UK Population Demographics PDF

Demography is the study of populations and their characteristics. The Uk’s population size is influenced by natural change (births and deaths) and net migration (immigration and emigration). A natural increase occurs when the number of births is higher than the number of deaths. The fertility rate...

Demography is the study of populations and their characteristics. The Uk’s population size is influenced by natural change (births and deaths) and net migration (immigration and emigration). A natural increase occurs when the number of births is higher than the number of deaths. The fertility rate is the number of live births per 1000 women, aged 15-44 over a year. In 1900, the fertility rate was 115 live births per 1000 women aged 15-44, compared with only 4 per 1000 in 2012. The total fertility rate is the average number of children women will have during their fertile years. The total fertility rate in 1964 was 2.95 children per woman compared to only 1.89 in 2014. Biological barriers can influence this, however, improvements in technology such as IVF have helped overcome this. The birth rate has generally declined since 1900. In 1900 the rate was 28.7 births per 1000 in 1900 compared to 12.2 births per 1000 in 2014. There have been fluctuations in the birth rate during 'baby booms’ such as after the World Wars but the rate has generally declined since 1900. Two factors that determine the birth rate are the proportion of women at childbearing age and the amount of children they have. Changing expectations of women has greatly influenced the birth rate. The increase in educational achievement and employment opportunities may mean women choose to prioritise having a career rather than having a family. Women can also now control how many children they have and when they have them because of the availability of contraception. Hakim (2010) argues that voluntary childlessness is a relatively new lifestyle choice, which could only have been brought about by the contraception revolution. Yet, according to Harper (2012), the education of women is the most important reason for the long-term decline in birth and fertility rates. Harper argues this has led to a change in mindset among women. As a result of these changes, more women now are remaining childless and more women are having children later in life. There has been a significant decline in the number of women aged 24 or under who are having children, whereas there has been a major increase in older mothers aged 40 or over. Additionally, the average age for a mother’s first birth is 30.9 years old whilst in 1970 it was 27 years old. Because women become less fertile as they grow old, these women are having fewer children. For example, in 2012, one in five women aged 45 was childless which is double the number of 25 years earlier. Educated women now are more likely to use family planning but they also see other possibilities in life apart from the traditional role of housewife and mother. The infant mortality rate (IMR) measures the number of infants who die before their first birthday, per thousand babies born alive, per year. In 1900, the IMR for the UK was 154 meaning over 15% of babies died within their first year, by 1950 the UK's IMR had fallen to 30 and by 2012 it stood at 4. The UK's IMR has declined since 1900. One reason for this is better housing and sanitation. This is seen in examples such as cleaner drinking water and flushing toilets. These improvements reduce the risk of infectious diseases and therefore lower the IMR as infants are particularly susceptible to these. From about the 1950s, medical factors began to play a substantial role in the IMR. For example, mass immunisation against childhood diseases, the use of antibiotics to fight infection and improved midwifery and obstetric techniques, all contributed to a continuing fall in the IMR. There were also improved services for mothers and children such as antenatal and postnatal clinics that give advice, support and monitor the health of mothers and babies. Harper (2012) notes that, once a pattern of low fertility lasts for more than one generation, cultural norms about family size change. Smaller families become the norm and large ones come to be seen as less acceptable. Harper argues that a fall in the IMR leads to a fall in the birth rate. This is because, if many infants die, parents have more children to replace those they have lost, thereby increasing the birth rate. By contrast, if infants survive, parents will have fewer of them. Until the late 19th century, children were economic assets to parents because they could be sent out to work to earn an income from an early age. However, since the late 19th century, children have gradually become an economic liability. Laws banning child labour and introducing compulsory schooling mean that children remain economically dependent on their parents for longer. Additionally, there have been changing norms about what children have a right to expect from their parents in material terms. This means that the costs of raising a child have risen. As a result of these financial pressures, parents now feel less able or willing than in the past to have a large family. The increasing child-centredness of the family and society as a whole means that childhood is now socially constructed as a uniquely important period in the individual's life. In terms of family size, this has encouraged a shift from 