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CHAPTER 4 Liberalism 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Introduction: Basic Liberal Assumptions Sociological Liberalism Interdependence Liberalism Institutional Liberalism Republican Liberalism Neorealist Critiques of Liberalism 4.6.1 The Retreat to Weak Liberalism 4.6.2 104 106 109 114 118 124 4.7 4.8 T...

CHAPTER 4 Liberalism 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Introduction: Basic Liberal Assumptions Sociological Liberalism Interdependence Liberalism Institutional Liberalism Republican Liberalism Neorealist Critiques of Liberalism 4.6.1 The Retreat to Weak Liberalism 4.6.2 104 106 109 114 118 124 4.7 4.8 The Counter-attack of Strong Liberalism Realist Resurgence? Integrating International and Domestic Factors KEY POINTS QUESTIONS GUIDE TO FURTHER READING 128 132 133 134 135 135 126 Summary This chapter sets forth the liberal tradition in IR. Basic liberal assumptions are: (1) a positive view of human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations can be cooperative rather than conflictual; and (3) a belief in progress. In their conceptions of international cooperation, liberal theorists emphasize different features of world politics. Sociological liberals highlight transnational non-governmental ties between societies, such as communication between individuals and between groups. Interdependence liberals pay particular attention to economic ties of mutual exchange and mutual dependence between peoples and governments. Institutional liberals underscore the importance of organized cooperation between states; finally, republican liberals argue that liberal democratic constitutions and forms of government are of vital importance for inducing peaceful and cooperative relations between states. The chapter discusses these four strands of liberal thought and a debate with neorealism which has given rise to a distinction between weak and strong liberalism. The concluding section evaluates how the liberal tradition has attempted to integrate domestic-level and system-level explanatory factors. 104 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES 4.1 Introduction: Basic Liberal Assumptions The previous chapter introduced the realist tradition, with its focus on power and conflict. This chapter is about the sharply contrasting liberal view. How can liberals be ‘optimistic’ about IR? Why do they see a more peaceful world down the road? What are their arguments and beliefs? The liberal tradition in IR is closely connected with the emergence of the modern liberal state. Liberal philosophers, beginning with John Locke in the seventeenth century, saw great potential for human progress in modern civil society and the capitalist economy, both of which could flourish in states which guaranteed individual liberty (Fawcett 2018). Modernity projects a new and better life, free of authoritarian government, and with a much higher level of material welfare (see Box 4.1). The process of modernization unleashed by the scientific revolution led to improved technologies and thus more efficient ways of producing goods and mastering nature. That was reinforced by the liberal intellectual revolution which had great faith in human reason and rationality. Here is the basis for the liberal belief in progress: the modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system that will bring, in Jeremy Bentham’s famous phrase, ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Liberals generally take a positive view of human nature. They have great faith in human reason and they are convinced that rational principles can be applied to international affairs. Liberals recognize that individuals are self-interested and competitive up to a point. But they also believe that individuals share many interests and can engage in collaborative and cooperative social action, domestically as well as internationally, which results in greater benefits for everybody at home and abroad. In other words, conflict and war are not inevitable; when people are guided by reason, they can achieve mutually beneficial cooperation not only within states but also across international boundaries. But liberal theorists disagree about the significance of the obstacles that block the way to human progress (Smith 1992: 204). For some liberals it is a long-term process with many setbacks; for others, success is just around the corner. However, all BOX 4.1 Key Developments: Modernization Between 1780 and 1850, in less than three generations, a far-reaching revolution, without precedent in the history of Mankind, changed the face of England. From then on, the world was no longer the same. The Industrial Revolution transformed Man from a farmershepherd into a manipulator of machines worked by inanimate energy . . . [It] opened up a completely different world of new and untapped sources of energy such as coal, oil, electricity and the atom. From a narrow technological point of view, the Industrial Revolution can be defined as the process by which a society gained control of vast sources of inanimate energy; but such a definition does not do justice to this phenomenon . . . as regards its economic, cultural, social and political implications. Cipolla (1977: 7–8) LIBERALISM FIGURE 4.1 Classical liberalism FOCUS: freedom, cooperation, peace, progress EARLY THINKERS: Locke (1632–1704) Bentham (1748–1832) Kant (1724–1804) The rule of law Liberal states respect ‘Republics will establish ‘Rechtsstaat’ international law perpetual peace’ liberals agree that in the long run cooperation based on mutual interests can prevail. That is because modernization constantly increases the scope and the need for cooperation (Zacher and Matthew 1995: 119; Mahbubani 2013) (see Figure 4.1). The belief in progress is a core liberal assumption. But it is also a point of debate among liberals (see Fawcett 2018; Pollard 1971: 9–13). What kind of progress? Scientific and technological for sure, but also social and political? What are the limits of progress? Are there any limits? Progress for whom? A small number of liberal countries or the entire world? The scope and degree of liberal optimism about progress have fluctuated over time. Many early liberals were inclined to be thoroughly optimistic; we have also noted the surge of utopian liberalism before and after the First World War. After the Second World War, however, liberal optimism became more muted. Robert Keohane, for example, cautiously notes that liberals believe ‘in at least the possibility of cumulative progress’ (Keohane 1989: 174; see also Keohane 2012). There was another surge of liberal optimism after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the notion of ‘the end of history’ based on the defeat of communism and the expected universal victory of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1989, 1992). However, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington of 11 September 2001, followed by attacks in Madrid, London, and elsewhere, have once more weakened liberal optimism. Many observers agree that at the present time, liberal ideas about progress and cooperation face a number of serious challenges (Niblett 2017; Duncombe and Dunne 2018; Lind and Wohlforth 2019; Mearsheimer 2019). Progress for liberals is always progress for individuals. The core concern of liberalism is the happiness and contentment of individual human beings. John