Religious Pluralism - Sociology PDF
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This document explores various theories related to the origin and function of religious pluralism from sociological perspectives. It delves into the concepts of animism and naturism, and emphasizes the role of religion in social cohesion and responding to existential anxieties.
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## CHAPTER 18 ### RELIGIOUS PLURALISM Indian religious pluralism is one of the most complex in the world and we may trace the main sources of its complexity to three factors: religious doctrines, historical antecedents and social composition of the believers. But before we take up this analysis a...
## CHAPTER 18 ### RELIGIOUS PLURALISM Indian religious pluralism is one of the most complex in the world and we may trace the main sources of its complexity to three factors: religious doctrines, historical antecedents and social composition of the believers. But before we take up this analysis a brief discussion on the sociological understanding of religion as a phenomenon is useful. One of the initial questions posed by early researchers was, how did religion originate and evolve? Two theories animism and naturism were advanced to explain its origin. Edward B. Taylor argues that animism is the earliest form of religion. The essence of animism is the belief in soul, which takes the form of spirits after death. There are two types of souls, one which leaves the body temporarily and returns to it. Man is capable of dreams and visions because of this soul. The permanent soul leaving the body results in death. The soul spirit it is assumed, could dwell in animals, plants and even inanimate objects. According to Taylor animism as a theory of religion originated to satisfy man's intellectual curiosity about phenomena such as deaths, dreams and visions. Max Muller suggests that early man believed in the supernatural powers of nature and this is the earliest form of religion. The power of nature was evident in natural phenomena such as sun and moon, wind and floods, thunder and lightning, volcanoes and earthquakes, none of which man could explain or control. Therefore, man submitted himself to those forces of nature and started worshipping them thereby satisfying his emotional needs. The first major systematic effort to put forward a functionalist explanation of religion was that of Emile Durkheim in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, published in 1912, based on a study of Australian tribes. According to Durkheim, all societies divide objects and eents into two; sacred and profane. Religion is concerned with the beliefs and rituals related to the sacred. The sacred things are not materially different from the non-sacred, but they represent something, that is, they are symbols. Durkheim argues that totemism, the earliest form of religion, was associated with primitive societies based on clans. Each clan had a totem, an object it worshipped, be it a tree, animal or rock, which operated as its emblem or flag. By sacralising and worshipping the totem, the symbol of the clan, people were in fact worshipping the society. That is, society is the true object of religious worship. Man worships society because it is more important and powerful than the individual. Durkheim wrote: “primitive man comes to view society as something sacred because he is utterly dependent on it”. And, man worships totem which symbolizes society, instead of society itself, because the totem is a concrete object towards which one can channelize respect and feelings. According to Durkheim, the primary condition for social life is "collective conscience”, that is shared values and moral beliefs. And religion is an important vehicle through which the collective conscience is expressed. That which is perceived as sacred is capable of giving birth to and strengthening social solidarity. This solidarity is often maintained through common beliefs and collective worship, which are two important aspects of religion. Malinowski, who studied the Trobriand Islanders concluded like Durkheim that religion reinforces and promotes social solidarity. However, Malinowski sees religion as an institution functioning in specific areas of social life, particularly those situations characterised by emotional stress and having the potentiality to disrupt social solidarity. Man faced anxiety and stress in two types of situations. First, life-cycle crises such as birth, puberty, marriage and death. Second, when he had to cope with situations about which his knowledge is inadequate and over which he has no control. In such situations of stress and strain the group unites through religious belief and worship to deal with them, thereby strengthening social solidarity. Talcott Parsons, the well-known functionalist, believes that religion is the ultimate source of societal values. By prescribing general principles, moral beliefs and codes of conduct religion acts as the fountain head of value consensus in society which is a prerequisite for establishing order and stability. Parsons argues that the significance of religion is largely anchored to the uncertainty and unpredictability in human life, and religion often