HF Political Philosophy - Liberty and Rights Notes PDF

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University of Melbourne

John Rawls

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political philosophy justice equality John Rawls

Summary

These notes provide an overview of John Rawls's ideas on political philosophy, focusing on fairness, justice, and the distribution of societal benefits. Rawls' work outlines principles of justice and the concept of the difference principle, evaluating how these apply to and benefit the less advantaged.

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**HF Political Philosophy -- Liberty and Rights Notes:** **John Rawls: "A Theory Of Justice"** -- *tldr: interested in creating a fair society through the semi-Utilitarian principal of wealth distribution through blind distribution of opportunities etc. Hard to summarise; look at writing.* +------...

**HF Political Philosophy -- Liberty and Rights Notes:** **John Rawls: "A Theory Of Justice"** -- *tldr: interested in creating a fair society through the semi-Utilitarian principal of wealth distribution through blind distribution of opportunities etc. Hard to summarise; look at writing.* +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Argument Line** | **Evaluations** | +===================================+===================================+ | [Fairness and | | | Justice] | | | | | | We all care deeply about fairness | | | and justice, even children as | | | young as 3 are able to recognise | | | this. | | | | | | Rawls is very interested in | | | justice, and sees justice as | | | synonymous with fairness. | | | | | | He recognises that the world is | | | full of inequality; inequalities | | | that stem from the lottery of | | | birth. | | | | | | He thus asks the question *"How | | | are the benefits that a society | | | produces to be distributed?"* | | | | | | In order to answer this question, | | | Rawls proposes two principals of | | | justice | | | | | | 1. [Each person is to have equal | | | right to the most extensive | | | system of equal basic | | | liberties with a similar | | | system for all.] | | | | | | "basic liberties" = right to | | | vote, freedom of thought, | | | freedom from psychological | | | and physical oppression, | | | right to hold personal | | | property. | | | | | | 2. [Social and economic | | | inequalities are to be | | | arranged so that they are | | | both] | | | | | | | | | | | | a. [To the greatest benefit of | | | the least | | | advantaged,] - | | | ***\[ the difference | | | principal\]*** -- This | | | principal is put in place to | | | encourage some sort of | | | incentive and possibility of | | | economic | | | [growth]. Ie; | | | that economic inequality is | | | justified so long as those | | | who are least well of would | | | be even worse if these | | | inequalities were removed. | | | | | | b. Attached to positions under | | | conditions of fair equality | | | of opportunity. | | | | | | Note: Rawls theory is | | | [egalitarian] -- *as | | | it emphasises the equality of | | | liberty, opportunity, and the | | | difference principal, and | | | recognises inequalities but | | | attempts to minimise their | | | effect.* | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | [Argument for the Difference | [Some Consequences and | | Principal] | Questions] | | | | | The argument for Rawls' | - What about inequalities that | | principals of Justice is called | lie in people's natural | | the "original position" | talents and abilities, for | | | example, sporting prowess, | | [Original Position:] | intelligence, music, etc? | | | | | - Suppose a group of people | Idea of Rawls: | | setting up a new country need | | | to outline a political | - Rawls believes that as a | | constitution for their | consequence, society should | | society in order to ensure | give more attention to those | | its fairness. | with fewer native assets. | | | Greater resources should be | | - There a two assumptions in | spent on the less intelligent | | this position | than the more intelligent. In | | | effect, an agreement to | | | regard the distribution of | | | natural talents as a common | | - First: that the people in the | asset. Further, those who | | original position are | have been favoured by natural | | self-interested and rational. | assets -- like intelligence | | They are concerned about | -- should only make gain from | | what's important for | it if it improves the | | themselves, and will act in a | situations of those who have | | way that will promote their | lost out. | | own best interests. | | | | [Challenge of this | | - Second: That in order to | generally:] | | eliminate this bias, the | | | committee would choose the | Posed by communitarians -- | | principals of justice behind | philosophy that highlights the | | a *'veil of ignorance.'