UPSC CSE 2024/25 GS-3 National Security PDF

UPSC CSE 2024/25 GS-3 MAINS MODULE By Dr. Shivin Chaudhary Merged PDF  Elements of National Security Element of National Details Security Military Security Protection from Invasion, Terrorism,...

UPSC CSE 2024/25 GS-3 MAINS MODULE By Dr. Shivin Chaudhary Merged PDF  Elements of National Security Element of National Details Security Military Security Protection from Invasion, Terrorism, Cyber attacks external military threats Managing physical Border security, Coastal Security threats Economic Security National wealth Economic freedom of state and citizens Ability to protect Economic sectors Energy Security Manage uninterrupted Security of international and energy assets supply of energy Environmental Security Climate change Internal Displacement, Warming War, Migration Pollution Transnational in nature Ethnic Security Avoid sectional conflict Maintain National Integration, Promote national harmony Cyber Security Protection of a Developing cyber offence and defence capacity country's digital infrastructure Health Security Disease surveillance Rapid response and emergency preparedness and early warning systems Information Security Protecting citizen's Data Protection Bill right to privacy Data as a public good Protection of information that affects national security Resource Security Water Conflicts Internal: Cauvery Dispute, External: Indus water dispute Political Security Ensuring national sovereignty Maintaining stability of the government Honoring human rights of citizens by the state Geostrategic Security Military co-operation Strategic autonomy of Defence purchase  Training Food Security Addressing nutritional poverty Measures to avoid starvation Disaster Security Mitigation response Quick response  National Security Doctrine What is a National Security Doctrine? A National Security Doctrine is a set of basic principles, based on the core interests of the State, that will shape how different elements of national power protect and further the interests of the Indian Republic. It is a concise summary of a country’s strategic vision and objectives, intended to prepare the nation to manage future challenges. In particular, there is a need to focus on the elements of a strategic doctrine which will identify the general missions and basic principles through which our armed forces, diplomatic and intelligence communities will seek to attain the national goals. Quotes The new frontiers of war, what you call the fourth-generation Ajit Doval warfare, is the civil society. “Half-done reforms create new vulnerabilities without solving old Shivshankar Menon ones. You cannot cross a chasm in two leaps. We are today in a situation where many of the reforms begun by the former CDS, General Bipin Rawat are incomplete.” “Three attempts were made to come out with a national security Shivshankar Menon strategy, but there was hesitation at the political level. It could have been because of the accountability it would bring in defence management for the government.” “India has a deeply ingrained tradition of strategic restraint arising Stephen P Cohen and from an ideological rejection of the use of armed force as a tool of Sunil Das Gupta colonisers. In rejecting colonisation, India has also rejected the instruments used by colonisers.” “The absence of a written National Security Strategy (NSS) doesn’t mean that the country doesn’t have one. If there was no policy, the Chief of Defence Staff country would not have been successful in revoking the special (CDS) General Anil status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370, or carried out Uri Chauhan and Balakot strikes.” Why in the News? India has initiated the process of formulating a National Security Strategy after years of discourse and deliberations within the military and strategic community on the need for such a framework. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) is currently working on a comprehensive National Security Strategy in consultation with several Central ministries and departments. A final Cabinet approval will be sought once the strategy is complete. Need of National Security Doctrine Responding effectively to New Domains of Warfare ○ Complex Threats: Growing frequency and sophistication of traditional threats, and non- traditional threats (cyber attacks, narco-terrorism and eco-terrorism). ○ Technological Advancements: Expansion of the battlefield through advanced technologies, which nullify traditional military advantages. ○ Grey Zone Warfare: Operations that exist in the ambiguous space between peace and war, complicating conventional responses. ○ Digital Age: Transformation of the battlespace by digital technologies, requiring updated strategies and capabilities. ○ Civil Society: The new frontiers of war, what you call the fourth-generation warfare, is the civil society.- Ajit Doval ○ Proxy Wars: Increased reliance on proxy actors to conduct warfare, necessitating comprehensive and adaptable security strategies. Recommended by Previous Committees: ○ Kargil Review Committee: Proposed integrating India’s security spectrum. It set up four task forces for reforms, whose recommendations have not been implemented  ○ Naresh Chandra Task Force on Security (2011): Emphasized the need for a national security strategy at the doctrinal level. Essential to Draft Before Theaterisation: ○ Former Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane highlighted the need to establish a national security strategy before implementing theaterisation. He argued that discussing theaterisation without a clear national security strategy is like putting the cart before the horse​ Clarity and Strategic Foresight: ○ Currently, the focus on military, paramilitary, and security/intelligence agencies is scattered. A national security document could offer clarity and strategic foresight for the modernization and integration crucial for India’s national security. Integration of Threat Perception: ○ Blurring Lines: The distinction between internal and external threats is increasingly blurred. ○ 2.5 Front War: Former CDS General Bipin Rawat mentioned India’s preparedness for a two-and-a-half front war, addressing challenges from China and Pakistan, along with internal security threats ○ Galwan Incident and Intelligence Failures: In 2020, the clash in the Galwan Valley, a disputed region between India and China, resulted in violent confrontations and casualties on both sides. This incident is often cited as an intelligence failure but is more accurately described as a failure in managing intelligence. Absence leads to Half-done Reforms: ○ As per Shivshankar Menon, “Half-done reforms create new vulnerabilities without solving old ones. You cannot cross a chasm in two leaps. We are today in a situation where many of the reforms begun by the former CDS, General Bipin Rawat are incomplete.” Enhances Country’s Comprehensive National Power: ○ India’s national security architecture has objectives, yet the absence of a policy paper hinders addressing the heightened threat matrix. A synergized national security strategy is crucial, offering comprehensive attention and strategic foresight. It enhances the capabilities of military, paramilitary, and security/intelligence agencies, solidifying our Comprehensive National Power. Algorithm to aid policymakers: ○ A doctrine enables us to provide a practiced response rather than one which will be ad hoc and haphazard. It acts like an algorithm that aids policy makers in making decisions and helps citizens in understanding them. The confusion and indecision often seen in the political class during crises, due to the absence of clear-cut and customary responses, is well known. Eg, The IC 814 hijacking incident. Increasing Proxy Wars and Strategic Contestation: ○ US-China/Russia Rivalry: The current environment is witnessing increasing proxy wars and intense strategic contestation between the US and China/Russia. ○ Afghanistan as Terrorism Epicenter: With the withdrawal of the US, Afghanistan has reemerged as the epicenter of terrorism. China has no qualms in maintaining links with Jihadi elements to exploit the situation for its benefit.  ○ Pak-China Axis: The Pak-China axis continues to pose serious challenges to regional stability and security. ○ Impact of Hamas-Israel Conflict: The Hamas-Israel war has energized Jihadi groups, necessitating a clear assessment and indication of their implications. Global Examples: ○ The United States, United Kingdom and Russia: They maintain and regularly update a National Security Strategy, outlining their security objectives and strategic priorities. ○ China: China has a Comprehensive National Security strategy, which is intricately linked to its governance structure, reflecting its broad security objectives and strategic priorities. ○ Pakistan: Pakistan introduced its National Security Policy 2022-2026, which outlines its national security objectives and priority areas, aiming to address both traditional and non-traditional threats. What will it contain? National Interests and Values: ○ Defining National Interests: The National Security Strategy (NSS) must clearly define national interests, which are specific ideas derived from broader national values. ○ Translating Concepts into Goals: These interests are then translated into national goals, focusing efforts on achieving them. Strategic Culture and Diplomacy: ○ The NSS needs to clarify that India’s strategic culture prioritizes finding amicable solutions to problems through diplomatic negotiations rather than seeking wars but retains the right to use force when necessary, necessitating the substantial expansion of both traditional and military diplomatic cadres as India rises. Communication of Objectives and Deterrence: ○ The NSS must convey messages to allies about the nation's objectives at regional and global levels and outline redlines to adversaries. This strengthens deterrence by indicating the steps to be taken if its interests are harmed. For instance, If Pakistan had been sufficiently forewarned that an attack in Kashmir could result in an Indian riposte to Lahore, it may have avoided the 1965 misadventure. Periodic Updates: ○ The NSS must be periodically updated to reflect the evolving geopolitical landscape and emerging threats, ensuring that the strategy remains relevant and effective in addressing current and future challenges. What has not been done so far? According to Former Army Chief General NC Vij (retd, “Only political direction to the Armed Forces in existence is Raksha Mantri’s operational Directive of 2009. It is now dated and hence needs to be revised.” Political Hesitation: According to Shivshankar Menon, “Three attempts were made to come out with a national security strategy, but there was hesitation at the political level. It  could have been because of the accountability it would bring in defence management for the government.” Lack of Cohesive Effort: There have been varying views in the strategic community about why India has not brought out a national security strategy, including the lack of a cohesive, whole-of-government effort to formulate and implement such a strategy. Deliberate Non-Disclosure: Another perspective is that the government has deliberately chosen not to make its national security objectives public, possibly to maintain strategic ambiguity and flexibility in its defense and security policies. Challenges in framing: Poor Civil-Military Relationships: ○ Lack of Joint Leadership: The absence of a unified command among the armed forces leads to each service focusing on its own doctrines without a cohesive approach. ○ Limited Input in Policy-Making: Service chiefs have operational autonomy but minimal influence in national policy-making. Strategic Restraint: ○ As per Stephen P Cohen and Sunil Das Gupta, “India has a deeply ingrained tradition of strategic restraint arising from an ideological rejection of the use of armed force as a tool of colonisers. In rejecting colonisation, India has also rejected the instruments used by colonisers.” Divergent Military Goals: ○ According to Walter Ladwig, Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford University, the Army seeks to leverage advanced technology to fight short-duration wars in a nuclear environment; the Navy seeks a potent blue water role with the introduction of nuclear-armed submarines; the Air Force wants to extend its strategic reach from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. Military doctrines should be a subset of the national security doctrine, and there is an urgent need for India to develop a joint war fighting doctrine instead of relying on single-service doctrines. Counter-view “The absence of a written National Security Strategy (NSS) doesn’t mean that the country doesn’t have one. If there was no policy, the country would not have been successful in revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370, or carried out Uri and Balakot strikes.” : Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan In 2014, when Ajit Doval assumed the role of National Security Advisor in India, a doctrinal change took place. Doval introduced a strategic doctrine that now bears his name: the Doval Doctrine or double squeeze strategy. Conclusion: In addition to intensifying geopolitical competition, the threat landscape and security challenges are expanding into various technological domains, escalating the tempo of grey zone warfare in an already conflict-ridden geopolitical landscape and making the threats more real and lethal. A vigilant and adaptive national security craft is essential to safeguard India’s interests in this complex and dynamic security environment.  Left Wing Extremism What is Left Wing Extremism? Left-wing extremism (LWE) is a political ideology that advocates for radical social, political, and economic change through the abolition of capitalism, the establishment of a socialist or communist system, and the dismantling of existing power structures. LWE groups often employ violent tactics to achieve their goals, including bombings, assassinations, and armed insurrections. YEAR QUESTION MARKS Article 244 of Indian Constitution relates to Administration of 2013 Scheduled areas and tribal areas. Analyze the impact of 10 non-implementation of the provisions of fifth schedule on the growth of Left Wing Extremism. The persisting drives of the government for development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal 2015 population and the farmers who face multiple displacements with 12.5 Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the left wing extremism (LWE) doctrine affected citizens back into the mainstream of social and economic growth. 2018 Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government 10 of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE. 2020 What are the sound determinants of left-wing extremism in Eastern part of India? What strategy should Government of India, 15 civil administration and security forces adopt to counter the threat in the affected areas? 2022 Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, 15 discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism. Quotes “We must, however, recognize that naxalism is not merely a law and Dr. Manmohan Singh order issue. In many areas, the phenomenon of naxalism is directly (Former Prime related to underdevelopment. It is not a coincidence that it is the Minister) tribal areas that are the main battleground of left wing extremism today.” “The Constitution intends that the land always should remain with Samatha Case the Tribals.” Judgement “Those who've taken the path of Naxalism & Terrorism must Hon’ Prime Minister recognise the power of non-violence. It will make India stronger & Narendra Modi serve humanity” “Movement is on its last legs” K. Vijay (Special Security advisor of MHA) Areas of Maoist Presence  Statistics and data from various newspaper and websites Left Wing Extremism (LWE) / Naxalism in India Affected States LWE Affected States: ○ Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Kerala. Violence Statistics Casualties (2004-2023): ○ Total: 8,863 people killed. ○ Civilians: Majority are tribals, often branded as ‘police informers’. Comparative Statistics: ○ 2004-2014: 17,679 incidents and 6,984 deaths. ○ 2014-2023 (till June 15): 7,649 incidents and 2,020 deaths. ○ Improvement: Incidents reduced by 52% (from 14,862 to 7,130); deaths reduced by 69% (from 6,035 to 1,868). Recent Trends (2020): ○ ACLED Records: 20% decrease in organized political violence involving Naxal-Maoist insurgents. ○ Reported Events: Total events decreased from 295 to 235; fatalities decreased by nearly 30%. Decline in Violent Incidents: ○ 2022: Violent incidents decreased by 77% compared to the peak in 2010. ○ Districts Affected: Reduced from 90 in 2010 to 45. Decrease in Casualties: ○ 2022: Deaths reduced by 90% (from 1,005 in 2010 to 98 in 2022). Evolution of Left Wing Extremism Phase Description First Phase Initial Outbreak: In 1967, insurgency began in West Bengal, Bihar, and (1969-1972) Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh. Naxalbari Incident: A tribal youth's assault in Naxalbari village, West Bengal, sparked a country-wide controversy, leading to the formation of the CPI (ML) in 19679 under Charu Majumdar. Movement Spread: Rapid spread to rural West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and urban Kolkata. Suppression: United Front government in West Bengal, with Indira Gandhi's Congress government, crushed the movement by 1972. Second Phase Emergency Period: Naxalite movement factionalized during the (1975-2004) Emergency (1975-77). Post-Emergency: Four main factions emerged: MCC, PWG, Party Unity, and CPI-ML (Liberation). Strategies: CPI-ML (Liberation) took part in elections, while others like PWG and MCC focused on armed struggle.  