Locke argued that states existed to underwrite the liberty and property of their citizens and thus enable them to live their lives and pursue their happiness without undue interference from other people. Where realists see the state first and foremost as a concentration of power, a Machtstaat, liberals see the state as a constitutional entity, a Rechtsstaat which establishes and enforces the rule of law that respects the rights of citizens. Such constitutional states would also respect each other and would deal with each other in accordance with norms of mutual toleration. That argument was expanded by Jeremy Bentham—an eighteenth-century English philosopher—who coined the term ‘international law’ (indeed, Bentham was the first to coin the term ‘international’) (Suganami 1978). He believed that it was in the rational interests of constitutional states to adhere to international law in their foreign policies (Rosenblum 1978: 101). This argument was 105 106 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES FIGURE 4.2 Basic liberal assumptions Human progress Human reason Cooperation The process of modernization: development of the modern state further developed by Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth-century German philosopher. He thought that a world of such constitutional and mutually respectful states—he called them ‘republics’—could eventually establish ‘perpetual peace’ in the world (Gallie 1978: 8–36). Figure 4.1 summarizes the focus of these leading classical liberal thinkers. In summary, liberal thinking is closely connected with the emergence of the modern constitutional state. Liberals argue that modernization brings progress in most areas of life. The process of modernization enlarges the scope for cooperation across international boundaries. Progress means a better life for at least the majority of individuals. Humans possess reason, and when they apply it to international affairs, greater cooperation will be the end result (see Figure 4.2). Formulated less boldly, liberals hold that anarchy in international affairs does not preclude cooperation, if common interests exist. In Chapter 2, we presented the utopian or idealist liberalism of the 1920s. This chapter focuses on liberal theory after the Second World War. It is useful to divide post-war liberalism into four main strands of thinking: sociological liberalism; interdependence liberalism; institutional liberalism; and republican liberalism (Ikenberry 2020; Nye 1988; Keohane 2002; Zacher and Matthew 1995: 121). Two of these perspectives— interdependence liberalism and institutional liberalism—operate on the systemic level (Waltz’s third image) whereas the other two—sociological liberalism and republican liberalism—operate on the level of the nation-state (Waltz’s second image). The following sections of this chapter will focus on what we see as the most important contributions representing each of these strands. 4.2 Sociological Liberalism For realists, IR is the study of relations between the governments of sovereign states. Sociological liberalism rejects this view as too narrow and one-sided. IR is not only about interstate relations; it is also about transnational relations, i.e., relations between people, groups, and organizations belonging to different countries. Transnational relations are considered by sociological liberals to be an increasingly important aspect of international relations. James Rosenau defines transnationalism as follows: ‘the processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events’ (1980: 1). In focusing on transnational relations, sociological liberals return to an old theme in liberal thinking: the notion that relations between people are more cooperative and more supportive of peace than are relations between national governments. LIBERALISM During the 1950s, Karl Deutsch was a leading figure in the study of transnational relations. He and his associates attempted to measure the extent of communication and transactions between societies. Deutsch argues that a high degree of transnational ties between societies leads to peaceful relations that amount to more than the mere absence of war (Deutsch et al. 1957). It leads to a security community: ‘a group of people which has become “integrated”’. Integration means that a ‘sense of community’ has been achieved; people have come to agree that their conflicts and problems can be resolved ‘without resort to large-scale physical force’ (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). Such a security community has emerged, argues Deutsch, among the Western countries in the North Atlantic area. He lists a number of conditions that are conducive to the emergence of security communities: increased social communication; greater mobility of persons; stronger economic ties; and a wider range of mutual human transactions. Many sociological liberals hold the idea that transnational relations between people from different countries help create new forms of human society which exist alongside or even in competition with the nation-state. In a book called World Society, John Burton (1972) proposes a ‘cobweb model’ of transnational relationships. The purpose is to demonstrate how any nation-state consists of many different groups of people that have different types of external ties and different types of interest: religious groups, business groups, labour groups, and so on. In marked contrast, the realist model of the world often depicts the system of states as a set of billiard balls; i.e., as a number of independent, self-contained units (see Figure 4.3). According to sociological liberals such as Burton, if we map the patterns of communication and transactions between various groups, we get a more accurate picture of the world because it represents actual patterns of human behaviour rather than artificial boundaries of states. Burton implies that the cobweb model points to a world driven more by mutually beneficial cooperation than by antagonistic conflict. In this way the cobweb model builds on an earlier liberal idea about the beneficial effects of cross-cutting or overlapping group memberships. Because individuals are members of many different groups, conflict will be muted if not eliminated; overlapping memberships minimize the risk of serious conflict between any two groups (Nicholls 1974: 22; Little 1996: 72). FIGURE 4.3 The billiard ball model and the cobweb model Billiard balls collide Cobweb of groups: conflicts muted 107 108 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES BOX 4.2 Key Arguments: The importance of individuals in global politics Citizens have become important variables . . . in global politics . . . [for] at least five reasons: 1. The erosion and dispersion of state and governmental power. 2. The advent of global television, the widening use of computers in the workplace, the growth of foreign travel and the mushrooming migrations of peoples, the spread of educational institutions . . . [have] enhanced the analytic skills of individuals. 3. The crowding onto the global agenda of new, interdependence issues (such as environmental pollution, currency crises, the drug trade, AIDS, and terrorism) has made more salient the processes whereby global dynamics affect the welfare and pocketbooks of individuals. 