acts as "tonic to self-confidence". Notwithstanding substantial advancement in science and technology there are questions which they cannot answer to man’s satisfaction. Why must a particular individual die young or be born blind? Why should particular individuals or collectivities be victims of poverty? Religion provides a range of answers, even rationalizations, to deal with these questions and issues which make sense to a substantial proportion of people in any society. Thus religion caters to the intellectual and emotional adjustment of individuals and groups which in turn promotes order and stability. The problems of functionalist explanation of religion are mainly two: First, the empirical contexts on which it is based are simple and/or relatively homogeneous. The situation in multi-religious societies such as India is much more complex as compared with relatively small and isolated tribal societies or predominantly uni-religious societies of contemporary West. Second, given its empirical base, functionalism tends to over-emphasize the cohesive and solidary function of religion. This sounds artificial and unrealistic in the case of multi-religious societies wherein religion plays not simply a divisive role but often foments and perpetuates virulent conflicts. The Marxian perspective on religion is markedly different from that of functionalism. To Marx, religion is a weapon of deception cleverly devised by the ruling class to perpetuate their privileges. It is systematically pressed into service to create an illusion among the oppressed and exploited that they will be rewarded in the other world for their sufferings in this world. By creating a "false consciousness" among the poor, religion is often used as an instrument to legitimise the appalling conditions of their existence and the oppression by the rich. It is the opium of the people. It blunts human sensitivity and need to protest while directing the same towards emerging religions. That is why, it is argued, that almost all new religions originate among the oppressed, exploited, alienated and marginalized people. Religion thus perpetuates the status quo. The Marxist perspective thus views religion as a double-edged weapon: On the one hand it appeases the poor of their suffering and on the other it provides legitimacy to the ruling class to perpetuate themselves in power. An examination of the role of religion in many societies may support this contention. On the other hand, it is also true that the affluent are attracted to new religions, that in several societies religion no more legitimizes but attacks power, that religion cannot be viewed as a mere expression of alienation or as an instrument of perpetuating the ruling class. In fact, at least in some societies progressive religious forces have come to play a vanguard role in bringing about a just and humane society. Against this background, another important sociological insight on religion should be noted. According to the Marxian perspective, religion being a part of the superstructure of society is necessarily and ultimately shaped by the infrastructure, the economy. But Max Weber convincingly argues in his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that religious beliefs and practices can be the motive force to bring about economic development and social change. However, in trying to link the spirit of capitalism with ascetic Protestantism, Weber was tempted to characterise several other religions as conservative and change resisting. For example, based on the available textual evidence he tried to construct a Hindu ethic based on two cardinal doctrines: the samsara belief in the transmigration of souls and the theory of karma and reincarnation. Weber argued that these two doctrines conjointly produced the caste system which was incapable of generating such a worldly ethic which can foster economic development. Three limitations of the Weber-thesis may however be stated here. First, his understanding of Hinduism is based on a book-view. Hinduism as it is practised is often at variance from the texts (as in the case of other religions) and it has shown considerable potentiality to initiate and accelerate the process of change and development. Second, the comparison between mainstream Hinduism and protestant ethic is a misplaced one. The more appropriate unit of analysis to unfold the potentiality of Hinduism to bring about economic development should have been Hinduism as it is practised. Third, it is established by now through empirical studies that Hinduism is capable of compartmentalized religious practices in the sphere of his domestic life and social relations this does not stand in the way of his adopting a modern rational mode of behaviour in his work place. This compartmentalization has in fact minimized the conflict between religiosity and secularism. ### Religions of India Historically viewed, the religious collectivities in India may be categorized into five in terms of their sources of presence. These are: 1. The primal vision of indigenous social categories: Animism and Naturism; 2. The earliest migrant religion which got 'nativised' and emerged as the dominant religion: Hinduism; 3. The religions which emerged as a result of protest