Political Parties in Papua New Guinea (to 2002) PDF

4 Political parties in Papua New Guinea (to 2002) This paper was first published in Political Parties in the Pacific Islands, Roland Rich, Luke Hambly and Michael G. Morgan (eds), Pandanus Books, The Australian National University, 2006. Reproduced wi...

4 Political parties in Papua New Guinea (to 2002) This paper was first published in Political Parties in the Pacific Islands, Roland Rich, Luke Hambly and Michael G. Morgan (eds), Pandanus Books, The Australian National University, 2006. Reproduced with the kind permission of the University. Some amendments not included in the published version have been added here. At the time of Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975, there was a small number of recently established political parties. The Australian colonial administration had had some doubts about encouraging the growth of parties in the emerging state, but, in the late 1960s, as parties spontaneously emerged, it extended its political education program to cover them. There was a widespread expectation, at independence, that a two or three dominant-party system would develop, in the context of a first-past-the-post electoral system, though there were some who feared that Papua New Guinea, like much of post-colonial Africa, would succumb to military rule or a dominant one-party regime. In fact, as in a number of post-colonial states, a coherent political party system has not taken root in Papua New Guinea. This is so despite the fact that elections have been held regularly and have produced orderly changes of government, and that, despite some pre-independence predictions, the country has maintained a democratic parliamentary system. In a paper written in 1984, I questioned the apparently widespread assumption that the ‘party system’ in Papua New Guinea was in a state of transition from an ‘undeveloped’ to a ‘developed’ system (that is, essentially one like Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and 47  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 some European countries), and specifically challenged the view that the party system would solidify along emergent social class lines (May 1984b). Some 20 years later, political party development in Papua New Guinea— or the lack of it—has tended to strengthen those convictions. This chapter, therefore, attempts, after presenting a brief history of political parties, to examine the main features of political parties in Papua New Guinea, to look at attempts to strengthen the political party system through legislation, to explain why parties have not developed as many predicted in the 1970s and 1980s, and, finally, to speculate on the future for political parties in the country. A brief history of political parties to 20021 In the lead-up to Papua New Guinea’s independence, the Australian administration progressively, if perhaps somewhat belatedly, established the institutions of an essentially Westminster parliamentary democracy. A part-elected, part-appointed House of Assembly was created in 1964, replacing an appointed Legislative Council, and further elections were held in 1968 and 1972, the latter producing the country’s first wholly elected parliament. Initially, there was little enthusiasm for political parties. As late as 1967, Australia’s external affairs minister, Charles Barnes, suggested that ‘the Territory would be better off without [political] parties’ (Canberra Times 23 June 1967), and this view was shared by many field officers of the Australian administration, who tended to be wary of any indigenous political organisation and disparaging of attempts to establish political parties.2 Recalling his unsuccessful electoral campaign in 1967, Albert Maori Kiki said: 1 For a more detailed history of political parties in Papua New Guinea, see Wolfers (1970), Stephen (1972), Loveday and Wolfers (1976), May (1984b, 2004c) and Okole (2004, 2005). Also see Faircloth et al. (1978). The role of political parties is also discussed in a series of studies of PNG’s national elections: Epstein et al. (1971), Stone (1976), Hegarty (1983), King (1989), Oliver (1989), Saffu (1996) and May and Anere (2002). From 1967 to 1991 the Australian Journal of Politics and History contained a regular chronicle of developments in Papua New Guinea written by various Port Moresby–based authors, which provides valuable source material; these chronicles have been brought together in Moore with Kooyman (1998). 2 Wolfers recalls that during the 1960s, police Special Branch personnel ‘were regularly to be observed taking notes’ at meetings of political parties (see Epstein et al. 1971:30). 48  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) Many people had told me that it was unwise to campaign on the Pangu platform, that the administration had tried to discredit us and that it could be used against me. In fact most of the Pangu candidates, even the ones from the inner circle, campaigned as individuals in order not to expose themselves to this kind of attack. (Kiki 1968:175; also see Somare 1970, 1982) Even as the 1972 elections approached, some officials of the Australian administration ‘foster[ed] the attitude that parties were detrimental to the country’ (Stone 1976:51). Despite this, political education material prepared by the administration before the elections of 1968 and 1972 commended political parties, specifically supporting the idea of two or three parties over one or many (May 1976), and, after a visiting United Nations mission in 1971 had recommended that parties be promoted on a nationwide basis (United Nations 1968:66), the administration distributed a booklet on parties that contained the platforms of the three major parties at that time. Indeed, by the early 1970s, it might be said that the administration was propagandising for the institution of political parties as some prominent Papua New Guineans were arguing against parties as being potentially disruptive. Inhibiting factors aside, mass-based political movements did emerge in the pre-independence period. Among the various political organisations to appear on the scene before the elections for the second House of Assembly in 1968, two—the United Christian Democratic Party (later United Democratic Party—UDP) and the Papua and New Guinea Union (Pangu Pati)—might be described as the first indigenous, mass-based parties. The UDP, an ideologically conservative party identified with the Catholic mission, was established in East Sepik Province in 1966, but proved to be short-lived, fading away after a disappointing showing in the 1968 election. Pangu was more successful. It emerged in 1967 from the ‘Bully Beef Club’—a group of emerging young nationalist leaders who met regularly at the Administrative College in Port Moresby to discuss political issues. The Pangu executive was representative of the four administrative regions of Papua New Guinea (Papua/South Coast, Highlands, New Guinea Islands and North Coast/Momase) and its leaders included Paul Lapun, Michael Somare, Albert Maori Kiki and Pita Lus (Somare 1975:45–51). When the second House of Assembly sat in 1968, 10 of the 84 members of parliament (MPs) were Pangu members (and another 20 or so were Pangu sympathisers). The party declared itself to be the ‘loyal 49  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 opposition’ to the administration-dominated ‘government’. Nevertheless, a study of the 1968 election, echoing Kiki’s comments, reported minimal party influence in the election: Outside a handful of towns, there was little sign of the ‘political parties’ so hastily inaugurated during 1967 … At worst … it was an electoral liability for a candidate to be publicly associated with them, and candidates … avoided or even denied such association. (Epstein et al. 1971:326) And Ted Wolfers (1998:36) observed: Parties probably had a real impact at the popular level only in the East Sepik, Bougainville and Morobe districts. Between 1968 and 1972, two other mass-based movements emerged, which were described at the time as political parties (Wolfers 1970; Stephen 1972). These were the Mataungan Association of East New Britain and Napidakoe Navitu of North Solomons. But though both movements fielded candidates in the election of 1972 (and the Mataungans again in 1977), they were not formed as political parties to contest elections.3 Before the end of the 1968–1972 House of Assembly, three