IPC 2602 International Political Dynamics PDF

© 2020 University of South Africa All rights reserved Printed and published by the University of South Africa Muckleneuk, Pretoria IPC2606/1/2021–2024 70729441 InDesign HSY_Style  CONTENTS  Page IN...

© 2020 University of South Africa All rights reserved Printed and published by the University of South Africa Muckleneuk, Pretoria IPC2606/1/2021–2024 70729441 InDesign HSY_Style  CONTENTS  Page INTRODUCTION v Theme 1: THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM, THE NATION- STATE AND THE WORLD ORDER 1 1.1 Introduction1 1.1.1 The origins and the nature of the modern world system 1 1.1.1.1 The modern world-system and the characterisation of the contemporary world2 1.2 The Emergence of the modern nation-state 4 1.3 The world order 5 Theme 2: THE THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY 7 2.1 Introduction7 2.2 The purpose of International Relations Theories 8 2.3 Why are there many theories of International Relations? 9 2.4 Realism and Balance of Power 12 2.4.1 Balance of power 14 2.4.2 Formation of alliances 15 2.4.3 The scaffolding of the international order 16 2.4.4 Realism: linking theory to evidence 17 2.5 Liberalism18 2.5.1 Foreign policy implications 20 2.5.2 Versions of Liberal Internationalism 21 2.5.3 Liberalism: Linking theory to evidence 22 2.6 Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention 26 2.7 Complex Theory and Complex Interdependence Theory 29 2.8 Postcolonial and Decolonial Approach 32 Theme 3: THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY 37 3.1 Introduction37 3.2 Foreign Policy Analysis: continued relevance in a perpetually evolving world 38 3.3 Understanding Foreign Policy Analysis 39 3.4 The hallmarks of FPA 39 3.5 The state level of analysis 41 3.6 The global level of analysis 42 3.7 Patterns of interaction – power, competition and conflict 46 3.8 FP formulation 46 3.9 FP instruments 47 3.10 Military action 49 3.11 Political intervention 50 3.12 Negative sanction 51 3.13 Foreign policy decision making 51 IPC2602/1(iii)  Page Theme 4: GLOBALISATION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF NON- STATE ACTORS 53 4.1 Introduction: Globalisation and non-state actors 53 4.1.1 Globalisation: a much contested concept 53 4.1.2 Approaches to the concept of globalisation 54 4.2 Types of non-state actors in the modern international system 54 4.2.1 International organisations 54 4.2.1.1 The World Bank55 4.2.1.2 Joint Vienna Institute56 4.2.1.3 The International Labour Organisation56 4.2.1.4 The Berne Union56 4.2.1.5 World Intellectual Property Organisation57 4.2.1.6 Multinational corporations57 4.2.1.7 Non-Governmental Organisations59 4.3 Terrorism, globalisation and the foreign policy of states 60 Theme 5: AFRICA’S EMERGENCE 61 5.1 Introduction61 5.2 The scramble for Africa 61 5.3 Africa rising 64 5.4 Conclusion/Summary65 Theme 6: SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 67 6.1 Basic research skills 67 6.2 Understanding of plagiarism: the theft of ideas 67 6.3 Referencing skills 68 6.4 Research concepts 70 6.4.1 Why do we do research? 70 6.4.2 Social science research today 71 BIBLIOGR APHY 73 (iv)  INTRODUCTION Welcome to the IPC 2602 module in International Political Dynamics. If you are asking yourself what International Political Dynamics is, you are asking a good question. Firstly, we have the word International, which tells us that the subject we are dealing with transcends borders. In other words, what happens in one country may affect what happens in other countries, or what one actor does in the international system will affect other actors and the decisions they make. Secondly, we have the word Political, which tells us that the subject matter will focus on political developments that transcend borders. Lastly, we have the word Dynamics, which tells us that the border transcending politics that we are studying will constantly change. Thus, International Political Dynamics is exactly what it sounds like; decisions and developments of a political nature, that have effects all over the world, and that also never stop changing. International Political Dynamics is not really a field of study on its own, rather it is a broad theme within the study of International Relations, aimed at introducing you to the study of Foreign Policy. Heywood (2002:400) defines policy as “a plan of action adopted by … an individual, group, business or government”. For something to be considered a policy, “a formal decision has been made, giving official sanction to a particular course of action”. Thus, foreign policy is the formal decisions made to allow a particular course of action that aims to advance the interests of one country within another country or group of countries. Keeping the above in mind, there are also a number of key areas, most of which are fields of study on their own, that will be discussed as part of International Political Dynamics. Broadly, these areas are the Modern International System, International Relations Theories specific to the understanding to International Political Dynamics and Foreign Policy decision making. We will also look at globalisation, the emergence of Africa, and we will end with a focus on skills development, where we will look at research skills. We will focus on the development of the Modern International System, paying particular attention to South Africa and Africa’s contribution to shaping the system as we see it today. You may already be aware that states are not the only important actors in foreign policy. In this module we will also introduce you to various non- state actors who have become powerful players in the Modern International System Under International Relations Theories, we will be discussing the basic theories that you need to understand to start practicing theoretical application on the subject matter. We will introduce you to the classical theories, but also to newer theories that will broaden your understanding of the Modern International System as it will be adding a non-Western perspective. IPC2602/1(v) INTRODUCTION Under Foreign Policy, we will look at foreign policy formulation, analysis and most importantly, decision making. Here you will get a chance to apply the theories that you have learned to the case studies that we have identified. In the final section, which will be on skills development you will learn about avoiding plagiarism, the Harvard referencing method, the purpose of research, and research concepts. By the end of this module, you should have a holistic understanding of Foreign Policy in the Modern International System. I hope that you enjoy this module, and that as a student of International Relations, you will gain a better understanding of the complex and ever changing field of study that you have chosen. ACTIVITY SECTION Since this module in International Political Dynamics largely revolves around Foreign Policy it is advisable that you familiarise yourself with the following textbox before commencing with the study themes. The purpose of this textbox is to provide you with enough information to put the study themes of this module in context, but also to provide an easy reference should you need to look up the basic information necessary to understand this module. Pay attention to the newspaper article, as you will need it to participate in your graded online group discussion for the introductory section of this module. This will be good practice to get you thinking and talking about the subject matter. Foreign Policy The link between intentions, actions and results In your study of Foreign Policy, you will encounter instances where the official foreign policy of a country and the foreign policy actions of that country do not appear to be in line. This is quite a common occurrence, and it has often been seen in South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour. According to Hengari (2014:3) South African “has flip-flopped when it comes to a consistent message that speaks to the values and norms that underpin its constitution and the White Paper on foreign policy, namely democracy, human rights and good governance”. Heywood (2002:400) argues that “policy is better understood as the linkage between intentions, actions and results”. It is important to keep Heywood’s argument in mind when thinking about South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour. On paper, South Africa’s foreign policy is based on the values found in democracy, human rights and good governance. Yet, when it comes to foreign policy actions, South Africa sometimes acted in direct opposition to those values. Thus, it is important to be aware of what is said in a country’s official foreign policy documents, but the documents alone will not be enough to understand what the country’s foreign policy really is. When it comes to understanding policy in general, Heywood (2002:400) makes the following observation; “[u]ltimately, policy can be evaluated only in light of its impact, according to “what actually happens” for good or for ill”. Thus, we (vi)  Introduction analyse foreign policy by considering the link between intentions (formulation, what is on paper), actions (behaviour) and results (what actually happened due to the actions). Online group discussion: Have a look at the following newspaper article and discuss how South Africa’s foreign policy actions in this case were not in line with its foreign policy values. Is this a case of flip-flop diplomacy? Another Human Rights Fail. The Star. 2 December 2015. Angela Mudukuti https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/another-human-rights-fail-1954633 IPC2602/1(vii) (viii)  1 THEME 1 1 The modern world system, the nation-state and the world order OBJECTIVES FOR THEME 1 After you have completed this theme you must be able to do the following: Discuss the origins and the nature of the modern world-system. Discuss the modern world-system from the decolonial perspective. Discuss the emergence of the nation-state from the Westphalian peace of 1648. Discuss the difference between Westphalian sovereignty and the United Nations sovereignty. Differentiate between the world-system and the world order. Discuss how the world order is constituted in the 21st century under the hegemony of the United States. KEY CONCEPTS Modern world-system, interstate system, world order, nation-state, global colonial- ity, colonialism, state sovereignty, hegemony. 