against dominant Hinduism: Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism; 4. Religions which are perceived to be the products of conquest or colonization: Islam and Christianity; 5. Religious groups which came as migrants: Jews, Zoroastrians and followers of Baha’i Faith. A few comments are in order on this classification. Generally speaking, the first three categories are usually reckoned as Indian religions, although Hinduism was brought to India by the Aryan migrants, a very long time ago. What is designated here as the primal vision or Animism/Naturism of the indigenous people refers to the original religions of Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes) and Dalits (Scheduled Castes). But most of them are now either Hinduised or converted to Islam, Christianity, Sikhism or Buddhism and may practice animism along with their new found religious creeds. At any rate these indigenous religious creeds seem to be gradually disappearing. Thus according to the 1961 census 89.30% tribals are recorded as Hindus, 5.3% as Christians, 4.19% as Buddhists, and 0.21% as Muslims. As for Scheduled Castes they lose their statutory status if they convert to any religion other than Sikhism. In 1961, 98.56% of the Scheduled Castes were Hindus and only 1.44% were Sikhs. A legitimate objection can be raised in referring to Christianity as a product of colonization, as Christianity was said to be preached in some parts of India by the first century A.D. In fact, Christians in India can be grouped into three sub-divisions based on their ‘ethnic’ differences: (a) The Anglo-Indians, who are a distinct product of miscegenation and colonialism, (b) Those who became Christians through mass conversion movements (mostly of Scheduled Caste and Tribe background) at the instance of Western missionaries after the advent of colonialism and (c) The pre-colonial Christians who claim to be converts from upper castes (e.g., Syrian Christians). Similarly, Muslim influx into India may be grouped into three: (a) Arab migration to the Malabar coast from the 7th century A.D. onwards ; (b) The Muslim conquest of Sind from the 8th century A.D.; and (c) Waves of Muslim invasions from 11th to 18th centuries by Turks, Afgans, Mughals and Persians. But notwithstanding these historical facts, to the majority of Indians, Hinduism is the native religion of India, Islam is an alien religion although it has existed in India for 13 centuries and Christianity is a colonial importation. Societal characteristics which contribute to religious pluralism are cultural diversity, techno-economic development, social stratification etc. For example, people belonging to the same religious faith if distributed across different linguistic groups add to social complexity as compared with a situation when religious and linguistic identities coincide. It is widely held that along with techno-economic development a process of secularisation sets in which has differing consequences for religion such as erosion of religiosity, questioning the legitimacy religious values and crystallization of religious fundamentalism if secularisation is perceived as a threat. To the extent co-religionists are distributed into rigid social categories it will be extremely difficult to bring about any social cohesion among them. And, if the system of social stratification is based on religious values as in the case of Indian caste system, considerable hostility may develop between the privileged and the oppressed. Having recognized the division between religions of Indian origin and alien religions, let us first deal with the former category. The primal vision of the original inhabitants of India is gradually disappearing, and given the official policy of not even enumerating and identifying them in the Census we are not in a position to discuss them as a category. At any rate, the identity assertions by Adivasis and Dalits of free India are rarely made in terms of their original religion. Thus, it is neither necessary nor possible to deal with them as specific religious categories. The majority religion of India, namely Hinduism, will be taken up for discussion in the end, to discern its attitude to ‘minority’ religions. Thus our immediate task is to discuss the three minority religions of Indian origin—Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism—in the context of religious pluralism. ### Jainism and Buddhism The emergence of Jainism and Buddhism in Sixth century B.C. repudiating the authority of orthodox Brahminism is reckoned as the first major known religious protest movement in India. Jainism denied the authority of the Vedas and revolted against Vedic sacrifices. Buddhism, while accepting the essential teachings of the Upanishads, joined hands with Jainism in denouncing Vedic sacrifices and Brahmanic supremacy. While Buddhism may be viewed as a bridge between Vedic Brahminism and non- Vedic Jainism, in propagating religious ideas both Buddhism and Jainism followed the same path. Their orientation was to the cause of common people, asserting the common spiritual right of all men, acknowledging compassion and love for all life, preaching in the language of the common people, and rejecting the authority of the arrogant