Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
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2025
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These lecture slides cover the philosophy of mind, focusing on theories such as mind/brain identity and functionalism. Key concepts include Leibniz's law, reductionism, and the mind-body problem. Examples using pain, tables, and clocks are used to illustrate philosophical points.
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Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 2025 Mind/brain identity theory ∙Conscious states are physical brain states. ∙E.g. Pain just is ‘C’ fibres firing. Liebniz’s law ∙X and Y are identical if everything true about X is true about Y, and everything true about Y is true about X. M...
Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 2025 Mind/brain identity theory ∙Conscious states are physical brain states. ∙E.g. Pain just is ‘C’ fibres firing. Liebniz’s law ∙X and Y are identical if everything true about X is true about Y, and everything true about Y is true about X. Mind/brain identity ∙Is everything true about the mind true about the brain? ∙Is everything true about the brain true about the mind? Carruthers (your reading): ∙That the concept of mind and the concept of brain can be different, but the fact of the matter is that they are not. Does identity theory help the mind/body problem? ∙Is it the right kind of response to the causal problem? ∙I intend to get a drink: it is not the ‘intention’ as we know it that is doing the causal work. ∙I want to exercise more: if I do, it is not because I want to, but because ‘wanting’ involves some physical cause and effect in my brain. ∙Is there a difference between a reason and a cause? Does identity theory help the mind/body problem? ∙Premise one (that mental/conscious states cause behaviour) gives us the idea that we do have some agency, causal control. ∙But then it turns out that the causal connection is physical. Does this fit with our idea of having agency -the ability to choose? Identity theory and ‘chauvinism’ ∙Chauvinism = prejudice towards a particular kind. ∙Mind/brain identity theory is prejudiced against other kinds of entities having minds. ∙E.g. If pain = ‘C’ fibres firing, then only individuals with the right physical make up can feel pain. Chauvinism ∙Animals or beings with different physical make up cannot feel pain? ∙Can an octopus feel pain? ∙Could an alien? Reductionism vs Non-reductionism ∙Trees or volcanoes can be understood by understanding the nature of their composite parts. They can be reduced to their parts. ∙Mental or mind states, unlike trees and volcanoes, cannot be understood ‘reductively.’ Volcanoes vs mind/brain states ∙Volcano = lava, smoke, magma coming through the earth’s crust etc. ∙(We can identify it with the parts that make it up.) ∙Pain = ‘C’ fibres firing ∙(If we identify it with the parts that make it up, then we get chauvinism.) Reductionism – Can the mind be reduced to the parts that make it up? Mind? Biology Chemistry Physics Quantum physics Reductionism vs non-reductionism ∙Mind/brain identity – Reductionist – The mind is the brain, can be identified by looking at the physical things that make it up. ∙But this seems wrong. ∙Functionalism – Non-reductionist – that the mind (and mental states) are identified by their function or role, not the physical brain state. Theory of Mind Physicalis Dualism m Mind and body are Mind/brain Functionali distinct identity sm substanc es (Reductio (Non- nist) reductionis t) Functionalism ∙Functional kinds: Functionalism (non-reductionist) ∙Like a mouse trap, pain can be defined by its function, not the physical parts that make it up. ∙A mousetrap can be wooden, metal, made of plastic; a cage, a lever, a string: They are all mouse traps because they all share a function. ∙Pain can be C fibres firing; such and such state in an alien; or XYZ in an octopus. Functionalism ∙Does not involve substance dualism (that there is some kind of immaterial stuff). ∙But also does not claim everything mental is reducible to something physical. What do we mean by function? ∙What something does: its role within a complex system of cause and effect. ∙It is a relational term: cannot be understood on its own. For example: ∙A table: Performs function of the thing you eat at/work at etc. Is defined by its function/role within a system. Has properties/uses that are not inherent in the constituent parts. ∙A clock: Performs the function of indicating the time. Can bring about knowledge in someone who sees it. None of its constituent parts can perform that function. For example: ∙Pain: Is caused by: damage to tissue; extreme temperature; etc Causes: crying, cursing, feeling scared, desire to move, etc Cannot be defined/understood in terms of its constituent parts. For example: ∙The belief that it is raining: Caused by seeing/perceiving that it is raining. Causes certain emotions, desires, intention, e.g. to get umbrella. Is related to other beliefs about what rain is etc.