In Defence Of Utilitarianism: An Economist's Viewpoint 1986 PDF

IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT Author(s): James A. Yunker Source: Review of Social Economy , April, 1986, Vol. 44, No. 1 (April, 1986), pp. 57-79 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29769312 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that he...

IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT Author(s): James A. Yunker Source: Review of Social Economy , April, 1986, Vol. 44, No. 1 (April, 1986), pp. 57-79 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29769312 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Review of Social Economy This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT* By James A. Yunker Western Illinois University Two articles denigrating utilitarianism, which recently appeared in a single issue of the Review of Social Economy, [Anderson; Ross] are symptomatic of the negative viewpoint on utilitarianism as a philosoph? ical concept which is apparently becoming increasingly popular. I find this distressing because, in my judgment, utilitarianism is not merely the best approach to questions of desirable social policy and individual behavior but is quite literally the only viable approach. Failure to recognize this state of affairs probably injects even more random error into our thoughts about these questions; thoughts which are already sufficiently muddled by the sheer overwhelming complexity of the natu? ral and social environments. As many readers of the Review of Social Economy are liable to regard these statements as patently preposterous, let me say at the outset that my viewpoint on utilitarianism has been formed not only by many years of research as a policy-oriented econo? mist, but also by the high standards of Christian social awareness instilled in me by an exclusively Roman Catholic education through the college level (I graduated from Fordham University in 1965). As indicated, one encounters a great many criticisms of utilitarianism in both the philosophical and social scientific literatures. But the fact is that the critics develop their own dubious definitions or interpretations of utilitarianism, and then proceed to criticize them. I prefer to take a positive rather than a negative approach; my concept of utilitarianism incorporates the basic idea expressed in the dictionary definitions but develops this idea in a manner consistent, first, with modern social scientific policy analysis and, second, with an "enlightened" or "refined" view of human nature and society. Consider the analogy between the concepts of "utilitarianism" and "socialism." According to the dictionary, socialism is simply public ownership of land and capital. Most of the criticism of socialism goes far beyond the definition. For example, socialism is first identified with central planning or the one-party state (because of the observed situa? tion under Soviet Communism) and is then castigated on the basis of the perceived defects of central planning or the one party state. To my *0034-6764/86/0401-57/$1.50/0. 57 This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 58 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY mind, this is an invalid criticism of socialism; socialism does not neces? sarily produce Stalinist regimes any more than capitalism necessarily produces Hitlerite regimes. For most of my professional career, in fact, I have been striving to inform the economics profession of the virtues of a system which I designate "pragmatic market socialism." [for example, Yunker, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1982a, 1982b] Pragmatic market socialism would be a socialist system incorporating economic market allocation (thus avoiding central planning) and regular elections contested by independent political parties (thus avoiding the one-party state). A fair judgment on socialism should be based on an assessment of the best specification and embodiment of the basic idea of socialism. It is the same with utilitarianism. While I certainly do not wish to engage in as extensive and spirited an advocacy of utilitarianism as I have for socialism, simply because the issue is not as important, I do feel that the time has come for a few words to be said in defense of utilitarianism. I will commence with a brief outline of a concept I call "broad utilitarianism," which to my mind represents a currently viable and effective interpretation of "utili? tarianism," in the same way that "pragmatic market socialism" repre? sents a currently viable and effective interpretation of "socialism." With this understanding of utilitarianism, I will then criticize four avenues of assault on utilitarianism found in the recent literature, of which the first two are indirect, the latter two direct. The indirect assaults are that utilitarianism tends to correlate with political conservatism [Anderson], and that utilitarianism is irrelevant to the examination of many pressing social problems. [James] The direct assaults are that utilitarianism is excessively materialistic in orientation [Ross] and unconcerned with equality [Sen], and that there are higher values than the social welfare value which utilitarianism proclaims as sovereign. [Williams; Sen; Lyons] This is hardly an exhaustive catalogue of assaults on utilitarian? ism, but responses to these assaults suggest responses to be made to others. Finally, I will briefly indicate why I believe that it is important to defend the utilitarian concept against these numerous assaults. BROAD UTILITARIANISM Here are some typical definitions, based on the classic writings of Bentham and Mill, of "utilitarianism": "the doctrine that the purpose of all action should be to bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number" [Webster's New World]; "the ethical theory which makes the pleasure or happiness of the individual or of mankind the end and This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 59 criterion of the morally good and right" [Funk and WagnalVs Stan? dard]; "the ethical doctrine that virtue is based on utility, and that conduct should be directed toward promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number of persons." [American College] It would seem that there are no better phrases to describe the conventionally adopted objectives of modern social policy analysis. I cite as an example the literature, to which I have recently contributed [Yunker, 1983], on optimal taxation or redistribution. Optimal taxation or redistribution is defined as that pattern of taxation or redistribution which maximizes a social welfare function into which the utility levels of all the individuals in the society enter as arguments. This maximization must be accom? plished subject to various constraints, including the tastes of the individ? uals, endowments of fixed resources, and (usually) private utility maxi? mization by individuals under market equilibration. The literature on optimal taxation is, of course, very rarefied and abstract, and for that reason many would label it unrealistic and impractical. But its advan? tage is that the basic structure of the problem is made very clear, and, while the structure of the problem may be less obvious in more informal social policy analysis, the structure is still there. Any social policy recommendation must be based on the presumption that if the recom? mendation is implemented, individual welfares (or utilities), and hence social welfare, will rise. Similarly, any rule of moral behavior must be based on the presumption that if the rule is generally observed by people, individual welfares and social welfare will be higher than if it is not observed. "Broad utilitarianism," as a general philosophy and methodology, avoids precise specifications as much as possible. However, it does insist, strictly in accordance with the meaning of the usual dictionary defini? tion, that ultimately both the desirability of social policies and the morality of