1.1 INTRODUCTION The modern nation-state exists within a broader economic, political and legal framework that is called the world-system. Within the world-system, there exists a certain world order that has evolved with the emergence of the inter-state system in the 17th century. The current nation-state is also part of the same world order constituted within the modern world-system. In other words, there exists a close relationship between, the world-system, the nation-state and the world order. In this theme, you will be introduced to the origins, the nature and the defining features of the world- system. We will also learn about the emergence of the nation-state and the world order, all being part of the modern world-system. It is also important to understand that foreign policy takes place within this complex environment. 1.1.1 The origins and the nature of the modern world system The world in which we live today, the modern world-system was produced by a long history of colonialism. This world had its origin in the long 16th century and it has been intact for many centuries. To be specific, its origin dates back to 1492, a period considered to be the foundation of modernity/coloniality. This world-system was then located in only a part of the globe (primarily in parts of Europe and the Americas), but over time it expanded to engulf the entire planet. Wallerstein (2004:22) describes it as a world economy and a capitalist economy. To elaborate his argument, he claims that a world economy must necessarily be capitalist, and that capitalism can only exist within the framework of a world economy. Hence, the modern world-system is IPC2602/11  a capitalist world economy. It is further argued that this system gives priority to the endless accumulation of capital. For that reason, Wallerstein (2004:23) has concluded that only the modern world-system has been a capitalist system. The capitalist world economy needs the nation-states, and most importantly the alternating presence of hegemonic powers within a regulated world order. This clarifies the relationship that exists between the world system, the nation-state and the world order. In this theme we will use Wallerstein’s analysis to examine how he came to think about this system to understand how the world in which we live work. You will also be expected to critically analyse this capitalist world-system by using his analysis. Many scholars in different disciplines such as political sciences, sociology, history, development studies, economics, and so forth, had produced a variety of literature that sought to explain how the world-system is constituted. While some have praised it, others have vehemently attacked it. Above all, theories have been produced about the modern world-system to understand how it functions. The most popular theory has been the ‘world-system analysis’. The world-system analysis, as a perspective, owes much to Immanuel Wallerstein who made a momentous contribution through his publication of The Modern World System that appeared in three volumes in 1974, 1980 and 1989. Wallerstein had consistently used his model to critique modernity, but his critique has been contested in certain quarters. Similarly, scholars, academics and students have for many years used this theory or approach as a unit of analysis to understand the social world. That said, it is important to indicate that in developing his world-system analysis, Wallerstein has built on earlier arguments and critiques, notably those of Fernand Braudel and Karl Marx. This then begs a question of what is the modern world system and how it is characterised. Let us now look at this question. 1.1.1.1 The modern world-system and the characterisation of the contemporary world An analysis of how the contemporary world is characterised, requires as a prerequisite a clear understanding of the concept of the modern world system. So, let us start by defining this concept. The modern world system is defined by Wallerstein (1974: 347)as: “a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning.” This definition speaks to a number of factors that describes the system, firstly, it highlights the tension and power hierarchy that exists within the system in which each force wrestles for power to shape the system according to its own advantage. Secondly, its characteristics can change or remain stable over time, depending on the internal dynamics within the system. Lastly, the internal logic of its functioning determines the strength or the weakness of this system. It is most interesting that the dynamics of its development are largely internal, that is, everything takes place inside the system. 2  It is vital to stress that in modern days, the power hierarchy highlighted above, has been explained in terms of the tension that exists between the core (North) and periphery (South) states, in which the powerful and wealthy societies of the global North (core) dominate and exploit the weak and poor societies from the global South (periphery) (Martinez-Vela 2000:4). It is argued that countries from the core (North) benefited the most from the capitalist world economy. This enabled them to develop strong central governments, extensive bureaucracies and large mercenary armies. In turn, this development permitted them to expand their control to other parts of the world (in particular to the Americas and Africa) through colonial conquest and dispossession. The impact of colonialism converted the colonised and dispossessed communities of the Americas and Africa into wage earners and left them with no land to own. It is against this background that domination and exploitation became the order of the day. As Mignolo (2011) observed, for domination and exploitation to take place, people must first be colonised, dispossessed and be made inferior, before they can be dominated and exploited. On the other hand, global colonialism has inhibited countries from the South, in particular African countries to develop in the same pace as their Northern counterparts. The process of conquests has also destroyed the local authority structures and replaced them with weak bureaucracies controlled by the colonial powers. As a consequence, the Northern countries continued to exploit African countries through the import of raw material, the implementation of coercive labour practices and the expropriation of much of the capital surplus generated by the South through unequal trade relations (Martinez-Vela 2000: 4). In most cases, these dominant states used both their soft and hard power to enforce unequal rates of exchange between the North and the South. For this reason, countries from the South remained financially constrained to the point where they are unable to compete equally in the international trade with the Western countries. It can be argued that the modern world-system is characterised by domination and exploitation. These are sustained by the continued existence of global coloniality without which, domination and exploitation will be inconceivable. Global coloniality is part of the world-system that emerged in the 16th century and this world-system has produced the nation state and world order that have been dominated by the West for many centuries. We will also discuss the nation-state and the world order in this theme. As indicated earlier, the world-system approach proposed by Wallerstein has been subject to intensive criticism, especially from proponents of the decolonial paradigm, simply for its Eurocentric representation. Indeed, Wallerstein was looking at the modern world-system critically, but from the perspective and the experience of the West. In other words, he was providing a Eurocentric critique of modernity. In this way, his analysis was blind to what is termed coloniality (Quijano 2007). In fact, he never conceived of coloniality as a fundamental problem. Coloniality is best described by Maldonaldo-Torres (2007:243), as the long-standing patterns of power that originate from colonialism. These power patterns continue to exist in modern day world and they are exercised even in the absence of the colonial administration. Coloniality is not colonialism, it outlives colonialism. Analysing the world-system through the coloniality/decolonial perspective, allows one to critique the system through looking at a broader perspective, the perspective that derives from the worldview of the marginalised or people from the receiving ends, that is a perspective from the South. In this regard, Grosfoguel (2011:10) has IPC2602/13  provided a valuable insight in his critique of the world-system by using coloniality/ decolonial perspective. He differed dramatically with Wallerstein’s argument that the world-system is a capitalist economy. For him, this is a narrow and Eurocentric perspective based on Marxist’s economic determinism in which human society is analysed in terms of a base-superstructure relationship. On the contrary, Grosfoguel (2011:10) argues that the modern world-system comprises interrelated hierarchies that were initiated by colonial conquest since the 16th century and were subsequently exported to the rest of the world through the expansion of European civilisation after 1492. Instead of focusing on capitalism as a sole factor in the constitution of this system, Grosfoguel posits that the world-system is an “entangled package” comprising racialised, capitalist, imperialist, patriarchal, gendered, colonialist, Christian-centric, epistemic, inter-state system and Eurocentric power hierarchies and it affects all dimensions of social existence (Grosfoguel 2007:21). In his view, racial hierarchy is instrumental in structuring all the multiple hierarchies in the world-system and therefore it has become an organising principle. While Wallerstein’s model of analysis has its own flaws, it has nevertheless, been valuable and influential in providing a foundation for most scholars to critique the system by using different perspectives. This also applies to the proponents of the decolonial perspective who have adopted the world-system (although moderate one) as unit of analysis. Self-assessment activity 1.1 (a) Critically discuss the origins and the nature of the modern world-system. (b) Define the concept of the modern-world system and explain how power plays out within the system. (c) What do you understand by the concept of coloniality and how it differs from colonialism? (d) Discuss the position of the global South within the modern world system with specific reference to Africa. (e) Critically discuss the modern world-system by using a decolonial approach. (f) Compare and contrast Wallerstein and Grosfoguel’s analysis/critique of the modern world system. 