4. The revolution of information technologies has made it possible for citizens and politicians literally to ‘see’ the aggregation of micro actions into macro outcomes. People can now observe support gather momentum as street rallies, the pronouncements of officials, the responses of adversaries, the comments of protesters . . . and a variety of other events get portrayed and interpreted on television screens throughout the world. 5. This new-found capacity of citizens to ‘see’ their role in the dynamics of aggregation has profoundly altered . . . possibly even reduced, the extent to which organization and leadership are factors in the mobilization of publics . . . Leaders are increasingly becoming followers because individuals are becoming increasingly aware that their actions can have consequences. Rosenau (1992: 274–6) James Rosenau has further developed the sociological liberal approach to transnational relations (Rosenau 1990, 1992). He focuses on transnational relations at the macro-level of human populations in addition to those conducted at the microlevel by individuals (see Box 4.2). Rosenau argues that individual transactions have import ant implications and consequences for global affairs. First, individuals have greatly extended their activities owing to better education and access to electronic means of communication as well as foreign travel. Second, states’ capacity for control and regulation is decreasing in an ever more complex world. The result is a world of better informed and more mobile individuals who are far less tied than before to ‘their’ states. Rosenau sees a profound transformation of the international system that is underway: the state-centric, anarchic system has not disappeared but a new ‘multicentric world has emerged that is composed of diverse “sovereignty-free” collectivities which exist apart from and in competition with the state-centric world of “sovereignty-bound” actors’ (Rosenau 1992: 282). Rosenau thus supports the liberal idea that an increasingly pluralist world, characterized by transnational networks of individuals and groups, will be more peaceful. In some respects it will be a more unstable world, because the old order built on state power has broken down; but only rarely will conflicts lead to the use of force, because the new cosmopolitan individuals who are members of many overlapping groups will not easily become enemies divided into antagonistic camps. LIBERALISM Moisés Naím (2013a; see also Solomon and Steele 2017) also stresses the diffusion of power towards the micro-level. His argument is that the conventional players in political, military, and corporate ‘macro-structures’ of power are increasingly being undermined and challenged by ‘micropowers’—‘insurgents, fringe political parties, innovative start-ups, hackers, loosely organized activists, upstart citizen media outlets, leaderless young people in city squares, and charismatic individuals who seem to have “come from nowhere” are shaking up the old order’ (2013b: 1). The rise of micropowers, Naím argues, is due to three ‘revolutions’. The ‘More revolution’ means that many more people are living longer and healthier lives and that makes them more difficult to ‘regiment and control’ (2013a: 58). The ‘Mobility revolution’ implies that people are able to move around a lot more than earlier: they cross borders, they communicate globally, and they easily switch loyalties. Finally, the ‘Mentality revolution’ concerns the aspiration of the rapidly growing middle classes around the world. They shake off traditional values, take nothing for granted, and they do not easily defer to authorities. Another recent statement of sociological liberalism was made by Phil Cerny (2010; see also Cerny and Prichard 2017). He underlines the many ways in which the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ is being challenged, leading to a transformation of the state (see Box 4.3). Where these processes will eventually lead remains uncertain; Cerny outlines four different major scenarios, ranging from ‘rosy’ and cooperative towards ‘hegemonic’ and more conflict-prone. We can summarize sociological liberalism as follows. IR is not only a study of relations between national governments; IR scholars also study relations between private individuals, groups, and societies. Overlapping interdependent relations between people are bound to be more cooperative than relations between states because state citizenship is exclusive and, according to sociological liberalism, state interests do not overlap and cross-cut. A world with a large number of transnational networks will thus be more peaceful. 4.3 Interdependence Liberalism BOX 4.3 Key Arguments: Phil Cerny on state transformation What we are seeing is not the disappearance of the state but the actual transformation of the state, its absorption into transnational webs of politics and power, and the reconstruction of the notion of ‘statehood’ itself along multilevel, multinodal lines. The key driving force in this transformation and reconstruction will be transnationally linked groups of political actors engaging in crosscutting competition and coalition-building behaviour, exploiting the growing institutional loopholes of global politics, constructing new power games, creating new networks, and changing people’s perceptions of how world politics works by changing the parameters and dynamics of who gets—and should get—what, when, and how. Cerny (2010: 22–3) 109 110 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES Interdependence means mutual dependence: peoples and governments are affected by what happens elsewhere, by the actions of their counterparts in other countries. Thus, a higher level of transnational relations between countries means a higher level of interdependence. This also reflects the process of modernization, which usually increases the level of interdependence between states. The twentieth century, especially the period since 1950, has seen the rise of a large number of highly industrialized countries. Theorizing about interdependence clearly belongs in the liberal tradition, but due to its focus on how economic factors affect political relations, it can also be seen as part of ‘international political economy’ (IPE) perspectives (Cohen 2008; 2019). We shall therefore return to theories about interdependence in Chapter 6 and Chapter 10, which are about IPE. Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1995, 1999) has analysed the effects of increased independence on the policies of states. Throughout history, states have sought power by means of military force and territorial expansion. However, for highly industrialized countries, economic development and foreign trade are more adequate and less costly means of achieving prominence and prosperity. That is because the costs of using force have increased and the benefits have declined. Why is force less beneficial for states and trade increasingly so? The principal reason, according to Rosecrance, is the changing character and basis of economic production, which is linked to modernization. In an earlier age, the possession of territory and ample natural resources were the key to greatness. In today’s world that is no longer the case; now a highly qualified labour force, access to information, and financial capital are the keys to success. The most economically successful countries of the post-war period are ‘trading states’ such as Japan, Germany, and South Korea. They have refrained from the traditional military–political option of high military expenditure and economic self-sufficiency; instead, they have chosen the trading option of an intensified international division of labour and increased interdependence. Many small countries are also ‘trading states’. For a long time the very large countries, most notably the former Soviet Union and the United States, pursued the traditional military–political option, thereby burdening themselves with high levels of military expenditure. According to Rosecrance, the end of the Cold War has made that traditional option less urgent and thus less attractive. Consequently, the trading-state option is increasingly preferred even by very large states. For instance, China has adopted a strategy of economic openness from the late 1970s. Basically, these liberals argue that a high division of labour in the international economy increases interdependence between states, and that discourages and reduces violent conflict between states. One is here reminded of the dictum attributed to the French nineteenth-century economist Frédéric Bastiat: ‘When goods don’t cross borders, the soldiers will.’ There still remains a risk that modern states will slide back to the military option and once again enter into arms races and violent confrontations. But that is not a likely prospect. It is in the less developed countries that war now occurs, according to Rosecrance, because at lower levels of economic development land continues to be the dominant factor of production, and modernization and interdependence are far weaker. During the Second World War, David Mitrany (1966) set forth a functionalist theory of integration, arguing that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties LIBERALISM between countries could lead to peace. Mitrany imagined, perhaps somewhat naïvely, that cooperation would be arranged by technical experts, not by politicians. The experts would devise solutions to common problems in various functional areas: transport, communication, finance, and so on. Technical and economic collaboration would expand when the participants discovered the mutual benefits that could be obtained from it. When citizens saw the welfare improvements that resulted from efficient collaboration in international organizations, they would transfer their loyalty from the state to international organizations. In that way, economic interdependence would lead to political integration and to peace. Ernst Haas developed a so-called neofunctionalist theory of international integration that was inspired by the intensifying cooperation that began in the 1950s between the countries of Western Europe. Haas builds on Mitrany, but rejects the notion that ‘technical’ matters can be separated from politics. Integration has to do with getting selfinterested political elites to intensify their cooperation. Integration is a process whereby ‘political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties . . . toward a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states’ (Haas 1958: 16). This ‘functional’ process of integration depends on the notion of ‘spillover’, when increased cooperation in one area leads to increased cooperation in other areas. Spillover would ensure that political elites marched inexorably towards the promotion of integration. Haas saw that happening in the initial years of West European cooperation in the 1950s and early 1960s. This is an example of a strong liberal theory which argues that institutions can change the identities and interests of states and thereby transform the international system (Beach and Pedersen 2020: 128–30)—or, in this case, the hitherto war-prone European multistate system. From the mid-1960s, however, West European cooperation entered a long phase of stagnation and even backsliding. That was due primarily to President de Gaulle of France, who opposed the limitations on French sovereignty that resulted from interdependence. Functional and neofunctional theory did not allow for the possibility of setbacks in cooperation; integration theorists had to rethink their theories accordingly. Haas concluded that regional integration should be seen in a larger context: ‘theory of regional integration ought to be subordinated to a general theory of interdependence’ (Haas 1976: 179) (see Figure 4.4). It was indeed such a general theory of interdependence that was attempted in the next phase in liberal thinking. But we should also note that theories of integration have seen a revival since the 1990s due to a new momentum in West European cooperation (Hix 2005; Telò 2007; Wiener, Börzel, and Risse 2019). A core issue in these recent studies concerns whether integration is best explained by a liberal, neofunctionalist approach, or by a realist approach emphasizing national interest. The recent phase of Brexit and the ‘America First’ policy of Donald Trump have intensified that debate. We return to this discussion between liberals and realists in the section ‘Neorealist Critiques of Liberalism’. An ambitious attempt to set forth a general theory of what they called ‘complex interdependence’ was made in the late 1970s in a book by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr, Power and Interdependence (1977, 2001). They claimed both Deutsch and Haas as inspiration and argued that post-war ‘complex interdependence’ is qualitatively different from earlier and simpler kinds of interdependence. First, relations between states 111 112 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES FIGURE 4.4 Major EU institutions European Commission Council of Ministers (27 Commissioners) (Sector ministers) European Court of Justice COREPER (Council of Permanent Representatives—civil servants at ambassador level supporting European Council work) European Council European Parliament (Heads of state from member countries) nowadays are not only or even primarily relations between stateleaders; there are relations on many different levels via many different actors and branches of government. Second, there is a host of transnational relations between individuals and groups outside of the state. Furthermore, military force is a less useful instrument of policy under conditions of complex interdependence. Consequently, international relations are becoming more like domestic politics: ‘Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not stop at the water’s edge’ (Keohane and Nye 1977: 25). In most of these conflicts military force is irrelevant. Therefore, power resources other than military ones are of increasing importance, for example, negotiating skills. Finally, under complex interdependence states become more preoccupied with the ‘low politics’ of welfare and less concerned with the ‘high politics’ of national security (Keohane and Nye 1977: 24–6; Nye 1993: 169). The differences between the receding old realist world and the advancing new world of complex interdependence are summarized in Table 4.1 (see also Oatley 2019). Complex interdependence clearly implies a far more friendly and cooperative relationship between states owing to ‘increasing fragmentation and diffusion of power in economic affairs, stemming from the growing interconnectedness of national economies’ (Cohen 2008: 28). According to Keohane and Nye (1977: 29–38), several consequences follow. First, states will pursue different goals simultaneously and transnational actors, such as NGOs and transnational corporations, will pursue their own separate