Merger: In 1998, Party Unity merged with PWG to form CPI-ML (People's War). Regional Control: MCC operated in Bihar/Jharkhand; PWG in northern Telangana. Caste Warfare: Violent clashes in Bihar between lower-caste Dalits (supported by MCC) and upper-caste vigilante armies (Ranvir Sena, Sunlight Sena). Third Phase Merger: In 2004, PU, MCC, and PWG merged to form CPI-Maoist with a (2004-2012) unified command structure. Increased Threat: Post-2004, Maoist control expanded, and violence escalated. Counterinsurgency: BJP government in Chhattisgarh and Congress leader Mahendra Karma launched Salwa Judum (2005-09); Operation Green Hunt (2009-12) targeted Maoists. Major Incident: In 2010, Maoists killed 75 CRPF personnel in Dantewada, leading to public uproar and stalling of Operation Green Hunt. Fourth Phase Decline in Violence: Levels of violence have declined since 2013, below (2013-present) the 1990s average. Possible Reasons: Successful counterinsurgency efforts like the Integrated Action Plan, road-building projects, police stations in vulnerable areas, and NREGA projects. Strategic Retreat: Maoist leadership may have adopted a strategy of tactical retreat to avoid further losses. Drivers of Naxalism (As per Report of An Expert Group to Planning Commission and ARC II) Social and Economic Issues Unresolved The intensity of unrest often arises from unresolved social and economic Social and issues like land rights, lack of economic opportunities, social discrimination, Economic and inadequate access to basic services. Issues Socio-Econo The exploitation of dalits and tribal communities, including forced labor and mic social discrimination, has fueled Naxalism. Exploitation The movement empowers these communities to assert their rights and demand respect and dignity, challenging oppressive practices like untouchability and forced labor. Livelihood Lack of food security and corruption in the Public Distribution System (often Related non-functional). Causes Disruption of traditional occupations and lack of alternative work opportunities. Deprivation of traditional rights in common property resources. The Minimum Wages Act has not been implemented. While, Naxals have ensured payment of decent wages in affected areas. Land and Agrarian Issues Land Disputes Naxalites target oppressive landholders, driving them away and redistributing and Agrarian land to the landless. Distress Eg, in Bihar, Naxalites have helped the landless Musahars take possession of land, although legal title remains an issue due to administrative resistance. Failure of Land reforms, including the introduction of land ceilings and distribution of Land Reforms surplus land, have had limited impact due to poor implementation, leading to persistent landlessness and agrarian distress, creating fertile ground for Naxalite ideologies. Land Related Evasion of land ceiling laws. Factors Existence of special land tenures enjoying exemptions under ceiling laws. Encroachment and occupation of government and community lands (even water bodies) by powerful sections of society. Lack of title to public land cultivated by the landless poor. Poor implementation of laws prohibiting transfer of tribal land to non-tribals in Fifth Schedule areas. Non-regularization of traditional land rights. Displacement and Forced Evictions Forest Rights Traditional usufructuary rights of forest dwellers have been declared illegal, and leading to their displacement. The Forest Conservation Act of 1980 and Displacement subsequent regulations have perpetually put forest dwellers on the brink of eviction. Naxalites have exploited this situation to gain support by opposing such displacement and advocating for forest rights. Displacement Eviction from lands traditionally used by tribals. (40% of those displaced) and Forced Displacements caused by irrigation and power projects without adequate Evictions arrangements for rehabilitation. Large-scale land acquisition for ‘public purposes’ without appropriate compensation or rehabilitation. Governance Issues Inadequate Misgovernance, corruption, and the lack of effective local governance have Governance contributed to the rise of Naxalism. The 73rd Amendment, which aimed to and empower local bodies, has largely remained unfulfilled, and co-optation of Corruption local leaders into the corrupt political system has belied genuine empowerment. Governance Corruption and poor provision/non-provision of essential public services Related including primary health care and education. Factors Incompetent, ill-trained, and poorly motivated public personnel who are mostly absent from their place of posting. Misuse of powers by the police and violations of the norms of law. Perversion of electoral politics and unsatisfactory working of local government institutions. Police and State Repression Police Arbitrary police action, harassment by forest department personnel, and brutal Harassment suppression of agitations supported by Naxalites have intensified resentment. and State The administration's focus on curbing Naxalite influence often overlooks the Repression legitimate grievances of the affected populations, exacerbating the conflict. Social Exclusion and Cultural Alienation Cultural and The alienation of tribal communities from their traditional lands and cultural Social practices due to state policies and commercial exploitation has created Alienation deep-seated discontent. The failure to recognize and address the unique cultural and social needs of these communities has driven them towards extremist movements. Social Denial of dignity. Exclusion Continued practice, in some areas, of untouchability in various forms. Poor implementation of special laws on prevention of atrocities, protection of civil rights, and abolition of bonded labor, etc. Eg, Naxal violence in Karimnagar (1980) against forced labour Psychological Empowerment Psychological The Naxalite movement has provided psychological empowerment to the Empowerment oppressed, particularly among the youth, who find a sense of power and identity in the movement. This empowerment comes from challenging the authority of traditional power holders and participating in a movement that promises justice and equality. Approach For Countering LWE Category Scheme Physical Special Infrastructure Scheme: Construction of fortified Police Stations; Extended till Infrastructure 2026 LWE Mobile Tower Project by Department of Telecom USOF supported scheme in mobile connectivity In uncovered aspirational districts NETRA (Micro-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles): Used by CRPF Assistance to Central Agencies for LWE management GIS Mapping School, post offices, health facilities, roads Rail Services in Bastar Road Connectivity Project for LWE (Ministry of Rural Development) Road Requirement Plan-I Institutional Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme Measures Unified Command setup in States of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal Special Central Assistance (SCA) for most LWE affected districts for 30 most LWE  affected districts Civic Action Programme (CAP): To bridge gaps between Security Forces and local people through personal interaction Multi Agency Center State Multi Agency Center: Jagdalpur, Gaya Black Panther COBRA Bastariya Battalion Operation Anaconda Jharkhand C-60 force (Gadchiroli district) Gadchiroli India Reserve Battalions to States Security Social Tribal Youth Exchange programmes: Organised by Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Measures (NYKS) Roshni: Digital literacy and mentorship initiative Going Online as Leaders (GOAL): Facebook initiative Livelihood Colleges: Vocational Training Eklavya Model Residential Schools 11 LWE districts did not have KVs sanctioned by Ministry of Education Education  Comprehensive Survey of Government’s Approach As per Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, subjects of 'Police' and ‘Public order' are with the State Governments. The Government of India has been supplementing the efforts of States affected by left wing extremism. The Government of India has adopted an integrated and holistic approach to deal with the Left Wing Extremist (LWE) insurgency by addressing the areas of security and development and also promoting good governance simultaneously. To achieve this, a 'National Policy and Action Plan to Address Left Wing Extremism' has been put in place that adopts a multi-pronged strategy in the areas of security, development, ensuring rights & entitlements of local communities, etc Security front: The GoI assists the LWE affected State Government by providing Central Armed Police Forces battalions, training, funds for modernization of State police forces, equipment & arms, sharing of intelligence, construction of Fortified Police Stations etc; Development side: Government of India (GoI) has taken several specific initiatives in LWE affected States, with special thrust on expansion of road network, improving telecommunication connectivity, skilling and financial inclusion. Development front: apart from flagship schemes of Government of India (GoI) several specific initiatives have been taken in LWE affected States, with special thrust on expansion of road network, improving Telecomm connectivity, skill development and financial inclusion. Dominant narratives understand Left Wing Extremism as a law and order problem. We have continued with historically used three-pronged strategy: ○ Use of force: The use of necessary military force to counter the aggressiveness of insurgents. ○ Address the grievances of alienated people: By infrastructure upgrades. ○ Address the political demands: With fixed timelines for political deliverables. There is a need to adopt a top-down approach, led by the army, instead of a bottom-up approach. This will create opportunities for army officers as it will allow senior officers with experience in counter-insurgency operations, ranging from colonels to generals, to be deployed. Empowering security personnel with the ability to use "quick-fix solutions" to address threats to their safety. Assessing experimented strategies: Adopting low-key level strategy (adopted in North-East) in contrast to the "hammer and tongs" strategy used by the Sri Lankan forces against the LTTE. Government should get the forces to participate in and collectively address a problem (Maoist insurgency) that cannot have a knee-jerk approach.  ‘Clear, hold and develop’ strategy can also be implemented, which uses development as a tool to win back the support of the tribal population, who overwhelmingly appear to sympathize with the extremists. Multi pronged Strategy (as discussed in ARC II, Latest MHA Annual Report) Building In seriously disturbed areas where agencies involved with Capacity of development work find it difficult to operate, there may be a case Security Forces for temporarily entrusting some development Capacity Building for (including the Conflict Resolution work to the security forces. This approach was Police) tried successfully in West Bengal, where the local police helped in ensuring that schools and health institutions functioned effectively. To enhance the capacity of the security forces to act effectively and firmly but within constitutional bounds, it is necessary that standard operational procedures and protocols are laid down in specific terms and detail. Formation of specially trained special task forces on the pattern of the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh also form an important element of the strategy to build capacity in the police machinery for tackling left extremism. Building Institutional capacity needs to be strengthened within the line Capacity of departments, particularly within their field formations in tribal Administrative areas by introducing appropriate management practices to deal Institutions with the specific needs of marginalised groups and to make deployment of personnel qualified to cater to area specific needs. It is necessary to constitute an Oversight Committee to monitor the implementation of the FRA, 2006. This committee should include individuals such as tribals, those committed to forest conservation and wildlife preservation, and individuals with a strong social commitment to these causes. Capacity State Governments should give such officers the benefit of being Building among trained at national level institutions like the LBS National Academy Government of Administration to professionally equip them to serve in tribal Personnel areas. Such officers could then bring their exposure and unique experience in the making of public policies, strategies and schemes for the development of these areas and the well being of its citizens. There is need for a national policy which could provide for reimbursing State Governments for the additional resources that may be required to make it attractive for officers to voluntarily opt for serving under difficult conditions in such areas. The system of periodic official inspections and review of organisational performance needs to be revitalised. Capacity The Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 Building in needs to be effectively implemented to bridge the governance Local Bodies deficit in these areas. Capacity Since they have the potential to act as a bridge between the Building in Civil extremists and the government and in educating the people about Society the futility of violence and preventing aggravation of the situation Organisations by ventilating public grievances within the legal-democratic framework. Ways and means of involving such organisations in conflict management can be also taken up. Cutting the This work can be entrusted temporarily to organisations like the Source of Border Roads Organisation and other governmental agencies Finances for which can execute these works directly. Naxalites An effective anti-extortion and economic offences wing that can curtail if not totally dry up the funding sources to extremists, has to be constituted. Way Forward (As suggested by Second ARC Report and Latest MHA Annual Report) N: Negotiations for While agreeing with the spirit of the Conflict SAMADHAN strategy’, negotiations Resolution with the extremist outfits should be an important mode of conflict resolution. A: Administrative There is a strong case for ‘back to the basics’ in the matter of Monitoring administrative monitoring and supervision. The system of periodic official Enhancement inspections and review of organisational performances needs to be revitalised. It must be recognised that a major reason for such practices falling in disuse in ‘disturbed areas’ is the apprehension of senior functionaries about their personal safety while on tour. It is advisable that the need to provide suitable security to the senior administrative and technical officers while on tour, is taken into account in working out requirements for security forces in areas affected by serious violence. X: eXtension of For effective implementation of the Scheduled Tribes and other Legal Frameworks Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Rights) Act, 2006, multidisciplinary Oversight Committees may be constituted to ensure that the implementation of this ameliorative legislation does not adversely affect the local ecosystems. A: Augmenting There is need to enhance the capacity of the security forces to act Security Forces effectively and firmly, but in conformity with constitutional bounds; it is necessary that standard operational procedures and protocols are laid down in specific terms and detail. L: Learning and Training and reorientation including sensitising the police and Sensitization paramilitary personnel to the root causes of the disturbances that they  Initiatives are seeking to curb, are necessary. I: Implementation Performance of the States in amending their Panchayati Raj Acts and Monitoring other regulations to bring them in line with the provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) and in implementing these provisions may be monitored and incentivised by the Union Ministry of Panchayati Raj. S: Strengthening Establishing and strengthening local level police stations, adequately Local Police staffed by local recruits, in the extremist affected regions should be an Strategy important component of the policing strategy for tackling left extremism. M: Maximizing For implementing large infrastructure projects, particularly road Infrastructure networks, that are strongly opposed by the extremists or are used to Security extort funds from local contractors, the use of specialised Government agencies like the Border Roads Organisation in place of contractors may be considered as a temporary measure. Conclusion: As per the Expert Group Report by the Former Planning Commission, “The rights and entitlements of the people underlying these issues find expression in the Constitution, the laws enacted by the various Governments and the policy declarations. The administration should not have waited for the Naxalite movement to remind it of its obligations towards the people in these matters. But at least now that the reminder has been given, it should begin rectifying its own deficiencies. It should be recognised that such a responsibility would lie upon the Indian State even if the Naxalites were not there, and even in regions where the Naxalite movement does not exist.”  Case Study: Naxalbari and Pavagada (To be Explained in Class) Case Study: The Misadventure of Salwa Judum Salwa Judum, which translates to "Peace March" or "Purification Hunt," in the Gondi language was a controversial state-sponsored vigilante movement formed in 2005 in Chhattisgarh, India. Formation and Salwa Judum was initiated in 2005 as a reaction against Naxalites. Support The movement was supported by the state government and was seen as a continuation of an earlier anti-Maoist campaign called Jan Jagran Abhiyan (1991), which had collapsed. The state facilitated the signing of police and military mining agreements to support Salwa Judum, with backing from corporations like Tata and Essar, which were interested in the region's mineral resources. By 2008, Chhattisgarh had branded certain members of Salwa Operations Judum as Special Police Officers (SPOs) or Koya Commandos, and Tactics providing them with support to adopt and apply counter-insurgency tactics.  Many volunteers of Salwa Judum were former Maoists, utilizing their knowledge of Maoist tactics against their former comrades. Salwa Judum is accused of numerous human rights violations, Impact and including the burning of over 600 villages as part of their Allegations counter-insurgency measures. The conflict and violence led to significant displacement, with around 300,000 people being forced to migrate. The operation resulted in a large number of deaths, with reports suggesting 98 deaths among SPOs and up to 800 deaths overall due to the conflict. One of the most notorious incidents associated with the Salwa Judum period was the Darbha Ghat massacre, highlighting the intense violence and unrest in the region. Supreme Court’s ban on Salwa Judum (Nandini Sundar and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh Case) Major Issues Excessive The SPOs were appointed under the Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007. delegation The Act said little, leaving far too much in the hands of the from the executive. legislature to No details or limitations were provided on the number of SPOs who the executive could be appointed, their qualifications, their training, or their duties. Appointment SPOs were playing a major combat role in counter-insurgency of the SPOs operations, and that their brief was not limited to non-combative assignments. Youngsters, with poor training, were being recruited by the State to engage