MFC Ch8 - Single-Family Dwellings PDF

Section II Commanding Structure Fires Single-Family Dwellings Fig. 8-0. Firefighters work an attached garage fire in a house. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department Introduction  A *single-family dwelling* is defined as a stand-alone residenti...

Section II Commanding Structure Fires Single-Family Dwellings Fig. 8-0. Firefighters work an attached garage fire in a house. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department Introduction  A *single-family dwelling* is defined as a stand-alone residential structure built for occupancy of one family (fig. 8-0). Houses/homes can be a few hundred square feet up to tens of thousands of square feet in size. Houses/homes come in all shapes and sizes. Countless home types exist and can be described by era built, construction type, design, size, and builder. Craftsman, Vic­ torian, Queen Anne, split-level, modern lightweight and mobile homes are just some of the cat­ egories of homes across America. *Large estate dwellings (akaMcMansions)* are houses that exceed 3,000 square feet (per NFPA 1700), often found in suburban areas (fig. 8-1). These homes are built in tracts for owners who want greater square footage but cannot afford a fully custom large home. They are character­ ized by open floorplans, tall ceilings, false dormers, and various decor that can be mass pro­ duced to cost-effectively enhance the look and style of the home. Other common characteristics include truss roof construction, tile roofs, stucco siding, brick facades and veneer, energy effi­ cient windows, and grand archways, to name a few. Conversely, truly custom large homes that are over 3,000 square feet may have characteris­ tics not typically associated with a house. These may include, but not be limited to, wine cel­ lars, theaters, elevators, walk-in refrigerators/freezers, multiple kitchens, and service entries. Some jurisdictions have residential fire sprinkler requirements for homes over a certain square footage, and they may have fire department connections (FDCs). CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND CHIEF JEFF HELVIN, SACRAMENTO CITY (CA) FIRE DEPARTMENT We sometimes think the unthinkable happens to the other guy. On October 7, 2008,1 was that other guy. My engine company, Engine 15, was part of a full first alarm assign­ ment dispatched to a reported structure fire. We arrived as the first due engine to find a newer two-story wood-frame single-family dwelling with heavy dark smoke showing from the second floor on the A, B, and D sides of the structure. An offensive attack was initiated with a 1%\" attack line while having to force entry through the front door (fig. 8-2). I saw the first floor clear of any smoke and was able to see clearly from the front door to the rear sliding glass door that there was no obvious smoke downstairs. We com­ mitted the attack line up the stairwell to the second floor. As we advanced upstairs the smoke started to get thicker, and by the time we reached the second floor we were in zero visibility with no heat. I scanned down the long hallway with the thermal imag­ ing camera (TIC) but was unable to see the screen due to the thickness of the smoke. We continued crawling down the hallway, feeling for some type of heat to indicate where the fire may be. At the end of the hall was a large master bedroom. This is where we started our search. I was off the hoseline searching for the seat of the fire and any victims while remaining in voice contact with the firefighter on the nozzle. As we were conducting our search in the master bedroom, the second-due engine was arriving, securing a water supply, and pulling a secondary hoseline. The captain assumed command, updating the incoming battalion chief (BC) with situational aware­ ness and completed a 360° view of the fire\... all good things! Meanwhile, I continued  the search for life and fire in the walk-in closet when the nozzle firefighter stated that the hoseline "just went flat." I wasn't too concerned, as I figured it was the engineer switching from tank water to hydrant water. Shortly after, I made my way back to the hoseline to check pressure myself, and the hose was completely flat. At that point, I knew something was not right. I started to crawl back to the hallway to check conditions when I was hit with a tidal wave of extreme heat. My two firefighters on the stairs, assisting with the stretch, were getting pushed up the stairs and down the hall from the heat and fire below them. It was con­ fusing, chaotic, and terrifying. I did not know where the fire was or why it was blowing up, but I knew I needed to get everybody in front of me to exit the building and regroup. We all started to crawl back down the hall with me in the back of the line when we got bottlenecked at the top of the stairs. This is where we all got separated. I was taking a beating from the heat by the open stairwell and had to turn back to escape what felt like the skin melting off my body. The first two firefighters tumbled down the stairs and made it out the front door. The third firefighter went head first out a second-floor window. My plan was to retreat to the master bedroom and exit out of a second-floor window. I made several passes down a wall where I thought I had previously found a window, but could not find it again. I started to second-guess my location and thought maybe I got turned around; however, I remembered that I had passed over the abandoned hoseline when reentering the master bedroom. It was at this point that I felt like I was not going to make it out alive. My air supply was diminishing and I was unable to find a secondary exit, so I huddled up in a corner to await my demise. I thought of three things: the firefighters that were with me and if they made it out and were okay, never seeing my wife and young son and daughter again, and the death process I would experience. I knew this was not acceptable, and had to make one more attempt at making it down the stairs. I reentered the hallway, got to the top of the stairs, and as I made it half way down I was enveloped in fire. I jumped over the banister handrail, landing in a small sitting room. I was completely disoriented and terrified, not knowing which way to go. I saw some outside light, which was an open sliding glass door on the B side of the structure. Once outside, I was assisted by other firefighters, assured my crew was out and accounted for, and trans­ ported to the local burn unit. This fire started in the kitchen on the first floor. The kitchen is not visible from the bottom of the stairs due to a couple of interior walls. The smoke traveled up the open stairwell and out the open second floor windows, giving the illusion that it was an upstairs fire. Routine\... right? As one can read, this was anything but routine. The fire service con­ tinues to, and always will, face many evolving factors that are unforeseeable, ever-changing, and out of our control. Below are the lessons learned. Some lessons are operational and department-specific, and some are lessons that are personal and unre­ lated to the incident but have changed the way I look at things moving forward. Lesson Learned Forcible entry and horizontal ventilation need to be synonymous. As we force entry this changes the flow path of the interior. We need to consider how this may impact our operation and fire spread. We hear about performing a 360° on the outside of a structure, but need to consider a 360° interior prior to committing a hoseline upstairs. Had I performed a quick survey of the downstairs I would have noticed the fire in the kitchen. While using the TIC upstairs to scan down the hallway, I couldn't see the screen and didn't understand why. In training, I always held the TIC about 6\" in front of my facepiece, but this does not provide a view in heavy smoke conditions. I never thought to press the TIC to my facepiece to provide some type of view. This is not ideal, but it is better than nothing. Also, consider using the TIC from the outside when assigned to perform the exterior 360°. When moving down a hallway searching for the seat of a fire, move together and do not leave unsearched rooms behind you. This could have been catastrophic. Review Mayday and self-survival procedures at the beginning of each shift, and incor­ porate it into your daily radio and SCBA check. I was in a Mayday situation but never thought to call a Mayday or activate my personal alert safety system (PASS). Now, from the standpoint of a BC, we should be reviewing how we will manage the Mayday and what we are going to say if a firefighter down or Mayday call comes in. On your worst day, do not assume that a drill from six months ago is going to have you respond at your very best. How we respond to a downed firefighter needs to be at the forefront of our memory, and we can only do this if it's part of our *daily* routine---part of our morning check. Of the three firefighters that were with me that day, only one was on the right tactical channel. One firefighter had a dead radio battery and the other was on a different tac­ tical channel. Give your radios the same respect as a paramedic does their heart monitor! Have awareness of modern versus legacy construction and fuel types. Most of our fires and experience take place in the older sections of our district. Fires burn more rapidly and differently in newer construction. Are your operations and tactics adjusted when responding into newer built construction? Can we have modern fuels in legacy construction? Lack of Respect The greatest number of both civilian and firefighter injuries and fatalities on the fireground occur in house fires. The most common pitfail in house fires is thinking they are bread and butter or routine. This lack of respect for the enemy will lead to the enemy winning the battle and potentially causing injury or death to civilians and firefighters alike. *Remember, most May­* *days, firefighter deaths or injuries, and civilian victims are in house fires.