1.2 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NATION-STATE The modern nation-state is part of the world-system of capitalism. The modern state exists within a larger cycle of states, which is commonly known as the inter-state system. The modern state as it is known today is said to be a product of the long thirty years of inter-state wars that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Westphalian Treaty was part of a long process that saw European powers come together and agreed to respect the territorial sovereignty of each other. They also established “consensual rules of mutual acknowledgement and recognition” of established borders (Grovogui 2002:324). Because of these processes and with the institutionalisation of the inter-state system through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the modern nation-state came into being. It also became synonymous with territorial sovereignty. At the same time, the political authority became exclusively the competence of the sovereign ruler within defined borders. In subsequent centuries, Europe witnessed several changes as the state continues to evolve towards the modern 4  state. The states became homogenous entities, reflecting uniformity in terms of the nation; hence the nation-state. It is interesting to note that in the context of Africa, the nation-state is a foreign concept and does not exist for various reasons. Firstly, the historical process of state formation in Africa has followed a different trajectory than the one followed by its European counterpart. Secondly, the formation of the state in Africa is a recent process, it was rather imposed through the process of colonialism. To be more specific, during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 the European colonial powers embarked on the scramble for Africa. The borders were arbitrarily drawn and defined for the convenience of the European colonisers to protect their own economic interests. It is against this background that the African state has never enjoyed stability in the true sense. For many years, the African state was embroiled in relentless political violence and intra-state wars. Moreover, the African state was marginalised economically from the modern world-system upon decolonisation and this has exacerbated its problems. Grovogui (2002:325) ascribes this incongruence between Western and African state to what he terms the “regime of sovereignty” imposed by European powers to Africa. He described African sovereignty as negative sovereignty that has rendered the state in Africa dysfunctional. Self-assessment activity 1.2 (1) Critically discuss the different processes of state formation in Europe and in Africa. (2) What is the difference between ‘territorial sovereignty’ and the ‘regime of sovereignty’? (3) Explain the concept of negative sovereignty as developed by Grovogui. 1.3 THE WORLD ORDER Closely associated with the concept of the world-system is the concept of the world order and the two concepts are often used interchangeably. However, the world-system is different from the world order in that the world order changes from time to time, but the world-system is static. For example, since the emergence of the interstate- system until today, the world order has been alternating between the different imperial powers such as Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, England and currently the USA (Mignolo 2011:xviii), while the world-system has remained a capitalist economy (Wallerstein 2004) or entangled package (Grosfoguel 2007). In other words, the world order is a political construct that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648 by European states (Nimako 2011:5) and it operates and transform within the world system. In Nimako’s view (2011:22), the world order that emerged since the 17th century can be categorised into Westphalian sovereignty and the United Nations sovereignty. He argues that the world order represented by Westphalian sovereignty gave rise to the colonisation of Africans and placed Africa at the periphery of the world-system and the one represented by the United Nations sovereignty gave rise to the decolonisation of Africa and transformed Africans to subjects of neo-colonial states (2011:22). The world order is also managed and maintained by a strong hegemony who attempts to create stability within the world system. To maintain hegemony, the hegemonic power IPC2602/15  must transform itself into a political and military power (Wallerstein 2004:58). At a point when the superiority of a hegemon is challenged by an emerging hegemon, the use of military force is likely a possibility. The hegemon’s use of military power is often viewed as a sign of weakness and this undermines its hegemony politically and economically. A good example is the USA’s threat or use of military force over emerging nuclear power states, such as Iraq, Libya and recently North Korea. The way in which the world order emerged, operated and operates help us to understand the status and position of regions and states within the world-system (Nimako 2011:3). Currently, Africa is part of the world order within the modern world-system that is defined and shaped by the global coloniality and this finds expression through the coloniality of power that continues to maintain the asymmetrical relationship between the global North and the global South. From the above argument, it is evident that the world order has been steadily changing from one hegemony to the other, but while this is so, it has not meaningfully changed the position of Africa within the world system. Foreign policy therefore takes place within the context of the world-system comprising the nation-states within a defined world order Self-assessment activity 1.3 (a) Discuss the difference between the world system and the world order. (b) Discuss the world order represented by the Westphalian sovereignty and the United Nations sovereignty. (c) Define the concept of hegemony and how it is employed within the context of the world order. (d) Discuss the current world order under the hegemony of the United States of America. 6  2 THEME 2 2 The theories of foreign policy OBJECTIVES FOR THEME 2 After you have completed this theme you must be able to do the following: Discuss the relevant classical and contemporary theories in international political dynamics. Discuss the purpose of the various international relations theories. Understand why international political theory is necessary. Discuss realism. Discuss liberalism. Discuss the Dell theory of conflict prevention. Discuss complex theory and complex interdependence theory. KEY CONCEPTS The purpose of theories, realism, liberalism, the Dell theory of conflict preven- tion, complex theory, complex interdependence theory, postcolonial/decolonial theory, balance of power, alliances, liberal internationalism. STUDY UNIT: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORIES 2.1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study unit is to introduce you to international political theories and their relevance, use and importance in international political dynamics. After you have completed this study unit you will be able to discuss the importance of theories, how they are conceived, their relevance and application in relation to foreign policy. You will know some of the important theories that are the subject of intense debates among scholars and practitioners of international relations. You will also appreciate some of the debates and the leading thinkers and some of the literature they have produced. This study unit should whet your intellectual appetite to learn more about the theories discussed here and many others not covered in this module. Before we get into the theories themselves, it is important to set the context of the relationship between international political dynamics, theories and foreign policy. International political dynamics, a subfield of international relations, is primarily about change in the international political system. There are myriad sources of changes. Some of the changes have to do with security of states; for example, the occurrence or prevention of wars. These changes impact on how states conceptualise and implement their foreign policies. In the 21st century, security concerns among states are no longer confined to conventional wars. They include weapons of mass destruction and cyber threat capabilities some of which are not exclusively in the hands of states. Non-state actors operating within territories of states and, in some IPC2602/17  instances, without the consent of those states, have gained access to powerful weapons. Some of the international political changes arise from within states where domestic policies have impact on other states and some arise from outside the state but they have an impact on the internal political dynamics of states themselves. Some of the changes are economic in nature as they involve commercial relationships between states and non-state actors such as multinational corporations. The concerns of states to improve the wellbeing of citizens involve negotiation, threats and inducements in relation to other states and non-state actors about the rules of trade and investments. Some issues that are of mutually beneficial interest are coordinated by states in multilateral platforms. At the heart of headline news that tell us about international political events and changes, such as the few examples we have just mentioned and others not mentioned here, is how human beings conceive of their status and primary role in their local societies as well as internationally. Differences of conception have over centuries in various geographical parts of the world produced different sets of relationships within and among societies. These relationships have, in the main, found articulation through state interactions although, increasingly, societies across the world are able to interact and form relationships outside the authority of states. The relationships that societies and states have produced over the years include the following: conflict and cooperation; conquest and freedom; free trade and protectionism; war and peace. The study of International Political Dynamics introduces important questions for students of International Relations, especially those who focus on foreign policy. How to make sense of the changes? Where do you look to interpret and understand the causes and consequences of actions of states and non-state actors that make headline news on a daily basis? Why have states or non-state actors behaved or are behaving in a particular way? Why would states or non-state actors, facing similar situations, behave differently? Is it possible to anticipate future behaviour of states? What kind of foreign policy instruments are suitable under what circumstances? One way to better appreciate the issues raised by these questions is by employing International Relations Theories. Let us start with the basics. What are theories? What do we mean when we refer to theories? How do theories fit in? How do they help us to improve our understanding of changes in the international system? In other words, what are the roles of theories? The next sections will clarify the purpose of theories, their usefulness, and it will introduce you to a few key examples of theories. 