Martin BA WMD Week 11 CBN end of Cold War 2324 slides PDF

1/9/2024 CBN Weapons at the End of the Cold War: Thinking across the Cold War, Post Cold War, and the Current Era Dr Susan B Martin, 12 Jan 2024 1 Outline      Overview of Second Term Questions and Reading for this week CW Use in the Iran-Iraq War Cold War versus Post Cold War World Feedback on...

1/9/2024 CBN Weapons at the End of the Cold War: Thinking across the Cold War, Post Cold War, and the Current Era Dr Susan B Martin, 12 Jan 2024 1 Outline      Overview of Second Term Questions and Reading for this week CW Use in the Iran-Iraq War Cold War versus Post Cold War World Feedback on exam (separate PowerPoint) 2 1 1/9/2024 Class sessions, first six weeks of Term Two 12/1 19/1 26/1 CBN at the End of the Cold War: Deterrence, Strategic Stability and Proliferation Threats Discussion of Term One Assessment Proliferation Choices and Nonproliferation Policies (cases of India and Iran) Waterloo FWB 2.46 Post-Proliferation: Variations in Posture and Strategy Waterloo FWB 2.46 2/2 Case Study: Coercion and Crises in Southern Asia For this week you will each complete this course online (you will earn a certificate), and we will then discuss in person in our regular class (approx. one hour). Waterloo FWB 2.46 9/2 CBN Weapons and Terrorism, Insurgency and Assassination 16/2 CBN, Arms Control, and Issues of Morality, Legality and Social Stigma (CWC, Landmines and TPNW) Waterloo FWB 2.46 Waterloo FWB 3.146 3 Class sessions, last five weeks of Term Two All in Waterloo FWB 2.46 23/2 1/3 8/3 15/3 22/3 Reading Week 20-24 February. Note: No class, no office hours this week. Arms Control and Use/Non-use: The Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Civil War Waterloo FWB 2.46 New Technologies , the Return of Major Power Competition, and New Questions about Limited Nuclear War Waterloo FWB 2.46 Current Issues/Simulation (possible simulation and/or case study, e.g. Pandemics and BW; allegations in regard to CBN and Ukraine; etc..) Waterloo FWB 2.46 Conclusion and Review (Practice for exam) Waterloo FWB 2.46 29/431/5 Exam Period The date and time of the exam is set by the Exam Office 4 2 1/9/2024 Change to office hours  Office hours for next week will be on Thursdays and Fridays like last term.  are now on Tuesdays and Fridays:  Tuesdays, 16:00-17:00 (by appointment only, online only) Fridays 11:00-12:00 (drop-in, no appointment needed, online and in-person)    Links to make an appointment and to join remotely are the same. All info has been updated on the KEATS page. 5 Questions and reading for this week     Did the end of the Cold War affect the role of CBN weapons in international politics, and if so, how? How were CBN weapons understood at the end of the Cold War/in the emerging unipolar system? Did this differ and if so, how, from how they were understood during the Cold War? What were the main threats involving CBN, if any? Who were the main actors? Readings:     Ikenberry, ‘Restructuring of the international system after the Cold War.’ Kaysen et al, 'Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War.’ Mueller, H., 'Viewpoint: Neither hype nor complacency: WMD proliferation after the Cold War.’ Ilchmann and Revill, 'Chemical and Biological Weapons in the "New Wars".' 6 3 1/9/2024 The Iran-Iraq War and CW use from 1983-1988 With Relevant for: Questions about use and non-use (role of norms, utility, strategic interests here?) Questions about arms control/disarmament Questions about the Post-Cold War world 7 CW from 1983-1988    Here we are looking at both the use of CW in the IranIraq War (1983-1987) and the further use by Iraq of CW against the Kurds (1987-1988). We didn’t have time to look at this when we looked at the use of CW from WWI onwards. You may also want to look back at the additional slides (on KEATS) on broader developments on CW in the Cold War. 8 4 1/9/2024 Relevant readings from Week 7 include:        McNaugher, ‘Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War.’ Russell, ‘Iraq’s Chemical Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam.’ Sabin and Karsh, Escalation in the Iran-Iran War’ Hiltermann, A poisonous affair: America, Iraq, and the gassing of Halabja. Michael Brill’s three-part article on the legacy of CW use in the Iran-Iraq War and Iran’s CW program (blog). Zanders, ‘Allegations of Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1980–88 Gulf War’ (6 parts, blog). And more….. 9 Iran-Iraq War: Use of CW 1  Chemical Weapons were used on the battlefield, both offensively and defensively;  The use of CW escalated over the course of the conflict, including:  From the use of RCA to mustard to the use of nerve agents (Tabun in 1984, Sarin in 1988);  Threat of use in the ‘war of the cities’;  In the Anfal campaign, against the Kurds. 10 5 1/9/2024 Background  Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the US in 1967 because it considered the United States complicit in Israeli military conquests during the so-called Six Day War of June 1967.  Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979.  The Iranian Revolution also takes place in 1979, with the US severing diplomatic ties in 1980.  