* Many houses are often remodeled without proper permitting and adherence to code, and can have hoarding conditions or excess occupancy. Garages are remodeled into living quar­ ters, and houses can be converted into makeshift commercial occupancies or healthcare facil­ ities, often with no sign of such modifications from the outside. Kitchen fires are the most common fire type. Other common occurrences involve improper heating, smoking, or use and storage of flammable materials. Low-mass synthetics make the smoke in today's house fires more flammable. The smoke itself is fuel (fig. 8-3). Garage fires and attic fires are a common characteristic of house fires and both can spur intense debate among firefighters across North America. **The following statistics are from the NFPA:** More than one-quarter (26%) of reported fires in 2015-2019 occurred in homes. Even worse, three-quarters (75%) of civilian fire deaths and almost three-quarters (72%) of all reported injuries were caused by home fires. During this five-year period, U.S. fire departments responded to an estimated average of 346,800 home structure fires per year. These fires caused an annual average of 2,620 civilian deaths; 11,070 civilian fire injuries; and \$7.3 billion in direct property damage. Most home fires and fire casualties result from five causes: cooking, heating, electrical distribution and lighting equipment, intentional fire setting, and smoking materials. Over the five-year period of 2015-2019 as a whole, cooking was the leading cause of home fires and home fire injuries, while smoking was the leading cause of home fire deaths.^1^ From a command standpoint, it would be easy to dismiss house fires as routine or simple and therefore not in need of ICS application. Many firefighters have died and been injured in house fires, including in homes less than 1,000 square feet. *Size does not matter.* Units in Sacramento, CA responded to a house fire in a structure that was no more than 1,000 square feet. The house was surrounded by debris and piled storage like a junkyard. Crews were unable to perform a lap due to the amount of hoarding in and around the home, requir­ ing them to respond from two different streets to access the house. Within a few minutes, they had a Mayday from a firefighter and multiple civilian victims. Prior to the Mayday, the IC wisely set up Divisions A and C in the front and back, respectively. Not because of the size of the house, nor the number of resources. He did it to gain situational awareness from two tactical super­ visors on either side of the house. In addition, this reduced the radio traffic on the tactical channel significantly. The Mayday was not your textbook transmission of "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday\...!" It was a quick, barely audible transmission, "I'm lost and out of air!" Due to the reduction in radio traf­ fic by the reduced span-of-control, one of the division supervisors heard the Mayday transmission and crews were able to respond appropriately, and a disaster was averted---all before the IC could even ascertain what was happening. More on this fire in chapter 12. Additional common pitfalls exist across North America regarding house fires. House fires are the most common type of structure fire you will encounter. It is easy to develop bad habits because of good luck. Some of these pitfalls may seem simplistic, but their results can be dys­ functional at least, and catastrophic at worst. Improper size-up No victim profile and delayed/missed search Lack of tactical supervision (divisions/groups) Lack of fire attack/vent coordination Garage fire tactical confusion Attic fire tactical confusion Misuse of transitional attack The following sections look at examples and, more importantly, solutions to these common pitfalls of house fires. Size-Up  Remember, lack of or improper risk assessment is number one on the NIOSH 5. On house fires, this can be catastrophic and can happen very quickly, as crews are eager to put out the bread and butter fire, often without sizing up what they have. According to Project Mayday, a 360° lap was not completed or only partially completed in 70% of the Maydays in career fire depart­ ments, and 62.7% in volunteer fire departments. Figure 8-4 shows a working attic fire that was confined to the attic due to electrical. This required a combination of vertical ventilation and fire attack from underneath. I have had to remind my company officers many times that they must get a lap, when pos­ sible, before committing to the inside of a house fire. We often get into a hurry and focus on the task of stretching the first line and beating other companies to first water. Sometimes, a lap is not possible on a house; however, most of the time, it is. It becomes a matter of priority and training. One of my captains kept bypassing a lap on his house fires. Finally, after several reminders, I told him that if he didn't do a lap on his next fire, I would send his engine back to the station. He had lots of excuses, like getting a pack on, helping with the stretch, locked gates, and so on. I get it, I've been there, but it's about making it a priority. We trained and he eventually got the point and on the next fire he performed a lap. Then, it became habit and he had a routine with his crew. The firefighter stretched the line, the engineer secured a water supply and irons to the front door, and the officer did the lap and update on the radio to incoming units. Companies were dispatched to a house fire early in the morning. While en route, dispatch updated the BC that flames were visible from below the house, and this was repeated to com­ panies on the tactical channel by the BC. Two engines arrived simultaneously to find a two-story home with smoke visible and no fire showing from the A side. Neither engine officer on scene performed a lap and did not real­ ize fire was below them as they entered the front door. Both companies raced to get water on the fire, and for a supply from the same hydrant. Approximately one minute later, fire was seen from the side of the house at the ground level, and this was not transmitted on the tactical channel. Less than two minutes later, two firefighters fell through the floor into an involved base­ ment. Both sustained significant injuries, as did other members who performed a gallant rescue of their comrades. If one of the first two officers would have slowed down the operation and performed a lap, they may have seen fire in the basement and performed an exterior attack. At the very least, they would have been able to size up the situation more thoroughly before com­ mitting to an interior attack. The above is just one example. This same story has been repeated countless times across the North American fire service. Crews arrive, do not know what they really have, and bad things happen. Take the time to size up what you have before committing crews inside a structure. We were dispatched to a house fire one night at approximately 0230. Unknown to any of us responding, the fire was reported by a fire medic ambulance that was transporting a patient to the hospital. The medic crew stopped at the fire and the driver got out and kicked in the front door without PPE or a SCBA. This created a flow path as the firefighter entered the struc­ ture to search, unbeknownst to anyone, without PPE, SCBA, nor a water can, let alone a hose­ line. The house was abandoned, and windows were boarded up from the *inside.