2.2 THE PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES International Relations involves the study of a great number of facts about the world. Yet these facts are only relevant when there is a framework to put them in. According to Carr (1961:11), a fact is like a sack; it would not stand up till you have put something in it. That something is theory because it is theory that provides the framework for the study of International Relations (Woods 1996:9). A theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutually dependent. It connects otherwise separate facts. It shows how changes in some of the phenomena necessarily entail changes in others (Waltz 1986:37). A theory is helpful to establish hypotheses. Without a theory we cannot say what it is that needs to be explained, how it might be explained, and which data, how 8  formulated, are to be accepted as evidence for or against the hypotheses. As Waltz (1986:45) puts it: To proceed by looking for association [of facts or phenomena] without at least some glimmering of a theory is like shooting a gun in the general direction of an invisible target. Not only would much ammunition be used up before hitting it, but also, if the bull’s eye were hit, no one would know it! International Relations Theories involve testing hypotheses, proposing causal explanations, describing events and explaining general trends and phenomena, with the aim of constructing a plausible image of the world (Burchill 1996:13). Explaining the purpose of theory, Halliday (1994: 75) made three points. (1) There needs to be some preconception about which facts are significant and which are not. Facts are myriad and do not speak for themselves. (Theory offers the preconception.) (2) Any set of facts, even if accepted as true and as significant, can yield different interpretations. (Theories offer different interpretation by emphasising certain facts above others.) (3) No human agent, whether academic or not, can be content with facts alone. All social activity involves moral questions, of right or wrong, and these cannot, by definition, be decided on facts alone. (Some theories deal with the preferences of agents.) Facts do not speak for themselves; observers give them voice by sorting out those that are relevant from those that are irrelevant, and, in so doing, they bring a theoretical perspective to bear. Theory provides guidelines; it sensitises observers to alternative possibilities; it highlights where levers might be pulled and influence wielded; it links ends to means and strategies to resources; and perhaps most of all, it infuses context and patterns into a welter of seemingly disarrayed and unrelated phenomena (Rosenau 2003:220). In addition to using theory to gain a deeper understanding of facts or phenomena, other scholars believe that International Relations Theory can influence foreign policy makers or practitioners in international relations. For example, Brown (2016:40) believes it is about improving the practice of international relations. 2.3 WHY ARE THERE MANY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? There are many theories of International Relations because not one theory is capable of helping us to understand all the dynamism in international politics. Different theorists would formulate theories based on what they consider to be important relationships between facts or even perceptions of foreign policy makers. Over the years, scholars have differed over which theory is best or what constitutes theory at all. Here are additional reasons why there are many theories and why it is important to try to study as many as possible. The following reasons apply to scholars who wish to formulate theories: The proliferation of theories allows the discipline of International Relations to explain changes in world politics as seen from a variety of different cultural, economic, gendered, political, ethnic, and social locations (Dunne, Kurki & Smith 2016:10). IPC2602/1 9  The events and issues that comprise international relations can only be interpreted and understood by reference to a conceptual framework. The theories of International Relations provide us with many choices of conceptual frameworks (Burchill 1986:14). One aim of studying a wide variety of International Relations Theories is to make international politics more intelligible and better understood. In other words, to make better sense of the institutions, events and processes that exist in the contemporary world (Burchill 1986:13). Different theories call upon facts in different ways. The same facts can tell a number of stories and lead to any one of a variety of conclusions (Woods 1996:9). The infinite material of any realm can be organised in endlessly different ways (Waltz 1986:36). Burchill (1996:13) sums up the role of theories: they provide an intellectual order to the subject matter of International Relations. They enable us to conceptualise and contextualise both past and contemporary events. In the end, Burchill (1996:23) suggests that the usefulness – or lack thereof – of theories can be evaluated against one or more of the following six criteria: A theory’s understanding of an issue or process The explanatory power of the theory The theory’s success in predicting events The theory’s intellectual consistency and coherence The scope of the theory The theory’s capacity for critical self-reflection and intellectual engagement with contending theories. Of course, no one, even if armed with what we can consider the best theories, can claim to have all the answers to questions listed in the introduction (section 1) about changes in international politics. But that does not mean that international developments do not warrant these questions. It also does not mean that there must be no attempt to answer them. It is impossible to predict with precision changes in international politics. Nor is it always the case that international developments can be fully understood and the motives of actors fully explained. Foreign policy decisions are sometimes about confronting the unknown. In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence in George W Bush’s administration, coined the phrase “known unknown”, which became famous after he tried to explain to unconvinced journalists that US planned attacks on Baghdad were linked to knowledge that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed weapons of mass destruction that were to be used for terrorist purposes against the United States and its allies. The US foreign policy decision to attack Baghdad was part of the “War on Terror” following terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Reports had suggested there was no link between the US military attack and Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction. During a press briefing at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld (2012:xv) responded to critical political journalists: Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me be- cause as we know, there are known knowns: there are always things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns: that is to say we know there are some things [we know] we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks through- 10  out the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult one. Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns” was later proven to be a euphemism for using unreliable information to launch a military attack on Iraq. An investigation found that the United States and Britain had acted hastily to launch a military attack on Iraq, capturing and killing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, and effecting regime change. An inquiry into Britain’s participation in the military invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s motivation for the invasion of another sovereign state, found that it was based on unreliable intelligence information that claimed that the Hussein regime possessed chemical weapons. The Chilcot Inquiry concluded: The widespread perception that the September 2002 dossier [a document presented by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to the House of Commons] overstated the firmness of evidence about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions [to produce weapons of mass destruction] in order to influence opinion and ‘make the case’ for [military] action to disarm Iraq has produced a damaging legacy, including undermining the trust and confidence in government statements, particularly those which rely on intelligence which cannot be independently verified (Chilcot 2016:131). There is, however, merit in the idea that states never possess perfect information when they formulate foreign policies. Nor do they always act on perfect information. As Mearsheimer (2011:127) points out, states sometimes guess wrong and end up doing themselves serious harm. Uncertainty is one of the key and permanent features in international foreign policy making and execution. Regardless of the difficulties of acting on imperfect knowledge with unpredictable outcomes, the practice of international politics has bequeathed scholars with lessons. Out of these have emerged theories and perspectives to explain certain types or patterns of actions or behaviours of actors in the international political arena. Understanding of some of the theories is, therefore, important if we are to improve our understanding of International Political Dynamics within the field of International