Lecture 9 - Groupthink and Mass-Killings PDF

30317 – Political Science and Comparative Politics Umberto Platini Groupthink and war atrocities [email protected] Outline What are mass killings and genocides?...

30317 – Political Science and Comparative Politics Umberto Platini Groupthink and war atrocities [email protected] Outline What are mass killings and genocides? How can they be rationalized? The case of strategic bombing What is “groupthink”? How can it lead to suboptimal outcomes? To what extent can we talk about of groupthink problems about the conflict in Gaza? The remaining part of the problem: Why do individuals comply with orders of mass killing? A few definitions Mass killing: the intentional killing of a significant number of the members of any group of noncombatants (as the group and its membership are defined by the perpetrator) Genocide: acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group -> A specific subset of mass killings in which the victim group is defined on the basis of its ethnicity/nationality/race/religion Societal cleavages and mass killings Traditional explanations focus on societal cleavages and dehumanization Societal cleavages and hatred/dehumanization are often present in mass killings —> Mass killings are the result of societal cleavages and incomprehensible/ irrational hatred What’s wrong with this explanation? Societal cleavages and mass killings Traditional explanations focus on societal cleavages and dehumanization Societal cleavages and hatred/dehumanization are often present in mass killings —> Mass killings are the result of societal cleavages and incomprehensible/ irrational hatred What’s wrong with this explanation? Selection on the DV… Many more instances of hatred toward other groups did not lead to mass killings Mass killings in China/Cambodia/USSR/Algeria targeted people of similar groups without long history of cleavages and hatred These explanations assume that society at large supports mass killings but that’s rare Mass killings To find out why mass killings and genocides happen, we need to answer two questions: 1. Why leaders order mass killings (strategic logic of mass killings) 2. Why perpetrators/followers participate in mass killings Leaders and mass killings Leaders order mass killings when they think they might be beneficial Groupthink issues The structure of the conflict can explain conditions under which leaders perceive mass killings to be strategically useful: Structure of international conflict Structure of civil conflict Structure of insurgent groups The case of strategic bombing Definitions Coercion: threat to inflect pain on target if target does not accede to demands Strategic bombing: Deliberate use of aerial attacks against the enemy’s military, industrial, and civilian infrastructure to weaken its ability to wage war. Contrast with tactical bombing, which focuses on specific military targets. The case of strategic bombing In long/devastating interstate conflicts, leaders sometimes resort to mass killings when they find victory to be difficult/unattainable using other means Particularly, countries may use strategic bombing to coerce enemy: 1. Break morale of population or get them to rebel against their leaders 2. Destroy infrastructure and degrade economic and military output 3. Decapitation/Kill the leadership The case of strategic bombing In long/devastating interstate conflicts, leaders sometimes resort to mass killings when they find victory to be difficult/unattainable using other means Particularly, countries may use strategic bombing to coerce enemy: 1. Break morale of population or get them to rebel against their leaders 2. Destroy infrastructure and degrade economic and military output 3. Decapitation/Kill the leadership “We must achieve two things: first, we must make [German towns] physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim is therefore two-fold, name to produce: (i) destruction; and (ii) the fear of death.” British strategic bombing planners during WWII (quoted in Valentino 2002; Pape 1996) The case of strategic bombing Japanese Bombing of Chongqing 1939-42 3000? tons of bombs >30,000? people killed Did not lead to Chinese surrender The case of strategic bombing German bombing of UK (The Blitz) 1940-41 12,000? tons of bombs over 8 months >30,000 people killed Millions of houses damaged Did not lead to British surrender The case of strategic bombing US bombing of TOKYO >1600? tons (1 night) 80,000 - 150,000? killed Around same number killed in Hiroshima, more than Nagasaki Entire campaign killed up to 900k people Did not lead to Japanese surrender (surrendered 5 months later) The case of strategic bombing US bombing of North Korea 1950-53 >600,000 tons (>30,000 Napalm) 80,000 - 150,000 killed North Korea did not surrender Pyongyang in 1953 after 75% of the city was destroyed. Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty The case of strategic bombing US bombing of Vietnam Operation Roaring Thunder 1965-68 7.5 million tons of bombs on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia >200k killed in Rolling Thunder North Vietnam did not surrender The case of strategic bombing STRATEGIC BOMBING DOESN’T WORK 1. Break morale of population or get them to rebel against their leaders 2. Destroy infrastructure and degrade economic and military output 3. Decapitation/Kill the leadership The case of strategic bombing STRATEGIC BOMBING DOESN’T WORK 1. Break morale of population or get them to rebel against their leaders Bombing leads to anger and apathy, not rebellion Government propaganda uses this to demonize enemy 2. Destroy infrastructure and degrade economic and military output 3. Decapitation/Kill the leadership The case of strategic bombing STRATEGIC BOMBING DOESN’T WORK 1. Break morale of population or get them to rebel against their leaders 2. Destroy infrastructure and degrade economic and military output Affects citizens much earlier than government