Determinants of Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia (PDF) - Amare Tekle - 1989

The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia Author(s): Amare Tekle Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Sep., 1989, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 479-502 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/161103 JSTOR is a not-for-p...

The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia Author(s): Amare Tekle Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies , Sep., 1989, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 479-502 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/161103 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Modern African Studies This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, 3 (I989), pp. 479-502 The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia by AMARE TEKLE* THE FOREIGN policy of Ethiopia, like that of other countries, is based on certain goals and values, and determined by the dynamic interplay of domestic and external factors. Although its formulation has been clearly influenced by Marxist concepts about the nature of society and the alignment of forces in the world, there are elements of continuity as well as change, not least because Ethiopia has maintained its core values while playing an important role from time to time in the international arena long before the 1974 revolution. In other words, despite a shift in orientation, the central purpose of Ethiopia's foreign policy has remained the same, and a change in style has not brought forth a change in essence. Indeed, in some respects, the exigencies of a fast-changing international environment have been more significant than the replacement of the Emperor by the Dergue. It must be stressed that Ethiopian policy has been largely rigid, with adjustments being made only in response to certain fait accomplis that were outside the control of the decision-makers. THE GOALS OF FOREIGN POLICY The present Ethiopian Government has s intimately-linked foreign-policy goals; nat guarantee territorial integrity and nation legitimacy of the regime, so that it can c accepted at home and abroad; and a restru Since concepts like 'national security' and and subject to different interpretations, how elite have been important in determining mean,1 as well as in setting priorities and external and internal resources in order t tation. * Associate Professor of Political Science, Morris Brown College, Atlanta, Georgia. 1 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: a theory of international relations (New York, 1966), pp. 571-2. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 480 AMARE TEKLE Upon achieving power, the immediate objectives of the Government were to win the conflict in Eritrea and the war with Somalia, and to achieve internal political stability by firmly establishing its authority and creating a framework for 'socialist' development. This required immediate commitment to bolstering its military strength, which involved seeking alliances which would ensure the immediate and massive inflow of armaments. The policy-frame was based on the principles of proletarian internationalism and non-alignment, reflected in all the basic docu- ments of the Government and the ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia (W.P.E.), including the new constitution. These proclaimed support for, and solidarity with, socialist countries as well as movements and forces committed to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and racism, plus Chinese reaction and Zionism, added in 1979 and I98I, respectively.1 From the beginning, the Government had consistently condemned both the so-called 'imperialists', essen- tially the United States and the N.A.T.O. alliance, and the alleged 'reactionary' Arab states, including Iraq and Syria, and conversely had closely identified itself with the causes of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, and the struggle of revolutionary movements in the Third World. Although the previous Government had proclaimed Ethiopia to b non-aligned, this stance included not only maintaining cordial relations with the Soviet bloc, but also providing the United States with military bases and facilities. By way of contrast, the present Government considers the Soviet Union to be a 'natural ally' of the Non-Aligned Movement.2 Whereas the organisation's founding fathers had, on th basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, emphasised mutua accommodation, understanding, tolerance, and co-operation, Ethio pia's Marxist leaders advocate class struggle and world revolution. THE EXTERNAL SETTING Although the external environment include systems, as well as bilateral relationships, it 1 Yemen was only willing to sign a treaty of friendship with Ethi not just to anti-imperialism and anti-racism, as in the propos Zionism', as finally agreed in I98I. A section denouncing 'Chin added to Chairman Mengistu's speech during the celebration of revolution, because Fidel Castro threatened to cancel his state Government did not take an official position on the question. 2 Socialist Ethiopia was one of the few vocal advocates of such was raised at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana in I979. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 48I precise distinctions between the three, since paramount role in each. Ethiopia is a small, impoverished country suff of war and famine, and dependent for its secur it has always been, on the assistance of other institutions. Its location in a strategically impo has always affected its foreign policy, notab major powers of the day. Although unabl marginal role in the international system, t Ethiopia, the structure and distribution of pow forces in the international environment, hav leeway in its diplomatic manoeuvres. History demonstrates that Ethiopia has succes taken advantage of, the interplay of forces perennially seeking solutions to its national dicaments. This explains the role played in t successive great powers - notably Portugal, It United States, and now the Soviet Union attachment to, and the advantage it has tak organisations, including the League of Nation and the Organisation of African Unity.1 The skill and opportunism with which Emp able to exploit the League of Nations, and en coming to his rescue against Britain, which in t role in Italy's defeat and his victorious return f use of his newly-acquired friendship with Wash power at home and to ensure his country's posi entry into, and active participation in, the Non well as his cultivation of the personal friendship including Nasser; his masterly manipulati movement and his pre-eminent role in the which enhanced the country's stature and hi world affairs - all can be cited as brilliant ex ability to manoeuvre skillfully in, and manip The present Government has also been success extent, in its assessment of the international climate, and in its attraction of support from the Soviet Union. Yet, it has damaged Ethiopia's stature and minimised its influence in the Non-Aligned 1 Stephen V. Chukumba, The Big Powers Against Ethiopia: Anglo-Franco-American diplomatic maneuvers during the Italian-Ethiopian dispute (Washington, D.C., I979), p. 6. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 482 AMARE TEKLE Movement and the O.A.U. This has nothing to do with the country's close relationship with Moscow since the present leaders are only a little more servile to their main ally than was the imperial regime to Washington. The problem lies less in the substance than the conduct of the policy adopted, and this has been detrimental to the Government's relationship with non-aligned, and particularly African states. i. The Regional System The foreign policy of Ethiopia has always been profoundly affected by the prevailing conditions in the Horn of Africa, and by its traditional perception of, and psychological disposition towards, neighbouring countries on both sides of the Red Sea. The present Marxist leaders, like their predecessors, believe that Ethiopia is uncomfortably surrounded by several unfriendly states, whose in- habitants share more differences than similarities, and whose relation- ships have largely been characterised by mutual suspicion and fierce hostility. Unlike its neighbours, Ethiopia not only managed to escape being colonised, but was able to assume its present dimensions, except in the north, during the 'scramble for Africa', expanding from 345,000 to 800,000 square kilometres during this time.' The leaders succeeded not because of their military strength but because of their capacity to exploit the cupidity of the European colonialists.2 Even so, Ethiopia itself was often treated as if it were not a sovereign state in full control of its destiny. The I906 treaty between France, Italy, and Britain, signed without the knowledge of Menelik II, let alone with his consent, was actually designed to carve Ethiopia into spheres of influence while seeming to guarantee its independence and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the Emperor was able to keep and control the lands and hitherto free peoples acquired as spoils of his own colonialism. This is the root cause of the continuing tension and hostility that obstructs the promotion of any positive, meaningful, and enduring relationships among the peoples and countries of the region. A glance at the map of Ethiopia reveals the problem. First, although the Ogaden and surrounding areas are inhabited by Somalis, they were incorporated into the Empire during the aforementioned 'scramble for Africa', on the basis of treaties and agreements between Ethiopia and Andre Davy, Ethiopie d'hier et d'aujourd'hui (Paris, I970), p. IOI. 2 Chukumba, op. cit. p. 29. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 483 its European 'neighbours'. But this historica has been rejected by an independent Somal sacred duty to struggle for the 'decolonisati Somalia and Ethiopia have already fought th territories, the last being in 1977, and host varied levels of intensity. At present, the Et National Movement (S.N.M.) operates fro determination to overthrow the regime in Mo Western Somali Liberation Front (W.S.L.F.) Second, Eritrea, which became an Italian colony in 1889, was federated after World War II with Ethiopia as the result of an unfortunate decision by the newly-created United Nations. However, even the federation, the bitter fruit of compromise, was forcibly and illegally annulled by Haile Selassie in I962, thereby provoking the already-dissatisfied Eritreans to embark on a war of liberation which has not yet ended. The Government continues to exercise less and less control over both disputed areas, helped by the intervention of foreign troops and a massive influx of armaments. The Eritrean and Somali conflicts are central determinants of the present Government's foreign policy, bein not only regarded as harmful catalysts in its relationships wit neighbours, but also wrongly perceived as the instigators of the myria national liberation movements and political/ethnic groupings insid and outside Ethiopia. Ethiopia shares the Nile and its longest border with the Sudan, an in spite of periodic spells of friendship, the Government has continued to help successive dissident groups in the Southern Sudan, including its present commitment to, and virtual control of, the Sudan People Liberation Front (S.P.L.F.), based in part on mistrust of the 'Arab Northerners, not least because of their support for Eritrea and it people. Ethiopia's relations with the third state in the Nile Valley have been shaped as much by Egypt's attitudes and actions as regard Somalia, Eritrea, and the Sudan, and by its close association with other Arab and Muslim states, as by the most basic questions regarding th Nile waters. Ethiopia's relations with Djibouti are cordial, albeit susceptible to subversion as a result of mutual mistrust:2 the smal state's fears of its bigger neighbour's long-range ambitions are justifie by bitter memories of the latter's pre-independence scheming wit 1 Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: a new political history (New York, 1965), p. 96. 2 'Djibouti -War on the Opposition', in Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris), 249, 27 Septembe I986, p. 3. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 484 AMARE TEKLE France, and the regime in Addis Ababa persistently worries that a Muslim Djibouti will succumb to the pressures of, and be controlled by, Ethiopia's Arab 'enemies', thus depriving it of a major outlet to the seas. Ethiopia's unsatisfactory relationships with its neig especially the vulnerability of its two ports in Eritrea, h why Haile Selassie had signed a mutual defence treat Although benefiting militarily, logistically, and diplo this agreement during its last war with Somalia, Ethio was ready access to the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa direct intervention by Kenya. However, the enemy of not necessarily always your friend, and the I979 treaty o and co-operation between Ethiopia and Kenya has implemented with much enthusiasm because of major ideology and the nature of their respective political alliances.' Ethiopia is the only non-Arab and officially non-Muslim state in the Red Sea region, and because of its proximity to the Middle East, the oil-rich Persian Gulf, and the militarily important Indian Ocean, it continues to attract the attention not only of the two superpowers, but also Israel and various Arab governments, as well as Western Europe and, to a limited extent, Japan and China. Haile Selassie had good relations with both Israel and Iran, not least because both were also staunch allies of the United States. Israel, which trained anti-guerrilla commandos in Eritrea, had military bases in the Dahalak archipelago in the Red Sea. Since I978, the Government has regularly denounced 'Zionist' Israel, despite having previously received fruitful clandestine help, including the supply of arms and ammunition, and also the training of the crack division known as Nebelbal, later to be used in Eritrea, at the new base in Arba, on the Addis Ababa-Assab road.2 Ethiopia's friendship with Iran faded when the Shah gave open military and diplomatic support to Somalia,3 but has now improved significantly. Conversely, Ethiopia was the object of Arab wrath and condemnation, especially after its participation in the Suez Commission of 1956, being regarded as the southern front for the alleged imperialist-zionist, anti-Arab alliance. Although the Emperor's 1 Colin Legum, 'Ethiopia on the Eve of Becoming Africa's First Full-Blooded Communist State', in Third World Reports (London), 24 August i984. 2 Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea: war and revolution in the Horn of Africa (Stanford, 1983), p. 104. 