ECS Readings: Social Movements, Nationalism, and Feminism PDF

ECS: Social Movements 1. Mattoni and Rone - Two decades of Transnational Social Movements European social movements in the last two decades have organised strategically with different features depending on the issue and the political context. 1. Global Justice Movement visible worldwide: Seattle 1999 demonstrations —> mobilitisation in Europe, creation of a network of activists that recognised themselves in the Global Justice Movement. —> counter-summit demonstrations b/t 2000-01. The movement was eclectic, activists and groups united into the battle for Global Justice despite different origins and roots. —> organisation of the European Social Forum, the first in Florence, 2002. —> criticised since 2004 by the more purist and radical early members that organised parallel forums in the same cities. Important movement for 2 main reasons: 1. Socialisation and political grassroots for an entire generation. 2. Brought up issues that were followed by other movements. 2. Contesting austerity and free trade after the crisis: two main tensions: 1. Tension b/t national and transnational level. 2. the role of the EU as a political actor. - Against precarity: First half of 2000s : Italian activists began to mobilise addressing the increased flexibilisation of labour market framing the problem as European. —> Mayday Parade on 1/05/2001 —> quickly became transnational (19 countries in 2005, 22 in 2006). —> fast internationalisation possible thx to the network created with the G.J. Movement. —> It needed a shared language on precarity but the translation was always temporary and fragile. - Against austerity beginning of 2010s and (mainly) at a national level. —> protested against the infringement of democratic national sovereignty by unelected institutions imposing austerity. —> different from the GJM the mobilised mainly middle-class people in their 20ies, the movement against the austerity included workers and unemployed and a very diverse range of age. Beginning in Madrid, Puerta del Sol, 2011 : we are not good in the hands of politicians and bankers” —> spread in Portugal and Greece —> pressure against Troika (EU commission, ECB, IMF). —> some transnational manifestations: los Indignados coordination of the Global Action Day (15 Oct 2011), the general strike in 2012 or 16-19 May 2012 Blockupy in Frankfurt (vs ECB). —> the national system remained a more concrete target. +) municipalist movements (especially in Catalonia,Serbia and Croatia) —> vs privatisation and for the city-level organisation of services and utilities with direct democratic participation. +) the role of the trade unions: Portuguese reframing with a focus on precarity and free labour market. Italy and Greece tension b/t more radical and conventional unions. France French Nuit Debout movement vs Holland's government (and later the Yellow vests vs Macron). - Against free trade agreements Most prominent cases of Europeanisation were movements against TTIP and CETA (free trade agreements). Due to: 1. Trade policy was an exclusive EU competence. 2. Attempt to democratise certain aspects of its external relations and empowerment of the Eu Parliament, seen both as a target and as a possible ally. —> coordinated by a broad network of civil society organisations, trade unions and some radical Green and left parties (especially in GER,AUS,BEL and SPA). Also cooperation of NGOs firstly involved in GJM. —> innovative initiatives: Eu Citizen initiative vs TTIP signed by 3 million people, even the attempt of cooperation b/t extreme left and right. Trump actually abandoned TTIP. - Global movements such as: Ni Una Menos, #MeToo, BLM, Fridays for Future. - Far Right Movements: PEGIDA (vs Islamisation) 2. Cameron - Feminism “We should all be feminist” —> not even all women declare themselves feminist (e.g. Sayers) and some even find it offensive (1 out of 5). Feminism may be talking of any or all the following: - Feminism as an idea (Shear) = “the radical notion that women are people” - Feminism as a collective political project (Hook) = a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation and oppression”. - Feminism as an intellectual framework (Hartsock) = a mode of analysis... a way of asking questions and searching for answers. As an idea much older than the political movement: 1st piece is Christine de Pizans’s The Book of the City of Ladies. Paradox: In order to assert that they are people just as men, women must unite on the basis of being women. —> so a battle can succeed only when an issue unites beyond the differences and for different reasons (e.g. women’s suffrage). —> in 1930s old vs new feminism in Britain: old = enfranchising of women - new = improvement of life as wives and mothers. 4 waves of Feminism: 1. women’s right —> mid-19th century - 1920s 2. Women’s liberation 1960-90s 3. multiple identity —> 1990s-2010s 4. intersectional (concept by Crenshaw)—> nowadays Critiques of the waves model: - Oversimplifies history - Overgeneralises - Ignores the continuum of the feminist activism. As an intellectual framework, it is out of the prototype of the philosophical movement but it still has theoretical basis in works such as Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. 2 basic ideas: 1. women are subordinated in society, 2. This subordination is neither inevitable nor desirable. Intersectionality : subordinations reinforce each other. 3. Ayoub - When States come out SLIDES ECS: Nationalism 1. Harris - Theories of Nation and Nationalism Two main schools: - primordialist (a.k.a essentialist): antiquity of nations or (at least) their essential ethnic cores. - modernist (a.k.a instrumentalist) : nations as the result of modernity and its processes of construction of both the idea of nations and nations themselves. (Nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around). B/t the two poles: - ethno-symbolists: moderate primordial approach stressing the durability of pre-modern ethnic ties, crucial for the elites attempts to create nations. (Especially) after Yugoslavia the focus is on the ways collective identities are shaped, how they affect people’s lives. Anthony Smith’s primordialism: Nationalism is a modern phenomenon (connected to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution) but nations themselves are not modern but are the continuation of ethnie. Ethnie: named human population with shared ancestry myths,histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity. The commitment in an ethnie may transcend (in times of need) other forms of belonging (class, gender, profession and region). In ancient/medieval times ethnicity played a crucial role since individuals in the less complex society of the time, relied more on the immediacy of their group and their views depended on their belonging to it. Modernity created the structural conditions in which nationalism could become an ideology of modern nations built around this ancient ethnic core. Ethno-histories constitute the cognitive map and the public moralities that enhance and justify the political action of the “nation-to-be” (justify even violence that would not be justified otherwise). —> 2 consequences: (1) the interpretation of history is unique to each group and must be defined in relation to other groups. (2) there is a linearity: ethnie —> nation. ?) How does an ethnie becomes a nation? —> 3 routes: 1. Civic nationalism: (West Europe) bureaucratic incorporation of loose ethnies into a territorial nation (monarchs that incorporate the middle class, aristocracy, the clergy) and wage with their wealth wars to maintain territories. This leads to the politicisation of national culture later devolved downwards to the people. —> not dominated by the ethnic aim but an ethnic core is strongly present in civic nations (i.e. France, Spain, Uk...). 2. Ethnic nation: (East Europe) intelligentsia frames the ethno-histories of the people into usable ethno-stories that can inspire the national struggle. Basically nationhood rationalised on the basis of language,myths and symbols. 3. Immigrants nation: (Canada, Australia, US) formation of a nation from immigrants of a number of ethnies. The national narrative tends to exclude the native ethnies and eulogise the pioneering spirit of the new ones. Liah Greenfeld (in Nationalism: 5 roads to modernity) places the birth of the nation in 16th century England (too far for a modernist) and connects the nation to sovereign people and nationalism to democracy. —> the outcome is the identification with a “unique sovereign people” where the uniqueness does not necessarily come from ethnicity (challenging Smith). Generally: collectivism = ethnic nationalism individualism = civic nationalism. John Armstrong (primordialist): Ethnic groups produced pre-1800 nations and modern nations were inspired by national identities. Ethnic identities are recurrent but not continuous. Primordialist (ethnic) view consequences: (1) Modern nations need an ethnic myth. (2) Nations are inevitable and dominant ethnicity should be privileged. (3) Attempts at creating a modern collective identity without ethno-histories will fail. Ernest Gellner’s modernism: nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. Nationalism is the modern answer to the changing need of shaping industrial society. Industrialisation created new, (mostly) impoverished urban populations lost in the new world schema —> language and culture will rebuild communities. Mass education —> society stratification —> social conflicts. Nationalism did invent the nation but doing so it also put some pre-existing differentiating marks. (Especially through language). problems: 1. Not all language groups in the world have produced a nation. 2. Nationalism (or proto-nationalism) is also present in non-industrial societies (without mass education). 3. Modernisation can also create resentment in religiously dissonant groups. 4. A social group is not enough to sustain a culture, it needs institutional structures that simultaneously erode other national cultures. 5. Dependence on more factors than patriotism or industrialisation. For example, international recognition is crucial. 6. Failed inclusion of political modernisation (democratisation) in the theory. It seemed evident the correlation b/t democracy and nationalism after the fall of communism. Other theories: 1. Economic transformation: rose particularly in the analysis of the post colonial struggle (vs imperialism). - Tom Nain, uneven development : nationalism as (one of the) major mover of history. It is an instrumentalisation of primordial identities used as a “catch-up strategy” for peripheries (dominated and exploited by the central capitalistic system). —> explains the formation of some post-colonial states but is deficient in explaining the formation of nationalistic movements in European nations with a small backward (and did not succeed to gain independence at the time.) —> even if we consider that backwardness is relative to aspirations (aspire to who’s better) it doesn’t fit the historical sequence and its complexity. 