'quantity' to 'quality'. Parents now have fewer children and lavish more attention and resources on these few. Changes in the number of babies born affect several aspects of society. These include the family, the dependency ratio, and public services and policies. The dependency ratio is the relationship between the size of the productive working population and the size of the dependent/non-working part of the population. The earnings, savings and taxes of the working population must support the dependent population. Children make up a large part of the dependent population, so a fall in the number of children reduces the 'burden of dependency' on the working population. However, in the longer term, fewer babies being born will mean fewer young adults and a smaller working population and so the burden of dependency may begin to increase again and the smaller future working population may struggle to fund the ageing population. Falling fertility rates mean fewer children. As a result, childhood may become a lonelier experience as fewer children will have siblings, and more childless adults may mean fewer voices speaking up in support of children's interests. However, fewer children could mean they will come to be more valued. A lower birth rate has consequences for public services. For example, fewer schools and maternity and child health services may be needed. It also affects the cost of maternity and paternity leave and the types of housing that need to be built. However, many of these are political decisions. For example, instead of reducing the number of schools, the government could decide to have smaller class sizes. Families are smaller due to parents having fewer children compared to in the past when large families were the norm. Smaller family sizes mean that women are more likely to be free to go out to work, therefore creating more dual-earner couples typical of many professional families. This is shown in the decline in full-time mothering and a rise in the number of dual-career families in which couples combine jobs and family life. About 60% of nuclear families are dual-career families. However, family size is only one factor here. For example, higher-income couples may be able to have larger families and still afford childcare that allows them both to work full-time. Additionally, ethnic minority families tend to be larger (this is partly because parents are younger and more fertile). Westwood and Bhachu (1988) observe that the decline in the birth rate does not apply to Aslan families. Gillespie (2003) identifies two potential motivational factors for voluntary childlessness. Some women are attracted by the pull of being child- free, because of the freedom and better relationships with partners that being child-free may involve. Studies indicate that couples are happier without children. There may also be a 'push' factor where some see parenting as conflicting with their careers or leisure interests. These women tend to express little interest in having children. Liberal feminists generally support the decline in the birth rate because it allows women more freedom over their lives for example pursuing a career if they wish. Wilkinson (1994) argues that there has been a ground-breaking shift in female expectations since the 1960s that has led to what she calls a 'genderquake' in attitudes. Unlike previous generations of women, women no longer automatically consider motherhood to be an obligation. The New Right would argue that the declining birth rate, caused by female employment and the availability of contraception, negatively impacts society. The New Right views these changes as partly to blame for the demise of the traditional nuclear family which is triggering an alleged moral decline. The death rate is the number of deaths per thousand of the population per year. The UK death rate is decreasing over time. In 1900, the death rate stood at 19, whereas by 2012 it was 8.9, over half of the figure in 1900. There are several reasons why the death rate declined during the 20th century. According to Tranter (1996), over three-quarters of the decline in the death rate from about 1850 to 1970 was due to a fall in the number of deaths from infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis. Deaths from infectious diseases were most common in the young and most of the decline in the death rate occurred among infants, children and young adults. By the 1950s, so-called 'diseases of affluence' such as heart disease had replaced infectious diseases as the main cause of death. These degenerative diseases affect the middle-aged and old more than the young. There are several possible reasons for the decline in deaths from infection. Social factors probably had a much greater impact on infectious diseases. These include improved nutrition. McKeown (1972) argues that improved nutrition accounted for up to half the reduction in death rates, and was particularly important in reducing the number of deaths from TB. Better nutrition increases resistance to infection and so increases the survival chances of those who did become infected. However, McKeown does not explain why females, who receive a smaller share of the family food supply, live longer than males. Similarly, he fails to explain why deaths from some infectious diseases, such as measles and infant diarrhoea, actually rose at a time of improving nutrition. Before the 1950s, medical improvements played almost no part in the reduction