Social Psychology: Social Identity and Categorization (2015)

6 SOCIAL IDENTITY STIGMATIZED CONNECTEDNESS SOCIAL IDENTITY CONSERVATISM...

6 SOCIAL IDENTITY STIGMATIZED CONNECTEDNESS SOCIAL IDENTITY CONSERVATISM SOCIAL CHANGE MORAL EXCLUSION CHAPTER OVERVIEW SELF-CATEGORIZATION SOCIAL CREATIVITY MASTERY SOCIAL INFLUENCE Categorizing Oneself as a Group Member STEREOTYPE THREAT Learning about Our Groups Feeling Like a Group Member A s part of your participation in a psychological experiment, you learn that you will be videotaped being interviewed about various social and academic aspects of Me, You, and Them: Effects of Social your life as a student. The experimenter shows you a sample videotape, which Categorization shows a student who appears incredibly successful: earning straight A’s in premed “I” Becomes “We”: Social courses, well dressed and attractive, full of self-confidence—yet still coming across as Categorization and the likable. Now you are given a questionnaire asking you to rate your own academic ability, Self social competence, and so on. With the superstar interview still echoing in your mind, Others Become “We”: Social wouldn’t your ratings perhaps be a little below the top of the scale? In contrast, suppose Categorization and the you saw a real loser instead of the superstar. The same actor (for the interviews were In-Group staged, of course) portrays a sloppily dressed, unmotivated individual who comes across Others Become “They”: as socially awkward and not terribly intelligent. Wouldn’t your self-ratings go up a bit Social Categorization in this case? Many studies similar to this have established that making social comparisons and the Out-Group to another person’s outstanding performance lowers people’s self-ratings, whereas witnessing a poor performance raises them. They Don’t Like Us: Marilynn Brewer and Joseph Weber (1994), though, added a new twist to their study Consequences of Belonging to Negatively when they also manipulated group membership. Before seeing the videotape, each partic- Perceived Groups ipant took a bogus test classifying him or her into one of two personality types, one said We Are Stigmatized: Effects to include 80% of college students and the other only 20%. The videotaped actor was on What We Do and also said to belong to one or the other group. These group memberships fundamentally How We Feel shifted the outcomes of the social comparison. When the videotaped interviewee was a Defending Individual member of the larger group, social comparison had its typical effect: Participants felt Self-Esteem bad if the performance was great and good if it was terrible, regardless of their own Individual Mobility: group membership. But consider what happened when the videotaped student belonged Escaping Negative to the minority group: Group Membership Social Creativity: Redefining For a majority group participant, a videotape of a minority interviewee had no effect Group Membership as whatever on the participant’s self-concept. It seems that majority group members Positive Social Change: Changing simply do not compare themselves to minorities. the Intergroup Context Even more striking, minority group participants who saw a minority interviewee One Goal, Many Strategies reacted in the opposite way from the usual social comparison process. They felt good CATEGORIZING ONESELF AS A GROUP MEMBER 191 if their fellow group member gave a great performance, and bad if he or she looked terrible! Could it be that people in this situation do not compare themselves as individuals against other individuals, but psychologically share in the positive or negative image the other person’s performance gives to their group? We described the effects of social comparison on As these findings show, being a member of a group influences many of our thoughts, the self in Chapter 4, feelings, and actions. You may feel good or bad about yourself depending on the specific pages 99–100. groups that come to your mind. Being part of and identifying with a group such as the Filipino community or the swim team, being a woman or a member of any other group can boost or lower self-esteem. Group memberships are an essential part of the self. Group membership can confer tremendous benefits. It gives us a sense of belonging and worth, of being valued for who we are (Tajfel, 1972). As group members, we can bask in the glow of achievements other than our own and feel at home in a haven of similarity and understanding. A sense of group membership that connects us to others is the basis for our participation in social life. It even protects our mental well-being and physical health, as you will see in Chapter 12. Group membership supports our needs for mastery as well as connectedness. Our groups can offer us support and confidence in our ways of understanding the world (Festinger, 1954; Hogg & Abrams, 1993), a topic that will receive much more attention in Chapter 9. The many benefits of group belonging come at a cost, however. Because our groups are so important for defining the self, we need to see them as attractive, valued, and successful. Unfortunately, valuing our own groups often entails preferring them over other groups. Regard, esteem, and liking for in-groups—groups to which we belong—at times become coupled with disregard, derogation, and dislike for out-groups. When this occurs, as sociologist William Graham Sumner (1906) said long ago, “loyalty to the in-group... [and] hatred and contempt for outsiders... all grow together” (p. 13). From school rivalries to ethnic prejudice to national patriotism, both the exaltation of in-groups and the belittling of out-groups reflect the importance of group membership for each of us. These positive and negative sides of our group memberships will both be explored throughout this chapter. The chapter first describes the way people come to view social groups as aspects of the self: how we learn what our group memberships mean, and what factors conspire to make a particular membership significant at any given time. The chapter then turns to the consequences of placing ourselves and others in social categories. Once a group membership is activated, it affects the way we see and respond to ourselves and others. Shared group membership tends to make us view other in-group members as similar to ourselves and as likable, so we try to treat them justly and fairly. But we often respond to out-group members with indifference, active dislike, or even overt discrimination. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the effects of belonging to a group that others look down on. From playgrounds to boardrooms, being Muslim, speaking with an accent, using a wheelchair, being gay or lesbian, or being on welfare can provoke scorn, dislike, and avoidance. Such negative group identities can take their toll on indi- viduals and groups. But this outcome is not inevitable, and the chapter concludes by describing how people resist the implications of a negative identity and even work to change society’s evaluation of their groups. 192 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY CATEGORIZING ONESELF AS A GROUP MEMBER Some group memberships are so important that they become a basic part of our view of ourselves. Try asking a friend to take a piece of paper and write 10 different sentences beginning “I am...” When people perform this task they typically list some individual characteristics such as “I am outgoing” or “I am tall,” but they also list group mem- berships: “I am a woman,” “I am German.” In fact, most people list more group than individual characteristics (M. H. Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). The process of seeing self-categorization oneself as a member of a group is known as self-categorization (J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, the process of seeing oneself as a Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Self-categorization is flexible and can readily shift member of a social group (Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000). Depending on the social context, for example, sometimes you may see yourself as a Mexican-American, other times as a student, and still other times as a unique individual, with group memberships tem- social identity porarily receding into the background. The term social identity refers to the way we feel those aspects of the self-concept about the group memberships that we share with others (M. Rosenberg, 1979; Tajfel, that derive from an individual’s 1972). Social identity turns “I” into “we”; it extends the self out beyond the skin to knowledge and feelings about the group memberships he or she include other members of our groups—and, as we will see, it generally involves positive shares with others feelings about both ourselves, and those others. Although some group memberships are only fleetingly important—being part of the “white shirts” team in a lunch-hour basketball game, for example—most group mem- berships are stable and enduring. Membership in gender and ethnic groups lasts a lifetime. Being a member of the Kardashian or the Hilton family, or being Muslim, Roman Catholic, or Buddhist can be just as long-lasting. How do we learn what characteristics are associated with our groups? Learning about Our Groups People learn about the groups to which they belong in the same ways that they learn the characteristics of other groups: by observing other group members or from the culture. We learn about our own groups in the same ways that we learn stereotypes of other groups: Lessons come from parents, teachers, peers, and the media. However, our most important lessons generally come from fellow group members and what they do (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Prentice & Miller, 2002). Consider your first job. These are, of course, the same