2. John Breuilly: nationalism = political movement seeking/exercising state power and justifying such action with a nationalist argument. —> power in the modern world is about control of the state. —> action-oriented political movement seeking control of a territory. Sometimes backward looking tools (Nairn would say a modern Janus, a face forward and one behind) —> elites tell stories about the past or invent tradition to generate emotive engagement. Nationalism as a new secularised religion, a model of the Gllnerian school of thought BUT with the inclusion of people as participants rather than mere subjects. 3. Benedict Anderson’s imagined community: a political community whose members, even if they’ll never know all their fellow members and despite the differences among them, see them as comrades, free and as a new form of identity different from the religious community (declining from the 16th century). —> doesn’t take into account the political consequences. ethnic attachment must not be forgotten, especially because it tends to come up when modernisation is resented. 2 more approaches: 1. Ideational (or doctrinal): modernist umbrella - Kedourie: nationalism in a doctrine invented in Europe and exported to native intelligentsia that later spread it among the population at large. —> accepted by the colonial intelligentsia because they felt resentment for their condition. - Hroch: phase model - Phase A: inquisition into attributes of a non-dominant group and whether it could develop into a nation - Phase B: emergence of activists - Phase C: a mass movement to set a special store by their national identity. 2. Historical by John Hutchinson - Long established cultural repertoires are carried into the modern era by power institutions. - Acceptance of the conflictual nature of nations but does NOT accept the idea that nationalist have the freedom to select whichever story they want to manufacture consent. 2. Gellner - Nations and Nationalism Nationalism was the result of the non-peaceful development of a particular agrarian society and of the following, still non-peaceful, process of global colonisation in terms of industrialisation. There’s a congruency b/t the Reformation (Protestant) spirit and the nationalism —> literacy and scripturalism. Industrialisation brought the economic and political penetration of communities (agrarian ones) that were before inward-turned and that now had to face a global centralised organisation of society with non-clear and ever-changing costumes and rules. There’s also a correlation b/t industrialisation and the colonialist phenomena —> the European conquest of the world was untypical since it was perpetrated by nations whose main focus was industry and not the military force. It is essentially the economy the reason why colonies were gradually abandoned b/t 1905 and 1960. For each cultural demarcation there’s a potential nationalism that may develop or may not. But a group, even if alienated, may choose not to act and live in peace (in its alienation of course) when it’s tolerated and not excessively oppressed (e.g. Ottoman Empire, felt after the attempt of Turkishisation). The cultural pool for the alienated must be suitable to welcome them but to define how it’s nearly impossible: each cultural scenario will generate its form of nationalism. It’s undeniable that a big amount of communities accept passively the cancellation of their culture during industrialisation but that doesn’t mean that nationalism isn’t important. Rather than a sort of a process of awakening a dormant nation, a new form of social organisation based on homogenisation, it has no room for all the pre-existent cultures and so has to cut some of them off. If nationalism is considered in the mythical form of the accomplishment of the destiny of a certain group or dormant nation (e.g. Hegel) , it appears weak since we have several potential nations never created. On the other hand, if considered in Gellener’s terms as the crystallization of a new social order after industrialisation, it appears nearly inevitable. In principle it wouldn’t be impossible to have one single nation but the different times of arrival of industrialisation led to the pluralism we have today. What is a nation? typically two paths to define a nation: (1) will (2) culture (1) will: apart from the fact that together with will, tolerance, loyalty a nation may be (and generally is) kept united also through fear, coercition and impostition, there are also many other communities whose members are united by will but that are not nations. (2) Culture: As said for nationalism, culture is used to create a nation but it’s not needed a culturally uniform society to build a nation. There are examples of culturally dishomogeneous societies that worked well. The viable way is to recognise that: nations can be defined only in terms of age of nationalism and not vice versa. That will include both the cultural (high cultures crystallisation) and will paths together with the convergence in the political units. Durkheim stated that in religious worship society adores its camouflaged image. In modern society of nationalism, high cultures adore themself spurning camouflage. The self-deception of nationalism still exists but the prism through which it filters its own self-adoration is no longer religion but the facade defense of folklore and Volk’s tradition that it believes to be defending. 3. Bugge - The history of the dichotomy Hans Kohn’s dichotomy of good nationalism in the West and bad nationalism in the East. Translated in 20 dichotomies, among them: civic vs ethnic which is still inherently linked to the West/East opposition. Roshwald highlights how the distinction b/t civic and ethnic can work only if they are considered as ending points of a spectrum. 3 types of critiques (by Tinsley): 1. Critique of the West 2. co-presence of civic and ethnic in every society 3. Static determinism of Kohn’s model. - Spencer and Wollaston: the denunciation of Eastern nationalism by Westerns is biased by the idea of superiority of the West. —> maintains the dichotomy though. - Kuzio: (1) all states stem from ethno-cultural cores (2) civic,ethnic and organic,voluntary elements are all included. (3) Western became civic in the 60s, East only in the 90s —> maintains the dichotomy. - Brubaker (late): ethnic and civic have a blurred definition, that makes them unsuitable even for the role of ending points of a spectrum. - Jaskulowski : Western-centric bias that tends to address Western nationalism with situational causes while Eastern with dispositional. - Tinsley: the dichotomy derives from colonialism and it’s even more dramatic with the Southern world. East could reach “civic status” by emulating the West, the South is considered just inferior. The making of Eastern Europe: (1) Before WWI the term Eastern Europe was used in reference to Russia. It was from 1918 that it became attached to the region we call today. Dzenovska: (2)The state-building process, directed by French and British geopolitical concerns, assigned people to territories, defined who was a “state person” and who was a “national minority” giving already a reason to fight for maintaining sovregnity. (3)The elites were to emphasise the image of perennial ethno-cultural craving for independence in order to create a shared myth for the nation. Moreover, the ethno-nationalistic tendency that was the result of WWI and post-war struggles was taken as inherently part of Eastern society (dispositional) by the Westerns rather than situational. Sulga: Britain (and France) before WWI identified as predetermined in a sort of an ethnic base the civic orientation of the states. In WWI the distinction b/t West and East was emphasised and Eastern were openly described as “deficient in power of self government” by Smuts. Smuts himself called for the application of the Mandates System in East Europe that was refused but shows the perception of that part of Europe. —> as Sharp underlined, Wilson’s attitude was the same attitude Smuts showed. He filtered the concept of self-determination through his Western-liberal (South American) point of view without considering the differences in Eastern Europe. —> but interwar USA and West had a double standard: 1. Civic nationalism in Eastern Europe. 2. Ethnic distinction within the country (immigration or even segregation in the US, not recognition of Minorities). Hans Kohn’s world of nationalism: Kohn distinguished b/t : the Western World and out of the Western World (dividing in Centre Eu - East Eu - Asia) - Germany as the first non-western: cult of the mistia Volk, nationalism and irrationality, “from Herder to Hitler”. - Italy non-West but less drastic, “down the road from a rational cosmopolitanism to a liberal rationalism.” - Hadn’t predicted the western-civic tendencies of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. - Czechs as the eastern outputs of the liberal West. The West-Out relationship was one of dissemination and reaction. (E.g. fascism had French origins but developed in Italy, Germany, India...). Cold War divisions at work: John Plamenatz and Ernest Gellner - nationalism as a cultural phenomenon: divided in Western and Eastern (also including Africa and Asia). Differently from Kohn, the East began with the Slavs. - The West as a homogenous entity marked by modernity, liberalism and progress. - Germany and Italy are part of the West because their illiberal processes were the tool to put political roofs to highly cultured people. - the Slavs reacted with nationalism to the contact with a civilisation (the western) alien to them. —> racial perspective. - also Gellner stresses the cultural and ethnic uneasiness of the Slavs, not making it relevant in any form to the Western side of Europe. Post-cold war panic: the barbarians at the gate. continuum of the idea of difference b/t West and East, especially with Longworth’s idea of a “stable popular psychology of virulent nationalism” in the East and Bideleux and Jeffries’ History of Eastern Europe. On the other and, the Poland historian Norman Davies tried to suggest the needing of a new picture of Europe’s history. 4. Conversi - Sovereignty 1. Sovereignty Historical Trajectory: Medieval/early modern model: fragmented sovereignty, the Sovereign (person/group) within whom ultimate political authority resided and whose jurisdiction extended to a specific territory. —> none of the connotations of possessiveness and exclusiveness coined by the modern term of sovereignty. After the “cuius regio,eius religio” principle and the consequent wars of religion and cultural homogenisation processes, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognised the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of all signatories. —> sovereignty in the hands of the ruler. Bodin and Hobbs: in the age of absolute monarchy the ruler had exclusive sovereignty of jurisdiction and didn’t need consent or to act following the laws. After the French Revolution the absolutist model crumbled. New principle of “cuius regio, eius natio”, thanks to nationalism who kept intact the state form. The new revolutionary centralism relied on the sovereignty of the state and its institution that had to (formally) represent the people. People sovereignty required an hardly existing homegnity that led to violent and discriminatory acts of minority persecution. Neo-liberal globalisation started the phenomenon of de-sovereignisation (Sassen). Sovereignty has become globally cruciform: horizontal sovereignty to project its power across the Global South through hierarchical networks of vertical sovereignty. New forms of graduated sovereignty. 