Lecture 10: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Nuclear Safeguards (Introduction) Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi 1  Introduction and Basics of International Safeguards 2  “3S” Integration - Safeguards Nuclear Saf...

NUCE 304: Evaluative Methods for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Nuclear Safeguards (Introduction) Dr. Ahmed Alkaabi 1  Introduction and Basics of International Safeguards 2  “3S” Integration - Safeguards Nuclear Safety Operating conditions, prevention of “3S” Culture accidents/mitigation of consequences, resulting in the protection of workers, the public, and the environment from undue radiological hazards Nuclear Safeguards Prevention and detection of theft or diversion of special nuclear material from civilian facilities through the use of material control and accountancy Nuclear Security Prevention and detection of, and response to sabotage, unauthorized access, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities 3  “3S” Integration - Safeguards Operations Elements work Training Administrative together to provide safe, Safety, Safeguards secure, & Security reliable, and Engineering & economically Technical Services Maintenance viable electric energy Emergency Response 4  “3S” Integration - Safeguards Safety Input: UF6 Storage raw material UF6 bulk Storage waste Conversion UF6 to UO2 bulk Output: Storage UO2 Fabrication UO2 UO2 pellets pellets pellets NDA visual inspection NDA pellet counter Fuel element item fabrication item NDA fuel rod scanner Output: UO2 Fuel assembly Fuel assembly Assemblies storage fabrication =KMP Safeguards Security canberra.com 5  “3S” Integration - Safeguards Definition: Nuclear Safeguards: “A set of measures implemented to verify that States comply with their international (i.e. Treaty) obligations not to use nuclear materials for nuclear explosives.” Measures include: – Nuclear Material Accountancy – Containment and Surveillance – Design Verification – Reports & Inspections Consider impacts on – and synergies with – nuclear safety and security… 6  Introduction and Basics of International Safeguards 7  Introduction and Basics of International Safeguards Why Safeguards? We will first start from a short historic overview of the first nuclear weapons project and first and only use of nuclear weapons in a war to demonstrate: – the power of nuclear weapons – why we don’t want nuclear weapons to ever be used again – the importance of safeguarding nuclear materials 8  The Manhattan Project Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves Project Director Started in 1942 Secret project Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer 120,000 Laboratory Director persons 2 billions USD Source: J.M. Crété, “Overview of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, CICAS-Introductory Course of Agency Safeguards 9  Trinity Test The first nuclear explosion in “Jornada del Muerto” Alamogordo, New Mexico, 16 July 1945 Source: J.M. Crété, “Overview of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, CICAS-Introductory Course of Agency Safeguards 10  “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” The nuclear bomb detonated in Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 (20000 tons TNT) The bomb detonated in Nagasaki on 9 August 1945 (21000 tons TNT) Source: J.M. Crété, “Overview of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, CICAS-Introductory Course of Agency Safeguards 11  Effects of Nuclear Weapons The energy released from a nuclear weapon can be divided into four basic categories: Blast - 40-60% of total energy Thermal radiation - 30-50% of total energy Ionizing radiation - 5% of total energy Residual radiation - 5-10% of total energy 12  Blast Effects Source: J.M. Crété, “Overview of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, CICAS-Introductory Course of Agency Safeguards 13  Thermal Effects Image:Gisei32.jpg When thermal radiation strikes an object, part will be reflected, part transmitted, and the rest absorbed. The fraction that is absorbed depends on the nature and color of the material. A thin material may transmit a lot. A light colored object may reflect much of the incident radiation and thus escape damage. The absorbed thermal radiation raises the temperature of the surface and results in scorching, charring, and burning of wood, paper, fabrics, etc. If the material is a poor thermal conductor, the heat is confined to the surface of the material. At Hiroshima, "shadows" were burnt into the walls by the flash burn of the thermal radiation. On this victim of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the pattern of the kimono is clearly visible as burns on the skin. Source: J.M. Crété, “Overview of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, CICAS-Introductory Course of Agency Safeguards 14  Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy At the same time there are a lot of peaceful applications of nuclear energy – production of electricity – medical diagnostics – medical treatments – food irradiation – oil well logging – nondestructive assay of materials – etc. Source: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_T2hqpQCAGsc/TLqEWj8io8I/AAAAAAAAACw/XPSFpgqOyiE/s1600/Nuclear-Power.jpg 15  The Mandate: IAEA Statute (1957) Art. III. Functions – A. 5. Establish and administer Safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials…made available by the Agency …are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement… 16  International Safeguards Regime This was the beginning of the international safeguards regime that we are going to discuss now The primary goal of this regime and International Atomic Energy Agency is to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and to ensure that fissile material is only used for peaceful purposes Source: http://iaea.org 17  Why Control Nuclear Materials? Building blocks for nuclear weapons Special Nuclear Weapon Design Material Manufacturing Capabilities 18  What are IAEA Safeguards? The safeguards system comprises measures by which the IAEA independently verifies the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities Safeguards are designed to ensure that safeguarded items are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose – applied by the IAEA to verify that commitments made by States under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled Measures are implemented under various types of agreements and protocols 19  Components of the IAEA Safeguards System Nuclear Material Accountancy Containment and Surveillance Design Verification Reports Inspections 20  Objectives of IAEA Safeguards Objective 1: – Timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection Objective 2: – The detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State 21  Safeguards Agreements and Applications 22  Safeguards Agreements and Applications An agreement for the application of safeguards concluded between the IAEA and a State or a group of States – in certain cases, with a regional or bilateral inspectorate, such as Euratom and ABACC – agreement is concluded either because of the requirements of a project and supply agreement to satisfy the relevant requirements of bilateral or multilateral arrangements (treaties) at the request of a State to any of that State’s nuclear activities – there are various types of these 23  Types of Safeguards Agreements INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement: based on INFCIRC/66 Agreement specifies the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, facilities and/or equipment to be safeguarded Prohibits the use of the specified items in such a way as to further any military purpose 24  Types of Safeguards Agreements INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement: concluded on the basis of INFCIRC/153 rev.2 Comprehensive Voluntary offer agreement Small Quantity Protocol safeguards agreement (VOA): (SQP): (CSA): concluded between the IAEA Concluded between the and a NWS IAEA and a State Applies safeguards on NWS voluntarily offers to all declared nuclear The state has less than allay concerns that safeguards material in all declared specified minimal could lead to commercial nuclear activities disadvantages quantities on nuclear in a State Some or all material material/facilities The state has no Follows format of nuclear material in the INFCIRC/153, but not facility comprehensive IAEA has concluded VOAs with each of the five NWS’s 25  Additional Protocol Coverage Source: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0707.pdf 26  Examples of Reductions in Safeguards Measures under IS Irradiated fuel – Timeliness goal extended from 3 to 12 months Fresh MOX fuel in LWRs – Timeliness goal extended from 1 to 3 months Verification of indirect use of material – Method: one level lower 27  State-Level SG Approach Designed for each State – combination of SG approaches for the specific facility types present in the State taking into account: – IAEA State evaluation – State nuclear fuel cycle – Interaction between facilities – Other State-specific features 28  Non-Compliance Violation by a State of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA – Examples: The diversion of nuclear material from declared nuclear activities The failure to declare nuclear material required to be placed under safeguards Under an additional protocol, the failure to declare nuclear material, nuclear activities, or nuclear related activities required to be declared Violation of the agreed recording and reporting system Obstruction of the activities of IAEA inspectors Interference with the operation of safeguards equipment – If State is found to be in non-compliance, the IAEA Director General shall report to the IAEA Board of Governors Which would call upon the recipient State to remedy any non-compliance 29  Types of Non-Compliance Diversion of nuclear material: – A particular case of non-compliance that would include: The undeclared removal of declared nuclear material from a safeguarded facility The use of a safeguarded facility for the introduction, production or processing of undeclared nuclear material The undeclared production of plutonium in a reactor through irradiation and subsequent removal of undeclared uranium targets Misuse: – A particular case of non-compliance that would include the use of the non-nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities or information specified and placed under safeguards to further any proscribed purpose 30  Exemption from IAEA Safeguards A State may request exemption for nuclear material up to certain specified limits A State may also request exemption for nuclear material related to the intended use – Gram quantities as a sensing component in instruments – Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of 238Pu exceeding 80% If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with safeguarded material, reapplication of safeguards on the exempted material is required 31  Safeguards Approaches Safeguards Agreement Signed Safeguards Approach Establish Safeguards Acquire Facility Establish Measures Information Safeguards Goals to be Implemented Identify Diversion Paths Identify Acquisition Paths Analyze Safeguards Approach Analyze Safeguards Approach Versus Diversion Paths Versus Acquisition Paths No Meet Goals? Yes 32  Nuclear Materials – A Few Definitions Source material: – natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium does not apply to ore or ore residue does apply to ore concentrate Fissionable material: – an isotope or a mixture of isotopes capable of nuclear fission Special fissionable material: – 239Pu, 233U,uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233, or any material containing one or more of the former does not include source material 33  Material Type Material type: classification of nuclear material according to the element contained and, for uranium, the degree of enrichment – Types are Plutonium Uranium U-233 Thorium Depleted Natural Low Enriched Highly Enriched 34  Direct and Indirect Use Material Nuclear material Direct Use Indirect Use Includes plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu, HEU and 233U All nuclear material except direct use includes chemical compounds, material mixtures of direct use materials Unirradiated Irradiated Material that does not Material in contain substantial irradiated form, amounts of fission e.g. irradiated products nuclear fuel 35  Significant Quantity (SQ) Approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of Direct Use Nuclear Material manufacturing a Pu (Pu-238 < 80%) 8 kg nuclear explosive U-233 8 kg device cannot be HEU (U-235 ≥ 20%) 25 kg excluded Indirect Use Nuclear Material – Accounts for unavoidable losses LEU (U-235 < 20%) 75 kg due to conversion Natural U 10 t and manufacturing Depleted U 20 t processes Th 20 t – Not critical masses – Used in establishing the quantity component of the IAEA inspection goal 36  References IAEA Safeguards Glossary – Available at http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3- cd/PDF/NVS3_scr.pdf The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards – Available at http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/NVS2_web.pdf INFCIRC 153 – Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Oth ers/infcirc153.pdf 37