goals free from state LIBERALISM TABLE 4.1 Types of international relations REALISM COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE • States dominant actors and coherent units • Transnational actors increasingly important. States not coherent units • Force usable and effective • Military force less useful. Economic and institutional instruments more useful • Military security dominates the agenda • Military security less important. Welfare issues increasingly important Based on Keohane and Nye (1977) control. Second, power resources will most often be specific to issue areas. For example, in spite of their comparatively small size, Denmark and Norway will command influence in international shipping because of their large merchant and tanker fleets, but that influence does not easily translate to other issue areas. Third, the importance of international organizations will increase. They are arenas for political actions by weak states, they animate coalition formation, and they oversee the setting of international agendas. Where do we locate complex interdependence in time and space? In terms of timing, it appears to be connected with social modernization or what Keohane and Nye (1977: 227) call ‘the long-term development of the welfare state’, which picked up speed after 1950. In space, complex interdependence is most evident in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand: in short, the industrialized, pluralist countries (Keohane and Nye 1977: 27). The relevance of complex interdependence grows as modernization unfolds, and it therefore best characterizes the relations between advanced Western countries. Keohane and Nye are nevertheless at pains to emphasize that realism is not irrelevant or obsolete: It is not impossible to imagine dramatic conflict or revolutionary change in which the use of threat of military force over an economic issue or among advanced industrial countries might become plausible. Then realist assumptions would again be a reliable guide to events. (Keohane and Nye 1977: 28) In other words, even among industrialized countries of the West an issue could still become ‘a matter of life and death’ (Keohane and Nye 1977: 29), because even that world is still in some basic respects a world of states. In that eventuality, realism would be the more relevant approach to events. Therefore, interdependence liberals suggest a compromise: The appropriate response to the changes occurring in world politics today is not to discredit the traditional wisdom of realism and its concern for the military balance of power, but to realize its limitations and to supplement it with insights from the liberal approach. (Nye 1990: 177) 113 114 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES Keohane and Nye thus construe ‘complex interdependence’ not as a direct description of reality but as an ideal type that could be contrasted with the realist ideal type. Sometimes, international relations will be more aligned with the interdependence pole; at other occasions, reality will fall closer to the realist pole (Keohane and Nye 2012: 265). Interdependence liberals are thus more balanced in their approach than some other liberals for whom everything has changed for the better and the old world of violent conflict, unbridled state power, and the overriding importance of the national interest is gone forever. However, in adopting this middle-of-the-road position, interdependence liberals face the problem of deciding exactly how much has changed, how much remains the same, and what the precise implications are for IR. This criticism is particularly relevant for Keohane and Nye’s work on complex interdependence. While they originally introduced it because they believed that the realist description of international relations had become outdated, they were later at pains to emphasize the complementarity between their perspective and especially Waltz’s (1979) neorealism. As Keohane and Nye (2012: 277) put it in an afterword to the 1989 edition of their book, their aim was a ‘synthesis of neorealist and liberal theories’. However, following the end of the Cold War, their assertiveness again increased, and in 2012, they noted that ‘we are struck by how much the world has come to resemble the ideal type of complex interdependence that we hypothesized’ (Keohane and Nye 2012: xxxiv). We return to this debate about the extent and nature of change in the international system later in the chapter (for analyses of interdependence and conflict, see Einstein 2017; Mansfield and Pollins 2003). Meanwhile, interdependence liberalism can be summarized as follows. Modernization increases the level and scope of interdependence between states. Under complex interdependence, transnational actors are increasingly important, military force is a less useful instrument, and welfare—not security—is becoming the primary goal and concern of states. That means a world of more cooperative international relations. 4.4 Institutional Liberalism This strand of liberalism picks up on earlier liberal thought about the beneficial effects of international institutions. In Chapter 2, we noted Woodrow Wilson’s vision about transforming international relations through the building of international organizations, most importantly the League of Nations. Present-day liberal institutionalists are less optimistic than their more idealist predecessors. They agree that international institutions can make cooperation easier and far more likely, but they do not claim that institutions can by themselves guarantee a qualitative transformation of international relations. Powerful states will not easily be completely constrained. However, liberal institutionalists do not agree with the realist view that international institutions are mere ‘scraps of paper’. International institutions are more than mere handmaidens of strong states. They are of independent importance, and they can promote cooperation between states (Keohane 2012; Johnson and Heiss 2018; Wiener, Börzel, and Risse 2019). What is an international institution? According to liberal institutionalists, it is either an international organization, such as NATO or the European Union (EU); or it is a set of rules which governs state action in particular areas, such as aviation or shipping. These sets of rules are also called ‘regimes’ (Keohane 1984; 1989). Often the two go together; LIBERALISM the trade regime, for example, is shaped primarily by the World Trade Organization (WTO). There may also be regimes without formal organizations; for example, the Law of the Sea conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) do not have a formal international organization. Institutions can have global membership, such as the UN, or they can be regional (or sub-regional), such as the EU. Finally, we should note that there is an additional type of international institution which is of a more fundamental kind, such as state sovereignty or the balance of power. These fundamental institutions are not what institutional liberals focus on; but they are main objects of study for International Society theorists, as we shall see in Chapter 5. We can identify an important development in liberal thinking about institutions. In the 1970s and 1980s, the study of international organizations metamorphosed into the study of international regimes. That is, rather than focusing on concrete international organizations such as NATO or