Relations. The use of theories to explain aspects of International Political Dynamics, particularly foreign policy, is necessarily an attempt to link evidence with International Political Theory. As Richard Herrmann (2002:119) explains: [The] study of International Relations includes diverse theories purporting to explain substantive patterns in world politics. The field is so characterised by different perspectives on how to defend these claims. One strategy, of course, is to connect the concepts that constitute a theory to observable indicators, spell out what expectations to follow from the theory, and then demonstrate whether these expectations materialise or not. Clearly, there is not one theory that can help us understand everything. No theory is all-encompassing and perfect. However, although theories have explanatory power, they have limits too. The limitations from which theories suffer are mitigated by the existence of a multiplicity of theories. It would, of course, be difficult to study all theories. The menu is too long. Different theories proffer different emphases in understanding International Political Dynamics. As Smith (2016:9) explains in the introduction to International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity: “This IPC2602/111  diversity has generated different answers to perennial questions in International Relations about actors, issues, causes, and consequences”. This study unit introduces you to five theories, among those that have been the major focus of intense debates among scholars of International Relations. Some of the theories – realism and liberalism – belong to the so-called classical category in that they can be regarded as founding theories of International Relations. Others – the Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention (Dell Theory), complex theory and complex interdependence theory and post-colonial/decolonial theory – are relatively recent and aim to keep up with the need to explain the continuing changes in international politics. Realism’s main argument is that the international system is anarchic and states always seek to maximise power to preserve themselves and avert the ever-present possibility of being attacked by other states. Liberalism focuses on the propensity of states to cooperate under a rules-based international order. The Dell theory emphasises the primacy of commercial relationships among nations that determine peaceful cooperation. You will be introduced to complex theory pioneered by James Rosenau in his book Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (2003). In terms of this theory, the international system is a complex whole consisting of agents whose ability to adopt and co-evolve with the system to ensure its stability under different circumstances is as important as agents whose actions can upset the system. Nothing in terms of this theory is taken for granted and everything matters (Rosenau 2003:212;216). You will be introduced to complex interdependence theory that Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye explained in their book Power and Interdependence (2012) deals with the myriad of agenda-setting complex systems well beyond realism’s military concerns in international politics. Post-Colonial/Decolonial Theory is derived from the realisation that formerly colonised societies emerged to formulate independent foreign policies after centuries of colonial occupations that were followed by satellite (proxy) status during the Cold War era. EXERCISE 2.1 Define International Political Theory. (1) What is International Political Theory? (2) Why are theories necessary in International Relations? (3) How can we evaluate the usefulness of International Relations Theories? (4) Why are there many theories of International Relations? (5) What are examples of International Relations theories? 2.4 REALISM AND BALANCE OF POWER The theory of Realism and Balance of Power can be traced back to Thucydides in the fifth century BC, who explained the policy to Tissaphernes, King of the Persians as one holding “the balance evenly between the two contending powers”, Athens and Sparta. This was during the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), a Greek war fought by the Delian League led by Athens against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. The war was caused by the rise of Athens and the fear this instilled in Sparta. It led Sparta to attempt to balance the rise of Athens. This build up to the war was described as “Thucydides’s Trap”, after the historian Thucydides. In recent times, 12  the “Thucydides’s Trap” has been used to speculate the likely outcome of the tension between the China and the United States. The question is whether the economic rise of China threatens the US in the manner Sparta felt threatened by Athens (Allison, 2017: xiv-xv). Since the Peloponnesian War, realism developed on the strengths of the writings of Thomas Hobbes, the 17th century British philosopher, who popularised the idea of human beings in a state of nature, in terms of which they are inherently prone to go war with one another. Indeed, modern realists treat Hobbes as the midwife of realism. Although his writings, particularly Leviathan, was concerned mostly with civil war, they would be interpreted and given wider meaning to account for much of the anarchy – and war – in international politics. In Leviathan, Hobbes (1968:185) wrote about the consequences of an overarching power, saying it left a gap that was the cause of war: Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such warre, as is of every man, against everyman… Of the consequences of lack of security, he wrote (1968:186): Whatsoever is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to everyman; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than with their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. The repercussions for state of nature go beyond lack of security and war and have implications for the economy too. Hobbes (1968:186) explained: In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently to Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things of the Earth; no account of Time; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. One of the proponents of realism and balance of power is Kenneth N Waltz. He took Hobbes’s theory further to the international level, beyond the Hobbesian individual who was unrestrained before the establishment of the Commonwealth – Hobbes’s peaceful institutional mechanism. In his book Man, the State and War: A theoretical analysis (2001), Waltz emphasises the primacy of the state in international politics and how states interact with each other in the context of anarchy, in other words, in the absence of a supranational government to guarantee their security. The absence of “common power”, according to Hobbes’s conception, lead us to permanent state of war. To illustrate the problem of lack of security for the state, a situation that drives them to arm themselves, Waltz (2001:201) makes the following example: A man attacked by would-be thieves on Main Street may fairly hope that the police will either thwart the attackers of recover the loot. The chances of get- IPC2602/113  ting away with crime are sufficiently small to reduce such incidents well below the point at which the ordinary citizens begin to carry arms. This, however, does not apply at state level. States do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their security unless they set out to provide it themselves. If security is something the state wants, then this desire, together with the conditions in which all states exist, imposes certain requirements on a foreign policy that pretends to be rational. The requirements are imposed by automatic sanction: Departure from the rational model imperils the survival of the state. But the actions of one state to provide for its own security are dependent on the actions of other states (Waltz 2001:201). While not overlooking the past, which provides light on some problems, realism accepts change as the first law of history. The political realist accepts that the necessity for facing problems on their merits and in the context of the ways that other actors on the world scene are dealing them – one of these ways being through choices on the basis of national interests, rather than by relationship to some blueprint or a series of reference points which are more ideal (Padelford & Lincoln 1962:241). 2.4.1 Balance of power From the theory of realism, emerges the concept of balance of power. The influence of a realist thinker, Hans Morgenthau, on realism was mainly on his development of insights on the balance of power. In his book Power Among Nations (1966), Morgenthau argued that the “balance of power” was a universal concept applied in natural sciences, economics and political science. It signifies stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium (balance) is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other elements composing the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium. The equilibrium exists in the human body. When the body suffers an injury or a pathological transformation of one of its organs, the equilibrium is disturbed, and the body tries to overcome the disturbance by re-establishing the equilibrium either on the same or a different level from the one that it obtained before the disturbance occurred. The same concept is used in social sciences, such as economics, with reference to relations between savings and investments, exports and imports, supply and demand, costs and prices (Morgenthau 1966:162). In the political sphere, two assumptions are at the foundation of all equilibriums. First, that the elements to be balanced are necessary for society or are entitled to exist. Second, that without a state of equilibrium among them, one element will gain ascendency over the others, encroach upon their interests and rights, and may ultimately destroy them. Consequently, it is the purpose of all such equilibriums to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it. The ultimate goal is stability and preservation of all elements in the system. If the goal were stability alone, it could be achieved by allowing one element to destroy or overwhelm the others and take their place. Equilibrium must therefore aim at preventing any element from gaining ascendancy over the others. The means employed to maintain the equilibrium consist of allowing the different elements