Introduction to Philosophy of Mind - Lecture Slides

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 2025 Reminders ∙Our last lecture (end of module 2): Thursday 10th April ∙Tutorial: Monday 14 April th ∙Module 2 test: Thursday 17 th April Do you think mind/brain identity is a good resp...

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 2025 Reminders ∙Our last lecture (end of module 2): Thursday 10th April ∙Tutorial: Monday 14 April th ∙Module 2 test: Thursday 17 th April Do you think mind/brain identity is a good response to the problem of causation (mind/body problem)? Yes (58%) No (42%)  Theory of Mind Physicalis Dualism m Mind and body are Mind/brain Functionali distinct identity sm substanc es (Reductio (Non- nist) reductionis t) Reductionism vs non-reductionism ∙Mind/brain identity – Reductionist – The mind is the brain, can be identified by looking at the physical things that make it up. ∙Functionalism – Non-reductionist – that the mind (and mental states) are identified by their function or role, not the physical brain state. Functionalism (non-reductionist) ∙Like a shelter, pain can be identified by its function, not the physical parts that make it up. ∙Pain can be ‘C’ fibres firing; such and such state in an alien; or XYZ in an octopus. ∙A belief/emotion/sensory impression is not defined by the physical things that make it up, but by their role in our lives. For example: ∙Pain: ∙The belief that it is Is caused by: damage to raining: tissue; extreme Caused by temperature; etc seeing/perceiving that it Causes: crying, cursing, is raining. feeling scared, desire to Causes certain emotions, move, etc desires, intention, e.g. to get umbrella. Cannot be defined/identified Is related to other beliefs in terms of its constituent parts. about what rain is etc. Hardware/software analogy ∙A computer is made up of physical components. ∙It can perform processes that can’t be understood in those terms. ∙E.g. Can perform calculations. Performing calculations is not reducible to whatever physical events are happening. How satisfactory is functionalism? ∙A mouse trap is not identified by its physical make up, but in each instance we can understand how the parts come together to perform that function. ∙There is no mystery as to how the parts perform the function that they do. Hardware/software analogy ∙It may be a mystery to me how the hardware of a phone or computer can do what it does, ∙But it can’t be a mystery to everyone. ∙There is a physical explanation for how a computer can perform particular functions. Is this analogous to the brain/mind? ∙It is a mystery to me how brain states give rise to mental states. (e.g. how particular physical state XYZ can be an instance of feeling happy) ∙Is it mysterious because I do not know, or because I cannot know how brain states gives rise to mental states? ∙I do not know: I can be brought to Functionalism ∙Denies that mental states are identified by particular physical states. ∙But accepts that mental states are physical states (of varying kinds). ∙There is an explanatory gap as to how those physical states can be mental states.