2. Liquid Sovereignty and Globalisation Refers to Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity and underlines a congruent shift from solid to liquid sovereignty too. Liquid modernity is a fluid liaison with a territory and no longer a perpetual bond, this new form of sovereignty clashes with Schimtt’s idea of indispensability of sovereign authority for the smooth functions of the legal order (to which Bauman refers). Bauman’s definition of sovereignty: “ the power to define the limits of humanity, the lives of those humans who have fallen or have been thrown outside those limits are unworthy of being lived.” The globalised world sovereigns are akin to the feudal lords on a global scale. They are outside of the democratic consultation but are able to influence decisions both at an individual and collective level. They are the tycoons of global economic powers. 3. Climate change and Sovereignty’s Finale: liquid vs residual. Liquefaction of melting states which cannot be stopped by neoliberalism that appears as unable to embrace significant changes in its way of thinking and acting. Territoriality is an enormous hindrance to global actions against climate change since the claims of residual sovereignty enable governments not to stop the harmful exploitation for fossil fuel and similar. Ulrich Beck’s ideal solution would be “cosmopolitan communities of climate risk” that could overcome the concept of territoriality focusing on the risk related to climate catastrophes. —> idea of climate transition. 4. Food as Central Sovereignty Subject food is culture and it’s been under attack by the forces of globalisation by forcing standardised models of consumption and production. It is related also to production and so to sovereignty over land. Food sovereignty movement 1996 by La Via Campesina, largely originated in response to the global agrarian redistribution. - Whose sovereignty ? Can be both Trans-national or local, but it tends to be more pursuit where there’s a bond with an ethno-cultural group (e.g. Bildu in the BAsque countries). It has also been included in the battle for sovereignty by aspirant national communities. - Food sovereignty, the Nation and the State. It has been institutionalised as a recognition of pluralism and plurinationalism in nations with socio-political claims by Indigenous Populations such as Bolivia or Ecuador. Food sovereignty is the one sovereignty which can move beyond the concept of liquid modernity being on one and adaptable and on the other based on solid realities such as food and soil. ECS: Migrations 1a. Scholten - Introduction to Migration Studies King: migration studies encompassing “all types of international, and internal migration, migrants and migration-related diversity”. Cohen’s 9 conceptual dyads in the field: 1. Individual vs contextual reasons to migrate 2. Rate vs incidence 3. Internal vs international migration 4. Temporary vs permanent mig 5. Settler vs labour migration 6. Planned vs flight migration 7. Economic migrants vs political refugees 8. Illegal vs legal migration 9. Push vs pull factors Meta-topics: 1. Why? 2. How? 3. What forms of migration can be distinguished ? 4. What are the consequences ? 5. How to govern? 6. What methods are used in migration studies? Genesis of the subject in Ravenstein’s 11 Laws of Migration (1880s) + 1927 Znaniecki and Thomas’ work on Polish migration to America and Europe. —> Greenwood and Hunt say that migration research took off in the 30s due to urbanisation and the Great Depression. —> it began to formalise and expand in the 50s-60s having as a turning point the debate on assimilation, started by Gordon (7 aspects:cultural,structural,martial,identifications,behavioural,attitudinal,and civic). 2 shifts: —> international migration studies —> study of ethnic and race relations In the 70s still epistemic communities, scarce interdisciplinary. In the 80s, still few interdisciplinarity but much more multidisciplinarity. —> “veritable boom” of contributions to migration research from several disciplines (+ internationalisation). 1990s —> qualitative turn in research, more focused on migrants’ experience then only on quantitative data. 2000s —> accelerated expansion of the field. Due to theoretical evolutions such as the overcoming of methodological nationalism (taking the nation state as a given if it were a natural entity, by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller) passing to, on one hand transnationalism and post nationalism, on the other to the local level. + deeper analysis of the migration forms. Growing self-reflection and self-criticism: - on conceptualisation of ethnicity —> importance of the intersectionality b/t ethnicity and class,citizenship... - On the relationship to policymaking. - On how to deal with discrimination and racism. Nowadays —> from multidisciplinary to interdisciplinary, categorised not only by disciplines but also by topics. —> move away from who/what to how/why. uneven Internationalisation —> migration studies has internationalised the higher share of collaborations is among European-based scholars and then North Americans. —> can be both for the critiques of national paradigms in migration studies and thx to the facilitation by broader science policies. 1b. Ludtke - Migration Governance in Europe. The biggest gain in power from the European Union came amid the oil hocks of the 70s and the turbulent end of the Cold War. The dramatic migration flow of the 1990s helped to launch the Eu’s first cooperation on migration. —> Eu management: from the weak intergovernmental structure of the Treaty of Maastricht to the supranational system of the treaty of Lisbon (2009) —> passage from intergovernmentalism to transnationalism. - End of the Cold War and first refugee crisis (86-96) Since the 70s crisis, worried politicians denying the reality of permanent settlement, politics of xenophobic exclusionism (zero-immigrants...). Governments were unable to formulate coherent strategies. —> by 2009 EU provided a response: common humanitarian obligation for all labour importing countries —> both limiting permanent settlement and new entries. 2 humanitarian forces: 1. Adherence to international laws on family reunification 2. adherence to the right of political asylum. 1980s liberalising move on the economic side —> Single European Act (86) removed mobile EU workers from the limits of national immigration regimes, placing them as elements of the single market. The 1990s crisis generated a paradox: new security threats made cooperation more difficult, and yet more necessary. “A partial loss of legal sovereignty is the price that must be paid for maintaining a measure of state autonomy in the face of mounting migration”. 1st European intergovernmental organisation devoted specifically to immigration = Ad hoc Immigration Group (AHIG) of 1986 —> never fully implemented under the EU competence. 1st important step) 1990 Dublin Conference —> eliminating the asylum abuse making the first signatory (safe) country of arrival/transit responsible for the examination of the request. Tension b/t the supranationalist push for a full competence of the European Commission over migration and the intergovernmental opposition —> Luxembourg compromise proposed 2 separate pillar for intergovernmental cooperation: the 2nd for foreign and security policy and the 3rd for justice and home affairs,including immigration (not the EU-mobile worker who were under the single market pillar). —> completed the job with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. - Securitised harmonisation, opt-outs first steps to supranationalism. (1997-2003) pillar system failures: (1) Failed to ratify the External Frontiers Convention (Gibraltar dispute) (2) Humanitarian-minded state blocking the Dublin Convention. (3) Refusal of the common visa list (UK opposition) Amsterdam summit 1997 EP proposal: 1. Call for majority voting in the Council 2. full parliamentary review for the EP 3. juridical review for the ECJ But the full competence of the EU on immigration was delayed until the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. IGC Amsterdam results: 1. The right of sole initiative for the Commission to propose laws. 2. Majority voting in the council for certain aspects. 3. parliamentary oversight for the EP 4. ECJ jurisdiction over immigration cases. + Schengen Area (free movement) implementation in the European structure (with opt-outs for UK, Ireland and Denmark). - Moving towards full supranationalism with crisis on the horizon (04-10) 1. Failed draft of a supranationalist constitution (Convention on the Future of Europe). 2. 2004 Hague Programme —> prevented the ECJ from having full jurisdiction over immigration + excluded legal immigration from the supranational control. 3. 2009 Lisbon Treaty: fully supranationalisation of immigration policy (with the exception of the Uk opt-outs). - the Arab springs in the aftermath: an ultimate test? Record in asylum requests and illegal migration fluxes. 1. Temporal inter-border controls in countries such as GER,AUS,DEN,SWE. 2. 2017 infringement procedures vs Poland,Hungary and CZE. 3. 2016 deal with Turkey 4. Italy pressures. 2a. Dumbrava - The Governance of Citizenship and Belonging We are facing a gradual liberalisation and denationalisation of citizenship. The elimination from citizenship laws of explicit discriminations on grounds of gender, ethnic or national origin, the expansion of access to citizenship for immigrants and a change of focus from obligations to rights. Citizenship laws have become a multi-purpose device. - Immigrant integration Ius soli citizenship: plays an important integrative function, applied mainly in Western Europe and conditionally (e.g. renouncing to double-citizenship, parents born in the country...). only Moldova doesn’t apply any condition. A process of hardening and renationalisation of naturalisation policies is taking place, especially for the subjective conditions. The proof of certain knowledge, appropriate behavior or of certain dispositions and commitments express a reversal of the paradigm of citizenship: It is no more a prerequisite to integrate, but it is now the crowning of a process of integration. Another trend is the growing acceptance of double-citizenship (x3 states that accept it b/t 1960 and 2013) —> it is a consequence of the application of the principle of gender equality in citizenship matters (get both parents’ citizenship) and of a rethinking of military duty. The trend is way more evident in Western Europe. Probably the growing number of refugees will force Central/Western Europe to adapt their citizenship policies, even if in Greece an attempt of instituting the ius soli was blocked. - National redefinition The hypothesis of a new era of “postcolonial membership” is being contradicted by the recent attempts of renationalisation of citizenship. —> new strategies to reconnect the state with