makes the argument that this norm, that empowered European parliament really provides that democratic legitimacy, in particularly when member states give up more and more sovereignty which is at the end the reason why the EP has received more and more power. The more you want the EU to do and the more you move to qualified majority so that single member state cannot anymore block that, the more you move away from the government of government’s perspective from Fritz Scharpf and you need to fill that by beefing up