During the Iran-Iraq War, the US was worried that Iran might gain political influence across the region. 11 Iran-Iraq War: Use of CW 2 The use of CW occurred, continued (and escalated) despite     the fact that both Iran (since 1929) and Iraq (since 1931) were parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol; UN investigations the use of CW (e.g. 1984, 1986, 1988); denunciation by (parts of) various governments and parts of the UN,  including UNSCR 582 (Feb 1982) which noted the membership of Iraq and Iran in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and ‘deplored “the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under’…the Protocol” and UNSCR 598 (1987) (Ali 2001, 50, 52-3); efforts to control the materials and equipment needed for CW,  E.g. embargo on sale of CW precursors for mustard and nerve agents to Iraq following report of UN investigation, by UK, US, France, Japan and Australia (Ali 2001, 49);  Foundation of Australia Group in 1985: informal group to harmonise export controls to help prevent the spread of CB weapons. 12 6 1/9/2024 The Beginning of the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1982 War began with Iraqi surprise attack Dec 22, 1980 (long standing rivalry and hope Iran weakened by revolution and purge) Iran had large advantage in numbers—human wave attacks Once Iraqi offensive stalled, Saddam Hussein began to consider use of CW as force multiplier to counter Iranian superiority in numbers (Tucker 249-50) Iraq experiences further setbacks, including March 17 1982 Iraqi defeat at Khorramshahr  By early summer, Iran forces are threatening Basra, Iraq’s 2nd largest city 13 The Use of Chemical Weapons       By 1982, US moves from neutrality to supporting Iraq July 1982: Tear gas used on small scale in attack near Basra (? if testing reaction?) 1983: Iraq starts small-scale use of mustard Tucker (War of Nerves) reports that such ‘special strikes’ required authorisation from Saddam Hussein, who feared international response of the violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Iraq acceded to the Protocol in 1931) Summer 1983: Iran sends letter to UNSG alleging use of chemical weapons; Tucker reports that the US secretly verified the Iranian allegation and delivered an official note to Iraq saying that the US opposed chemical weapons as a matter of principle. Iraq temporarily halts attacks; US continues to tilt toward Iraq, with the US and Iraq restoring diplomatic relations in November 1984 14 7 1/9/2024 The Use of Chemical Weapons, 2   March 1984: Iraqi uses CW as part of effort to dislodge Iran from Majnoon Island, after conventional attack fails. November 1984: In February 1984, an Iraqi press release warned, “The invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possess[es] this annihilation insecticide.” [psychological value of CW?] ~~~ some gaps in use as Iraq tries to surmount technical and operational difficulties, concerns about international reaction  December 1986: Saddam Hussein authorizes use without prior approval and effectiveness increases (Tucker) 15 The Use of Chemical Weapons, 3 Shane Harris and Matthew M Aid (2013), “Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran’ According to Harris and Aid:  Beginning in 1987, US started sharing intelligence information with Iraq, to help avoid Iranian breakthrough in the 1988 spring offensive (fear was that Basra would be captured, Iraqi military would collapse, and Iran would win the war).  ‘The DIA was authorized to give the Iraqi intelligence services as much detailed information as was available about the deployments and movements of all Iranian combat units.’  ‘The sarin attacks then followed.’  April 1988: Iraq uses sarin on front line troops on Al-Faw Peninsula, with Iraq regaining control; Tucker and McCarthy (in Planning the Unthinkable) argue CW were not needed; question if used for psychological effect.  ‘According to the CIA, two-thirds of all chemical weapons ever used by Iraq during its war with Iran were fired or dropped in the last 18 months of the war.’ 16 8 1/9/2024 The Use of Chemical Weapons, 4       Effectiveness of Iraqi use of CW increases with experience (learning curve); Effectiveness of Iranian defences also increases (see Ali p.51) Used to maintain momentum of assault. Used to deny terrain (persistent agents); useful in mountainous and rough terrain, allowing a few troops to hold territory. Used for psychological effect? Used mustard (a blister agent) but also nerve agents like tabun and possibly sarin. Iran estimates that it suffered 60,000 casualties from chemical weapons. 17 Halabja and the Anfal Campaign 1987-1988 Anfal campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared.  Use against Iraqi Kurds to punish them and to end rebellion/for repression  To repel an Iranian advance (started March 13) and inflict a psychological blow on the Kurds. Iran captured Halabja on March 14.  Saddam Hussein orders attack on Halabja to kill Kurds and any Iranians there: The attack on March 16 starts with napalm, then chemical weapons-mustard gas, phosgene, and nerve gas (tabun and sarin). This was then followed by an artillery barrage.  Chemical weapons killed between 2,000-5,000; injured another 10,000.  Iraqi claims of Iranian responsibility were picked up by Western press.   