emigrants (e.g granting citizenship to people with descendants from the country). —> ethnically focused: direct exclusion for ethnical reasons is prohibited but indirect measures are used. + favouring the co-ethnicity (even out of the national borders) in the acquisition of citizenship. - Citizenship deprivation and terrorism In several countries a person can be deprived of its citizenship for one or more of these reasons: Acquisition of another citizenship residence abroad taking service in a foreign army disloyalty/treason (21 Eu countries) In some of them deprivation only applies to naturalised citizenship. Terrorist involvement is mentioned in Montenegro, France and the Netherlands as a reason to be deprived of citizenship. After the 00s-10s terrorist attack this power was extended. Someone stresses the deprivation as a reaffirmation of the condition upon which citizenship itself is based. Others underline how this principle weakens citizenship making it contingent on people’s performance. It is important to avoid statelessness. - Citizenship for sale Market oriented membership. Lot of European countries have a special channel for citizenship acquisition for people who give a unique contribution to the country. Only Bulgaria,Cyprus, Malta and Romania concede the so-called “investor citizenship”: The debate is on the needing (or not) of what is identified as a genuine link b/t the country and the citizen to obtain membership. The detractors of the investor citizenship say that it favors riches, undermines equality and corrupts democracy. Who supports the idea, on the other hand, says that it brings well-being for everybody and that is just part of a larger trend. - EU citizenship EU citizenship depends on holding the citizenship of an EU member state, but the EU has limited influence over how member states regulate national citizenship. ECJ Cases Expanding EU Citizenship: Micheletti: EU member states cannot impose extra conditions on the recognition of another member state's citizenship. Chen: EU citizenship rights can apply independently of national citizenship, e.g., for family members of EU citizens. Rottman: Loss of EU citizenship due to the withdrawal of national citizenship is within EU law, and national actions must be proportional. Sincere Cooperation: EU principle requiring member states to cooperate and avoid actions that harm Union objectives, relevant to citizenship policies like Malta's. 2b. Bertossi and Duyvendak - Beyond National Models Integration as an important public issue in the 80s. —> debate on access to citizenship, socio-economic impact and institutional/cross-national response. National models to describe different approaches —> strong correlation b/t institutional and ideological logics of these countries' political traditions and policies of migrants’ integration. - French republicanism - Dutch and British multiculturalism - German ethno-national conception In the mid-90s transnational trends questioned these models but at the end of the century and in early 2000s neo-nationalistic trends took the scenes. —> retreat of multiculturalism (UK and Netherlands). - The limits of models Comparative research —> 2 approaches 1. Pluralist = internal cultural and normative heterogeneity of models as cultural constructs. 2. Monist = citizenship and migration policies as a moduled by one one national principle described as coherent, stable and sufficient to account differences b/t states. Examples: - laïcité in France —> assimilationist country, the Republic marks the French political open definition of citizenship. - race in the UK and the Netherlands (more precisely, pillarisation) —> multicultural norms enabling people to mobilise on the basis of ethnic identities. The monist perspective only offers a quasi-historical view because it supposes a priori continuity. —> leads to miscomprehension of social and institutional realities (e.g. The French army organises pelerinage for its Muslim soldiers, how to explain with the concept of laïcitè. Or is the Netherlands' pillarization multicultural or just divisive?). —> another issue with models: definition by scholars is very close to the discourse of a variety of stakeholders in the political and media spheres. - The entanglement of policies and scholarship Conceptualisation of national models as an unintended consequence of the dynamic b/t particular developments in the academic field and the concern of policy makers. —> prevalence of the national-model in policy debates is part of political nationalisms. —> also researches had taken for granted the existence of nation-states, national identities and national people. Rogers Brubakers’ distinction b/t the French republican citizenship system and the German ethno-national one. + Contested Citizenship by Koopmans —> empirical validation of philosophical systems. Not only contention between philosophies but also over philosophies. National-state models assume that a nation by coherent politico-cultural ideas that path-dependently determine policies. —> but political culture is hardly as consensual as assumed. What people have in common is a set of ambivalent problems. In the new pessimistic period about immigration policies, national-state models are being evaluated by their performance on the task of national preservation. - The implicit in politics of modelling 1. The idea that policies are exclusively bound to the nation, overlooking subnational policies. —> Fravell “self-justificatory discourse” + researchers sharing this “methodological nationalism” not question the concept of nation itself. 2. The assumption that agency and collective interests are marginal dimensions of institutional arrangements and of the public debate. —> not clear when it comes to explaining how causality works. 3. Oversimplification of policies and overstressing the alleged coherency and consistency of these policies. Policies are way more resilient then represented and also there are differences on how they are applied at a local level. 3. Crawley and Skleparis - Refugees or Migrants Especially from the 2015 migration boom, strong presence in the public debate of the distinction b/t REAL refugees and economic migrants. —> the distribution is highly politicised and there’s a mismatch b/t the normative framework and the actual contemporary phenomena of migration. Avoid “categorical fetishism”. The public, political and academic fields modulate each other. - the problem of categories Categories often based on place, causes, time or duration —> this is oversimplifying the contemporary scenario. New categories have been (academically) created such as “distress migrants” or transit migration to fill the gap b/t migrant and refugee but have been quite ineffective. These categories, even if presented as natural, serve political purposes. The term “refugee” is regulated by the Refugee Convention but how it is applied reshapes the concept constantly. —> nationality-based categories: EU safe countries of origin. - Political and economic forced migration underdevelopment, conflict and, by extension, economic and forced migration are closely linked. —> gives people more motivation to migrate. As the interviews in Greece showed, it wasn’t need for the migrant to be directly involved in an act of violence, it was the intolerability of constant fear most of the time to force them to move. + Economic reasons caused by the war. Crucial (threatening) role of the IS. - Moving b/t categories over space and time One big problem is the idea that migrants move to one point to another so what happens in between is inconsequential. Actually most of the intervieweds (2⁄3) had left Afghanistan years before arriving in Greece, a lot of them trying to settle in Iran. The subrotidnated and discriminated status led them to move to Europe. Similar situation for the Syrians in Turkey, despite the EU-Turkey agreement that allows them into the job-permits system very often they are forced to migrate further due to poor conditions. 4. Caviedes - European Integration and the Governance of Migration. TCN = third-county national - The historical progression of European Governance Lavenex has labelled the mode of governance in Justice and Home Affairs matters, including migration, as transgovernnentalism = combination of elements of traditional communitarisation (EU as leading) + more intergovernmental practices resting upon loosing cooperation. Kooiman’s typology of 3 orders of governance: 1. First: managing matters on a day-by-day basis 2. Second: foresees a greater delegation to establish/maintain the institutional settings —> transfer governance or at least setting up procedures and regulations. 3. Third: meta-governance, anticipates the governance requires putting in place a normative framework. Tömmel’s examination of EU governance: 1. Intervention of the supranational institution performing states functions. 2. 1960s : attempt to harmonies politics, had to face te resistance of member states —> just a legal framework setting goals, imo,ementation up to the states. 3. mid-80s : mutual recognition of the neighbours standards. 4. 1990s: more sophisticated institutional structures of the EU, direct intervention in member states. —> unlikely to have the migration governance of the EU following this timeline. The issue has developed in the fourth phase but it’s an highly politicised topic, making it hard to establish a second-order EU governance. - freedom of movement The Coal and Steel Treaty, 1951 + Treaty of Rome,1957: freedom of movement for workers 1968 : removal of discriminations b/t EC workers Single Eu Act, 1986 → 1990 directives: rights for students, persons with sufficient means, employees and self-employed who had ceased their activity. 2004: no more just for economic activity, just preventing welfare tourism. - immigration and asylum TCNs migration wasn’t addressed in the fundamental treaties of the 1950s. 1985 Schengen Act: free movement within the patterns (at that time BEL,FRA,NED, BDR) included in the dynamics also TNCs. After the Treaty of European Union: 3 phases of governance 94-99: placed in the 3rd pillar, intergovernmental phase. (after the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997) 99-05: immigration in the 1st pillar (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) not effective (first 5 years,the commission was to share the right of initiative with the members) more effective was the implementation of the Schengen Act in Title IV of EC Treaty. since 2005: Treaty of Lisbon 2009 (removal of pillar structure, all the immigration affairs under co-decision), ECJ can hear cases from all national courts. Since 2014 the Commission assumed oversight capacity. + Agencies such as Fortex (2004) and the European Asylum Support Office (2010). - Varying governance transfer by migration issue area 1. Labour immigration Blue card (2009) : TCNs highly skilled workers could move to another member state after 18 months, with a long-term perspective for permanent residence. → issue: countries could declare their market unprepared or don’t even adopt the blue card system. → further application: idea to apply it for unskilled workers only partially applied with the Seasonal Workers Directive (2014). 