ways we learn What did it mean to become part of the team in the service department, on the factory about the stereotypic floor, or in corporate headquarters? Did people joke around, or was the atmosphere characteristics of groups pretty serious? Probably you figured out what it meant to be an employee in your to which we do not company primarily—maybe only—by watching others. To illustrate the importance of belong, as Chapter 5 interaction with group members, one study tracked sorority pledges’ perceptions of their (pages 149—161) groups over an academic year and found that as they got to know them better, these discussed. women saw their groups in increasingly stereotypic terms—in other words, they learned the stereotypes (C. S. Ryan & Bogart, 1997). In this way, what we and other group members do often becomes the basis for group stereotypes. But what we do is strongly influenced by our roles. In any society, members of a group may occupy particular roles that influence who they are. In the United States, CATEGORIZING ONESELF AS A GROUP MEMBER 193 for example, women are less than 2% of mechanics, 4.5% of mechanical engineers, and 8% of computer network architects, compared to 72% of cashiers, 81% of elementary and middle school teachers, and 90% of registered nurses (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Do a group’s common roles and occupations influence group members’ views of Chapter 3, pages 69–72, themselves? The answer is a qualified yes. People may not make direct inferences about discussed how and their own characteristics on the basis of role-constrained behaviors as readily as observers why we often draw do. Still, roles affect the individuals who hold them because as people enact their roles, personality inferences they acquire role-related skills and develop tendencies to behave in certain ways. These about others, even when skills and tendencies in turn make those behaviors, and correspondent self-inferences, their behaviors are driven more likely. For instance, a woman’s experiences raising young children may leave her by their roles. better able to interpret nonverbal behaviors or to comfort people when they are dis- tressed. Thus, performing a role based on gender or on membership in some other group can shape our future behaviors and, ultimately, our self-knowledge (Eagly, 1987). Feeling Like a Group Member Knowledge about group memberships may be activated by direct reminders, such as group labels; by the presence of out-group members; by being a minority; or by intergroup conflict. Group membership is particularly significant in some cultures and for some individuals, who tend to see the world in terms of that group membership. No matter how extensive our knowledge about the characteristics of our groups, that knowledge will have little impact unless the group membership comes to mind. Imagine you are a male Midwestern feminist, or a female Canadian conservative. Perhaps you are also musically talented, near-sighted, and love Cajun food. In what circumstances will your gender, politics, or other group memberships be more important than your individual attributes? And which group membership will matter? A variety of social and cognitive factors can conspire to make a particular group membership accessible. These range from temporary situational factors, to more enduring aspects of social structure or culture, to stable individual differences. Direct Reminders of Membership. If someone calls you “jock,” or “nerd,” or uses an ethnic slur, you are reminded directly, though perhaps temporarily, about your social identity. Honorary titles or pejorative labels bring group membership home in a hurry (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Charters & Newcomb, 1958). Being offered a “senior citizen” discount at a restaurant or movie theater may be an unwelcome reminder of one’s age (Stock, 1995). Often, however, the process is more subtle. Circumstances remind us of our similarities with others, and this activates knowledge of group membership. The mere presence of other in-group members can be a potent reminder (Doise & Sinclair, 1973; Wilder & Shapiro, 1991). Just hearing another New Zealand accent is enough to make one of the authors of this text “feel” like a New Zealander, seeing someone in a Harvard T-shirt reminds another author of his New England background, and spying a person carrying a tennis racquet reminds another of her tennis player identity. When group similarities are highlighted, as when a team wears uniforms or when members coordinate their actions for a common goal, membership and all it entails becomes even 194 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY more accessible. This process is powerful enough to overcome alternative categorizations that might be important in other circumstances (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). So White and Surinamese soccer players join together on the Dutch national team, and Republicans and Democrats coordinate their talents on a town planning committee. Presence of Out-Group Members. The presence of out-group members can also be a forcible reminder of shared group membership, as demonstrated in a study conducted in Belgium. Belgian university students were asked to write descriptions of typical stu- dents of Belgian and North African origin. For some, the experimenter who made this request was a North African; for others, the experimenter was Belgian. The responses of the students who wrote in the presence of an out-group member, the North African experimenter, revealed greater identification with their Belgian in-group (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Rijsman, 1988). Apparently, the presence of even a single out-group member is enough to increase our sense of in-group membership. When outsiders are present, resourceful group members sometimes put their mouth where their membership is, using language to emphasize their identification with their group. For example, when French-speaking Canadians were confronted with English- speaking Canadians in one experiment, the French speakers either broadened their accents or switched to their native language altogether (Bourhis, Giles, Leyens, & Tajfel, 1978). Ethnic languages are important sources of social identity, as efforts by French speakers in Canada, Catalans in Spain, and Welsh nationalists in Britain to preserve their languages all attest. Being a Minority. If a few out-group members arriving on the scene can make in-group membership accessible, imagine the impact when they actually outnumber the in-group. In Chapter 4, we noted that people are more likely to think of themselves in terms of individual characteristics that are unusual or distinctive in their social group (W. J. McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1978). The same principle operates at the group level: People are more likely to think of themselves in terms of their memberships in smaller groups than in larger ones (Brewer, 1991; S. E. Taylor and others, 1978), and especially when they are solo repre- sentatives of their group in a situation (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007). The study by Brewer and Weber (1994) described at the beginning of this chapter illustrated this point, showing that members of a minority group were more likely than members of a majority to base their self-esteem on the performance of a fellow group member. Consider the results obtained when William McGuire and his colleagues (W. J. McGuire, McGuire, & Winton, 1979) asked grade-school children to talk for 5 minutes about themselves and carefully coded these self-descriptions. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the researchers found that boys and girls from households where their gender was You may recall a similar in the minority were more likely to mention gender than were children from households point from Chapter 5, where their gender made up the majority. Similarly, children whose ethnic group page 163: A solo member constituted a minority at school were more likely to mention their ethnicity in informal of a group tends to be self-descriptions than were children who were part of the ethnic majority (W. J. McGuire, perceived by observers in McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978). terms of that group membership. Conflict or Rivalry. Although all of these transitory circumstances can make a social identity accessible, probably the most potent factor that brings group membership to CATEGORIZING ONESELF AS A GROUP MEMBER 195 Percentage of participants mentioning 20 gender in their self-description 15 10 5 0 Males were majority Equal numbers of Females were majority in household males and females in household in household Boys Girls Figure 6.1 Being in the minority matters Chapter 13 will describe In this study, grade-school children spoke for five minutes in response to the instruction “Tell us about the several vivid yourself.” Notice that both boys and girls were more likely to mention their gender if their gender was demonstrations of the a minority at home. (Based on W. J. McGuire and others, 1979.) effects of intergroup conflict on group mind is ongoing conflict or rivalry between groups (Doise & Weinberger, 1973; Ryen identification, including & Kahn, 1975). One experiment set up a discussion on a social issue, either between the famed “Robbers a male and a female participant who disagreed on the issue or between two men and Cave” study. two women, who disagreed along gender lines (Hogg & Turner, 1987). In the second SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP Group membership does not exist in a vacuum, of course, but has an importance that depends on the cultural context (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Collectivist cultures, like most in