individual behavior must be evaluated on the basis of their consequences in terms of individual happiness ("utility" in economic parlance) and social welfare (which depends in some way on individual utilities). But broad utilitarianism, in itself, does not go beyond this to specify either the state of the world which governs the production of consequences from social policy and individual behavior; or the appro? priate method of evaluating these consequences. Such specifications must obviously be made in particular cases in order to apply utilitarian? ism to practical problems. These specifications are necessarily more or less intuitive and, consequently, more or less controversial. Clearly there is room for an infinite amount of disagreement among utilitarians This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  60 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY regarding the desirability of specific policies or the morality of specific actions. Also it is certainly fair to say that utilitarian evaluations are not based entirely upon reason since the consequences which determine the evaluations are deduced on the basis of presumptions about the state of the world which are often very much intuitive in nature. We may say that utilitarian evaluations are based upon a combination of reason and intuition: intuition specifies the key assumptions made about conditions prevailing in the world, and reason then extracts or deduces the conse? quences (from a given social policy or individual action) given the prevailing conditions. Certain key aspects of broad utilitarianism serve to distinguish it from the many specific formulations of utilitarianism which have been set up as straw men by critics. First, the individual utility and social welfare consequences of any given social policy or individual behavior pattern can rarely be predicted with any degree of certitude. These conse? quences have to be regarded as random variables, and the most a given policy or act can affect is the probability distribution over the range of conceivable outcomes. Desirable policy or behavior is that which has a positive effect on the expected value of social welfare, using the statisti? cal sense of "expected value." Second, the social welfare referred to is the sum of instantaneous social welfares over a fairly substantial period of time. The relevant criterion is not expected social welfare at the present (or instantaneous) moment. Third, the broad formulation of utilitarian? ism asserts only that relationships exist, not what specific forms they take on. One key relationship is the social welfare function: the relation? ship that translates individual utilities into a measure of social welfare. Broad utilitarianism does not dictate that this function follow the sum of-utilities form.1 Other social welfare functions used in contemporary economic policy analysis include the Nash product-of-utilities form and lThe linear, or sum-of-utilities, social welfare function is often referred to as the Benthamite social welfare function on the basis of Bentham's famous dictum: "the greatest good for the greatest number." Strictly speaking, this dictum suggests maximation of the welfare of the majority of the population (fifty-one percent) at least as much as it suggests maximization of the welfare of the entire population. Even if the entire population is admitted into the social welfare function, Bentham's dictum only suggests, rather than precisely implies, a linear form for the social welfare function. It has to be realized that Bentham and Mill were not writing with the mathematical precision of contemporary economic analysis in mind. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 61 the Rawls maximin-utility form.2 Also, broad utilitarianism does not dictate that, in the individual utility functions, consumption of material goods and services purchased in the economic marketplace is the only determinant, the most important determinant, nor even a particularly important determinant of individual utility.3 Our knowledge is far too limited at this point for confident specification of the exact forms of either the individual utility functions or the social welfare function, as well as of other functions bearing upon the consequences of policies and actions. Thus, utilitarian evaluations of social policies or individual moralities must be regarded as problems in decision-making under a high degree of uncertainty. Not surprisingly, a great deal of controversy is possible between social analysts, even though they may all set out with the same utilitarian objective of determining social policies that maxi? mize social welfare. It is also important to recognize that the concept of broad utilitarian? ism motivating this essay includes a sharply defined distinction between "simple goodness/value" and "moral goodness/value." Judgments on morality, as opposed to judgments on the more general concept of desirability (i.e., all morally good actions are desirable, but not all desirable actions can be described as morally good), are confined to individual behavior as opposed to social policy. For a given action by a given individual to be judged morally good or bad, the judge must see that the individual in question perceives a conflict between the course of action that would most benefit his own long-term expected individual utility and the course that would most benefit long-term expected social welfare. The morally good course of action is the latter which benefits long-term expected social welfare; the morally bad course of action is the former, which benefits long-term expected individual utility. 2The literature on the best form for the social welfare function is a very small part of the overall public choice literature contributed by economists. Most of this literature is forbiddingly technical, even though its subject matter tends to be thought of as "comraon sensical" by the uninitiated man-in-the-street. Some illustrative references on this debate include Kaneko and Nakamura, Ng, Howe and Roemer, and Yaari. Consensus does not seem to be in sight on the most valid mathematical form of the social welfare function. In applied policy analysis, several forms are utilized; particularly the linear form, among other things, because of its mathematical convenience. 3Much of Mill's energy in his writing on utilitarianism was devoted to disassociating utilitarianism from crude Epicureanism and hedonism. It was in the course of such a discussion that Mill produced the famous lines: "It is better to be a human being dissatis? fied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." The reason is that entities of higher intelligence are better able to appreciate and enjoy that level of satisfaction which they do achieve. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  62 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY In other words, the concept of "sacrifice," which can only apply to the individual, is essential to the concept of morality: a person can only be morally good if he sacrifices his own interests in favor of those of society, while he can only be morally bad if he sacrifices society's interests in favor of his own.4 Judgments on the morality of individual behavior are often very subtle and difficult. One reason is that the elaborate system of rewards and punishments devised by society is an effort to create an identity or near-identity between the personal self interest of any given individual and society's interest. Thus, ordinarily self-interested behavior closely parallels socially desirable behavior, and the conflicts between the private interest and the social interest which create the possibility of moral and immoral behavior do not arise. The above represents a very concise account of broad utilitarianism,5 but hopefully enough has been said to show that this interpretation of utilitarianism has at least as much to recommend it, in terms of consist? ency with the dictionary definitions set forth