CWC and Syria Lecture Slides PDF

The Chemical Weapons Convention + CW use in the Syrian Civil War Dr Susan Martin BA WMD 2023-24 1 Rest of Term 15/3 Arms Control and Use/Non-use: Syria (FWB 2.46) New Technologies, the Return of Major Power Competition, and New Questions about Limited Nuclear War (FWB 2.46) Dr Strangelove/nuclear st...

The Chemical Weapons Convention + CW use in the Syrian Civil War Dr Susan Martin BA WMD 2023-24 1 Rest of Term 15/3 Arms Control and Use/Non-use: Syria (FWB 2.46) New Technologies, the Return of Major Power Competition, and New Questions about Limited Nuclear War (FWB 2.46) Dr Strangelove/nuclear strategy discussion (FWB 2.46) 22/3 Conclusion and Review (Practice for exam) (FWB 2.46) 1/3 8/3 Revision/Practice in April Revision week? (22nd-26th) Exam Period 29/4-31/5 2 1 Puzzles Continuing challenges? Chemical Weapons Convention Part I: Origins and Explanation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Part II: What is the CWC and what does it encompass? Questions: Has the CWC been a success—in what ways, by what criteria? (Is the glass half-full, half-empty, completely empty?????) 3 Current challenges facing the CWC? February Annual Challenges to the CWC (and the AntiCW Norm?) Part III: Overview of Challenges Part IV: Focus on Syria Questions: Does response to Syria represent a success or a failure? What is the significance of the continuing challenges posed to the CWC? 29, 2024 Review 3 Part I: The Chemical Weapons Convention: Origins and Explanation 4 2 Chemical Weapons Convention A multilateral disarmament treaty that ‘aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by States Parties.’ States Parties agree to take the steps necessary to enforce that prohibition in respect of persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction. State Parties agree to disarm (this covers any stockpiled weapons+ production facilities + old chemical weapons abandoned on the territory of other states). State Parties agree to verification regime that includes on-site inspection. Currently 193 state parties; Israel has signed but not ratified; South Sudan has started process of joining; Egypt and DPRK have not signed or ratified. 5 What explains the CWC (and disarmament/arms control in general)? Is disarmament possible in an anarchic international system? Or does disarmament require a transformation of international politics, such that the use of force is no longer possible/acceptable? >> is the ‘problem’ the weapon, or anarchy, or both? 6 Martin, PIS 1617 6 3 My take: it’s both Weapons are both a symptom of the anarchic nature of the international system and a problem in and of themselves (if different configurations of weapons and/or particular characteristics of weapons lead to instability and increased insecurity—think back to the security dilemma) From a realist perspective, our ability to address problems caused by specific weapons systems is limited by the continued anarchic nature of the international system and the value of the weapon within such a system. 7 Martin, PIS 1617 7 Theoretical explanations of disarmament and arms control include: Realism: emphasis on geopolitics, military utility, security; Weapons get banned when it is in the interest of the great powers; Some realists argue that ‘Arms control is feasible only when it is not needed’ (Gray, Summer 1993). Norms: emphasis on ideas, norms, identities; weapons are banned when they come to be seen as immoral, inhumane, inappropriate—perhaps for certain identities (e.g. ‘civilized’ states). 8 8 4 Chemical Weapons Convention: Origins March 15, 1962—US and USSR both submit plans for general and complete disarmament to ENDC; CBW included CW use in Vietnam by US, by Egypt in Yemen 1968 CBW placed on agenda for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) 1969 President Nixon announces that US renounces biological weapons BWC (1972/1975 EIF) linked to general and complete disarmament and presented as first step towards chemical disarmament Moscow Summit 1974 US and USSR agree to hold bilateral talks to develop joint proposal for CW prohibition 1975—US ratifies Geneva Protocol (after end of Vietnam War) 1980 Ad Hoc Working Group on CW established in Conference on Disarmament (formerly CCD, formerly ENDC) 1980s: Use of CW in Iran-Iraq War, including at Halabja in 1988 (condemned but not much done; US insists Iran using as well and continues to support Iraq) Under President Reagan, US seeks binary chemical agents 9 Chemical Weapons Convention: Origins (2) 1989 January 149 states at conference in Paris launch appeal for complete prohibition of chemical weapons 1989 (9 November) Fall of Berlin 1989 September Memorandum of Understanding USSR and US—bilateral verification experiment and data exchange 1990 (agreed Feb; signed June) U.S.