more political parties had emerged. The first of these, the United Party, had its origins in an Independent Members’ Group (IMG) established in the House in 1968 among a group of members brought together essentially by their opposition to Pangu’s demand for early independence. The group consisted largely of highlands members together with some of the more conservative expatriate members. In 1968–1969, attempts were made by members of the IMG to create local groups to support a political party centred on the IMG and, in early 1970, the formation of a coordinating body, Combined Political Associations (Compass), was announced. Its chairman and secretary were both highlanders. The following year, Compass changed its name to United Party (UP). By mid-1971, UP claimed the backing of 45 parliamentary members. A second party also emerged from within the IMG in 1970: the Business Services Group, under the leadership of Julius Chan, comprised 10 members, mostly from the New Guinea Islands, who, it was suggested ‘seemed to represent a regional distrust of the highlands leadership implicit in Compass’ (Loveday and Wolfers 1976:21). The Business Services Group subsequently founded the People’s Progress Party (PPP). The association 3 The leaders of several other ‘micronationalist’ movements that emerged about this time also contested elections, some successfully, but did not see themselves as political parties (May 1982:Chapter 1). 50  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) of highlanders with a ‘go-slow’ attitude to independence, which Compass/ UP represented, also prompted the formation among a group of generally younger and more progressive highlanders of the New Guinea National Party (NP), which was generally regarded as ‘the highlands equivalent of Pangu’ (Loveday and Wolfers 1976:21). The 1972 election was thus, for the first time, contested by parties. About 150 of the 611 candidates who nominated were endorsed or selected and helped by parties (Loveday and Wolfers 1976:74), and in his overview of the election David Stone (1976:535) concluded that ‘undoubtedly … what marked the 1972 general election from its predecessors was the prominent and active participation by political parties and associations’. Nevertheless, some candidates were still hesitant about publicly admitting party membership, and party organisation was still weak: as in 1968, a number of electorates fielded more than one candidate from the same party, and no party had a nationwide organisation. In the event, no party emerged from the 1972 elections with a clear majority and, notwithstanding the expectations of the UP (which had anticipated up to 60 seats and in fact won about 37), after some intense lobbying of members elected without formal party commitment, Pangu leader Michael Somare was able to cobble together a national coalition government, which embraced Pangu (with 18 endorsed candidates winning, and additional pro-Pangu members bringing its numbers to 26), PPP (11), NP (eight), the Mataungan Association (three) and eight independents. This post- election lobbying of apparently unattached members set a precedent for all subsequent elections. The UP accepted the role of opposition, and this party alignment was broadly maintained during the life of the 1972–1977 parliament (though in 1975 some UP members supported the government on critical divisions). In 1972, a Constitutional Planning Committee was appointed to begin the process of preparing a constitution for the independent state. Its Final Report (1974) contained only a brief comment on political parties, proposing that parties be registered and supporting the idea of public funding for parties. The constitution subsequently provided that organic laws would make provision to ensure the integrity of political parties and candidates,4 but 25 years later this had not been done. 4 Sections 129–130 of the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea stipulated that parties were to be registered and political contributions limited; contributions to parties and candidates by non-citizens were specifically precluded. 51  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 Between 1972 and the first post-independence election in 1977, there were several significant developments in the incipient party system. One was the emergence of the Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG) in 1974. The NPG represented a coalescence of members who supported the proposals of the Constitutional Planning Committee against modifications put forward by the government (Griffin 1998). Although it voted as a cohesive group on ‘national’ issues in 1974–1975, the NPG specifically avoided the label ‘party’ and its 18 core members—drawn from the four major parties plus the Mataungan Association and a newly formed Country Party (whose members were recruited mostly from the UP)—retained their party affiliations. Another development was the election, in a by-election in 1976, of a second member representing the separatist Papua Besena movement, whose leader, Josephine Abaijah, had been elected in 1972, and the subsequent announcement of a Papua Party (McKillop 1982). A third was the split and virtual collapse of the NP during 1976–1977, after Somare had dismissed from cabinet its leader and deputy leader, and a move by them to withdraw all NP members from the coalition failed. The NP split provides an early example of the way in which parties have fractured when some party members have jockeyed for a place in a new coalition while others have wanted to hold on to ministerial portfolios. By the end of the 1972–1977 parliament, party allegiances, as well as coalition ties, were looking fragile and there were calls for variously an all-party system and a no-party system. In 1977, the party mass organisations, which had generally atrophied since 1972, were revived for the country’s fourth and inaugural post- independence election. This time, of the 879 candidates who contested the 109 seats, 295 (30 per cent) were endorsed by one, or more, of the three major parties (Hegarty 1998). In addition, a number of Papuan candidates stood for Papua Besena, which in 1977 appeared to have evolved from an ill-defined separatist movement to a fully-fledged political party. Observers of the 1977 poll seem to have been generally agreed that political parties had a substantial impact on the election (Hegarty 1983:Chapter 1; 1998), though, in an interim report on the election, Bill Standish (1977) concluded that while in the towns, competition ‘was more in terms of modern associations’, in rural areas ‘clan voting prevailed’. In 1977, as in 1972, uncertainties about the political allegiances of some candidates resulted in intense post-election lobbying among those who hoped to be able to put together a government. One proposal was for a ‘National Alliance’ including UP, Papua Besena, the Country Party and 52  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) NP. Another was for an Islands-based Alliance for Progress and Regional Development, led by the two former NPG spokesmen, John Momis and John Kaputin. In the event, the successful combination was a coalition of the enlarged Pangu and PPP membership (38 and 20, respectively) with most of the Mataungan and North Solomons members and two UP defectors, led by Somare. After several months of infighting within the opposition, former NP minister Iambakey Okuk emerged as opposition leader. Having attempted unsuccessfully to bring together his highlands supporters, Papua Besena members and some others in a People’s United Front, Okuk revived the NP and, as its leader, waged an aggressive campaign against the coalition. In November 1978, after a growing unease in the relationship between PPP and Pangu (which had probably more to do with personalities and leadership styles than with policies), PPP withdrew from the coalition. Pangu was maintained in office by a split within the UP, which brought about half of that party’s members across the floor to the government. In 1978–1979, the Somare government survived three no confidence motions initiated by Okuk, but in January 1980, after a cabinet reshuffle, Momis and Kaputin withdrew from the coalition, forming a new party, the Melanesian Alliance (MA), and, two months later, with their support, a no confidence vote against the Somare government succeeded. Chan became prime minister as the head of a National Alliance government comprising PPP, NP, MA, Papua Besena and part of UP. The Alliance was able to hold on to office until the scheduled elections of 1982, but it was, to say the least, an improbable coalition. PPP and NP, broadly aligned in support of capitalist development and foreign investment (though with little personal empathy between Chan and Okuk; see Post-Courier 21 June 1983), were at one end of a political spectrum from the MA, which regarded itself as being to the left of Pangu and whose leaders were strongly identified with economic nationalism and the aim of self-sufficiency; and Papua Besena, which owed its origins in large part to fear and distrust of highlanders (Daro 1976; McKillop 1982), was a strange bedfellow for a coalition in which highlands members were a large component and whose deputy leader (Okuk) was a staunch highlands subnationalist. Between 1977 and 1981, extra-parliamentary party organisation, such as it was, had again atrophied, but party organisations were resuscitated in the lead-up to the 1982 elections and several new groupings appeared. 