Asia, South America, and Africa, foster and reinforce views of the self in group terms (Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996; Trafimow & Finlay, 2001). People from these cultures tend to see themselves as members of groups or categories—perhaps as workers at a particular plant, graduates of a certain school, or inhabitants of a specific village. In such societies, family units are often multigenerational and employment relationships may last a lifetime. In contrast, people who live in the United States, Canada, Northern Europe, and other individualist cultures are encouraged to think of themselves in comparatively idiosyncratic terms, for example, as tall, dark, and handsome. They tend to value freedom, personal enjoyment, and the achievement of individual goals, while viewing group memberships as temporary and changeable (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Tipton, & Swidler, 1985). Members of these societies have high divorce rates and often seem comfortable switching churches or employers. Thus, cultural differences can affect whether people think of themselves more often as individuals or as members of groups, and by so doing, they can create corresponding differences in social behavior (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). But as we will see throughout this chapter, even in individualist cultures in which group memberships are seen as more fluid and less omnipresent, group memberships make a big difference to people’s ways of thinking about themselves and those around them (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002). 196 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY Direct reminders Presence of out- Being a minority Intergroup conflict group members Being called Being part of a Discussing affirmative “Ma’am” Chatting over coffee mostly male work action with some or “Miss” with a mixed-sex team women who favor it group of friends and some men who oppose it Accessibility of social identity as a group member I’m a woman Figure 6.2 Factors that make a social identity accessible Many factors can increase the accessibility of a particular group membership. Not only obvious reminders, like group labels or intergroup conflict, but even relatively subtle factors like the presence of out-group members can activate our knowledge of group membership. condition, because the conflict was along group lines, participants identified more strongly with their groups, for example, by rating themselves as more typical of their sex. Even a news report of rivalry can remind us of group loyalties. In one study, exposure to a campus newspaper headline like “Humanities, Science Majors at Odds over Core Program” was enough to increase the accessibility of students’ identity as scientists or humanists (V. Price, 1989). The importance of conflict also means that people identify more strongly with groups that they learn are targets of discrimination from the society at large (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). All in all, conflict is perhaps the most powerful factor in making a group membership accessible. Figure 6.2 summarizes the many factors that can have this effect. ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION Does it really make a difference if we see ourselves as Belgians, Californians, socialists, or libertarians? It certainly does! When group memberships surface, they influence the way we see ourselves and others, making a huge difference in how we think, feel, and act. The reason is that group memberships not only help define our self and tell us who we are, but they also connect us to some people (fellow in-group members) at the same time as they divide us from others (out-group members). As we discuss these three effects of group memberships in turn, you will see that they are all interconnected. ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 197 “I” Becomes “We”: Social Categorization and the Self Activated knowledge about a group membership has multiple effects on people’s self-concept and self-esteem. The group’s typical characteristics become standards for members’ behavior. Group memberships also influence people’s moods and self-esteem as they feel bad about their group’s failures or good about their successes. Relatively small groups typically have the greatest effects. Seeing Oneself as a Group Member. Seeing oneself as a group member means that the group’s typical characteristics become norms or standards for one’s own behavior (J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). As a result, people tend to think and act in group-typical ways. One experiment demonstrated this effect by having some students listen to a discussion in which one group presented pro-environmental attitudes. Some of the students were about to join the group voicing the positive attitudes, whereas others knew they would not be joining. The students who were going to join the group rated themselves as higher in environmental awareness than did the other students who heard the same discussion (Mackie, 1986). In other words, their own opinions moved toward the group’s position. In another study, Dutch university students were presented with a comparison that was potentially threatening to their group; for example, psychology students were asked to compare their own group to physics students on intelligence (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). The way students responded to this threat depended on their initial level of identification with their group. Students who identified only weakly avoided the threat by dissociating themselves from the in-group. But students who strongly identified with their group tended to show group solidarity by rating themselves as highly typical of their group. As this result shows, factors that activate people’s group identity—even social comparisons that are threatening to the group—can cause people to see themselves as typical group members. The same process is responsible for the finding that when laboratory groups include men, women speak more tentatively than they do in all-female groups (Carli, 1990). The presence of men apparently makes the women’s identity as females accessible, causing them to act in ways that they regard as typical of women, such as by avoiding assertive speech. In fact, gender group norms are usually highly valued, so acting in accordance with those norms tends to make people feel good about themselves (W. Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997). Liking Ourselves: Social Identity and Self-Esteem. We have all experienced it: We feel great when our team wins. When Germany won soccer’s World Cup championship in 2014, defeating Argentina by scoring a winning goal in the last few minutes of the game, hundreds of thousands of their fans celebrated in the streets, waving flags, tooting horns, and setting off fireworks. Why? Because our groups are part of ourselves, when good things happen to our team, our school, or our city, we feel good—about life and about ourselves. Recall that in the experiment described at the outset of this chapter, the same process made members of a minority group feel good or bad depending on the performance of a fellow group member (Brewer & Weber, 1994). 198 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY Strivers for positive self-esteem that we are, we play up group memberships that make us feel good about ourselves (Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000; Tesser, 1988). Robert Cialdini and his co-workers (1976) investigated this tendency to BIRG (pronounced to rhyme with “surge”), or bask in the reflected glory of a positive group identification, by counting “in-group” clothing worn on school days following football games. At seven universities they found that students wore more school sweatshirts, baseball caps, scarves, and pins if the football team won than if it lost. To test their hypothesis that links to a positive group membership serve to raise self-esteem, Cialdini and his colleagues (1976) gave students a brief general-knowledge test and temporarily raised or lowered their self-esteem by manipulating the results. Some randomly selected stu- Photo 6.1 Basking in refl ected glory. When we identify with a group, dents were told falsely that they had performed poorly their emotional ups and downs become our own. Like these New York Giants fans, we are not only happy to join in a victory celebration, we on the test, and others were told that they had done well. are happy because our team has won. The students were then asked, seemingly incidentally, to describe the outcome of a recent game. In their descrip- tions, the students who thought they had failed the test were more likely to associate themselves with winning teams (referring to them as “we”) and to dissociate themselves from losing teams (referring to them as “they”), than were students who believed they had done well and whose self-esteem was intact. Thus, You may recall from people BIRG as a way of restoring positive self-regard, and they do so particularly when Chapter 4, pages self-esteem is threatened. 