-USSR "Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons” * Destruction of at least 50 percent of declared stocks by the end of 1999, with reduction to 5,000 agent tons by 2002 * Production of CW stops upon entry into force of this agreement, without waiting for the global chemicalweapons ban. * On-site inspections during and after the destruction process * Annual exchanges of data on the stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring of the declared stockpiles. * Work towards global ban 1990 2 August Iraq invades Kuwait, 1991 Persian Gulf War: US prepared for CBW attacks by Iraq 1991 31 Dec Formal Dissolution of the USSR 1992 3 Sept. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 3 September 1992 1992 November UN GA adopts by consensus a resolution endorsing the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention and calling upon all states to become signatories (145 states cosponsor resolution) 1993 (13 Jan) Chemical Weapons Convention opens for signature (EIF 1997; according to treaty EIF occurs 180 days after 65 states have ratified) 10 5 Key question for today: Is realism’s claim that arms control and disarmament are limited by anarchy etc. challenged by the examples of chemical and biological disarmament—disarmament that took place without a transformation of the anarchic nature of the international system? >>>And if so, might a ‘nuclear weapons convention’ be possible’? 11 Martin, PIS 1617 11 The realist argument: The examples of BWC and CWC actually support realism’s claim, and therefore suggest that nuclear disarmament is unlikely without transformation 12 Martin, PIS 1617 12 6 First, Nuclear weapons helped to make the BWC and the CWC possible. 13 Martin, PIS 1617 13 Second, CB disarmament was only possible when it served the security interests of the great powers. Public opprobrium--or norms--classifying these weapons as ‘inhumane’ and ‘uncivilised’ were not sufficient to bring about disarmament. 14 Martin, PIS 1617 14 7 Look at the record…. Opposition to chemical weapons increased dramatically in 1960s, but this lead to the BWC, not the CWC—why? Chemical weapons still had utility at this time: US using defoliants and tear gas in Vietnam, and CW playing a role in US-Soviet relations (as in-kind deterrent) 15 Martin, PIS 1617 15 Why willing to give up BW? In the 1950s and 60s United States and UK came (separately) to an understanding that nuclear states had no need for biological weapons BW also seen as increasingly dangerous in hands of adversaries—as a cheap alternative to nuclear weapons for adversaries of US/UK US field trials showed BW capable of producing effects comparable to nuclear weapons 16 Martin, PIS 1617 16 8 The Road to the CWC The BWC stipulates that negotiations on chemical disarmament to continue...and they did, but so did development of chemical weapons Use of CW by Iraq in Iran-Iraq War does not lead to cut off of Western support Then: Mikhail Gorbachev End of the Cold War US-Soviet agreement on chemical weapons 1991 Persian Gulf War 1993 CWC opened for signature 17 Martin, PIS 1617 17 In short…… Paraphrasing Julian Perry Robinson and expanding his argument to biological weapons as well: While there is a normative side to biological and chemical disarmament, ‘the history of the negotiations …can be explained both satisfyingly and usefully solely in terms of national security.’ 18 Martin, PIS 1617 18 9 Questions? 19 Part II: What is the CWC and what does it encompass? 20 10 Article I-General Obligations 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; b) To use chemical weapons; c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. For text of the convention, see: https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention 21 29/02/20 24 21 Article I-General Obligations, cont. 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. 22 29/02/20 24 22 11 Article II Definitions and Criteria 1.“Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or separately: a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; [>>This ‘General Purpose Criterion’ is intended to capture any use of chemicals as weapons, whatever the chemicals or delivery methods used including currently unknown agents or delivery methods] a)Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; b)Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b). 