Introduction to Philosophy of Mind - Lecture 12 (2025)

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 2025 Reminders ∙Our last lecture (end of module 2): Thursday 10th April ∙Tutorial: Monday 14 April th ∙Module 2 test: Thursday 17 th April  Theory of...

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 2025 Reminders ∙Our last lecture (end of module 2): Thursday 10th April ∙Tutorial: Monday 14 April th ∙Module 2 test: Thursday 17 th April  Theory of Mind Physicalis Dualism m Mind and body are Mind/brain Functionalis distinct identity m substance s (Reduction (Non- ist) reductionist ) Functionalism ∙Like a shelter or a mouse trap, a mental state can be identified by its function, not the physical parts that make it up. ∙Pain can be ‘C’ fibres firing; such and such state in an alien; or XYZ in an octopus. ∙A belief/emotion/sensory impression is not defined by the physical things that make it up, but by their role in our lives. ∙The mind is not reducible to the brain. For example: ∙Pain: ∙The belief that it is Caused by: damage to raining: tissue; extreme Caused by temperature; etc seeing/perceiving that it Causes: crying, is raining. cursing, feeling Causes sighing, scared, desire to bringing an umbrella move, etc etc. Qualia and functionalism ∙Qualia = The subjective experience/what it is like from the inside. E.g. The feeling of pain is not just damaged tissue and shouting/swearing, etc. There is also something that it is like to be in pain. This can be generalised to what it is like to see red, taste a lemon, feel sad, etc. ∙Functionalism = mental states are ‘what they do’ Are ‘zombies’ possible? ∙A philosophical zombie = something that is in every way like us, but just without the ‘qualia’. ∙Looks like us, even on the inside. ∙Behaves like us (functionally indistinguishable). ∙Will laugh when tickled, but won’t have the sensation of being tickled. ∙Is this possible? Philosophical zombies ∙If a zombie is possible, then functionalism can’t be right. ∙Zombies are functionally identical to us, but don’t have a ‘mind’. ∙So are they possible? ∙Conceptually possible?/Actually possible? However: ∙If zombies are possible, then we are left with the causal problem again. ∙How can we understand ‘consciousness’ as playing any kind of role? How would you make a zombie? ∙E.g. Clone someone’s DNA? ∙Wouldn’t that person also have consciousness? ∙What needs to be added to the biological organism that we are to make us conscious? So, are zombies possible? ∙Initial intuition: why not? ∙But perhaps there is reason to think they are not possible. ∙Something that is like us in every physical way will be like us in every way.