109–110, that, in the same way, people tend to Social Identity and Emotions. Group memberships lead us to experience emotions play up the idiosyncratic on behalf of our groups, as well as affecting our self-esteem (E. R. Smith, 1993). In one characteristics they feel study demonstrating this point, psychology students were told about another psychology good about. student at a different university who had been treated unfairly by authorities. In one condition where the participants were subtly reminded of their common identity with the victim, they reported feeling less happy and more angry—despite the fact that they BIRG (bask in reflected glory) themselves remained totally unaffected by the events (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, a way of boosting self-esteem by 2001). People experience anger, fear, pride, guilt, or other emotions in response to events identifying oneself with the that affect their groups because identification with a group makes the group part of the accomplishments or good qualities self, giving the group emotional significance (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Mackie, of fellow in-group members Devos, & Smith, 2000). Importantly, these emotional reactions are not just a form of empathy—feeling an emotion on behalf of another person. Rather, they appear to be truly an integral part of group membership as evidenced, in part, by the fact that highly identified group members feel stronger emotions in response to group-relevant events (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). For example, in one study, students reported how much they felt emotions as an individual and as a member of various groups (e.g., as an American; Smith and others, 2007). They also reported their feelings about other groups and the actions they would like to enact toward them, such as to argue with or oppose them. Much more reliably than their individual-level emotions, participants’ group-level ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 199 emotions predicted their feelings and desires for action toward other groups. Thus, we experience emotions as group members, which influence how we feel about and behave toward out-groups. Balancing Individuality and Connectedness. As we saw in Chapter 4, members of individualist cultures like to see themselves as unique individuals, distinct from others. Yet they are also motivated to seek connectedness and similarity with others. Can people balance these two seemingly incompatible needs? In fact, group membership can simul- taneously satisfy both. Perceiving the differences between our group and other groups provides feelings of being unique and special, whereas seeing the similarity among members within our group can help us feel connected and similar (Brewer, 1991). Though individual and cultural differences influence the relative strengths of these opposing motives, the best balance for most people most of the time involves member- ship in relatively small groups. A group that is too small might not be an adequate basis for group pride, but in a group that is too large, the person might be too anonymous to attain much respect. Studies have confirmed this idea by showing that people’s iden- tification with small groups increases when experimental manipulations increase their desires either for connectedness or for uniqueness (Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010). Additional evidence comes from an examination of how college-aged students identify with musical styles (Abrams, 2009). A large survey asked United Kingdom residents aged 18–21 to pick their three favorite musical styles from a lengthy list of options that included things like pop/rock, Motown, and ska. They were also asked about how much they expressed their favored musical styles, for example, by buying the music or adopting clothing or hair styles associated with that music. Fans of the musical styles that were objectively most and least popular showed fewer of these behaviors than fans of music in the middle range. Engaging with a form of music that is not popular might make one feel too distinct, while engaging with one that is extremely popular may not offer enough distinctiveness. The “just right” groups in the middle appear best for expressing one’s group identity. Thus, relatively small groups seem to provide the best balance between similarity and group identification, on the one hand, and uniqueness and recognition for one’s individual qualities, on the other (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). Others Become “We”: Social Categorization and the In-Group When group membership is highly accessible, people see other in-group members as similar in their central group-linked characteristics. However, extensive personal inter- action (when group membership is not activated) also provides knowledge about their unique and diverse personal characteristics. People like fellow in-group members and tend to treat them in fair, humane, and altruistic ways, seeing the other members as similar to themselves in their goals and interests. An accessible group membership is not just an aspect of the individual self, like one’s height or chess-playing ability. Instead, a social identity links the individual to others and therefore influences the way the person thinks, feels, and acts toward other in-group members. 200 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY Perceiving Fellow In-Group Members. When we think about fellow in-group mem- bers, what is uppermost in our minds? When group membership is accessible, we think mostly about the features we believe we share with the group, thereby causing us to see other in-group members as similar to ourselves (Krueger, 2007; Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001). In one demonstration of this effect, students were assigned to groups ostensibly on the basis of their artistic preferences. They were then asked to guess the extent to which other in-group members shared their own personal characteristics and preferences (V. L. Allen & Wilder, 1979). As expected, the students assumed that all members of the group would be very similar in art preferences. Surprisingly, they also thought that in-group members’ interests, activities, and even personality traits would match their own. Anything that increases the accessibility of group membership—being a minority, engaging in competition, even just making judgments about another group, for example—further enhances this assumed similarity (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; B. Simon, 1992). Although a highly accessible shared group membership leads us to focus on our similarities with other in-group members, we also manage to learn quite a lot about other in-group members’ personal qualities—the things that make them unique as indi- viduals. This awareness of specific, personal attributes develops as we interact with other members in a variety of contexts and situations (J. C. Turner and others, 1987). It is particularly acute when personal rather than group identities are most salient, as when a group of close friends chat together over dinner. HOT TOPICS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: IS THE SELF SIMILAR TO THE IN-GROUP, OR IS THE IN-GROUP SIMILAR TO THE SELF? We just described how people perceive fellow in-group members as similar to themselves, using their self-knowledge as a basis for inferring what the in-group is like (Krueger, 2007). However, earlier we stated that when they are socially categorized, people think of themselves in terms of in-group norms and stereotypes—using group knowledge as a basis for inferring what the self is like (Turner and others, 1987). Are these processes competitors, or could both of them operate simultaneously? A recent study by Jeff Cho and Eric Knowles (2013) demonstrated both, within the same sample of participants and the same set of traits. For each of 90 traits, participants rated whether the trait described them personally and whether it described their gender group, on 5-point scales. In a later task, they made yes/no responses for each trait, again judging whether or not it described both the self and the in-group, while the response times were recorded. Patterns of response times provided evidence that both processes were operating. When participants were relatively certain that a trait characterized (or did not characterize) the in-group but were uncertain about whether it described themselves personally—as indicated by extreme ratings on the 1–5 scale for the group but midrange ratings for the self—they used their group knowledge as a basis for their response for the self. This amounts to assuming that the self shares the group’s typical characteristics. But conversely, when par- ticipants were relatively certain that a trait characterized (or did not characterize) the self but were uncertain about whether it described the in-group, they used their self-knowledge to generate their response for the in-group. This amounts to assuming that the in-group shares the self’s typical characteristics. In summary, knowledge about the self and the in-group mutually influence each other, with both processes contributing to convergence or overlap between perceptions of the self and the group (Smith and others, 1999). ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 201 Knowing about others’ unique characteristics helps us to find our own place in the group. As Chapter 4 noted, we define our personal selves in terms of what makes us distinct from others (W. J. McGuire and others, 1978; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Among your fellow students, you may be the serious one, the conservationist, the lover of coun- try music. Of course, to make these differentiations you have to pay attention to the personality, passions, and preferences of your fellow in-group members. In doing so, you learn a lot about them—so much that when group membership is not highly accessible, you are likely to see your group as quite diverse in characteristics not related to group membership (Park & Judd, 1990). Liking In-Group Members: To Be Us Is to Be Lovable. Because they share our attrib- utes, fellow in-group members become part of “me and mine” and so we like them, usually much more than we like out-group members (Otten & Wentura, 2001). Asked to evaluate essays or creative solutions to problems, people treat their own group’s work more generously than out-group products. They choose to interact with and to befriend members of their own rather than of another group (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Silver, 1978). Even people assigned to groups on a trivial or random basis evaluate their own group as more positive and desirable than other groups, and the in-group bias is stronger yet when the groups are real and meaningful (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Indeed, the very concept “we” seems to have positive connotations, as compared with the concept “they” (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). When people have seen nonsense syllables (like xeh) paired with the word “we,” they have more positive feelings about them, compared to syllables paired with the word “they.” Participants also respond more quickly to positive words that follow the prime “we” than to those that follow “they.” This is true even when the prime words are flashed too quickly to be consciously read. Both of these findings suggest that the label “we” automatically activates positive associations that facilitate the recognition of other positive words. In a clever study of the consequences of these effects for intergroup behavior, students were asked to read a description of the task that they were to perform with other individuals. For one group of participants, this task was described as “something we all have to do our best on”; for other participants it was “something they have to do their best on.” When asked to imagine the quality of the interaction and the likability of the other participants, those who had been exposed to the in-group pronouns had more positive expectations than those who had read out-group pronouns (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993). It may have occurred to you that attraction to other in-group members is somehow different from “ordinary” feelings of liking for another individual. After all, attraction usually depends on getting to know someone—on recognizing their desirable personal characteristics and your common interests. In contrast, attraction in group situations seems to depend merely on the knowledge of shared group membership (J. C. Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983; Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Orina, 2006). Indeed, people often prefer others who are typical members of an in-group even if those people would not be especially likable on the merits of their individual characteristics alone. This pattern has been observed in many types of groups, including work groups and the members of an Australian football team (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & Hardie, 1991; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). In a sense, in-group members are liked not as individuals but as representatives of the liked group (Clement & Krueger, 1998). 202 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY The fact that we like our groups so much even shows up in the very language people use to describe others’ actions (Maass, 1999). Anne Maass and her colleagues (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989) prepared cartoon drawings depicting positive actions by in-group and out-group members. Asked to describe the actions, participants gave You might have noticed that the attributions we relatively concrete and specific descriptions of out-group behavior, whereas the in-group make about our groups descriptions were more abstract and general. If an out-group member comforted a lost are just like the child on a crowded street, participants said “he talked to the child,” or some similarly self-enhancing specific statement. The same action by an in-group member elicited “he helped” or “cared attributions we make as for the child.” The concreteness of the out-group descriptions implicitly casts the behav- individuals. To check the iors as ungeneralizable, one-of-a-kind instances, whereas the more abstract terms used parallels for yourself, for in-group actions emphasize their links to the actor’s positive general characteristics, see Chapter 4, page 132. such as helpfulness or caring (Maass and others, 1989). Treating the In-Group Right: Justice and Altruism. If in-group members are lovable and similar to us, we will want to treat them as we ourselves would like to be treated. Indeed, people sometimes act in ways that seem to make no sense from the perspective of individual costs and benefits. Parents scrimp and save to leave an inheritance for their children. Soldiers sacrifice their lives for their comrades or their country. From the per- spective of a social group, however, actions like these make a great deal of sense. Groups prosper when their members are willing to subordinate personal interests to the group and to help other members in times of need. This has been true since members of many early hunting societies shared the meat from large animals among the whole group (A. P. Fiske, 1992). When group memberships are uppermost in people’s minds, they often act in these altruistic ways, showing more concern for treating others fairly than for getting the largest share of rewards (Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998; Wenzel, 2004). When people see the world through the lens of their group memberships, what is best for the group blurs together with what is best for the individual. As “I” becomes “we,” the distinction between self-interest and group interest vanishes (J. C. Turner and It is this unification others, 1987). This merging of perceived individual and group interests constitutes the of self-interest and psychological basis for fair and altruistic behavior. Over a century ago, Charles Darwin group-interest that (1871/1909) argued that morality derives originally “from the social instincts”: Actions makes altruistic and are judged good or bad “solely as they obviously affect the welfare of the tribe.” When self-sacrificing behavior people think of themselves as members of a family, community, ethnic group, or nation, possible, as we will see in Chapter 14. It is also the they feel like and feel for fellow in-group members. As a result, treating those others basis of effective with fairness and compassion—indeed, treating others as they themselves would like functioning of small to be treated—becomes easy, natural, and the right thing to do (Deutsch, 1973, 1990; interacting groups, a Staub, 1978; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). topic discussed in detail An accessible group membership makes other in-group members part of “me and in Chapter 11. mine.” Shared group membership has dramatic effects on the way we think about, evaluate, and behave toward other members, as shown in Figure 6.3. ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 203 Accessibility of social identity as group member I’m a Presbyterian. See other in-group Like other in-group Treat them with fairness members as similar. members. and altruism. We Presbyterians agree I feel warmth and liking I donate to Presbyterian on most important issues. for my fellow church charities and relief members. organizations. Figure 6.3 Social identity turns others into “we” When a shared group membership is accessible, it has positive effects on the way we see, evaluate, and treat other group members. Others Become “They”: Social Categorization and the Out-Group People see out-groups as uniform and homogeneous. People also dislike, devalue, and discriminate against out-group members, depending on the extent to which they are seen as threatening to the in-group. When the out-group is simply different, it elicits mild dislike. When the out-group is seen as outdoing the in-group, this more serious threat results in resentment, dislike, and overt discrimination. Out-groups that are seen as severe threats to the in-group elicit murderous hatred, severe discrimination, aggression, or moral exclusion. The comedian Emo Phillips (cited in D. L. Hamilton & Mackie, 1990) describes a con- versation with a suicidal man threatening to jump off a bridge: I said, “Are you a Christian or a Jew?” He said, “A Christian.” I said, “Me too. Protestant or Catholic?” He said, “Protestant.” I said, “Me too. What franchise?” He says, “Baptist.” I said, “Me too. Northern Baptist or Southern Baptist?” He says, “Northern Baptist.” I said, “Me too. Northern Conservative Baptist or Northern Liberal Baptist?” He says, “Northern Conservative Baptist.” I said, “Me too. Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist or Northern Conservative Reformed Baptist?” He says, “Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist.” I said, “Me too. Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist, Great Lakes Region, or Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist, Eastern Region?” He says, “Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist, Great Lakes Region.” I said, “Me too. Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist, Great Lakes Region, Council of 1879 or Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist, Great Lakes Region, Council of 1912?” He says, “Northern Conservative Fundamentalist Baptist, Great Lakes Region, Council of 1912.” I said, “Die, heretic!” and I pushed him over. (D. L. Hamilton & Mackie, 1990, p. 110) Emo Phillips makes comic what more often is tragic: the tendency to hate and mistreat 204 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY those who are not members of our in-group, regardless of how similar to us they may seem to outsiders. We have seen that people generally feel good about their own groups, and while this tendency may be benign, all too often bringing one group up in the world also means putting others down. Unfortunately, anthropological evidence suggests that hostility toward out-groups is common in intergroup relations. Throughout human history and in every human culture, esteem, consideration, and favoritism await in-group members, whereas disdain, discrimination, and domination are often the fate of those categorized as out-group members (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). In short, categorization into an out-group has a range of negative consequences. Perceiving the Out-Group as Homogeneous: “They’re All Alike!” A member of an Isla Vista, California, band explained, “Los Angeles bands are all homogeneous. Seattle bands all sound like Seattle bands. But Isla Vista music is more original. Bands here play all out-group homogeneity effect kinds of music!” (Lagerquist, 1992). You should have no difficulty finding other examples the tendency to see the out-group of this out-group homogeneity effect: the tendency to perceive out-group members as as relatively more homogeneous “all the same” compared to the relatively more diverse in-group. People of European and less diverse than the in-group origin typically see the widely diverse groups of Native Americans as “all the same” while finding great diversity and variety among those of European descent. Members of one fraternity find members of other houses just as they expected them, but do not think they themselves fit their own group’s stereotype (Linville, Fisher, & Salorey, 1989; Mullen & Hu, 1989). Thus the tendency to see out-groups as relatively homogeneous is quite wide- spread. What accounts for this effect? One obvious potential explanation involves familiarity: We usually know more in-group members than out-group members, and we are therefore more aware of their diversity. Because we are less familiar with out-group members, we do not observe their diversity, which gives the impression that they are very similar to one another (Linville and others, 1989). But lack of familiarity with the out-group is not the whole story. Another important factor is the relatively constrained nature of typical interactions with out-group members. People’s exposure to out-groups often takes place in settings where no individual interaction is even possible, for example, when students from a rival school attend a sports event en masse. In such settings, one can easily gain the impression that out-group members are pretty much all alike. In contrast, interactions with in-group members are likely to be relatively more varied, relaxed, and informal (Rothbart, Dawes, & Park, 1984). Finally, as we noted earlier, people habitually focus on the personal characteristics that make them unique and different from others. Within the in-group, this means that we learn a lot about others’ characteristics in the process of finding out what differentiates us from them. But we can feel unique and different from out-group members just by noting their group-defining characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, nationality, or university affiliation (J. C. Turner and others, 1987). In a study demon- strating this effect, Bernadette Park and Myron Rothbart (1982) asked students to read brief newspaper stories about men and women. When they later were asked to recall as much as they could about the protagonists, they remembered more personal details, such as occupation, about same-sex than about opposite-sex individuals (see Figure 6.4). ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 205 30 Percentage of participants who accurately 25 recalled characters’ occupation 20 15 10 5 0 Male participants Female participants Male story characters recalled Female story characters recalled Figure 6.4 It is easier to remember us than them In this study, men and women were asked to read a “newspaper story” and, at a later time, to recall information about the main characters. As you can see, men more easily recalled the occupations of male characters, whereas women more easily recalled female characters’ occupations. (Based on Park & Rothbart, 1982.) SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN PRACTICE: OUT-GROUP HOMOGENEITY IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION Seeing members of an out-group as all alike can set the stage for harmful effects, perhaps most strikingly in the realm of witness misidentification. This happens because the out-group homogeneity effect extends even to the perception of physical characteristics. Apparently, members of other groups “all look alike.” A consequence of this is that people can recognize the faces of members of their own ethnic group more easily than the faces of members of other groups, an effect called the cross-race identification bias (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Bothwell, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). In one study illustrating this, Texas con- venience store clerks were asked to identify three male customers—actually experimental confederates—who had stopped by to make a purchase earlier in the day. One confederate was Black, another was Mexican-American, and the third was Anglo-American. The shop clerks were also members of these three ethnic groups. As Figure 6.5 shows, the clerks made more accurate identifications of the customer belonging to their own group than they did of the customers from the other two groups (Platz & Hosch, 1988). This cross-race identification bias appears to result in part because people typically do not have the motivation to pay close attention to the distinguishing features of other-race faces (Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007). In one study supporting this notion, White students were shown pictures of White and Black faces during an initial exposure task and later tried to recognize these faces. Before the initial exposure, some students were warned about the cross-race identification bias and instructed to pay close attention to the distinguishing features of faces, especially those of a different race. Those given no special instructions showed the standard bias: White perceivers recognized White faces with greater accuracy than Black faces. But those told to pay close attention to individual 206 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY faces were able to identify Black and White faces equally accurately. Thus, unless people are aware of the bias and motivated to distinguish one other-race face from another, the bias appears. No wonder, then, that criminal defendants and their attorneys often question the accuracy of eyewitness identifications across ethnic group lines.. 70 60 Percentage of correct identification 50 40 30 20 10 0 Anglo-American African-American Mexican-American clerks clerks clerks Anglo-American African-American Mexican-American customer customer customer Figure 6.5 Inaccuracy in cross-ethnic identification Convenience store clerks who were either Anglo-American, African-American, or Mexican-American tried to identify customers that researchers had sent to visit their store earlier. The three customers also belonged to one of the three ethnic groups. As shown here, clerks were best able to identify customers from their own group. (Based on Platz & Hosch, 1988.) Effects of Mere Categorization: Minimal Groups. As we just described, people usually have poor memory for racial out-group faces. But, consider a recent intriguing study: White students were given an alleged personality test and told that they were a “green” or a “red” personality type (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). In actuality, these personality types do not exist and were assigned to participants at random. Students then saw a series of White faces appearing on red or green backgrounds that supposedly iden- tified the personality type of the pictured individual. Results showed that the students had better memory for faces that matched their own personality types. “Red” students remembered “red” faces more than “green” faces, and “green” students remembered “green” faces better than “red” ones. It seems people show an effect akin to the cross- race identification bias, even when race isn’t involved! These results suggest that we think differently about in-group versus out-group members, even when the groups are not real or meaningful. Memory confusions are one thing, but might we actually treat others differently simply because they are in another group, even a seemingly inconsequential one? When we consider ethnic conflict in the ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 207 Sudan or Iraq, or any of the other manifold examples of one group’s maltreatment of another, multiple explanations can be offered. These include negative stereotypes, mutual ignorance and fear, unjust distribution of resources, and a history of conflict. However, perhaps the most sobering body of social-psychological research on the issue reaches a startling conclusion: Explanations like these are not always necessary. Discrimination can occur when a dividing line simply creates two groups, even in the absence of these common sources of antagonism. In one of the initial experiments illustrating this point, a number of English boys aged 14 to 16 were assigned to Group X or Group W on the basis of a coin toss (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). The groups had no defining characteristics, and members did not know which other individuals were in each group. There was no basis for in-group or out-group stereotypes, and the groups had no history of conflict or antagonism—indeed, no history at all. For all these reasons, this situation was appropriately labeled a minimal intergroup minimal intergroup situation situation. After being assigned to a group, each boy was given the opportunity to dis- a research situation in which tribute rewards worth a small amount of money to two other individuals. For example, people are categorized, on an arbitrary or trivial basis, into he might be asked to divide, in any way he wanted, 15 points between two other