War economies have been quite resilient, partly because military has priority 3. Decapitation/Kill the leadership The case of strategic bombing STRATEGIC BOMBING DOESN’T WORK 1. Break morale of population or get them to rebel against their leaders 2. Destroy infrastructure and degrade economic and military output 3. Decapitation/Kill the leadership Destroying entire cities to kill a few individuals may work But high-up leaders are often the most protected (underground bunkers/ hidden/etc) Groupthink “Groupthink refers to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” Janis, Irving. "Victims of groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes." (1972). In other words: a psychological phenomenon where the desire for consensus and cohesion leads a group to make poor decisions by suppressing dissent and ignoring alternatives The book proposed some case studies: Bay of Pigs failure during the Kennedy Presidency Korean War Vietnam escalation under Lindon Johnson Pearl Harbour Groupthink Organizational features Structural elements: Insulation of the Group Lack of tradition of impartial leadership Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures Homogeneity of member’s social background Triggering elements: High stress/Low hope of a better solution Low self esteem/Insecurity/political uncertainty Symptoms of Groupthink: Overestimation of the group: Illusion of invulnerability: overconfidence of one’s own means Belief in inherent morality of the group: Translating policy decisions on ethical or moral grounds that leave little space to the alternatives Closed-Mindedness: Collective Rationalizations: Encapsulating the issue at hand on larger frames of understanding that are common in the group (fight against communism) Stereotypes of Out-Groups: Bidimensional and simplistic view of the enemy Pressures Towards uniformity: Self-Censorship Illusion of Unanimity Direct Pressure on Dissenters Self-appointed mindguards: Individuals who filter alternative information flows to the decision maker. Symptoms of Defective Decision-Making: Incomplete survey of alternatives Incomplete survey of objectives Failure to examine risks of preferred choice Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives Poor information search Selective Bias in Processing Information at hand Failure to work out contingency plans Groupthink and the Cuban invasion In April 1961, the U.S. government, under the administration of President John F. Kennedy, launched an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The plan was to overthrow Fidel Castro and his USSR-aligned communist regime The invasion was poorly planned, executed without proper support, and quickly crushed by Cuban forces, leading to a major embarrassment for the U.S. government. Groupthink and the Cuban invasion Groupthink symptoms: Illusion of invulnerability: The group was excessively optimistic about the success of the operation. Members believed that the invasion would trigger a mass uprising against Castro and that the plan would unfold without serious complications. Belief in the Inherent Morality of the Group: The decision-makers believed that their cause—overthrowing a communist government in Cuba—was morally justified. This made them overlook the ethical and strategic implications of intervening militarily in another sovereign country, particularly given the potential for civilian casualties and international condemnation. Stereotyped Views of Out-Groups: The U.S. leadership stereotyped Castro and his regime as weak and easily overthrown. They underestimated the Cuban military’s capacity Groupthink and the Cuban invasion The reasons behind the failure Flawed planning: No contingency plan in place for the unsuccess of ground invasion Lack of critical debate: The group did not thoroughly examine whether non-military options, such as diplomatic pressure or covert actions. Overreliance on air support: When the bombing campaign was scaled back for fear of provoking the Soviet Union, it severely weakened the invasion's chances of success Misreading of the Cuban public sentiment: The US did not realize the widespread popularity of Castro’s regime, and its ability to mobilize support Groupthink and the Cuban invasion The positive side The failure of the invasion allowed Kennedy to implement a radically different decision processes in future crises Kennedy established that a series of meetings had to be convened without him to avoid indirect censorship of dissent Opened procedures for greater critical debate Allowed the successful de-escalation of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis Groupthink and Vietnam Before 1964, U.S. military involvement was limited to providing aid and advisors to the South Vietnamese government. As the Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese support for the communist forces grew, the U.S. faced increasing pressure for greater intervention After the Gulf of Tonkin Incident 1964 President Johnson acquired authority to escalate U.S. military involvement without a formal declaration of war. Massive buildup of U.S. troops, along with bombing campaigns like Operation Rolling Thunder. Despite increasing military commitments, the U.S. was unable to achieve a decisive victory Janis argues that the Vietnam case contains significant elements of groupthinking Groupthink and Vietnam Illusion of Invulnerability: Overconfidence in the ability of the U.S. military to achieve victory. Key decision- makers believed that the U.S. could win the war through sheer military force. Collective Rationalization: Domino theory assumed that if Vietnam were allowed to be communist, communism would have spread all over (self-fulfilling prophecy that allows for escalation) Belief in the Inherent Morality of the Group: Need to contain communism. Stereotyped Views of Out-Groups: The Johnson administration largely viewed North Vietnam as a puppet of the Soviet Union and China, ignoring the strong nationalist motivations. Pressure on dissenters: George Ball, one of the few high-ranking officials who consistently opposed the escalation of the war, was marginalized in discussions Groupthink and GAZA? > 80’000 tons of explosives 1.9 million Gazan displaced Around 43 000 killed (70% women and children) 280 aid workers killed since last October 1200 Israeli and foreign victims of the October 7th Hamas pogrom (282 women and 36 children) 250 (38 children) taken hostage. 