Brahmins. The total population of Jains in 1971 was 2,604,646. Jains account for less than half-per cent of the total population of India ; 60% of them live in urban settlements and they are dispersed throughout the country. However, over 75% of Jains are concentrated in four states: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh. Traditionally, a trading group, Jains are economically prosperous as compared with other religious collectivities. Although it emerged as a protest against Brahmanic supremacy and caste system, in course of time Jainism also got trapped in it. Vilas Sangave reports that there are 87 castes and sub-castes among Digambaras and 38 castes and sub-castes among Svetambaras, the two leading Jain sects. While Digambara sect has accommodated a few low caste groups (who are prohibited from worship in the temples and from serving meals to ascetics), Svetambaras are all of clean caste origin. Generally speaking, Svetambaras have close social interaction with Hindus of upper caste origin in terms of commensality, intermarriage etc., and have accommodated Hindu rituals, worship forms and priests. Digambaras define their socio-cultural boundary more sharply with Hindus. The differences and tensions between the two Jain sects are manifest in their having separate all-India Jain conferences, tirthakshetras (places of pilgrimage) and contending claims for these. There are a few important points about Jains to be noted here. First, they are not socio-culturally distinct from Hindus, although they are a distinct religious community both in terms of doctrines and rituals. Second, Jains although small in size are divided both on sectarian and caste bases and hence do not function as a unified religious group. Third, Jainism is no longer a proselytizing faith, but is socially insulated. Fourth, Jains do not identify themselves with any specific territory, or language and are not concentrated in any state. Fifth, the central value of *ahimsa* (non-violence) is crucial to the life of Jains which prompts them to initiate, sponsor and finance many charitable institutions. This invests them with considerable respectability. Finally, their territorial dispersal and tiny size do not provide them with any visible political clout although they are economically an important group. Although Buddism is a contemporary of Jainism, its life history and social identity is substantially different. Today Buddhism is practically an expatriate religion from India. While there are several Buddhist majority nation-states in Asia, the Buddhists constituted only 3,812,315 or 0.70% of the Indian population in 1971. However, in 1951 they were a mere 0.05% and the increase of Buddhists between 1951 and 1961 was 1671%. The 1961 Census records the number of Buddhists in India at 3,256,036 and the overwhelming majority of them were in Maharashtra: 2,789,501 as compared with only 2487 Buddhists in the state in 1951. This staggering increase of Buddhists in Maharashtra was due to the initiative of one man, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Having considered the possibility of conversion to several non-Hindu religions, Ambedkar finally took *Diksha* in Nagpur on October 14, 1956, at the hands of the oldest Buddhist monk in India. Then he administered a simple conversion ceremony to an estimated crowd of 300,000 to 600,000. The Buddhist conversion movement then spread to Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, particularly to those areas where Ambedkar and the political party he founded, the All India Scheduled Caste Federation (AISCF), had some direct influence. However, by the next decade 1961-71, the tempo of conversion slackened and the percentage increase of Buddhists during this period was only 17.33%. The neo-Buddhists, the low caste converts to Buddhism, celebrated the 25th anniversary of Ambedkar’s *Diksha* on 6th October 1981 through mass conversion. R. S. Gavai, who led this mass conversion claimed that 300,000 embraced Buddhism on that day. The figure, however, was contested by some, but even the parsimonious estimate of Prakash Ambedkar, a grandson of B. R. Ambedkar and an official of the Buddhist Society of India puts it at 150,000. (Conversion as an escape route from ritual degradation and caste oppression is not unknown in Indian history. Both Islam and Christianity grew largely through conversion from low castes. Our analysis of the Sikh situation reveals that the Sikhs are mainly concentrated in one of the states in India with which they territorially identify. Further, the Sikhs claim to be a distinct linguistic community with a specific history and culture. Given the religious injunctions to use specific symbols (the five k's), the Sikhs as a religious community, are intensely involved in politics, India. Due to the interpenetration of religious and secular authority in Sikhism and the dominance of ecclesiastical organization, all these have led to the persistent demand for a separate and autonomous ‘homeland’ for Sikhs either Sikhstandin Union or a sovereign theocratic state, Khalistan or Sikhistan. This generates enormous value conflicts not only with the predominantly secular Indian Constitution but also with the central state authority and the