* This | connection between the individual | | veil of ignorance, according | and the society -- is that don't | | to Rawls, would ensure that | our talents, abilities and | | each individual would promote | preferences make us who we are? | | values that allow for anyone | | | -- regardless of fortune, | What would an individual even be | | gender, intelligence, | if all this identity had been | | strength -- to lead a good | abstracted from them? | | life. This is because the | | | parties would be unaware of | [Another Objection by | | what their position in the | Communitarians:] | | world would be. | | | | Rawls' understanding of justice | | The original position creates a | is based on seeing society as a | | situation where the choosers are | set of isolated individuals. He | | forced to choose impartially. | believes that they may be | | | co-operating, but only out of | | Almost out of fear for | necessity. Thus Rawls ruled out | | self-preservation, they would | the idea of society being | | choose values that would benefit | intrinsically good, rather than | | anyone/ would not discriminate | merely a necessary means to | | against anyone, as they | individual advantage. What is bad | | themselves have no idea what | about this? | | their position in society would | | | be. | [Surfer - Brain Surgeon Analogy | | | Objection] | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | ['Maximin' Principal] | - Rawls believes that our | | | talents are arbitrary and | | Consider the difference principal | that we shouldn't really be | | in more detail: | rewarded for them as they are | | | already an inequality that is | | Maximin is a rule for choice | in our advantage. Yet despite | | under uncertainty. If you are | this, Rawls has built into | | choosing between alternatives A,B | his theory of justice -- the | | and C in circumstances where your | difference principal -- an | | information is severely | incentive for economic | | restricted, then the Maximin rule | incentives. In this case, the | | says: Look at the consequences of | talented can acquire an | | A, B and C and then choose the | unequal share of economic | | one whose worst consequence is | welfare so long as it | | better than the others. | benefits the lowest in | | | society. | | Maximin helps us create a society | | | where the least well off still | - Thus, a brain surgeon who | | have a relatively high/ elevated | would rather be on his | | life position. \--\> Limited | surfboard all day, would be | | knowledge behind the veil of | able to charge more money | | ignorance helps ensure a decision | from people to receive his | | where we are concerned with the | medical expertise -- and | | minimum someone will receive, and | considering that those who | | hence, we are incentivised to | are ill are considered worse | | play it safe and to ensure a good | off in society, and that | | life for those at the bottom of | receiving medical treatment | | society. | is beneficial -- it is | | | permissible in such a | | | society. | | | | | | - Many object to this, saying | | | that clearly the surgeon is | | | committing blackmail as the | | | patients are forced to pay | | | this fee in order to stay | | | alive, and hence, they object | | | to Rawls' principals of | | | justice. | | | | | | [Contemporary Rawlsian | | | Response] | | | | | | Well spotted, that is why we | | | wouldn't allow such injustices, | | | instead, creating just basic | | | institutions that would be able | | | to serve those in need. Whilst we | | | wouldn't force the surfer to get | | | off his board -- as that would | | | infringe upon his first principal | | | of liberty -- there is no | | | absolute need to pay him more if | | | he does go and use his talents as | | | he ought to. | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ **Robert Nozick: - Libertarian:** *tldr*: *A minimal state, limited to protecting individuals against force, theft, fraud, and enforcing contracts, is justified. Any state that goes beyond these functions violates individual rights.* +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Argument Line** | **Evaluations** | +===================================+===================================+ | [Self-Ownership] | [Objection by Cohen in Wilt | | | Chamberlin Analogy] | | - Nozick agrees with Rawls and | | | believes that justice comes a | Cohen objects to the analogy of | | just *process.* But he | Wilt Chamberlin earning an extra | | dislikes what he calls | \$250,000 through his argument | | 'patterned' distributions of | that Nozick exploits '*rhetorical | | justice, which are about | sleight-of-hand'* to illustrate | | end-results much like Rawls' | his point. | | | | | - Nozick believes that justice | Whilst it may seem just to us | | is the proper respect of | that Wilt gets the \$250,000, we | | rights; and that our rights | don't actually live in a society | | stem from the fact that we a | with a just initial distribution | | self-owning individuals. We | of wealth like that of Rawls. | | can do whatever we want with | | | our property -- and that | Maybe in our society, where kids | | extends to our body. | who grow up in disadvantaged make | | | good with their own raw talent, | | - He contends that we all | we *don't mind* these types of | | deserve to have this right | inequalities. | | respected, and it would be a | | | violation of justice if it | However, under Rawls' principals, | | were not. | we would no longer have an | | | initial unfairness, and hence, it | | - It does not matter what the | becomes far harder to justify | | inequalities are in a | unfair distribution of wealth in | | society, so long as the route | a society where people are mostly | | to said positions in society | even | | we a just one, then the | | | outcome is also just. | [Counter -- counter:] | | | | | [Wilt Chamberlin | Intuitive rebut using Rawls' | | Analogy:] | logic of the difference principal | | | | | Suppose that in a given | - Lowest people are benefited | | basketball season, Wilt | by watching this game | | Chamberlin asks for an additional | | | 25 cents to be paid to him for | - Inequality of wealth is | | any game ticket in which he is | created, but also brings up | | playing in. Let's imagine that | those at bottom who receive | | all the basketball fans are happy | entertainment through the | | to pay this amount, and that by | game. | | the end of the season, Wilt | | | amounts an additional \$250,000. | [Gap in Taxing the | | | Rich] | | Nozick asks -- how could this be | | | unjust? Everyone consented to | Using Nozick's concept of just | | paying said amount, and no force | distribution, we could never tax | | was used to make people pay the | rich people and us it for | | amount. | anything that they would not also | | | benefit from. If we were, for | | To complain about the unequal | instance, to take money from | | distribution of wealth to Wilt -- | millionaires to buy food for | | and to try and redistribute it -- | starving children, the | | would be an injustice. | millionaires, according to | | | Nozick's reasoning, would be the | | To interfere, in the words of | slaves of the children. This | | Nozick, would to be to | seems counterintuitive. | | unjustifiably mingle in the acts | | | between consenting adults. | [Astronaut Example:] | | | | | [Entitlement | Suppose an astronaut lands on an | | Theory:]\ | uninhabited, yet liveable planet. | | Justice in holdings consists of | According to Nozick, the | | three principles: | astronaut can claim this planet | | | as their own. Now suppose that | | - **Acquisition:** Resources | another astronaut ended up on the | | are justly acquired if they | planet after the first. There is | | are unowned and acquired | nothing for them to eat, drink, | | without harming others. | or sleep on that doesn't belong | | | to the first astronaut. Unless | | - **Transfer:** Holdings are | the first astronaut is charitable | | justly transferred if done | to the second, the second must | | voluntarily. | become the first's slave in order | | | to survive. This looks unjust. | | - **Rectification:** If past | | | injustices occurred, they | [Eyes Analogy:] | | should be rectified according | | | to a principle of justice. | Imagine a state where no one is | | | born able to see. Now, the state | | | has a patent on a design of | | | artificial eyeballs that allow | | | people to see. Shortly after | | | people are born, they are given | | | such eyes. The eyes remain the | | | state's property, yet they let | | | people borrow them for free over | | | their lifetimes. | | | | | | Now, suppose that someone loses | | | both of their eyes, and that the | | | state runs a lottery that | | | randomly gives an eye from | | | someone else to the person with | | | none. If your number is pulled, | | | the state comes and plucks one of | | | your eyeballs out to donate to | | | the other. Now, you may think | | | that this is unjust -- but if you | | | do, then this shows it is *not | | | the idea of self-ownership at | | | work,* but rather, some other | | | idea about what a state can and | | | cannot do. | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ **Mill: "On Liberty"** +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Argument Line** | **Evaluations** | +===================================+===================================+ | [Mill Core Values:] | [Vagueness of Harm | | | Principal] | | [Liberty and | | | Autonomy] | Mill\'s harm principle is too | | | vague to apply effectively in | | Mill believes that above all | practice. What constitutes | | else, personal freedom is | \"harm\" is often subjective and | | paramount | culturally dependent. For | | | example: | | - How does he come to this | | | position? | - Does harm include indirect or | | | emotional harm, such as | | - He ties the importance of | offense or psychological | | freedom to its practical and | distress? | | moral benefits | | | | - Can societal harms, like the | | a. In general, being able to | erosion of social norms, | | make choices for yourself | justify limiting freedom? | | furthers human progression | | | \--\> You need people to do | [Positive vs Negative | | and say stupid things so we | Freedom] | | can refute said actions and | | | discover what is the best | [Objection]: Mill | | outcome, and hence, what is | focuses on **negative freedom** | | best for our society. | (freedom from interference) but | | | neglects **positive freedom** | | b. Mill adds that individuals | (the ability to act on one's own | | need liberty as you know what | potential). Critics argue that | | is best for yourself. You as | liberty is meaningless without | | your own person know what the | the resources or conditions to | | pros and cons are of certain | exercise it. | | actions. You are in the best | | | position to decide what to | - Example Critic: **Isaiah | | do. \--\> You, as an | Berlin** distinguishes | | independent agent, know how | between negative and positive | | to best serve yourself. | liberty, suggesting that | | Unlike a government who will | Mill\'s approach neglects | | have biases, you act in | social and economic | | accordance with the greatest | inequalities that restrict | | interest of yourself. | meaningful freedom. | | | | | c. The Measure of humanity is | | | exercising our freedom. \--\> | | | Making a poor choice isn't a | | | one off action, it's a | | | process. Making bad decisions | | | and growing from them make us | | | more human; Mill argues that | | | they are what make us human. | | | | | | Mill Has one exception to this | | | freedom though, and it what he | | | calls the 'Harm Principal' | | | | | | Mill is okay with reducing | | | someone's personal freedom if | | | they were to use said freedom to | | | harm someone else. | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

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