* The fire quickly grew due to the oxygen supply, and the firefighter narrowly escaped. The firefighter did not see this and never transmitted any updates to the responding alarm. As the first BC, I noticed the fire medic unit leaving the scene when we arrived. Only later was I told of the actions of this crew. Needless to say, we could have had an unknown firefighter trapped in an abandoned boarded up home before any suppression units arrived on scene. I wish I was making this up; however, it happened and, thankfully, disaster was averted. Need­ less to say, the firefighter and his partner got a stern talk (putting it mildly) after the facts came to light. First-due company officers must take the time to perform a size-up (FPODP or FIRST) prior to giving a verbal arrival report. Pulling past the house will give you three sides to see before getting off the rig. This should include a VP as early as possible. The VP drives everything else (priority, strategy, tactics, resource requests/assignments, tasks, etc.). An initial VP can be given upon arrival based upon the time of day, presence of vehicles, signs of life, notification from occupants, and so on. After initial direction is given to the crew, the company officer should complete a 360° lap, if possible. Confirm the VP, look for TPOs (side doors, bedroom windows, breezeways), check for basements, see if the fire is in the attic, and look for forcible entry/egress challenges. Also, confirm the layout of the building and location of the fire. Transmit a 360° update to incom­ ing companies. Every medical aid call in a house to which you respond is an opportunity to pre-plan. You should gain awareness of the following, as a minimum: Layout of different housing tracts Occupancy habits and patterns Tactical points of opportunity (TPOs) Hording conditions of "frequent flyers" Location of utilities Neighborhoods with sparsely located hydrants Alleyways and alternative access routes Gates to private communities Victim Profile and Search Firefighters often experience tunnel vision on the flames and want to initiate fire attack with­ out considering a VP early in the incident. Often, if a VP is not announced on the radio, search can be an afterthought. For FDs with SOGs, a search should be part of the initial alarm assign­ ment. A VP gets everyone on the scene on the same page regarding the amount of risk versus gain and sets the tone for the rest of the incident. Victims have been found in house fires after the fire is overhauled and even discovered by investigators. We had a fire in a mobile home park that was dispatched at 0630. as a "mobile home fire with elderly female trapped." Upon arrival, the first-due engine reported fire in a *motor* home and directed incoming units to cancel the water supply. Two engines were on scene upon my arrival as the first BC. I assumed command and was told by the first engine on scene that the primary search was complete, no victim found. I directed the second engine to per­ form a secondary search and check with bystanders to confirm an all clear for the motor home and trailer park. They responded a few minutes later, "Command, Engine 2, secondary search negative. No victim found. We have an all clear on the motorhome. We have also checked with neighbors, and no one has seen her. We are sure she is not here." I then cancelled the ambulance and balance of the alarm. By this time, the local news had arrived to set up their van and boom for a morning news update. They interviewed me and I told them that we were dispatched to a fire in a mobile home. Upon arrival, it was a motor home, and no victim was found. I then walked over to check in with the crews and assist with picking up hose. The news crew continued with their preparations for the morning update with our fire scene in the background. As I walked to the motor home and observed the captain mucking out the interior of the vehicle, I noticed a tiny bathroom inside with the thin, card­ board style door closed on the bottom and burned away on the top from the fire. I asked the captain if crews had searched the bathroom. He said, "We checked it with the TIC." My heart immediately sank. I directed him to search again with his hands. After a few seconds, he said, "She's in there!" The victim was a tiny elderly woman who had succumbed to the smoke and fallen off the toilet. The debris from the fire attack, including towels and remnants of the cardboard door, covered her. She had no heat signature visible to the TIC and was barely visible to the eye with­ out moving the debris off her. Our paramedic firefighter pronounced her deceased at the scene. This was a terrible day and a lesson I would never forget. First, while a great tool, the TIC is *not* a substitute for skilled searching by firefighters. The TIC is *notX-ray* vision. Rather, it recognizes the infrared spectrum, and that has inherent lim­ itations. It cannot see through solid objects, including debris, drywall, lath and plaster, nor through windows. We must search voraciously, whether the VP is confirmed or low. Our job is to rescue civilians from fires, and technology will never outperform a well-trained firefighter who is bent on finding victims. Second, mobile homes, motor homes, RVs, camper shells in the back of pickup trucks, and trailers can have victims just like a stick-framed permanent house. We must treat them as such and not be lulled into a less urgent mindset when searching these spaces. Kids can have sleep overs in campers and trailers (fig. 8-5), and many people are using these as alternative hous­ ing due to a host of issues, from the economy to green living to overflow (fig. 8-6). At the same time, if possible, do not get into check-box command and get a water supply before you search a motor home or trailer. Search and rescue is the lifeblood of any fireground operation, especially in houses. We must have multiple tactical options available from conventional search, window-to-door removal, window-initiated search, and pincer search (chapter 6, page 131).  Tactical Supervision (Divisions/Groups) Fire departments across America have an extremely disparate approach to commanding and organizing house fires. Some use no divisions or groups and feel that the span of control of the IC is manageable. This view lacks consideration for other benefits of ICS. Tactical supervisors bridge the tactical gap and prevent the NIOSH 5 from coming into alignment. This helps the IC remain ahead of the incident power curve, reducing radio traffic, and leverages division/ group safety officers embedded into various locations around the incident. Many FDs will go to the opposite extreme and utilize an operations position to supervise the fire and bridge the tactical gap. This places *all* the operational responsibilities onto the operations chief, and the above advantages vanish. Essentially, the IC gives the entire incident to operations, and that officer inherits all the problems the IC had. This is due to skipping the lower levels of the ICS hierarchy. *Divisions and groups should be utilized and employed well* *ahead of section chiefs like operations.* We will discuss this later in this chapter. Another common phenomenon is the use of fire attack as a radio designator, rather than a true ICS tactical supervisor position like a fire attack supervisor, who supervises multiple crews performing the objective of fire attack and water supply. This can create confusion as fire attack may cause several companies to individually answer the radio, and they may or may *not* perform the critical objective of search due to the designation. Commonly, an engine may be assigned to fire attack. Then that crew is called fire attack, even though several other companies may also be performing that task. Other companies may also be called the same, and confusion with accountability and radio traffic ensues. Transmis­ sions from the IC such as, "E21, you are fire attack," can cause confusion. Is E21 now called fire attack? Are they simply performing the task of fire attack, or are they a group supervisor from whom other companies are supervised? Details matter, and this disparity can cause confusion when lives truly hang in the balance. For this reason, the terms initiate versus assume, as discussed in chapter 5, are crucial to illu­ minate any confusion. Remember, initiate is for task-level assignment. Assume is for a tactical (division/group) supervisor assignment. Another common practice is to assign the second chief officer arriving to a house fire to Safety, thereby widening the span of control as the safety officer does not have tactical respon­ sibility nor do crews report to them. The safety officer is just one more person talking to com­ mand. Additional confusion is brought as the chief assigned to safety does a lap of the house. Crews often gravitate to this chief and unity of command (one boss) gets blurred. The crews seek direction and authority from the white helmet walking by who must resist the temptation to jump into the tactics. This happened during a house fire one night with a report of a victim. I was assigned safety officer. During my lap, I discovered the known would-be victim outside the house. I directed some crews accordingly and told command of the situation. During our debriefing, he scolded me for not staying in my lane as the safety officer. This exemplifies the check the box mindset of some incident commanders. But technically, he was right. Alternatively, each tactical supervisor has the responsibility of safety for their respective areas of the incident, and each has the authority to make tactical decisions, account for crews, and communicate with them directly, all of which reduces the span of control. Having division and group supervisors gives the IC the benefit of multiple safety offi­ cers and allows them to get ahead of the incident power curve by remaining in the "then/what if" strategic mindset. Later in this chapter, we will illustrate several alternatives for organizing house fires utiliz­ ing ICS. Tactical Decision-Making Disclaimer--- Science and Experience Tactics have always been debated and will always be debated. Today, the two approaches often come from a science/research perspective and an experiential perspective. It was once around the coffee table only that stories of firefighting lore would be told by Jakes as they sipped coffee and spoke of great battles, tactics, tools, and tricks of the trade. We would sit, jaws agape, sop­ ping up the sweet nectar of wisdom and experience. These firefighters had fought the beast, survived, and had the scars to prove it. Their tactics were proven, time and again, on the bat­ tlefield. As we aspired to their levels of saltiness, we too had experiences that became our tool­ box from which to engage in