It has been argued that the psychological effect was the main aim because Iraq could have done more damage with conventional weapons. Others argue the attack as a whole brought the Iranian offensive to a halt. 18 9 1/9/2024 War of the Cities (McNaugher; Tucker and McCarthy; etc.) Started as early as 1982  1986: Iranian ballistic missile attacks against Baghdad, with Iraq unable to retaliate; this was politically unacceptable, and Iraq tuned to development of Al-Hussein missile  War of Cities more significant in 1988  Iranian setbacks, including loss of Al-Faw Peninsula  In late spring Iran and Iraq use conventional missiles to attack each other’s cities; Iraqi threat of use of CW against cities (McNaugher 22)  McNaugher: Iraq launched some 160 extended range SCUDs toward Tehran alone; caused panic and contributed to decline in morale, death toll of 2000, fleeing population; Iran launched some 70 SCUDS at Iraq, mostly at Baghdad, where life mostly continued as normal  July 1988: Cease-fire signed >>Did threat of chemical weapons delivered by missile convince Iran to end the war?  19 War of the Cities, 2 McNaugher argues no  War of Cities started much earlier than 1988, but only in 1988 did it have much effect  Importance of social and international context  1988 saw not just war of cities but Iraqi recapture of territory, US naval vessels challenging Iranian ones. In addition, the US had accidentally shot down an Iranian commercial airliner.  Iranian war-weariness—demonstrations against the war, with some revolutionary Guards participating.  Growing economic and political crisis in Iran.  Iran relying on conscripts as opposed to earlier in war  Helps to explain difference of effect of missiles on Iran vs Iraq.  Also argues that CW use in final tactical battles was not key to Iraqi success. 20 10 1/9/2024 Response to Use      March 1984: UN Investigation; Security Council condemns use of chemical weapons but does not name Iraq. March 1986: A second UN investigation under the UN Secretary General’s mechanism; Iraq refuses to cooperate. During the war, Iraq did not acknowledge its use of chemical weapons. After the war, Iraq argued that Iran initiated use of CW and that it was simply responding in kind. US, UK, other states continue to support Iraq, some supply it with some dual-use materials; US providing intelligence from 1987. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/03/foreign-office-did-not-stop-iraqmaking-weapons-due-to-british-firms-presence https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/07/23/german-firmsprimed-iraqs-war-machine/09371363-d003-4a78-88ef-476c183b21dc/  Use at Halabja generates more condemnation. 21 Iran and Chemical Weapons     During the war, the US blamed Iran and not Iraq for the use of chemical weapons, including at Halabja. In fact, not clear that Iran used them at all: 1997 US report states that evidence in the open literature does not provide sufficient evidence for Iranian use. This is still widely debated.  Suggestion that some CW agent released by Iraq blew back onto Iraqi troops.  Also suggestion that Iranian troops made use of Iraqi CW munitions it captured. In a 1987 interview, the Iranian representative to the United Nations (UN) stated that “…if the Iraqi regime does not take any steps in putting an end to the crimes of the Iraqi regime, we will retaliate in kind, and in that case, we will certainly announce it.” (NTI) An Iranian official stated that Iran did decide to acquire CW and possessed them, but then ended its CW program after the cease-fire. 22 11 1/9/2024 Additional sources  Use of CW in Iran-Iraq War: military results? Humanitarian results? Response of the international community?   Documentary: A Forgotten Crime https://www.journeyman.tv/film/6358/a-forgottencrime The Anfal Campaign and the CW Attack on Halabja: Use of CW for Internal Threats    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MueGmjuf-fY (about 2 minutes) https://www.facebook.com/K24English/videos/halabja-massacre/1045609492255386/ (about 8 minutes) Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ and https://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/IRAQ913.htm#5 23 Factors that influenced use and non-use in the Iran-Iraq War?  What was the role of military factors/political interests and norms/arms control? Or, what questions does the Iran-Iraq War raise about the role of these factors? 24 12 1/9/2024 Impact on Post-Cold War World  Expanded/refocussed understanding of CW threat Major use of CW in regional war increases concern about CW (as well as BW and NW) proliferation  This pivot is facilitated in at least two ways by the end of Cold War between US and USSR (how/why?) New urgency for control of CW  Since conclusion of the negotiations for the BWC in 1971, there were negotiations on chemical weapons at the Conferenced of the Committee of Disarmament (and then the Conference on Disarmament when it was formed in 1979) Concern about the possible use of CBN in the 1990-1991 Gulf War  And subsequent efforts to prohibit Iraq from developing or possessing CBN and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km (UNSC 687, formal ceasefire resolution)    25 Cold War versus Post Cold War World vs ….? 