at the outset of this section, as do the interpretations of the various critics of utilitarianism to whom I now turn. I will offer a series of rebuttals to certain criticisms of utilitarianism which have appeared in the social scientific and philo? sophical literatures. The criticisms addressed here represent only a small ?T grant that it is arguable that the distinction made between good and moral good is not clearly implied in the writings of the classical utilitarians. John Stuart Mill wrote, for example: "He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble." This sentence elicited a lengthy footnote in which Mill dealt with the objection raised by a certain Reverand Davies that a tyrant who saves a victim from drowning for the purpose of slowly torturing him to death afterwards should not be described as acting in a morally right manner. Mill's response is that the saving of the life is still describable as morally good; although, if the intention (as opposed to the "motive") of the rescuer is to perform torture afterwards, that act of torture would be morally wrong, and the torturer would be adjudged morally bad. This seems rather dubious. Surely Mill would agree, on the basis of the intention factor, that the level of good (or bad) morality attributable to a given act would depend on the element of potential sacrifice. Surely he would agree that a poor swimmer who rescues a child from a cold and stormy sea out of a general sense of responsibility and altruism performs an act of higher moral quality than a strong swimmer who rescues a child from a quiet pond in the conscious and explicit hope of a material reward from the grateful parents. At another point in Utilitarianism, for example, Mill wrote: "Though it is only a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that anyone can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make that sacrifice is the highest virtue that can be found in man." 5Space constraints prevent a longer exposition of broad utilitarianism herein, but the interested reader will find fuller treatment in "A Broad Utilitarian Theory of Value and Moral Value," Forum for Social Economics, Spring, 1985. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST^ VIEWPOINT 63 sampling of such criticisms, and, furthermore, they must necessarily be addressed in a very abbreviated manner. Nevertheless, I hope to suggest that the foundations of utilitarianism are considerably stronger than many philosophers and social scientists believe them to be. UTILITARIANISM AND POLITICAL CONSERVATISM Utilitarianism has been accused of being correlated with an unhealthy degree of political conservatism. The argument seems curious in that Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, widely regarded as the chief architects of the utilitarian position in philosophy, were at the same time enthusiastic and forceful social reformers. Be that as it may, Charles Anderson, a political scientist, has advanced the following argument in an article published in the Review of Social Economy. Political scientists generally subscribe to pragmatism. They generally support changes in socio-economic policy, political institutions, etc., for the purpose of determining whether or not they "work," (i.e., appear to improve social welfare). They are not troubled by idealistic notions of optimal policies but are content merely to find better policies. Econo? mists, on the other hand, tend to subscribe to utilitarianism. They want to formulate ideal or optimal policies, and until they can do that they prefer to cling to the status quo. Since such ideal or optimal policies can rarely be found, economists tend to oppose changes on principle. Although I am not aware of any systematic surveys on the subject, it seems that, as a group, political scientists are more liberal than econo? mists. Economists as a group seem to be more concerned that society not neglect alleged efficiencies of free market allocation, while political scientists as a group are concerned that society be aware of alleged breakdowns in laissez faire that should be corrected through discretion? ary social policy. But it is dubious at best to propose that the philosophi? cal predispositions of the two disciplines were a major factor in the evolution of this situation. It is easy to envision pragmatists who would be staunchly conservative politically: "The status quo must be preserved because it works." At the same time, utilitarianism hardly seems a serious impediment to taking a sympathetic view of proposed social reforms. In my own case, for example, a utilitarian viewpoint in philosophy does not prevent me from preferring socialism over capitalism. (The socialism would be of a democratic, market socialist variety, I hasten to add.) Differential or marginal analysis is quite natural to utilitarianism: a proposed reform is evaluated on the basis of the incremental social costs and benefits it This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 64 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY would entail. If the incremental benefits are perceived to be greater than the incremental costs, the reform would be supported ? even though it might be clearly recognized that the new policy is unlikely to be "optimal" in the strong sense of being the absolute best over the range of all conceivable alternatives. It is commonsensical that while one step up will probably not bring us to the top of the mountain, it will get us that much closer. Utilitarians are just as capable of appreciating this point as are pragmatists or anyone else. THE "IRRELEVANCE" OF UTILITARIANISM Utilitarianism has been described as "irrelevant" because few people subscribe to it, and, as a result, it cannot be used to support social policies which are "obviously" desirable.6 For example, in an article in Ethics Susan James is concerned with the proposition that the United States should increase its foreign aid contribution because of the moral duty we have to relieve suffering in the less developed world. The utilitarian approach to foreign aid is rejected as irrelevant. Instead, an argument is advanced that may be roughly summarized as follows: Some years ago, OSHA allowed pesticides to be used in a manner that quite possibly had severely deleterious effects on the health of migrant farm workers laboring in pesticide-treated fields. All right-thinking persons are shocked and outraged by this and readily pronounced a judgment of immoral behavior on the OSHA officials responsible for the decision. Whatever it is that is responsible for this particular judgment of immorality also dictates that the citizenry of the United States be deemed immoral because of their niggardly support of foreign aid. Possibly, the appeal to the concept of moral duty contained in the James article will be found meaningful by an appreciable number of people and will thereby have a favorable effect on the foreign aid 6J. S. Mill may have had this in mind when he wrote: "They [certain critics of utilitarianism] say it is expecting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society." Mill's response to the objection, obviously strongly influenced by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" doctrine, is that in a properly structured world, an individual action which fosters social welfare will normally also foster the private welfare of the individual. The fact that the motive for the action is to enhance the individual's own welfare does not make the action less desirable socially. This point was much elaborated by the early utilitarians, although they often used the term "morally right" when it would have been better to use simply "right." The broad utilitar? ian theory upheld herein improves upon classical utilitarianism by adopting an explicit distinction between "good" and "moral good" to reflect the universal judgment that actions undertaken to benefit the individual's own welfare are not appropriately described as morally good, even though they are desirable because they augment social welfare. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 65 contribution made by the United States government. But one tends to doubt it. First of all, outside of the milieu of knee-jerk liberalism, an adverse judgment on the morality of the OSHA officials is not as straightforward as James seems to think. Second, even if a judgment of immorality is made, it will be based (implicitly if not explicitly) on utilitarian grounds: the expected utility losses to the migrant farm workers from impaired health owing to the pesticides would be deemed greater than the expected utility gains to the fruit growers from higher profits and to the consumers from lower prices. Third, for the decision to be deemed "immoral," as opposed to simply "unwise" or "adverse," it would have to be assumed that the OSHA officials in question were fully aware that the losses to the migrant farm workers exceeded the gains to others, and that they made their decision to enhance their own private utilities (e.g., through receiving monetary bribes from the fruit growers). The case for more foreign aid (or less for that matter) can only be sensibly made on utilitarian grounds. Some time ago I published an article on a computer simulation model describing a potential "world economic equalization program." [Yunker, 1976] The output from the model suggests that, at the very slight cost of a minor retardation in the rate of increase of per capita consumption in the United States, the economic gap in living standards between the richest and the poorest regions of the world could be reduced from one fifth to one tenth of its present magnitude within a thirty year period. The debatable assump? tions on which this remarkable conclusion rests are (1) that living stan? dard disparities are mainly due to extreme differentials in generalized capital endowments between regions; and (2) that the principle of diminishing marginal productivity applies strongly to generalized capi? tal. From these assumptions, we may deduce, even without benefit of a computer model, that transferring a certain amount of generalized capital from the United States to, say, India, would decrease output in the United States by a very small amount and increase output in India by a very large amount. At the same time, the extreme consumption inequality in the world today considerably augments the risk of nuclear war or nuclear terror? ism. As I see it, increasing U.S. foreign aid would result in only a small decrease in the material consumption of the U.S. population but would generate a substantial increase in its psychological security. (The sub? stantial increase in the economic welfare of the less developed world would substantially reduce the risk of nuclear war or terrorism.) In This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 66 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY other words, a sound argument for more foreign aid can be based on the crude self-interest of the U.S. population. But the argument can be stated in terms of a social welfare function in which the welfare of people in, for example, India, would be incorporated along with the welfare of people in the United States. The formulation and application of such a social welfare function by the United States citizenry would not necessarily be an act of pure altruism on their part. If U.S. citizens ignore the poverty of people in India (effectively place a weight of zero on the utility of Indians in the U.S. social welfare function), and their consequent niggardliness with respect to foreign aid imposes a low level of utility on the Indian people, then this policy will increase the chance that U.S. citizens will one day find themselves engulfed in nuclear fireballs. The fact that altruism has its roots in self-interest refers back to the paradox of moral value men? tioned above: normally self-interested behavior parallels socially desir? able behavior so that, even though the behavior is socially desirable, it cannot be described as morally good. If utilitarian arguments such as these fail to induce the U.S. to provide more foreign aid to the less developed world, I cannot imagine the U.S. being swayed by "moral duty" arguments such as those of Susan James. INADEQUATE SPECIFICATIONS OF UTILITARIANISM Several critics have assaulted "utilitarianism" as a general concept, when what they are really assaulting is a specific formulation of utilitar? ianism which they find inadequate or invalid. This is analogous to attacking arithmetic because some people make mistakes in computa? tions. I cite two economists as exemplars of this category of critic. David Ross lambasts economists for making the foolish "utilitarian" assumption that "economic development" (defined simply in terms of an increase in the production and consumption of priced, marketed, material goods and services) will be advantageous to the populations of the less developed countries. No, says Ross, as we all know (or should know), money does not buy happiness. Economic development tends to bring about a host of evils: environmental decay and ugly urban sprawl; psychic distress from the higher degree of uncertainty about the future, psychic distress because of the tendency for material consumption aspi? rations to escalate faster than achieved consumption; and serious declines in leisure, philosophical serenity, and higher culture. An obvi? ous comment on this argument is that it provides a very convenient and ostensibly morally acceptable rationalization (of the "it's for their own This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 67 good" variety) for withholding foreign aid from the less developed countries. I prefer the "charity begins at home" approach taken by Gordon Tullock in a rather scandalous article in the Southern Economic Journal. At least it is not hypocritical. Tullock's argument is simply that the restrictive immigration policies practiced by all the wealthier nation-states of the modern world demonstrate quite unambiguously that each places a much higher weight on its own citizens in defining social welfare than it does on non-citizens ? so why not be honest about it? But whether Ross' argument represents unconscious hypocrisy or not, it is not a valid criticism of the broad formulation of utilitarianism advanced herein, but rather is a criticism of taking an unduly restricted view of the individual utility function. In reality, according to Ross, individual utility depends on many things besides material consump? tion; it depends also on a pure environment, individual breathing space, security and stability, modest consumption wants in relation to achieved consumption, equality, leisure, correct philosophical attitudes, and enjoyment of traditional cultural expressions. To the extent that I as a utilitarian might agree with Ross that these things enter the utility functions of individuals and that increasing material consumption tends to conflict with some or all of them, it reduces my estimates of the probable net gains to be anticipated from increasing material consump? tion. But even if I were to go to the extreme of deeming an increase in material consumption in the less developed world to have a negative overall impact on expected long-term social welfare, my opposition to foreign aid (or anything else that might increase material consumption in the less developed world) would be based on a utilitarian judgment. Why, therefore, does Ross choose to consider his opinions on the utility function antithetical to utilitarianism? The answer is that Ross does not adequately understand utilitarianism. Another example is provided by the economist Amartya Sen. Sen takes the view that utilitarianism necessarily implies subscription to the Bentham sum-of-utilities social welfare function. He then criticizes this function for not taking account of the dispersion of individual welfares. Thus, utilitarianism is not in favor of egalitarianism. As all right