in dangerous and deadly operations. They lacked both the legal and professional education necessary for their tasks. Rights of SPOs The SPOs were expected to perform all the duties of police officers but were paid only an honorarium. This, and the arbitrary and vague nature of their appointment and functioning, was held to violate the equal protection guarantee in Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 21, the right to life clause, was also said to be violated, as the State displayed insensitivity towards the lives of SPOs, placing them in danger without giving them the necessary education and support they needed. Theme I: Left Wing Extremism as a Result of Non-Implementation of Fifth Schedule As per the Second ARC Report, “There is no doubt that the policies initiated under PESA will contribute in inculcating a sense of participation and purpose within the village community - something that would surely make them less susceptible to subversive agendas. The problem, however, is that PESA is an 'indicative legislation'; it lays down certain guidelines whose implementation depends on the States carrying out specific amendments (or enacting exclusive legislations) in their Panchayati Raj and other Acts. While many States have taken preliminary action on the lines suggested in PESA, there is a general impression that its implementation is, by and large, unsatisfactory.” Dimensions Provisions Administration The President of India can declare any area as a Scheduled Area after of Scheduled consulting the Governor of the state. Areas The Governor can make regulations for the peace and good governance of any Scheduled Area in the state. These regulations may prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes, regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes, and regulate the business of money-lending to the Scheduled Tribes. Tribes States with Scheduled Areas must establish a council; Council advises on Advisory welfare and advancement of Scheduled Tribes. Council It consists of up to 20 members with three-fourths being representatives of Scheduled Tribes. Special The Governor can direct that any particular act of Parliament or of the Provisions for Legislature of the state shall not apply to a Scheduled Area or shall apply the Welfare of with modifications and exceptions. Scheduled The Governor has the power to repeal or amend any existing law in its Tribes application to a Scheduled Area if it is necessary for the peace and good governance of the area. Reports to the The Governor of each state having Scheduled Areas must annually or as President required by the President make a report to the President regarding the administration of these areas. The Union Government must ensure that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule are effectively implemented. Linkages with development of LWE due to non-implementation of Fifth SChedule (Xaxa, Mungekar, Bhuria Commission Reports) Application of Some areas with tribal majority do not have Vth Schedule Status. Laws in All laws are routinely extended and aren't adapted to tribal sensitivity Scheduled and issues. Areas After the adoption of the Constitution, the general Laws got extended to the Scheduled Areas in routine and the community system of governance got excluded from the legal frame. The traditional  system of governance in the Scheduled Areas that used to be the community's exclusive domain thus lost its legitimacy and was weakened with the passage of time. The Governor's office doesn’t have the capacity to deal with these matters. Land Alienation Madhya MP Land Regulation rules of 1959 are still in place (not without Pradesh which authorizes transfer of land to non-tribals. the consent of Gram Chattisgarh The state government still does not prohibit Sabha) acquisition of land on minute loan default of tribal. Rajasthan The state government does not recognise traditional authority. District administration can overturn Gram Sabha’s decision. Reports to Casual Exercise: The Reports from Governors are casual, irregular the President and unattended. As a result, this mechanism has not been used the way it was intended. (Mungekar Commission Report) Not sending reports on time: According to the Bhuria Commission Report (2002-2004), at the time of their writing, the States of Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh did not send their reports from 1999-2000, while Maharashtra and Orissa had not sent theirs from 2000-2001 onward. Non performance of Administrative Duties: A confidential report sent to the President by the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (accessed by Down to Earth magazine in 2013) has also complained of the failure of Governors in performing their administrative duties to ensure selfgovernance in tribal areas. Tribal Tokenistic nature of meetings: The members of the TAC have few Advisory powers even in terms of what can be discussed at the Council Council meetings. Eg, the Chhattisgarh TAC rules states that, apart from matters referred to it by the Governor, “No issue shall be taken up for discussion and included in the proceedings and no proposals shall be passed in a meeting unless the issue has been mentioned in the notice for the meeting.” Even when issues are taken up by the TAC, it has been noted that there is rarely any sustained and consistent engagement with the matter in the form of follow-ups and field visits. As per the minutes of their meetings, none of the TACs discussed the issue of land alienation among tribals between the years 2005 and 2011. The failure of implementation has cleared a governance vacuum that is usually filled by the Maoists. As per Mungekar Committee, “particularisation, not generalisation', and 'discretion, not rule by rote' comprise the moving spirit of this frame. It is the law that must be adapted to the specific situation of each group, however small and minuscule, rather than forcing the simple people to adapt to a frame that they do not know and are not in a position to appreciate.” As per the Supreme Court in the Samatha Case, “the purpose of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution is to prevent exploitation of truthful, inarticulate and innocent Tribals and to empower them socially, educationally, economically and politically. The Constitution intends that the land always should remain with the Tribals.” Theme II: Women in Red Corridor Expression of Gender Motivates in Red Corridor: Dominant presence of women in Maoist cadres: Women occupy 60% of total Maoist cadres and almost all operational and tactical positions responsible for sustaining Maoist rebellion. Moist appeal rooted in commitment towards women's rights: This is reflected in its all-women squads such as the Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (KAMS). These women-led campaigns against various forms of gender-based violence, including forced marriage, abduction, outcasting menstruating women, bigamy, domestic violence, and police brutality. The overarching grievance of women in the movement is that of gender inequality. Increased crimes against women: The National Crime Records Bureau 2019 data shows that Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Odisha registered 84,938 such crimes. Tribal women, in particular, have been victims of 69.6% of violence against women over the past decade. Police brutality and impunity often push women towards Maoism, creating a cycle of violence. Increasing layers of inequality: The layers of inequality in the Red Corridor are numerous, with SC/ST women bearing the brunt of gender, caste, and class subjugation. ○ SC/ST women form 40% of the Maoist forces but account for 90% of its martyrs. ○ SC/ST women disproportionately suffer mass displacement and loss of livelihood, as 75.8% of India's mineral production currently comes from their ancestral lands. Marginalisation of the rural economy: It leaves women poorer than men of the same households. Therefore, many women perceive Maoism as a means of relief from poverty and unemployment. Issues with Women in Red Corridor: Structural Violence: Women subjected to the same structural violence they fight against. Representation: Comprise 35-40% of total members but have negligible representation in the central committee (1 out of 20 members).  