boys, groups that have no history, who were identified only as “Member number 49 of the W group” and “Member number no conflicts of interest, and no 72 of the X group.” stereotypes The late European social psychologist Henri Tajfel devised this procedure as a base- line for further comparisons. He planned to go beyond merely categorizing participants into groups, and to add other ingredients, such as negative stereotypes or conflict over resources, one at a time until prejudice and discrimination developed. However, the results in the baseline situation confounded the researchers’ expectations. Even in this minimal situation, the boys favored their own group: They awarded more points to mem- bers of their in-group than to boys in the out- group. They were not always blatantly unfair; for example, of the 15 points, boys awarded an average of 8.08 to the in-group and 6.92 to the out-group. However, the bias in favor of the in-group was consistent, and this finding was replicated in many other similar studies (Brewer, 1979; Mullen and others, 1992). Simple categorization into groups seems to be sufficient reason for people to dispense valued rewards in ways that favor in-group members over those who are “different.” Discrimination and Social Identity. What explains the favoritism found in minimal intergroup situations? Were people simply seeking material gain for the in-group? Tajfel was not so sure. His further explorations of behavior in minimal intergroup situations revealed a startling tendency: Participants 208 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY often favor the in-group over the out-group even when doing so costs the in-group in absolute terms. For example, Tajfel gave some of his participants a choice between option A, which allocates 11 points to an in-group member and 7 to an out-group member, and option B, which gives 17 points to each. Many preferred option A, which gave the in-group an edge over the out-group, even though choosing A instead of B cost the in- group 6 points (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). These results and others show that the expectation of rewards is not the driving force behind intergroup discrimination (Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996). A host of studies of minimal groups showed that members give their own group higher ratings on positive traits, evaluations of performance, and inferences of morality (Brewer, 1979). Apparently, group members want to make their groups better, stronger, and more lovable in any way available to them. These findings led Tajfel to propose that just as we strive to view our individual selves positively, we also want to view our social identities in positive terms. This idea was the social identity theory basis for social identity theory, which argues that people’s motivation to derive positive the theory that people’s motivation self-esteem from their group memberships is one driving force behind in-group bias to derive self-esteem from their (Tajfel and others, 1971). Preferring the in-group over the out-group becomes a way of group memberships is one driving expressing regard for the in-group, and it is therefore a way of feeling good about oneself, force behind in-group bias of valuing me and mine (M. Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Interestingly, studies show that people in minimal intergroup situations do not discriminate when allocating negative outcomes (like unpleasant blasts of noise) as they do when handing out praise or money (Otten & Mummendey, 2000). This finding illustrates the important distinction between in-group favoritism (which occurs even in minimal intergroup situations) and out-group hostility, which as we will see requires other ingredients such as threat or direct inter- group conflict. Only when in-group preference is joined by threat or conflict do people shift from simply rewarding the in-group to actively punishing the out-group. Effects of Perceived Mild Threat. One type of threat people sometimes face is a threat to their self-esteem. One of the many benefits of group membership is that it can serve to enhance self-esteem, as social identity theory holds. In fact, the finding that people can increase their self-esteem by discriminating against out-groups has been repeatedly confirmed (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; M. Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). And people are particularly likely to choose this tactic when their self-esteem is threatened. In a study by Steven Fein and Steven Spencer (1997), for example, some participants (who were assumed to be mostly heterosexual) were given false negative feedback on a supposed intelligence test. They then read a detailed description about a young actor’s struggles to begin a career in New York City. If the description of the actor implied that he was probably gay, participants who had been made to feel bad about themselves rated the actor in highly negative and stereotypic terms. The ratings were more positive if the actor was described as heterosexual, or if the participant had received no negative feedback. So, we may discriminate against out-groups if we experience a threat to our indi- vidual self-esteem. But, what if the out-group posed a mild threat to the in-group itself? If an out-group is perceived to be competing with us or outdoing us, this can trigger intergroup discrimination. The effects differ, however, depending on the relative status positions of the groups (Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001). When higher-status groups are threatened, they tend to discriminate ME, YOU, AND THEM: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 209 on dimensions that are centrally relevant to the group distinction. Thus, the economically successful tend to view their own groups as superior to out-groups on dimensions such as hard work, ambition, and intelligence—traits seen as quite relevant to economic position and success. In contrast, lower-status groups show more discrimination on other dimensions that are less directly relevant to status. So lower-status groups frequently evaluate themselves more favorably than higher-status out-groups on dimensions like friendliness, cooperativeness, or likability (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). In general, unequal status amplifies intergroup discrimination. If groups perceive themselves as losing out to an out-group that is gaining in status, power, or prosperity, they often turn from mild dislike to stronger emotions (Fiske, 2002). Anger, resentment, and support for overt discrimination against the out-group are frequent outcomes. Effects of Perceived Extreme Threat: Moral Exclusion and Hate Crimes. In June 2011, a group of White teenagers came upon James Craig Anderson, a middle-aged African-American, in a parking lot. They beat him and eventually ran over him with a truck, killing him. The attackers did not know Anderson personally, and they had no history of disagreement or conflict with him. Their only motive for this brutal crime was that Anderson was Black. What can explain this kind of behavior? Stereotypes can pro- duce group prejudice, as we discussed in Chapter 5, and Anderson’s attackers probably believed that Black men have a variety of negative characteristics. But can stereotypes fully account for such murderous actions? It seems more likely that extreme forms of prejudice—going beyond mere dislike to outright hatred—may be the cause. Where does such hatred come from? When prejudice turns from dislike to extreme hatred, it usually reflects the percep- tion that what “they” stand for threatens everything that “we” stand for (Brewer, 2001). At times, we may perceive our in-group as especially virtuous and an out-group as posing a threat to our group (Reicher and colleagues, 2008). This can set the stage for par- ticularly destructive clashes with the out-group. Indeed, if we perceive our in-group as especially good and an out-group is perceived to threaten our existence, it becomes imperative that we get rid of them. For our virtuous group to remain, we must eliminate this threat. When people perceive such extreme threat, they usually respond in two interrelated ways. First, they exalt in-group symbols and values. Past or present group leaders, flags, slogans, and the group’s historical accomplishments are glorified and cast in a totally positive light (Castano, 2008). Second, they begin to hate the out-group. Thus, hatred for outsiders often arises in connection with the exaltation of in-group symbols, whether the hatred is directed against homosexuals, women, immigrants, or racial, ethnic, or religious groups (Kinder, 1986; Sears, 1988). Recall that in the minimal inter- group situation, preferences for the in-group are relatively mild, taking the form of favoring the in-group with good things but usually not giving the out-group an unfair share of punishments (Otten & Mummendey, 2000). However, extreme group threat ties together glorification of the in-group and hatred for the out-group into an ominous package (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). moral exclusion In these situations, out-groups may also be viewed as fundamentally inferior to the viewing out-groups as subhuman in-group—as subhuman and outside the domain in which the rules of morality apply and outside the domain in which (Opotow, 1990). Moral exclusion can begin with symptoms that appear relatively benign, the rules of morality apply 210 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY such as a belief in the in-group’s moral superiority. The disease quickly spreads, however. In-group members may portray the out-group in subhuman terms, often by labeling them as vermin, barbarians, or even germs “infecting” the pure in-group, or by dismissing