to pursue their opposing tendencies up to the point where the tendency is not strong 14  enough to overcome the tendency of the others, but strong enough to prevent the others from overcoming its own (Morgenthau 1966:163). In the specific case of the nation-state, the power that needs to be balanced is that of another state. It also means nation-states are constantly calculating their relative power positions in the international system to balance each other by way of forming alliances. The problem, though, is that in Morgenthau’s conception, the nations could never be sure of the precise power that their supposed competitors possess. (Fast forward to the 21st century: we will remember US Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown knowns” in the previous section?). In the earlier epoch, Morgenthau (1966:199) theorised thus about uncertainty of power: This uncertainty is … immeasurably magnified when the weights in one or the other or in both scales are composed not of single units but alliances. Then it becomes necessary to compute not only one’s own and the opponent’s national power and to correlate one with the other, but to perform the same operation on the national power of one’s allies and those of the opponent [before deciding on the right foreign policy action]. The risk of guessing is greatly aggravated when one must assess the power of nations belonging to different civilisations. It is difficult enough to evaluate the power of Great Britain or of France. It is much more difficult to make a correct assessment of the power of China, Japan, or even the Soviet Union. The crowning uncertainty, however, lies in the fact that one cannot always be sure who are one’s own allies and who are the opponent’s. Alignments by virtue of alliance treaties are not always identical with the alliances that oppose each other in the actual contest of war. Realism builds into its theoretical postulations the measure of uncertainty that inevitably makes the international system descriptively anarchic. But it remains the theory of realism that to secure themselves; states form coalitions to balance potential attacks from those they fear have power to destroy them. Balancing is the key strategy that states employ when a rival takes steps to increase its share of world power. Those states that feel threatened can build up their own capabilities. This is referred to as internal balancing. Or they can join with others to form an alliance against the dominating state. This process is called external balancing. This is what happened to Japan and Germany whose domineering tendencies elicited a coalition that eventually defeated them in World War II (Mearsheimer 2011:126). 2.4.2 Formation of alliances Common to the desire of all sates is the wish to survive, to thwart potential or perceived threats, states play a game of survival in which they form coalitions to have an advantage over others. If some states seek an advantage over others, they combine; if other states want to counteract this advantage, they in turn combine (Waltz 2001:204). If the advantage sought is measured in terms of power to destroy or damage another country, then the strengthened state refrains from the effort to increase its strength only at the risk of its survival. Pursuing a balance-of-power is still a matter of choice, but the alternatives are those of probable suicide on the one hand and the active playing of the power-politics on the other. The cardinal rule of the game, according to Waltz, is often taken to be: Do whatever you must to win it. Waltz uses Hobbes’s conception of power as the capacity to produce an intended effect (Waltz 2001:205). IPC2602/115  Waltz’s theory is based on the assumption that states act rationality. This assumption is not without faults. What does acting rationally mean? Mearsheimer (2011:127) explains: To assume states are rational is to say that they are aware of the external envi- ronment and they think intelligently about how to maximise their prospects for survival. In particular, they try to gauge the preferences of other states and how their own behaviour is likely to affect the actions of other states, as well as how the behaviour of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy. When they look at different strategies that they have to choose between, they assess the likelihood of success as well as the costs and benefits of each other. Finally, states pay attention not only to the immediate consequences of their actions, but to the long-term effects as well. Nevertheless, rational states miscalculate from time to time because they invariably make important decisions on the basis of imperfect information – “known unknowns”. They hardly ever have complete information about any situation they confront, which forces them to make educated guesses. This is due in part to the fact that potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and to conceal their true aim. But even if disinformation were not a problem, states are often unsure about the resolve of opposing forces as well as their allies, and it is often hard to know beforehand how one’s own military forces, as well as those of the adversaries, will perform on the battlefield. Therefore, rational states sometimes guess wrong and end up doing themselves serious harm. Mearsheimer points to Waltz’s own admission that dominant powers have behaved badly and have consequently lived troubled lives. These are not the cases of states miscalculating in a way that does not make strategic sense. These are actions of states acting foolishly by ignoring relevant information or paying attention to largely irrelevant information (Mearsheimer 2011:127). 2.4.3 The scaffolding of the international order Although the states have acted foolishly in the past and might continue to do so in future, realism is credited for explaining the world we live in today. One of the proponents of realism – and its balance of power variant – is the American diplomat and scholar, Henry Kissinger. Opining on the virtues of the balance of power with a broad sweep covering more than a thousand years right up to the 21st Century, Kissinger (2014:12) observed that the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the religious wars in Europe was brought about by the balance of power. The treaty was aimed at thwarting potential universalisation of one set of values propounded by a particular state at the expense of another. Explaining the significance of Westphalia, Kissinger (2014:27) observed: For more than a thousand years, in the mainstream of modern Europe statecraft order has derived from equilibrium, and identity from resistance to universal rule. The Westphalian concept of state sovereignty (brought into being by balance of power between competing states) took multiplicity as its starting point and drew a variety of multiple societies, each accepted as a reality, into a common search for order. By the mid-19th century, this international system was in place on every continent; it remains [in the 21st century] the scaffolding of international order as it now exists. 16  2.4.4 Realism: linking theory to evidence Having sketched the central ideas about realism, the question arises: how do we know that a particular action by a particular state was or is motivated by realist thinking? That is to say, how do we know that the state in question believes or believed in the use of power to achieve equilibrium or to balance other states? How do we know that its actions are rationally calculated to safeguard its interests by using force in international politics? Remember, in the introduction, we said that it would be difficult to know with precision some answers; however, we also said that, that is not a reason to stop asking the questions and seek answers. We stated that the role of theory is to help us improve our understanding of International Politics. So how is that possible? Hermann (2002:120) proposed two approaches to solve the problem. The first is the objective strategy. It assumes that the external environment can be described by the scholar in terms what are objectively accurate. It then assumes that actors correctly see objective power distribution and incentives in the environment. This strategy leads to the study of the international environment that actors are supposedly able to describe with accuracy. The assumption is that once we are able to describe the environment, we would know what kind of foreign policy action a state will take in relation to a specific issue. The second strategy is called phenomenological strategy. It assumes that the actor’s actions will follow from the actor’s perception. This strategy puts emphasis on the empirical identification of the perceptions and world-views held by actors. It seeks to explain actions by referring to the cognitive understandings and ideas that actors have, rather than searching for primarily explanatory leverage in the objective structure of the environment. This strategy can be executed in part by studying the statements and choices of decision makers to determine predisposition to this or that other strategy (Hermann 2002:125). For realist thinkers, such statement will demonstrate that they believe that they live in an anarchic international system, they have to maximise usage of power to survive and conquer their rivals – real or perceived. REALISM IN SUMMARY Basic premise – human beings are constantly in a state of war Actors in the international system – the state Nature of society and international system – anarchic Main concern – survival or self-preservation through dominance Foreign policy strategy – driven primarily by military considerations Universal concept – equilibrium Intellectual source – Thomas Hobbes (Book: Leviathan, first published in 1651) Influential theorist – Hans Morgenthau (Book: Power Among Nations, first published in 1948) Contemporary theorist – Kenneth Waltz (Book: Man, the State and War, first published in 1959) Linking theory to evidence – 17th century wars, World War I, World War II and the US War on Terror IPC2602/117  EXERCISE 2.2 Consider the following text and answer the questions. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld and the “Parade of Horribles” “In the Autumn of 2002, during a National Security Council meeting on Iraq, I departed from the agenda to read a handwritten list of possible problems, later referred to as the ‘Parade of Horribles’, that I believed could result from an invasion [of Iraq]. Sitting at the table in the Situation Room, with [President George] Bush, [Vice President Dick] Cheney, [Secretary of State Colin] Powell, [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice and [CIA Director George] Tenet, and others in attendance, I went through the items one by one. The list was meant to generate serious, early thinking about the potential risks and what might be done to assess and reduce them…With regard to the risks of invasion, my memo listed a number of problems that were worth thinking about in case they materialised, though they ultimately did not: While the US is engaged in Iraq, another rogue state could take advantage of US pre-occupation – North Korea, Iran, and PRC in the Taiwan Straits. There could be a higher than expected US and coalition deaths from Iraq’s use of weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait and/or Israel. US could fail to find WMD (weapons of mass destruction) on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world US could fail to manage post-Saddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East and the benefit of Iran…” Source: Donald Rumsfeld (2012 480–481) Questions: (1) Identify the aspects that Rumsfeld note to demonstrate that he is a realist thinker. (2) Would you say that his note is indicative of a policy maker who is a rational- ist? How? (3) Identify an aspect that shows that he believes in the balance of power. Explain. (4) Do you think he is overly concerned about America’s security? (5) Do you get a sense that he fears for America’s security or he is more inter- ested in regime-change? Or is he concerned with both? (6) Which strategy did you use to answer the questions: the objective strategy or the phenomenological strategy? Why was it appropriate in this case? 2.5 LIBERALISM The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of communist Soviet Union heralded what many scholars regarded as the triumph of liberalism. Before we seek to understand the implications of this supposed victory of liberalism, we must define what it actually is. What does the theory liberalism entail? The liberal theory contains both a political element and an economic element. Liberalism is primarily concerned with enhancing 18  the freedom and welfare of individuals. It proposes that humankind can employ reason better to develop a sense of harmony of interests among individuals and groups within a wider community, domestic or international. In the international sphere, these goals are realised through the promotion of liberal democracy (Underhill 1994:27). Liberal democracy is characterised by human rights for individuals, including the political rights to elect or to be elected in a periodic election that determines who becomes the government. In a liberal democracy, there is separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary. It is a political system derived from the interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s liberal thought advocated in his book Perpetual Peace (1795). Although Kant was sceptical of the concept of democracy, he emphasised the importance of the separation of powers that would guarantee the realisation of the public will as opposed to despotism (Behr 2010:133). Within three years of the of end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, a liberal scholar, published the widely debated book, The End of History and The Last Man (1992). The book criticised realism, the theory we discussed in the previous section. Realism, according to Fukuyama, suffered from being too narrowly focused on self- preservation as the motive for human behaviour. At the level of state, this behaviour resulted in societies that were inherently aggressive towards one another. This kind of observation about the motivation of human behaviour failed to consider the history and the ideological evolution of human beings. (Fukuyama 1992:254). The ultimate ground for war among states was Plato’s concept of thymos (the desire for recognition), not self-preservation, as realism argued. Just as human history began with the bloody battles for pure prestige, so international conflict begins with a struggle for recognition among states, which is the original source of imperialism (Fukuyama 1992:256). Fukuyama also borrowed from Kant’s concept of a universal history. Taking into consideration human’s ideological evolution over time, Fukuyama’s premise allows for the struggle for recognition to be fulfilled in a liberal order that requires neither war not conquest. Whereas in ancient times the desire for recognition on the part of aristocrats led to imperialism and slavery, the early forms of thymos were to a large extent displaced in the modern period by increasingly rational forms of recognition whose ultimate expression was the modern liberal state. Realism did not consider this historical development (Fukuyama 1992:259). The end of the religious wars between Protestants and Catholics that nearly destroyed England in the 17th century is attributed to political liberalism. This civil peace brought about by liberalism should logically have its counterpart in relations between states. Striving for conquest was not a universalistic characteristic of all human societies (Fukuyama 1992:260). The expansion of civil peace had three consequences: first, the desire of states for legitimacy; second, the end of colonial conquests by major powers motivated in part by the adoption of liberal norms of human rights outlined in the Atlantic Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights; third, the peaceful co-existence among liberal democracies; and fourth, the expansion of commerce which, in turn, served as a disincentive for war among liberal states (Fukuyama 1992, Chapter 24). (See the Dell Theory.) Fukuyama took his theory of liberalism further, dividing the world in two parts. The “post-historical” part that has completed its ideological evolution and reached a point where rational forms of recognition have become possible. This part is the one in which liberal democracy has been established. The other part is the one “still IPC2602/1 19  suck” in history, and it thus called “historical”. In other words, it is yet to complete the historical evolution to liberalism. 2.5.1 Foreign policy implications What are liberalism’s implications on foreign policy? How does the level or stage of liberal evolution affect a state’s foreign policy? We learned from the previous section on realism that in an anarchic international system, where there is no ultimate authority, states are always in a constant state of war with each other. What then for liberalism? Fukuyama (1992: 279) makes the following two points: Firstly, the historical half of the world persists in operating according to the realist principles, and the post-historical half must use realist methods when dealing with the part still in history. The relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear, and despite the growing degree of economic interdependence, force will continue to be the ultima ratio in their mutual relations. Secondly, it would seem natural that liberal democracy, which seeks to abol- ish the distinction between masters and slaves by making men the masters of themselves, should have different foreign policy objectives altogether. What will produce peace in the post-historical world will not be the fact that the major states share a common principle of legitimacy. Peace will arise instead out of the specific nature of democratic legitimacy, and its ability to satisfy the human longing for recognition. Fukuyama’s second postulations is based on his interpretation of Kant’s ideas on the individual, the state and the international sphere. Kant’s Perpetual Peace argued that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of what he termed the three “definitive articles” of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles, perpetual peace will have been established (Fukuyama 1992:213). The first article requires that the civil constitution of every state must be established and it must be republican. It must be founded on three principles: freedom for all members of society, dependence of everyone upon single common legislation and equality before the law. In addition, Kant argued for a representative government, although he thought this was possible without it being democratic. Kant defined democracy as majoritarianism, which is oppressive to the individual. This was problematic since he believed in a representative government.. His fear for democratic majoritarianism seemed to be based on the absence of an independent judiciary in his theory (Kant 1970:98-101), although liberal scholars who drew from his writings conceived of a modern liberal democracy that includes among its key features an independent judiciary and the rule of law. The second article proposed that liberal states will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation or union. Reason, as the highest legislative moral power, absolutely condemns war as a test of right and sets up peace as an immediate duty. According to Kant (1970:104): But peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between the nations; thus, a particular kind of league, which we might call a 20  pacific federation (foedus pacificum), is required. It would differ from a peace treaty in that the latter terminates one war, whereas the former would seek to end all wars for good. The third definitive article will establish a cosmopolitan law (or right) to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. Kant (1970:106) despised the plunder of the resources of strangers and the enslavement of other people. He advocated for hospitality towards strangers by saying: In this context hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory. He can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceful manner in the place he happens to be in. 2.5.2 Versions of Liberal Internationalism Inspired by Kant’s “pacific union” at an international level, liberal theorists have extended liberal theory to Liberal Internationalism. They do not emphasise equilibrium as, for example, Hans Morgenthau has done. Where realists see equilibrium or balance (as Henry Kissinger’s interpretation of the Treaty of Westphalia suggests), liberals (as Fukuyama interpreted the end of hostilities brought by the Treaty of Westphalia) see the inexorable expansion of international interdependence among the people and societies of the world. Because