Menstrual Health: Lack of mainstream access to menstrual leave and hygiene products such as sanitary napkins, soap, and water. Health Issues: High prevalence of anemia and protein deficiency among women. Forced to be on constant alert, carrying a gun at all times. Reproductive Rights: Forced vasectomy and abortions; no opportunity for family life. Sexual Exploitation: Sexual exploitation and violence; issues often addressed inadequately in people's courts. Way forward Gender-sensitive policies: which offers women better alternatives than joining cadres. Re-work hard-power security responses: With an adequate focus on ground realities and focus on the welfare of Adivasis. Priority must be to diminish motivations, not demean them: The driving factors should not only be understood as incentives behind the violence but potential solutions for peaceful outcomes. Theme III: Non-Implementation of Forest Policies Evolution of Forest Policies  Forest Rights Act, 2006 The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 recognizes and vests forest rights and occupation rights in Forest Dwelling Scheduled Tribes (FDST) and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (OTFD). Features of Forest Rights Act, 2006 Identifies four types of rights: a. Title Rights - for a maximum of 4 hectares only for the land already being cultivated. b. Use Rights - to extract Minor Forest Produce (MFP), grazing areas, pastoralist routes. c. Relief and Development Rights - in case of forced displacement or illegal eviction. d. Forest Management Rights Who can claim these rights? ○ Forest Dwelling Scheduled Tribes (FDST) and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (OTFD) ○ Any member who has at least 3 generations (or 75 years) prior to 13th December 2005 primarily resided in these lands for bonafide livelihood needs. Gram Sabha's Authority: Gram Sabha has the authority to initiate the process for determining the nature and extent of individual or community forest rights. Three-tier structure: a. Gram Sabha b. SDM Committee c. District level Committee Free and informed consent of Gram Sabha is required in case of notifying National Parks (NP) and Wildlife Sanctuaries (WLS). Issues with implementation Gaps at the Confusion over terms such as "primarily resides in," "bonafide policy level livelihood." Lack of clarity, especially over the position of Primitive Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs). Conflict: Confusion due to Forest Conservation Rules (FCR) 2022 which don't require the collector to obtain the consent of Gram Sabha before preliminary approval. Divergence of land for infrastructure creation: Status of Forest Report by Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science, Environment & Forests – 2400 sq. km diverted under Forest Conservation Act, 1980  Pendency: According to a report by the Ministry of Tribal Gaps in Affairs (MoTA), only 40% claims were recognized. implementation Forest Department's Resistance: To recognize Community Forest Rights (CFR), Eg, In Sarguja district 27 CFR titles were claimed and conferred, but not recognized by the Forest Department (FD). Grounds of Wrong interpretation of OTFD definition and dependence clause. claim rejection Lack of evidence, GPS surveys, absence of proof. Claims on grounds where land is disputed, Eg, Chhattisgarh: "orange areas" are disputed between revenue and forest departments. (SCSTRTI Report, 2013) Need for forest rights sensitization (SC/ST/OBC). No eviction until the process of recognition and verification of Violation of rights is complete. clauses Eg, In Thane, evictions without due process. Serious flaws in the constitution of Forest Rights Committees in many states. Adequate implementation of the act requires sensitization on the part of the authorities concerned. Recently, a joint communication by MoEF and MoTA was sent to all state governments for the expedited implementation of the act.  North East Insurgency YEAR QUESTION MARKS The north-eastern region of India has been infested with 2017 insurgency for a very long time. Analyze the major reasons for 10 the survival of armed insurgency in this region. Facts Related to North East Insurgency North Eastern Region 99% of North Eastern borders are international. The North East Region covers 8% of India's geographical area and about 4% of the national population. It is culturally and ethnically diverse having more than 200 ethnic groups which have distinct languages, dialects and sociocultural identities. Extent of insurgency in North Eastern Region What is North East Insurgency? The term "North East Insurgency" typically refers to the various armed conflicts and insurgent movements that have taken place in the northeastern region of India. The region is home to several ethnic and linguistic communities, many of whom have long-standing grievances over issues such as political representation, economic development, and cultural preservation. Typology of the Conflict The conflicts in the North East have some peculiar characteristics: they are asymmetrical; they are ambiguous, making it difficult to differentiate a friend from an enemy; they are fought in unconventional modes, deploying political and psychological means and methods; and the conflicts eventually tend to escalate into prolonged wars of attrition. Violence in the region is also caused by the failure of the State administration to provide security. This has led to the creation of alternative forces of ethnic militia for provision of security. From the perspective of its ethnic constituency, a private ethnic militia is considered a more reliable provider of security when it is threatened by another ethnic group that is armed with its own militia. This is usually the context in an ethnically polarised situation in which the State administration fails to provide security and the actions of the Army are seen as partisan.  Causes of North East Insurgencies Secessionist The Naga insurgency, climaxing in 1956, was an armed ethnic Demands conflict led by the Naga National Council (NNC), which aimed for the secession of Naga territories from India. The more radical sectors of the NNC created the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), which also included an underground Naga Army. Cultural Every 48 years, a cyclic ecological phenomenon called Mautam Threats leads to widespread famine in this region. When such a famine started in 1959, the Mizos were left disappointed by the Assam Government's handling of the situation. The introduction of Assamese as the official language of the state in 1960, without any consideration for the Mizo language, led to further discontent and protests. The growing discontent with the Government ultimately resulted in a secessionist movement led by Mizo National Front (MNF). Demand of The neglect of statehood of Manipur, the Nagaland statehood in 1963 statehood via violence and foreign supports from then East Pakistan and China help the formation of many insurgents groups in North-East India including Manipur. Manipur's incorporation into the Indian state soon led to the formation of many insurgent organizations, seeking the creation of an independent state within the borders of Manipur, and dismissing the merger with India as involuntary. Demographic In the 1980s, Tripura's demography underwent a major change as a Changes result of illegal migrants and refugees from former East Bengal and subsequently from Bangladesh. Tripuris were pushed to the hills and the politics and administration in the state became dominated by the Bengali-speaking and immigrants. It was the particular reason which had created national consciousness among the local populations. The continuous neglect on the immigration issue had led to a direct confrontation between Indian nationalism and the newly created Tripuri nationalism. Note: Assam Accord, Naga Insurgency and Mizo Accord will be dealt in details in the Class.  Initiatives for North Eastern Region Scheme Description Security Deployment of CAPFs CAPFs deployed to aid state authorities in Measures counter-insurgency operations and provide security to institutions. Reimbursement of Reimbursement of security-related SRE expenditures to states, including expenses on raising battalions, logistics, ex-gratia grants, and rehabilitation. Modernization of State Central assistance for modernizing state Police Forces police forces to deal with insurgency. Sanction of India Sanction of 61 India Reserve Battalions to Reserve Battalions strengthen security infrastructure in NE states. Banning Unlawful Sixteen insurgent organizations declared Associations as unlawful associations and/or terrorist organizations under UAPA. Suspension of Pursuing talks with insurgent groups that Operations and MoS abjure violence, leading to Suspension of Operations agreements and MoS. Rehabilitation Surrender-cum-Rehab Revised scheme offering financial grants, and ilitation Scheme stipends, vocational training, and funds for Development rehabilitation camps for surrendered insurgents. Civic Action Welfare and developmental activities by Programme Army and CAPFs, including medical camps, sanitation drives, and infrastructure repairs. Helicopter Subsidy Providing connectivity, affordable transport, Scheme and evacuation services to remote areas of NER with a subsidy for helicopter operations. Special Special Development Special development package of ₹ 1,500 Development Package - Bodo crore for Bodo areas in Assam. Packages Accord (2020) Special Development Special development package of ₹ 1,000 Package - Karbi crore over five years for Karbi areas. Anglong Agreement (2021) Special Development Special development package of ₹ 1,000 Package - Adivasi crore over five years for infrastructure  Groups Agreement development in Adivasi inhabited areas of (2022) Assam. Special Development Development package to accelerate Package for Bodoland development and meet the aspirations of Territorial Council the Bodo people. (BTC) Development Package Development package for infrastructure in for Karbi Anglong Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Autonomous Council area. Territorial Council (KAATC) Special Economic Special economic package for Package for Dima development in Dima Hasao Autonomous Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council area. Territorial Council (DHATC) Infrastructure Non Lapsable Central Aimed at addressing the gap in Development Pool of Resources infrastructure in the North Eastern Region (NLCPR-State) by funding projects