23 Riot Control and ‘Purposes not Prohibited’ Article II, 7: “Riot Control Agent” means: Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. Article II, 9: “Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention” means: a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons; c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes. 24 12 Text of CWC, cont. Article III, Declarations requires each state party to submit declarations within 30 days after EIF of CW, old and abandoned CW, CW production facilities and other facilities related to CW Article IV, Chemical Weapons sets out the requirements for States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons 25 Text of CWC, cont. Article VI, Activities Not Prohibited under this Convention (non proliferation/industry verification regime) Article VII, National Implementation Measures Article VIII, The Organization Establishes the OPCW as the implementing body Article XI, Economic and Technological Development provides international cooperation for the economic and technological development of States Parties 26 13 Other key parts of the CWC Article IX, Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding in relation to concerns about possible non-compliance Article X, Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons provides for assistance and protection to a State Party if it is attacked or threatened with attack by chemical weapons Article XII, Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions provides for measures to ensure compliance, including sanctions against a State Party that fails to uphold its treaty obligations ---Annex on Chemicals: Delineates the three Schedules and shows lists of Toxic Chemicals and their Precursors Verification Annex: Sets out the detailed procedures to be followed by the States Parties and by OPCW inspection teams during verification/inspection activities at chemical weapons facilities or sites and industrial facilities 27 Annex on Chemicals-Three Schedules Schedule One has been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon as defined in Article II; It poses a high risk to the object and purpose of the Convention in other ways (e.g. chemical structure related to other toxic chemicals listed in Schedule 1, or can be used as precursor in production of a toxin chemical listed in Schedule 1) Has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention Schedule Two Properties are such that could be used a chemical weapon Could be used as precursor at final stage of formulation of chemical listed in Schedule 1/Schedule 2, part A or is important in the production of chemicals listed there Not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Schedule Three Similar to above, but “may be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.” 28 29/02/20 24 28 14 ‘Machinery’ of the CWC: 2 1. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Receives states-parties’ declarations on CW related activities/materials + relevant industry Inspects + monitors facilities + activities On-site activity ‘Routine inspections’: to verify content of declarations ‘Challenge inspections’: at any facility or location to clarify questions of possible noncompliance Investigations of alleged CW use (e.g. Syria) 29 2. Conference of State Parties (CSP) Composed of all members Meets annual Can hold special sessions Decisions: to be taken by consensus if possible; if not, defer vote for 24 hours and if consensus still not possible, take decision by 2/3majority of members present and voting CSP is adopts report programme and budget of OPCW (which are submitted by the Executive Council) Elect members of Executive Council Appoint Director-General Undertake 5 year reviews Etc.30 29/02/20 24 30 15 3. Executive Council 41 members, two-year terms 9 state parties from Africa, designated by states from that region 9 state parties from Asia, designated by states from that region 5 state parties from Eastern Europe, designated by states from that region 7 state parties from Latin America and Caribbean, designated by states from that region 10 state parties from Western Europe and other States, designated by states from that region One further State Party to be designated consecutively by States Parties located in the regions of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean With proportion of state parties from each region to include those with most significant national chemical industry 31 29/02/20 24 31 3. Executive Council, cont. Draft budget and programme Draft report on implementation Draft agenda for sessions of CSP Can request special sessions Consider relevant issues, including issues of compliance and non-compliance and in these cases: consult with State Party; and if further action necessary it can: inform all State Parties of the matter; bring it to the CSP; Make recommendations to CSAP regarding measures to redress and to ensure compliance Etc. 32 29/02/20 24 32 16 4. Technical Secretariat Assists CSP and Executive Council Carries out verification measures Etc. 5. Designated Labs Laboratories who perform off-site analysis of chemical analysis from chemical production facilities, storage depots and other installations, or from the site of an alleged use of chemical weapons. 