2011 → Assimilation of employment and residence permit in one authorisation. 2. Long Term Residents LTRs directive (2003): freedom of movement and equal treatment to TCNs and their family members who have lived in another EU country for at least 5 years. → issue: countries could require TCNs to fulfill integration requirements (e.g. language, culture tests...). 20 infrangements have been registered, the Court started to intervene in a more supranational tendency. 3. Family reunion Directive on the Right to Family Reunion (2003): permitted to many states to become more restrictive in terms of age limits for children and maximum processing time. It was essentially an intergovernmental directive, also the ECJ sanctioned that it simply determines how the right of family reunion may be exercised, but it doesn’t CREATE the right. → the Commission was cautious, the implementation process long and only the Court seemed assertive in applying the directive. 4. Asylum 1990 Dublin Conference: first-safe country principle. 2003: minimum standards for asylum seekers. 2004: minimum standards for the qualification as refugee and asylum procedures. 2013: empowerment of the EP, right to interview, greater protection for unaccompanied minors, limit detention → others say it abandoned the expansion of the right towards which the Commission had been moving. → generally loosened the restrictions, but countries such as GER,ITA,POL are trying to expand the “third safe countries list” to reject more asylum seekers. 5. Irregular Migration Returns Directive (2008): co-decision procedure, establishing minimum deporation standards, temporary custody and processing times limit. The EP tried to limit the members discretion → it actually had a little impact, it even allowed countries such as Italy to become more restrictive (max detention from 2 to 18 months). → cooperation with third countries and agencies such as FRONTEX to secure borders. ECS: Heritage 1. Delanty - Inventing Europe Every age reinvented the idea of Europe so it is not a self-evident entity. Defines Europe as “central and organising metaphor of a complex civilisation” expresses “our cultures’s struggle with contradictions and conflicts”. Not only inclusion and unity but also exclusion and differences. Core ambivalence: 1. exclusivist and normative polity 2. participation and solidarity ?) Can a collective identity not based on ethno-culturalism be shaped? → only if it is based on a new concept of citizenship. x) Refuse of the idea of: “old roots” (T.S. Eliott) at the basis of the European identity or such a thing as a “European Spirit” (Jasper). European Idea: product more of a conflict than consensus. → more connected to: state tradition and elite cultures (rather than politics of civil society) → BUT to become a normative principle Europe MUST have a social dimension (and be disengaged from the state tradition). x) not in the sense of “spiritual or moral dimension” (Havel) or Platonic Idea. Neither as the result of the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. (Gorbachev) Europe is more a product of history than its subject = “historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms and dynamics”. Europe is a structuring force (used with strategic goals in mind and to design a reality that can be used) → not reducible to an idea, what’s real is the discourse within which the reality is constituted. !) “Europe is a historical projection, a universalising idea under the perpetual threat of fragmentation from forces within European society”. = the embankments (idea of Europe) of a river (european society) aimed to deviate it in a certain direction. The river's intrinsic tendency will be to put pressure on the embankments, if they’re strong enough they will resist, otherwise the canalization will fail. at 1st Europe as a cultural idea → self-conscious political identity BUT failed to become a cohesive collective identity. idea Europe: regulative idea for identity-building processes (cultural model of society, collective identities.) → references to: 1. Anderson’s imaginary community (=nation) → higher level of abstraction (also Castoriadis) 2. Durkheim → “collective or social representation encompassing within it an heterogeneity of cultural forms”. when a cultural idea becomes part of the political-identity building process = ideology. (definition of reality attached to an interest in power) → if dominant (substitute individual choice) = pathological. identities as the vehicle for the reproduction of dominant ideologies. Can be shaped through the “Self-Other dichotomy”. → can be come solidarity (recognition of the other) or exclusion (negation). → pivotal in European identity creation. collective vs personal identity: Europe as collective → 16th century part of the personal → late 19th cent. idea of Europe derived from “above” → intellectuals and elites. → hegemonic idea to produce consensus. (Gramsci’s concept of hegemony). → substitute for the complexity of modern society (Luhmann). Furthermore, Europe is a geo-political reality. → colonialism and conquest unified Europe (not peace and solidarity). Proved to be a divisive phenomenon (attempts to unite the continent always after a conflict). The eastern frontier as the tumultuous and to-be-defended side of Europe. gap b/t the idea of Europe and the idea of national community. (also because of the obscurantist expectation of a homeland with its correlated invention of history and moralisation of geography). → in the case of Europe: mystique of civilization and myths of high culture. !) Europe (may be) fulfilling the role that Gallner pointed out for nationalism: culturally uniform mode of communication during industrialising (or industrialised) eras. → adapting D’Azeglio → “We have made Europe, now we have to make the Europeans”. Europe has reinforced the ideology of nationality. - what the idea of Europe is today: hegemonic imposition of a mega-community resulting in a socio-technical framework for the pursuit of unrestrained economic growth. (linked to the neo-liberal program) - what the idea of Europe should be: an orientation for a post-national identity to be the basis for a new cultural pluralism. (sociological) Structures : state (1) - economy (2) - culture (3) - society (x) (1) political unity, militarism and Europe as a security agenda. (2) also linked to (1), focused on economic interests. (3) scientific-technological culture, high (bourgeoisie) culture... (x) focus on civil society and/or the public sphere → to be pursued rather than the macro-institution-building process only including the first 3. ?) Where should the space for identity building be found? not in the administrative-institutional apparatus → recently considering collectively mediated goals and citizens identity based only on their interests rather than on a vision of unity. Idea of Europe as a cultural value ≠ normative postulate (universal validity) ?) Are universal ethical principles embodied in European culture? Europe as legitimation for secular and territorial policies. Tension b/t Europe as geopolitical name and as a cultural framework → two aspects never united due to the constant threatening from outside (8th century Muslim expansion, 1945 Red Army invasion) → attribution to its own structure a universal value → exported in the New World after 1492. [Europe, unable to build a geopolitical environment that truly reflects the set of cultural values collectively known as 'European Values'—probably due to the vast gap between the idea of Europe and the civil society—decided to make these values the goal to be pursued and the universal realization to aspire to. In other words, seeing no perfection in the 'European Earth,' it was assumed that an ideal 'European Hyperuranium' existed, where the perfect correspondence between culture and political organization was eternally stored, and that the European Earth was nothing but its mimesis.] Universalist position ≠ Eurocentrism (Habermas) → the formal properties that every country must have to be separated from the concept of Europe. Idea of Europe never fully secularised → idea if the universal survived as a cultural absolute. Universality → (can be) a notion of otherness that includes the Other. → model of citizenship based on participation and solidarity. “Europe as an idea, identity as a reality”. 2. McDonald - Making Histories How the past is configured and riconfigured in the present. → inventing and shaping tradition to produce Europe as a particular possibility. 1. Invention of Tradition (term used by Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) not only the past shapes the present, the present could shape the past. → politicised narrative of the past serving the interests of some social group. (i.e. Nazi → manipulation of the German Volkskunde). Critiques to the inventing traditions theory: - posits a misleading dichotomy b/t “real” and “invented” tradition, ignoring that all traditions had a starting point and so are subject to re-making and adaptation. - too instrumentalist: tradition is just the result of elites’ social engineering acts and there’s no space for who actually lives the traditions. → today “softer” terms: we talk about “making” (not inventing) and “memories”. Inventing traditions seems to be effective where the process is active and instrumental. 2. Anthropology, tradition and change. Anthropologist work before the 1980s: tradition stable or at least adaptive to changes. - Bausinger’s Folklore in a World of Technology (1961) → technology as the subject-matter of new lore + importance of “second-hand traditions” (used and altered by people who did not create them). - Shanklin → tradition changing “to fit present circumstances” + started to consider tradition as a discursive construct. what kind of past persists and what aspects of the present are inscribed in a more enduring temporality. tradition for selling places and marketing the past. Examples: French wines: Ulin → elite driven legislatively produced “uniqueness” of Bordeaux wine. Demoissier → the invention of the terroir concept for Burgundy. Communist East Europe: Kaneff, in Talpa (BUL) → the villagers distinguished: history = embodiment of political-economy - tradition = (pot. oppositional) way to conceptualize the human order - folklore = state sponsored notion of national identity. → it was an effective exception → in Talpa no significant resistance. → new pasts are not less meaningful, tradition is the bedrock that pre-existed socialism. 3. Anthropology, tradition and Europe. The orientation of research by experts led to a particular epistemological space for Europe → two temporalities: rapid forward momentum and ongoing change (modern,central urban Europe) vs static tradition (rural and peripheric) inevitably to be invaded by the former. In the 80s experts looked for a more effective way to tackle the subject, being now aware of its effects. - Historical Situating: supposed marginal areas are part of a wider historical process (situated in history). → look beyond the immediate romantic description to find the actual roots. (if) there’s a common ground, analyze how it is differently mobilised. (i.e. the structural nostalgia by Herzfeld, originally in ancient Greece but, being a strategic “spiritual basis” expectable to be also in Europe). 