3 The Shah bluntly told an Ethiopian delegation which visited Tehran in I977, of which th author was a member, that he had given Somalia 'a few rifles', in addition to medical supplie This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 485 personal diplomacy gradually improved re South Yemen were openly hostile, the positi political confusion that engulfed Ethiopia Indeed, the more conservative Arab gove threatened by the prospect that the Dergu destabilising Marxist state in the region tha possibility of turning the Red Sea into a South Yemen appears to be friendlily disp Finally, in spite of its ruling classes, Eth culturally as much a part of Africa as Menelik's colonial ambitions aside, its hist Red Sea and the Nile. After I960, howeve westwards beyond the Sudan and south Following the independence of most Afr recognised that Ethiopia's interests and prob from theirs, and that it must, for its own g African affairs. Hence the adoption of a s Ethiopia by harnessing and channelling t African nationalism, which had already m debut in regional and international affair unknown concern for, and active partici African developments, most notably th harmonising role played by Haile Selass Organisation of African Unity in I963. It can be argued that this policy was Ethiopia could get from Africa, and not o For example, on a number of crucial issue Haile Selassie opportunistically sided with including the French over their continued r Djibouti,2 and the British after Rhodesia independence.3 The present Government h benefited from the bilateral and multilatera but with a marked difference in both commitment and rhetoric. Erlich, op. cit. ch. 7, especially pp. 79-8I. 2 Only after the fall of the Emperor in 1976 did Ethiopia unequivocally support Djibouti's independence, albeit much to its regret in I983. 3 Although a co-sponsor of the decision of the extraordinary session of the Organisation of African Unity's Council of Ministers that member-states should sever diplomatic ties with Britain, Ethiopia reversed its position shortly thereafter and helped effectively to scuttle any possibility of unanimity on effective sanctions against Rhodesia. This was to deal a serious blow to the image of the O.A.U., whose resolutions were seldom to be taken seriously thereafter. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 486 AMARE TEKLE 2. The Bilateral Relations The corner-stone of Ethiopia's current foreign policy is its continuing friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Apart from the Dergue's near total dependence on the leaders in Moscow and their Warsaw Pact allies for military and logistical support during the war with Somalia and in the Eritrean conflict, several other factors have facilitated the consolidation of this new special relationship. This included gratitude for the immediate and unhesitant recognition of Mengistu's Government by the U.S.S.R. and the other members of the Soviet bloc. In addition, they responded quickly and generously when the military regime needed 'revolutionary' assistance and guidance in order to respond to the multitude of problems that it had inherited, as well as those caused by the creation of a new socio-economic and political order, albeit mistrustful of the old bureaucracy and yet themselves possessing little political experience and administrative skill. The Dergue ended up by signing numerous economic, social, political, trade, cultural, educational, consular, and administrative agreements and protocols with almost all socialist countries, including the People's Democratic Republic of Mongolia. The growing intimacy between the Marxist leaders of Ethiopia and those elsewhere in the communist world was further heightened, but not caused, by the West's hostile reactions to the Dergue. The Soviet Union and its allies were thus able to exert immense influence in both the domestic and foreign affairs of Ethiopia. Exper from the German Democratic Republic assisted the military regime i its struggle against various opponents, including the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (E.P.R.P.), and in training cadres for th completely reorganised security services, later consolidated into a fu fledged ministry with the second biggest budget in the country. The Dergue has sent hundreds of Ethiopians for training to the Soviet Uni Eastern Europe, and Cuba, and meanwhile continues to employ ma of their administrators and technicians. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has sometimes adopted rather rough and intimidating tactics in order to get the Government to follow Moscow's line, even where no apparent interests are involved, as in Micronesia, or when Ethiopia's cause might be injured, as with Cuba's position on Puerto Rico. While the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the two countries stresses the role of 'con- sultation' on matters of mutual concern,1 it is widely accepted tha 1 Keesings Contemporary Archives (Harlow, Essex), 2 February I979. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 487 secret documents contain provisions that o pro-U.S.S.R. foreign policy in exchange for eff the present leadership. Under the circum customary for officials from the Foreign Min Addis Ababa routinely to apprise their count be adopted by Ethiopia as regards specific forthcoming international and regional confer which the U.S.S.R. has no representation. In fa managed during 1976-7 to rebuff Soviet attem advisory group in its Ministry of Foreign Aff Since the most important spheres affected by are mutual security and defence, the Treaty of eration provides the legal framework, and for effective measures to be taken when they m Soviet leaders and the news media have rep strategic importance of Ethiopia, and the U exclusive use of the Dahalak archipelago in part of its Indian Ocean aircraft in bases in Eritrea.2 Ethiopia illustrates the dilemma faced by an dependent on foreign military and technical as Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation has b concerned nationals and foreigners, includi mind that Ethiopia has in the past consisten policy goal, rather than avoiding entanglin argued that the Marxist leaders are continu and have not lost sight of national interests, in commitment to the special relationship wit attitude towards, the Soviet Union. Yet, the im are difficult to reconcile with the real interest principles of the international and regional ments to which it belongs. In fact, the presen object lesson in how a bilateral agreement can those geo-strategic factors, historical consider principles that are ordinarily so essential in and conduct of any state. 1 The Ethiopian Defence Minister was reportedly denied ent 1981. 2 The Ethiopian Government claimed that most of the aircraft destroyed by an E.P.L.F. commando raid on Asmara airport in I984 belonged to the Soviet Indian Ocean naval group. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 488 AMARE TEKLE Can Marxist Ethiopia be written off as a Soviet satellite? Although its diplomatic relationship with the socialist bloc has broadened and deepened - four new embassies have been opened in Eastern Europe since the revolution - it conducts active diplomatic intercourse with western as well as other non-socialist countries, either through its own embassies abroad or through the numerous diplomatic missions resident in, or accredited to, Ethiopia. It has also opened an important new embassy in Brussels accredited to both the E.E.C. and the Benelux countries. However, content analysis of policy reveals a different picture. First, it must be mentioned that Ethiopia continually consults the Soviet Union on all major policy decisions, and those that do not meet Moscow's approval have either been cancelled or shelved - for example, the posting of an ambassador to the United States in I983.1 Secondly, Ethiopia obsequiously follows the line taken by the Soviets in international conferences, and has strongly spoken for their interests where they were not represented. Thirdly, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (W.P.E.) and the state bureaucracy sometimes show more than necessary eagerness to praise the policies and actions of Moscow, even before the latter has solicited for support officially - for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has been suggested that Ethiopia's continued trade relations with the capitalist countries illustrates the pragmatism of its policies, and the specific nature of its socialist development. This, however, is more an indication of the Soviet Union's willingness to allow Ethiopia to earn the foreign currency with which it prefers to be paid for its arms and other goods, rather than of the Government's independence of action. The value of this arrangement is further enhanced by Moscow's ability to determine the rouble's rate of exchange with western currencies. Is Marxist Ethiopia a proxy of the Soviet Union? Obviously Moscow uses all its African allies, as far as it can, to promote the interests of the Soviet Union, not least in the O.A.U.2 Until the fairly recent implementation of glasnost and perestroika, many African leaders feared that the Soviet Union was all too ready to intervene militarily in the continent by stressing the alleged imperative of proletarian inter- nationalism, as well as by specific provisions in agreements with its 1 General Taye Tilahun, who became ambassador to Sweden, was originally slated for Washington, D.C., until the Dergue abruptly changed its mind because of Soviet pressure. Since 1975, Ethiopia has been represented only by a charge d'affaires, and its latest attempt to appoint an ambassador was rebuffed by the Bush Administration in I989. 2 The Soviet Union has used Ethiopia's 'good offices' to promote its African policy on several occasions - for example, in its relations with Robert Mugabe (who had not previously been backed by Moscow) just before and after Zimbabwe's independence. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 489 Marxist allies. During the Brezhnev era, there w Ethiopia would be used as a staging point in muc Yemen or Angola served in the case of the Soma the Eritrean conflict in 1977-8. These fears s conviction that the unstable conditions in a number of African states would, sooner or later, provoke conflict with their neighbours and involve Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops. In this respect, even more attention must be paid to the central role played by Ethiopia in the informal network of Africa's Marxist regimes created during the late I97os and early I98oS. This has enabled the Government to forge an undertaking with Angola and Mozambique to harmonise their positions in almost all international and regional conferences. Even more ominously, though impracticably, they have made agreements to extend all-round assistance to each other,1 and to Marxist groups and progressive movements struggling to achieve power in independent African states. Co-operation in this respect has taken place on a government-to-government and party-to-party basis, as well as with both legal and illegal opposition parties. This has not augured well for Ethiopia's relations with a number of other African states, especially its neighbours. There was a nagging suspicion in the minds of several Kenyan politicians and officials that the abortive coup in 1983 against President Daniel arap Moi may have been inspired, and even supported, by Ethiopia. On the other hand, it must be noted that this network has also become a medium of consultation in order to harmonise negotiating positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) regarding economic and technical help for their African allies. THE INTERNAL SETTING The internal setting of a nation's foreign analysed by looking at (i) economic condit bilities, and (iii) political development and/ psychological components, consisting of (iv the ideology, and (vi) the personality and im I. Economic Conditions Ethiopia has been, and remains today, one of the world's poorest and economically most backward countries. Several factors account for this, 1 Colin Legum, 'Moscow's Closest Ally in Africa', in Third World Reports, 25 November I983, p. 2. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  AMARE TEKLE 490 notably an imbalanced economy and an inadeq environment. Although the agricultural sector per cent of the population, by the time of the re contributing only about two-thirds of the gross n country. The Dergue moved quickly to nationalise the means of production and distribution, to promulgate far-reaching land-reforms, and to formulate a series of short- and long-term economic plans. It was hoped that an initial concentration on industrialisation would, inter alia, stimulate farming and employment. But the announced programmes could not be realised because the country was besieged by a host of political, economic, administrative, and natural problems, including foreign and civil wars and drought. Agricultural production fell, and many rural areas were ravaged by one of the worst famines in modern history, while industrial output not only slowed down, but in some cases even declined. Although plagued by the leadership of incompetent cadres unable to give proper guidance, by faulty and ill-maintained machinery and equipment, and by inadequate materials and wastages, the Dergue preferred to blame bureaucratic apathy and lethargy for the bad performance of state enterprises and industries. It must be recognised that Ethiopia does not possess enough internal resources to overcome all its economic difficulties, and to finance the construction of the infrastructure needed to assure industrialisation. But although the ten-year perspective plan relies heavily on foreign aid,1 the assistance received from the country's major allies has proved to be woefully inadequate and disappointing. In all fairness, it must be mentioned that this has more to do with their incapacity than their lack of goodwill, since Ethiopia is the fifth largest recipient of Soviet and East European economic and technical assistance. Aid from the West has been reduced to trickles, mainly because of the Government's strong political alignments, bad human-rights records, and unac- ceptable economic programmes, although the E.E.C. continues to provide aid. The investment picture looks bleaker by the day, in spite of measures taken by Ethiopia to attract foreign capital, and the presence of a docile, if lethargic and disenchanted, labour force, intimidated to accommodate the worst excesses and dictates of the regime. Since 1983, there have been subtle but intermittent attempts by the authorities to 1 Colin Legum, 'Ethiopia. The Politics of Food: what hopes for recovery after the famine?', in ibid. 7 February I985, p. 2. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 491 improve relations with the West in general particular.1 Most recently, the new polici Union have had an impact on Ethiopia's lead must be seen in the light of changes in Mo Ababa. Ethiopia's noticeable increase in trade with countries in the socialist bloc that practise barter means that it is now facing more serio balance-of-trade and debt-servicing problems than it would have don if this strategy had not been adopted at the expense of trade relation with the capitalist countries of the West.2 2. Military Capabilities Beset by so many internal stresses and strains, as well as by variou external conflicts, the acquisition of arms has historically been one o the most important foreign-policy goals of the rulers of Ethiopia,3 a so remains today. Indeed, despite generous help from the Soviet Unio the Government appears to be willing almost indefinitely to alloca either directly or indirectly, more than 60 per cent of the countr annual budget on the armed forces, now the largest in black Afri According to the International Institute for Strategic Studie Ethiopia's military establishment by 1986 included 243,000 men a women on active combat duty in all the services, about I ,ooo tanks a 250 armoured vehicles, over 700 pieces of artillery, 45 surface-t surface and 28 surface-to-air missile battalions, 175 combat aircr (including 30 helicopters), and 36 naval vessels. Statistics for neighbouring states indicate Ethiopian superiority in quality as well a in quantity in all areas.4 In addition, a factory to make machine-g and light-arms has been built with assistance from North Korea,5 an Czechoslovakia has helped to expand and modernise the production munitions in Addis Ababa. As long as there is no durable peace in the Horn of Africa and within Ethiopia, the latter's heavy dependence on military purchase 1 Legum, 'Moscow's Closest Ally in Africa', p. I, and The New York Times, 27 March I988 2 'Ethiopia: external debt', in Indian Ocean Newsletter, 24, 30 August I986, p. 8. 3 Richard Pankhurst, 'The History of Fire Arms in Ethiopia Prior to the Nineteenth Century in Ethiopia Observer (Addis Ababa), xi, 3, 1967, Pp. 202 and 208. Also Saadia Touval, Soma Nationalism: international politics and the drivefor unity in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 48. 4 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, i986-87 (London, 1987): Djibouti, p. 122; Ethiopia, p. 123; Kenya, p. I26; and Somalia, p. I34. No figures were given for the Sudan. 5 Agreement was reached during Mengistu's visit to Pyongyang in I984. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  AMARE TEKLE 492 and aid from the Soviet Union is likely to continue: of the total imported armaments valued at more than $4,ooo million by 1985, only two per cent came from other sources.1 However, it is not possible to predict the direction of the country's foreign policy after - or even before - i991, since Moscow has reportedly given notice that it is not willing to provide military supplies at the present rate when the existing agreement expires. Armaments alone do not produce results. Sections of the Ethiopian army are poorly trained, have little attachment to the Government, and suffer from bad morale. In spite of so much external assistance, the armed forces have had to resort to forced conscription because of their heavy losses, not only against the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (E.P.L.F.), which once again controls almost all of the rural areas, but also in Tigray, Begmeder, Wollo, Ogaden, Bale, Arsi, and Wollega.2 The Government's only real victory has been against the miniscule and little-known Sidamo Liberation Front in I983. 3. International Political Development and Instability The political evolution of Ethiopia has been handicapped since the revolution by the disunity of its peoples and, consequently, by widespread instability. To conceive of present-day Ethiopia as a cohesive entity is to ignore concrete realities, and to be unaware that all attempts to forge such a society have foundered on the monumental blunders of successive regimes, because they have tried to impose a single set of values on a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, polyglot population. It is simply not possible to insist that there exists an 'Ethiopian culture' and a common 'Ethiopian heritage' which reflects both the past achievements and future aspirations of an 'Ethiopian' people.3 Today, Amharas, Eritreans, Oromos, Tigreans, Somalis, Afars, Sidamas, etcetera, co-habit an empire created and preserved by violence, seething with hatred and tormented by conflict. Any state must embody a consensus of beliefs, values, and aspirations, and needs to instill in its inhabitants a basic trust in its institutions, laws, administrative processes, and leaders if it is to ensure its survival 1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook, i985 (Stockholm, i986), pp. 134, 355, and 396. 2 Colin Legum, 'The Soviet Union's Afghanistan in Africa', in Third World Reports, 15 June I984. 3 P. T. W. Baxter and Hector Blackhurst, 'Some Problems Arising from Levine's Inclusion of the Oromo in his Delineation of Ethiopia as a Cultural Area', in Vercingetorix in Ethiopian (Paris), 9, I978, p. I59. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 493 by securing their allegiance. Otherwise, that civil strife or disappear in disorder. Modern attempt to devise a political framework tha national consciousness and a feeling of basic ethnic and religious groups. On its assumptio soon realised that its initial promise to move in fulfilled only by the establishment of a moder recognises the equality of all its people, and popular feelings, and aspirations, including a question based solely on the wishes of the peo of the matter is that the present regime dictatorship, and because of its ethnic composit of its historical heritage, it is unable and unwil policy. Even after the adoption of a new, purportedly egalitarian con- stitution, the peoples of the 'Provinces', who together form a majority of the population, find that they have a proportionately smaller stake in the administration of the state, as well as fewer economic, social, and cultural benefits. The few concessions that were made in their favour have become meaningless as the central authorities issued an endless series of regulations, directives, and decrees amending the original documents. When viewed in absolute terms, the plight of the majority of the inhabitants remains as bad as it had been previously; indeed, it has been claimed that the present Ethiopian state continues to be ruled by an 'Amharic, imperialist regime that may not be different in the eyes of its disaffected minorities or its rural poor from the imperial government of Haile Selassie'.2 There is no doubt that serious internal political contradictions continue to characterise Ethiopia, and that they are a cause of concern for the Marxist leaders, both in terms of the continued unity of the state and their own stay in power. Significant numbers of people in southern, western, eastern, and south-eastern Ethiopia are smouldering with resentment about what is perceived to be their continued Amhara domination.3 1 Africa Confidential (London), 19 September i984. 2 Dennis Austin, 'Things Fall Apart?', in Orbis (Philadelphia), 25, 4, 1981, p. 922. 3 See, for example, 'Ethiopia's Hidden War: the Oromo liberation struggle', in Horn of Africa (Summit, NJ.), 5, I, 1982, p. 63. 