26 13 1/9/2024 Cold War versus Post Cold War versus ? After the end of the Cold War, how many eras of international politics do you think there have been? How do we define and identify ‘eras’ in international politics? For each era, what do we think the key characteristics are? What characteristics are important when we want to analyse CBN issues? 27 Polarity     A way of characterising the distribution of power in the international system Focuses on the ‘leading’ or ‘dominating’ states—great powers Sometimes focuses on individual states, sometimes on alliances/blocs of states Typically discussed in terms of three configurations of power:    Unipolarity (a single dominant state—or if using alliances/blocs, one dominating group of states) Bipolarity (two dominant states—or if using alliances/blocs, two dominating groups of states) Multipolarity—three or more dominant states (great powers)—or if using alliances/blocs, three or more dominating groups of states) 28 14 1/9/2024 Arguments about polarity include   Bipolarity more stable: The smaller the number of poles, the more efficiently and effectively great powers are able to balance against threats (Waltz) Multipolarity more stable: More great powers means there is greater flexibility –e.g. shifting alliances provide a useful means of balancing against threat (classical realism, Deutsch and Singer, etc..)    Likelihood of conflict Stability (of the structure), meaning the ease or difficulty of a change in the structure or polarity of the international system; in other words, the expected duration of a system with that structure. Impact on international cooperation/the extent to which shared problems can be addressed. 29 Deterrence, Stability and Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World    ? What is role of CBN weapons outside the US-Soviet conflict?  What was it in the Cold War?  Do they have a role in the post-Cold War world/today? During the Cold War the concepts of ‘strategic stability’ and ‘arms race stability’ were largely applied to the US-Soviet relationship.  What is their meaning in the post-Cold War world/today?  What do they mean in a unipolar or multipolar world?  Do we need to reformulate what they mean or how they are applied? Was there a change in the emphasis put upon the possible proliferation of CBN weapons from the Cold War to the Post Cold War era, and if so, what explains it? 30 15 1/9/2024 In-class exercise: Eras in Int’l Politics  Era, including rough years:  Polarity and Major States:  Defining transitions and events, if any:  Key conflicts/issues/major axes of conflict:  Dominate CBN issues/events, if any (including arms control, cases of use and non-use, issues, strategies, etc.):  Other changes we should consider? 31 Response to Module Evaluations     Thanks to those (5) that completed the module evaluations Overall those who responded seem to be happy with the module If you have specific suggestions, please fill out this MS Form (the form is anonymous and will not collect your name or email address): https://forms.office.com/e/9GbpAC7wxd This link has also been added to Keats page under next week’s toggle. 32 16 1/9/2024 Module evaluations, 2  Some of you mentioned the US centric nature of the first term. This unfortunately reflects the state of CBN politics during the Cold War and the existing literature.  Information on Soviet (and other countries’) programmes much less available, and existing literature still debates what programmes/policies were (with less on what explains them)  Did try to include other cases where possible—e.g. Japanese use of biological weapons, World War I use of chemical weapons  Will have more diversity in Term 2, but important to note that good sources on other countries are less available— government archives do not tend to be open (and of course, even in US/UK/etc some documents are still classified) 33 Module evaluations, 3   Similar issues with a desire for more on CBW; there is less literature and fewer peer-reviewed sources (plus the fact that CBW were less of a dominant issue in international politics during the period examined in Term One).  Will have another think next year about possibilities for broadening out Term One Will review amount of detail and incorporation of critical perspectives in lecture. 34 17 1/9/2024 Key concepts and ideas   Polarity End of the Cold War and the ‘liberal moment’ or potential of post-Cold War world    e.g. Kaysen et al page 110: ‘And so we cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of seizing the moment-certainly the best opportunity since World War II-to work on reducing motivations for the use of force to deal with the world's problems, to try to realize the promise of the UN charter and to establish an international rule of law. We should view getting rid of nuclear weapons as something facilitated by that larger effort. To the extent we succeed in that approach, getting rid of them will be easier, but less important.’ New Wars and question of change in security context Proliferation (more on this next week) 35 Next week: Proliferation Choices and Nonproliferation Policies (cases of India and Iran) Waterloo FWB 2.46 Any Questions? 36 18