battle. We adapted. We kept some things, modified some things, and tried new things. There were no YouTube videos to watch on our phones, or UL FSRI studies to read. So, books and magazine articles were the records and means from which to pass along tactical wisdom. Icons and luminaries arose from the East and West Coasts who wrote books and shared their experiences, tactics, wins, and losses. Names like Dunn, Stapleton, Brennan, Norman, Brunacini, Anthony, Mittendorf, Castro, Halton, and countless others rose and wrote iconic books and articles. And thank God they did! This inspired the next generations to do the same. To dare speak tactics and place words on a written page, as if to say, "I know what I'm talking about, here." This brought both criticism and praise. "Way to go!" one minute and "Who the hell do you think you are?" the next. The advent of scientific studies appeared to polarize the fire service almost overnight. The two camps of experience and science seemed at odds. This was apparent at kitchen coffee tables across America, tailboard after-action reviews, and countless classrooms and confer­ ences where some students would walk out in disgust if the instructor didn't match their ide­ ologies. This is where it gets dicey. We never want to stop listening to each other. Debate is good, as it causes discussion to (hopefully) learn from each other to come up with best prac­ tices. Neither should be considered gospel; however, both should be considered excellent sources from which to discuss and choose the best practice for any given situation. And every situation is different. Looking back, each generation reaches a tipping point where they start to think they know better than the previous generation. The problem is that the previous generation is still there, working in the firehouse, or more likely at headquarters. This happens every 20 years or so. That's why we seem to always go back to the same tools we did in generations past. The new generation finds a new way to use an old tool that was used previously. First, water was okay to put in windows, then not, then okay again. First, smoothbore nozzles were the only way, then fog was the new deal, then smooth bore again. The point is that we are about to embark on some more tactical considerations in this text­ book. This may cause you to wince, disagree, or agree wholeheartedly. It's based upon your experiences, training, SOGs, regional differences, riding position, rank, articles, books you've read, mentors you've had, and countless other factors. Just keep reading. We attempt to show both experiential and scientific approaches to a few of these topics as *both* have tremendous value. As you enter the next sections and chapters, please maintain a humble heart and open mind. Sometimes there is even more to be learned through the shared experience or viewpoint of someone else than personally being present for the same event, because emotions are not a factor. Fire Attack/Vent Coordination Fire attack and ventilation have always required coordination. The UL FSRI studies have brought to light just how critical this coordination of tactics is from a scientific standpoint, and the next generation of firefighters have a clear understanding of this premise. Often, crews on a roof performing vertical ventilation with a saw at high revolutions per minute (RPM) cannot hear the radio to coordinate with task-level crews inside the structure who are communicating through SCBA in low visibility. This is why a division supervisor in charge of the interior of the structure who is communicating for attack crews *and* a designated roof division supervisor who is communicating for vertical vent crews are *both* critical to the clear, effective, and expeditious process of communication and coordination of these vital tactics. Division A, for example, often does not need to communicate with attack crews, as they can see the conditions and progress of the fire attack and can quickly confirm for the roof division that they can open the roof. As the division supervisor on countless house fires, I have often communicated to the roof division without having to confirm with my attack crews inside that ventilation is needed. I could see conditions that confirmed that water was on the fire and simply give the roof division a thumbs-up from the ground, standing in the front yard of the house without having to try to communicate with a crew at the end of a nozzle (fig. 8-7). Vertical ventilation is another subject of much debate. It works very well when it is done cor­ rectly and water is applied. One common question we face while teaching is whether fire vent­ ing the roof prior to getting on the roof is a cause to eliminate vertical ventilation as an option. It depends. "Fire venting itself" or "it's already vented the roof" does not mean that the vent is doing what you want it to do, nor having the effects inside the structure. The location or size of the fire venting may be inadequate. For example, heavy smoke and heat may be in the living space from a fire that extended into the attic. The attic fire is minimal, just starting to breach the decking. The crews inside need relief. Or a strip mall may have fire over the involved unit, but trench cuts are required to prevent lateral spread over exposures B-l and D-l. A good truck officer will take note and identify that the fire has weakened the roof assem­ bly to some degree if it has already vented. This is a risk/benefit size-up decision. Experienced truck officers who do vertical ventilation on a regular basis are more likely to go to the roof, even if it is venting upon arrival, if conditions inside need more ventilation. That said, you *must* *have adequate training and experience to perform this tactic.* And always get water on the fire. In figure 8-8, fire vents after the hole is cut. This will commonly occur during an attic fire, or after the truck punches through the ceiling to relieve heat, smoke, and gases underneath in  the living space. Note the small caliber hoseline. This is for protection of the crew as they cut. It was once taboo to take a hoseline to the roof, let alone place it into a vent hole. I have seen this have catastrophic results and injure firefighters below, as happened to two good friends on a duplex fire. That said, a protective hoseline for the crew is appropriate. In addition, my crews have occasionally used small caliber lines to cool down a very small attic fire that was hard to access from below, or from the gable or eaves. This must be done cautiously and judi­ ciously. Again, training and experience are vital. PPV is even more critical to coordinate, as the induction of fresh air into the box can have immediately catastrophic results. Fire conditions can quickly escalate and incur a flashover into what was an otherwise vent-controlled fire. This is precisely what occurred one morning at an apartment fire. I was the IC, and an eager captain turned a fan into a doorway without the attack team having water on the fire, nor an adequate exhaust opening. The result was a flashover. From the ICP, I saw a bedroom window go from black smoke to flashover in seconds. The search crew inside came out with their turnouts off-gassing. No coordination occurred and thank God we didn't have any injuries. Garage Fires Take a look at figures 8-9a and 8-9b, the two simulated images. The first (fig. 8-9a) has a well-involved attached garage. Note light smoke from the turbine vent on the roof. How do you expect the fire to grow, in what direction, by what avenue, and how soon? Figure 8-9b shows extension into the house (likely the kitchen in an older home) and definitely the attic (two turbine vents). Would the fire grow in the time that you arrived, forced entry, and stretched a line? Would transitional attack on the way in the front door make any difference? How soon is the second-arriving engine on scene? What is your staffing? These all matter. If you have adequate staffing and/or resources, consider your first line in the front door to protect potential occupants and the uninvolved. First, cut off the fire (confine), then extinguish. Once it's in the attic, you should get inside the living space to check extension and occupants ASAP. Attached garage fires are a common occurrence throughout North America. With the advent of McMansions and their "Garage Mahal" garages that often boast three or four bays, signifi­ cant garage fires can easily burn down an entire home or ignite exposures, creating a tactical challenge upon arrival of the first-due company. This occurred one morning when the first company arrived to find a well-involved attached garage fire. The company officer reported, "E201 on scene, we have a two-story house with heavy fire from the garage, and what appears to be bedrooms above. We are initiating fire Fig. 8-9a. The fire in the garage appears to be extending into the attic. attack inside to push the fire out. Next in, give us a water supply. This is Main Street Com­ mand." The second-due company arrived and announced, "E202 on scene. We can hit it with our deck gun." This drove the E201 crew out of the house as they were getting pummeled by the heavy stream coming at them while they made it to the interior garage man-door. The result was that the fire extended into the home's living space and the house was a total loss. Now, as you read this you are likely in one of two camps: those who believe