18 MOA 27 This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 494 AMARE TEKLE 4. Historical Legacy Obviously, a state created by the conquest and subjugation of smaller and weaker kingdoms and principalities,1 and governed by endless pacification campaigns and expeditions to collect tribute, must be wary about the continuing loyalty of at least some components of its heterogeneous population, and militarily prepared to deal with them. But another historical worry has also dominated the perception and attitudes of all Ethiopian regimes: suspicion of their neighbours, rooted in the memory of past confrontations. The Christian ruling classes of Ethiopia have long been convinced that 'Arabs' and 'Muslims' can never be reconciled with their nation's interests, nor perhaps even with its continued existence.2 They therefore view the policies of several Arab and Muslim states with grave misgivings and suspicion, always searching for hidden, sinister motives even in inocuous actions and pronouncements. This obsession haunts the Government and causes it to make needless, unwarranted, and unsubstantiated accusations against 'reactionary Arab states'. These historical predispositions have forced the present rulers, as their predecessors, to conceive a four-tracked foreign-policy strategy: (i) to wedge divisions between Arab states, (ii) to pit Africans against Arabs, (iii) to make arrangements with those in a position to influence Arabs, and (iv) to search for a powerful patron. To these ends, the Government has fostered dissension in, for example, the Sudan and the Yemen Arab Republic; entered into friendly relations with South Yemen, and even Libya, whose position on Eritrea is, at best, ambivalent; attempted to forge a consensus against Arab states in the O.A.U.; actively cultivated the friendship of the most influential members of the Non-Aligned Movement, notably India and Yugo- slavia, as well as such western countries as Italy and West Germany; and, of course, has become the most faithful ally of the Soviet Union in Africa. President Mengistu's official visit to Syria in I986 was part of Ethiopia's continuing diplomatic efforts to gain more friends in the Middle East. The above historical legacy has turned the Horn of Africa an Ethiopia into both symbols and battlegrounds, because it has gi birth to a conflict between a state which refuses to entertain any dou 1 Edward W. Poison Newman, Ethiopian Realities (London, I936), pp. 46-7. 2 Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: the widening storm (New York, 1979 edn.), I4-I5, refers to the issue as the 'rooted perception of an irremedial enemy'. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 495 about its legitimacy as a nation, and its interna it as a moribund anachronism. 5. Ideology Marxism-Leninism was initially adopted as an ideology mainly to accommodate, and perhaps co-opt, the various left-wing parties and other organisations which had sprouted, seemingly overnight, at the beginning of the popular uprising against the ancien regime. But the Dergue also needed an attractive political slogan, as well as a clear set of guiding principles that would enable its decision-makers, inter alia, to evaluate, correlate, and react correctly to international phenomena at all levels of the political environment. At first, the military rulers simply divided the world into two hostile camps - the socialists and the imperialists. This simplistic perspective provided simple, uncomplicated, and ready answers to their questions. The Soviet Union, by virtue of its ideology, would not only be a logical friend and ally, but would also be able to supply military, economic, and political assistance upon request; and the United States could serve as a focus for hate, to be conveniently blamed for past, present, and future calamities and sinister conspiracies. Ideology led Marxist Ethiopia to espouse 'proletarian international- ism', to project a 'progressive' image, and to forge close ties with all regimes, parties, and movements that were linked in any way to the Soviet Union. All public and official Ethiopian documents underlined the need to strengthen the bonds of unity and friendship among socialist and 'progressive' countries. Hence the positions taken by the Government on, for example, Afghanistan and Nicaragua, the Los Angeles and Seoul Olympics, and its recognition of the African National Congress (A.N.C.) as the sole legitimate representative of the people of South Africa, contrary to the decisions and stance of the O.A.U.1 This ideological element in foreign policy more often than not contradicted national interests, and had negative effects and disap- pointing results, especially in much of Africa, where Ethiopia came to be viewed as a Soviet surrogate ready to export Marxist revolutions at Moscow's command. Despite the fact that the Government has contributed heavily to the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa, their leaders are rather cautious about the risk of giving an 1 Colin Legum, in Third World Reports, I November 1983, p. 2. 18-2 This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 496 AMARE TEKLE excuse for greater western intervention by the luke-warm and even negative re 'progressive' Arab states, except for So consistent moral support of Arab and Pa for example, have expressed their readines unity of an Ethiopia that does not include Mengistu's visit to Damascus eliminated Libyans are equivocal about the appropri by openly supporting Mogadishu aga Movement, Gadhafi has destroyed an im tripartite agreement between Ethiop Democratic Republic of Yemen, the onl Ethio-Arab co-operation, other than Et Yemen. 6. The Leadership and Its Images Theoretically, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (W.P.E.) is now the repository of power in the Marxist state, and its supreme organ, the Politburo, is supposed to formulate and transmit policy hierarchically, on the basis of democratic centralism, to the party and state bureaucracy. However, since the Politburo is composed of men selected for their unswerving loyalty to Mengistu Haile Mariam - who is not only the Secretary-General of the W.P.E. but also the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - all party and state officials serve at his will and execute his commands. In Ethiopia, Marxism-Leninism has been virtually feudalised, and a new oligarchy has been created that behaves much like the one that had kept the Emperor in power for so long. Personal loyalty to the leader rather than belief in, and commitment to, an ideological system and its principles is the cardinal - some say the sole - criterion for upward mobility and the key to success. Absolute rule proscribes disagreement, and Mengistu dominates political life in Ethiopia in a way that not even Haile Selassie could ever have imagined. He takes a particularly close interest in, and exerts great control over, the regime's foreign policy, almost every detail of which has been dictated or approved by him. Indeed, to a great extent, the outcome is a reflection of the President's idiosyncracies and amour propre. Mengistu's success in imposing himself on the fledgling committee or Dergue that gradually evolved into the Provisional Military Ad- This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 497 ministrative Council (P.M.A.C.), and thence i Government of