53  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 Indeed, in the 1982 elections, parties seemed to be more salient than ever. Pangu, PPP, UP, NP, MA and Papua Besena/Papua Party all fielded candidates, while two new groups—a Papua Action Party (which had links with the NP) and a predominantly Papuan ‘Independent Group’ headed by former defence force commander Ted Diro—emerged as significant contenders. Some 59 per cent of the 1,125 candidates who stood in 1982 were endorsed by one or more of these eight parties (Hegarty and King 1998:357). My own observation of the 1982 campaign in East Sepik Province suggested not only that nearly all candidates sought a party label (some, indeed, more than one) but also that a high proportion of voters could accurately attach party labels to most candidates; nevertheless, ‘party organization was still fairly rudimentary and … local and kin ties and exposure to the electorate were still critically important’ (May 1989a:221–27). Notwithstanding this, party attachment for most candidates seemed still to be loose and it was not rare for a candidate who failed to get endorsement or assistance from one party to turn to another; for some parties and in some electorates, party attachment meant little more than the use of a label. Further, in a number of instances, party members stood against endorsed candidates of their own party against their party’s interests (though in some cases, parties—especially Pangu—supported more than one candidate in order to split the local vote of opponents of their endorsed candidate). Overall, it seemed that although there was in 1982 some increase in party voting, personal and local loyalties were still considerably more important for the majority of voters (Hegarty and King 1998:361). The outcome of the 1982 election was a victory for Pangu, which— apart from the recently established MA—was the only party to increase its representation in the parliament. Somare was duly re-elected to the prime ministership, heading a government comprising Pangu (with 50 members), UP (six) and a number of members who were either elected as independents or switched from other parties after the election. Diro emerged as opposition leader and, surprisingly, parliamentary leader of the NP, after Okuk had lost his seat in Simbu; but when, in 1983, Okuk was returned in a by-election, Diro stepped down from both posts in Okuk’s favour. The MA aligned itself with the NP/Independent Group and Papua Party in opposition, but the PPP for a while occupied the middle benches. 54  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) In 1985–1986, Pangu Pati suffered two splits. The first occurred when a group of 15 members led by Deputy Prime Minister Paias Wingti (a highlander who had been elected as a UP candidate but switched to Pangu in 1977) left to form a new party, the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM). The second came in early 1986 when a small group of senior Pangu members, led by Somare’s Sepik colleague Anthony Siaguru, formed a Pangu Independent Group. The group sought acceptance as an ‘affiliate’ of Pangu, but when this was refused they broke away to form the League for National Advancement (LNA). The Somare government survived a vote of no confidence early in 1985 with support from the NP and MA, but in November a vote of no confidence went against Somare, and Wingti became prime minister, leading a coalition consisting of PDM, PPP, NP and some Pangu, UP and MA defectors. During 1986 there was tension within the coalition, particularly between Wingti, Okuk (until his death in late 1986) and Chan, but the coalition was still intact when parliament rose for the 1987 election. As the 1987 election approached, five new parties emerged, including the People’s Action Party (PAP), a Papuan-based party led by Diro, which drew on the support for the earlier Papua Action Party and Diro’s Independent Group, and the Morobe Independent Group (MIG) headed by former student leader and Morobe premier, Utula Samana. This gave a total of 15 parties. Despite the increased number of parties, the percentage of party- endorsed candidates among the 1,513 candidates nominating dropped to 37, and independents won 22 of the 106 seats contested (elections in three seats having been postponed). In a pre-election survey of voters conducted by Yaw Saffu (1989), to the question ‘What is it that you would look for in the candidate you will be voting for?’, only 3.4 per cent of respondents answered ‘Party’. When votes were counted, Pangu had 26 seats, PDM 17, NP 12, MA 7, PAP 6, PPP 5, MIG 4, LNA 3, Papua Party 3 and UP 1. It was widely expected that Somare would be able to put together a winning coalition, but in the event it was Wingti who was successful, emerging as the leader of what Somare described as ‘a ramshackle gaggle of unruly independents’ (Post-Courier 6 August 1987), which included the PPP and a newly formed Papuan Bloc led by Diro, which included the Papua Party, PAP and some independents. In the following months, the governing coalition came under severe strain. Diro, who had served as minister for forests in the previous Wingti government, had been named in an investigation into the forestry industry and faced a leadership tribunal as well as perjury charges; it 55  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 was also disclosed that he had received ‘campaign contributions’ of almost A$180,000 from Indonesian Armed Forces Commander Benny Murdani contrary to the provisions of Papua New Guinea’s constitution. Notwithstanding this, Diro continued to press for appointment as deputy prime minister and for more cabinet posts for the Papuan-dominated PAP, and failed to dissociate himself from rumours of an impending coup, after Wingti had removed the commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) and three colonels, all of whom were Papuans. Kaputin, who had been expelled from the MA for joining the Wingti coalition in 1985, initiated a meeting of New Guinea Islands members (attended by 10 of the 17 Islands members), which called for ‘political stability, social justice and a return to the principles of democracy’. And there were defections from the governing coalition, one member referring to the government as ‘morally corrupt’. Facing a vote of no confidence, the government adjourned parliament (a strategy first used by Somare in 1985 and used by successive governments after Wingti). During the adjournment there were, first, moves for a ‘grand coalition’ including PDM, PPP and Pangu, over which talks collapsed, and then the signing of an ‘irrevocable memorandum of understanding’ for the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation, embracing PDM, PPP, Pangu, PAP and Samana’s renamed Melanesian United Front (MUF). But while Wingti was signing an agreement with Pangu, he was secretly negotiating with the NP (then led by Wingti’s fellow highlander Michael Mel), and, in a cabinet reshuffle in June 1988, NP was dealt in and Pangu excluded. A motion of no confidence was foreshadowed as soon as parliament met later that month, and there was a spate of defections from PDM. The NP also split, again. In the subsequent vote, a combination of Pangu (including a few members who defected back to Pangu), most of the Papuan Bloc, the MA, LNA, a faction of NP and a few others prevailed over Wingti’s