thinking persons are egalitarians, this establishes the invalidity of utili? tarianism. The fact is that any and all arguments for egalitarianism are founded on utilitarian logic of some kind or another. The classic economic argument for income equality produced in the late nineteenth century This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 68 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY by Edgeworth, for example, relied upon two key assumptions, among others: (1) a Bentham sum-of-utilities social welfare function; and (2) diminishing marginal utility of income. This argument justifies redis? tribution (up to a point) even if the effect of redistribution is to lower total income. Consider the following, simple hypothetical example of a two household society, the numerical values of which incorporates the diminishing marginal utility of income assumption. Rich Household Poor Household Sum Income Utility Income Utility Income Utility Without Redistribution 100 12 20 5 120 17 With Redistribution 50 10 30 8 80 18 As shown, redistribution lowers the sum-of-incomes. This does no redistribution objectionable, however, because it increases the su utilities, which is the Benthamite criterion. It should be poin that, even in the absence of diminishing marginal utility, redistr may be justified on sum-of-utilities grounds using the assum interdependent utilities: the poor household might envy the rich hold, the rich household pity (or fear) the poor household, or Thus, the utility consequences of income redistribution in th example might hold even if the relationship between income an for each household would be proportional if each household wer ious of the existence of the other household. Of course, income redistribution could be carried to the point w reduces the sum-of-utilities, as in the following example which el hypothetical income figures and includes only hypothetical utility fig Utility Rich Poor Household Household Sum Mild Redistribution 10 4 14 Strong Redistribution 5 5 10 Sen would presumably argue that "strong redistribution" is better than "mild redistribution" because equality is good per se, and, conse? quently, since the sum-of-utilities is lower with strong redistribution, this establishes the invalidity of utilitarianism. If pressed on why equal? ity is good per se, Sen would presumably answer that equality reduces the psychological distress involved in envy and pity (or fear) ? note that this is a reference to social welfare. But if the envy-pity factor has already been incorporated into the utility functions via the presumption of interdependencies, and these interdependencies are manifested in the interdependent utility functions are receiving an increasing amount of analytical attention from economists. Important contributions include Hochman and Rodgers, Becker, Boskin and Sheshinski, and Layard. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 69 numerical values shown in the above example, it is not obvious that the sum-of-utilities function fails to constitute a valid indication of the undesirability of strong redistribution. For example, faced with such a large reduction in its utility from the implementation of strong redis? tribution, the rich household might embark on a civil war in an effort to prevent it, and the war might achieve this objective (consider, for example, the Spanish Civil War). The main point to be made, however, is simply that utilitarianism in general is not confined to the Bentham, or sum-of-utilities, specification of the social welfare function. It was mentioned above that two per? fectly respectable alternatives to the Bentham sum-of-utilities specifica? tion in contemporary economics are the Nash product-of-utilities and the Rawls maximin-utility specifications. According to Rawls (but not Nash), strong redistribution in the above example would be preferable to mild redistribution. Thus, strong redistribution is potentially justifi? able on utilitarian grounds (although the question of the validity of the justification would remain). In fact, one widely utilized social welfare function involves the sum of the powers of the individual utilities, where the power is a positive number less than one. [Layard and Walters, pp. 48-50] Any degree of aversion to inequality in utilities, no matter how extreme, may be represented simply by taking the power sufficiently close to zero. Of course, egalitarianism can be carried too far, as can most other virtues.8 It has been theoretically and experimentally veri? fied, for example, that were income redistribution to be carried past a certain point, it would actually reduce the material consumption of the poorer households. Thus, redistribution past this point could only be justified on psychological grounds (reduction of envy/pity) rather than on grounds of material welfare. There is evidence, moreover, that even on Rawlsian grounds and under conditions of utility interdependencies, redistribution should stop well short of the point at which material consumption of all households is exactly equal. [Yunker, 1983] But regardless of specifics, the point remains that the issue of equality, no less than any other policy issue, must be studied from the perspective of some form of utilitarianism if we are to aspire to meaningful, useful statements about it. 8Some recent contributions which highlight the potential efficiency or income costs of over-enthusiastic pursuit of income equality include Baumol and Fischer, Collard, Lecom ber and Slater, Carruth, and Yunker. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 70 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY HIGHER VALUES THAN SOCIAL WELFARE The example of equality leads us naturally to the last criticism of utilitarianism to be addressed here. This is the criticism that there are values (such as equality) which are higher than the social welfare value which is proposed as "the ultimate value" by utilitarianism. Higher values include freedom, equality, loyalty, non-violence, helpfulness, truthfulness, reliability, fairness, compassion, and so on.9 These values are upheld by behavior which complies with the traditional rules of ethical and pro-social behavior. The utilitarian position is, of course, that all values such as these are subsumed by the social welfare value: what makes them values is that their general observance in human society will promote individual utility and, hence, social welfare. Some critics of utilitarianism endeavor to establish that these values transcend the social welfare value by means of arguments which may be (some? what satirically) summarized as follows: A more or less preposterous set of circumstances is postulated, in which a given behavior pattern which is normally socially beneficial could arguably have adverse social wel? fare consequences. It is then asserted that "all right-thinking persons" will deem the behavior pattern to be ethical and desirable regardless of its potentially detrimental effect on social welfare. This shows that whatever value is being upheld by the behavior pattern is higher than the social welfare value. Three recent examples typify this line of rea? soning. Bernard Williams suggests a scenario which is roughly equivalent to the following: A tyrannical dictator A is in a position of "complete domination" over individuals B and C, who are both ordinary, blame? less citizens. A gives B a choice: (i) murder C and go free, or (ii) refuse to murder C and be murdered along with him by A. If B is a utilitarian (according to Williams), he will probably reason that state (i) is better 9Excluded from this list is the religious value of eternal salvation, i.e., union with God, friendship with the Almighty, or other expressions of the notion that the purpose of life is to get and remain on good terms with a supernatural Deity. I hope that this does not bring me into an excessive amount of conflict with subscribers to religious doctrines. In most of the great contemporary religions