that E201 was correct, and those who believe E202 was correct. Therein lies the notion of tactical confusion on garage fires. Who is correct? As you can see, the garage is embedded into the home with what appears to be bedroom windows overhead. All incidents begin with a victim profile. Neither company identified a VP, nor announced one as they began their respective operations and gathered more information. In addition, with two three-person companies on scene, there are clearly enough personnel for several tactical options. They are not limited, for example, by two-person staffing, delayed companies, or distant water supplies. This further allows for multiple choices in this particu­ lar scenario. Using our previous FPODP size-up process, consider the following from E201: Facts: Two-story house with fire in garage. Probabilities: Moderate VP, vertical and horizontal extension. Bedrooms overhead. Own Situation: First-arriving engine, with additional companies arriving directly. Decision: Life saving priority, offensive strategy. Plan: Establish command, go inside to confine the fire from the living space and search, secure a water supply. Contrast this with E202's size-up: Facts: Two-story house with fire in garage. Probabilities: Moderate VP, vertical and horizontal extension. Bedrooms overhead. Own Situation: Second-arriving engine, with additional companies arriving directly. Decision: Life saving priority, offensive strategy. Plan: Attack the garage with a deck gun from the street without a water supply. Which company is out of alignment? Given the circumstances, E202 is out of alignment, due to the VP and the fact that fire is potentially getting into the living space and there are bedrooms above. Now, some of you reading this would say, "but taking the heat out of the garage and resetting the fire is a good thing and can only improve conditions for potential occupants and firefighters." Let's take a closer look at this. The UL/NIST studies have given us great information to con­ sider when making tactical decisions. Transitional attack (hitting it hard from the yard) has become an option that was otherwise taboo in generations past. The advent of modern con­ struction and the use of low-mass synthetics for interior contents and decor have certainly required new tactics, like transitional attack. Fires grow exponentially faster and reach flash- over more rapidly than ever before. So, taking some heat out of the fire on the way into the structure has advantages. Blasting the fire from the street with a deck gun is *not* transitional attack, especially when another company has already committed to interior operations. This is a defensive tactic. It is not even a combination tactic, as both companies are affecting the same space and opposing each other, to the detriment of one (E201). As we discussed in chapter 7, a combination strat­ egy requires close coordination to prevent situations just like this one. In addition, getting to potential victims as soon as possible is the priority here. Even if E201 was not in position behind the garage to get impacted by downstream master stream applica­ tion, the deck gun is still not the best option with these conditions and staffing/resource levels. Any time taken away from getting into the house, confining the fire with interior hoselines, and searching behind and above the fire takes precious seconds away from potential victims who must be removed from the environment as soon as possible. Even when heat is removed, lethal doses of carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide are present and killing your victims. From the inside, E201 can confine the fire from getting into the living space, take heat out of it, and allow the fire to exhaust steam and products of combustion out of the building and away from occupants. They are also able to get to any victims much faster, as they are *inside* the building with them. The difference is discipline. *Tactical discipline* is the act of restraining oneself in the moment to consider alternative options that could make conditions more favorable, rather than react­ ing in the moment with adrenaline or emotion. Firefighters are born, bred, and wired to put water on the fire, break stuff, and go into danger. That is what we do, and it is what makes us who we are. That said, we sometimes act in the moment without taking a second to see the bigger picture and consider other options that may take a few seconds longer but have better overall benefits to the incident. That is why tactical supervisors are there, to see the bigger picture. Had E201 performed a quick transitional attack on the way into the home, that would have been appropriate. That is *not* what E202 did. If E202 had arrived first with two personnel, an adequate water supply, and the expectation of the next company to have a prolonged arrival time, then a deck gun might be a better choice. Every factor must be taken into consideration (VP, construction, staffing, additional resources, timing, water supply, experience, and training of the crews, etc.), *not just what is infront of you.* Generally speaking, when conditions and resources allow, getting into the house as soon as possible should be the first priority for the first company on an attached garage fire. This has several benefits: Firefighters get into the house to search for potential victims as soon as possible. In the likely event that the fire has breached the fire wall into the attic or living space, firefighters are positioned to confine the fire as soon as possible. If fire is confined to the garage, you have still checked the house for victims and can then consider alternate attack options, such as using a side door or front door, or front roll-up door. A charged line should remain inside in case conditions change. Figures 8-10a and 8-10b show alternative methods of attacking an attached garage fire. Figure 8-10a shows indiscriminate use of a fog pattern from the open garage. This is *not*  transitional attack. This has potential to pressurize the attic and living space. Yes, you cannot push fire with water; however, you can introduce pressure and air with a misapplied attack and reverse the flow path of smoke, heat, steam, and other products of combustion. Contrast this with figure 8-10b, which shows the tactical discipline to check the inside for occupants and extension and put the line between the involved and uninvolved. When the fire is clearly isolated to the garage (by the fire wall), as confirmed by an interior search for occupants and fire, another method is to attack from the person-door on the side of the house, if possible. These may be heavily secured (fig. 8-11). This may also be considered if you have a low VP, confined fire, and have limited staffing without the means to quickly open the garage roll-up door. Attic Fires Attic fires in homes are common. Electrical wiring is a common culprit in many parts of the country. Fire extension into attic spaces and cocklofts from fires in the living space or on the exterior is likely, as the fire wants to travel upward due to convection. HVAC vents, kitchen ducting, and lighting fixtures in the ceiling make easy pathways for fire to extend into the spaces above firefighters. Garage fires commonly extend laterally into attached homes due to breached fire walls between the garage and attic over the living space. Outside-in fires, where the origin is outside the house, often extend into the attic through soffit or rafter vents. Plastic garbage cans are a common culprit, as discarded ashes, fireworks, cigarettes, oily rags, and other ignition sources cause the fire to easily travel up the siding into vents. Other possibilities are intentional starts outside, vehicle fires, or vegetation fires, to name a few. Like the garage fire, attic fires spark contentious debate among firefighters around North America. Most debate centers on two things: the location from which to attack the fire, and whether vertical ventilation is effective. The most important thing to remember before getting into these discussions is that, in most buildings, the garage and attic spaces are compartments separate from the living spaces and should be treated as such, with confinement and compart­ mentalization as the priority. It is not uncommon for first-arriving firefighters to enter a house or apartment, encounter light smoke conditions in the living space, and report they have a working attic fire, immedi­ ately followed by the radio traffic, "we are going to start pulling ceiling." Once again, the attic is a separate compartment from the living space and the ceiling is the dividing wall. On far too many attic fire scenes, the living space of the dwelling and the occupant's belongings are in perfect condition upon arrival, and within 30 minutes, hundreds of square feet of drywall and cubic feet of insulation will be soaking wet on the floor and furniture through the work of firefighters. An intact ceiling at a working attic fire is a very effective salvage cover and fire barrier. When it is recognized that a fire is in the attic (non-occupied) and not the living space (occu­ pied), take advantage of the time this barrier provides to complete important objectives of pri­ mary and secondary search, followed by aggressive salvage operations to protect the most important property in the structure, the stuff below the roof line. As with all tactics, each has a time and place, and attic fires are no exception. There is rarely one size that fits all in any aspect of fireground tactics. Attic fires can be quickly contained and extinguished by breaching the ceiling and attacking from underneath. The benefits are that the seat of the fire can be more directly hit by streams, and access is relatively simple. However, tall ceilings, lath and plaster, ducting, wiring, and hording conditions can make this challenging. In addition, heavy fire overhead with a tile roof should be a watch-out situation, as catastrophic collapse can occur quickly when lightweight web trusses and gusset plates are impinged by flame. **If you do attack the attic fire from underneath, here are some proven tactics that you** **may want to consider:** A bathroom off a hallway is a good location from which to initiate an attic attack inside. These hallways are usually centrally located, so you can reach a lot of the attic space from that location. You can also access the ceiling easily without an attic ladder by stepping up onto the toilet, then the counter, using them as makeshift steps. Open a small hole with a hook. Insert the nozzle (1^3^4\" line) with the *widest fog pattern* *possible.