33 29/02/20 24 33 6. Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) Plays a key role in reviewing relevant science and technology in advance of each Review Conference Have also developed Temporary Working Groups that help to study particular issues and provide advice For example, CW destruction technologies Convergence of Chemistry and Biology Protection and Assistance Education and Outreach 7. New Chem Tech Centre Provides enhanced and enlarged facilities for Laboratory, Equipment store and training Opening 2023 34 29/02/20 24 34 17 The CWC was signed in 1993—what then? Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat had four years to prepare for entry into force Text of agreement was the ‘blueprint’ but they had to make it a reality Tasks included: Development of inspection procedures and manuals Development of confidentiality provisions Develop lists of approved inspection equipment Recruit and train highly skilled technical Secretariat staff, including 200 inspectors Etc 35 29/02/20 24 35 The CWC entered into force in 1997— what then? State Parties: In addition to signing and ratifying the treaty, State Parties also need to: Make a declaration—within 30 days of EIF, states have to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles, chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs), relevant chemical industry facilities, and other weapons-related information. Technical Secretariat required to: Process declarations of CW stockpiles and former CW production facilities Conduct Initial Inspections of CWSFs, CWFPs, and CW Destruction facilities Conduct initial inspections of Schedule 1 and 2 facilities (CWC set tight deadlines for these) Etc 36 29/02/20 24 36 18 Once all declared CW destroyed, what next for CWC and OPCW? Non-state actors (they are not addressed at all in the text of the CWC) Work on chemical security (parallel to nuclear security) to raise industry awareness Emphasis on universality to prevent any ‘safe havens’ for misuse of chemicals Chem Tech Centre (keeping up with advances in science and technology 37 Part III: Overview of Challenges to the CWC (and the Anti-CW Norm?) 38 19 Challenges include 1993: CWC opened for signature 1994: Aum chemical attacks [use of CW by NSA] 1995-1996: Use of chemical weapons by AQI in Iraq 1997: CWC enters into force (EIF) 2002: Moscow Theatre Siege—use of fentanyl compound, killed ~125 of the hostages 2007 onwards: Inability of US and USSR to meet deadlines for destruction 2012-2019 (?end date): Use of chemical weapons by the Syrian state Use of chemical weapons by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 2013-today: on-going questions about initial declaration by Syria upon joining the CWC 2017: DPRK assassination of Kim Jong Nam with VX in Malaysia 2018: Russian poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal with Novichok nerve agent in UK 2020: Russian poisoning of Alexi Navalny with Novichok nerve agent 2023-today: Misinformation about CBW in Ukraine Ongoing: advances in science and technology 39 Non-State Actors OPCW working with State Parties on the national implementation required by Article VII of the CWC; this connects with the issue of NSAs in its criminalisation of activities prohibited by the CWC OPCW works with the UN 1540 Committee OPCW has established an Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, OPCW participates in United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and before that with the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Taskforce OPCW’s Chemical Safety and Security Management Programme 40 20 Central Nervous System-acting chemicals (like those used in Moscow Theatre Siege) Long-standing concern about possible use of ‘incapicitants’ or CNS-acting chemical agents as chemical weapons US developed BZ as an incapicitant (though it was considered as imperfect at the time and was a stop-gap); US also conducted research into LSD and other agents. (BZ was included in CW Schedules as it had been developed by US as a chemical warfare agent) CNS agents received renewed attention with the 2002 use of fentanyl in the Moscow Theatre siege. CSP-26 Decision in December 2021 that aerosolised use of CNS acting chemicals is not consistent with the law enforcement purposes allowed under the CWC (emphasise on aerosolisation in order to distinguish prohibited use from medical use) 41 Inability of US and Russia to meet destruction deadlines Under the CWC, State Parties had ten years, plus a possible five-year extension, but neither the US nor Russia could meet 2012 deadline Destruction was both more expensive and more technically complicated than expected; especially in US, need to work with communicates where destruction facilities were located (e.g. Pueblo, Colorado) 2011 CSP adopted a political solution, based on transparency and oversight (monitoring by state parties—which allowed them to see US and Russia were engaged in serious effort) Russia completed destruction in 2017, with substantial financial assistance from US and others US completes destruction 7 July 2023. 