Lecture Notes: Nuclear Safeguards (Part 2) PDF

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Nuclear Safeguards (Part 2) Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi 1  Nuclear Material Accountancy 2  Nuclear Material Accountancy Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) is the principle...

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Nuclear Safeguards (Part 2) Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi 1  Nuclear Material Accountancy 2  Nuclear Material Accountancy Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) is the principle means employed by the IAEA to independently verify the correctness of the accounting information produced by facility operators and the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material – this is complemented by containment and surveillance (C/S) measures NMA responsibilities exist at the Facility, State, and IAEA levels 3  Elements of Nuclear Material Accounting Establishment of accounting areas Record keeping Nuclear material measurement Preparation and submission of accounting reports Verification of the correctness of the nuclear material accounting information 4  Material Balance Areas (MBAs) An area in or outside of a facility such that: – the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each MBA can be determined – the physical inventory of nuclear material in each MBA can be determined when necessary Design information made available to the IAEA is used to determine MBAs and to select Key Measurement Points (KMPs) – used to determine the nuclear material flows and inventories 5  Criteria for Establishing MBAs In determining MBAs, the IAEA uses the following criteria: – size of MBA should be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established – in determining the MBA, advantage should be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and concentrate measurement efforts at KMPs simplifies the application of safeguards – a number of MBAs in use at a facility may be combined into one MBA to be used for Agency accounting purposes – if the State requests, a special MBA around a process step involving commercially sensitive information may be established 6  Strategic Points in a Facility Strategic Point: location selected during examination of design information where the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified – a ‘strategic point’ may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed Key measurement point (KMP): a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory – KMPs include the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in MBAs 7  Example: MBAs in a U Conversion and Fuel Fabrication Facility Input: Storage raw Storage waste UF6 material UF6 Conversion UF6 to UO2 Output: Storage UO2 Fabrication UO2 UO2 pellets pellets pellets Fuel element fabrication =KMP Output: UO2 Fuel assembly Fuel assembly Assemblies storage fabrication 8  Design Information Verification 9  DIV: Objectives Principal objective: establish basis for inspections at declared facilities, and ensure that the arrangements chosen remain appropriate: – Understand possible means through which the facility could be used to further a State’s nuclear weapons ambitions, and approve facility for dedicated peaceful use, as appropriate – Understand the nuclear materials accountancy system to be implemented at the facility and the interaction with the national authority (IAEA safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the State's system. INFCIRC/153, para 7) 10  DIV: Objectives Develop a safeguards approach that will ensure timely detection of: a. Diversion of nuclear materials from declared flows and inventories; b. Detection of facility misuse as may be relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for purposes unknown; and c. Detection of facility modifications that might alter the capability of a facility or render the safeguards approach ineffective 11  DIV Spans Facility Life Cycle 1. Pre-Construction (Design and Planning) Phase 2. Construction Phase 3. Commissioning Phase 4. Operating Phase 5. Maintenance/Modification Phase 6. Shutdown Phase 7. Closed Down Phase a. State of Preservation b. State of Decommissioning 8. Decommissioned for Safeguards Purposes 12  Design Information Process DIQ: Design Information Questionnaire: – Operator prepares, State (SSAC) approves and transmits under formal arrangements. Marked as “SAFEGUARDS CONFIDENTIAL” to protect security and proprietary information. DIE: Design Information Examination: – Inspectors review DIQ and any supplemental information, conduct review with SSAC authority, facility operator DIV: Design Information Verification 13  What does a DIQ look like? The DIQ has a common part and then supplemental parts tailored to each type of facility For simple facilities, the DIQ may be 10 pages long when completed. For complex facilities, e.g., reprocessing plants, the DIQ may be 300 + pages long and include information in the form of drawings and photographs 14  Establishment of Requirements of NM Accounting and Control 7. Physical inventory taking 8. Shipper/receiver differences 9. Material balance closing 10. Measurement control 11. Application of containment and surveillance measures 12. International transfers of NM 13. Inspections 15