of deaths from infectious diseases. However, after the 1950s, improved medical knowledge, techniques and organisation did help to reduce death rates. Advances included the introduction of antibiotics, mass immunisation, blood transfusion, improved maternity services, as well as the setting up of the National Health Service in 1948. More recently, improved medication, bypass surgery and other developments have reduced deaths from heart disease by one-third. According to Harper (2012), the greatest fall in death rates is simply from a reduction in the number of people smoking. However, in the 21st century, obesity has replaced smoking as the new lifestyle epidemic. For example. in 2012, one-quarter of all UK adults were obese. Yet, although obesity has increased dramatically, deaths from obesity have been kept low as a result of drug therapies. Harper suggests that we may be moving to an 'American' health culture where lifestyles are unhealthy but a long lifespan is achieved by the use of costly medication. In the 20th century, more effective central and local governments with the powers to enforce laws led to a range of improvements in public health and the quality of the environment. These included improvements in housing (producing drier, better-ventilated, less overcrowded accommodation), purer drinking water and improved sewage disposal methods. Similarly, the Clean Air Acts have reduced air pollution, such as the smog that led to 4,000 deaths in five days in 1952. Other social changes also played a role in reducing the death rate during the 20th century. These include the decline of dangerous manual jobs such as mining in tandem with increasing health and safety regulations. Smaller family sizes reduce the rate of transmission of infection. Higher incomes in society may also allow for healthier lifestyles. Life expectancy refers to how long on average a person in a given year can expect to live. As death rates have fallen in the UK, UK life expectancy has increased. For example, males born in England in 1900 could expect on average to live until they were 50 (57 for females) but males born in England in 2013 can expect to live for 90.7 years (94 for females). Over the past two centuries, life expectancy has increased by about two years per decade. If the trend of longer life span continues, Harper (2012) predicts that we will soon achieve 'radical longevity’ with many more people reaching age 100. One reason for the lower average life expectancy in 1900 was the fact that many infants and children did not survive beyond the early years of life. A newborn baby today has a better chance of reaching its 65th birthday than a baby born in 1900 had of reaching its first birthday. Despite the overall reduction in the death rate and the increase in life expectancy over the last 100 years, there are still important class, gender and regional differences. For example, women generally live longer than men - although the gap has narrowed due to changes in employment and in lifestyle (such as more women smoking). Lower social classes also tend to have lower life expectancies. Similarly, those living in the North of the UK have a lower Iite expectancy than those in the South. Socioeconomic factors therefore affect life expectancy. An example of this is how working-class men in unskilled or routine jobs are nearly three times as likely to die before they are 65 compared with men in professional jobs. According to Walker (2011), those living in the poorest areas of England die on average seven years earlier than those in the richest areas. The ageing population describes how the elderly as a proportion of the population is rapidly increasing over time as the elderly are generally living longer and growing older. The average age of the UK population is rising. In 1971. it was 34.1 years. By 2013, it stood at 40.3. By 2037. it is projected to reach 42.8. In the UK, the number of people aged 65 or over equalled the number of under-15s for the first time in 2014. Hirsch (2005) notes that the traditional age 'pyramid' is disappearing and being replaced by more or less equal-sized 'blocks' representing the different age groups. For example, by 2041 there will be as many 78-year-olds as five-year-olds. This ageing of the population is caused by three factors: increasing life expectancy (people are living longer into old age), declining infant mortality (nowadays hardly anyone dies early in life), and declining fertility (fewer young people are being born in relation to the number of older people in the population). Older people consume a larger proportion of public services than other age groups. This is particularly true of the aged 75 or over part of the ageing population in comparison to the aged 65-74 year-olds part. This makes them particularly dependent on the working population. Services such as healthcare, social care, state pensions and public transport will increase in need and demand as the aged population increases. Therefore the costs of these services may increase due to the pressure from the rising demand. Governments may reduce spending on state pensions and heating allowances as they cannot maintain them as the older population grows in size. In addition to increased expenditure on public services, an ageing population may also mean changes to policies and the provision of housing. The number of pensioners living alone has increased and one-person pensioner households now account for about 