FINAL EXAM REVIEWER IN HUMAN RIGHTS PDF

REVIEWER IN HUMAN RIGHTS Q: What is the doctrine of "void for vagueness"? In what context can it be correctly applied? Not correctly applied? A: A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. It ap...

REVIEWER IN HUMAN RIGHTS Q: What is the doctrine of "void for vagueness"? In what context can it be correctly applied? Not correctly applied? A: A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. It applies to both free speech cases and penal statutes. However, a facial challenge on the ground of vagueness can be made only in free speech cases. It does not apply to penal statutes. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, 05 Oct. 2010) Q: Compare and contrast “overbreadth doctrine” from “void-for-vagueness” doctrine. A: While the overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means in a statute which sweep unnecessary broadly and thereby invades the area of protected freedom. A statute is void for vagueness when it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence cannot necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 Nov. 2001) Tests in determining compliance with the equal protection clause a. Rational Basis Test - The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. This standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are "presumed to be valid" largely for the reason that "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and unavoidable one" (British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008). b. Strict Scrutiny Test - It is applied when the challenged statute either: a. Classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic; or Infringes fundamental constitutional rights (Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004). c. Intermediate Scrutiny Test - It is used as a test for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 1 G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009). The government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, supra). Determination of Test to be Applied The choice of the appropriate test for evaluating a legislative classification is dependent on: 1. the nature of the rights affected, i.e.whether "fundamental" or not; and 2. the character of the persons allegedly discriminated against, i.e., whether belonging to a "suspect class" or not(Dissenting Opinion of J Carpio-Morales,BSP, G.R. No.148208, Dec. 15, 2004) Q: The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth Association (GBTYA), an organization of gay, bisexual, and transgender persons, filed for accreditation with the COMELEC to join the forthcoming party-list elections. The COMELEC denied the application for accreditation on the ground that GBTY A espouses immorality which offends religious dogmas. GBTY A challenges the denial of its application based on moral grounds because it violates its right to equal protection of the law. a) What are the three (3) levels of test The three levels of test applied in equal protection cases are as follows: First, the strict scrutiny test which is applied when the legislative classification disadvantages a subject class or impinges upon a fundamental right, the statute must fall unless the government can show that the classification serves a compelling governmental interest. Second, the intermediate scrutiny test, when the classification, while not facially invidious, gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties or disadvantages a quasi-suspect class. Are they applicable in equal protection cases? Explain. The law must not only further an important government interest and be related to that interest. The justification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. Lastly, the rationality test, if neither the strict nor the intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, the statute will be tested for mere rationality. The presumption is in favor of the classification, the reasonableness and fairness of state action and of legitimate grounds of distinction. 2 Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Obscenity is not protected expression. (Fernando v. CA, G.R. No. 159751, 06 Dec. 2006) Sec. 2 of P.D. 969 requires the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials. (Nograles v. People, G.R. No. 191080, 21 Nov. 2011) Q: One day a passenger bus conductor found a man's handbag left in the bus. When the conductor opened the bag, he found inside a calling card with the owner’s name (Dante Galang) and address, a few hundred-peso bills, and a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. He brought the powdery substance to the National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory examination, and it was determined to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug. Dante Galang was subsequently traced and found and brought to the NBI Office where he admitted ownership of the handbag and its contents. In the course of the interrogation by NBI agents, and without the presence and assistance of counsel, Galang was made to sign a receipt for the plastic bag and its shabu contents. Galang was charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs and was convicted. On appeal he contends that - The plastic bag and its contents are inadmissible in evidence being the product of an illegal search and seizure. Decide the case with reasons. A: The plastic bag and its contents are admissible in evidence since it was not the NBI but the bus conductor who opened the bag and brought it to the NBI. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is a restraint upon the government. It does not apply so as to require exclusion of evidence which came into the possession of the Government through a search made by a private citizen. (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 18 Jan. 1991) 3 Q: A police officer saw Harvey urinating in public. A local ordinance imposes a Php500.00 fine for urinating in public. The police officer shouted at Harvey: "That is against the law!" Harvey sarcastically answered: "No, this is against the wall!" Then and there, the police officer arrested him and brought him to the police station. At the police station, Harvey was frisked and was found in possession of an unlicensed.38 caliber revolver loaded with five live ammunition. He was subsequently charged with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms. When the prosecution offered in evidence the unlicensed firearm and ammunition, the defense objected on the ground that the pieces of evidence are products of an illegal search and seizure. The prosecution contended that the pieces of evidence were lawfully seized after a valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Was the search and seizure valid? Explain briefly. A: Yes, the subject warrantless search and the seizure of the unlicensed revolver were valid because they were done after a prior lawful warrantless arrest. Harvey was seen, or caught and arrested, by the police officer in the act of violating a local ordinance prohibiting and punishing urinating in public. This can be considered as a valid in flagrante delicto arrest for said crime on the basis of Harvey's overt act of "urinating in public" done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; see Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, 31 July 2017; see Luz u. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 Feb. 2012; Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, 02 Sep. 2015) It is established that a search incidental to a lawful arrest is valid. (People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474, 29 Aug. 2012; Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 Nov. 2007) NOTE: In Miguel u. People (G.R. No. 227038, 31 July 2017), which significantly also involves "urinating in public," the accused was arrested by police officers who "simply responded to a purported report of a man showing off his private parts," on the basis of which, the "the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him" as he "went out to the street to urinate." Thus - "On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at around past 12 o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to urinate when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him. In other words, the police officers sought out the accused based on the "purported report of a man showing off his private parts," but did not arrest him for "showing off his private parts" or for actually urinating in public. 4 Accordingly, the Court ruled – "More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge should have be been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process cannot be reversed.") Q: When can evidence "in plain view" be seized without need of a search warrant? Explain. A: The evidence must be immediately apparent; and Plain view justified seizure of the evidence without further search. (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, 31 May 2001) Q: At about 5:30 A.M. of 15 Sept. 2019 Police Senior Inspector Officer A of the Manila Police District Station received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Mr. Z would be meeting up later that morning with two (2) potential sellers of drugs at a nearby restaurant. As such, Officer A decided to hang around the said place immediately. At about 9:15 A.M., two (2) male passengers. Named A and Y, who were each carrying a traveling bag, alighted from a bus in front of the restaurant. A transport barker, serving as a lookout for Officer A, signaled to the latter that X and Y were "suspicious-looking." As the two were about to enter the restaurant, Officer A stopped them and asked about the contents of their bags. Dissatisfied with their response that the bags contained only clothes, Officer A proceeded to search the bags and found packs of shabu therein. Thus, X and Y were arrested, and the drugs were seized from them. According to Officer A, a warrantless search was validly made pursuant to the stop and frisk rule; hence, the consequent seizure of the drugs was likewise valid. Q: What is the stop and frisk rule? 5 A: The stop and frisk rule is an exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. (Manalili v. CA, G.R. No. 113447, 09 Oct. 1997) The stop-and-frisk rule was not validly invoked by Officer A. A basic criterion to invoke the stop-and-frisk rule would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. Officer A merely relied on a text message by an unidentified informer to conduct the search. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. Personal knowledge is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects. (Cogaed v. People, G.R. No. 200334, 30 July 2014) Q: Five foreign nationals arrived at the NAIA from Hong Kong. After retrieving their checked-in luggage, they placed all their bags in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5. They were instructed to place their luggage on the examiner's table for inspection. The examiner found brown-colored boxes, similar in size to powdered milk boxes, underneath the clothes inside the foreigners' bags. The examiner discovered white crystalline substances inside the boxes that he inspected and proceeded to bundle all of the boxes by putting masking tape around them. He thereafter handed the boxes over to Bureau of Customs agents. The agents called out the names of the foreigners one by one and ordered them to sign their names on the masking tape placed on the boxes recovered from their respective bags. The contents of the boxes were thereafter subjected to tests which confirmed that the substance was shabu. 