of the world, God is depicted as taking a benevolent interest in the affairs of the human race. Thus, He should not object to humans endeavor? ing to maximize social welfare. I certainly have no objection to religionists asserting that the ultimate reason why we should strive to maximize social welfare is that it reflects greater honor and glory on God. Such religionists are welcome to say that the very highest value is obedience to God's Will ? so long as it is agreed that God wills the earthly happiness of His human creations. }. S. Mill writes on this matter as follows: "If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other." This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 71 than state (ii) since only one innocent person would be murdered, and he will proceed to murder C and will be adjudged immoral by the preponderance of mankind.10 Amartya Sen proposes a scenario in which A is a sadist and B is a strong, healthy, happy individual. If A tortures B under these circumstances, A's utility gain will be larger than B's utility loss. Torture would thus be approved by utilitarianism ? but it remains obviously immoral.11 David Lyons [pp. 163ff.] envisions a fine lawn covering a public park. If everyone walked on the lawn it would be ruined, so an ordinance has been passed enjoining people from walking on the lawn. Along comes citizen A one dark and stormy night. He can get home more quickly by taking a shortcut across the lawn. No one else is about. A, being a utilitarian, reasons that by taking the shortcut he will increase his own welfare without inflicting an appreciable welfare loss on anyone else (if only a few people walk on the lawn, it won't be harmed). So A walks on the lawn and all right-thinking persons adjudge the behavior to be immoral. There are at least three obvious objections to this kind of reasoning. First, utilitarianism is not so likely to judge that behavior which is ordinarily socially disadvantageous is ? even under the atypical cir? cumstances envisioned ? socially beneficial. Second, there is always the possibility that the behavior pattern in question, even though ordinarily undesirable, is in fact ? given the extraordinary circumstances ? socially beneficial. Finally, the principle of "adherence to standard morality" does not provide a superior basis to utilitarianism for evaluat 1?)Smart and Williams [pp. 97-99]. The scenario described in the text is not exactly the one proposed by Williams, but it constitutes an effort to better delineate the problem being raised. Williams' actual dilemma of "Jim and Pedro* may be respresented as follows: A is in a position of absolute power over innocent citizens B, C, D, E, F,..., Z. A gives B a choice: kill C, whereupon D, E, F,..., Z will be allowed to go free, along with B; or don't kill C, whereupon A will kill C, D, E, F,..., Z, and B will go free as before. Williams is of the opinion that even though D, E, F,..Z, and possibly even C as well, would (probably) be begging B to kill C under the circumstances, it would be morally improper for B to do so. It seems to me that even morally righteous non-utilitarians might have a hard time arriving at this judgment. If B sanctimoniously refuses to do the deed and proceeds unscathed on his way, a whole group of people will have been forced to lay down their lives so that B's conscience might remain clear. This might be deemed a case of excessive, Pharisaical piety even by most non-utilitarians. "More accurately, Sen says that torture would be approved by "welfarism." In Sen's terminology, utilitarianism is a special case of welfarism. Welfarism is the social welfare function approach in general, while utilitarianism is the particular variant of welfarism in which the social welfare function takes on the sum-of-utilities or Benthamite form. It is obvious from this paper that I do not agree with Sen's view that utilitarianism necessarily requires use of the linear social welfare function in evaluating social policy and individual morality. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 72 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY ing the morality of behavior under the atypical circumstances envi? sioned because the essence of the proposed dilemmas lies in a strong conflict between different "standard principles of moral behavior." Such conflicts are only to be expected. The standard principles of moral behavior are all grounded on the assumption that, in general, abiding by these principles will raise social welfare. But in atypical cases, a given action can have multiple consequences, some of which will raise social welfare and some of which will reduce it, such consequences being closely balanced in terms of the magnitude of the effects. The positive consequences proceed along the usual lines envisioned by one principle, the negative consequences proceed along the usual lines envi? sioned by another. Thus, the principles are brought into conflict. We will comment on each of these objections in turn. The first objection is probably the most important in a practical sense. A utilitarian is no more likely to approve behavior which is normally undesirable than a non-utilitarian, regardless of the circum? stances of the behavior. But he will reason in a strictly utilitarian manner. In the case of tyrant A ordering B to wantonly murder C, the first thing that will occur to a utilitarian is that the expected gain ? even to B ? from carrying out the order is not so large as Williams purports it to be. Quite possibly, after the order has been carried out, A (obviously a very nasty character) will break his word with a chuckle and murder B anyway. Or on the day after this sad affair, there might be a revolution which topples A, whereupon B will either be tried and executed for murder or, at a minimum, shunned and excoriated for his craven act of cowardice. If, on the other hand, B courageously refuses to follow the order, A might perceive the error of his ways and relent, or the defiance might stir a bystanding audience into an immediate revolu? tion so that B becomes an honored ? and living ? hero. Utilitarianism, moreover, might well prescribe that B should actually sacrifice his own life in the matter, on grounds that it sets a glowing example of goodness and non-violence that will have a substantial beneficial effect on the welfare of succeeding generations. Turning to Sen's example, it is difficult to conceive how in a case of what we ordinarily consider "torture" (pulling out fingernails, branding with a hot iron, drilling an exposed nerve in a tooth, etc.) the psycholog? ical satisfaction to the torturer, no matter how enthusiastic a sadist, could possibly be quantitatively larger than the physical pain to the torturee, no matter how physically robust and temperamentally san? guine. Another relevant consideration is the utility of third parties. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 73 Perhaps A's utility would be raised by torturing more than B's utility would be reduced by being tortured, but we must also throw into the scales the adverse effect of the torture on the utility of some observer C (perhaps Professor Sen), who would be alarmed and distressed at the thought that A, encouraged by B's submission, will extend his torturing activities to C. A might also be setting a bad example for other sadisti? cally inclined people, whose victims would not be so robust and san? guine that they lose less from torture than the torturer gains. On the whole, therefore, I would expect utilitarians to be just as appalled by actual instances of torture as non-utilitarians. Similarly, a utilitarian pondering Lyons' nocturnal pedestrian tempted to walk on the grass is not so likely to deem the act acceptable. Getting home a few minutes earlier is a negligible gain for A, and if he walks on the grass, it will do some damage, however slight. A's walking on the grass might also set a bad example for a group of children who could be lurking in the vicinity, unobserved by A. Even A's own interest is probably not best served by walking on the grass. A policeman might turn up unexpect? edly when A is halfway across the lawn, so that he is made to pay a stiff fine for the transgression. The second objection is that perhaps behavior which is ordinarily undesirable is, in fact, under the weird circumstances conjured up by the non-utilitarian critic, desirable or even moral. The world is full of strange and unexpected paradoxes, and perhaps they exist also in moral logic. Might we imagine circumstances in which it would be legitimate for B to murder C under instructions from the tyrannical A? What if the possibilities mentioned above of double-crossing, relenting, and revolu? tion are exceedingly remote, and B is a family man with a wife and children to support, not to mention an old mother, and he is, moreover, a skilled surgeon whose services are absolutely vital to save the lives of the numerous victims of some esoteric ailment? According to some rather sanctimonious non-utilitarians, it is "horrible" even to speculate in this vein.12 But one is tempted to wonder what the non-utilitarian's choice would be were he, through some uncanny fate, to be actually trapped in B's position? Sometimes those who hold others to very strict moral standards are noticeably easier on themselves. As for Sen's "tor? ture" example, do we not sometimes observe parents allowing them 12The word "horrible" is suggested by the following statement of Bernard Williams: [Smart and Williams, p. 78] "These distinctive characteristics [of utilitarianism] he mostly seems to find agreeable, while to me some of them seem horrible." The "he" refers to J. J. C. Smart, the author of an essay sympathetic to utilitarianism included in the same volume. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 74 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY selves to be pummeled by their young offspring in the belief that the minor discomfort is outweighed by the apparent relief to the child from a bit of self-expression? Is this necessarily immoral? And as for Lyons' nocturnal pedestrian, is it not conceivable that we ought to give the poor devil a break and let him go ahead and walk on the grass without being morally condemned? After all, perhaps he has the flu and is in dire peril of developing pneumonia. The final objection is to the non-utilitarian's TJosition that the simple principle of adherence to standard moral rules or duties satisfactorily resolves the problem iri situations which appear to be difficult dilemmas on utilitarian grounds. I would contend that these dilemmas continue to present difficult judgmental problems even if it is granted that proper behavior is that which adheres most closely to traditional moral rules and duties.13 The rule that applies to Williams' problem is that it is immoral to kill except in self-defense. But clearly a case could be made (albeit possibly a "horrible" one) that B's killing of C under the circum? stances would be in the nature of self-defense. In Sen's problem, there is a conflict between the principle of non-violence (by which A should not torture B) and the principle of helpfulness (by which B should submit to torture as a means of helping A.)14 As for Lyons' nocturnal pedestrian, there is a conflict between the principle of freedom (according to which one has the right to follow one's own interest so long as there is no significant conflict with another's interest) and the principle of volun? tary compliance with socially ordained rules. Non-utilitarians are fond of proposing strange and remarkable sets of circumstances designed to demonstrate that "following the rules" takes precedence over social welfare. Utilitarians are certainly able to play that game. They can imagine hypothetical conditions at the opposite end of the spectrum, no less strange and remarkable, designed to dem? onstrate that social welfare takes precedence over following the rules. Let us imagine a farmer sitting in a rocking chair on the front porch of 13As J. S. Mill writes: "It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances...." 14The "principle of helpfulness" is from the social psychological literature on morality and moral development. [See Staub for a survey] The morality of an individual subject in an experiment is often gauged by that individual's willingness to help another person in need. The more help that is rendered by the subject, and the greatest the difficulty or cost to the subject of rendering the help, the higher the rating given to the subject's morality. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 75 his house. The house stands at a crossroads. Down one branch the road comes to the edge of a cliff. Down the other it leads to a state police headquarters. The farmer is listening to the radio. A special news bulletin announces that a maniac has just hijacked a busload of chil? dren, with the expressed intention of driving them over a cliff in order to offer a human sacrifice to the "great scorpion-god." At that precise moment, a bus full of terrified children being driven by a wild-eyed maniac pulls up in front of the farmer's porch. "Which way to the cliff?" asks the driver. Should the farmer follow the truthfulness rule and tell the maniac which branch of the road leads to the cliff? I suspect that even Bernard Williams, Amartya Sen, and David Lyons would admit that the farmer should lie. But they would not want to admit that the justification for the lie is its probable beneficial effect on the utilities of the children, not^to mention that of their parents, friends, and the community at large. Rather they might assert, in line with Kant's Categorical Imperative, that the "duty to save life" overrides the "duty to tell the truth." The case clearly shows, however, that duties may come into conflict. Just as a conflict would exist in the farmer and the maniac scenario, so, too, conflicts would exist in the scenarios imagined by Williams, Sen, and Lyons. Duty-oriented, non-utilitarians are forced to handle this state of affairs by claiming that some duties are more important than others. But it could certainly be argued (rather trivially) that this position contradicts the whole concept of a duty. A duty is a duty; it must be performed, and no questions are allowed. Aside from this quibble, however, how is the Kantian, duty-oriented, non-utilitarian to decide which duty is the more important, and hence the operative duty? A utilitarian would hardly be at a loss on this point. He would simply say that a person ought (has a duty, if you prefer that terminology) to follow that course of action which he believes will have the best effect on individual utilities and hence social welfare. In the case just posited, the farmer will hopefully agree that the social benefits from saving the lives of a busload of children are greater than the minor social costs, in terms of reduced reliability and trust, of telling a lie. What does the Kantian, duty-oriented, non-utilitarian offer as an alternative to estimating the potential social costs and benefits of a given action? Nothing, really. It might be asserted that the "higher duty" in a given situation is "obvious from the circumstances," is "clear to all right-thinking persons," is "apparent to any individual of judgment, discernment, and proper moral training." But these phrases have no useful operational implica This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  76 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY tions. They can only be made operational through estimation of relative social costs and benefits of the action. Of course, I personally do not believe for a moment that the vast majority of alleged non-utilitarians actually eschew utilitarianism in making practical judgments on questions of social policy and individual morality. I believe that they make quick, unconscious mental calcula? tions of the relative social costs and benefits of the policy