leadership, and Rabbie Namaliu, who had replaced Somare as parliamentary leader of Pangu in July 1988, became Papua New Guinea’s fourth prime minister. Despite the enlightened leadership of Namaliu, and the passage of a budget of ‘unity, reconciliation and reconstruction’, the period from mid-1988 to 1992, when the next election took place, was turbulent. It saw the start of the Bougainville rebellion, unrest within the PNGDF, economic downturn and escalating problems of law and order. Several votes of no confidence were initiated, and parliament was adjourned for further long periods in 1989 and 1990. In 1991, the constitution was amended to 56  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) extend the initial grace period for votes of no confidence from six months to 18. There were several cabinet reshuffles, among which Diro eventually achieved the position of deputy prime minister, a position he held until April 1991, when he was found guilty of 81 counts of misconduct under the Leadership Code. The decision of the leadership tribunal in the Diro case precipitated a brief constitutional crisis when the governor-general, a Papuan and former president of the PAP, refused to sack Diro. The tensions brought about by all this political activity saw a split in the PAP, defections from PDM, PPP and Pangu, and the expulsion of rebellious MPs from several parties. Commenting on Wingti’s political machinations in mid-1988, Saffu (1998a:455) suggested that ‘Wingti’s modus operandi had helped to raise the levels of cynicism and deception in PNG politics’. Indeed, the well- publicised comings and goings in the parliament of 1987–1992 left many people cynical about political parties, and, although there was, once more, something of a revival of extra-parliamentary party activity in the lead-up to the 1992 election, parties seem to have been less salient in 1992 than in the previous two or three elections (May 1996). Six of the parties that had contested in 1987 had disappeared (including Samana’s MIG/MUF, Papua Besena and the Papua Party), and several new parties emerged, including the People’s Solidarity Party, a breakaway from the PAP. The People’s Solidarity Party polled well (probably in part at the expense of the PAP), but failed to win a seat and subsequently faded away. In 1992, the fee for candidature was raised from K100 to K1,000 in an attempt to counteract the growth in the number of candidates standing, but the number continued to rise, to 1,655. Of these, 75 per cent chose to stand as independents. In 1987, the seven major parties (Pangu, PPP, PDM, MA, PAP, LNA and NP) won 51 per cent of votes and 76 seats; in 1992, their share of the vote fell to 32 per cent and they won 68 seats (Saffu 1996:29). Pangu was the most successful party, but its percentage of the total vote fell from 34 to 9 per cent and seats won from 50 to 20. In the vote for prime minister, Wingti, in coalition with the PPP, LNA and a group of independents, defeated Namaliu by a single vote. As in every parliament to date , there was a mid-term change of government in 1994 when, having resigned and been re-elected as prime minister in a move to avoid a vote of no confidence, Wingti was removed after a Supreme Court ruling against his action. In the parliamentary vote that followed, PPP leader Chan became prime minister, outvoting prominent Port Moresby politician Bill Skate. Skate had been elected as 57  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 an NP candidate but subsequently established the Papuan-based Papua New Guinea First Party (PNGFP). Chan headed yet another coalition government, in partnership with Pangu. Chris Haiveta, who had succeeded Namaliu as Pangu leader, became deputy prime minister. In 1997, there was a major political upheaval when the Chan government, having secretly negotiated a contract with ‘military consultants’ Sandline International to bring an end to the Bougainville rebellion, was challenged by the commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier-General Singirok. Singirok denounced the contract, detained the Sandline mercenaries and called on Chan, Haiveta and the defence minister to stand down. An inquiry was set up and a major crisis averted, but in the ensuing election Chan lost his seat. Once again, there was a proliferation of parties on the eve of the 1997 election. New parties included the People’s National Congress (PNC), which replaced the PNGFP as Skate’s Papuan-based party; the Movement for Greater Autonomy (MGA), a New Guinea Islands–based party headed by former Manus premier, Stephen Pokawin; and the National Alliance (NA). In 1995, Somare, then a member of the Chan government, had opposed legislation that fundamentally changed the country’s provincial government system. As a result, he was dropped from cabinet and became alienated from some of his Pangu colleagues. He subsequently joined the recently founded NA, a new political grouping comprising the MA, the MGA (which also had its origins in the provincial government debate), some Pangu supporters and progressive independents. Somare used the NA as his electoral vehicle in 1997. Of the 2,372 candidates contesting, 712 were listed as having party attachment, though parties in 1997 seemed to have fewer resources to offer and party leaders seemed to be less active outside their own electorates. On these figures, the proportion of independents fell slightly, to 70 per cent, though the actual number rose. PAP fielded the largest number of candidates (111); surprisingly, given its Papuan origins, more than half of these were in highlands electorates, where there were multiple PAP candidates in a number of electorates. When votes were counted, PPP (which had won eight seats in 1992 but had seen its support grow to 32 before the parliamentary recess of 1997) had 16 seats; Pangu had also lost ground, winning only 13 seats; the NA had 12 (including 4 MA and 1 MGA seats), PDM 9, PNC 6 (all in Papuan electorates) and PAP 6; minor parties won 9 seats and there were 38 independents. In the scramble for numbers prior to parliament sitting it looked likely that a Somare-led coalition would emerge on top, though 58  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) there was once again talk of a ‘grand coalition of unity, transparency and progress’ (Post-Courier 30 June 1997). However, the NA-led coalition failed to get the numbers in parliament when Skate, who had promised support for Somare, took his PNC into a rival grouping and was rewarded with the prime ministership. The Skate-led coalition included PPP, Pangu and PDM. Haiveta again became deputy prime minister. Between 1997 and 1999 the parliamentary membership of the PNC reportedly grew from 6 to 44, before falling back to 2 (Gelu 2005:86). The Skate government faced several minor crises between 1997 and 1999—mostly self-made. In December 1998, there was another long adjournment of parliament designed to avoid a vote of no confidence (between July 1998 and June 1999, parliament met for only 17 days). Tensions had emerged between Skate and Haiveta, and when, in 1999, Skate dropped Haiveta from cabinet, Pangu withdrew from the coalition and backed the PDM in a successful move to oust Skate. Wingti having lost his seat in 1997, the leadership of PDM was assumed in 1998 by former finance secretary and central bank governor, Sir Mekere Morauta, who had stood as an independent in 1997 and had been a minister in the Skate government before becoming one of 12 ministers sacked by Skate. When parliament resumed in July 1999 Skate resigned and in the vote for prime minister, Morauta won by 99 votes to 5—with Skate voting for him! Morauta thus became Papua New Guinea’s sixth prime minister. In 2001, a number of members switched allegiance to the PDM, giving it for a while an absolute majority in parliament, but the 2002 elections saw a substantial shift away from the party (see below). Characteristics of political parties in PNG It is impossible, within a short space, to detail the constant comings and goings of members, defecting from one party and joining another, sometimes only temporarily, and the constant wheeling and dealing among party leaders seeking to advance their party’s interests or their own ministerial aspirations through the formation of new coalitions or the preservation of existing ones. The brief history above, however, conveys something of the flavour of party politics in Papua New Guinea and provides a broad context within which some of the particular characteristics of political parties and the ‘party system’ in Papua New Guinea can be highlighted. 