4. Making European history EU invented Traditions: Cris Shore → EU institution initiatives to “affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity”. → creating symbols such as the 12 stars on the flag (impregnated with classical and Christian meaning, harmony even more than symbolizing the member states). On the new currency abstract but “European style” monuments and buildings, something close to a “metaphysical” idea of Europeanness. Writing European Histories: Historian Stefan Berger states: “History is what divides the Europeans, not what unites them” → not shared by all historians → Institutional initiatives to show European historical shared grounds: films, European Cities of Culture, European Pavilions at World Fairs... The Museum of Europe (Pierre Nora), first exhibition “C’est notre histoire/It’s our history” Critiques (by de Jong) → the exhibition starts from 1945, WWII is remembered only as a common catastrophe rather than a conflict within Europe. Moreover the dilemma of the oppositional Other: 27 stories told by economically and socially differentiated Eruopeans excluding “racial diversity” and possible references to histories beyond the European Union. 5. European Historical Consciousness (launched by Kober Foundation) - What is it? Historical Consciousness by (Jeismann and) Rusen → a faculty allowing to escape the sense of contingency and give meaning to the passage of time. so EUROPEAN historical Consciousness: an historical narration avoiding nationalistic dimension but (1) how to write a common history ? (2) will this give Europeans a consciousness of being Europeans? - National differences and cultural models → the Russian Boystov pointed out the risk of elevating Europness over the nationalistic spirit: creating a distinction b/t modern Europe (who accepted this principle) and non-modern. GER → refusal of nationalism, past as an obstacle, individualistic-psychological feeling of guilt and shame → needing to cope with the past. ex-Soviet States → nationalism as a mean of freedom. ?) Would a more developed European history make us think about the Nazi past and the Holocaust less within a frame of German culpability ? → still the Germans, even trying to de-attach Nazism and the Holocaust from a merely national dimension, wanted it to maintain it at the core of the European Historical Consciousness. the generationalism (specifically of GER but ubiquitous in EU) → divide history and people in age-bands. 6. Other Histories → in some cases a challenge to official accounts, in other alternative ways of conceptualising history. Particularly investigated in Greece, the cradle of European identity but marginal in modern dynamics (moreover also exposed to a troublesome historical development, says Herzfeld). - Nationalist narratives and hidden histories → Karkasidou: artificially created distinction b/t local Greeks and refugees, result of a cut-out from the mainstream and (even) educational narration of history of the large number of Slavic present in Greece since the Kingdom of Macedon. → seen as unpatriotic and hard to conduct such a research due to biased education received. → Collard: Villagers would talk about the Ottoman Empire era as if they had lived it, ignoring the 1940s period of German occupation → infringement of usual temporality. 7. Other Historical Consciousness Michael Herzfeld (analysis in Rethemnos) : social time = everyday experience, where events are influenceable. monumental time = reductive and generic, collective predictability, stereotypes and categories. History is conceptualized in different ways based on the historical time followed and the mean through which it is embodied. David Sutton: Kalymnos, Greece 1. familiar historicization: histories are quarrels, disputes, acts of shame that alter the normal pattern of life in predictable ways. → use history (of a family) to interpret and predict behaviours. → have an emotional charge attached to history. 2. The Europeans (invoked as the other) are accused of forgetting history and re-fall in their mistakes. Vieda Skultans: post-Soviet Latvia 1. national literature paradigms enlisted to make sense of the past → individual suffering derive meaning from national history. 2. memory and oral accounts crucial → to escape the violation of authenticity perpetrated by the Soviets. 3. older narrators = legendary narration younger = unconnected happenings. → due to the education in different times: the former in independent era (public narration = private) the latter in Soviet era (public ≠ private) John Borneman: The Two Berlin 1. through family policies: gap b/t state and individual narration: DDR > BRD BRD : appeal to tradition as an antidote to historical victimization. → visions that accepted their own state and foresaw only small changes. DDR : narration ≠ experience → the goal was a complete elimination of the past, towards a future communist destiny. 3. Smith - Uses of Heritage Heritage as a “process of engagement, an act of communication and an act of making meaning in and for the present.” The real moment of Heritage is not in the objects, but in the act of passing on and receiving memories and knowledge. The sites and places “of heritage” and the expert that organise it work as “heritage experiences” not as heritage themself. All heritage is intangible → places or things are not inherently carriers of meaning, what makes them heritage are the cultural activities around them. → the act itself of recognizing and protecting them is a constitutive cultural process of heritage (it is not a consequence of the site benign heritage already). On one side → heritage is about the promotion of consensus. On another → the tool used to challenge and redefine values and identities. Heritage is an act of negotiation → it is a discourse through which also the way we act and the knowledge is constructed is organized. Western discourse about heritage = authorized heritage discourse → privileges professional discourse and its material manifestation but there’s also a range of popular discourses and practices that may even challenge the dominant discourse. Consensual heritage narratives about national identity were challenged by diversity of community identity claims → heritage debate began to recognise and engage with the issue of dissonance and the use of memory in shaping heritage and identity. Re-evaluation of the tourist as more mindful and critique of the non-Western or Indigenous to the dominant narrative challenged the emphasis placed on the idea of material authenticity → idea of heritage considered through an analysis of the consequence this idea has in people’s life. Heritage is also a political process through which a range of struggles are negotiated. 4. Van Huis - Dissonant Heritages Analyzing both institutions and the embodied experiences of individuals, which are the constituents of heritages, memories and identities. 2 projects: (1) EUROHERIT and (2) BABE (1) EU’s heritage politics and politics. Analyses from the point of view of institutional actors and practices resulting in the creation of top-down identities, a subject position and a common belonging among Europeans. (2) Focuses on global mobility and scrutinises heritage and memory through cultural products and memory across borders. Its centre are subjective narrations and the impact that intercultural exchange and contact have on people’s narrations. Post-Cold War Europe (1990s) saw the 3rd wave of European integration in which Europeanisation became even more crucial. The 2004-07 enlargement of the EU (with the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention) highlighted the strict relationship b/t European integration and restrictive migration policies. To be pointed out is also the securitisation of European external borders (Fortress Europe) legitimised through racialized notions of Europe rooted in hierarchical ideas of identity produced in colonial modernity. Double role of memory: 1. Claim of recognition and empowerment by marginalized groups. 2. Part of the power (knowledge) regimes that define exclusion/inclusion. —> memory practices “from below” need to be accompanied by radical changes “from above” to achieve their full potential. Ambitions of materialising remembrance always involved materialising identity —> through the assumption of isomorphic territory, social formation, mentalities and memories. —> no more the idea of “container culture” but still, borders constantly recompose themselves with the crisis of the nation state. “Memory and heritage as battlefields of border-making and border-crossing, constituted first and foremost by regimes of practices”. - Border (verb) = interplay b/t social ordering and memory making, the practice of disseminating borders both in physical and socio-political space with a strict relationship with politics of belonging. Memory-Heritage: - Memory: process where individual and collective mingle. Localised within a framework of socio-cultural practices and perceived within socio-cultural settings defined by specific resources (asymmetrically accessible). Brockmeier : memories are “trans-individual” cultural creations which are made sense of through stories and are often materialised. The materiality of them is embedded in explanatory and interpretative discourses with a pivotal role of narratives. - Heritage: an act of communication, a cultural process, and a performance dealing with the assertion and mediation of historical narratives and collective memories, and the values that underpin these. It emerges only when something is narrated or treated as heritage in the right sociocultural context. Heritage dissonance (by Kisić) = intrinsic quality of all heritages that does not pose a problem in itself but includes a tension (and quality) that testifies to the play among different discourses, and open space to different actions. The power of heritage,memory and belonging is in their ability to produce reality. Narratives: connect past and present + connect the self and the world. Dissonant Heritage in Europe: analysing the European Heritage Label awarded sites/cultural goods can be found both dissonance and domestication of the European past. Sites of dissonance (i.e. refugees camps...) show how dissonant can be heritage for marginalised groups. Dissonance is also a means to show the intangibility of heritage, especially on nationalistic narratives. (i.e. Smith’s authorised heritage). Dissonance strongly felt and publicly demonstrated —> bottom-up moments of re-scrutinisation of heritage and narratives in the majority of the population and even institutions.