liberal perspectives focus on relationships rather than power, they see more clearly the increasing volume, scope, and complexity of global interactions. These interactions have grown geometrically over time and crystallised in regularities and patterns that constitute widening domestic societies and international institutions (Nau 2012:87). Taking these observations further, G John Ikenberry (2013:Chapter 1) has observed that the liberal agenda was never fixed and has kept evolving. Three versions – 1.0; 2.0; and 3.0 – could be identified since the end of the World War I. Version 1.0 is associated with the ideas of President Woodrow Wilson (president of the US from 1913 to 1921) and the post-World War I international settlement. Wilson had a vision of an international system organised around a global collective security body in which sovereign states would act together to uphold a system of territorial peace. Open trade, national self-determination, and a belief in progressive global change were also important. At the centre of his ideas was the establishment of the League of Nations to provide mechanisms for dispute resolution among states. Wilson’s vision faded when the League of Nations collapsed. The US Senate had refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty that would buttress US participation in the league. Liberal international order was once again revived after World War II as the US sought to lead the allies to build post-war systems. The Atlantic Charter provided the vision. The re-establishment of the League of Nations, which became the United Nations, to regulate inter-state affairs and secure peace characterised the era. The Bretton Woods conference led to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. Thus, emerged a rules-based order underwritten and dominated by the US, which used the institutions to spread liberal ideals under version 2.0 of liberal internationalism. Version 2.0 faced its challenges among which is erosion because the unipolar post-Cold War system gave the US power to controversially violate the sovereignty of other countries. States faced the dilemma that they are no longer the monopoly of security as non-state actors have IPC2602/121  also gained violent capabilities. There are also increasing pressures for reforms of the institutions that underpin version 2.0 to make them more representative. It is in this context that liberal internationalism 3.0 is projected to emerge. This would mean reworking the American-dominated liberal order. International institutions could reflect more global memberships. These would include a reform of the UN, with a reorganised Security Council that expanded permanent membership to rising non-Western countries such as Japan, India, Brazil and South Africa. Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and the World Bank – would also expand and reapportion rights (Ikenberry 2013:45). 2.5.3 Liberalism: Linking theory to evidence Now, let us apply the approach proposed by Hermann (2002:120) to link liberalism’s claims to evidence. In the first section of the study unit we referred to the need to link theoretical claims to evidence. When objectively described, the international environment ought to substantiate the Kantian liberal claim, as further enunciated by Fukuyama. This would also mean that liberal-oriented leaders would be more interested in cooperation and peace as opposed to war, and evidence should show that liberal states do not go to war. Doyle (1986) conducted a historical study of war and peace, which partly emboldened Fukuyama’s theory. He made two conclusions about the legacy of liberalism. The first is the “pacification of foreign relations among liberal states”. Beginning in the 18th century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the “pacific federation” or “pacific union”, had begun to be established among liberal societies. By 1986, more than 40 liberal states made up the union (Doyle 1986: 211, 212 & 221). The second legacy is that peaceful restraint only seemed to work in liberals’ relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with non-liberal states (Doyle 1986:212). Debate: The excerpt of the following article from Foreign Affairs Journal (14 June 2018) takes an issue with Fukuyama and Ikenberry’s liberal theory. The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom By GRAHAM ALLISON Among the debates that have swept the U.S. foreign policy community since the beginning of the Trump administration, alarm about the fate of the liberal international rules-based order has emerged as one of the few fixed points. From the international relations scholar G. John Ikenberry’s claim that “for seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order” to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s call in the final days of the Obama administration to “act urgently to defend the liberal international order,” this banner waves atop most discussions of the United States’ role in the world. About this order, the reigning consensus makes three core claims. First, that the liberal order has been the principal cause of the so-called long peace among great powers for the past seven decades. Second, that constructing this order has been the main driver of U.S. engagement in the world over that period. And third, that U.S. President Donald Trump is the primary threat to the liberal order–and thus to world peace. The political scientist Joseph Nye , for example, has written, “The demonstrable success of the order in helping 22  secure and stabilize the world over the past seven decades has led to a strong consensus that defending, deepening, and extending this system has been and continues to be the central task of U.S. foreign policy.” Nye has gone so far as to assert: “I am not worried by the rise of China. I am more worried by the rise of Trump.” Although all these propositions contain some truth, each is more wrong than right. The “long peace” was not the result of a liberal order but the byproduct of the dangerous balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the four and a half decades of the Cold War and then of a brief period of U.S. dominance. U.S. engagement in the world has been driven not by the desire to advance liberalism abroad or to build an international order but by the need to do what was necessary to preserve liberal democracy at home. And although Trump is undermining key elements of the current order, he is far from the biggest threat to global stability. These misconceptions about the liberal order’s causes and consequences lead its advocates to call for the United States to strengthen the order by clinging to pillars from the past and rolling back authoritarianism around the globe. Yet rather than seek to return to an imagined past in which the United States molded the world in its image, Washington should limit its efforts to ensuring sufficient order abroad to allow it to concentrate on reconstructing a viable liberal democracy at home. GRAHAM ALLISON is Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. The full article is available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/ myth-liberal-order?cid=nlc-fa_fatoday-20180618. LIBERALISM IN SUMMARY Basic premise – man is driven by desire for recognition Actor in the international system – the state and non-state actors Nature of society and international system – pacific federation Main concern – prosperity through peaceful cooperation Foreign policy strategy – republican constitutionalism expressed in international relations Universal concepts – desire for recognition and universal history Intellectual source – Immanuel Kant (Book: Perpetual Peace, first published in 1795) Contemporary theorists – Francis Fukuyama (Book: The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992) Linking theory to evidence – Establishment of post-war liberal regimes EXERCISE 2.3 Answer the following questions (1) What is liberalism? (2) What are the differences between realism and liberalism? (3) What form of government is informed by liberalism? (4) What kind of foreign policy can be expected among liberal states? IPC2602/123  (5) Provide an example of an international institution established as part of liberal international order? (6) What are the main differences between realism and liberalism? EXERCISE 2.4 Consider this shortened article published by Foreign Policy Journal (10 August 2018) and answer the questions related to realism and liberalism. Meet the Middle East’s Peace of Westphalia Re-enactors Can a series of far-flung, high-level conferences bring peace to the Middle East by applying lessons from 17th-century Europe? BY BORZOU DARAGAHI A group of scholars, mostly affiliated with University of Cambridge and acting with the encouragement of the German government, have quietly gained traction at [reinacting a “Peace of Westphalia” conference for the war-raved Middle East in the twenty-first century] by drawing on lessons from 17th-century Europe. Their goal is to organise a contemporary Peace of Westphalia for the Middle East, on the model of the series of diplomatic meetings that ended the Thirty Years’ War that ravaged what was then Germany. The project has already held eight workshops and conferences in Cambridge, London, Berlin, Munich, and Amman, Jordan, with stakeholders and policymakers involved in the Middle East’s conflicts; the hope is these meetings will eventually pave the way for a final series of conferences that can produce a grand bargain. Among those who have endorsed the project and taken part in its formal discussions are former CIA Director David Petraeus, Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit, United Nations Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, and former Iran nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian. The government of Jordan has been involved in the discussions, and both Royal Court chief Fayez Tarawneh and Prince Faisal, the king’s brother, have taken part in the conferences. Recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly endorsed the project. But if the idea of a grand bargain appeals in the abstract to many Middle Eastern players, the conference organisers are very aware that achieving it in practice will be far more difficult. The original Westphalian conference proves that goodwill won’t be sufficient; in Europe, exhaustion of bloodshed served as the ultimate midwife of peace. Simultaneously arriving at that stage in places as diverse as