6  Q: Can the shabu found inside the boxes be admitted in evidence against the five foreigners for the charge of illegal possession of drugs in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002? A: YES, shabu obtained in ordinary customs searches such as those done in airport, which is a valid warrantless search, are admissible in evidence. (Dela Cruz v. People G.R. No. 209387, 11 Jan. 2016) Q: Ernesto, a minor, while driving a motor vehicle, was stopped at a mobile checkpoint. Noticing that Ernesto is a minor, SPOl Jojo asked Ernesto to exhibit his driver's license but Ernesto failed to produce it. SPOI Jojo requested Ernesto to alight from the vehicle and the latter acceded. Upon observing a bulge in the pants of Ernesto, the policeman frisked him and found an unlicensed.22-caliber pistol inside Ernesto's right pocket. Ernesto was arrested, detained, and charged. At the trial, Ernesto, through his lawyer, argued that policemen at mobile checkpoints are empowered to conduct nothing more than a ''visual search". They cannot order the persons riding the vehicle to alight. They cannot frisk or conduct a body search of the driver or the passengers of the vehicle. Ernesto's lawyer thus posited that: a) The search conducted in violation of the Constitution and established jurisprudence was an illegal search; thus, the gun which was seized in the course of an illegal search is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is inadmissible in evidence. b) The arrest made as a consequence of the invalid search was likewise illegal, because an unlawful act (the search) cannot be made the basis of a lawful arrest. Rule on the correctness of the foregoing arguments, with reasons a) The search conducted in violation of the Constitution and established jurisprudence was an illegal search; thus, the gun which was seized in the course of an illegal search is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is inadmissible in evidence. A: The contention of Ernesto’s lawyer is correct. The warrantless search of motor vehicles at checkpoints should be limited to a visual search. Its occupants should not be subjected to a body search. (Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, 07 Oct. 1994) The “stop and frisk rule” applies when a police officer observes suspicious activity or unusual activity which may lead him to believe that a criminal 7 activity may be afoot. The “stop and frisk” is merely a limited protective search for outer clothing for weapons. b) The arrest made as a consequence of the invalid search was likewise illegal, because an unlawful act (the search) cannot be made the basis of a lawful arrest. A: Since there was no valid warrantless arrest, the warrantless search was also illegal. The unlicensed.22 caliber pistol is inadmissible in evidence. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 Feb. 2012) Q: Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police officers was on routine patrol in Barangay Makatarungan when it noticed an open delivery van neatly covered with banana leaves. Believing that the van was loaded with contraband, the team leader flagged down the vehicle which was driven by Hades. He inquired from Hades what was loaded on the van. Hades just gave the police officer a blank stare and started to perspire profusely. The police officers then told Hades that they will look inside the vehicle. Hades did not make any reply. The police officers then lifted the banana leaves and saw several boxes They opened the boxes and discovered several kilos of shabu inside. Hades was charged with illegal possession of illegal drugs. After due proceedings, he was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the CA affirmed his conviction. In his final bid for exoneration, Hades went to the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the police officers searched his vehicle without a warrant; that the shabu confiscated from him is thus inadmissible in evidence; and that there being no evidence against him, he is entitled to an acquittal. For its part, the People of the Philippines maintains that the case of Hades involved a consented warrantless search which is legally recognized. The People adverts to the fact that Hades did not offer any protest when the police officers asked him if they could look inside the vehicle. Thus, any evidence obtained in the course thereof is admissible in evidence. Whose claim is correct? Explain A: The warrantless search was illegal. There was no probable cause to search the van. The shabu was not immediately apparent. It was discovered only after they opened the boxes. The mere passive silence of Hades did not constitute consent to the warrantless search. (Caballes v. CA, G.R. No. 163108, 23 Feb. 2005) 8  Q: A witnessed two hooded men with baseball bats enter the house of their next door neighbor B. After a few seconds, he heard B shouting, "Huwag Pilo babayaran kita agad.” Then A saw the two hooded men hitting B until the latter fell lifeless. The assailants escaped using a yellow motorcycle with a fireball sticker on it toward the direction of an exclusive village nearby. A reported the incident to POI Nuval. The following day, POI Nuval saw the motorcycle parked in the garage of a house at Sta. Ines Street inside the exclusive village. He inquired with the caretaker as to who owned the motorcycle. The caretaker named the brothers Pilo and Ramon Maradona who were then outside the country. POI Nuval insisted on getting inside the garage. Out of fear, the caretaker allowed him. POI Nuval took 2 ski masks and 2 bats beside the motorcycle. Was the search valid? What about the seizure? Decide with reasons. A: The warrantless search and the seizure was not valid. It was not made as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. (People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671, 15 Nov. 2000) The caretaker had no authority to waive the right of the brothers Pilo and Ramon Maradona to waive their right against an unreasonable search and seizure. (People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 12 Aug. 1992) The warrantless seizure of the ski masks and bats cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine, because they were seized after an invalid intrusion into the house. (People v. Bolasa, G.R. No. 125754, 22 Dec. 1999) Q: Crack officers of the Anti-Narcotics Unit were assigned on surveillance of the environs of a cemetery where the sale and use of dangerous drugs are rampant. A man with reddish and glassy eyes was walking unsteadily moving towards them but veered away when he sensed the presence of policemen. They approached him, introduced themselves as police officers and asked him what he had clenched in his hand. As he kept mum, the policemen pried his hand open and found a sachet of shabu, a dangerous drug. Accordingly charged in court, the accused objected to the admission in evidence of the dangerous drug because it was the result of an illegal search and seizure. Rule on the objection. A: The objection is not tenable. In accordance with Manalili v. CA (G.R. No. 113447, 09 Oct. 1997), since the accused had red eyes and was walking unsteadily and the place is a known hang- out of drug addicts, the police officers had sufficient reason to stop the accused and to frisk him. Since shabu 9 was actually found during the investigation, it could be seized without the need for a search warrant. Q: What are the instances when warrantless searches may be effected? A: A warrantless search may be effected in the following cases: 1. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Searches of moving vehicles; 3. Searches of prohibited articles in plain view; 4. Enforcement of customs law; 5. Consented searches; 6. Stop and frisk (People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, 30 Jan. 1998); 7. Routine searches at borders and ports of entry; (US v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 06 June 1977) and 8. Searches of businesses in the exercise of visitorial powers to enforce police regulations. (New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 19 June 1987). A: No, Severino is incorrect. The inspection at the military checkpoint of the public transport bus, where the passengers can be considered as having a reduced expectation of privacy, and which, as shown in the facts, was done in a minimally intrusive manner, especially considering that Severino's bag was opened only after or upon his prior consent, can be considered as or was a reasonable search. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police procedures(f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. (Saluday u. People, G.R. No. 215305, 3 Apr. 2018) (Central Bar Q&A by Atty. Carlo L. Cruz, 2024) 10  Section 3. 1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. 2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Three (3) Strands of the Right to Privacy: 1. Locational or Situational Privacy - the privacy that is felt in physical space, such as that which may be violated by trespass and unwarranted search and seizure (Vivares vs. St. Therese College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014) 2. Informational Privacy - right of an individual not to have private information about himself disclosed; and the right of an individual to live freely without surveillance and intrusion (Whalen vs. Roe 429 US 589, 1977) 3. Decisional Privacy - Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be et alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. (Morte vs. Mufuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968) When Intrusion is Allowed GR: The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 3(1)). XPNs: 1. Lawful order from a court; or 2. When public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 3(1)) Q: In a criminal prosecution for murder, the prosecution presented, as witness, an employee of the Manila Hotel who produced in court a videotape recording showing the heated exchange between the accused and the victim that took place at the lobby of the hotel barely 30 minutes before the killing. The accused objects to the admission of the videotape recording on the ground that it was taken without his knowledge or consent, in violation of his right to privacy and the Anti-Wire Tapping law. Resolve the objection with reasons. A: The objection should be overruled. What the law prohibits is the overhearing, intercepting, and recording of private communications. Since the exchange of heated words was not private, its videotape recording is not prohibited. (Navarro v. CA, G.R. No. 121087, 26 Aug. 1999) 11  Q: As a car driver was getting into their car inside the parking area of a mall in Makati, two individuals suddenly came from behind them. One pointed a gun to the car driver's head while the other grabbed the car keys in the driver's hand. The two then sped away with the car. After recovering from the initial shock, the driver took their smartphone and opened the app "Find My Car." "Find My Car'' is an app that tracks in real time the movement and location of a car through a Global Positioning System (GPS) device installed in the car. The driver then went to the nearest police station and showed the officers the current location of the car as shown on their smartphone. The car appeared to stop at a spot in Novaliches, Quezon City. Six hours after the car had been stolen, a combined team of elite police officers from the Highway Patrol Group and the Criminal Investigation Detection Group, by force and without a warrant, searched a private home in Novaliches, Quezon City. The private home was pinpointed by the car's GPS tracker as displayed on the driver's phone. The private home is enclosed by a gate and is equipped with security cameras. In the private home's garage, the police officers found the driver's car, along with two other cars which matched police records of previously stolen motor vehicles. The officers seized and impounded all three cars. Right then and there, they also arrested the owner of the private home, who was subsequently charged with carnapping. Are the seized cars admissible in evidence? Explain briefly. A: NO, they are not. The warrantless search was invalid. The act of the police officers barging into or, with force, entering the private home where the cars were found based purely on the information obtained from the subject app but only with respect to the owner's car, and after six hours from the commission of the alleged crime, cannot be considered as falling within the coverage of any of the permissible warrantless searches, which include searches incidental to a lawful arrest. (People v. Alberto II, G.R. No. 247906, 10 Feb. 2021; Pagigan v. People, G.R. No. 252003, 10 Feb. 2021; Liwanag v. People, G.R. No. 249125, 26 Apr. 2021) The subject warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. This is not allowed. It is established that, although a warrantless search and seizure may be allowed as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest, the latter must precede the search and seizure. The process cannot be reversed. (People v. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, 17 June 1999; People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, 03 Apr. 1998; Dionisio v. People, G.R. No. 249880, 17 Feb. 2021) Moreover, it cannot be 12 said that said warrantless arrest was valid, not being either an in flagrante hot pursuit. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, ROC) The information that was relayed to the police officers by the owner of the car based on the app cannot be considered under the rules as probable cause for either type of warrantless arrests. This constitutes additional reason for the invalidity of the subject warrantless search and seizure, which, to reiterate, could or may have been allowed under the circumstances only if there had been a prior lawful warrantless arrest. Accordingly, their seizure was unlawful. They are therefore inadmissible in evidence, following the rule in the Constitution to the effect that any evidence obtained in violation of the rules against un- reasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III, in relation to Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution) Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment Prior restraint and subsequent punishment When Prohibition on Prior Restraint does not apply 1. When the nation is at war. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008) 2. Obscene publications 3. Security of community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence or overthrow by force of orderly government. (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, June 1, 1931) Q: In a protest rally along Padre Faura Street, Manila, Pedrong Pula took up the stage and began shouting "Kayong mga kurakot kayo! Magsi-resign na kayo! Kung hindi, manggugulo kami dito!" ("you corrupt officials, you better resign now, or else we will cause trouble here!") simultaneously, he brought out a rock the size of a fist and pretended to hurl it at the flagpole area of a government building. He did not actually throw the rock. a) Police officers who were monitoring the situation immediately approached Pedrong Pula and arrested him. He was prosecuted for seditious speech and was convicted. On appeal, Pedrong Pula argued he was merely exercising his freedom of speech and freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Decide with reasons. 13  A: Pedrong Pula should be acquitted. His freedom of speech should not be limited in the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state had the right to prevent. He pretended to hurl a rock but did not actually throw it. He did not commit any act of lawless violence. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 03 May 2006) Q: What are the two (2) basic prohibitions of the freedom of speech. Explain. A: The two basic prohibitions on freedom of speech and freedom of the press are prior restraint and subsequent punishment. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 Feb. 2008) Q: The KKK Television Network (KKK-TV) aired the documentary, “Case Law: How the Supreme Court Decides,” without obtaining the necessary permit required by P.D. 1986. Consequently, the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) suspended the airing of KKK- TV programs. MTRCB declared that under P.D. 1986, it has the power of prior review over all television programs, except “newsreels” and programs “by the Government”, and the subject documentary does not fall under either of these two classes. The suspension order was ostensibly based on Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 which grants MTRCB the authority to issue such an order. KKK-TV filed a certiorari petition in court, raising the following issues: The act of MTRCB constitutes “prior restraint” and violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. A: The contention of KKK-TV is not tenable. The prior restraint is a valid exercise of police power. Television is a medium which reaches even the eyes and ears of children. (Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996) Q: The Secretary of Transportation and Communications has warned radio station operators against selling blocked time, on the claim that the time covered thereby is often used by those buying them to attack the present administration. Assume that the department implements this warning and orders owners and operators of radio stations not to sell blocked time to interested parties without prior clearance from the Department of Transportation and Communications. You are approached by an interested party affected adversely by that order of the Secretary of Transportation and Communications. What would you do regarding that ban on the sale of blocked time? Explain your answer 14  A: I would challenge its validity in court on the ground that it constitutes a prior restraint on freedom of expression. Such a limitation is valid only in exceptional cases, such as where the purpose is to prevent actual obstruction to recruitment of service or the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops, or for the purpose of enforcing the primary requirements of decency or the security of community life. (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 31 May 1931) Attacks on the government, on the other hand, cannot justify prior restraints. For as has been pointed out, “the interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. (United States v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, 08 Mar. 1918) The parties adversely affected may also disregard the regulation as being on its face void. As has been held, “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,” and the government “thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” (New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 30 June 1971) The usual presumption of validity that inheres in legislation is reversed in the case of laws imposing prior restraint on freedom of expression. Requisites of a Valid Content-Based Regulation 1. The government must show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about - especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm - otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid; 