majority community, the Hindus, in the process of Sikh mobilization to attain their demands. ### The Jews, Zoroastrians and the Baha’is. It may be recalled that we have categorized religions of alien origin in India into two—those which are associated with political conquest/colonisation and those which came as migrant groups. We will deal with the latter category first: Jews, Zoroastrians and Baha’is. Jews, the most “perennial minority” and mobile community in the world is the smallest religious group in India, not exceeding 26,000 even at the peak of its growth in the 1940’s. In 1961 census, the Jews numbered only 18,533 and 88% of them were urban dwellers. The major concentrations of Jews also point to the three sub-divisions among them: The Bene Israel of Bombay, the Baghdadi Jews of Calcutta and the Cochin Jews. The Jews came to India in a series of migrant waves and social differentiation among them is based on this, resulting in the formation of endogamous groups, although in popular reckoning the differentiation is based on colour: White, Brown and Black Jews. The Jews being a tiny dispersed group in India, never nurtured any aspiration for political or economic dominance. Moreover, Jews never tried to proselytize in India, they only wanted to preserve their cultural and religious identity. And a favourable social climate for this obtained in India. As Stritzower observes, “the Jews in India have no fear for their communal survival, nor ### Sikhism The third religious collectivity in India which emerged as a protest against established religions is Sikhism. Unlike Jainism and Buddhism, it is a relatively young religion: Sikhism is only 400 years old. Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism too fought against the dominance of Brahmin priests and their legalistic controls. Similarly, he also fought against Islamic orthodoxy. Thus on the one hand, Nanak rejected both Hinduism and Islam and on the other, he tended to fuse them together. The tenth and the last of the Sikh gurus, was Gobind Singh (1666-1708). He established the Khalsa (order of the pure), ended the reign of gurus by transferring the authority to the corporate community and to the Adi Granth (Sacred Book), entrusted the task of regulating the Sikh conduct to Panch Pyaras (the five Beloved), enjoined the Sikhs to distinguish themselves by adorning the five emblems: kesh (unshorn hair and beard); kanga (comb); kachh (knee length pair of breeches); karah (steel bracelet); and kirpan (sword). From now on, the khalsa brotherhood, popularly known as Keshdharis (bearded ones) came to be identified as the orthodox Sikhs, while others, the Shahajdharis (shaven ones) came to be perceived as deviants. The demographic composition of religious communities in prepartition and post-partition Punjab varied substantially. In 1921 Punjab was a Muslim majority province where 51% of the population were Muslims but in 1961 Muslims counted only 2%, while 64% of the population was Hindus and 33% Sikhs. In 1971 there were 10, 378, 797 Sikhs in India (1.89% of the population) and of this 78% lived in the Punjab. The Sikhs are predominantly a farming community and 81% of them lived in rural areas in 1971. The largest concentration of Sikhs, (two lakhs or more in each case) outside Punjab too is in states contiguous to Punjab; Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi and of these only in Delhi are the Sikhs predominantly urban. At the time of partition the Sikhs demanded a separate sovereign state, although they were frontally involved in the national liberation struggle against the British. The demand for Sikhistan, a separate nation-state of Sikhs was made for the first time on According to the 1971 Census although Christians constitute only 2.6% of the total population of India, they number 14,223,382, which is more than the population of several nation-states. The three Southern states, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala together account for more than 60% of the Christian population of India, Kerala having the highest concentration of Christians with 21% of its total population. However, there are a few smaller states or Union territories with a larger proportion of Christian population; Nagaland (67%); Meghalaya (47%); Goa, Daman and Diu (32%). Apart from this, there is another Christian enclave in Central India situated in the tribal belt of Jharkhand region which is administered by several states thus making a thin distribution of Christian population in all of these states. The identity of Christians in India is a diffused one but the dominant image is that they are mainly converts from Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes, during the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, The mass conversion movements to Christianity and the crystallization of the national liberation movement more or less coincided. The enthusiasm of the new converts for their new creed invariably prompted them to take pro-British posture as the colonial masters were not only perceived as co-religionists but also as protectors of the Christian faith and interests, notwithstanding the British policy of ‘neutrality’ in this context. The relative non-involvement of Christians