the WTO, the literature began to focus on the—more general—institutionalized rules of international cooperation. The core idea was that self-interested states create international regimes to solve collective action problems (Keohane 1984; 2012). If well crafted, regimes have the advantage of solving commitment problems and creating ‘repeated games’, that is, bargaining under the expectation that the parties will need to cooperate again in the future (Beach and Pedersen 2020: 91–3). This strand of thinking accepted the realist notion of the primacy of states and the primacy of power and interests but it held that regimes could ameliorate conflict between states even under anarchy—and that state leaders often recognize the advantages of this (Stein 2008: 204). Liberal institutionalists claim that international organizations and international regimes help promote cooperation between states. The extent of institutionalization can be measured on two dimensions: scope and depth. ‘Scope’ concerns the number of issue areas in which there are institutions. Are they only in a few crucial economic areas, such as trade and investment, or are they in many other economic, as well as in military and socio-political, areas? For assessing the ‘depth’ of institutionalization, three measures have been suggested: • Commonality: the degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviour and understanding about how to interpret action are shared by participants in the system. • Specificity: the degree to which these expectations are clearly specified in the form of rules. • Autonomy: the extent to which the institution can alter its own rules rather than depending on outside agents (i.e., states) to do so. (From Keohane 1989: 4; see also Peters 2011) It is clear that a thorough analysis of the scope and depth of institutionalization among a group of states is a substantial research task. The difficulty is to determine the exact level of institutionalization. One way of doing that is to look at a group of states where we immediately believe that the scope and depth of institutionalization are high and then evaluate the ways in which institutions matter. One such group of states is Europe, especially the European Union countries. EU countries cooperate so intensively that 115 116 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES they share some functions of government, for example, in agricultural and industrial policies; they have established the regulatory framework for a single market in the economic sector, and they are in the process of intensifying their cooperation in other areas. The EU, in other words, is a good test case for examining the importance of institutions. Institutional liberals claim that institutions have made a significant difference in Western Europe since the end of the Cold War (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2019). Institutions acted as ‘buffers’ which helped absorb the ‘shocks’ sent through Western Europe by the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany (Keohane et al. 1993). The institutional liberal view can be set against that of neorealist analysis. Neorealists argue that the end of the Cold War is likely to bring the return of instability to Western Europe which could lead to a major war. We have reason to fear a repeat of the turbulence of the first half of the twentieth century. Peace in Europe during the Cold War rested on two pillars that made up the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. They were, first, bipolarity with its stable distribution of military power and, second, large arsenals of nuclear weapons almost entirely monopolized by those superpowers (Waltz 1993: 44). With the revival of multipolarity, however, instability and insecurity are sharply increased. At the root of all this is the anarchic structure of the international system. According to neorealist John Mearsheimer, ‘[a]narchy has two principal consequences. First, there is little room for trust among states . . . Second, each state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will provide its security’ (1993: 148). The argument made by liberal institutionalists (Keohane 2012; Keohane et al. 1993) is that a high level of institutionalization significantly reduces the destabilizing effects of multipolar anarchy identified by Mearsheimer. Institutions make up for lack of trust between states. They do that by providing a flow of information between their member states, which consequently are much less in the dark about what other states are doing and why. Institutions thus help reduce member states’ fear of each other. In addition, they provide a forum for negotiation between states. For example, the European Union has a number of fora with extensive experience in negotiation and compromise, including the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Institutions provide continuity and a sense of stability. They foster cooperation between states for their mutual advantage. Institutions help ‘create a climate in which expectations of stable peace develop’ (Nye and Welch 2020: 39). The constructive role of institutions as argued by institutional liberals is summarized in Box 4.4. BOX 4.4 Key Concepts: Institutional liberalism: the role of institutions • Provide a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; • Enhance the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own commitments—hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place; • Strengthen prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements. Based on Keohane (1989: 2; see also Keohane 2012; Deudney and Ikenberry 2018) LIBERALISM BOX 4.5 Key Arguments: Transnational conflicts and international institutions International institutions are overtaxed in a double sense: their basis of legitimacy is too small for the responsibilities they are supposed to carry out; but, in view of the magnitude of global problems, what they do is not enough. Many of the post-war international institutions have been supplemented with, or replaced by, new institutions that intervene more deeply into the affairs of national societies. These institutions increasingly exercise independent political authority and violate the principle of non-intervention, which, in turn, leads to serious problems of legitimacy and public acceptance. At the same time, international institutions are too weak, for example, to regulate international financial markets or to effectively combat climate change and its impacts. As a result, growing societal and national resistance to these institutions has begun to emerge in conjunction with transnational disputes over international affairs. Zürn (2011) Current research on international institutions focuses on the challenges that these institutions face in an increasingly globalized world. On the one hand, there is a growing need for the regulation and management that institutions provide; on the other hand, they are lacking in both power and legitimacy necessary to take on heavy responsibilities (see Box 4.5). In this context, focus is also on the factors that decide the demand for institutional cooperation and integration. One major position in this debate emphasizes the crucial role of state interests; that position is labelled ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ (Moravcsik 1999). Another major position is neofunctional theory which focuses on international cooperation driven by functional challenges; that is, some tasks are better attended to by international cooperation than by states alone and that works in favour of more cooperation. A recent version of neofunctionalism attempts to create a revised analytical framework that makes room for both ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘functional’ elements (Niemann 2006). At the same time, there is now more focus on issues connected with leadership (Beach 2010; Paterson et al. 2010) and with democracy and legitimacy (Eriksen 2009). This focus on agency and democratic legitimacy has seemingly been vindicated by recent events. Maybe the greatest current threat to international institutions came from an elected president within the leading liberal power. The Trump presidency in the United States had no enthusiasm for international institutions and would rather pursue its ‘America First’ agenda in bilateral deals with other states (Ikenberry 2017). Institutional liberalism can be summarized as follows. International institutions help promote cooperation between states and thereby help alleviate the lack of trust between states and states’ fear of each other, which are considered to be the traditional problems associated with international anarchy. The positive role of international institutions for advancing cooperation between states continues to be questioned by realists. We return to that debate later. 117 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES 4.5 Republican Liberalism Republican liberalism is built on the claim that liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-abiding than other political systems. The argument is not that democracies never go to war; democracies have gone to war as often as have non-democracies (Weart 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002). But the argument is that democracies do not fight each other. This observation was first articulated by Immanuel Kant (1992 [1795]) in the late eighteenth century in reference to republican states rather than democracies, and it was later put forward by the American philosopher Thomas Paine (Waltz 1959: 101). It was resurrected by Dean Babst in 1964 and it has been advanced in numerous studies since then. One liberal scholar even claims that the assertion that democracies do not fight each other is ‘one of the strongest nontrivial or non-tautological statements that can be made about international relations’ (Russett 1989: 245). This finding is the basis of the present optimism among many liberal scholars and policy-makers concerning the prospects of long-term world peace. Their reasoning goes as follows: Because the number of democracies in the world has increased rapidly in recent generations (see Figure 4.5), we can look forward to a more peaceful world with international relations characterized by cooperation instead of conflict (parts of this section draw on Sørensen 2008a). As Bruce Russett (2003: 493–4) succinctly puts it, ‘the more democracies there are in FIGURE 4.5 Democracy’s progress .6 .5 Average global level of democracy 118 .4 .3 .2 .1 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2019 Year Note: The graph reports average global scores for the Varieties of Democracy Electoral Democracy Index, V-Dem Dataset v11.1 (CC BY SA), available at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/. The index ranges from 0.0 (no electoral democracy) to 1.0 (perfect electoral democracy). LIBERALISM the world, the fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of peace will be’. Why are democracies at peace with one another? The most systematic theoretical answer to that question has been given by Michael Doyle (1983, 1986). Doyle based his argument on Immanuel Kant’s classical liberal treatment of the subject. There are three elements behind the claim that democracy leads to peace with other democracies. The first is the existence of domestic political cultures based on peaceful conflict resolution. Democracy encourages peaceful international relations because democratic governments are controlled by their citizens, who will not advocate or support wars with other democracies. The second element is that democracies hold common moral values which lead to the formation of what Kant called a ‘pacific union’. The union is not a formal peace treaty; rather, it is a zone of peace based on the common moral foundations of all democracies. Peaceful ways of solving domestic conflict are seen as morally superior to violent behaviour, and this attitude is transferred to international relations between democracies. Freedom of expression and free communication promote mutual understanding internationally, and help to assure that political representatives act in accordance with citizens’ views. Finally, peace between democracies is strengthened through economic cooperation and interdependence. In the pacific union it is possible to encourage what Kant called ‘the spirit of commerce’: mutual and reciprocal gain for those involved in international economic cooperation and exchange. Recent work has added civil society as an additional democratic inducer of peace. In a global analysis covering the period 1900–2010, Hegre, Bernhard, and Teorell (2020) show that the combination of social accountability, created by a vibrant civil society, and vertical accountability in the form of electoral competition is the most effective way of securing peace between democracies. Of the different strands of liberalism considered in this chapter, republican liberalism is the one with the boldest expectations for a transformation of the international system. For most republican liberals, there is not only confidence but also hope that world politics is already developing and will develop far beyond rivalry, conflict, and war between independent states. Republican liberals are optimistic that peace and cooperation will eventually prevail in international relations, based on progress towards a more democratic world. Not only that, they see it as their responsibility to promote democracy worldwide, for in so doing they are promoting peace, which is one of the most fundamental of all political values (Weart 1998). The end of the Cold War helped launch a new wave of democratization; that led to growing liberal optimism as regards the future of democracy. Yet, most liberals are well aware of the fragility of democratic progress. When republican liberals examine the conditions for democratic peace in the light of recent democratic transformations in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, the evidence does not support any profound optimism. With regard to the first condition (see Figure 4.6), it is evident that a democratic culture with norms of peaceful conflict resolution has not yet taken root in many new democracies. Democratic norms must be ingrained before the domestic basis of the democratic peace will be secure, and such a development of the political culture usually takes a long time. There will be setbacks; some countries will revert to non-democratic 119 120 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES FIGURE 4.6 Republican liberalism: three conditions of peace among liberal democracies 1. Democratic norms of peaceful resolution of conflict 2. Peaceful relations between democratic states, based on a common moral foundation 3. Economic cooperation between democracies: ties of interdependence forms of rule. For example, Russia’s democracy scores have consistently declined in the 2000s, and today, it is clearly autocratic (see Table 4.2). Furthermore, many scholars have warned that established democracies are not doing too well either. In some of the classical homes of liberal democracy, a clear majority of people are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. In the UK (69 per cent), in the US (59 per cent), in France (58 per cent), and in Greece (74 per cent) are expressing dissatisfaction (Pew Research Center 2020). A recent analysis goes so far as to frame this as a new process of ‘de-consolidation’ of western democracies (Foa and Mounk 2016; see also Jervis et al. 2018). However, several scholars have cast doubt on these negative interpretations, showing that the established democracies have proven remarkably stable even in recent years (Alexander and Welzel 2017; Carothers and Young 2017; Norris 2017). On this basis, it seems fair to say that the general distinction between new and fledgling democracies and old and established still exists (Cornell et al. 2020). As regards the second condition, peaceful relations have indeed developed between the consolidated democracies of the West. There is reason to hope that most of the new democracies of Eastern Europe will come to be included in this zone—provided that there are no severe setbacks in their further democratization. Recent developments in Hungary and Poland, where populist politicians have undermined independent institutions such as courts and media, raise concerns but most of the new EU members still fare well on indicators of democracy. The democracies of the Global South are more problematic in that regard. The foundations between the Global North and South are not strong. During the Cold War, the United States was hostile and even aggressive towards some southern democracies; e.g., the Dominican Republic in the early 1960s and Chile in the early 1970s. This reflected American determination to defend its perceived economic and security interests in its competition with the Soviet Union (for further analysis, see Sørensen 2008a: 131–59). Today, there can still be divisions and mistrust between old and new democracies. Turning to the final condition, economic cooperation and interdependence are highly developed among the consolidated democracies of the West. Most of the new democracies LIBERALISM TABLE 4.2 Most and least democratic states in the world The Varieties of Democracy Electoral Democracy Index (data from 2019) Highest rating (top 10th percentile) Denmark Estonia Costa Rica Belgium Luxembourg Spain Sweden Norway Switzerland New Zealand France Finland High rating (top 25th percentile—top 10th percentile) South Korea Argentina Cyprus Latvia Australia Taiwan Germany Jamaica the Netherlands Austria Barbados Armenia Japan Lithuania Mauritius Cape Verde Slovakia Lowest rating (bottom 10th percentile) Saudi Arabia Bahrain Eritrea Laos China Yemen Qatar Palestine/Gaza North Korea Syria United Arab Emirates Eswatini Low rating (bottom 25th percentile—bottom 10th percentile) Turkey Belarus Morocco Libya Zimbabwe Republic of the Congo Palestine/West Bank Russia Bangladesh Nicaragua Jordan Zanzibar Chad Cambodia Rwanda Kazakhstan Djibouti Venezuela Portugal Canada Ireland Greece Italy United Kingdom United States of America Slovenia Czech Republic Peru Panama Chile Malta Timor-Leste Turkmenistan Somalia Burundi Tajikistan Thailand Iran Vietnam Sudan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Cuba Egypt Oman Based on data from https://www.v-dem.net/en/ (CC BY SA). The index measures electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; organizations can operate freely; elections are clean; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on political matters. The index ranges from 0 (no electoral democracy) to 1 (perfect electoral democracy). 121 122 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES of Eastern Europe are integrated into these economic networks through membership of the European Union. Yet, the complex negotiations about the Eastern enlargements of the EU in 2004, 2007, and 2013 demonstrate the considerable difficulties involved in close economic cooperation between countries at highly different levels of development. For the democracies of the South, continued one-sided economic dependence on the North rather than interdependence is the order of the day, even two decades after the end of the Cold War. That relation of basic inequality augurs less well for the development of peaceful relations even if both parties have democratic governments. In short, the emergence of a global pacific union embracing all the new and old democracies is not guaranteed. Indeed, most of the new democracies fail to meet at least two of the three conditions for a democratic peace identified above. And instead of exhibiting further progress, they may backslide towards authoritarian rule (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Most republican liberals are therefore less optimistic than was Francis Fukuyama when he predicted ‘the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (1989: 4). Liberals argue that there is a democratic ‘zone of peace’ among the consolidated liberal democracies, including Western Europe, North America, and Japan. But the expansion of that zone is far from assured (Russett 1993: 138). At the same time, established democracies are facing a rising tide of ‘populism, economic inequality, frustration and fear’ (Hobson 2017: 706). Even if there is so far little evidence that this is producing democratic deconsolidation, the consequences for the democratic peace remain uncertain. Most republican liberals thus emphasize that democratic peace is a dynamic process rather than a fixed condition. A pacific union does not spring into existence between countries as soon as they meet a minimum definition of democracy. Peace is built on all three foundation stones (see Figure 4.6) only over a long period of time. There can be setbacks. There can even be reversions to non-democratic rule. There is a weakness even in this qualified republican liberal argument, however. Republican liberals need to specify the exact ways in which democracy leads to peace, and they need to sort out in more precise terms when there is a democratic peace between a group of democracies and why. In that context a more thorough evaluation of the current processes of democratization is necessary. There are already a number of contributions that address these issues (Harrison 2010; Hook 2010; Hobson 2011; 2017; Hegre 2014; Bartusevicius and Skaaning 2018; Hegre, Bernhard, and Teorell 2020). At the same time, many scholars have argued that there is a ‘dark side’ to the relationship between democracy and peace (Mann 2005; see also Richmond 2020). A large body of scholarship has thus associated both democratization and partial democracy with an increased risk of external warfare and/or civil war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2005; 2012; Hegre et al. 2001; see Gleditsch and Hegre 2014). One strand within this literature argues that changes in the direction of democracy are likely to increase hitherto suppressed conflicts between societal groups, including ethnic groups. This has been used to predict both higher levels of civil war in democratizing states and a higher involvement in external warfare. The latter argument—which is indebted to Samu