their ability to expe- rience human sentiments like joy or grief (Paladino and others, 2002; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). This attitude allows us to suspend behaviors we usually consider both human and humane, such as helping others and treating them fairly and justly. Thus, when in-group members commit atrocities against an out-group, in-group members who are especially inclined to glorify their group respond by dehumanizing the out-group and resisting demands that the perpetrators be brought to justice (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). When a powerful in- group excludes members of relatively powerless groups from the scope of moral principles, the stage may be set for extreme intergroup oppression, massacre, or genocide (Opotow, 1990; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). Destructive actions against the out-group may be rationalized by the idea that “they brought it on themselves” or by self-justifying comparisons with horrible atrocities committed by others. The actions may be given euphemistic and misleading labels, like Hitler’s genocidal “final solution” or the Serbian “ethnic cleansing.” Finally, group members reject personal Photo 6.2 Less than human. Group hatred is responsibility for hateful or destructive acts by appealing to the in-group’s sometimes so strong that the in-group portrays welfare as a source of higher moral authority (Reicher and others, 2008). the out-group as less than human, as seen here in this World War I poster trying to entice Americans These aspects of moral exclusion often play a role in the dynamics of to enlist in the military to fight the “gorilla like” intergroup conflict, which we will discuss in Chapter 13. Germans. Sadly, examples of prejudice and discrimination fueled by perceptions of extreme threat are easy to find. One took place when the Communist regime in the former Yugoslavia began to fail around 1990. People of Serbian descent felt themselves threatened by Croatians and Muslims, and under a strongly nationalist leader, Slobodan Milosević, they launched military campaigns aimed at “ethnic cleansing,” creating a new, larger homeland by killing members of other groups or driving them from their homes and lands. Similar patterns were found in the genocidal attacks in Rwanda launched in 1994 by Hutu extremists against Tutsi and moderate Hutus, and in the attacks beginning in 2003 by ethnically Arab militias against Black residents in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Beginning in 2011, the Syrian government slaughtered many of its own civilians who were engaged in peaceful protests in the country. These actions led to the formation of an armed opposition group, prompting a civil war. This war was fueled, in part, by religious differences, as the Syrian government is primarily Alawites, whereas a majority of the opposition is Sunni Muslims. In all these cases, the victimized out-group was perceived, because of cultural, ethnic, or religious differences, as threatening the valued in-group’s control of the government or other major societal symbols and institutions. People’s reactions to out-groups usually stop short of virulent hatred, moral exclu- sion, and violent hate crimes. Still, as shown in Figure 6.6, the reactions, though they range from mild to intense, are always negative. Moreover, prejudice and discrimination against out-groups are found in all cultures (LeVine & Campbell, 1972), and they may be even stronger in the collectivist cultures of Asia and Africa than in Western, individualist THEY DON’T LIKE US: CONSEQUENCES OF BELONGING TO NEGATIVELY PERCEIVED GROUPS 211 Out-group seen as homogeneous An identifiable out-group. Germans tend to Turkish workers in Germany. see Turks as “all alike” Out-group seen as Out-group seen as Out-group seen as seriously different from in-group outdoing in-group threatening in-group Some Germans see Some Germans believe Some Germans believe cultural and religious Turks take Germans their country should be differences. jobs. ethnically pure. Mild dislike for Dislike and resentment Extreme hatred for out-group for out-group; support out-group; potential for for action against group violent action Some Germans avoid Some Germans support Some German neo-Nazi Turks or discriminate immigration limits; write “skinheads” assault and against them in minor anti-Turkish slogans on murder Turks. ways. walls. Figure 6.6 Social identity turns others into “them” Out-group members tend to be seen as “all alike.” In addition, they are often disliked and victimized by discrimination, depending on the magnitude of threat they are seen as posing to the in-group. Negative reactions may range from mild dislike, due to the simple perception of difference, to extreme hatred or even genocide when the in-group’s very existence is believed to be threatened. cultures (Hsu, 1983; Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993). Those high in collectivism care deeply about their own groups and have been shown to favor them in various ways more strongly than those scoring lower in collectivism (e.g., Yoo & Donthu, 2005). Thus, those in collectivist cultures may be even more likely to discriminate against out-groups. Dislike, distrust, and discrimination seem to be intrinsic parts of the way people respond to out-groups: When intergroup threats emerge, negative treatment of the out-group is inextricably linked to the esteem and favor that in-groups enjoy. THEY DON’T LIKE US: CONSEQUENCES OF BELONGING TO NEGATIVELY PERCEIVED GROUPS What are the costs of belonging to a group that is disliked, discriminated against, or excluded from the scope of moral principles? Out-group discrimination does not always escalate to out-group genocide or other hate-motivated violence, but it can have insidious effects even when it does stop short of these extreme acts. For example, members of such groups are likely to suffer from unequal economic opportunity, lack of access to quality education and medical care, and poor living conditions. In the United States, for example, the infant mortality rate for Blacks is more than twice the average for Whites; in fact, it is worse than the rate in Malaysia. Moreover, 43 of every 100 Black children live in poverty. 212 6 SOCIAL IDENTITY TABLE 6.1 Turning the Tables: Questions Implying that Group Membership is Abnormal and Devalued 1. What do you think caused your heterosexuality? 2. When and how did you decide you were a heterosexual? 3. Is it possible that heterosexuality is just a phase you may grow out of? 4. Is it possible your heterosexuality stems from a neurotic fear of others of the same sex? 5. If you’ve never slept with a person of the same sex, is it possible that all you need is a good same-sex lover? 6. To whom have you disclosed your heterosexual tendencies? 7. Why do heterosexuals feel compelled to seduce others into their lifestyle? 8. Why do you insist on flaunting your heterosexuality? Why can’t you just be who you are and keep quiet about it? 9. Why do heterosexuals place so much emphasis on sex? 10. There seem to be very few happy heterosexuals. Techniques have been developed that might enable you to change. Have you considered aversion therapy? 11. Considering the menace of hunger and overpopulation, can the human race survive if everyone were heterosexual like yourself? 12. Despite social support of marriage, the divorce rate is still 50 percent. Why are there so few stable relationships among heterosexuals? Note: This questionnaire has been used in sensitivity-training workshops to provoke discussion. Does it give you a sense of what it might feel like to belong to a group that most people dislike and regard as abnormal? Source: From Working It Out: The Newsletter for Gay and Lesbian Employment Issues. Membership in disliked groups can impose other important costs as well, and the price is paid in decreased self-esteem and emotional well-being. If a group becomes part stigmatized of the member’s view of the self, the effects of belonging to a stigmatized, or negatively negatively evaluated by others evaluated, group may be pervasive (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Brian Mullen and Joshua Smyth (2004) found that specific immigrant groups in the United States that were more frequently targeted by negative ethnic slurs actually had higher suicide rates—a tragic reminder of the power of hateful speech in people’s lives. Does being stigmatized inevitably drag down the individual, as this finding suggests? Or can a group become a source of pride for its members even when others look down on them? What kinds of strategies can people use, either as individuals or on behalf of an entire group, to escape or overcome their stigmatization? This part of the chapter will consider all these questions. Most of us belong to one or more groups that society devalues and stigmatizes, at least in certain contexts—women, people of color, the elderly, recent immigrants, people with AIDS, the overweight, disabled people, the unemployed, the addicted; the list seems endless. If you cannot think of any negatively regarded groups that you belong to yourself, perhaps reading the questions in Table 6.1 will give you a sense of what others experience. We Are Stigmatized: Effects on What We Do and How We Feel Negative stereotypes about the abilities of a group’s members can become self-fulfilling, actually harming the members’ performances. Belonging to a devalued group also poses a threat to self-esteem. THEY DON’T LIKE US: CONSEQUENCES OF BELONGING TO NEGATIVELY PERCEIVED GROUPS 213 Effects on Performance. Realizing that others think that your group does not have what it takes to perform well is a psychological burden in itself. However, research shows that this stereotype threat can actually act as a self-fulfil