59  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 Party organisation Typically, political party organisation in Papua New Guinea has been weak. Although, on paper, some of the larger parties have had organisational structures based on party branches, most parties have been essentially parliamentary alliances and have been dominated by prominent parliamentary members (or, in a few cases—the PPP with Julius Chan and the PDM with Paias Wingti—by former MPs who hoped to be re-elected). In between elections, party organisations in the electorate, such as they exist, have tended to lie dormant. Even Pangu, which in the 1970s and 1980s probably came closest to maintaining an effective organisation—at least in its strongholds of East Sepik and Morobe Provinces—found it difficult to sustain popular support. As a result, the textbook functions of a political party in formulating policy options, recruiting supporters and selecting candidates have seldom been fulfilled in Papua New Guinea. Indeed, rather than having party branches that select candidates from among their numbers for the open and provincial electorates, in most parties it is the party leader who seeks out and recruits likely candidates for party endorsement, frequently from outside the party. In general, the better-established parties seek candidates they think can win, and candidates choose parties they think can support their campaign and win government. It is not uncommon for candidates aligned (often self-aligned) with, but not endorsed by, a party to campaign as ‘pro’ that party; in the 1990s, for example, a number of candidates identified themselves as ‘pro-Pangu’ before Pangu discouraged the practice. Lack of mass membership has also affected party finances. In the elections of 1968–1987, the larger parties were generally able to offer financial and logistical support during election campaigns—financing candidate deposits and the printing of posters, providing vehicles, boats or outboard motors for campaigning and sometimes providing T-shirts or cash. Indeed, in the 1970s, several major parties had established ‘business arms’ to generate campaign funds (see Hegarty 1979). In the 1990s, most business arms seem to have been depleted and party funding for endorsed candidates seems to have substantially dried up. When funds were forthcoming to support party candidates, party leaders seem to have been the predominant source, strengthening the personalistic tendency in party identity. 60  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) In parliament, party discipline has generally been weak, the institution of party whips not having become well entrenched, and, from an early stage, ‘party hopping’ or ‘yo-yo politiks’ has been fairly commonplace. Associated with the fluidity of party attachment has been a rise in the number of candidates standing as independents. Often such ‘independents’ have known party leanings and might have accepted campaign support from parties that had endorsed another candidate, but have left themselves relatively free so that, if elected, they can ‘sell’ their parliamentary support to the party that makes the best offer. This has given rise to a particularly Papua New Guinean practice: after the declaration of candidates after elections, two or three camps are set up, generally well away from Port Moresby (in one instance in Cairns, Australia), by powerbrokers for the major parties, and attempts are made to physically assemble winning coalitions of elected members. Substantial inducements might be offered to attract members to a coalition, and, on occasion, there have been complaints that members have been held at such camps against their will (hence the term sometimes used for such occasions—‘lock-ups’). Party differentiation The ease with which some MPs have changed party allegiance reflects partly a lack of clear ideological (or other) differences between parties. In the period before independence, Pangu, together perhaps with the NP, was differentiated from the other parties primarily by its critical attitude towards the Australian administration and its demand for early independence. The UP preferred a longer transition to independence, reflecting the view of its predominantly highlander membership that they needed more time to ‘catch up’ with the coastal people, who had had a longer period of contact with the colonial administration and enjoyed higher levels of education and public sector employment. With the achievement of independence in 1975, this ceased to be a point of differentiation. Otherwise, the UP and PPP were generally regarded as more ‘business’ oriented and more favourably disposed towards foreign participation in the economy than Pangu, whose associations included trade unionists. But in practice the differences were not substantial, as the record of the first coalition government (1972–1977) demonstrated. Indeed, on the one occasion that substantial differences on important policy issues did arise—namely, during the constitutional debates of 1974–1975, which gave rise to the NPG—alignments cut across party 61  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 lines. Already in 1977 Hegarty noted ‘a convergence of ideology and policy’ (Hegarty 1998:300). The nature of the coalition that replaced Somare in 1980 (see above) suggested further that issues were secondary to strategies for achieving parliamentary office, a view reinforced by the 1978 split in the UP and demonstrated in political behaviour ever since. Among later-established parties, the MA, under the leadership of former Catholic priest John Momis and Bernard Narokobi, has been seen as a relatively socially progressive party; there have been several ‘labour’ parties, the most recent, the Papua New Guinea Labour Party, linked to the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress; there was a short-lived Socialist Democrat Party, ‘The True People’s Party’, established by former student leader Gabriel Ramoi and described by him as taking ‘the centre line between socialism and democracy’ (Post-Courier 2 August 1988); a Christian Democratic Party was launched in 1995, ‘with the vision to provide Christian Leadership in all levels of government’; and a United Resources Party emerged during the 1997–2002 parliament with a platform that emphasised equitable returns from resource development. But none of these has done much to further the cause of issue-based politics. In the 1980s, there were suggestions that emerging social class divisions might provide a basis for political party development, but subsequent developments have not provided the evidence for such a view. One corollary of the lack of major ideological differences between parties is that when governments change there are seldom substantive changes of policy. Notwithstanding the fractiousness of Papua New Guinea politics, in other words, there has been a fairly high degree of stability in policy direction. Another is that there have been no major systemic obstacles to parties associating with one another in coalitions (though there have been personal antipathies). Over the years almost every major party has at some stage been in coalition with every other. Conversely, pre-electoral alliances (that is, agreements not to contest against one another) are rare: an MA– MIG alliance in 1987 held but a Pangu–MA agreement in 1982 did not. In the absence of class or ideological cleavages, ethnic or regional divisions seemed to be a likely base for political aggregation. The visiting United Nations mission in 1971 expressed concern at the regionalist tendencies in political party development (United Nations 1968:176), and the next year a local scholar forecast that ‘it will not be ideology or class interests which separate the parties—if there are more than one … regional interests are the most likely source from which political parties will derive their mass 62  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) base’ (Waddell 1973b:96). Commentaries on the 1977 election tended to support this judgement: Hegarty observed that in the pre-election period ‘considerable social differentiation had become apparent’, but went on to conclude, ‘the basic cleavages in PNG politics are not ideological or class based