in the national struggle created suspicion and misgivings about them in the minds of Indians in general and Hindus in particular. After attaining independence this attitude has been gradually changing but given the Christian propensity to proselytization, their worldwide missionary links and financial aid, the majority community seem to feel a constant threat of losing adherents of Hinduism to Christian faith. Christians in India are predominantly rural (75%); most Christians are economically poor and usually they are engaged in low prestige occupations) However, there is a small section of urban middle class Christians who experienced upward mobility through the educational facilities made available to them by missionaries. Christians in India usually do not assume an overall religious identity; they are highly fractionated not only denominationally but ethnically too. Thus the identities are crystalized either as Catholics or as one or other of the numerous protestant denominations on the one hand, or as Anglo-Indians, tribal Christians, neo-Christians (new converts), Syrian Christians etc., on the other. They are not a vocal community, nor do they have a distinct style of life (except Anglo-Indians) and usually they are absorbed into the local regional-linguistic milieu. Christians in India are not politically organised for two reasons. First, the socio-cultural fragmentation based on denomination and ethnicity. Second, their conscious rejection of separate electorates initially and the subsequent non-communal approach they seem to take in political affairs. Following the tradition of modern west, the Christians in India accept the separation between the Church and the state. This stands in the way of their being organized on a political platform on an all India basis. Further, their small size and physical dispersion does not equip them to acquire any political clout except in certain regional contexts, such as Kerala, North East and the tribal belt of Central India. But in the latter two areas the Christian identity assertion is basically in terms of their tribal background. There is one area in which the Christians dominate in India notwithstanding their small size and that is, service institutions, particularly in Education and Health. And the Christian contribution in this regard is widely acknowledged. ### Islam Islam is also perceived as a product of political conquest/colonialism, like Christianity. But there are certain vital differences between them. First, the racially distinct European Christians came as colonisers, ruled over India and left; the Middle East Muslims came as conquerors, settled down, got attuned to native ways and ruled India for seven centuries. In time the British rule and the emergence of Indian nation rendered the Muslims a powerless community. Second, although the Muslims are a minority in India, they constitute 11% of the total population and numbered nearly 62 million in 1971. Although there are about three dozen Muslim majority nations in the world, India has the third biggest Muslim population in the world. This numerical strength bestows on Muslims an instantaneous political clout given the importance of number and communal interest groups in democratic politics. Third, the partition of the Indian subcontinent on the basis of the ill-conceived two nation theory not only led to the biggest known uprooting of humanity (of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims) in history, but created a psychological distance between Hindus and Muslims. The formation of two Muslim nations in succession, in 1947 (Pakistan) and in 1971 (Bangladesh) as immediate neighbours of India rendered Indian Muslims, objects of suspicion in the eyes of non-Muslim Indians in general and Hindus in particular; with the result that they have to constantly prove their loyalty to India. In this process the Indian Muslim faces a double estrangement ; most of his erstwhile co-religionist neighbours became alien citizens (of Pakistan and Bangladesh) and his fellow Hindu citizens have become stranger-neighbours. Fourth, for a variety of reasons Urdu came to be associated with North Indian Muslims, bestowing upon them the status of a speech community, reinforcing a specific Muslim cultural identity. In this process millions of Hindus disowned Urdu as their mother tongue (as the Hindus of Punjab did vis-a-vis Punjabi) and Muslims came to perceive Hindus as destroyers of their language and culture. Fifth, Muslim masses particularly in North India have a distinct style of life in terms of drees, trimming of beard by men and observance of purdah by women, dietary practices, architecture of dwelling units, stipulated and highly rou-tinized forms of worship etc., all of which render them physically and socially visible. Sixth, Muslims seem to be socially enclosed in that they tend to live in exclusive neighbourhood clusters. This may be partly due to cultural factors but partly at least this tendency seem to be a product of insecurity faced by them through the recurrent communal riots. Whatever may be the reason, exclusive Muslim residential areas logically implies exclusive Hindu neighbourhoods, which in turn inhibits free interaction between the two communities