2.The regulation which restricts the speech content must serve an important or substantial government Interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 3.The Incidental Restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest(CHAVEZ V. GON, G.R. NO. 168338, FEB. 15, 2008) (LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 223705. August 14, 2019) Facial Challenges and Overbreadth Doctrine Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. Put differently, an overbroad law or statute 15 needlessly restricts even constitutionally-protected rights. On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Q: When is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law on the ground of violation of the Bill of Rights traditionally allowed? Explain your answer. A facial challenge is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights (in the First Amendment [U.S.]) including religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the rights of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statues not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamentals rights. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., the Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 08 Apr. 2014) While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statues not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamentals rights. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., the Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 08 Apr. 2014) A: A statute is overbroad when a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations is sought to be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and invade the area of protected freedom. It applies both to free speech cases and penal statutes. However, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth can only be made in free speech cases because of its chilling effect upon protected speech. A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is not applicable to penal statutes, because in general they have an in terrorem effect. (Southern 16 Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, 05 Oct. 2010) It is noteworthy, however, that facial invalidation of laws is generally disfavored as it results to entirely striking down the challenged law or statute on the ground that they may be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It disregards the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution in judicial review, and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts, deviating, thus, from the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication. Hence, an on-its-face invalidation of the law has consistently been considered as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort." The allowance of a review of a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is justified, however, by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. The Court elucidated: Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which were used in early Philippine case laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule, which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and (c) the balancing of interests test, which was also recognized in our jurisprudence. (LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 223705. August 14, 2019 Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 203299, February 11, 2014 Test criteria for subsequent punishment: 1. Dangerous Tendency Test - There should be a rational connection between the speech and the evil apprehended. 17  2. Clear and Present Danger Test - There should be a clear and present danger that the words when used under such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER that they will bring a about the substantive evils that the State has a right to prevent. 3. Balancing of Interests Test - The courts should BALANCE the PUBLIC INTEREST served by legislation on one hand and the FREEDOM OF SPEECH (or any other constitutional right) on the other. The courts will then decide A privileged communication may be classified as either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. The absolutely privileged communication are not actionable even if the same was made with malice, such as the statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their duties for any speech or debate during their session or in any committee thereof,29 official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or during the hearing, as well as the answers of the witnesses to questions propounded to them.30 The qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations but which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" belong.31 (NOVA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. ATTY. REUBEN R. CANOY G.R. No. 193276, June 26, 2019) Article 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall 18 forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law. In Estrada vs. Escritor, this Court encapsulated its policy towards these kinds of disputes as "benevolent neutrality": By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government action and examines the effect of these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise. 19  The "Lemon test", which has been extensively applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in issues involving the determination of non-establishment of religion clause originated from the case of Lemon vs. Kurtzman. In that case, the Court used a three-pronged test to adjudge whether the assailed governmental act violated the First Amendment, as follows: 1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and, 3. The statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The printing of the INC commemorative stamp did not amount to a violation of the non-establishment of religion clause Tests to determine the validity of governmental regulation Three parts of the lemon test 1. It must have a secular legislative purpose; 2. It must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 3. It must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions. (Lemon v. Kurtzman) GOOD LUCK ! MAY THE GOOD LORD CONTINUE TO GUIDE AND BLESS US ALL ! 20