but regional’ (Hegarty 1983:454, 461), and Premdas and Steeves (n.d.:35) ventured the opinion, ‘it would be difficult for anything but an ethnically based party system to emerge’. By the 1980s, the regional concentration of party support appeared to have been diluted somewhat (cf. Jackson and Hegarty 1983). Nevertheless, there was still evidence of a regional element in party support: Pangu had its strongest support from East Sepik and Morobe Provinces (in the case of East Sepik, Pangu support merged with loyalty to the provincial member, Pangu leader and ‘father of the nation’, Michael Somare), though from 1982 it began gaining support in parts of the highlands; PPP and MA were strongest in the New Guinea Islands Region (though by 2002 the PPP’s support base had broadened geographically, with only 7 of its 71 candidates in the Islands Region and 28 in highlands electorates); and the UP, NP, Country Party and subsequently PDM were associated primarily with highlands politicians. More specifically, a Morobe District People’s Association had been established in 1973 with the objective of preventing people from outside Morobe Province becoming parliamentary members for Morobe electorates (at this time, the Pangu member for Lae was a Papuan) and, in 1987, this sentiment was revived by former Morobe premier, Utula Samana, who took his MIG from provincial to national politics, winning four of the 10 Morobe seats in that year. (The MIG changed its identity to the Melanesian United Front in 1988 and by 1992 had disappeared.) A more substantial regional influence has been that exercised by Papuans.5 This began with the election of Papua Besena leader, Josephine Abaijah, and the formation of the Papua Party; in 1977 Papua Besena won six of the eight Central Province/National Capital District seats and the Papua Party won three Papuan seats. It continued with the formation of the NP-associated Papua Action Party and Diro’s Independent Group in 1982. There was also a short-lived Papuan Solidarity Bloc in 1983. The Papua Action Party and the Independent Group in turn provided the 5 Papua, originally British New Guinea, was an Australian protectorate, and New Guinea, originally German New Guinea, a League of Nations/United Nations mandated territory separately administered by Australia. During World War II the two territories came under a common Australian administration and this continued after the war, culminating in a single independent state. However, there has been a lingering sense of separate Papuan identity. 63  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 base of the PAP (initially in 1987 a Papuan-dominated party, though in more recent years it has received substantial support from the highlands) and the re‑emergence of a Papuan Bloc in parliament. The Papuan Bloc comprised about 20 members from Papuan electorates and in 1987 had 12 of the 26 cabinet portfolios; in 1988 it played a decisive part in the downfall of the Wingti government but it broke up soon after. After being elected in 1992 as an NP candidate, Skate also played the regional card, forming the PNGFP, a Papuan-based party and, in 1997, as leader of the PNC—a party with six MPs, all Papuan—he became the country’s first Papuan prime minister. Party longevity Not surprisingly, in this context, the majority of parties that have emerged over the years has been short-lived. There has been a proliferation of parties at each election, but those that do not achieve electoral success mostly disappear soon after the election. Many of these are essentially one-person parties. Of the parties represented in the national parliament, Pangu has enjoyed a continuous history as a major player since 1967, though it has suffered three major breakaways and is currently (mid-2005) split into two factions; PPP also has a continuous record as a major party, though it too is divided between two factions; UP and NP have survived, but with periods of low activity and records of acute factionalism; the MA has been a small but significant actor since its formation in 1980, but with one of its early leaders being expelled from the party; and the PDM, PAP, NA and PNC have now been around, if sometimes fractious, for several years. Beyond that, parties have tended to come and go quite rapidly, mostly just before and just after elections. The OLIPPAC, limited preferential voting and parties to 2002 In the latter half of the 1990s, there was considerable dissatisfaction within Papua New Guinea about the country’s lack of social and economic progress and increasing problems of lawlessness and corruption, and growing criticism from outside. On becoming prime minister, Morauta vowed to address these issues and ‘to restore integrity to our great 64  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) institutions of state’. A major plank in his government’s reform platform was an Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC). A secondary measure was an amendment to the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections to change the electoral system from one of first-past-the-post voting to one of limited preferential voting.6 In each national election in Papua New Guinea since 1972, there has been a steady increase in the number of candidates contesting, notwithstanding an increase in the required fee for candidature in 1992, from K100 to K1,000 (then roughly equal to per capita GDP). While some of these candidates might have been put up to split the local vote of a rival candidate in another clan or another part of the electorate, with voter support being localised there are often several candidates with a good chance of winning if they can hold their support base together. There has also been a fairly steady increase in the proportion of candidates who have stood—at least overtly—as independents. These developments have had at least two adverse effects on elections. First, with the number required for victory usually relatively small in open electorates with many candidates, holding one’s support base or vote bank together is critical, and this has encouraged voting irregularities and violence in parts of the country, especially in the highlands. In 2002, this caused the declaration of failed elections in six of the nine electorates in Southern Highlands Province. Second, with many candidates competing, the percentage of the total vote that winning candidates have obtained has been, on average, steadily falling (by 1997, 87 per cent of successful candidates were elected with less than 30 per cent of the vote in their constituency and 14 per cent with less than 10 per cent of the vote). Concerns about these issues lay behind the OLIPPAC. After widespread public consultation, organised through a Constitutional Development Commission, and parliamentary debate, the OLIPPAC and associated constitutional amendments were passed in December 2000 and came into force in 2001, in time for the country’s sixth post- independence elections. In a foreword to an explanation of the proposed legislation by the commission, Prime Minister Morauta described the 6 In an unpublished paper (‘Political change in Papua New Guinea: Is it needed? Will it work?’) [reproduced as Chapter 2 in this volume] presented to a conference at the Divine Word University, Madang, 2003, I questioned some of the assumptions underlying the 2001 reforms. Some of those questions remain valid. For more recent analyses of the operation of the OLIPPAC, see Baker (2005) and Gelu (2005). 65  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 initiative as ‘the most important Constitutional change this country has made since independence’.7 Its broad objectives were to strengthen the party system and help return stability and integrity to politics. The OLIPPAC (to which minor amendments were made in 2003) contains four main provisions. Party registration Political parties must be registered with the Registry of Political Parties, an office created under the OLIPPAC and independent of the Electoral Commission. An unregistered party cannot nominate candidates for election. Parties must submit details of membership and a constitution, and provide financial returns on an annual basis. Membership is not to be confined to people from a particular province, region or group and the party must not encourage regionalism or secession.8 Party offices are to be ‘elected in a democratic manner’ (spelled out in the legislation). Party members must be paid-up, and a person cannot be a member of more than one party. Provision is made for cancellation of registration (inter alia, if a party fails to file financial returns for two consecutive years), for dissolution of a registered party (where a majority of party members or 75 per cent of party MPs agree), and for amalgamation of registered parties. In addition to the registrar, the OLIPPAC set up a Central Fund Board of Management (renamed in 2003 Commission on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates), whose membership comprises the registrar, the electoral commissioner, the clerk of the national parliament, the chair of the National Economic and Fiscal Commission, and church and women’s representatives. The board appoints the registrar and is responsible for dealing with registration applications and management of the Central Fund (see below). By August 2001, 43 parties had registered (though not all had supplied the necessary documentation). Under the 2003 amendments to the OLIPPAC, party presidents, secretaries and treasurers will also receive renumeration through the Central Fund and there will be budgetary support for an Office of the Opposition. 7 ‘Explaining the Proposed Political Integrity Laws Prepared by the Constitutional Development Commission’, Waigani, July 2000, p. 1. 8 The term ‘regionalism and secession’ is taken from Bengo (2002:4). The organic law itself (S.7 [a]) does not specifically mention ‘regionalism’. 66  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) Funding of parties and candidates The OLIPPAC established a Central Fund, from which parties receive public funding. The sources of income available to the Central Fund comprise an annual appropriation from the national budget and (unlimited) contributions from citizens, international organisations and non-citizens. The allocation to parties is on the basis of K10,000 for each elected MP. In 2003, the Central Fund Board of Management approved the distribution of K990,000 to 20 parties, at the same time complaining that ‘the government has miserably failed to adequately fund the Board and its Secretariate [sic]’ (CFBM 2003). In addition, registered parties and candidates can receive contributions from citizens and non-citizens of up to K500,000 in any financial year, in each case—a somewhat generous provision, especially considering that the constitution in 1975 and draft legislation of 1989 and 1993 precluded non-citizen contributions, and the Constitutional Development Commission initially recommended a limit of K100,000. The donor and the recipient are required to provide details of such contributions to the registrar, though there have been complaints that the registrar has not been fully informed. Successful candidates are also required to submit a detailed financial statement within three months of election (though in 2002 few did). Strengthening political parties in parliament Probably the most important provisions of the OLIPPAC were those intended to prevent party hopping. Under the organic law, a member of parliament who was elected as a party-endorsed candidate cannot withdraw or resign from that party during the life of the parliament (unless he/she can establish that the party or an executive of the party has committed a serious breach of the party’s constitution or that the party has been adjudged insolvent) and cannot vote against a resolution of the party concerning a vote of no confidence, the election of a prime minister, approval of the national budget or a constitutional amendment (a member can, however, abstain from voting). Contravention of this provision is regarded as resignation from the party and sets in motion a series of procedures that can culminate in the member having to reimburse the party for all campaign and other expenses received from the party, exclusion from appointment as a minister or committee chair, 67  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 or dismissal from parliament. A member elected as an independent can join a party after the initial vote for prime minister, and then incurs the same obligations to the party as a party-endorsed candidate. A member elected as an independent who remains independent, but who supported a particular candidate in the vote for prime minister, must not vote against that candidate or his/her government in a subsequent vote of no confidence, nor against a budget brought down by that government, nor against a constitutional amendment proposed by that government. These provisions were tested in late 2003 and again in 2004, when the Somare government, already facing threats of a vote of no confidence, sought to extend, from 18 months to 36, the grace period within which an incoming government was free from a vote of no confidence. The proposed constitutional amendment was defeated, but several parties split over the issue. Some members who voted against their party leader defended themselves by arguing that there had not been a formal party resolution on the issue. [In 2004 the proposed amendment was dropped— see Chapter 5.] The OLIPPAC also provides that, after an election, the head of state shall invite the party with the greatest number of endorsed candidates elected to form a government and to nominate a candidate for election by the parliament as prime minister. This was intended to minimise the post- election lobbying that had produced the ‘lock-ups’ after earlier elections.9 In 2002, this probably gave an advantage to Somare, as leader of the NA, and Somare was duly elected prime minister, but it did not eliminate the post-election machinations, it did not necessarily ensure a victory for Somare, and despite Somare’s clear win in 2002 it did not prevent threats of a no confidence vote against him. Incentives for female candidates In an effort to address the massive under-representation of women as electoral candidates and in the national parliament, the OLIPPAC provided that where a party-endorsed female candidate received at least 10 per cent of the votes cast in her electorate, the Central Fund would reimburse up to 75 per cent of the campaign expenses outlaid on her by the party (in 2003 this became an amount of K7,500). In 2002, the 9 Another provision of the OLIPPAC made it an offence to force, threaten, intimidate, detain or otherwise interfere with the free movement of an MP in the performance of his parliamentary duties. 68  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) number of female candidates (mostly independents) rose from 45 to 74, but the number elected fell from two to one, and only one received 10 per cent of the vote. Before the 2002 national elections, 43 parties had registered with the registrar for political parties, though many of these had very small membership and, on the eve of polling, a number had not provided the registrar with the required list of candidates. In the event, with ‘failed elections’ declared in six seats in 2002, 24 parties were represented in the new parliament: the NA with 19 members, PDM 13 (well below the 70 or so seats it held in early 2001), PPP 8, Pangu 6, PAP 5, People’s Labour Party 4, 9 parties with 2 or 3 members and another 9 with 1 member each. Seventeen candidates were elected as independents. By December 2003, the number of parties had been reduced through amalgamations to 18, with most of the independents joining the United Resources Party, which after the 2002 election had only one MP.10 As the leader of the party with the most winning candidates in 2002, Somare was invited to form a government, and he was subsequently elected prime minister by a vote of 89 to nil, with 14 members abstaining. The PDM, under Morauta, joined the small opposition group, subsequently changing its name to the Papua New Guinea Party. Wingti was re-elected in 2002, but he stood as an independent and did not seek to regain leadership of the party he had established in 1985. The second of the Morauta government’s 2001 reforms, the shift from first‑past-the-post voting to limited preferential voting (LPV), was effected in the general belief that such a change would bring about greater cooperation between candidates, reducing the number of candidates and lessening the violence associated with recent elections—though the rationalisation of this belief has never been made very clear (cf. Rumsey 1999:327; Reilly 2001a:88–89). LPV came into effect after the supplementary elections in Southern Highlands in 2003. By December 2004, six by-elections had been held under LPV. All were fairly peaceful affairs, with fewer candidates than in the 2002 national elections, but since that is usual in by-elections it would be premature to take these outcomes as a validation of this particular piece of social engineering. 10 A list of parties and some detail on the larger parties can be found in May (2004c). 69  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 Why has a coherent party system failed to develop in PNG? The question, ‘Why have parties not developed?’, implicitly assumes that political parties are an inherent part of a parliamentary system. Certainly, the process of majority decision-making encourages groups of like-minded members to come together to ensure the numbers necessary to push legislative agendas, and when there are significant lines of social cleavage—class, ideology, ethnicity, religion, region—and corresponding clearly differentiated collective group interests, these might form a natural basis for party organisation. This has been the history of political party development in most developed nations. But it does not describe politics in Papua New Guinea. First, as Hegarty (1979:187) has argued, Papua New Guinea lacked the galvanising influence on politics of an independence struggle, through which parties have often been defined elsewhere, and, after the early differences between Pangu–NP and UP over the speed of transition to independence became irrelevant in 1975, party platforms, as we have seen, tended to converge. Class has not emerged as a major social cleavage in a country where about 85 per cent of the population is at least partly involved in subsistence agriculture and even the urban elite tend to retain their links with the village. Undoubtedly, there is a growing gap between rich and poor, but Western class models are largely irrelevant in explaining the dynamics of economic inequalities in Papua New Guinea. Regionalism has had more impact on Papua New Guinea politics, especially in relation to a continuing Papuan identity, but it has not provided a systematic basis for party organisation. Indeed, to achieve office, all coalitions need to put together a group representative of all four regions, and this to some extent cuts across regionalism as a base for party organisation. In the absence of such social or geographic cleavages, collectivities have developed primarily from personal networks. Since politicians also compete for office, these personal networks are typically fragile, especially among aspiring leaders. Second, and not unrelated, politics in Papua New Guinea remain essentially parochial. While I have argued elsewhere that the view of electoral outcomes in Papua New Guinea being determined by clan or ‘tribal’ loyalties is an oversimplification [see Chapter 6], electoral success nevertheless seems to be determined primarily by local factors: local reputation, local perceptions of a candidate’s ability to deliver goods 70  4. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TO 2002) and services to his or her electorate, and the effectiveness of electoral campaigning. Successive studies of Papua New Guinea national elections have provided little evidence of a party vote—even of a strong Pangu vote in Pangu’s stronghold of East Sepik—and only occasionally (as perhaps in the case of Sir Michael Somare, the country’s first prime minister) has a national reputation translated into local votes. Added to this, the high cost of campaigning, together with a high turnover of parliamentary members,11 means that most MPs seek a quick return from their period in office, and this places a premium on being in government, preferably with a cabinet portfolio. Indeed, MPs’ constituents generally expect their member to be in government, regardless of party attachment. After several opposition MPs defected to governing coalition parties in 1990, they explained: ‘we are elected to Parliament to be in government’ (Post‑Courier 17 April 1990, quoted in Saffu 1998b:488). As a result, MPs are driven less by the desire to implement a particular policy agenda than by the desire to maximise the returns, for themselves and their constituents, from being in office. And as every government since 1972 has been a coalition and, until 2002, no government has survived a full parliamentary term, with MPs hopping from one party to another and parties shifting allegiance from one coalition to another, the potential for individual interest outweighing party loyalty is substantial. This has been reflected in the frequency of votes of no confidence. In such a volatile atmosphere, party loyalties are difficult to sustain. OLIPPAC sought to address this problem by strengthening parties, but developments since December 2003 have so far suggested that MPs are not willing to accept the constraints of the OLIPPAC and that the state is either incapable of enforcing the provisions of the organic law or unwilling to pursue them. Prospects for future party development If political parties in Papua New Guinea could play a role in mobilising electors and defining issues that cut across narrow clan or local identity interests, if they could play a role in selecting capable and effective candidates to become MPs, if they could provide an organisation and discipline to control the parliamentary behaviour of MPs—the functions 11 Between 1968 and 1997, on average 53 per cent of MPs lost their seats at each election. In 2002– 2003 the figure rose to just over 80 per cent. 71  STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 2001–2021 traditionally associated with parties in liberal democracies—they could make a substantial contribution to the achievement of a less fractious political system, in which the legislature legislates and the executive takes the lead in governing. There is no real evidence that this is happening, or, in the light of experience to date with OLIPPAC, that it will happen. As has been argued above, since the 1980s, political parties seem to have become more, rather than less, fluid, weaker in terms of organisation and finance, and have a shorter life expectancy. Those inside and outside Papua New Guinea who argue, largely on the basis of developed Western country experience, that parties will develop but that, as in developed Western countries, the process ‘will take time’, have not produced a convincing argument to support this social Darwinist assumption. Almost 30 years after independence, political allegiances are still heavily personalised and significantly localised, with a poorly developed sense of national identity. State institutions are mostly weak, and, in the absence of the sort of major social cleavages that characterised political party development in the West, there is no obvious reason why this should change. Moreover, Papua New Guinea is not unique: as I suggested in 1984, ‘the predominance of personal and factional (kin, ethnic or religious group) politics may be particularly appropriate to the politics of small-scale, as well as poorly integrated, societies’ (May 1984b:142). In many countries, mass-based political parties are weak and play a secondary role to personalised parliamentary factions. In 1970, a frustrated young political organiser, Michael Somare (1970:490), observed: ‘the administration is the giver of all things and people do not care so long as they are at the receiving end. Our people are so accustomed to getting things for nothing that … they do not see why they should organise as political groups’. Thirty years later, people were not ‘so accustomed to getting things for nothing’, but they still tended to see the state as the source of things, and getting access to the state meant getting their candidate elected. Once in parliament, MPs hope to improve their access to what the state has to offer by becoming part of government, and, with weak party allegiance and discipline, parliamentary alliances are constantly shifting. Institutional change, through the OLIPPAC, has so far done little to change this pattern. What is needed to bring about change is a fundamental shift in behaviour, and, in the foreseeable future, it is not clear what could bring about such a change. 72 This text is taken from State and Society in Papua New Guinea, 2001–2021, by R.J. May, published 2022 by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. doi.org/10.22459/SSPNG.2022.04