(i.e. the overcoming of “white innocence” in colonialism). Dissonances represent the non-linear way in which circuits of influence work in our globalised present. ECS: Contemporary challenges Bauman - The Age of Nostalgia Angelus Novus by Paul Klee → the exchange b/t past and future of the respective vices and virtues. The future is now in debit, while the past in credit. Boym → nostalgia = a sense of loss and displacement, but is also a romance with one’s fantasy. The 20th century began with the futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia. → it is a defense mechanism for the accelerated rhythms and upheaval of life and history. → the restorative variety is used by nationalists. → part of the inevitable set of affections present since the world has been discovered to be a matter of choice. In the modern era the Moronian Utopia was abandoned in favour of an individualised and privatised research of happiness.There’s no-more such a thing as a topos to reach where to be happy. The modern man is now free from constraint, but this new condition blessing came mixed with a new matter of fear: risks. The progress exchanges its role with retrogression because men see now the future as the horror of inadequacy, retrotopias took the stage. Solana → EU as an example of retrotopia both for the nationalists tendencies both for the attempt to apply yesterday’s policy to today’s problems. retortopia is derivative of the negation of utopia’s negation → it is fixed on a topos but substitutes the “ultimate perfection” with the assumption of the endemic dynamism of the order it promotes. Derives its stimuli from the hope of reconciling security with freedom. Attempt of iteration of the status quo ante existing or IMAGINED to have been existing before the second negation. (e.g the French Revolution led to the creation and idealisation of the Ancien Regime) → the hope is not to return to the past as such but rather to the imagined past. 2. Eliott - The Origins of AI A general social theory of the interconnections b/t AI, complex digital systems and the coactive interactions of human-machine interface. → = social impact, unequal power and stocks of cultural knowledge. - What is AI? The term “artificial intelligence” was coined at the 1956 Dartmouth Summer Research Project by McCarthy & co. = try to achieve the simulation of advanced human cognitive performance in particular, and the replication of the higher functions of the human brain. The American 50s were the age of “new is better”, of the idea that nature as an external phenomenon came to an “end” → the use of “artificial” wouldn’t probably be used today. Many definition of AI: 1. the comparison with human intelligence → there’s no common definition of human intelligence or an accurate way to measure it in all its facets. 2. the (too) high level of abstraction → indifferent to different forms of intelligence, the human business of emotions, interpersonal bonds and even the relationship with the human body. 3. Ai as a monolith → doesn’t differentiate b/t - narrow (or weak) AI → can do only what it is programmed to do; - artificial general intelligence (or Deep Ai) → self-learning machines seeking to replicate human intelligence. - superintelligence → non-existing full replication of human intelligence. AI isn’t a new idea, we can find “prehistoric” traces of it in the Greek myth of Talos of Crete or the Mesopotiamian invention of automatic doors by Ismail Ibn. Also Aristoteles wrote of “artificial slaves” in his Politics. In the early modern period in Europe the automatons are still in the realm of dreams but a form of cooperation with the scientific method is found in calculation and mechanics. In the Modern era reality is shaped through automatons, cyborgs and androids (Frankestein or R.U.R by Capek). It is at the dawn of the 20th century that this dream entered the empirical field with the invention by Fischer and Harris of the tide-predicting mechanical computer (Old Brass Brain). 1950s Uk, Alan Turing “Can Machine Think?” → Turing Test: to pass it, a machine should be able to produce a conversation that could not be distinguished by a human judge from a real human one. Dreyfus “What Computer Can’t Do” → computers lack the human ability to understand context or grasp situated meaning. Searle → deriving from Wittgenstein’s demonstration that what gives ordinary language its precision is its use in context → Chinese Room Argument: A person who doesn’t understand Chinese sits in a room with a set of instructions to match Chinese symbols.By following the rules, the person can produce responses in Chinese that seem meaningful to an outsider. Even if the Turing Test is passed, he doesn’t understand a word of Chinese. → AI can mirror human intelligence but is not able to constantly connect words and talk within practical contexts of action. - Frontiers of AI: Global Transformations, Everyday Life. AI (also as) → the transformation and transcendence of human capabilities from natural, inborn and inherited determinations of the biological and and biographical realm. AI is a galaxy-wide (Schneider) movement, extraterritorial and (almost for sure) more durable than the human experience. It is both a condition and a consequence of globalisation. → it depends on how globalisation is seen: - Some say it is solely an economic phenomenon → AI is simply an upshot of the corporate activities of big companies. - Some others, globalisation = americanisation → AI is the tool of powerful actors to accomplish this task, in fact it was largely promoted and funded by the American Government. → it is crucial to understand the relationship b/t techno-industrialisation of war and the flow of AI techs to grasp the globalisation of AI. —> AI directly sprang from the challenges the West had to face in the Cold War: 1. Sputnik 1 and 2 led the USA to increase dramatically the fund spending in research and technology. 2. New research funding in AI by CIA, National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense. 3. Attempt to have USA first on the moon + Licklider’s projects leading to ARPANET, the precursor of the Internet and WWW. - Complex System, Intelligent Automation and Surveillance AI develops in terms of interdependent complex systems, at once robust and fragile. It stabilizes socio-technical systems on one hand, and makes others disappear on the other hand. To understand the power interests realised in/through AI, the complex systems have to be understood, the major includes: 1. the scale,scope and extensity of AI 2. the intricate interplay of “new” and “old” technologies. 3. the Globalisation of AI. 4. Diffusion of AI (institution and every-day life). 5. the socio-technological trend towards complexity. 6. AI tech into lifestyle change. 7. Transformation of power as a result of AI and surveillance. The precision control (or controlled precision) of AI won’t be reached [Gleick] because of the dramatic impact that even the smallest variation on measurement may have (butterfly effect). What we see are the algorithmic cascades: a never-ending process whereby the consequences of human-machine interactions spread quickly. → AI-driven change is non-linear, uncertain. The change is both individual and cultural → there is both an “automated life” and an “automated society”. On the positive side of this new asset we have the healthcare and education improvements for example. The surveillance aspect, consisting both of collecting data and codification of them, raises critiques for the respect of human rights. → a new Panopticon (concept by Bentham, constant surveillance where the supervisor is not seen)? or rather disorganized surveillance that derives from the nets of data created by the users’ activity. 3. Binczyk - Unique Discussion Anthropocene = epoch of man, Homo sapiens has become a force of geological consequence. This idea leads to a confrontation of 2 dramatically dissimilar timeframes. → the acceptance of the Anthropocene would be unprecedented in the field of geology. It coincides with the so-called Great Acceleration (since 1950) and the collective activity of humans have undeniably generated long-term geological effects. Chakrabarty argues that the introduction of the Anthropocene would need a redefinition of history → in terms of post-history or geo-history, facts are no longer isolated from their planetary context. The planet Earth may turn to be uninhabitable to humans → complicates the linear understanding of time (past-present-future) since there’s no longer future perspective. Jeopardisation of the planet and its species’ stability. The agency of the species Homo sapiens is evaluated also in a cosmic scope, having caused changes that may be comparable to that of fluctuations in Earth’s orbit. Paradox: Homo sapiens process the environment but is at the same time part of the environment, subject to planetary metabolism. Philosophical shift in the definition of freedom: ability to withstand natural force → collective form of planetary responsibility, multi-species eco-justice. + The men’s hyperagency is not only a symbol of power, but also of helplessness and futility in front of the magnitude of the environmental crisis. → the Earth seen as the uncontrollable Other. Anthropocene as a unique epoch of irreversible losses for the non-human element of the world → Paradox: The imminent shrinking of the humans’ possibilities at the same time makes every action or decision (or non-action/non-decision) unprecedentedly vital. Eschatological (secular) dimension: the ideas of unprecedented changes, inevitability, of loss of control endangers apocalyptic connotations. → it is of course too late for precaution, but it is time for damage control. The rhetoric power of the Anthropocen may help get out of the marasmus of pro-environmental policies, with: (1) integrated vision of the planetary system. (2) the admission of the risk of losing the future of humanity. (3) the idea of planetary us, no delay in politics. 4. Machin and Meidert - Political Identification in Europe Introduction: Crisis as a Turning Point The term "crisis" originates from the Greek word "krisis," denoting both decisive moments and life-determining choices. Crisis often symbolizes a pivotal moment that provokes structural reorganization or exposes dominant narratives and values. Masco critiques modern governance for using crisis narratives to uphold the status quo, diminishing its mobilizing potential. European Crises and Identity Europe has faced manifold crises in recent years: financial, refugee, democratic, institutional, inequality, climate, and pandemic crises. Questions arise about whether these crises stem from a single root cause or merely reflect socio-ecological instability. Crises can either paralyze or provoke transformation, creating opportunities to redefine European identity and "us vs. them" boundaries. Historical Perspectives Outhwaite explores the history of European integration, noting its crisis-driven evolution. Crises from post-war reconstruction to Brexit have shaped European identity and integration. The EU’s “crisis of integration” paradoxically stems from its success in unifying diverse nations. Migration and Identity Migration crises highlight tensions between European values and securitization practices. Fotou argues that migration management threatens European identity by contradicting its core humanitarian ideals. Populism and Emotional Politics Populist movements exploit crises to draw sharp distinctions between "us" and "them." Emotional appeals, as discussed by Bartoszewicz and Giannousi, play a critical role in shaping collective identities. Emerging Themes Schröder identifies citizen-led protests (e.g., Anti-TTIP) as moments where European identity emerges from grassroots