through state Scheme governments. (all non-exempted Central Ministries/Departments, are mandated to spend at least 10% of Gross Budgetary Support (GBS) for Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored Schemes in North Eastern Region (NER).) North East Special Focused development of physical Infrastructure infrastructure related to water supply, Development Scheme power, and health. (NESIDS) Hill Area Development Implemented in Tamenglong district of Programme (HADP) Manipur to address physical and social infrastructure gaps. Economic North Eastern Road Addresses inter-state connectivity through Development Sector Development restoration and upgradation of inter-state Scheme (NERSDS) roads. Prime Minister’s Aims at rapid and holistic development of Development Initiative the North Eastern Region by funding for North East Region infrastructure and social development (PM-DevINE) projects. Externally Aided Important window for getting funds for  Projects (EAPs) intrinsic sectors in the NER through multilateral funding agencies. Social Social and A fund aimed at developing social and Development Infrastructure infrastructure projects in the North Eastern Development Fund Region. (SIDF) Aspirational Districts Focus on coordination and monitoring of of North Eastern development in the aspirational districts of Region NER. Solutions (ARC IInd and MHA Annual Report) (Important ones are Discussed in detail in Class) Category Recommendations Capacity 1. Provide opportunities for officers in the North East to serve outside the Building in region. Administration 2. Increase incentives for officers working in the North East. 3. Operate regional training institutions through the North Eastern Council (NEC). 4. Discuss feasibility of regional cadres for senior technical positions. 5. Collaborate for administrative reforms and monitor implementation. Capacity 1. Upgrade North East Police Academy (NEPA) infrastructure and staff. Building in Police 2. Introduce a scheme for deploying police personnel from the region to Central Police Organisations and vice versa. Capacity Sixth Schedule Councils: Building in Local 1. Amend Sixth Schedule for Autonomous Councils to benefit from State Governance Finance and Election Commissions. 2. Review relationship between Councils and State Government in Meghalaya. 3. Identify powers Governors may exercise at their discretion under the Sixth Schedule. 4. Amend Paragraph 14 of the Sixth Schedule for a common commission for autonomous districts.  5. Review budgetary allocation arrangements for Autonomous Councils in Assam. Village Level Self-governance in Tribal North East: 1. Legislate for village level bodies with defined powers in Autonomous Councils. 2. Link additional funding to legislation for elected village bodies. 3. Work out fund requirements for Autonomous Councils normatively. 4. Recognize Nagaland's decentralised village self-governance for development initiatives. 5. Extend elected village committees for NREGA implementation throughout Meghalaya. 6. Codify customary laws where village bodies administer justice. Other Issues of Local Governance: 1. Apportion functions between Councils and Panchayati Raj Institutions in Assam. 2. Meet establishment costs of Councils from outside tribal sub plan. 3. Identify innovative initiatives for Tribe Specific Councils. 4. Prepare District and sub-District plans jointly with Tribe Specific Councils and Panchayati Raj Institutions. 5. Legislate for elected village level bodies in hill areas of Manipur. Capacity 1. Amend NEC Act, 1971 to restore conflict resolution provision. Building in Regional 2. Integrate NEC with the Ministry of Home Affairs' security coordination. Institutions 3. Prepare integrated regional plans through the Planning Commission. 4. Involve NEC in State plan formulation. 5. Entrust NEC with sanctioning funds from the Non Lapsable Central Pool of Resources (NLCPR). 6. Prepare a 10-year perspective plan for the region. 7. Abolish Ministry for Development of North Eastern Region (DONER) and restore responsibilities to subject matter Ministries.  8. Make NEHU a centre for advanced study and NEIGRIHMS a centre for tertiary health care. Capacity 1. Implement recommendations from reports on transforming the North Building – East and development initiatives. Miscellaneous Issues 2. Promote the region as a preferred investment destination. 3. Set up a Transport Development Fund for road corridors. 4. Implement ‘look east’ policy for long-term growth. 5. Improve rail connectivity. 6. Establish more bank branches and credit disbursement outlets. 7. Set up centres of excellence for professional and higher education. 8. Study customary judicial systems for better understanding and dissemination. 9. Develop a credible system of maintaining land records. Recent Peace Agreements Peace Description Agreements NLFT-SD Government of India, Agreement with the Sabir Kumar Debbarma-led Agreement NLFT, Sabir Kumar National Liberation Front of Tripura, where 88 (2019) Debbarma activists surrendered. A ₹100 crore development package was provisioned for tribal areas. BRU Government of India, Permanent domicile agreement for 6959 BRU Agreement Government of families in Tripura, with a financial package of (2020) Tripura, Government ₹661 crore. of Mizoram, BRU representatives Bodo Accord Government of India, MoU signed with Bodo groups resolving the Bodo (2020) Government of issue with a ₹1500 crore development package. Assam, Bodo groups 1615 NDFB workers surrendered. Karbi Government of India, Historic agreement with Karbi groups to end the Agreement Government of crisis in Karbi Anglong, ensuring Assam's (2021) Assam, Karbi groups territorial integrity. Over 1000 cadres surrendered. Tribal Peace Government of India, MoU with 8 tribal groups to resolve issues of Agreement Government of tribals and tea garden workers in Assam. 1182 (2022) Assam, 8 tribal cadres surrendered. groups Assam-Meghal Government of Agreement to resolve six out of twelve aya Inter-State Assam, Government longstanding boundary disputes between Assam Boundary of Meghalaya and Meghalaya. Agreement (2022) Assam-Arunac Government of Agreement to resolve boundary disputes between hal Pradesh Assam, Government Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, enhancing Inter-State of Arunachal Pradesh cooperation and development. Boundary Agreement (2023) DNLA Government of India, Agreement with the Dimasa National Liberation Agreement Government of Army to end hostilities and promote peace in (2023) Assam, DNLA Assam. Agreement with Government of India, Peace agreement with UNLF to promote peace in UNLF (2023) Government of Manipur. Manipur, UNLF Formation of a Peace Monitoring Committee. Agreement with Government of India, Settlement with ULFA including a ₹5000 crore ULFA (2023) Government of Special Development Package over five years Assam, ULFA and the formation of a committee to monitor implementation. Way Forward R Resolution of Disputes through Bodo Accord (2020), Karbi Agreement (2021), Negotiations and Peace Accord Agreement with ULFA (2023) E Economic Development and BRU Agreement, Special Development Package for Empowerment BTC S Securing International Operation All Clear (Royal Bhutan Army), Operation Collaboration for Counter Sunrise (Myanmar) Insurgency and Socio-Economic Development O Opening out institutional structure Establishing North East Developmental Councils, for North East Setting up regional administrative bodies L Law and Order Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces  (CAPFs), Special laws like AFSPA V Valuing Administrative and Modernization of state police forces, Training Implementational Efficiency in programs for local administration Governance E Evolving strategies to include all Community meetings, Involvement of local leaders stakeholders in policy-making D Development oriented security Initiatives to involve security forces in forces developmental activities, Civic Action Programme by CAPFs  Manipur Issue Recent Context Self-governed Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum (ITLF), which represents Kuki-Zo separate groups, announced that it would establish a "self-governed separate administration administration" with a separate “chief minister” in areas where the tribal groups have a majority, “whether the Centre recognises it or not.” Setting check The Kukis have set up check-points on roads to prevent the Meitei points from entering the hill region. The state government has condemned it as a move “motivated and aimed at vitiating and disturbing the law and order situation in the state.” Psychological Socially and psychologically, the state has been divided into two Split parts and what remains now is a political and administrative region. Center’s The central government’s continuing support for the state Endorsement government and endorsement of its policies and decisions have made the situation difficult. Arambai Formed as a socio-cultural outfit in 2020, Arambai Tenggol has Tenggol garnered tremendous public support and administrative clout in the Imphal Valley over the past nine months. After the violence broke out in the state last May, members of the group were seen to be at the forefront of the clashes with Kukis, looting arms from state armouries and defending Meitei villages against Kuki attacks. Data on the conflict Source Findings Official Statement by 175 people have been