or action under question and arrive at their judgments accordingly. But the fact that the calculations are quick and unconscious means that they are crude and unreliable. A utilitarian, on the other hand, will make a conscious and conscientious effort to calculate relative social costs and benefits. It seems evident that conscious and conscientious benefit-cost estimations will produce more refined and reliable estimates than quick and uncon? scious estimations. IS THE ISSUE SIGNIFICANT? I am interested in defending the utilitarian philosophy against non utilitarian alternatives because I believe that, over the long run, social welfare will be higher if more people subscribe to this philosophy. The underlying apprehension that seems to inspire many of the published critiques of utilitarianism is that the spread of this philosophy would erode voluntary compliance among humanity with the traditional stan? dards of moral behavior. As utilitarianism spreads, for example, fewer and fewer people (according to this apprehensive view) will tell the truth automatically because of the traditional proscription on lying. When confronted with a temptation to lie, more and more people will pause to ponder the matter from a utilitarian perspective, will proceed to find a rationalization that supports their temptation, and will then lie.15 The connotation is clearly that this will produce a sad state of 15This is admittedly a very informal interpretation of arguments such as that of D. H. Hodgson [pp. 39-50], which purports to show, through deductive logic, that an act utilitarian society (in which each person evaluates each act strictly in terms of its utility without any reference to norms of ethical behavior) could not support truthfulness and promising. At the risk of over-simplifying the somewhat tortured reasoning, Hodgson seems to be asserting that since no one would have any particular reason to expect the truth to be told or promises to be kept (because of the absence of general moral principles), no one would rely on truth-telling and promise-keeping so that there would be no disutility caused by failures to tell the truth or keep promises. But the whole basis of the argument is then contradicted because Hodgson intimates that a society in which people could not rely upon other people to tell the truth or keep promises would have a lower level of welfare than real-world society. But if the general telling of the truth and keeping of promises will enhance social utility, people will tend to rely on truthfulness and promising so that any specific instance of lying or promise-breaking will tend to have adverse welfare conse? quences. Mill himself argued at length in Utilitarianism that the utilitarian philosophy very much supports truthfulness and promise-keeping. This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  IN DEFENSE OF UTILITARIANISM: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEWPOINT 77 affairs as far as human welfare is concerned because of the concomitant decline of trust in society ? although the human welfare implication is not ordinarily explicated very clearly since such explication might sug? gest that the author is laboring under the "utilitarian delusion" that lying is wrong only because it tends to have adverse consequences for social welfare. While a case may certainly be made, I personally do not perceive utilitarianism to constitute a serious threat to the traditional, general? ized moral proscriptions against destructiveness, dishonesty, and non cooperation. According to utilitarianism, things are good only to the extent that they enhance social welfare. The fact that social welfare depends on individual welfare should not obscure the precedence that social welfare takes over individual welfare in utilitarian philosophy. The essence of the utilitarian position is that the individual should take account of the social implications of his actions, and not merely the personal implications.16 I would therefore expect utilitarians to gener? ally be quite constructive, honest, and cooperative in their personal behavior to the extent that it is influenced by their philosophical ideol? ogy. On the other hand, I do perceive some types of non-utilitarianism to represent a semi-serious threat to the spirit of free, critical, and impar? tial inquiry on which we humans so much pride ourselves. In their ardor to cultivate unquestioning respect and awe for traditional moral virtues, some non-utilitarians go too far. They claim that it would demean these virtues to attempt to subject them to a critical analysis in terms of their impact upon human welfare ? they are allegedly above such analysis. This appears to me an attitude of dogmatism, inflexibility, and intoler? ance. I would not be surprised to find that such an attitude in moral philosophy would be correlated to an analogous attitude in political viewpoint. In other words, rejection of utilitarianism might well corre? late with political extremism of either the right or the left. It might also correlate with a negative viewpoint on scientific inquiry in general. It is, of course, an empirical question as to what extent intellectual subscription to utilitarianism tends to correlate with "loose" moral behavior and to what extent intellectual subscription to some forms of non-utilitarianism tends to correlate with a dogmatic, anti-scientific 16J. S. Mill: "I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness that forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." This content downloaded from 137.215.20.232 on Thu, 22 Aug 2024 13:26:53 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 78 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY mentality. I would expect any existing correlations to be small, even were they to be statistically significant. One factor which would keep the correlations small is that a great many individuals who profess themselves to be opposed to utilitarianism nevertheless employ a broad formulation of utilitarianism in any and all practical thinking they do about actual problems of social policy or individual conduct. Such individuals, although not considering themselves utilitarians, will dis? cuss the pros and cons of social policies and individual actions in terms of their potential effects on human individuals, and by implication, on society as a whole, and will take a very critical and sophisticated approach in examining these effects. But someone who is a genuine non-utilitarian must necessarily eschew any mention of individual or social welfare in evaluating policies or actions. What I have suggested happens is that such individuals make quick, crude, unconscious, cost-benefit estimates of human welfare consequences, and that they pass judgment on the basis of these esti? mates. Asked to explain their judgments to an alert utilitarian, ready to pounce upon any stray references to social welfare, they will produce hopelessly obscure mishmashes composed of tautologies, non sequitors, unwarranted assumptions, and begged questions. The problem with non-utilitarian evaluations of social policy and individual morality is that suppressing rational consideration of social welfare consequences and instead relying totally upon intuitive snap judgments tends to produce highly unreliable judgments. Such judg? ments are more likely to be in error than are judgments based upon relatively prolonged, conscious, rational, systematic examination of probable social welfare consequences. On the other hand, I certainly do not exaggerate the power of analysis in coping with difficult social policy and individual morality questions. Given the gaps in our present knowledge, the reliability gains in our judgment, even from very pro? longed cognitive effort, can at best only be described as slight. But as an economist and (hopefully) as a reasonable human being, I hold a slight gain to be preferable to no gain. References Anderson, Charles W. 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