93 still in Hamas’ hands Groupthink and GAZA? Groupthinking and success Yetiv, Steve A. "Groupthink and the gulf crisis." British Journal of Political Science 33.3 (2003) Not all episodes where groupthink is present leads to suboptimal outcomes The Gulf Crisis: Invasion of Kuwait (August 2, 1990) On August 2, 1990, Iraq, led by President Saddam Hussein, invaded and quickly occupied Kuwait. The United States, under President George H.W. Bush, led an international coalition of 35 countries to oppose Iraq’s aggression. On January 1991, Operation Desert storm launched a large air campaign On February, the deployment of ground forces liberated Kuwait in less than 100 hours. Most decisions were taken by President Bush together with his close councilmen (gang of 8) Groupthinking and the Gulf Crisis Elements of groupthinking during the gulf crisis: Homogeneity of member’s background: Most of the members of the gang of eight were close on a personal level, sharing common values and experiences. Informal and unstructured decision procedures were put in place in a setting where the President discouraged frictions. The Bush administration strongly framed the Gulf Crisis as a moral struggle, portraying Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a clear-cut case of aggression that required a firm response Groupthinking and the Gulf Crisis Elements of groupthinking during the gulf crisis: Stereotyped views of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Saddam was seen as an irrational and unpredictable actor. Closed path towards negotiations The growing momentum toward military action likely discouraged some individuals from expressing their doubts about the potential risks and long-term consequences of war. Unchallenged the determination of the President for a military solution NSA advisor Scowcroft's strong alignment with the president’s views and his commitment to maintaining group cohesion may have prevented deeper exploration of diplomatic alternatives Groupthinking and the Gulf Crisis Why not a failure? President Bush’s experience in several diplomatic posts, the job as CIA director and the years as a high- level official in Washington were instrumental in gathering a large consensus in the international community Colin Powell’s stress on the security of US military personnel allowed for a prudent and overcapable deployment of forces. Unexpected fragility of Iraqi forces Does that mean we should not worry about groupthinking? Groupthinking We need to be careful to take Groupthink as a generalizable statistical regularity for failures and successes Groupthink theory does not rely on large-N case sample, they are often selected cases However, it is still a compelling theory Some elements of flawed decision making highlighted by the theory are intuitively bad How should we think about groupthink then? If something bad happens and elements of groupthink are present, it may not mean that every time symptoms emerge, a tragedy will occur Tragedy are still a possibility through (better safe than sorry) We still need to be alert. Devise procedures that allow for the careful consideration of all alternatives Flag and demand eplanation to policy-makers when symptoms emerge. The case of strategic bombing WHY DO FOLLOWERS/INSURGENTS FOLLOW ORDERS OF GENOCIDE OR MASS KILLING? Individuals committing atrocities WHY DO FOLLOWERS/INSURGENTS FOLLOW ORDERS OF GENOCIDE OR MASS KILLING? The Milgram Experiment Two participants (1 actor, 1 recruit) Supposedly randomized into “teacher” and “learner” (actor is always learner) Teacher asks learner to complete a word pair If learner answers incorrectly, teacher administers (FAKE) electric shock Learner (actor) pretends that the shocks are real Shocks increasing from 15 volts (“Slight”) to 450 (“Danger: Severe Shock”) Individuals committing atrocities WHY DO FOLLOWERS/INSURGENTS FOLLOW ORDERS OF GENOCIDE OR MASS KILLING? The Stanford Experiment University students recruited Randomly assigned to act as guards or prisoners Supposed to last for two weeks, ended after 6 days https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAX9b7agT9o Individuals committing atrocities WHY DO FOLLOWERS/INSURGENTS FOLLOW ORDERS OF GENOCIDE OR MASS KILLING? Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 1963 Anna Arendt Individuals committing atrocities Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 1963, Anna Arendt Who are the perpetrators? Are they absolute monsters and criminals? How does Eichmann look? Are all Fascist/Nazi supporters complicit to the crimes of their regimes? What are the implications of your answer? Individuals committing atrocities Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 1963, Anna Arendt Who are the perpetrators? Are they absolute monsters and criminals? How does Eichmann look? Are all Fascist/Nazi supporters complicit to the crimes of their regimes? What are the implications of your answer? Average citizens can become perpetrators of atrocious crimes when embedded in structure that normalizes the need for the elimination of a target group. Societal and organizational structures assign values to individuals. Rejecting the values in a totalitarian society which assigns sub-human worth to groups of individuals can require cognitive, cultural and emotional means that are beyond the endowment of the average person. (do you agree?) It is necessary to build resilient cultures against values that allow for the enactment of violence.