42 29/02/20 24 42 21 Story includes debunking of Russian misinformation on destruction of CW stockpiles under the CWC 43 Use of Novichok for assassinations Novichok agents discussed in open literature by 1995 as new and more deadly type of nerve agent developed by Russia. Novichok nerve agents were not included on original CWC Schedules. OPCW provided technical assistance to UK and German investigation of the assassination attempts. A large number of member states has called on Russia to provide information and to clarify –with little success. 2019 Conference of State Parties took the decision to add Novichok nerve agents to Schedule 1, thus making the first amendment to the Schedules of the CWC. 44 22 Part IV: Challenges to the CWC (and the Anti-CW Norm?), Focus on Syria 45 Syrian use of chemical weapons Begins in 2012 20 March 2013: Syria requests UNSG to conduct an investigation into alleged chemical attack in Aleppo, claiming opposition forces had used CW and killed 25 people. France and UK sent letters to UNSG, calling for investigations into three alleged incidents of the use of CW in Syria. 21 March 2013: SG announces UN will conduct an investigation into possible use of CW in Syria in conjunction with WHO and OPCW. (‘UN Sec General’s Mechanism’) 14 August: After obstructing the investigation, Assad agrees to allow UN inspection team into Syria to investigate three alleged attacks. Mandate is whether CW used, not who used them. Investigation starts 19 August. 46 29/02/20 24 46 23 Ghouta attack, and reaction While inspection team is in Syria, a large-scale chemical attack occurs on 21 August at Ghouta (suburb of Damascus) Rockets with sarin; approx. 1400 civilians killed UNSC emergency meeting Assad denies use and says will allow UNSGM inspectors to visit Damascus sites Convoy of UNSGM inspectors attacked by snipers US Pres. Obama makes clear use of force being considered Second UNSC meeting takes place British Parliament votes against supporting military action, despite report from JIC that CW were used and ‘highly likely’ Assad regime responsible US gov’t releases report—IC has ‘high confidence Syrian gov’t used CW in Damascus; Sec. State Kerry says Assad regime has used CW multiple times and that the use of military force is under consideration Obama announces that he will seek authorisation from Congress for use of force France releases intelligence assessment—Assad regime used sarin on 21 Aug and in two earlier attacks, violation of the Geneva Protocol 47 Reaction to Ghouta, 2: Syria joins CWC 9 September 2013 : Russia proposal to place Syrian CW under international control for subsequent destruction in return for no US military strike >>>USRussian negotiations, reach agreement on 14 September In the meantime (12 Sept), Assad regime sends letter to UNSG saying Assad has signed decree providing for the accession of Syria to the CWC 27 September 2013: UNSCR 2118 Endorses US-Russia ‘Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons’ 27 September 2013: OPCW-UN Joint Mission to oversee timely elimination of Syrian chemical weapons program 14 October 2013 Syria joins CWC, with an accelerated deadlines for dealation and destruction 23 October 201: Syria submits initial formal CW declaration UNSGM investigation concluded December 2013 48 24 Three issues: 1. Destruction of declared capabilities Declared Syrian CW Production Facilities were verified as functionally inoperable by 1 November 2012 (unfilled munitions also destroyed in Syria) 1300 tonnes of declared CW were first removed from Syria (fear Assad regime would change its mind) and then destroyed—US cargo ship adapted to have CW destruction unit onboard, and CW were destroyed at sea >>Destruction of declared facilities and stockpile completed 49 Three issues, 2: 2. Syrian’s declaration –full and complete? April 2014 OPCW established a Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to verify Syria’s declaration This is still on-going; the 23 Feb 2024 report from OPCW states that: ‘Considering theidentified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete….’ (https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/02/ec105dg12 %28e%29.pdf) 50 25 Three issues, 3: 3. On-going CW use in Syria Use of CW by the Assad regime resumes in 2014 (first chlorine, later sarin), after Syria joined the CWC Various investigations: OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM), UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) International response and open question of how to bring Syria into compliance with the CWC 51 Continued Use and New Investigations April 2014: The OPCW established the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) with a mandate to determine whether CW used, not to attribute use Come under fire in May 2014>>>emphasis on remote work August 2015: OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) established by UNSCR 2235 to provide attribution (identify those responsible) for cases of CW use substantiated by FFM. Mandate renewed in 2016. November 2017: renewal of JIM mandate vetoed by Russia (UNSC) June 2018: the Conference of State Parties of the OCPW establish the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of specific cases of CW use in Syria. Can only investigate cases where FFM determined that use of likely use of CW has occurred, as well 52 as cases for which JIM did not issue a report. 29/02/20 24 52 26 Overall findings FFM: (https://www.opcw.org/fact-finding-mission) Has issued 19 reports covering 71 instances of alleged CW use Concluded that CW used or likely used in 20 instances—14 cases of chlorine use, 3 cases of sarin use, and 3 cases of mustard use. JIM attributed: (https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/JIM-Fact-SheetJuly2018.pdf) Investigated 11 cases Attributed four CW incidents the Syrian regime (3 chlorine, 1 sarin) Attributed three CW incidents to the Islamic State (IS) (mustard) IIT attributed (to date): (https://www.opcw.org/iit) Three cases in Ltamenah in March 2017 to Syria (2 sarin and 1 chlorine) One case in Saaqib in February 2018 to Syria (chlorine) One case in Douma in April 2018 (chlorine) 53 Further response to Syrian use of CW Condemnation: Use of chemical weapons widely condemned, including by Russia and Syria who claim other parties are responsible for CW use in Syria Military force:[Military operations also carried out with aim to defeat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] April 2017: US launched a missile strike (57 missiles) against a Syrian airbase following CW attack April 2018: France, UK and US launch missiles (> 114) against alleged CW facilities Suspension by OPCW: in April 2021, the Conference of State Parties suspended certain rights and privileges of Syria under the CWC Sanctions: by various states and the EU (not by the UN, where Russia and China vetoed sanctions in the UNSC) War crimes: Collection of evidence, etc by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry; International Partnership against Impunity for Use of Chemical Weapons Assistance: to actual and potential victims of chemical warfare—training, medical assistance, etc. Universal jurisdiction: allows prosecution of war crimes, etc. in different countries 54 27 55 Further challenges Evolution of science and technology Not just agents but also production technology How to make sure verification regime is fit for purpose Increase in geopolitical conflict—how to keep (restore) cooperative actions at OPCW? Sustain ability and will to investigate allegations of use ? Utility of challenge inspections (inhibited by fear of tit for tat, as well as by relative priority of CW issues on state agendas) How to bring states back into compliance? Further progress on universality? After destruction (of declared stockpiles), what is role of OPCW? Misinformation 56 28 Big questions….. One way of understanding chemical weapons convention is that it was a vehicle for shared norms and engagement—US provided lots of money for Russian destruction of CW, for demilitarisation (and in relation to CBN as a whole, through Cooperative Threat Reduction) But at least one reading of the current situation is that we are witnessing the failure of this approach, that this, and the broader approach underlying it based on a ‘liberal world order,’ has failed. At same time, the utility of military force as a means of solving fundamental problems of order in international relations is also challenged by experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan (and previous examples as well). >>>Where does that leave us? If these interpretations are correct, what tools are we left with? Does this take us back to containment and deterrence from the Cold War? 57 Despite current challenges and questions….. the CWC stands as a major achievement, as do aspects of current response to challenges, including: the destruction of the declared Syrian stockpile in the midst of a civil war, the first amendment of the Schedules of the CWC, and the creation of the IIT, which removes the threat of UNSC veto on the investigation and attribution of alleged use of chemical weapons. 58 29