movements. The Spitzenkandidat process represents a top-down effort to instill a European identity via democratic participation. Conclusion Crises, real or perceived, are moments of opportunity to rethink collective identity. The book emphasizes the need for critical reflection on Europe’s responses to crises, urging a balance between transformative potential and existing power structures. ECS: Colonialism 1. Said - Orientalism Orientalism = (1) a way of coming to terms with the Orient’s special place in European Western experience. (2) a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction b/t the Orient and the Occident. (3) as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (Mainly of a British and French cultural enterprise) Disraeli’s Tancred describes the Orient as a mere career for young Western, found to be an all-consuming passion. The Orient was Orientalised not only because it was found different, but specifically as a mean of domination. Orientalism is not simply a mass of lies, it is a structurally created field of knowledge filtered through the lens of Western thought. —> an hegemonic (Gramsci) idea dividing us Europeans (Hay) from the “inferior” Orient. Genuine scholarship such as de Sascy’s Chrestomathie arabe or Lane’s Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians. Also racial ideas such as Renan’s and Gobineau’s. To avoid distortion and inaccuracy, 3 aspects of contemporary reality: 1. The distinction b/t pure and political knowledge: the work of a humanist should be non-political even if it’s hard to detach the scholar from the circumstances of life. Knowledge is not automatically non-political. Knowledge is produced in a political scenario that influences it and the civil society involvement in it is directly correlated to the impact it can have on power. Orientalism is a distribution of geopolitical awareness into all fields of knowledge, an elaboration based on interests created and maintained (and not only on a geographical distinction), it is a discourse shaped (to a degree) by the exchange with power structures. —> the gap b/t the superstructural and the base level in scholarship is being voluntarily kept open, especially on Orientalism. —> studying the hegemonic ideas’ products is crucial to understand how the biased views of Orientalism were the product of a structural issue. 2. The methodological question: finding a proper starting point and cutting out part of the material. —> in this specific case, the frame is the British-French-American deal with the Arabs and Islam. 3. The personal dimension: the author, as an Oriental in Western world (Egyptian-Palestinian in America), tries to create the “inventory” Gramsci suggested to achieve taking advantage of eachone’s personal history. 2. Sartre - Preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth - Golden Age: the European colonists undertook to manufacture a native elite. A process of whitewashing building nothing more than echoing people. - New generation (before ‘39): cultural awareness starting to spread among natives (you are making us into monstrosities...), the European thought to let it flow as nothing but talks, without any form of recognition of integration or equality. It was seen nearly as a success, from an educational point of view, to have Greco-Romanised them. It was like when you teach a parrot to repeat some words, maybe even some insults, you are satisfied with that, you know it just repeats and talks with no clue on what it’s saying. You wouldn’t be so happy if one day the parrot was to tell you that it’s tired to be in a cage and started pecking the cage lock to break it. - 1961: the attitude is changed, Fanon talks about Europe as “done for”, the Third World speaks no more to the colonisers, it speaks to itself taking Europe as an object of discussion. Fenton doesn’t even spend time in condemning the atrocities perpetrated by them, it just underlines these actions as symptoms. The union of natives of undeveloped countries is called, and a revolution, if meant to be successful, has to be socialist, not to fall under the imperialist-fashion government of the native bourgeoisie (created, like all the other divisions within society as well, by the Europeans themselves). Fanon’s book is not for the European, it is a manifesto for the Third World to take advantage of the Cold War paralysis to get “into universality” for the first time. So, why should Europeans read it? 1. Fanon shows his brothers the mechanism by which we are estranged from ourselves. It will make the (European) leader ashamed, and as Marx said, is a revolutionary sentiment. 2. Aside from the fascist Sorel, Fanon is the first after Engels to identify the liberal hypocritical violent dialectic of History. What settlers try to do is dehumanise the locals. But they can’t genocide them or bring them to the status of animal, not because it is impossible but because the need them as slave. This half-achieved process of dehumanisation produces the native and, one day, the chance for decolonisation. The European see the process of “domestication of inferior races” as an attempt to cancel the native’s instinct for violence. They forget that “we only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of us” and they ignore that they are not bringing natives to submission but to a contradiction that Europeans will pay sooner or later. In the first phase of rebellion, the half natives will face terror: not only terror for the cruel repression, but also for their own fury which is not their violence but it’s our which just turns back. Colonisation both leads the colonised to fight against their own brothers and to religious estrangement to escape from colonial estrangement. The result is nothing but a combination of the two creating a dissociated self,a nervous condition that is introduced and maintained by the settlers with the colonized’s consent. When life is to be feared more than death, a third phase violence takes place: the absolute revolt against the settler. The liberal are surprised, the Left sets limits over which stops supporting the rebels, but this fight doesn’t need any form of legitimation. Fanon says it is the process of a man recreating himself. Violence is the only means of freedom, killing a settler means both to eliminate the oppressor and create a free man (the ex-native), all the barriers fall (including the Tribal ones, created and sustained by colonisers). Organisation is seeked and politica, military and social needs can’t be divided. The new society has to be socialist and the new man moves even beyond the building of humanity, it fights putting forward a better future than his own individual life. — here Fanon stops. Sartre says the non-violence would be a solution only if violence was to start this evening. Being the current condition a result of thousands-years of violence, the non-violent approach is just a passive way to set you in the aggressors’ side. “One day our human kind becomes full-grown, it will not define itself as the sum total of the whole world's inhabitants, but as the infinite unity of their mutual needs.” 3. Dabashi - Can Non-European Think ? A previous Dabashi article with the same title as the book. —> the book wants to be a Declaration of Independence both from postcoloniality and the exhausted historically occasioned epistemics. —> European philosophers such as Zabala and then Mardar responded to Dabashi’s article feeling accused of Eurocentrism, even feeling offended. This was a sort of a defense against the colored boy, a clear demonstration that Europeans were not able to look beyond their European nose. Dabashi wasn’t referring neither to hegemonic or counter-hegemonic ideas in Europe, he was trying to map a new topography of the world in the way of thinking and scholarship. Mignolo and Niga, postcolonial thinkers as Dabashi provided a more accurate and less partial response to the articolo —> that shows that the hegemonic position of the European had provincialised them in the attempt of becoming universal and viceversa for the colonised. The European “can’t read” because they are assimilating what they read back into snare and into what they already know. They are thus incapable of projecting forward into something they might be able to learn. The postcolonial register (militant Islamism, Third World Socialism...) has exhausted itself. The world, and specifically the Arab and Muslim world, is changing and so is the set of ideas. The Europeans tend to exercise the philosophical practice with the particular European set of structures and knowledge they have, just talismaising non-Western thinkers (just as Zizek does with Fanon) as a proof of philosophical inclusion. But the non-Europeans (defined so by Europeans themselves) are claiming a space in the world which is hegemonically occupied by Europeans that are to blind to see the new wave coming. Europe is dead. Long live Europeans. Islam invented in their Orientalism is dead. Long live Muslims. The Orient and the Third World created to be dominated have disappeared. Now it is the people that have to decolonise their mind. —> and the Europeans cannot read this postcolonial setting. It is the idea of Europe that is more dispensable and the new course after post-coloniality includes all the defranished people by the global operation of capital. Orientalism then and now Dabashi criticised the New York Times journalist Kritsof, due to a series of cliché-ridden pieces about Iran after a quick visit. —> Israeli journalist Frantzman accused Dabashi of abusing the term Orientalism, and warned of the danger of reducing the right to talk about a certain affair only to people who are involved in it. —> Dabashi recognises the abusive use of the term but rejects the idea of exclusivism. Orientalism as a critique to a knowledge-production system needs to be used and updated theoretically. Knowledge and power The European should start philosophising with the Other and no longer Philosophise the Other. Orientalism has by now dissolved in endosmosis = knowledge no longer predicated on any enduring episteme. —> post 9/11 condition is an example, a condition in which the aggressive formation of a field of public knowledge against Muslims is no longer conducive to the reversed formation of a sovereign and all-knowing subject. —> knowledge from think tanks percolates into the public domain, conducive to various modes of disposable knowledge production. —> it is “fast knowledge” produced on the model of “fast food” with no epistemic consistency. Generally produced by partisan think tanks that favour ideological congruence rather than competence. —> Weber talks of a typical “nullity” in the capitalist modern era. The battles are both in streets and squares but also against the new regime du savoir. A new political language will emerge as much from the new political alliances as form a larger frame of epistemic references. Power is Power The rejection and abuse of Orientalism are perpetrated by Zionists and Islamists with the same purpose> enforce the link of knowledge/power. —> remapping the world as Third World implosion make its invention, the West, diasppear.

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