leading to reinforcement of prejudice and differences. Finally, the dichotomy between Church and State does not exist in the Muslim concept. The source of Muslim law is the sacred texts, and its official legal interpreters, the Ulemas, have religious sanctions behind them. This intertwining between the secular and the religious in the Muslim thought and action inevitably puts a high premium on religious sanctions and is a constant source of tension in a ‘secular’ state such as India, which is populated predominantly by Hindus. The Muslim world view inevitably leads to the mixing of religion and politics which has given birth to several Muslim communal political parties such as all India Muslim League and Jamat-e-Islam championing the Muslim interests in secular matters. It may be noted, however, that Islam in India is not a unified entity. It is sharply divided internally, both denominationally and ethnically. The division of Muslims into Shias and Sunnis is global and the unending conflicts between these denominations/sects find their frequent reverberations in India also. Further, Indian Islam is not a monolithic entity: Turkish, Arabic and Afghan Islam are different and all of them are found in India. As Percival Spear observes "Indian Islam is a necklace of racial, cultural and political pearls strung on the thread of religion”. Sociological investigations in different parts of India have unambiguously shown that Muslims invariably adapt and assimilate the local folk-ways and cultures. The ability of Hinduism to absorb any religious collectivity into the caste matrix is reflected in the division of Muslims into *Ashraf* (nobles) and *Ajlaf* (commons), the first category being constituted by the upper layer of Sayyids, Shaiks, Mughals and Pathans and the second, the descendants of low caste converts into Islam. All these divisions—doctrinaire, ethnic and caste—erode the potentiality of Indian Muslims to function as a unified group in spite of the constant common threat they perceive from Hindus. Muslims are geographically both concentrated and dispersed like Christians. While the biggest Muslim concentration in India is in Uttar Pradesh, there are at least two states/union territories which have Muslim majority: Jammu and Kashmir (66%), and Laccadive and Minicoy Islands (94%). Again states like Assam, Bihar and Kerala have substantial Muslim population. On the other hand, Muslim population is littered all over India. This simultaneous concentration and dispersal has created further tensions: those who live in states with substantial Muslim presence have a sense of power and those who live in states where Muslim population is negligible suffer from an acute power deprivation. As a religious community, the Muslims are not an economically prosperous group. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a small section of Muslim aristocracy (the descendants of Muslim nobles drawn from the Ashraf category) which is still well off, the overwhelming majority of Muslims are at the lowest step of the economic ladder. In fact, Muslim middle class as a category seems to be scarcely emerging. In the final analysis, past political glory, substantial size, present political clout, economic disabilities, socio-cultural insulation, close linkage between the religious and the secular and an abiding commitment to propagate their religion renders Indian Muslims a category apart as compared with all other religious ‘minorities” in India. ### Hinduism It is neither necessary nor possible to attempt an elaborate analysis of Hinduism which is so rich and plural in terms of its value streams and praxis. Therefore, what follows is an attempt to highlight as briefly as possible those critical elements which are pertinent to the present discussion. A religion which acclaims worldly pursuits is likely to give great importance to the present achievements; since conception of time and perspective of history is a short term one. Hinduism regards human history as a lower level experience. Wordly pursuits such as *Kama* (sexual pleasure) or *artha* (pursuit or wealth) are lower in the hierarchy of Hindu goals as compared with *moksha*, spiritual liberation. In this scheme of thinking history is not important, "because it is swallowed up in the vastness of cosmic process." Pursuantly, what one is, Jew or Gentile, man or monkey, in one incarnation need not worry the Hindu excessively since the prospect of reincarnation perpetually awaits him. Logically, this attitude fosters tolerance of fellow humans and reverence to nature. (In Hinduism ultimate reality or supreme spirit is nameless, formless, without quality: Reality is one. But multiple paths to attain the goal are permitted. This in turn meant multiplicity of Gods, belief systems, worship patterns etc., all of which can co-exist harmoniously. Thus protestant Hindu religijudaism, Jainism and pre-colonial Christianity, pre-military Islam, all coexisted harmoniously in India. However, two points are to be noted here. Among these religions only Buddhism had a vigorous proselytization programme (at that time) which took place mainly in India. Second, notwithstanding the fact that the belief systems of these religions were tolerated, Hinduism had