* Open the bale *fully* as it passes the plane of the ceiling into the attic. Shove the nozzle up into the attic space to the point that it starts moving around by itself, usually 3-5 feet. At that point (3-5 feet), hold the hose firmly while the nozzle tumbles around by itself in the attic. Move the hose in a circular motion to keep the nozzle moving and bouncing off the roof any joists, rafters, ducting, trusses, wiring, and so on. It's like inserting a giant sprinkler head into the attic space, yet easier than a cellar nozzle over your head (fig. 8-12). Keep the flow until conditions improve. This may take 1-2 minutes or more. The fog is converting to steam and the nozzle is acting like a giant sprinkler head. Again, depend­ ing upon the amount of fire, the British thermal units (Btus) may take a minute or two to succumb to the water and steam. Eventually, the gallons per minute (GPM) will outdo the Btus and prevail. If your FD performs vertical ventilation, then opening the roof further away from the fire (6-12 feet) will provide release of the heat, pressure, and energy out of the attic. The reason for opening further away from the fire and not directly over is for safety, and it allows the steam conversion so the water doesn't just flow right out of the hole without absorbing Btus. A common pitfail is not using a wide fog and spraying up with a straight stream pattern from a crouching position in the living space. This will only cause the straight stream to penetrate the attic and the stream will not absorb any Btus as it shoots out the roofline. Once an initial conversion or knockdown occurs, cut a scuttle and use a ladder to get into the attic to spray water directly onto the roof construction members and coat them with water as needed, or reach corners and distal areas. Be judicious with the water so you don't do more damage with the water than the fire did.  Larger attics may require use of a ladder initially and more than one 1%\" hoseline. Consider attacking from other interior locations in large attics. Have a backup line in the living space below to protect firefighters from any change in conditions. In 2012 UL FSRI completed a study titled *Study of Residential Attic Fire Mitigation Tactics* *and Exterior Fire Spread Hazards on Firefighter Safety.* The study included lab and field exper­ iments involving attic fires with both internal and exterior starts and how traditional and non-traditional tactical approaches impacted them. The following are the tactical consider­ ations listed from the study. An overview of these tactical considerations includes:^2^ ** Increased use of plastics in exterior walls will change what you arrive to---**Changes in residential wall construction methods are playing an important role in how exterior fires are initiated, as well as how they spread and extend. ** If the fire starts on the outside, start fighting it from the outside---**Rapid water application to knock down the exterior fire is a critical part of any attempt to control not only the fire's spread to adjacent structures but also the fire's migration into the interior of an exposed building. If the source of the fire is not suppressed, it will continue to supply heat energy to the fire developing on the interior, worsening conditions on the inside for occupants, and in many cases making it impossible for the interior crews to maintain or advance their positions. ** Learn to anticipate where and how an exterior fire will migrate to the interior---Ex­** terior wall fires may easily spread to the interior at locations other than the eaves and soffits. Any penetrations---such as air vents, electrical receptacles, plumbing penetrations to faucets and drains, and especially windows---provide the opportunity for fire spread into the interior of the structure. Leaving the interior fire barrier in place until the exterior fire can be controlled will limit the extension into the structure. ** Attic fires are commonly ventilation-limited fires---**The openings provided for natural ventilation are not sufficient to maintain steady state burning and fuel-limited fire behavior. The size of the fire is limited by the available oxygen and will nearly always become ventilation-limited. Controlled openings created below the neutral plane (such as through the ceiling below the attic space) will not cause immediate growth and can provide access for suppression operations. ** Closely time or limit vertical ventilation until water is in the attic---A** vented attic fire was more difficult to control with the indirect methods applied to the unvented attic test. The "open up above and then attack it from below" tactic can and has been success­ fully used at attic fires. However, it can create a large amount of property damage and puts both civilians and firefighters at high risk during the initial stages of the operation if not timed properly. Once initial water absorbs some energy, a vertical vent will assist the crews with suppression and overhaul because standard fireground ventilation tactics will be sufficient for exhausting the smoke and fire gases produced by the remaining fire. In the absence of suppression, the positive effect of a roof opening is a very short-lived phenomena. The accelerating fire can overwhelm all openings and push back into the occupied space. Increased visibility does not automatically mean a reduction in the size of the fire over your head. ** Plastic ridge vents can affect size-up and fire dynamics---**As the vents heat, the plastic melts and collapses on the opening at the peak, creating a very effective seal. Once the ridge vent seals, the eaves will act as both the source of air as well as the exhaust and you may notice a pulsing of smoke out of the eaves. ** Wetting sheathing with an eave attack slows attic fire growth---**If crews wet the sheathing, either as part of an offensive fire attack or defensively to slow fire spread to uninvolved sections of the structure, the major flame spread mechanism in the attic is eliminated until the moisture evaporates. Removing the soffit and flowing water along the eave line of these structures was the most effective way to gain the upper hand on a fire that was venting through the roof. ** Attic construction affects hose stream penetration---**The most effective water appli­ cation takes into consideration the construction of the attic, using the natural channels created by the rafters or trusses to direct the water onto the vast majority of the surfaces. ** Consider flowing up instead of down with a master stream---**Consider using an aerial device or portable ladders and handlines to open up the eaves and flow water into the attic. This approach could result in controlling the fire enough to permit firefighting crews to transition back inside the structure to complete searches, suppression, and overhaul. ** Knee wall fire dynamics---**During a structure fire, it is possible for fire to enter void spaces and surround crews conducting interior operations. Even though there is a delay between making the breach and the change in conditions, once initiated, the transition to untenable conditions in the area of operation occurs in seconds. Knee wall construc­ tion often provides the potential for ideal fire growth, with air entering low at the eave line and combustion gases exiting the peak through mushroom vents, ridge vents, or gable vents. ** Apply water on a knee wall fire at the source and toward the direction of spread** **before committing to the attic---**Applying water utilizing the same path the fire took to enter the void space may be the most effective method at slowing fire growth. Water application to the knee wall will not be effective until the source below it is controlled with direct water application. ** Interior operations on knee wall fires---**Tests have demonstrated that the most effec­ tive way to get a handle on knee wall fires is to control the source fire, cool the gases prior to making large breaches in the barrier, and then aggressively open the knee walls to complete extinguishment, focusing on wetting the underside of the roof decking. Working Fire Example of Eave Attack with Coordinated Vertical Ventilation Figures 8-13a and 8-13b are from a working attic fire that started on the exterior. Two lines were inside, with crews reporting very little progress on the fire by pulling ceiling and flowing. Command called for vertical vent and another line to try to get it at the gable end. Gable end siding and access with fence prevented water application and the line was moved to the A side, where soffit was pulled and ladder crew completed vent. Heat trapped at the ridge auto ignited just out of the vent as the crew descended. With about one minute of flow along the Alpha-side eave, the fire was under control and all smoke was being drawn up and out of the vertical vent hole as the eave vents and interior ceiling breaches became low-point intakes with a high-point exhaust. Notice smoke at the door and porch in one picture and not the next (figures 8-13c and 8-13d, respectively). This operation highlights the value of coordinated fire attack and ventilation operations and several of the UL FSRI attic fire tactical considerations.  