1/8 of all households. This reduces the supply of housing for the rest of the population and increases the cost of housing. Most are female as women generally live longer than men and also then to be younger than their husbands. Among the over-75s there are twice as many women as men, this has been described as the ‘feminisation of later life’. However, there is a trend of more multi-generational extended families living in one house as there are mutual economic and social benefits for the family members involved. Additionally, more housing specifically for elderly people is being built such as care homes and retirement villages. This increases the amount of smaller houses that are suitable for the elderly and in turn, increases the supply of larger houses for larger families. Like the non-working young, the non-working old are an economically dependent group who need to be provided for by those of working age, for example through taxation to pay for pensions and health care. As the number of retired people rises, this increases the dependency ratio and the burden on the working population. In 2015, there were 3.2 people of working age for every one pensioner. This ratio is predicted to fall to 2.8 to one by 2033. However, it would be wrong to assume that 'old' necessarily equals 'economically dependent'. The aged population now is becoming healthier and more capable than older people have been in the past. Therefore some of the issues of increased demand for public services may be overstated. Also, while an increase in the number of old people raises the dependency ratio, the declining number of dependent children may balance this. The government has also made changes to increase the size of the working population such as raising the state pension age. One consequence of the ageing population in modern society is the growth of ageism - the negative stereotyping and unequal treatment of people based on their age. Ageism towards older people may be seen in discrimination in employment and unequal treatment in health care. Similarly, much of the discourse about old age and ageing has been constructed as a 'problem' for example in terms of the cost of pensions or health care for the old. Viewing the old as a burden is a social construction as in some other cultures, the elderly are greatly respected. Many sociologists argue that ageism is the result of 'structured dependency'. The old are largely excluded from paid work, leaving them economically dependent on their families or the state and then being viewed by others as a ‘burden’. In modern society, our identity and status are largely determined by our role in production. Those in compulsory retirement are then excluded from production and left with a dependent status and stigmatised identity. From a Marxist perspective, Phillipson (1982) argues that the old are of no use to capitalism because they are no longer productive. As a result, the state is unwilling to support them adequately and so the family, especially female relatives, often have to take responsibility for caring for the elderly. In modern society, life is structured into a fixed series of stages, such as childhood and youth. Age becomes important in role allocation, creating fixed life stages and age-related identities (such as worker or pensIoner). The old are thus excluded from a role in the labour force and made dependent or powerless. In postmodern society, it is argued that fixed stages of the life course have broken down or blurred. This gives individuals a greater choice of lifestyle, whatever their age. Unlike in modern society, consumption becomes the key to our identities. Hunt (2005) argues that defining ourselves by what we consume means we can choose a lifestyle and identity regardless of age. Therefore our age no longer determines who we are or how we live. As a result, the old become a market for a vast range of 'body maintenance' or 'rejuvenation' goods and services through which they can create their identities. These include cosmetic surgery, gym memberships and anti-ageing products. While the ordinary stages of the life course may have broken down somewhat, inequality such as class and gender remain important. Many of these are related to the individual’s previous occupational position. For example, the middle class has better pensions and greater savings from their higher salaries. Poorer old people have a short life expectancy and have a more infirmity making it more difficult to maintain a youthful self-identity. Women often have lower earnings and take more career breaks as carers than men so they often have lower pensions than men. They are also subject to sexist and ageist stereotypes, for example, being described as ‘old hags’. Immigration refers to when people enter the country. Emigration refers to when people leave their country to go abroad. Net migration is immigration minus migration. Positive net migration means more people are entering than leaving, and negative means more people are entering than leaving. Reasons for emigration include war, natural disasters, political oppression, and economic recession. Reasons for immigrating include seeking asylum, better living standards, better economic prosperity, better opportunities, liberty and better welfare provisions. Historically, the UK saw a trend of immigration in the 1940s (Jews immigrating to escape oppression), the 1960s (Caribbean immigrants fulfilling job roles) and the 21st century (refugees escaping conflicts across the world). A consequence of these trends is a more ethnically diverse society. By 2011, ethnic minority groups accounted for 14% of the population. By the 1980s, non-whites accounted for little more than a quarter of all immigrants. The mainly white countries of the European Union became the main source of immigration to the UK. The main reasons for emigration out of the UK have been economic. ‘Push’ factors include periods of economic recession in the UK or unemployment whilst ‘pull’ factors include higher wages and better opportunities abroad. These economic reasons for migration out of the UK contrast with the reasons of other groups who have been driven to migrate by persecution. The UK population size is increasing, partly due to a natural increase but also because of positive net migration. For example in 2014 the UK’s net migration was +260,000. 38% of the immigrants were EU citizens and 14 % were British citizens returning to the UK. Additionally, births to non-UK-born mothers account for roughly 25% of all births now. However, even with these, the number of births remains below the replacement level (the number needed to keep the population size stable). Immigration directly lowers the average age of the UK population as immigrants are generally younger than the average UK native. For example, in 2011, the average age of UK passport holders (41) was ten years older than the average age of non-UK passport holders living in Britain (31). Also, many immigrants return to their native country when they retire. This helps to lower the dependency ratio as immigrants are likely to be of working age. Additionally, this helps decrease the burden of dependency as these workers will pay taxes that can contribute to funding the ageing population and other dependents. These workers also often work in the industries/services that the ageing population use most such as health or social care. Immigration also indirectly lowers the average age of the UK population. This is due to them being generally younger and so tending to be more fertile and having more babies. This means immigration does increase the dependency ratio as their greater numbers of children will increase the dependent population in the UK. However, over time, these children will join the labour force and help to lower the ratio again. Globalisation is the idea that barriers between societies are disappearing and people are becoming increasingly interconnected across national boundaries. One change globalisation has lead to is increased international migration. Some trends in migration are acceleration, differentiation and the feminisation of migration. The trend of acceleration refers to how the rate of migration has significantly quickened. The United Nations (2013) stated that between 2000 and 2013 international migration increased by 33%, to reach 232 million. In the same year, 862,000 people either entered or left the UK. Globalisation is increasing the diversity of types of migrants. For example, students are now a major group of migrants. In the UK in 2014, there were more Chinese-born (26%) than UK-born (23%) postgraduate students. Some migrants are permanent settlers such as refugees, some migrants have legal entitlement and some migrants enter without legal permission. Before the 1990s, immigration to the UK came from a fairly small range of former British colonies. Most of these migrants had legal entitlement, became citizens and lived in a small number of geographically concentrated ethnic communities in the UK. However, since the 1990s globalisation has led to what Vertovec (2007) calls 'super-diversity'. Migrants now come from a much wider range of countries. Legal status, class, culture and religion can all create differences and wide geographical dispersion even within a single migrant ethnic group in the UK. Cohen (2006) identifies three different types of migrants and therefore shows the differences between migrants. One type Cohen distinguishes is ‘Citizens’ who have full citizenship rights such as the right to vote. Since the 1970s, the UK state has made it harder for immigrants to acquire these. Another type is ‘Denizens’ who are privileged foreign nationals welcomed by the state for example highly paid employees of multinational companies. Helots are the most exploited group. States and employees regard them as a reserve army of labour or ‘disposable’. They are found in unskilled, poorly paid work and include illegally trafficked workers, and those legally tied to particular employers, such as domestic servants. In the past, most migrants were men. Today, however, almost half of all global migrants are female. This has been called the globalisation of the gender division of labour, where female migrants find that they are fitted into patriarchal stereotypes about women's roles as carers or providers of sexual services. Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) observe that care, domestic and sex work in Western countries is increasingly being done by women from poorer countries. For example, Shutes (2011) reports that 40% of adult care nurses in the UK are migrants. Most of these are female. One reason for this is the expansion of service occupations (which traditionally employ women) in Western countries, which has led to increasing demands for female workers. Western men remain generally unwilling to perform domestic labour whilst Western women have joined the labour force and are now less willing to perform this labour. The resulting job vacancies have been partly filled by women from poor countries. There is also a global transfer of women's emotional labour. For example, migrant nannies provide care and affection for their employer’s children at the expense of their children who are left behind in their home country. Migrant women also enter Western countries as 'mail order' brides. This often reflects gendered and racialised stereotypes, for example of Asian women as servile. Women migrants also enter the UK as illegally trafficked sex workers, often kept in conditions amounting to slavery. Feminists would use this information to reinforce the argument that female migrants are exploited more and still fulfil the traditional gender role (domestic/emotional/childcare work). Some feminists may argue that while the position of Western women has improved, the general position of all women in society has not improved to the same extent. Different migrants have different views on their identity and sometimes this has led to friction in communities. For some migrants and their children, their country of origin may provide an additional or alternative source of identity. For example, migrants may develop hybrid identities made up of two or more different sources. Eade (1994) found that second-generation Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain created hierarchical identities: they saw themselves as Muslim first, then Bengali, then British. Those with hybrid identities may find that others challenge their identity claims as they accuse them of not ‘fitting in' or really being what they identify as. Eriksen (2007) claims globalisation has created more diverse migration patterns, with back-and-forth movements of people through networks rather than permanent settlements in another country. Modern technology also makes maintaining international connections possible. As a result, migrants are less likely to see themselves as belonging completely to one culture or country. Instead, they may develop transnational 'neither/nor' identities. Migrants may adopt more of a global culture and skills that allow them to communicate around the world with several different migrants. For example, Eriksen (2007 describes how some Chinese migrants in Italy found their native language Mandarin more useful for their everyday life than Italian. This was because Mandarin was important for their global connections with Chinese people in other countries. Migrants in a globalised world are therefore less likely to desire assimilation into the host culture. With increased international flows of migrants, migration has become an important political issue. States now have policies that seek to control immigration and deal with increased ethnic and cultural diversity. More recently, immigration policies have also become linked to national security and anti-terrorism policies. Assimilationism was the first state policy approach to immigration. It aimed to encourage immigrants to adopt the language, values and customs of the ‘host’ culture to make them similar to their host country. However, assimilationist policies face the problem that some migrants (especially transnational migrants or those with hybrid identities) may not be willing to abandon their native culture or to see themselves as belonging to just one nation-state. Multiculturalism policies allow separate cultures to flourish and accept that migrants may wish to retain a separate cultural identity. However, in practice, this acceptance may be limited to more superficial aspects of cultural diversity. However, the extent to which this is allowed is dependent on the State. Eriksen (2007) distinguishes between 'shallow diversity and 'deep diversity'. Shallow diversity often hides deep-rooted problems that migrants face e.g. discrimination and hate. An example of shallow diversity is allowing chicken tikka masala to be Britain’s national dish. Deeper diversity has taken some criticism since the 9/11 terrorist attacks as some governments have moved away from multiculturalism. An example of deep diversity is the extent to which the State will allow arranged marriage. Similarly, critics argue that multicultural education policies celebrate shallow diversity- superficial cultural differences, such as 'samosas, saris and steel bands' while failing to address deeper problems children from migrant backgrounds face, such as racism. From the 1960s there was a move towards multiculturalism but since the 9/11' Islamist terror attack in 2001, many politicians have returned to demanding that migrants assimilate culturally. For example, in France, veiling of the face in public was made illegal in 2010. However, Castles (2000) argues that assimilation policies are counter-productive as they depict migrants as culturally backward or ‘Other’. This could lead to the minorities responding by emphasising their difference in hostile ways and so the suspicion towards them increases. This may promote anti- terrorism policies that target them and from this may breed marginalisation. Ultimately, the goal of assimilation is defeated. Assimilationist ideas may also encourage workers to blame migrants for social problems, such as unemployment, resulting in racist scapegoating. Castles and Kosack (1973) this scapegoating benefits capitalism by creating a racially divided working class and preventing united action in defence of their interests.