the People's Democratic Republic and educational background and unimpressiv made him over-confident. The successful promot cult, coupled with the exhilirating experience of cringing bureaucrats, has made him arrogant of his erstwhile colleagues in the P.M.A.C. It conviction, often expressed in exasperation, messianic mission to chart the destiny of the na - or burdensome duty - of deciding its fate. Thi as a millenial leader who, much like Theodros only against foreign and domestic enemies shortsightedness and indifference of his hapless regime as arbitrary as it is brutal. As a result, major decisions in foreign policy h sufficient thought about their implications, o equally rash decisions soon thereafter. At least were simply summoned by Mengistu to be g sometimes they did not even know that other m had been assigned foreign-policy duties, or m committees. Although the present Foreign Minis Politburo, having been previously head of Directorate of both the P.M.A.C. and the Com the Party of the Workers in Ethiopia (C.O.P.W present head of the Foreign Relations Director influential member of its Central Committee, th only lieutenants who receive orders from, and im made by, Mengistu. This monopoly of au institutionalisation, in spite of an elaborate part affects adversely the predictability and clarit policy, and makes its systematic formulation difficult. The Foreign Ministry, previously a compar bureaucracy, has lost influence and is in dang irrelevant. In spite of the theoretical supremacy state bureaucracy, an unresolved feud, po Mengistu himself, smoulders between the lead Relations Directorate of C.O.P.W.E. (and now 1 Mengistu Haile Mariam often attempts to compare himself wi his other r6le-model, Menelik II. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 498 AMARE TEKLE are supposedly in charge of the Foreign Ministry.1 To make matters worse, other Ministries, notably State and Public Security, Defence, and Foreign Trade, as well as the Central Planning Supreme Council, have succeeded in bypassing the Foreign Ministry, sometimes even conducting their own unauthorised diplomatic activity, albeit with the knowledge and approval of Mengistu. Hence the occasional gaffes and embarrassment as different ministry officials have adopted contra- dictory positions and mutually excluding policies regarding the same issues.2 Under these circumstances, diplomats from the socialist bloc, particularly the Soviets and Cubans, have not only ignored the Foreign Ministry, but have sometimes tried to get its decisions reversed by encouraging interventions in their favour by important members of the new oligarchy. If it is justified to interpret the determination and conduct of Ethiopian foreign policy, at least to some extent, on the basis of the President's ideas and images, then two traits in his character are relevant. First, Mengistu has an almost pathological hatred for Somalia and the Eritrean liberation movements. Like many other Ethiopian decision-makers, official propaganda notwithstanding, he finds no distinction between the Government and the people of Somalia, and actually believes that no Somali will waive his claim to any 'territory where a Somali cow grazes'.3 He is equally unable to understand why so many Eritreans have been fighting for so many years against Ethiopia, and his animus against their liberation movements, whom he considers to be satanic, precludes rational consideration of the problem, let alone a peaceful solution, in spite of some public commitments. Secondly, Mengistu aspires to carve an eminent place for himself in African history by ensuring that Marxist Ethiopia plays a significant r6le in the future development of the continent. He is convinced that destiny calls him to lead a vanguard of' progressive' African forces that will further the goals of socialism, end imperialism, neo-colonialism, 1 Foreign Minister Feleke Gedle-Giorgis had to compete with his own deputy, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who had equal access to Mengistu. The feuds between Feleke and Berhanu Bayih (head of C.O.P.W.E. External Relations before i983), Goshu Wolde (Foreign Minister, 1983-6), and Ashagre Yigletu (head of W.P.E. External Relations since I984), were open secrets in the party and state bureaucracies. Even today, when Politburo member Berhanu Bayih is Foreign Minister, the feud continues, albeit at a lower level of intensity. 2 The case of Pastor Gudina Tumsa became a cause celebre during I979-80, with the r6gime presenting three versions at the same time concerning his fate. It should be noted that Ethiopia hosts two Palestinian movements, because the Democratic Front and the P.L.O. were respectively invited by C.O.P.W.E. and by the state bureaucracy, each obviously unaware of the other's action. 3 Mengistu's statement at the I977 O.A.U. summit, Libreville, Gabon. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 499 and apartheid, and promote world peace. H Ethiopia to undertakings unwarranted by provision of training, arms, and propagan movements in Southern Africa. By way of contrast, a number of professional diplomats and foreign- service personnel, encouraged by some pragmatists in the part hierarchy, continue to advocate a more realistic foreign policy tha would be built on the accepted principles and conduct of international relations, while accommodating Ethiopia's special relationship with i new allies. They contend that a degree of doctrinal flexibility necessary, since the country's needs cannot be met fully by the Soviet Union and other Marxist regimes, and have therefore advocated a expansion of relations with the West. On the other hand, there is n doubt that the majority in the party, and their supporters in th Foreign Ministry, still subscribe to a narrow ideological interpretation of the dynamics of the alleged global struggle, in which the evil agent of imperialism and capitalism are determined to destroy socialism and the forces of progress. They believe that relationships across this dichotomy cannot, therefore, be fruitful, and may even be harmful by inviting destabilisation, as in Chile.1 CONCLUSION An attempt has been made to identify and exam that have determined the foreign policy of M relations with Somalia, conflict in Eritrea, a Ethiopia, albeit within the framework of a speci Soviet Union and its allies. However, it is also clear that the leader- ship's perceptions of both the internal and external environments are extremely important, since in the final analysis it is human beings, and not 'situations' that make decisions and formulate policies.2 Hence the conclusion that if the attainment of peace, security, stability, and social progress is the acid test for the success or failure of a regime, then Ethiopia has not benefited much from its foreign policy. Having adopted Marxism-Leninism, the military leaders opted for a clear identification with, and uncritical support of, the Soviet Union and its allies, and an equally indiscriminate condemnation of the West, 1 'Another Envoy Defects', in Indian Ocean Newsletter, 247, I3 September I986, p. 3. The R.A.F. Hercules which airlifted food during the 984-5 famine were considered as 'a cover for imperialist penetration and attempted subversion'. 2 Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York, I964), p. I24. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 500 AMARE TEKLE especially the United States, even when there was no obvious necessity. Of course, underlying this seemingly rash and reckless support for Moscow's views and actions was the unrelenting quest for an early external commitment to safeguard the revolution and the state. Indeed, it seems that the Dergue's strategy was vindicated by the decision of the Soviet Union to airlift a massive supply of armaments in I977, and the following year to cement their new relationship by means of a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Rare is the African regime which has shown such eagerness to enter into an unequal partnership with the Soviet Union. Small states are often told what to do, or even pushed around, by th great powers, and the degree of coercion is generally related to th extent of their dependency. On the other hand, the major task of the foreign policy of weak regimes is to attempt to reduce such extern pressures by minimising their dependence and by maximising the scope of manoeuvreability in international affairs. However, although Ethiopia depends so heavily on its Marxist allies for military suppli and other vital resources, including oil, it must be pointed out that th Soviet Union also needs Ethiopia, not least if it is to maintain an credibility about the effectiveness of its ideology, as well as its ow reputation, in the less-developed world. Needless-to-say, the presen heavily-imbalanced relationship stems from Ethiopia's internal con ditions and conflicts, and they show little sign of being solved unless th Government rectifies the structural weaknesses of the economy, an successfully implements the recently launched ten-year developme plan with the help of a massive injection of foreign capital, techni assistance, and aid. Since it is increasingly unlikely that this can b provided by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the authorities Addis Ababa may have to look again at how they propose to tack their internal problems and conduct their economic diplomacy. Perhaps the most perilous aspect of Ethiopia's foreign policy is i commitment to a military solution of both domestic and regiona problems irrespective of its fearful consequences for the welfare a interests of all concerned. After more than 15 years of turmoil, war, famine, and pestilence, the Ethiopian people are fervently desirous tranquillity at home and peace with their neighbours. Unfortunately, the most influential decision-makers continue to commit the major pa of the meagre resources of their debt-ridden country, as well as extern assistance, including humanitarian aid, to the enlargement an maintenance of the regime's military juggernaut. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY 50I Take, for example, Ethiopia's conflict with ought to be in a position to recognise the le claims as well as their limitations, and to em of action which would make a mutually acc solution possible. As regards the Eritrean conflict, the leaders a remarkable lack of vision, not least because t backed offensive against the Eritrean liberatio illusions of military victory and precluded a solution. However, the unfolding drama therea monumental disasters of the Red Star (1982 campaigns, involving almost the entirety o Ethiopia, as well as the heavy losses caused b the vicinity of Af-Abet ( 987 and I988), should clear that an obdurate adherence to a mi unwarranted as it is unfeasible and irresponsib remains, irrespective of some self-serving pea all as only convenient time-buying subterfuge political climate in Ethiopia stifles bold and much so that any forceful advocacy of a p Eritrean conflict has hitherto been considered resulting in an Hobbesian-type end to the live But what of the future? Despite hopes constitution might, inter alia, increase and ins in the process of making governmental decisio end of the almost exclusive role played by one the final document only serves to legitimise t power and, consequently, Mengistu's strang ment. Given the total lack of criticism and options are impetuously adopted before dipl been exhausted, not least because the fusion of in both foreign and military affairs has boundary between the realms of diplomacy Although it can safely be predicted tha continue to have close links with the Soviet Union and its socialist 1 Major Sissay Habte, the first head of the Political and Foreign Relations Department of th P.M.A.C. (1976), Brigadier Getachew Nadew, Commander of the Northern Army in Eritre (I976), and perhaps even Atnafu Abate, Deputy Chairman of the P.M.A.C. (I977), were the more important Ethiopians among the many that met with sudden, nasty, and brutish deaths fo expressing such opinions openly and forcefully. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  AMARE TEKLE 502 allies, there are perhaps three ways that foreign policy could be affected without a change in ideology. First, the regime led by Mengistu may approach the West in earnest, with the concurrence and encouragement of the Soviet Union, in order to explore avenues of possible co-operation to mitigate Ethiopia's economic predicaments. Indeed, recent events indicate that the Soviet Union has found it to be in its own interest to insist on the cultivation of such a relationship.1 This will have a marginal effect on the basic policies of the present rulers, or the prospect for peace and stability in the region, if not coupled with Soviet insistence on finding solutions to the on-going conflicts, because any additional external help would only strengthen their power base by easing domestic pressure. In fact, western support and aid, signifying acceptance of W.P.E. policies, may only encourage the regime to be more repressive and stubborn. Second, there could be a change in leadership from within the regime itself, possibly engineered by Moscow. An attempt might be made to solve the Eritrean conflict under the aegis of the Soviet Union, which may want to make an honourable withdrawal before further deterioration makes its involvement even more uncomfortable and expensive. Third, there might be a change of policy as the result of a ne leadership being virtually imposed on Ethiopia by the Soviet Union, a had been done in Afghanistan (i985) and South Yemen ( 986). Bu while such an intervention might have been authorised by Brezhnev will not be by Gorbachev. However, a new and more 'open' Marx Government might be able to find solutions to the major problems of both Ethiopia and the region as a whole, especially if backed massive western assistance. Of course, as has been the experience of so many other countries, there is yet another possible scenario; namely, the forceful removal of the current regime and its replacement by a group espousing another ideology and a different national strategy, including foreign policy The new leaders might well be ready not only to adopt more realisti and imaginative measures in order to create a stable and peaceful Ethiopia, and to make a permanently acceptable arrangement in the Ogaden, but also to support a radical political solution to end the Eritrean conflict. 1 The P.M.A.C. softened its position on the issue of compensation for nationalised property (especially American) only after the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa forcefully advocated such a policy. This content downloaded from 196.190.61.162 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:51:28 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms