PHIL 1100 Exam Study Guide PDF

Week 1 Notes What is Philosophy -​ Philosophy means “love of wisdom” -​ Very abstract (to discover and examine principles that are universal and eternal; “Universal” means applies to everything, or applies to everything of a certain type, or applies everywhere. “Eternal” means ne...

Week 1 Notes What is Philosophy -​ Philosophy means “love of wisdom” -​ Very abstract (to discover and examine principles that are universal and eternal; “Universal” means applies to everything, or applies to everything of a certain type, or applies everywhere. “Eternal” means never goes into, or out of, existence. → Philosophy contains studies that are non-empirical: based on experience; Observations of the world (through seeing, hearing etc., with or without the use of special instruments like microscopes) are the basis for empirical knowledge. Philosophy, by contrast is a priori: such conclusions or knowledge are based on reason alone, or reason together with innate knowledge and definitions -​ Philosophy is essentially an activity. So, not something static, but something active and changing: it is the activity of asking questions (fundamental assumptions) → A fundamental assumption is an assumption that supports other beliefs and plans of action and is basic in two ways. (a) It supports so many other beliefs and plans of action, that if we discovered it was false, it would cause us to radically revise our beliefs, or way of doing things. Some assumptions are basic to the way a whole society operates, or basic to an entire scientific field. (b) It is not ordinarily noticed or examined Main Areas of Study within Philosophy -​ Three broad areas of inquiry: metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory -​ Metaphysics: the study of the most fundamental aspects of reality: What are the most basic categories of existence? Are atoms more real than, say, a chair that is made up of atoms? Do immaterial substances exist? Do abstract objects exist? → Also includes ontology: defined as the study of being; it can also refer to the totality of what someone believes exists -​ Epistemology: the study of knowledge: “What are the sources of knowledge?” “Does knowledge come from intuition? logic? experience?” → Concerned with the nature of justification -​ Value Theory: the study of value: its main areas of focus are ethics, social-political philosophy and aesthetics. Ethics and social-political philosophy both concern questions about how we should live → Ethics: what is morally right and wrong; socio-political philosophy: how we should organize ourselves as a society and what is justice; aesthetics: another word for the philosophy of art (what is beauty; does it matter in our lives, etc.) -​ Logic: formal study on the difference between good and poor reasoning Underlying Values -​ Intellectual honesty: not pretending that you know things you don’t know. One application of this: not representing other people’s ideas or words as your own -​ Intellectual humility: realizing and understanding deeply that you don’t know everything. -​ The point of a debate is not to win, but to find the truth An Argument -​ An argument is comprised of a set of claims or statements; one of the claims is called the conclusion, the rest are premises; these are intended as offering reasons to accept the conclusion: put into standard form: claims on separate lines, conclusion at the end Week 2 Apology by Plato (of Socrates) -​ Socrates is accused of corrupting the youth, making the worst argument appear to be the better, of accepting money for this, and of believing in Gods the city does not → He first mentions that his speech is different from the other distinguished gentlemen → Defense: wisdom comes from knowing that you know nothing; his wiseness is a sign from the Oracle of Delphi (of which he hears it from Chairephon [with such knowledge, he asked people around and realized that people who thought they were wise were not in actuality due to ignorance; thus, the Oracle’s riddle to human wisdom is that it is worth little, and Socrates sees this]); argued he never meant to harm the youth; and believed in spiritual things, so he can not be an atheist → He does not beg for mercy, rather, he defends his values and beliefs, for which he does not fear death, but is understanding of people who wish that upon him -​ Socrates mentions the “an unexamined life is not worth living:” essentially meaning that life is unfulfilling without philosophy and that without seeking knowledge, questioning beliefs, and living virtuously, there is not point in life Euthyphro -​ A dialogue about the nature of piety (holiness) and how we define what is morally right; Socrates seeks a clear definition from Euthyphro, who wants to charge his father for murdering a slave (died from exposure [Euthyphro thinks it is pious to charge him]) -​ Back and forth discussion on what piety (generally, a sense of duty or respect to higher power, basically a reverence to the divine, or holiness) → First argued that what he is doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer (his father) was piety, yet that is not a definition but an example; then he says whatever the Gods love; yet they all do not agree on all aspects; then says it is what ALL the Gods love/accept (Socrates replies: “Is something pious because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is pious?”); either way, the discussion is concluded with Euthyphro leaving (major dilemma) Ethical Relativism or Moral Relativism -​ Some questions rely on references to the practice of culture, the beliefs of an individual or the commands of God: “stealing is always wrong;” “genocide is wrong;” “helping old people carry their groceries is a good thing” and so forth → Claims that are true or false are only relative to one of these factors, hence the name ethical/moral relativism Week 3 Ethics of Belief (William Clifford) -​ Asserts that individuals have a moral obligation to investigate the validity of their beliefs before accepting them; by not seeking evidence, we can earn the habit of never seeking evidence → Belief is not private, but has societal implications; contributes to the collective understanding of a group (avoid beliefs that are founded with no evidence as it always wrong) → Argues that even if a belief turns out to be true, the sincerity behind that belief does not absolve the individual from ethical responsibility if it was formed carelessly The Will to Behave (William James) -​ The deadness and liveness of a hypothesis is only related to the individual thinker; it is measured by their willingness to act → A decision between hypothesis’ can be categorized as the following: living or dead; forced or avoidable; momentous or trivial, and we can call an option a genuine option when it is of the forced, living, and momentous kind -​ Live or dead: a live hypothesis is one that appeals as a real possibility to the individual considering it, while a dead hypothesis does not engage the individual at all -​ Forced and avoidable: an option is “forced” when the person must choose between two options, with no possibility of abstaining from making one. An “avoidable” option allows a person to abstain or remain indifferent. -​ Momentous or trivial: a momentous option carries significant consequences; it is crucial and likely to impact one's life in a profound way. Trivial options are inconsequential, lacking stakes and so forth -​ Genuine options: a genuine option is one that appeals as a real possibility (living), requires a decision (forced), and has significant consequences (momentous) (choosing a religious faith can be a genuine option because of its greater implications on life -​ Argues for the legitimacy of adopting a belief, particularly in religious matters, even in the absence of sufficient logical or empirical evidence to support that belief → Belief does not solely come from evidence, but influenced by emotions, passion, and will → Passional nature: the emotional and volitional aspects of human experience that influences our decision-making → Volition: refers to the faculty or power of using one's will to make choices or decisions. James suggests that while pure reason alone does not dictate our beliefs, our will can influence which beliefs we embrace -​ Challenges Clifford’s view: says belief is not entirely based on evidence, of which Clifford argued; insists that waiting on evidence can lead to a paralysis in decision-making, preventing people from embracing beliefs; says it is reasonable to make decisions based on passion and volition; emphasizes that lived experience and personal engagement often demand belief; overall, James’ argument seems more flexible Week 4 Intro to the Theory of Knowledge -​ Society is based on the idea that knowledge holds value; truth is part of knowledge, and truth is valuable, therefore, knowledge holds value because of truth → Answer by some philosophers: if we act from true assumptions about how the world works, we are more likely to be successful in our actions and thrive over the long term. Sometimes we can get what we want when we act from false assumptions, but when that occurs it is due to luck -​ Ingredients in distinguishing knowledge from its nearest kin: what is the value of knowledge; what is knowledge; does knowledge exist? → To deny anyone has knowledge is to be a skeptic; however, you can also be skeptical about the future, which this form of skepticism is more common than global skepticism: skeptical about every kind of knowledge  -​ Knowledge encapsulates different meanings: there is know-how (riding a bicycle or knowing how to swim); direct acquaintance (to know a person or place); and factual information or propositional knowledge (2+2=4) → The classical analysis of propositional knowledge is that knowledge IS justified true belief (known as “The Justified True Belief Theory”); not all beliefs are true and not all beliefs are justified -​ Three components to knowledge: belief, truth, and justification -​ S knows that p if and only if: (1) S believes that p; (2) p is true; and (3) S has a justification for p. → In more ordinary English, this is saying that every case of knowledge is a case of someone having a belief that is true and justified AND it is saying the reverse: every case of someone with a belief that is true and justified is a case of someone who knows something. Skepticism -​ The view that knowledge does not exist; some hold that no one has any knowledge of any kind (they would be considered a global or total skeptic) -​ As a philosophical position, it is a conclusion reached by considered reasons; there is also a distinction between academic skepticism and pyrrhonic skepticism → Academic skepticism: the view that either knowledge in general is not possible or the view that knowledge of a certain kind is not possible → Pyrrhonic skepticism: a recommendation about what we should do rather than a definite conclusion that knowledge does not exist. Says we should suspend judgment on the question of whether knowledge exists. This was thought to be a cure for dogmatism (being insistent on your beliefs to such an extent that you lose sight of everything else) -​ We mainly focus on external world skepticism: we can not know any facts about objects existing independently of our own perceptions; we can not even know of objects outside of our minds → This notion is also different from idealism: a metaphysical view according to which objects we would ordinarily think of as existing independently of our perceptions – objects such as tables, trees and planets – are actually mental constructs, made in some way out of our ideas. Idealism is a view about the nature of reality. Reality is a mental reality according to the Idealist -​ External world skepticism has no thesis about the nature of reality; its thesis is an epistemological thesis: it is a thesis about the scope of our knowledge. Her thesis is that our knowledge does not extend to include facts about any objects that may exist independently of our perceptions. -​ Argument of global skepticism: 1. In order for someone to know a proposition as fact, it has to be impossible for that person to be mistaken. (For example, in order for a person to know that there are two cats in the apartment downstairs, it has to be impossible for him to be mistaken in believing this. It has to be that there is no way he could be wrong, e.g. no possibility that someone opened a window and a cat jumped out, etc.) 2. Everything is always possible. ___ 3. Therefore, no one knows anything → If we accept this idea, we give up a great deal; it’s a huge big deal to conclude that no one knows anything about anything (and mean it).  -​ In general, to evaluate an argument you need to consider two factors. (1) How well do the premises support the conclusion? If the premises were true, would they guarantee the conclusion? Would they make the conclusion probable? Would they have little bearing on the conclusion? (2) Are the premises true? What supports them? Elements of Knowledge -​ There is a similarity between knowledge and belief: knowledge is belief but belief is not knowledge (if a person believes in p, she might (falsely) think she knows that p); we can only know what is true -​ Superstitions are no basis of knowledge; hence, true belief is not an instance of knowledge -​ Knowledge is also not the same as true belief; the missing ingredient from the use of effort to find evidence and use logic in obtaining knowledge is justification Week 5 Descartes’ Goal and General Summary -​ His goal in his meditations is to find foundations for knowledge → Done by the method of doubt test: he considers whether there is any possibility that a given belief can be false. If so, he sets aside the belief as being uncertain (or dubitable, doubtful), and so unsuitable to serve as a foundation -​ In essence, to find beliefs that can serve as foundations, Descartes must find certainties. To find certainties (or indubitable beliefs-- ones that cannot be doubted), Descartes must see which of his beliefs have a possibility of being false -​ Considers both realistic and imaginary, even phantasmagorical scenarios in which he has that belief, and yet unbeknownst to him in that scenario, the belief is actually false -​ He divided his beliefs into two categories: empirical beliefs (based on sense experience) and a priori beliefs (such as pure reason) -​ Questions all belief (doubt as a foundation); Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am establishes that the very act of thinking confirms his existence); nature of mind (the mind or soul is distinct and a non-material substance, separate from the body [thus, the mind can exist without a body]); in the 3 and 4 Meditation, he argues for the existence of a perfect God, which he infers from the idea of perfection present in his own mind; and in the 5 and 6 Meditation, he analyzes whether sensory perceptions provide any argument for the existence of material bodies Distinctions in Reading Descartes’ Meditations -​ Correspondence Theory: a belief or statement is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact -​ Fact: a mind-independent state of affairs, a situation in the world (the universe). Facts constitute mind-independent reality. Reality is made up of facts -​ Truth is not the same as certainty: certainty can refer to two different ideas: it can be a subjective feeling someone has, or it can mean the objective impossibility of being mistaken; when Descartes talks about certainty, it is the latter meaning that is relevant -​ Setting aside beliefs of uncertainty vs labeling beliefs as false: in Meditation 1: he first categorizes beliefs into broad categories, those based on experience through the five senses, and those which are based on reason alone (pure logic). He then asks himself:  could beliefs of this kind possibly be doubted (It is possible, though improbable, that he might be hallucinating, or be experiencing an optical illusion of some kind)? -​ Possibility vs Probability: To say that it is possible for a proposition to be true is to say that there is no contradiction in supposing it to be true. On the other hand, to say that a proposition is probable, by contrast, is to say it is likely; every proposition that is probable is also possible -​ Illusions vs hallucinations: illusions are misperceptions (seeing or hearing things). On the other hand, hallucinations are experiences in which it seems as if you are seeing or hearing something that is not there at all Arguments from Illusion -​ Every belief that fails his doubt test is uncertain -​ He describes three scenarios in Meditation 1 involving perceptual illusions, dreaming and an evil genius -​ In the first case, he wants us to consider the possibility that we can be fooled by our senses; when perceptual illusions occur, circumstances are special. Illusions occur when we are using our eyes or ears in non-ideal conditions The Dreaming Scenario -​ We often dream things that are false – that fail to correspond to reality. So, Descartes thinks to himself, “what if I were dreaming now, then the contents of my mind could be false” -​ The contents of our minds also include beliefs such as those expressed by the sentences, “2+2 is 4;” for him, they might include complex mathematical theorems because Descartes was a mathematician -​ Descartes uses the word “ideas” to mean contents of the mind. An “Idea” can be a belief -​ A belief like “I have a body” cannot be considered a foundational belief. If it is true we have a body, and if we know this, our knowledge of this depends on some other more fundamental (more certain) beliefs. It can’t depend on our observation – our visual experience, according to Descartes Evil Genius Scenario -​ Why would god want to fool him (“couldn’t god, who is all powerful, have it in his abilities to bring it about that I believed such a thing when really it was false?”)? So he conjures an evil genius - an imaginary creature who is just as powerful as can be and can bring it about that there is a systematic mismatch between Descartes’ ideas and external reality → He’s imagining a scenario where this evil genius just arbitrarily, unpredictably, brings about a mismatch between a bunch of Descartes’ ideas and the world. -​ The evil genius, by hypothesis, can make all things false → The evil genius can manipulate his brain so that it seems like he’s seeing a chair, when there is no chair. -​ At the end of Meditation 1, he questions: Is there NOTHING that is certain? At the beginning of Meditation II he says to himself, Maybe the only thing that is certain is that nothing is certain -​ The cogito argument (I think, therefore I am): comes to the following warnings: Descartes can only be certain he exists as a thinking thing or activity or as a  consciousness; and that the argument only works to deliver a certainty when the premise and conclusion are in the first person and the present tense Week 7 (Week 6 was a Reading Break) The Mind-Body Problem -​ objects have mass and weigh something. They reflect light and other kinds of waves. They have locations in three- dimensional space. They have size and shape (hence why we can perceive them through our 5 senses) -​ Descartes was interested in the question of how the mind relates to the physical world -​ The mind-body problem has 3 specific questions: (R) Is the mind a physical object made of matter? (R)(i) If the mind is not physical, how could our mental activity have any effects on what our bodies do? (R)(ii) If the mind is physical, what part of the physical world is it? The neurons of our brain? The whole nervous system? Our behavioural dispositions? Some part of the body plus the tools we use that help us calculate and remember things? A computer program? → He answered no to the first premise, but now had to answer the second: if the mind is not physical, but instead some ghostly immaterial substance, not subject to the laws of physics, how could mind cause anything to happen in the physical world? -​ Many people (not all) would say yes to the first premise -​ To answer, he espoused substance dualism or Cartesian dualism or just dualism: the mind and body were distinct substances. Mind is not physical matter. Mind or consciousness is some kind of immaterial substance, not subject to the laws of physics 1. Three Competing Views on the Laws of Nature -​ Materialism: The view that everything that exists in the universe is made of physical matter (matter/energy); though based in science, it fails to explain subjective experience/conscious awareness in physical terms -​ Idealism (famously held by Bishop Berkeley: The view that everything that exists in the universe is spirit-stuff, or ideas that emanate from it -​ Substance Dualism: The view that some things that exist in the universe are made of matter and some things are made of spirit-stuff -​ 2. If you are a materialist, there are several options for explaining how the mind with all its contents could be made of matter. → The identity theory: the view that the mind is identical to the brain, and furthermore, every distinct type of idea, belief, desire, hope, fear, memory, perception, emotion, sensation etc. is identical with some physical feature of the brain → Main objection to the theory is that it defines the “mind” broadly (known as the species chauvinism objection) -​ Logical behaviourism (or philosophical behaviourism): our minds are open to view through our behaviour. If a person is not currently displaying her thoughts and feelings in her behaviour for everyone to see, she is nevertheless disposed to do so, should the right circumstances occur → For the behaviourist, every distinct type of idea, belief, desire, hope, fear, memory, perception, emotion, sensation etc. is identical with some set of behavioural dispositions  -​ Functionalism (an alternative to the Identity Theory and Logical Behaviourism in the 1960s): the view that every distinct type of idea, belief, desire, hope, fear, memory, perception, emotion, sensation etc. is defined in terms of its role – or job - in an information processing system → One role of belief is to produce other beliefs implied by it. Another role of belief is to combine with desire to bring about successful action/behaviour. A third role of a belief is that it forms after the appropriate sensory input → For the functionalist, the belief that spiders make great pets, like any other belief, is defined by its relationship to perceptions (sensory input) that caused the belief, desires that the belief, if true, can help satisfy, and other beliefs -​ 3. Functionalism is an improvement on both the Identity Theory and Behaviourism. However, as Thomas Nagel in “What it is Like to be a Bat” argues, none of these approaches seem promising for explaining the subjectivity of our conscious awareness Key Concepts by Nagel -​ Reductionism: the complete explanation of a phenomenon A in terms of some process or structure B (where B is part of well-founded scientific theory) → For example, the phenomenon of lightening is explained in terms of physical theory – as electrostatic discharge. We can say that lightening is nothing but electrostatic discharge -​ One of Nagel’s questions is whether we can succeed at giving a reductive explanation of consciousness in terms of physical processes or structures -​ Physicalism: It can be a synonym for Materialism (the view that everything in the universe is made of matter). It also can be used to mean that every phenomenon in the universe can be explained in terms of the processes and structures referred to by mature fully developed physics -​ Qualia: something related to quality and quantitative; refers to the painfulness of pain, the pleasurableness of pleasure, and the qualitative aspect of any piece of awareness you have – the feel of any single instance of conscious experience → Colour experiences are qualia; how things taste or smell are qualia -​ Point of view perspective: literally they are referring to the fact that a physical object like a table will present different appearances to our eyes depending on the angle from which we are viewing it -​ Subjective: means having to do with a subject. Subjective is something that is from, or about, a subject. To say “George’s judgment was subjective” means that his judgment was based on no facts at all, or facts only pertaining to him and no one else, or that other people will not be able to verify the truth of his judgment -​ Subjective vs objective: for Nagel, that which is objective is something which is accessible from multiple points of view. That which is subjective is accessible from a unique point of view What is a Bat? -​ Objective analysis does not capture the essence of subjectivity -​ Limitations of reductionism: for Nagel, that which is objective is something which is accessible from multiple points of view. That which is subjective is accessible from a unique point of view  -​ He emphasizes that a physical theory must account for subjective experiences, which are part of the internal world. If reductionism omits the subjective perspective, it can't fully explain the reality of those experiences → Critiques neobehaviourism and other schools of thought that seek to replace the subjective concept of mind with an entirely objective framework. He argues that these approaches lead to an incomplete understanding of the mind -​ Consciousness complicates the mind-body problem; it resists neat scientific correlation; Unlike other phenomena (e.g., water and H2O), consciousness remains elusive to reductionist explanations -​ Humans can imagine what it is like to be a bat, but these are limited by our own existence Week 8 Alan Turning’s Computing Machinery and Intelligence -​ Raises the question of whether machines can think or not -​ Creates the imitation game (or the Turing Test): an interrogator tries to distinguish between a man and a machine based on their responses to questions. If the machine can convincingly imitate the human participant and the interrogator cannot reliably tell them apart, Turing suggests it may be considered as having demonstrated intelligent behavior -​ Limitations and criteria: acknowledges potential biases against machines in the game but argues that if a machine can perform well, it should not matter how it thinks, as long as its responses are indistinguishable from those of a human → Turing acknowledges that while specific machines have limitations, it is not established that these limitations apply universally -​ Turing predicts that within about fifty years, advancements in computing will allow machines to perform so well in the imitation game that an average interrogator would only have a 70% chance of correctly identifying human from machine -​ Lady Lovelace’s objection: states that a machine can only do what it is programmed to do, implying that it cannot originate new ideas or thoughts. She emphasizes that machines lack the ability to generate creativity or truly independent thought → Turing counters these objections by asserting that advancements may allow for machines to exhibit behaviors that could be indistinguishable from human thinking, thus challenging the belief that machines are incapable of "thinking" in a meaningful way The Chinese Room -​ An experiment by philosopher John Searle that argues a computer running a program can appear to understand language without genuinely understanding it; it simulates its “understanding,” which is not intelligence Week 9 Intro to the Problems of Free Will and Determinism -​ Concerns the question whether our actions and decisions can be free if all events in the universe are caused – and causally determined -- by earlier events -​ There seems to be an important connection between the concept of a “free will” and the concept of “moral responsibility” → Free will is necessary for moral responsibility  -​ Maybe a wave hit our boat, and I bumped in to you by accident because I lost my footing. You fell out of the boat. In this case, while I bumped in to you, I did not do it intentionally and so I did not do it of my own free will. I fell against you. Therefore, I am not morally responsible for what happened as a result of bumping in to you. If I am not morally responsible, then if you lose your car keys after falling into the water, it is not my fault -​ Second scenario, say we’re playing around, and I bump Into you on purpose. You fall out of the boat and lose your car keys. In this case, I am morally responsible -​ Most people in society believe that there is such a thing as moral responsibility → If (i)people really do deserve credit for their acts - whether the act is commendable or blameworthy, and if (ii)being morally responsible for an act implies that the agent acted from a free will, then it seems to follow that there is such a thing as a free will -​ Central questions of the free will debate: whether the existence of free will is compatible with the truth of determinism → “Determinism” (also known as “Causal Determinism”): Everything that happens must happen, given prior events and the laws of nature (LON: Newton’s laws of Motion; Ideal gas law, etc.) → There do not have to be any knowing beings at all. If determinism is true, everything is determined given prior events and the laws of nature, whether anyone knows the laws of nature or not -​ Classical positions on whether free will determinism is true: incompatibilism: freedom of the will is not compatible with determinism. It is contradictory to say that freedom of the will exists and determinism is true. It is contradictory to say free will exists and that we are governed by laws of nature that determine what happens next given what happened earlier -​ Libertarianism: freedom of the will exists and determinism is false. Many of our acts (maybe all) are done out of our own free will and are not the effects of some causes outside of us. Our will is our own; it is not subject to the laws of nature. Libertarianism is a kind of incompatibilism. It cannot be true that we both have free wills and that our choices are all determined. The truth is that we do have a free will -​ Hard Determinism: This is a kind of incompatibilism according to which determinism is true but freedom of the will does not exist. No one does anything from a free will – this is an illusion. The truth of determinism implies there is no free will -​ Soft Determinism: According to the soft determinist, determinism is true and at the same time, people are able to exercise a free will in making choices. The soft determinist is one type of compatibilist. The general compatibilist says free will and determinism can co-exist – they do not contradict each other. The soft determinist says they both do exist in fact Preliminary Points for Understanding the Incompatibilist Argument -​ The central question of the free will debate is the question whether the existence of freedom of the will is compatible with the truth of determinism -​ The question whether freedom of the will and determinism are compatible is the question whether the numbered propositions are logically consistent: (1) Determinism is true (2) People do at least some things from their own free will  -​ Consistent: the question whether any two propositions are consistent is the question whether it is possible for both to be true. It is the question whether they contradict each other or do not contradict each other -​ Whether determinism and free will are compatible and can both be true, will depend on how we define “free will”. How should we analyze free will? What are its components? -​ If we analyze free will to include the requirement that alternatives be available to an agent, free will’s existence is incompatible with the truth of causal determinism Three Arguments -​ What the Libertarian and the Hard Determinist agree about: They are both Incompatibilists -​ Libertarians believe we have free will, so causal determinism must be false—events aren't all predetermined. In contrast, Hard Determinists reject free will as an illusion, accepting that causal determinism is true and incompatible with free will -​ Libertarian’s Argument: (1) If determinism is true, then there is no free will. (And if free will exists, then determinism is false.) (2. )Free will exists. ___ (3.) Therefore, determinism is false. (This means: not everything that happens is determined by prior events and laws of nature. The universe is deterministic. Random things happen. ) -​ Hard Determinist’s Argument 1. If determinism is true, then there is no free will (and if free will exists, then determinism is false). 2. Determinism is true. ___ 3. Therefore, free will does not exist → They share the premise that free and determinism are incompatible and cannot co-exist -​ Argument for Incompatibilism 1. Pretend for the moment that causal determinism (CD) is true. 2. Every event would be determined by the past - no event could happen differently (given prior events in history and laws of nature). 3. Human actions are events. 4. Every human action would determined by the past. No person could do otherwise (given prior events and laws). 5. In order to be correct in saying that a person did something of her own free will, it must be that the person could have done otherwise. 6. So since no person could do otherwise (line 4), no one would do anything of her own free will (line 5) - - - 7. Conclusion: If CD is true, no one has a free will. Causal determinism and freedom of the will cannot co-exist. If we have free wills, then causal determinism must be false Has the Self “Free Will”? -​ C.A. Campbell: the freedom at issue (as indeed the very name 'Free Will Problem' indicates) pertains primarily not to overt acts but to inner acts; it is the simple point that the act must be one of which the person judged can be regarded as the sole author; Granted an act of which the agent is sole author, does this 'sole authorship' suffice to make the act a morally free act -​ A free act is undetermined according to Campbell -​ Despite knowing heredity and environment influence choices, the ordinary person still believes in moral responsibility and that individuals can be the true authors of their actions -​ Granted an act of which the agent is sole author, does this 'sole authorship' suffice to make the act a morally free act? Can we truly hold someone morally responsible if they had no choice? Moral freedom seems to require the ability to have acted differently → Questions whether it's fair to praise or blame someone for an action they couldn’t help doing—even if it came from their own nature. It suggests that for someone to be morally responsible, they must have had the real ability to choose differently -​ It is that a man can be said to exercise free will in a morally significant sense only in so far as his chosen act is one of which he is the sole cause or author, and only if - in the straightforward, categorical sense of the phrase - he 'could have chosen otherwise -​ Here, and here alone, so far as I can see, in the act of deciding whether to put forth or withhold the moral effort required to resist temptation and rise to duty, is to be found an act which is free in the sense required for moral responsibility → There should be a consideration of the evidence of the moral agent's own inner experience → Since there is no way of knowing the act of moral decision -or for that matter any other form of activity - except by actual participation in it, the evidence of the subject, or agent, is, on an issue of this kind, of primary importance -​ We feel morally responsible because we believe we could choose to resist temptation or give in—this sense of choice is why we blame ourselves afterward → We face temptation, we believe we could choose to resist or give in. If we give in, we often feel guilty because we believe we could have chosen to resist—this sense of choice is key to feeling morally responsible -​ Even if we feel we have real moral freedom, are the arguments against it strong enough to make us doubt that feeling? → Even if we feel, in moments of temptation, that we must have free will and real choices, the passage asks: are the arguments against this kind of freedom so strong that we shouldn’t trust our personal feeling or experience of it? -​ Against determinism: libertarianism does not conflict with the predictability of behavior based on character in everyday situations; choices in ordinary contexts are often influenced by character, allowing for successful predictions of behavior; free will is primarily relevant in moral dilemmas where duty conflicts with desire; in such conflicts, although unpredictability may occur, it does not imply that "anything can happen"; the moral effort required to choose affects outcomes; critics claim that if an action does not stem from the character of the self, it lacks meaning and cannot be an expression of the self's will; Campbell distinguishes two senses of "intelligibility" → Predictability: If free acts are unpredictable, critics argue they are unintelligible. Campbell asserts that this doesn't qualify as a legitimate criticism of libertarianism → Meaningfulness: He argues that free will can represent a creative activity that goes beyond deterministic constraints -​ Observations of free actions from an external standpoint may miss their significance; understanding comes from the inner experience of the self making choices -​ His arguments: Moral responsibility assumes we have free will -​ True freedom must involve inner choices where the self is the sole author and could have chosen otherwise  -​ In moments of moral temptation, we strongly feel we have this kind of freedom—to choose whether to resist or give in -​ Determinist arguments based on behavior predictability don't affect this kind of free will, which is limited to inner moral choices -​ Claims that undetermined acts are meaningless ignore that inner experience is crucial—moral decisions are deeply real from the inside, even if they seem unclear from the outside Week 10 Ayer, Freedom and Necessity -​ Ayer can be seen as a soft determinist (both a free will and determinism can exist) -​ The belief that human behavior is governed by causal laws while simultaneously believing in free will. This presents a conflict since determinism seems to undermine the ability to act otherwise -​ Ayer argues that moral responsibility hinges on the capacity for free action. If an individual's actions are determined and could not have been avoided, it challenges the justification for moral accountability -​ Even if one feels free, their actions might still be explainable in causal terms (previous events or conditions that hold influence). It raises questions about whether true freedom exists if actions can be anticipated based on previous causes -​ He posits that if a choice is purely accidental, moral responsibility is not justified -​ Individuals are responsible for their character, which influences their choices, yet this gives rise to the question of how much agency one possesses over their character -​ Posits that freedom should be contrasted with constraint rather than causality. An action can be causally determined without being constrained → To be constrained you must be caused, but not the other way around → Uses cases like kleptomania to illustrate how lack of free decision-making can impact moral judgment. Even when a person feels free, if their character limits their choices, they may not truly be free -​ He suggests a redefinition of freedom, asserting that genuine freedom involves voluntary action, absence of compulsion, and the ability to choose differently, even if these choices are caused by previous factors -​ Arguments against Campbell: believes that an action can be both causally determined and free as long as the individual is not constrained or coerced; argues that moral responsibility can still exist in a deterministic framework. He claims that as long as individuals are acting in accordance with their character and without external constraints, they can still be morally responsible for their actions; argues that freedom should be contrasted with constraint (i.e., being forced to act) rather than with causal determinism. Ayer believes that causation does not necessarily imply constraint, which means a causally determined action can still be labeled as free when it arises from one's character and choices; understanding past histories/characters is part of being responsible and capable of making free choices  -​ Also took issue with other soft determinists: believed most compatibilists define free will as the “consciousness of necessity” → Being aware of the choices we are forced to make does not mean that we can make different ones -​ Free will is acting in accordance to our desires; being able to explain the reasons for our actions; and the laws of nature account behaviour, they do not dictate it (according to Ayer) Frankfurt’s “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” (Youtube) -​ What structure of will is necessary for personhood? → We have rationality on one hand and wills on another → Kant believed that reason supplied the will with principles to act -​ The will: first order sets that we wish to be effective; we have some desires we wish to be effective, and others that we do not; desires that are sufficient to make us act → Second-order desires: that we have desires for our desires: I desire to have desires to study more, eat healthier, etc. -​ Frankfurt argues that you can have secondary desires, but that the first-order desire is one that one not want to be effective → We can have second-order desires alongside another second-order desire volition and mere secondary-order desires at last -​ In his belief, a person is someone who has second-order volitions -​ Wants us to see the difference between people who have second-order volitions and those who do not (the unwilling addict: has second-order volitions [you care for what your will is like]; you want to be one way as opposed to another despite his first-order level to take drugs) → The other addict is a wanton (wanted?): does not have second-order volitions and his actions reflect his first-order desires (does not care for their will) Week 11 Egoism vs Altruism -​ To some ethical theories, behaving ethically sometimes involves self-sacrifice -​ Psychological egoism: the view that all human actions are motivated by egotistic desires. These are desires to do what will benefit one’s own self or give one pleasure -​ There are things you can do that bring about short-term pleasure, but which do not benefit you. And there are things you can do to benefit yourself that do not bring about pleasure -​ Altruism: an altruistic act is an act that is motivated by a desire to benefit someone other than oneself -​ According to those who accept altruism as the correct view about human nature, at least some our acts, at least some of the time, are altruistic. They are not disguised egoistic behaviours -​ Disguised egoism: the effect of helping others but are actually done for the purpose of bringing about a benefit for oneself, and are acts the agent would NOT have been performed had he predicted the act would not be of benefit to himself -​ Psychological egoism and (psychological) altruism describes us as humans; they are descriptive claims (they attempt to describe our true nature)  -​ Ethical egoism: the theory between the difference between right and wrong, good and bad → PE is different from this → In order to do what is morally right, I should do what benefits me for the reason that it will benefit me. Ethical egoism says we should never sacrifice for others -​ Generally speaking, ethical theories are theories about how we OUGHT to behave and why Richard Kraut’s “Altruism” -​ Altruistic acts include not only those undertaken in order to do good to others, but also those undertaken in order to avoid or prevent harm to them → You can still be altruistic even if your decision to act is based on self-interest and other motives → A single motive cannot be characterized in both ways; but a single act can be undertaken from both motives -​ “I shall never do anything unless doing so is best for me”. Such an individual is refusing ever to sacrifice his well-being even to the slightest degree. But in view of the terminological points just made, he could have altruistic motives for some of what he does—or even for much or all that he does! → He could have mixed motives: he is careful always to do what is best for himself, but that allows him also to be motivated by the perception that what he does is also good for others -​ Two versions of altruism: an act is altruistic in the strong sense if it is undertaken in spite of the perception that it involves some loss of one’s well-being. An act is altruistic in the weak sense if it is motivated, at least in part, by the fact that it benefits someone else or the fact that it will not injure anyone else -​ Psychological egoism, for which it too has variations, denies the existence of altruism; this is the strongest form of the doctrine (all human action is motivated by self-interest) → Weaker version of PE: some argue altruism is never pure—we always act with some self-interest (for our own good). A weaker view says we never choose actions we know will harm our well-being. A third view allows concern for others but insists we never help if we believe it will make us worse off -​ PE challenge and rebuttal: Perhaps the people you know are like this. But my experience of the world is rather different from yours. I know many people who try to benefit others for their sake. I myself act altruistically. So, at most, your theory applies only to the people in your social world → She might argue that experiments show people aren’t purely altruistic—or only care about their own good—and that this applies to all humans; all human beings are motivated in the same way → Also an a priori philosophical argumentative response: we don’t have to be keen observers of other people or look within ourselves to arrive at psychological egoism. We can recognize that this doctrine is correct simply by thinking about the nature of motivation and desire Arguments for Psychological Egoism (George W. Matthews) -​ There are two main arguments in defence for PE: The first is a purely theoretical argument. It is based on an analysis of rational decision-making and claims that because of certain facts about the way we make decisions, these decisions are always selfish; the second: an empirical argument. It does not rest on the claim that we are selfish by definition, even though that is what PE ultimately claims. Instead it appeals to evidence about real human behavior in the real world → What this argument is claiming is that if we think about what is involved in rational action in general, we will soon realize that it has to be selfish by definition → Second argument: it seems silly: If psychological egoism were false we should be able to find a real example of selfless or altruistic behavior: for instance, A person gives all of their extra money, after paying their bills and buying groceries, to charity and does so anonymously; another person stops to help the victim of an accident on the highway even though doing so makes them late for an important meeting -​ These challenges do not fall apart because according to PE believers, these are apparent examples of altruism; on closer examination these apparently altruistic acts can be shown to really be based on underlying selfish motives: the person giving money to charity: perhaps they do it because they feel guilty of being rich, or because it lowers their tax bracket; as a reader, this idea seems weird → Theories need to appeal to sufficient evidence if we are they are to be convincing theories. It seems that the more evidence a theory has the more believable it becomes. But there is a catch – we shouldn’t have too much evidence for a theory → The problem with paranoia, considered as an empirical theory – a claim about what is really going on in the world – is not that there is no evidence for it. Instead, the problem is that there is no possible evidence that might count against it. In philosophical jargon it is “non-falsifiable” -​ All empirical theories not only need evidence to support them, they also need to be falsifiable, that is, there has to be at least the possibility that they could be wrong. Note that “falsifiable” does not mean the same thing as “false,” or “falsified.” Such theories are obviously no good → Falsifiable: falsifiable theories are theories that might not be true, even if the only such theories that are worth our time are ones that have not yet been shown to be false -​ PE is a non-falsifiable theory, just like paranoia → We can always reinterpret others’ motives in ways that undermines the appearance of altruism. As a result, however, PE loses any claim it may have had to be a genuine theory about what human behaviour is really like and is revealed to be nothing but a cynical projection of selfish motives onto all human action -​ Back to the first argument: Rational decision-making is decision-making that realizes one’s own goals and so it is bound to be selfish the argument concludes. A little reflection on this argument, however, reveals a subtle problem. Does the fact that a goal is my own goal have to mean that my interests alone are at stake in the attempt to satisfy that goal? → PE claims that my goals are always my goals, and so they must be selfish. But doesn’t this mix up two different meanings of the expression “my goals?”  -​ “My goals” can mean either my personal intentions or goals that conflict with yours. Mixing these meanings in an argument is a fallacy (equivocation), which makes the argument invalid -​ However cynical we may sometimes feel about the possibility of genuine altruism, we must leave open the possibility that we are at least capable of being altruistic Week 12 Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings -​ Gilbert argues that collectives can indeed feel guilt regarding their actions, challenging the notion that only individuals can experience this emotion. She posits that collective guilt feelings are a form of joint commitment among group members, where they acknowledge wrongdoing and express readiness to feel guilt as a body. This perspective supports the idea that collectives can be held accountable -​ Collective intent and action: a collective can intend to act if the members are jointly committed to that intention. This collective intention leads to actions that can be identified as free or coerced, impacting the moral assessment of those actions -​ Existence of collective beliefs: if groups are held to have beliefs, then it follows that they can also possess moral beliefs, including beliefs about guilt -​ Critique of individual-centric guilt: argues against the view that guilt requires a specific phenomenological experience, implying that guilt can be recognized without the need for a distinct emotional experience -​ Collective guilt feelings: arise from expressions of readiness among group members to experience guilt together. This does not necessitate that every individual in the group feels guilt personally, which can lead to collective guilt even when not all members feel it -​ Importance of context: context in which collective actions occur can affect the perception of guilt. For example, external pressures may justify actions that are otherwise morally questionable, complicating the assessment of collective guilt -​ Practical consequences: Gilbert notes that if collectives can feel guilt, this could have significant implications for improving relations between wrongdoers and victims, suggesting a pathway for reconciliation and accountability Collective Intention, Collective Action and Coordination Problems -​ Gilbert writes that groups of people (not just individuals) at times have moral responsibility for (group) acts – acts involving the coordinated participation of many individuals. In case such acts cause harms to others, there can be collective guilt → collective responsibility for slavery or for an unjust war or for other acts where the group that has been harmed might years later seek redress -​ How can groups of individuals as opposed to individuals be morally responsible for anything? Individuals should take responsibility. Gilbert argues that we are collectively responsible for an act, or the harms that may result from it (or the benefits), when there has been a collective intent on (as opposed to various individual intentions) to engage in the act (or series of acts) → There is also a metaphysical question to this: how can groups of individuals as opposed to individuals form inten ons to do anything or make decisions?  -​ Gilbert thinks a collective intention exists when individuals in the group commit to an act that can only be brought about by multiple individuals playing a coordinated part in bringing about the act. Commitment to participation in an act that requires a coordinated effort is key to her -​ How to coordinate without explicit agreements becomes a serious practical issue when we consider that it is important for us to coordinate our behaviour in some circumstances to achieve the best outcomes and we do not always know what other people will do Rational Choice Theory: Collective Action Problems Video -​ RCT: when people act independently and produce a worse outcome than they would if they could find a way to coordinate → Collective action problems are diverse, but is most common when a group of people share a goal, but achieving it requires some of them to contribute (organizing a beach clean-up, etc.) -​ Not all collective action problems can be solved, and not all of them are worth saving → The cost of collective action can exceed whatever benefits it might bring; it may bring more problems (same goes for prisoner dilemmas, public goods, and commons tragedies under a similar structure) -​ Ways of addressing collective action problems: social norms, legal sanctions, and tax incentives → When it comes to air pollution, fuel taxes can reduce consumption, lead people to purchase fuel-efficient cars, and other aspects → For global pollution (greenhouse gases that cause climate change)), a carbon tax would reduce their use of carbon-intensive energy and other things → Social norms: people have bumper stickers to signal how they drive low-emission cars; produces a norm in taking pride in reducing pollution; because of population diversity, social norms usually can not get people to make larger sacrifices to achieve a collectively beneficial goal -​ Public sanctions (shaming and so forth) can work in smaller groups, but the cost of solving a problem (say the essence of women wearing high heels) through legal sanctions is too high → Some people like to wear high heels regardless of social pressure to do so, therefore, they would lose their liberty to dress as they please; secondly, all tax payers would have to finance the prosecution of people wearing high heels -​ While norms, laws, and incentives can solve some collective action problems quite well, things like pollution are an example of how not all collective action problems are worth solving