killed across the state, and 5,000 the Government (as cases of arson including the torching of more than 4,700 stated by the houses have been reported. Inspector General of Moreover, 386 religious structures (254 churches, mostly Police, I. K. Muivah, belonging to the Kukis, and 132 temples) have been as of 14 September) vandalised. The report by the Conflict and violence triggered 69,000 displacements in Geneva-based South Asia in 2023, with Manipur violence alone accounting Internal for 67,000. Displacement The report termed it as the highest number of Monitoring Centre displacements triggered by conflict and violence in India (IDMC) since 2018. Background: Since the 1960s, various militant groups have emerged in Manipur, claiming to represent the various demands and grievances of their respective ethnic communities; the Kukis and the Nagas, in particular, have been fighting for their separate homeland—a struggle that naturally conflicts with the aim of the Meiteis to defend the state’s territorial integrity. Its long border with Myanmar—which is ungoverned territory—and the fraternal and other ties between the militant groups across the border, compounds the security threat on Manipur. Causes of the Conflict Trigger Factor The Manipur High Court had in March, 2023 called for recommendations to be sent to the central government to recognise the Meitei community as a "scheduled tribe," an official status designed to protect minorities from marginalisation. On May 3, 2023, a 'Tribal Solidarity March' was organised in Manipur's hill districts to protest against the Meitei community's demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status. Contestation The very idea of what is “Manipur” fundamentally varies across the over ethnic different ethnic communities that call the state their home. indigeneity Groups Idea of ethnic indigeneity Meiteis and While there is some consensus among the majority of the Nagas Meiteis and the Nagas over their common roots, the Kukis are seen as outsiders. Kukis The Kukis, for their part, claim to be equally indigenous to Manipur—a claim that the Meiteis contest. The much cited ‘Anglo-Kuki War’ by the Kukis to claim their indigeneity to Manipur is often contested by the Meiteis. Territorial integrity vs Perspective Key Points Demands for a separate Meitei Fight for Manipur’s territorial integrity. homeland Opposition to demands for separate homelands by other groups. Naga Led by NSCN-IM, seeking creation of "Nagalim" (Greater Nagaland) covering Naga-majority areas in Manipur. Bangkok Agreement (June 2001): ○ Signed between the Government of India and NSCN-IM. ○ Extended a three-year ceasefire to Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur. ○ Rejected by Meitei groups, leading to violent clashes and 13 deaths in one day.  Kuki Demand for a separate homeland called Kukiland-Zale’n-gam. Causes apprehensions among the Meiteis. Uneven Meiteis are not permitted to buy land in Kuki- and Naga-inhabited Distribution of areas. Since Manipur joined the union of India in 1949, Meiteis Resources have felt aggrieved over their lack of rights to protect their customs, land, beliefs, and livelihoods. Granting ST status to the Meiteis would allow them legal ownership over land resources currently controlled by the Nagas and Kukis. The Nagas and Kukis fear this would give Meiteis a monopoly over land, strengthening their political and economic dominance. Hill Valley Divide Dimension Status Economic and Development has been valley-centric, Infrastructure benefiting the Meiteis while leaving the Kukis Development and Nagas marginalized. Between 2017 and 2020, the Imphal valley received a budget allocation of INR 21,481 crores compared to just INR 419 crores for the hills Political The hills, home to ~40% of the state's Representatio population, have only 19 seats in the state n legislative assembly. The Meiteis, who make up 50% of the population, hold 40 seats. This disproportionate representation leaves the Kukis and Nagas reliant on a state assembly controlled by Meitei lawmakers. Governance Deficit and Governance The lack of effective governance Demands for Deficit exacerbates issues of asymmetric political Autonomy in representation and development. Manipur Insurgency movements have created parallel governance structures due to perceived governance failures.  Ineffective decentralisation of power leaves hill district populations unable to obtain justice. Decentralisation The Hill Areas Committee (HAC) and Issues Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) were established to protect tribal rights. Formed under Article 371C and the District Council Act-1971, the six ADCs were intended to ensure decentralised governance. ADCs have limited legislative and judicial powers, relying on the state government for policy implementation, reducing them to administrative bodies and creating resentment. Demands for There are calls for Sixth Schedule status for Autonomy the hill districts to enhance autonomy. The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended the extension of Sixth Schedule provisions in the Hill areas of Manipur in its March 2002 report. Illegal immigration, Meitei’s The majority of Meiteis (and to some extent War on drugs, Perspective the Nagas, too) are of the view that the illegal and Anxiety migration of the Chins from Myanmar, over following the takeover of the junta in 2021, citizenship threatens the ‘demographic balance’ of Manipur. Kuki’s Kukis reject the allegations that they are Perspective facilitating or benefiting from the illegal immigration of Chins. They argue that these accusations are part of a broader majoritarian agenda pushed by the Meiteis to marginalize the Kukis and consolidate their dominance in the region. Economic Dumping of goods from China; the illegal Impact migration (both real and the perceived) of the Chins from Myanmar; and increasing cultivation of poppies and consequently the rising drug trade in Manipur. While the dumping of goods from China is often seen through the prism of state security, the illegal immigration from Myanmar, and the rise of poppy cultivation and the drug trade are often  linked to the Kukis of Manipur. Way Forward M Meaningful Establish platforms for dialogue among conflicting Dialogue communities. Encourage the participation of academics and concerned individuals to initiate and mediate these discussions. A Addressing Priority to end violence as a precursor for any Violence confidence-building measures. Disarm militant groups and civilians, manage the illegal flow of arms. N New Political Restructure political representation to reflect demographic Representati realities. on Ensure uniformity in legislative assembly constituencies to bridge disparities between regions. I Interrogate Open debates on ethnic communities’ claims to land based on Land traditional customs. Ownership Promote equitable land distribution and address disparities in development benefits. P Political Will State government's political will is crucial for meaningful change. Policies should prioritize nation-building over electoral interests. U Uniform Implement decentralized governance to address autonomy Governance demands effectively. Aim for governance that addresses local issues without exacerbating ethnic tensions. R Reinforce Foster fraternity among ethnic groups to combat ethnic Fraternity majoritarianism. Build social consensus that supports democratic principles and discourages separatist demands. Conclusion: There is an urgent need for meaningful dialogue among the conflicting communities that could precede confidence-building measures among the ethnic groups. In turn, the only way that such confidence-building measures could be initiated to bring an end to the violence. The political will of the state government would be key.  New ULFA Peace Accord (2024) Signing Ceremony The peace accord was signed on December 29, 2023, in New Delhi, involving the pro-talks faction of ULFA, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, with the central and Assam governments. Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma were present​. Key Provisions and Promises Renunciation of ULFA has agreed to renounce violence, disarm, disband its armed Violence organization, and vacate camps. Members will participate in peaceful democratic processes​. Democratic The group will engage in the democratic process established by law, Participation ensuring the integrity of the country​​. Economic Package A comprehensive economic package worth ₹1.5 lakh crore for Assam's holistic development has been pledged. This includes various development projects and investments​. Constitutional Ensuring the protection of Assam’s indigenous population, cultural Safeguards identity, and land rights. The agreement includes reserving 97 out of 126 Assembly seats for indigenous people and conducting future delimitation exercises accordingly​. Special Provisions Addressing ULFA’s demands, such as safeguarding the missing members, providing amnesty and rehabilitation, and preserving indigenous culture. The AFSPA has been lifted from 85% of Assam due to reduced violence. Challenges and Unresolved Issues Opposition from The hardline faction ULFA-I, led by Paresh Baruah, did not join the Hardline Faction peace process and continues to operate from the China-Myanmar border. This faction remains a significant challenge, evidenced b