absorbed them socially, through the caste system. Hinduism is marked by the absence of ecclesiastical organization, congregational worship, professional clergy, all of which inhibit (a) organized political action, and (b) initiation and institutionalization of internal reforms. The institutional vacuum created by the absence of Church is often filled by caste system rigorously regulating social life to the finest details, leading to societal totalitarianism. The social regulation of individual and collective life through the caste system is buttressed through ideological justifications provided by the Hindu theory of origin of Man and the law of Karma and Reincarnation. The absence of ecclesiastical organizations (eg. Church) and the presence of hierarchically arranged social segments (castes) together seem to have given birth to a complex conceptualization of religion itself in Hinduism. The structure of upper caste Hinduism is *dharmik*, anchored to the notion of ritual purity and pollution which stigmatizes and silences the “untouchables”. To cope with the situation the latter categories needed an alternate notion of religion, which did exist in India for centuries, the *Panthik* conception of religion, "a fellowship of those who revere a lineage of spiritual authority," was launched and sustained by *Bhakti* movements. The *Panthik* equalitarian structures created by saints did not displace the *dharmik* in-equalitarian structures; but they managed to coexist. While the *dharmik* and *panthik* conceptions of religion bring out the tensions within Hinduism, although in different ways, the *panthik* conception attempts to cement all Hindus, the ritually clean and unclean ones, into a community. This is often expressed through a variety of Hindu ecumenical movements ranging from Arya Samaj to Hindu Virat Samaj. The three conceptualizations provide three distinct religious identities which function independently in different contexts without creating any serious contradictions. Apart from these horizontal perspectives there also exist vertical orientations in looking at Hinduism. For example, it is conventional to distinguish between the Great Tradition of Hinduism, infused with all India Sanskritic elements as against the multiplicity of Little Traditions which incorporate local deities, beliefs and rituals into the Hindu Pantheon. M.N. Srinivas in his *Religion and Society among the Goorgs of South India*, elaborates on this theme by introducing the concept of *spread* so as to understand the differential distribution of various elements of Hinduism at different levels. Thus he distinguishes between all India, regional and local Hinduism. While it may not be appropriate to designate the multiplicity of Hindu sub-groups as sects and denominations, their distinctiveness needs to be recognized. In the West, protest against the mainline Church often led to the emergence of new sects and denominations. In India protests against Hinduism have taken different courses. First, emergence of new religions—Jainism, Buddhism. Second, emergence of new religions synthesizing the elements in more than one religion—Sikhism. Third, emergence of “denominations” such as Arya Samaj in Punjab or Lingayat in Karnataka, which stand for uniting varying caste categories. Fourth, “sects” based on specific social categories such as Ad dharm in Punjab or Adi dravida in Tamilnadu. Thus the Ad dharmis reject only upper caste dharmik Hinduism and Adi dravidas are opposed to only Aryan Hinduism. Fifth, new “sects” based on the synthesis of doctrines of different religions (eg ; Nirankaris) or formed by drawing people with different socio-religious background (eg; Radhasoamis). Sixth, emergence of guru cults which are usually centred around one charismatic individual who may be a Hindu (eg; Bhagwan Rajneesh) or a non-Hindu (eg ; Shirdi Sai Baba). Hinduism is not against preaching of other religions but it disapproves of conversion. And this abhorrence in the Hindu mind towards conversion has generated tensions in Indian society from time to time. Technically speaking there is no mechanism of conversion in Hinduism and the contingency of placing the convert in the caste hierarchy makes it particularly problematic. Therefore, instead of abrupt conversion, Hinduism gradually absorbed the outlying groups into its fold. However, faced by the challenge of proselytization, Hinduism did develop an ingenious mechanism of re-conversion back to Hinduism through Shuddhi or Purification ceremony. Although Shuddhi was first invoked in the context of the orthodox Brahmin crossing Kala Pani, it was employed as an instrument of reconversion by Swamy Dayananda Saraswati, the founder of Arya Samaj, a movement to face the threat posed by Christianity and Islam. Arya Samaj worked for Hindu religious reform, creation of a spirit of Hindu unity and denounced Islam, Christianity and the West. Several Hindu organizations and political parties—the Hindu Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Rama Rajya Parishad, the Jana Sangh—gradually emerged drawing inspiration from Arya Samaj. ### State and Religious Pluralism State policies are necessarily anchored to historical experiences and existential realities. The foregoing