Fig. 8-13b. A coordinated eaves attack and vertical vent was ordered. ** If the fire starts on the outside, start fighting it from the outside---**The attic fire was quickly mitigated by water application from the eaves. However, this was an adjustment by the IC, not the initial action. On the interior, water application was delayed due to decking added in the attic for storage. When there are enough members available to apply exterior water and extend an interior line simultaneously, take the opportunity. ** Attic construction affects hose stream penetration---**The most effective water appli­ cation takes into consideration the construction of the attic, using the natural channels created by the rafters or trusses to direct the water onto the vast majority of the surfaces. ** Wetting sheathing with an eave attack slows attic fire growth---**If crews wet the sheathing, either as part of an offensive fire attack or defensively to slow fire spread to uninvolved sections of the structure, the major flame spread mechanism in the attic is eliminated until the moisture evaporates. Even if the eave line had not completely extinguished the fire, it would at least result in fire control. Attic fires were common in Sacramento, and we had countless opportunities to fight them in different ways. An extremely effective way of attacking, as mentioned previously, was attack­ ing from underneath, and coordinated vertical ventilation. The key is that the stream inserted into the attic must be at the correct location (as close to the fire as possible), and the stream Fig. 8-13c. Gases venting from the hole auto-ignite as expected. must be a very wide fog pattern. Essentially, you are inserting a giant sprinkler head into the attic to create massive steam conversion. This conversion will initially knock the fire. Finally, it was once extremely taboo to take a hoseline and insert a stream into a vertical vent hole. It is still not a great option and has potential for bad results, as the weight of the water and impact of a misused straight stream can and has brought ceilings down onto fire­ fighters, as was the case on a duplex fire we had that injured two firefighters. This option maybe considered in houses that are confirmed to be abandoned, as it may minimize risk to firefighters if they are not in the would-be living space, where other dangers may loom. I had crews take a booster line to a roof to access a stubborn attic fire that was localized, unable to be reached by crews below. The roof division surgically and judiciously used the line to knock down the fire and prevent spread until crews underneath could make adequate access. This should be an exception and *not* the rule and *must* be highly coordinated between division supervisors. Exterior Control---Transitional Attack (NFPA 1700) Transitional attack is a tactic executed in an *offensive* strategy. For some, transitional attack has become the magic silver bullet of tactics, where it is *always* used, despite other factors and conditions. The timing of the UL/NIST studies, combined with a new generation of firefight­ ers who learn quickly through media and are much more adept at technology, YouTube, and the internet, has created a propagation of belief for some firefighters that transitional attack is a *must do* in *every* situation. For example, I arrived on-scene at a house fire to find a firefighter performing transitional attack on a fully involved garage. The fire had burned most of the roof off the garage and the flames were 50 feet high. The *1%\"* line was doing no good, as the Btus outmatched the GPM, and this first line should have been inside to confine the fire as the garage fire was venting away from the attached living space (fig. 8-14). Contrast this with hitting a window on the way to the front door---two totally different approaches. One is simply an adrenaline-charged emotional reaction, the other is a well-thought tactical decision as part of an interior attack. Like all tactics, transitional attack has a time and place on the fireground. When done prop­ erly, it has outstanding benefits. NFPA 1700 defines the objective of Exterior Control-Transi­ tional Attack to improve occupant tenability and interior conditions for fire control (https:// [www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/l/7/0/nfpa-1700](http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/l/7/0/nfpa-1700)). This is our goal with tactics for life: to improve conditions for occupants and firefighters alike. While we cannot push fire with water, we can impact the flow path, pressure, and direction of heat flow. Even this is not as much of an issue, as long as the stream is not a fog pattern. A deck gun is a defensive tactic. If a deck gun is required, it is by definition *not* a transitional attack. Even if it is for a few seconds, a deck gun into a building is a defensive tactic. Occasion­ ally, this can be extremely effective with large amounts of fire, with exposures threatened, or with limited staffing and resources with a water supply. You may choose to switch to an offen­ sive strategy; however, this will take longer than a true transitional attack performed on the way into a house. The key to successful transitional attack is tactical discipline (see previous section). When flames are billowing out of a window, every firefighter who has ever lived has a primal instinct to put water on the fire. Tactical discipline answers the "why, when, where, and how" to the "what" of transitional attack. **Why:** The objective is to cool the space to improve thermal conditions and allow for the imminent entry by the crew into the building. **When:** An offensive strategy is declared, and the objective is to get into the living space quickly. Enough GPM must be flowing to accomplish this from the handline you are stretching. If Btus are beyond the GPM capability of hoseline used during the transitional attack (not reducing flames/Btus) then a transitional attack is not effective and, therefore, not an option. You must enter to be transitional. If you do not or cannot enter, you are not performing transitional attack. **Where:** On the way into the building. Transitional attacks are most effective into windows and man-doors *on the way into* a house or other living space. Consider the layout of the build­ ing and assess locations of doors and windows. If a doorway is nearby and can be utilized for the attack, that may be the most direct path, and a nearby window may act as an exhaust to let any pressure out of the building. **How:** The *S's---straight/solid stream,* at a *steep* angle to deflect the stream across the ceiling, held Steady to limit air entrainment, for a *sustained* period of time to maximize compartment cooling and surface coating to reduce the potential for fire regrowth. Early transitional attack methods were short 15- to 20-second flows, while visual condition changes appeared at the window. Later interior fire stream studies and experiments showed this was not enough to improve survivability. Figure 8-15 shows an appropriately applied transitional attack. The building was fortified, including bars on the windows. The fire was seated at the front. Transitional attack was required prior to entry. Notice the upward straight stream pattern.  I ICS for House Fires The alternative to the safety officer is to break the house fire into manageable and functional parts that can be logically and individually supervised, yet laterally coordinated. A division supervisor who leads the crews entering the home from the portal of entry maximizes account­ ability and safety while minimizing radio traffic. This also works for two-story homes and above. Even if a home has multiple stories, the division supervisor at ground level should supervise the crews who entered their side of the structure, as that is the portal of entry. They should know if E20, for example, went to the second floor with an attack line and TRI went to the second floor to search. If the supervisor were to be on the second or third floor with a central open stairwell, they would not be in a position to truly supervise due to smoke and heat, nor to look at exterior con­ ditions. While the supervisor may decide to temporarily enter the hot zone to check in with crews and look at conditions, this is *not* the ideal place to reside. **Let's look at several ICS templates for house fires.** Smaller Home One template from which to start is a 4:1 model with the following components (fig. 8-16). A simple establishment of Division A to supervise crews inside the house has the following benefits: Significantly reduced radio traffic and fewer crews are transmitting on-air with inaudi­ ble radio transmissions. Reduced span of control for the IC. Greater tactical supervision and consolidation of resources. A safety officer is embedded into the incident. The Division A supervisor can have eyes-on, hands-on active accountability of crews in real time going in and out of the structure. The Division A supervisor can see and anticipate deteriorating conditions that neither the crews in the hot zone nor the IC can see, including performing laps, if possible, or delegating to another firefighter. Tactical coordination can occur with operations outside of the structure, such as ventila­ tion, RIC, and medical. The IC can get into the "then/what if?" mindset and stay ahead of the incident power curve. **Division A** Boundaries: The inside of the house. Resources: All crews working inside the house. Objectives: / Initially, fire attack and search. / After knockdown, transition into salvage and overhaul. / Positive pressure ventilation or horizontal ventilation would also be supervised under Division A to ensure maximum coordination under a single supervisor.  Fig. 8-16. ICS can be applied to a smaller home very quickly. *Source.* Illustration courtesy of Sam Wallace **Roof Division** Boundaries: The roof. If crews are on the roof, regardless of objective, a roof division alerts all personnel that rooftop operations are underway. Resources: Crews working on the roof. Objectives: If vertical ventilation is the tactic of choice with a crew(s) on the roof, a roof division supervisor is critical in maintaining situational awareness and tactical coordi­ nation with Division A, laterally. This can be through radio transmissions or hand signals. This eliminates the need to go through the IC and delay ventilation/fire attack coordination while unnecessarily increasing radio traffic. Ideally, no less than three personnel should perform vertical ventilation on a roof: the offi­ cer to supervise and coordinate, one firefighter to sound, create a louver, and punch, and the other firefighter to cut. The combination of potentially being above active fire, along with fall­ ing off the roof, creates a significant need for tactical supervision of just one crew, let alone multiple crews. Even if a three-person truck company goes to the roof without the expectation of a second truck, the company officer should be identified as roof division supervisor while the crew of two remains in the task level. A crew of two was performing vertical ventilation on a house fire. The officer was task-saturated and attempted to louver a vent hole that was cut by his firefighter. While cre­ ating a louver in the hole, the officer did not see his firefighter fall through the roof. When he turned around, he saw fire from the hole. The result was significant injuries to the firefighter and a Mayday with RIC activation. crews entering to operate from the back of the home would work for Division C.  Resources: All crews entering from that side/division. Objectives: Crucial to coordinate with other divisions to prevent conflicting and redun­ dant operations/effort. Initially, fire attack and search. After knockdown, transition into salvage and overhaul. Positive pressure ventilation or horizontal ventilation would also be supervised laterally under division supervisors to ensure maximum coordination under a single supervisor. Confirmed Rescues in Homes Another template would be for known rescues in homes with known victims (confirmed victim profile). Here, utilizing a fire attack group supervisor and a rescue group supervisor instead of division(s) to coordinate the critical objectives of fire attack and search divides the labor more clearly (fig. 8-20). All things being equal, most firefighters naturally lean toward fire attack or search as a tac­ tical priority. This is a derivative of experience, training, classes taken, articles read, UL/NIST studies, apparatus assignments, and so on. Obviously, conditions like the size and layout of the home, number and location of victims, size and location of fire, and number and type of resources responding all drive that decision. Still, as you read this, if you were responding to a house fire with victim(s) and no additional information, you would lean one way or another. And you would not be wrong either way. In general, both need to happen simultaneously and in coordinated fashion. Therefore, it is easy for a single division supervisor to get overwhelmed if they were assigned to coordinate fire attack *and* search/rescue of multiple victims as Division A, for example. A more effective and efficient option is to break the crews inside the house fire into fire attack and rescue groups. A medical group would also be needed for treatment and transport of the victim. If vertical vent were performed, a roof division would also be appropriate. Otherwise, fire attack group could coordinate PPV, horizontal, or hydraulic ventilation. The coordination of getting victims out and to the medical group is not easy and requires that the rescue group and medical group supervisors remain attached at the hip to minimize the TTT to get the victim(s) to ALS intervention. Remember, according to FRS data, the victim must be out and to definitive care within 6-8 minutes to survive. This template works well for homes, duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, condominiums, town homes, and garden apartments with relatively localized fire. If you have fire involving a lot of units, consider multiple divisions and a rescue group for the known victim(s). Summary House fires are the most common structure fire and where the most firefighter injuries and fatalities occur. Complacency kills. Considering a house fire a bread and butter job is a sign of disrespect that could cost you and/or your crew the ultimate price. At the very least, it is igno­ rant and dismissive of those firefighters who have lost their lives to these structures. Countless home designs exist. The crucial aspect of incident command and tactical decision-making is knowing the home construction in *your* jurisdiction. McMansions are larger homes that are built relatively inexpensively for the amount of square footage they boast. Some of these building features, open spaces, and lightweight methods can have catastrophic results. In addition to disrespecting house fires, additional pitfalls exist from a command and tac­ tical standpoint. These include improper size-up, no victim profile, lack of tactical supervision (divisions/groups), delayed/missed search, lack of fire attack/vent coordination, garage fire tactical confusion, attic fire tactical confusion, and misuse of transitional attack. Both expe­ rience and science play an important role in determining the best tactic at the time. Every sit­ uation is different. ICS templates for house fires, like all structure fires, are based upon building, conditions and resources. Most houses can be organized by either a Division A, Division A/C (or more based upon the above), or fire attack and rescue groups for known victims. Never treat a house fire as routine or bread and butter and practice the varying ICS tem­ plates based upon your resource levels and building types. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Explain some of the factors that contribute to complacency with regard to single-family dwelling fires. 2. Describe the differences between fire attack" as a radio designator and a group supervi­ sor position. 3. Provide three tactical considerations for garage fires. 4. Provide three tactical considerations for attic fires. 5. Describe the application of exterior control/transitional attack. 6. Provide an example of how you would utilize three division/group supervisors given a first-alarm single-family dwelling fire. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in chapter 8 provides detailed information to assist with instruction and education for all course objectives with a focus on the single-family dwelling. The chapter format supports the CO279 course outline by speaking specifically to basic division of tactics, rescue, exposures, confinement, ventilation and salvage for single-family dwelling fires to include fires in attic and garage spaces of these structures. Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C \#1: Three-Story Victorian Home with Base­ ment Fire Extending for an objectives-based scenario exercise. NFPA 1021 Job Performance Requirements The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, Fire Offi­ cer IIJPR 5.6, 5.6.1, and Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1. Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C \#1: Three-Story Victorian Home with Base­ ment Fire Extending for 1021 Job Performance Requirement based scenario exercise for Fire Officer I, II, and III. Endnotes 1\. Marty Ahrens and Radhika Maheshwari, "Home Structure Fires," *NFPA Research,* Novem­ ber 2020, 2 Steve Kerber and Robin Zevotek, *Study of Residential Attic Fire Mitigation Tactics and Exte­* *rior Fire Spread Hazards on Fire Fighter Safety* Underwriters Laboratories Fire Safety Research Institute \[UL FSRI\], November 26, 2014), study-residential-attic-fire-mitigation-tactics-and-exterior-fire-spread-hazards-O.